N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary purposefully creates a continuing relationship through substantial contacts with a New York resident, even if the nondomiciliary never enters the state.

Grimaldi v. Guinn · filed 2010-02-09(a)(1)

Notwithstanding the foregoing, based on the totality of the circumstances ... in light of the number, nature, and timing of all of the contacts involved, including the numerous telephone, fax, e-mail, and other written communications with the plaintiff in New York that Guinn initiated subsequent to his initial involvement in the project, as well as the manner in which Guinn employed his decidedly passive Web site for commercial access, Guinn must be deemed to have sufficient contacts with this state.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose purposeful New York business activity is substantially related to the claim, even if the defendant never entered the state.

Kaprall v. We: Women's Entertainment, LLC · filed 2010-06-22(a)(1)

New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who “transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state” (CPLR 302 [a] [1]), even where that defendant has never physically entered the state (see Parke-Bernet Galleries v Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13, 17 [1970]), “so long as the defendant’s activities here were purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted” (Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 467 [1988]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction when a nondomiciliary transacts business in New York and the claim substantially relates to that business; factual disputes on those points can preclude summary judgment.

Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v. Sirtech Canada, Ltd. · filed 2010-12-16(a)(1)

Once the plaintiff establishes purposeful activities in the state that bear a substantial relationship to the claim asserted, “CPLR 302 (a) (1) jurisdiction is proper even [if] the defendant never enters New York” (Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375, 380 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... While this evidence established Sirotek’s prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, we conclude that plaintiff raised triable issues of fact in opposition, warranting the denial of Sirotek’s motion.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary when the defendant transacts business in New York and the claim arises from that transaction.

Andrews v. Modell · filed 2011-05-10(a)(1)

Pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1), “long-arm jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary exists where (i) a defendant transacted business within the state and (ii) the cause of action arose from that transaction of business” (Johnson v Ward, 4 NY3d 516, 519 [2005]; see CPLR 302 [a] [1]).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary that contracts to deliver goods into New York; delinquent customer accounts delivered to a buyer in New York can satisfy that rule.

LHR, INC. v. T-MOBILE USA, INC. · filed 2011-10-07(a)(1)

We agree with the court that, under the circumstances of this case, SunCom’s sales to plaintiff of delinquent customer accounts (hereafter, accounts) render it subject to the court’s jurisdiction (see generally People v Concert Connection, 211 AD2d 310, 315, appeal dismissed 86 NY2d 837).

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary insurer that contracts outside New York to insure risks in New York, upon a prima facie showing.

CONSTANTINE, M.D., JEFFREY v. STELLA MARIS INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD · filed 2012-07-06(a)(1)

We nevertheless conclude that plaintiff made a prima facie showing that SMI contracted in the Cayman Islands to provide services in New York (see CPLR 302 [a] [1]), and thus that the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate (see Insurance Co. of N. Am. v Pyramid Ins. Co. of Bermuda Ltd., 1994 WL 88754, *2 [SD NY]; see generally Armada Supply Inc. v Wright, 858 F2d 842, 849 [2d Cir 1988]; Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v Harel Ins. Co. Ltd., 2011 WL 3480948, *2 [SD NY]; Caronia, 999 F Supp at 300-301).

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside New York to provide financial services in New York when the claim arises from that contract.

Summit Construction Services Group, Inc. v. ACT Abatement, LLC · filed 2011-12-16(a)(1)

Giving consideration to the legislative intention, this court, like the Second Circuit before it, sees no reason to conclude that financial services are to be excluded from the types of services within the ambit of CPLR 302 (a) (1). This court concludes that a nondomiciliary who contracts outside of New York to supply financial services in New York may be subjected to jurisdiction in New York where the cause of action arises out of the contract.

Section 302(a)(1) does not provide jurisdiction based on a contract to supply services in New York unless a contract with the defendant is sufficiently alleged.

Mercator Corp. v. Windhorst · filed 2016-02-10(a)(1)

Because the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a contract with these defendants, there is no personal jurisdiction over these defendants.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based solely on the incidental mailing of documents to New York.

Gliklad v. Deripaska · filed 2017-04-25(a)(1)

The mere mailing of documents from London to New York without more is insufficient to constitute that Deripaska contracted to supply goods or services in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdiction over a foreign insurer that contracts to cover goods bound for New York when a breach claim arises from that contract, even if the goods never arrive.

Federico and Company LLC v. Zurich General Insurance Malaysia Berhad · filed 2023-10-10(a)(1)

The “contracts anywhere” requirement of CPLR 302(a)(1) is satisfied with respect to M&W’s claims related to the NY Certificates. ... It should therefore come as no surprise that any alleged breach of the NY Certificates would be claimed upon in New York, even if the Insured Cargo was lost prior to its arrival in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from a contract to supply goods in New York.

Watson v. Second Bite Foods, Inc. · filed 2023-11-13(a)(1)

The action arises from the defendants’ contracts with Daily Harvest, whose principal place of business is in New York, to make and supply ingredients to Daily Harvest in New York. ... That satisfies the requirements for specific jurisdiction under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a contract to supply services in New York when the service at issue was to occur in Lebanon.

Raad v. Bank Audi S.A.L. · filed 2024-03-05(a)(1)

This prong of CPLR 302(a)(1) is inapplicable here, where the service at issue in this action—i.e., the transfer of funds—allegedly was to—and failed to—happen in Lebanon.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when the claim arises from a contract to supply goods in New York.

La Saltena S.A.U. v. Ercomar Imports Internacional Corp. · filed 2024-05-22(a)(1)

Therefore, as Judge Bloom found in her order on the motion to transfer venue, the Court also finds that Defendant contracted to receive and supply goods within New York and is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction based on a non-domiciliary’s New York business transactions or a contract to supply services in New York; neither basis was established here.

Mamo v. Integrated Indus. Contr., LLC · filed 2024-09-30(a)(1)

Specific jurisdiction, or long arm jurisdiction by virtue of CPLR 302 has also not been established. There is no evidence that any of those defendants "transacted business" in New York or contracted to perform any services within New York.

Section 302(a)(1) does not treat a foreign bank’s agreement to transfer funds held abroad to New York as a contract to supply services in New York.

Raad v. Bank Audi S.A.L. · filed 2025-04-28(a)(1)

We disagree. Contrary to the Raads’ contention, the services Bank Audi contracted to provide in connection with a hypothetical overseas transfer of funds located in Lebanon do not occur “in” New York.

A guaranty requiring payments in New York counts as a contract to supply services in the state under § 302(a)(1).

CHASE MANHATTAN SERVICE CORPORATION v. National Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-06-24(a)(1)

On the other hand, New York courts that have been directly presented with the issue of the sufficiency of a guaranty as the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the guarantor, have held that providing a guaranty — where the payments are to be made in New York — constitutes “supplying] goods or services in the state” under CPLR § 302(a)(1). ... Nevertheless, this application of CPLR § 302(a)(1) must also comport with the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause. ... For the reasons set forth above, defendant NBS/Canada’s motion to dismiss the action against it for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied, and plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment against defendant NBS/Delaware is granted.

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a paternity proceeding based solely on the child’s birth in New York, without minimum contact by the respondent with the State.

O'Neill v. D.J.J. · filed 1995-12-28(b)

The mere birth of a child in New York, absent some minimum contact by the respondent with the State of New York, is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over such a nonresident respondent.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident mother in a putative father’s paternity action seeking support when her duty to support the child already exists.

Gordon J. Y. v. Erin L. M. · filed 1984-06-18(b)

She is the natural mother and the duty to support has existed since the birth of the child (Family Ct Act, § 413). This fact, coupled with the tenor of the current statute governing jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries (CPLR 302, subd [b]), does not preclude the petitioner from proceeding to establish paternity in this court.

Section 302(b) does not provide personal jurisdiction in a paternity proceeding before an obligation to pay child support exists.

Pamela P. v. Ray J. · filed 1980-11-03(b)

The court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over respondent is not based on the long-arm statute, CPLR 302 (subd [b]), there being, as yet, no obligation to pay child support.

Section 302(b) does not confer personal jurisdiction in a paternity proceeding until a fact-finding hearing establishes paternity and the support obligation.

Anonymous v. Anonymous · filed 1980-05-30(b)

In personam jurisdiction in a paternity proceeding cannot be acquired pursuant to CPLR 302 (subd [b]) until the status and obligation have been decided at a fact-finding hearing.

Section 302(b)’s support-obligation proviso cannot supply personal jurisdiction in a paternity proceeding before the parental tie has been determined to exist.

Nilsa B.B. v. Blackwell · filed 1981-12-31(b)

Our conclusion that an “obligation to pay support” has not “accrued” in a paternity case, within the meaning of CPLR 302 (subd [b]), at least until the parental tie has been determined to exist, is also supported when the relevant language of the proviso at issue is considered in the context of CPLR 302 (subd [b]) as a whole.

Section 302(b) permits personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent in a paternity proceeding only if the respondent formerly resided or was domiciled in New York.

Shirley D. v. Carl D. · filed 1996-10-15(b)

We cannot find, on the strength of this vague and unsubstantiated allegation, that the petitioner has established that the respondent is a former resident or domiciliary of New York such that the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (b) would be proper.

When jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) rests on a defendant’s New York transaction with the plaintiff, visits after the alleged breach are irrelevant to jurisdiction as framed by the plaintiff.

Petty v. Oy · filed 1984-06-28(a)(1)

Since jurisdiction is based on Myllykoski’s transaction of business with plaintiff in New York in this matter, August, 1977 should serve as a terminus insofar as plaintiff’s inquiries into said defendant’s visits to New York are concerned. Any inquiry as to Myllykoski’s visits to New York after that time is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, as framed by plaintiff.

Sharply conflicting affidavits about whether a foreign parent is subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1) require a jurisdictional hearing.

Shea v. Hambro America Inc. · filed 1994-01-06(a)(1)

Finally, the IAS Court did not err in directing a reference as to whether the complaint should be dismissed as against defendant Hambros PLC, the parent company of defendant Hambro America Incorporated and a holding company organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, for lack of jurisdiction, because the sharply conflicting affidavits submitted by the parties with respect to whether Hambros PLC is subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) (1) for "doing business” in New York (see, Frummer v Hilton Hotels Intl., 19 NY2d 533) and whether the parent-subsidiary relationship between Hambros PLC and Hambro America Incorporated was sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign parent (see, Taca Intl. Airlines v Rolls-Royce of England, 15 NY2d 97), required a jurisdictional hearing (see, Cato Show Print. Co. v Lee, 84 AD2d 947, 949).

When the record is inadequate to resolve jurisdiction under CPLR 302, the court may order discovery on that issue.

Samsung America, Inc. v. GS Industries Inc. · filed 1998-05-05

We find that the present record is inadequate to determine the jurisdictional issues under New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302) and we remand for discovery on that issue.

Under § 302(a)(1), a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing purposeful New York activity related to the claim can survive a motion to dismiss and obtain jurisdictional discovery.

Gottlieb v. Merrigan · filed 2014-07-03(a)(1)

Although defendants submitted an affidavit asserting that their communications in the workers’ compensation case were “limited” and they maintain that the case was handled by Swanson’s separate New York counsel, we conclude that plaintiff has made an adequate showing of defendants’ involvement to survive a motion to dismiss.

Section 302(a)(2) permits jurisdictional discovery to determine whether a non-domiciliary committed a tort in New York, personally or through an agent.

International Diamond Importers, Inc. v. Oriental Gemco (N.Y.), Inc. · filed 2014-11-24(a)(2)

On the facts alleged, the Court cannot determine if there is specific jurisdiction over Foreign Defendants. Jurisdictional discovery is granted to determine if Plaintiff has met its burden to establish specific jurisdiction.

Allegations linking a New York correspondent account to a currency exchange involving the plaintiff’s funds can make a sufficient start toward showing personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).

PD Cargo, CA v. Paten International SA · filed 2017-04-13(a)(1)

Plaintiff’s allegations that Paten used a correspondent account in New York to run a “blue dollar” currency exchange operation, and that defendant vendor Lácteos CDS directed plaintiff’s funds to Paten’s account because Lácteos CDS is a customer of the blue dollar operation, made out a sufficient start in demonstrating personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302 (a) (1).

A party that raises triable issues of fact about personal jurisdiction under section 302(a)(3)(ii) is entitled to discovery on that issue.

Mileski v. MSC Indus. Direct Co., Inc. · filed 2018-03-07(a)(3)(ii)

Moreover, upon converting that branch of Buffalo's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction into a summary judgment motion, the Supreme Court properly denied the motion on the ground that MSC raised triable issues of fact as to whether MSC could assert personal jurisdiction over Buffalo under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) and properly found that MSC was entitled to discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction ( see Venegas v Capric Clinic , 147 AD3d 457; cf. Okeke v Momah , 132 AD3d 648).

Under § 302(a)(3), evidence of New York sales and a product’s foreseeable use in New York can provide a sufficient start to warrant discovery into personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary.

Archer-Vail v. LHV Precast Inc. · filed 2019-01-17(a)(3)

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, we agree with Supreme Court that the foregoing provided the "sufficient start" required to warrant further discovery on the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be properly exercised over Spillman under CPLR 302 (a) (3), while also comporting with federal due process requirements ( Peterson v Spartan Indus. , 33 NY2d at 467; see Expert Sewer & Drain, LLC v New England Mun. Equip. Co., Inc. , 106 AD3d 775, 776 [2013]; cf. Bunkoff Gen. Contrs. v State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. , 296 AD2d at 700-701).

Section 302(a)(2) supplies a basis for personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, while section 302(a)(3)(ii) makes international revenue and marketing relevant to asserting personal jurisdiction.

Starr Russia Invs. III B v. v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd. · filed 2020-07-16(a)(2)

Similarly, because we found jurisdiction over ZAO based on CPLR 302(a)(2) and potential alter ego jurisdiction over the UK Deloitte defendants, plaintiff is not entitled to [*2]documents about their international revenue and marketing, which would only be relevant if it were trying to assert personal jurisdiction over them pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii).

Allegations that a manufacturer knowingly supplied products through a distribution stream reaching New York and received substantial revenue from it can suggest a basis for jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3) sufficient to permit jurisdictional discovery.

Piotrowicz v. Techtronic Industries North America, Inc. · filed 2021-04-30(a)(3)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding P&F’s role in the design, manufacture, and distribution of the Saw itself or components thereof, and P&F’s knowledge that it was participating in and receiving substantial revenue from a stream of commerce that reached New York customers, are adequate at this stage to suggest a basis for this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over P&F under CPLR § 302(a)(3) and consistent with due process.

Section 302(a) permits targeted jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff alleges relevant New York contacts but lacks facts needed to determine whether long-arm jurisdiction exists.

Vega v. Hastens Beds, Inc. · filed 2021-08-28(a)

However, there are other facts, not in the control of Plaintiff, that may be necessary to determine if New York law permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Hastens AB and/or Hastens Ltd. under CPLR 302(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff is granted leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery regarding whether Hastens AB and/or Hastens Ltd. transact business within New York, regularly do or solicit business within New York, or derive substantial revenue from either interstate or international commerce or goods used or consumed in New York.

Section 302(a)(1) permits jurisdictional discovery and denial of a motion to dismiss with leave to renew when the plaintiff makes a sufficient start in showing personal jurisdiction.

SPCH Multifamily Credit Ops 1 LLC v. Construction Mgt. & Dev.-Cal., LLC · filed 2025-04-17(a)(1)

When a party makes a sufficient start in demonstrating personal jurisdiction, as Plaintiff has here, denial of the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction with leave to renew upon completion of jurisdictional discovery is proper.

A plaintiff who makes a sufficient start showing that jurisdiction may exist under CPLR 302(a)(1) or (3) is entitled to jurisdictional discovery before the claim is dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Salter v. Meta Platforms, Inc. · filed 2025-06-27(a)(1), (a)(3)

Plaintiffs now appeal from an order granting the motion, and we conclude that plaintiffs are entitled to jurisdictional discovery before it can be determined whether dismissal is warranted ( see Williams v Beemiller, Inc. , 100 AD3d 143, 152 [4th Dept 2012], amended on rearg 103 AD3d 1191 [4th Dept 2013]).

Under CPLR 302(a)(1), a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing personal jurisdiction may obtain jurisdictional discovery even when the record does not yet establish jurisdiction.

Biswas v. Aramis Distribs. N.Y., Inc. · filed 2025-12-09(a)(1)

Although the record here does not warrant an affirmative finding of personal jurisdiction over defendants under the long-arm statute, plaintiffs have made the "sufficient start" necessary for jurisdictional discovery to go forward ( see Bangladesh Bank v Rizal Commercial Banking Corp ., 226 AD3d 60, 74 [1st Dept 2024]; Matter of James v iFinex Inc ., 185 AD3d 22, 30 [1st Dept 2020]).

Section 302(a)(1) and (2) provide grounds for specific personal jurisdiction based on New York business transactions or tortious acts in the state; a plaintiff who makes a sufficient start toward showing jurisdiction may obtain discovery before dismissal is decided.

Davenport v. Lumibao · filed 2026-03-02(a)(1), (a)(2)

The court concludes that, by submitting evidence that, although the plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing that IWCNJ is subject to jurisdiction in New York, she set forth a “sufficient start” by showing that her contention that New York has jurisdiction over IWCNJ is not frivolous, inasmuch as (a) IWCNJ and IWCNY share at least one officer and one office and, thus, may be so intertwined that they may be considered one entity for the purposes of imposing tort liability, (b) the court might be able to assert specific in personam jurisdiction over IWCNJ pursuant to the “transacting business” provisions of CPLR 302(a)(1) consonant with due process considerations since there is a factual question as to whether it has permanent presence in New York, and (c) there are factual questions as to ... whether IWCNJ may have negligently rendered medical care to her ward in New York that would subject it to specific in personam jurisdiction by virtue of committing a tortious act in the state within the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(2), or by virtue of its dominion and control over IWCNY at a time when IWCNY allegedly committed a tortious act in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an objective showing that a reasonably prudent nondomiciliary should have expected its tortious act to have consequences in New York.

Murdock v. Arenson International USA, Inc. · filed 1990-05-08(a)(3)(ii)

On this issue, the courts have adopted an "objective” test of foreseeability, pursuant to which it must be established that a reasonably prudent non-domiciliary should have expected the tortious act to have such consequences in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires more than foreseeability that a product might reach New York; the defendant must have a purposeful New York affiliation, such as an effort to serve its market.

Schaadt v. T. W. Kutter, Inc. · filed 1991-01-24(a)(3)(ii)

Moreover, it is not enough that a defendant foresaw the possibility that its product would find its way here; foreseeability must be coupled with evidence of a purposeful New York affiliation, for example, a discernible effort to directly or indirectly serve the New York market (Martinez v American Std., 91 AD2d 652, 653-654, affd 60 NY2d 873; see, McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C302:24, at 113).

Section 302 permits personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the transactions at issue occurred in New York.

East Continental Gems, Inc. v. Yakutiel · filed 1992-03-27

In the case at bar, this court, again, finds that the transactions involved herein, all transpired in New York, thereby making the defendant Chayto, S. A. subject to our jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant could reasonably expect its conduct to have consequences in New York.

Pastorella v. City of New York · filed 1992-04-02(a)(3)(ii)

We agree with the IAS court that appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant Racal could have reasonably expected the sale of its helmets to have consequences in New York (Murdock v Arenson Inti. USA., 157 AD2d 110). Accordingly, there is no basis for jurisdiction over Racal under CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii)'s reasonable-expectation requirement can be satisfied by a DES manufacturer's participation in the national market, even without direct New York sales.

Carrano v. Abbott Laboratories · filed 1994-08-18(a)(3)(ii)

Thus, Boyle, by its acts, together with other manufacturers, affirmatively interposed itself into the New York market and "should [have] reasonably expect[ed] the act to have consequences in the state” of New York (CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires a reasonable basis to expect that an out-of-state tortious act will have consequences in New York; a crew member’s later move there does not satisfy that requirement.

Penny v. United Fruit Co. · filed 1994-11-28(a)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, since the foreseeability requirement of CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is unsatisfied, there is no jurisdiction to hear these cases under New York’s long-arm statute.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits long-arm jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary manufacturer whose activities make it foreseeable that its products will be marketed and found in New York.

Drexler v. Highlift, Inc. · filed 2002-07-08(a)(3)(ii)

Here, Highlift and the NYCTA submitted sufficient facts to demonstrate that Lull engaged in activities which made it foreseeable that its products would be marketed and found in New York, thereby subjecting it to long-arm jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) reaches a manufacturer that should reasonably expect its out-of-state conduct to have consequences in New York, even when it uses an out-of-state distributor.

Boris v. Bock Water Heaters, Inc. · filed 2004-03-04(a)(3)(ii)

This court finds, however, that CPLR 302 (a) (3) (ii) was satisfied in this case as to defendant Bock, notwithstanding its utilization of an out-of-state distributor. Clearly, Bock, a national leading manufacturer selling its products in all 50 states, expected or should have expected that a defect in its product would have consequences in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) does not establish a reasonable expectation of New York consequences merely because an independent distributor might sell the defendant’s product in New York.

Stephan v. BABYSPORT, LLC · filed 2007-08-06(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to support the finding that Defendants should reasonably expect their acts to have consequence in the State of New York. Once the sale of the allegedly infringing product was made to MacLane, the products could have be available for ultimate sale in any one of the states in which MacLane does business. To sustain jurisdiction on the basis that New York was one of those possible destinations is too tenuous a connection on which to base jurisdiction.

Under section 302(a)(3)(ii), a defendant seeking summary judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction must show that it does not derive substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce or could not reasonably anticipate consequences in New York from its alleged tortious acts.

Kesterson v. Cambo Fotografische Industrie Bv · filed 2006-06-22(a)(3)(ii)

Notwithstanding its burden in the first instance of showing entitlement to summary judgment on jurisdictional grounds, Cambo failed to demonstrate lack of substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce, or an inability reasonably to anticipate that its allegedly tortious acts would have consequences in this state (see CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer when its distribution arrangement makes it reasonable to expect a product defect to have consequences in New York and it derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce.

DarrowvHetronicDeutschland · filed 2014-07-10(a)(3)(ii)

In view of such purposeful distribution arrangement, we agree with Supreme Court's conclusion that defendant sought to indirectly market its product in New York and, thus, should have reasonably expected a manufacturing defect to have consequences in this state (see generally ...).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires the plaintiff to establish that the defendant expected or reasonably should have expected its out-of-state conduct to have consequences in New York.

Finerty v. Abex Corp. · filed 2015-02-26(a)(3)(ii)

We find that, while plaintiffs injury occurred in New York, where his mesothelioma manifested itself (CPLR 302 [a] [3]), plaintiff failed to establish that Ford UK expected or should reasonably have expected that his exposure to asbestos in Ireland would have consequences in New York (CPLR 302 [a] [3] [ii]; see e.g. Penny v United Fruit Co., 869 F Supp 122, 129 [ED NY 1994]; Waggaman v Arauzo, 117 AD3d 724 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 903 [2014]).

Knowledge of pending New York litigation alone does not establish that an out-of-state lender should reasonably expect its loan to have consequences in New York under § 302(a)(3).

Broker Genius Inc. v. Seat Scouts LLC · filed 2019-08-27(a)(3)

Martin’s knowledge of the existence of Broker Genius’s litigation against Seat Scouts does not suffice to show that Pistol expected or should reasonably have expected the execution of the Note to have consequences in New York.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires an out-of-state tortfeasor to have expected or reasonably foreseen direct consequences in New York before a court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction.

Grandelli v. Hope St. Holdings, LLC · filed 2019-10-16(a)(3)(ii)

The plaintiffs' contention that Warner Europe is subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) is without merit. Conferral of long-arm jurisdiction in New York as set forth in that provision requires (1) that the defendant committed a tortious act outside the State; (2) that the cause of action arises from that act; (3) that the act caused injury to a person or property within the State; (4) that the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected the act to have consequences in the State; and (5) that the defendant derived substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce ( see CPLR 302[a][3][ii]; Fantis Foods v Standard Importing Co. , 49 NY2d 317, 324-325; Murdock v Arenson Intl. USA , 157 AD2d 110, 113-114).

Section 302 does not confer personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary when an out-of-state accident has no proven connection to the defendant’s business, property, or tortious conduct in New York.

Miranda v. De La Cruz · filed 2024-07-11

Plaintiff provided no proof she conducted business in the state, owns real estate there, nor has the tortious act been committed in New York. Additionally, she was served with the summons at her home in New Jersey. As such, no sufficient relationship to the state has been proven in order to satisfy the nexus requirement. The motion is granted.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits jurisdiction when an out-of-state tort causes injury in New York and the defendant could reasonably foresee being sued there.

Japna, Inc. v. Selfx Innovations Inc. · filed 2024-03-22(a)(3)(ii)

Tulip India could have reasonably foreseen being sued in the state, and Plaintiff has sufficiently established personal jurisdiction under § 302(a)(3)(ii).

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) requires facts showing that the defendant expected or should reasonably have expected an out-of-state act to have consequences in New York.

Citadel Securities Americas LLC v. Portofino Technologies AG · filed 2024-10-31(a)(3)(ii)

Because Plaintiffs have not shown that Defendant expected or should have reasonably expected that his investment in Portofino would have consequences in New York, Plaintiffs have not established that New York’s long arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3), confers personal jurisdiction over Defendant.

Section 302 does not attribute a predecessor’s New York acts to a successor based solely on a merger or asset purchase without actual or constructive consent to service.

In Re Nazi Era Cases Against German Litigation · filed 2004-05-20

Without consent to service, actual or constructive, neither a merger itself or purchase of assets is enough under New York law to attribute a predecessor's acts to a successor for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction under CPLR § 302.

Section 302 does not attribute a predecessor’s New York acts to a corporate successor based solely on a merger or asset purchase without actual or constructive consent to service.

Wortham v. AG · filed 2004-05-20

Without consent to service, actual or constructive, neither a merger itself or purchase of assets is enough under New York law to attribute a predecessor’s acts to a successor .for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction under CPLR § 302.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction over a corporate successor merely because a successor liability exception may make it liable for its predecessor’s torts.

Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc. · filed 2005-09-01(a)(1)

The “product line” and “continuing enterprise” exceptions to the successor liability rule deal with the concept of tort liability, not jurisdiction. When and if either exception is found applicable, the corporate successor would be subject to liability for the torts of its predecessor in any forum having in personam jurisdiction over the successor, but the exceptions do not and cannot confer such jurisdiction over the successor in the first instance.

Section 302(a)(1) permits personal jurisdiction over a successor by merger when the merger has a substantial relationship to the claims.

Matter of Gronich & Co., Inc. v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc. · filed 2020-02-18(a)(1)

Petitioner established jurisdiction over respondent C1 Delaware as it demonstrated a substantial relationship between the merger and its claims by virtue of C1 Delaware's status as successor by merger of the company that received a transfer of assets from Longstreet ( see Ambac Assur. Corp. v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , 2015 WL 6471938, *6 [Sup Ct, NY County 2015], mod on other grounds 150 AD3d 490 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 302 permits a successor that acquires all of a predecessor’s assets and liabilities to inherit the predecessor’s status for specific personal jurisdiction, even without a merger.

Ester Lelchook v. Société Générale de Banque au Liban SAL · filed 2024-04-18

Thus, we clarify that where an entity acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over an entity that acquires all of a predecessor’s assets and liabilities when the predecessor’s New York business contacts support jurisdiction on the claims.

Lelchook v. Société Générale De Banque Au Liban S.A.L. · filed 2025-08-11(a)(1)

As described, SGBL acquired all of LCB’s assets and liabilities, without reservation. It therefore “inherit[ed] [LCB’s] status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction.”

CPLR 302 cannot provide an alternative basis for personal jurisdiction in city court when that court’s jurisdiction and service of process are more limited.

Marita Car Rentals, Inc. v. Ishtiaq · filed 2006-01-05

Additionally, since the long-arm jurisdiction of a city court under UCCA 404 (a) is not as broad as that of the Supreme Court under CPLR 302, because service of process is restricted to the home county or an adjoining county by way of article VI, § 1 (c) of the New York State Constitution and UCCA 404 (b) (Hyman & Gilbert v Greenstein, 138 AD2d 678, 680 [2d Dept 1988]), CPLR 302 cannot serve as an alternative basis for obtaining personal jurisdiction in this matter.

Section 302(a)(3) permits a pertinent foreign jurisdiction’s law to establish a tortious act even when New York law does not treat the act as tortious.

City of New York v. A-1 Jewelry & Pawn, Inc. · filed 2007-08-15(a)(3)

Thus, even in circumstances in which New York law is not violated, foreign law of a pertinent jurisdiction can suffice to supply the “tortious act” on which CPLR 302(a)(3) jurisdiction is predicated.

Section 302(a) requires a cause of action to anchor long-arm jurisdiction; a pre-action discovery proceeding that asserts none does not satisfy that requirement.

In re Fidelity National Title Insurance · filed 2011-11-28(a)

There is thus no “cause of action” which could provide an anchor for long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 302.

Section 302’s long-arm jurisdiction provisions do not apply to a subpoena served on a nonparty witness.

Genger v. Genger · filed 2015-10-22

Consequently, this court cannot and need not obtain personal jurisdiction over Parnés, and resort to the Hague Convention, while enabling plaintiff to depose him, would not accomplish it. ... For the same reason, CPLR 302 and 313 are inapposite.

Section 302 provided a means to obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonresident through service outside New York, defeating his claim of immunity from service in court.

Sandella v. Hill · filed 2018-11-21

Here, even assuming that the defendant's appearance in New York was voluntary ( see Thermoid Co. v Fabel , 4 NY2d 494), he was not entitled to immunity because personal jurisdiction could have been obtained over him by serving him outside of New York pursuant to CPLR 302 and 313 ( see Bokara Rug Co., Inc. v Kapoor , 93 AD3d 583, 584; Olbi USA v Agapov , 294 AD2d 139, 139; Brause 59 Co. v Bridgemarket Assoc. , 216 AD2d 200, 201).

A New York choice-of-law provision alone does not establish jurisdiction under § 302(a)(1).

Great Western Insurance Company v. Graham · filed 2024-06-25(a)(1)

Second, the prevailing case law holds that a choice-of-law provision on its own cannot suffice to establish jurisdiction.

Section 302(a)(1) does not confer personal jurisdiction based on a plaintiff’s incidental transfers from a New York bank account that the defendant did not choose or direct.

Advanced Plus LLC v. Jordan · filed 2025-04-21(a)(1)

As in Timothy Coffey, the incidental wire transfers from Plaintiffs’ account in New York are insufficient to find personal jurisdiction over Defendants under § 302(a)(1).

Section 302(a)(1) concerns personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's New York contacts, not subject matter jurisdiction.

Eastern States Well & Pump Servs., LLC v. Martin · filed 2025-06-05(a)(1)

Defendant's contacts with New York implicate personal jurisdiction and not subject matter jurisdiction ( see CPLR 302 [a] [1]; State of New York v Vayu, Inc. , 39 NY3d 330, 332 [2023]).

Section 302(a)(3) applies only to tort claims, excluding contract and quasi-contract claims.

Bowerman Cleaning & Restoration LLC v. Stamford Plaza Hotel & Conference Center · filed 2025-09-23(a)(3)

As discussed above, Section 302(a)(3) applies only to torts.

Section 302(a)(3)(ii) permits personal jurisdiction based on qualifying tortious conduct outside New York that causes injury in the state, but excludes defamation.

Belzberg v. Leonidov · filed 2026-02-19(a)(3)(ii)

Plaintiff has alleged tortious conduct including unfair competition, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty aimed at Belzberg in New York. While Defendants are correct in arguing that defamation is not covered under this provision, the other tortious conduct alleged by Plaintiff is covered. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over the Business Defendants exists under CPLR § 302(a)(3)(ii).