N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period, which is not tolled by continuing representation after counsel stops handling the matter.

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Zeichner, Ellman & Krause, LLP · filed 2004-03-02(6)

Commencement of this action in July 2002, after purported discovery of the malpractice, ran afoul of the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]; Julian v Carroll, 270 AD2d 457 [2000]). ... The statute was not tolled by any alleged continuing representation by defendants, since they no longer represented plaintiff on the foreclosure matters at issue after July 1998 (National Union Fire Ins. Co. v Davis, Wright, Todd, Reise & Jones, 157 AD2d 571, 572 [1990]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period; the claim accrues when an injury exists.

Artese v. Pollack · filed 2004-04-02(6)

The Statute of Limitations for a legal malpractice is three years. (CPLR 214(6)). ... Here, there was no ascertainable injury and therefore no cause of action prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations on July 31, 2000.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

Rachlin v. LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross · filed 2004-06-14(6)

The defendants demonstrated prima facie that so much of the plaintiffs complaint as alleged legal malpractice based on their representation of him in a civil action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Alicanti v Bianco, 2 AD3d 373 [2003]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Clark v Jacobson, 202 AD2d 466 [1994]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Joyce v. JJF Associates, LLC · filed 2004-06-24(6)

Plaintiffs’ cause of action for legal malpractice based upon an alleged conflict of interest and breach of duty in connection with a tax savings plan implemented in 1996 should have been dismissed as barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6)’s limitations period for legal malpractice is not tolled by continuous representation when the attorney-client relationship has ended and no ongoing relationship exists.

Marro v. Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner · filed 2003-11-17(6)

The continuous representation doctrine does not apply since there is no evidence of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the plaintiff and the law firm after that date (see Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d 511, 512 [2001]; Wester v Sussman, supra). Accordingly, the cause of action alleging legal malpractice is barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a claim based on allegedly negligent architectural services a three-year limitations period even when the claim is framed as a breach of contract.

In re the Arbitration between Kliment & Halsband & McKinsey & Co. · filed 2004-01-13(6)

Thus, respondent’s claim is not an exception to CPLR 214 (6) and the Legislature’s intention that it be subject to a three-year statute of limitations is clear.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, and a defendant seeking dismissal as untimely must establish when the alleged malpractice occurred.

Kanter v. Pieri · filed 2004-10-01(6)

Defendant thus failed to establish that the acts constituting malpractice as alleged by plaintiff occurred more than three years before the commencement of this action.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that accrues when the malpractice occurs.

Sommers v. Cohen · filed 2005-01-31(6)

Since the alleged malpractice was the defendants’ failure to file an answer in the underlying matrimonial action, the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]) accrued on the last date the answer could have been filed (see Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 93 [1982]; Venturella-Ferretti v Kinzler, 306 AD2d 465, 466 [2003]; Goicoechea v Law Offices of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 AD2d 507, 508 [1996]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of the malpractice.

Georgiou v. Panayia of the Mountains Greek Orthodox Monastery, Inc. · filed 2005-03-31(6)

Initially, we note that an action for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the date that the malpractice was committed (see CPLR 214 [6]; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]). The record reveals that the latest date that plaintiffs allege Groper represented them was December 1996. Inasmuch as this action was not commenced until September 19, 2003, it clearly is untimely.

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim to be brought within three years of the malpractice, subject to tolling for continuous representation on the same matter.

Amendola v. Kendzia · filed 2005-04-29(6)

We further conclude, however, that the court properly dismissed the fifth counterclaim, for legal malpractice, as time-barred. “A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed . . ., and must be interposed within three years thereafter” (Ranter v Pieri, 11 AD 3d 912, 912 [2004]; see CPLR 214 [6]). ... There is nothing in the record before us from which it might be concluded that Parone acted as attorney for Kendzia or the partnership with respect to the transaction at issue within three years prior to commencement of the action.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, measured from the alleged malpractice rather than its discovery.

Shivers v. Siegel · filed 2004-10-04(6)

The three-year statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action (see CPLR 214 [6]) runs from the time of the alleged malpractice, not from when it is discovered (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301, 305 [2002]; Alicanti v Bianco, 2 AD3d 373, 374 [2003], lv denied 3 NY3d 602 [2004]; Venturella-Ferretti v Kinzler, 306 AD2d 465, 466 [2003]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims; continuous representation may extend that period.

Melnitzky v. Hollander · filed 2005-03-10(6)

The causes of action for legal malpractice and breach of contract, which allege that defendant misrepresented that he would continue to advise plaintiff in the underlying action notwithstanding his formal withdrawal, were properly dismissed upon unrefuted evidence that the parties’ last communication involving the subject matter of the representation occurred almost five years before the commencement of the action (CPLR 214 [6]; see Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]). ... The continuous representation doctrine does not avail plaintiff absent allegations showing that defendant continued to represent plaintiff within the limitations period.

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Guerra Press, Inc. v. Campbell & Parlato, LLP · filed 2005-04-29(6)

An action to recover damages arising from an attorney’s malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(2) and (6) provide the limitations periods for claims to recover estate legal fees and for legal malpractice.

In re the Estate of Merker · filed 2005-05-19(2), (6)

Petitioner executrix’s claims, whether seeking a refund for legal fees paid to respondent as attorney for the estate (SCPA 2110 [3]) or damages for legal malpractice, were time-barred (CPLR 214 [2], [6]).

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to nonmedical malpractice claims even when an express contract term states an ordinary professional obligation.

MATTER OF ARBITRATION BETWEEN KLIMENT & McKINSEY & CO. · filed 2004-12-16(6)

McKinsey's claim is fundamentally a claim that K&H failed to perform services in a professional, nonnegligent manner by neglecting to comply with the relevant building codes as promised in the agreement. As a result, the claim is barred by CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6) gives a nonmedical professional malpractice claim a three-year limitations period even when an express contract term restates the professional’s ordinary duties.

In re the Arbitration between Kliment & McKinsey & Co. · filed 2004-12-16(6)

Allowing this claim to proceed would accomplish the precise result the Legislature sought to prevent— allowing what is essentially a malpractice claim to be couched in breach of contract terms in order to benefit from the six-year statute of limitations. ... As a result, the claim is barred by CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled by continuous representation concerning the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.

Montes v. Rosenzweig · filed 2005-08-08(6)

It is well settled, however, that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims may be tolled by operation of the continuous representation doctrine, provided that “the continuing representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice” (Shumsky v Eisenstein, supra at 168). Here, the plaintiffs alleged facts which, if proven, would establish that the statute of limitations was tolled by application of the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims.

Gelmac Quality Feeds, Inc. v. Ronning · filed 2005-11-10(6)

The instant action was commenced in July 1999, well beyond the three-year statute of limitations period of CPLR 214 (6), and thus the first cause of action is time-barred.

CPLR 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period whether they sound in tort or contract; the period begins when the injury becomes actionable.

Kerbein v. Hutchison · filed 2006-06-08(6)

No dispute exists that the statute of limitations governing this legal malpractice action, whether sounding in tort or breach of contract, is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus plaintiffs complaint, filed on December 19, 2002, was timely.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from the malpractice to bring a non-medical professional malpractice claim.

Tenamee v. Schmukler · filed 2006-07-13(6)

Thus, under CPLR § 214(6), Tenamee had only until February 16, 2004 to commence a malpractice suit. His complaint in this action was filed on August 30, 2005, more than a year and a half after the statute of limitations had run.

Section 214(6) gives New York legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice is committed.

Dimensional Music Publishing, LLC v. Kersey Ex Rel. Estate of Kersey · filed 2006-08-25(6)

The state of limitations in New York for legal malpractice is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). The statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the injury, which is when the malpractice was committed.

CPLR 214(6) gives a malpractice claim against an architect three years from accrual.

Cross Development, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America · filed 2006-09-22(6)

The claim originally asserted by Travelers in the third-party action and now asserted in the demand for arbitration accrued, if at all, upon the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for the building designed by MWT on June 15, 2001. Thus, the demand for arbitration was served after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations governing malpractice actions against architects (see CPLR 214 [6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538 [2004]).

CPLR 214 (6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which the continuous representation doctrine can toll.

Moss v. McKelvey · filed 2006-09-29(6)

Although plaintiffs’ claims against defendants accrued when the alleged malpractice was committed (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Kanter v Pieri, 11 AD3d 912, 912-913 [2004]), the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice set forth in CPLR 214 (6) would be tolled if the continuous representation doctrine were to apply (see Kanter, 11 AD3d at 913).

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim, subject to the continuous representation doctrine.

Marlett v. Hennessy · filed 2006-09-29(6)

Because the instant action was not commenced within three years of that accrual date of the instant legal malpractice claim, plaintiffs must have the benefit of the continuous representation doctrine or their legal malpractice claim is time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]; Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86, 93-95 [1982]; Amendola v Kendzia, 17 AD3d 1105, 1108 [2005]; Kanter v Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [2004]).

The three-year limitations period for legal malpractice is tolled by continuous representation only when the later representation concerns the matter in which the alleged malpractice occurred.

Bastys v. Rothschild · filed 2005-11-16

Rather, it tolls the statute of limitations “only where the continuing representation pertains specifically to the matter in which the attorney committed the alleged malpractice.” ... That is not this case. While the record shows that Rothschild continued to provide Jonas Bastys with estate planning advice into the limitations period, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any advice rendered after July 15, 1994, “pertain[ed] specifically” to the matters that are the subject of the malpractice claim.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

Tropp v. Lumer · filed 2005-11-21(6)

Moreover, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]) was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001]; cf. Rachlin v LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 8 AD3d 461, 462 [2004]).

Section 214(6)’s three-year limit on professional malpractice claims against engineers is tolled while the engineer continues to provide related professional services on the same matter.

In re the Arbitration between Clark Patterson Engineers, Surveyor & Architects, P.C. & City of Gloversville Board of Wat · filed 2006-01-19(6)

There is no dispute that the three-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]) governs claims against engineers (see Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20, 29-30 [2001]; Germantown Cent. School Dist. v Clark, Clark, Millis & Gilson, 294 AD2d 93, 98 [2002], affd 100 NY2d 202 [2003]). ... Thus, there was continuous representation that tolled the limitations period and rendered respondent’s demand for arbitration timely.

The three-year limit for accounting malpractice claims may be tolled by continuous representation; annual audit agreements and reports alone do not establish that each audit was a separate service.

Williamson ex rel. Lipper Convertibles, L.P. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP · filed 2006-06-22(6)

Contrary to defendant’s contention, the yearly signing of a new audit agreement and the yearly delivery of a final audit report do not alone establish as a matter of law that each year’s audit was a separate and discrete event. ... We cannot yet tell whether the circumstances here actually warrant the application of the doctrine. But the pre-2000 claims should not have been dismissed prior to a full exploration of the facts.

CPLR 214(6)’s three-year period for accounting malpractice is not tolled by work on later tax returns when each return is a separate transaction, even if the accountant repeats the same error.

Booth v. Kriegel · filed 2006-11-16(6)

We hold that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply under these facts because, regardless of the common mistake affecting the tax returns, each return was a separate and discrete transaction. Therefore, any claim arising from the preparation of each successive tax return accrued, and the statute of limitations on that claim began to run, upon the completion of the services relating to that return.

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Williams v. Lindenberg · filed 2005-12-05(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period that began here when the client signed a consent to change attorneys.

Frost Line Refrigeration, Inc. v. Gastwirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP · filed 2006-01-10(6)

The three-year statute of limitations began to run on September 10, 2001, when the plaintiff Arthur Best signed a consent to change attorney form, relieving the defendant Gastwirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP, as counsel in the ... underlying action (see CPLR 214 [6]; Sommers v Cohen, 14 AD3d 691 [2005]; Marro v Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner, 1 AD3d 488 [2003]; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d 310 [2002]; Wester v Sussman, 287 AD2d 618 [2001]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions.

Green v. Conciatori · filed 2006-02-21(6)

Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action as against Popkin had expired when the plaintiff commenced this action in February 2004 (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Zorn v. Gilbert · filed 2006-03-28(6)

A cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Williams v Lindenberg, 24 AD3d 434 [2005]). Here, the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice accrued, at the latest, on December 4, 1997, when the judgment of divorce in the underlying action was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Westchester County. As the plaintiff commenced this action on May 30, 2001 more than three years later, those causes of action were time-barred (see CPLR 203 [a]; McCoy v Feinman, supra at 305).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, regardless of whether the claim is framed in contract or tort.

Melendez v. Bernstein · filed 2006-05-23(6)

Thus, the first and second causes of action are time-barred, as the defendant’s representation of the plaintiff ended in March 2000 and this action was not commenced until October 2004 (see CPLR 214 [6]; Bouley v Bouley, 19 AD3d 1049 [2005]; Carnevali v Herman, 293 AD2d 698 [2002]).

Section 214(6)'s malpractice limitations period does not apply to aircraft mechanics; negligence claims against them are governed by section 214(4).

Parker v. Leonard · filed 2005-12-22(6)

As a preliminary matter, we note our agreement with plaintiff that the occupation of aircraft mechanic is not one that should be considered “professional” under the standards set forth in Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group (96 NY2d 20, 28-30 [2001]). Therefore, actions against aircraft mechanics are governed by the “limitations periods applicable to negligence actions (CPLR 214 [4]) and breach of contract actions (CPLR 213 [2])” (id. at 30-31), and not the limitations period applicable to malpractice actions (see CPLR 214 [6]).

An architect malpractice claim accrues when the architect completes the work, including obtaining a certificate of occupancy if that is part of the architect’s obligations.

Frank v. Mazs Group, LLC · filed 2006-06-06(6)

Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs’ claims against the appellant did not begin to accrue for statute of limitations purposes until the issuance of the certificate of occupancy on December 20, 2001. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the claims which were asserted against the appellant on October 14, 2004, were not time-barred pursuant to CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limit on professional malpractice claims even when they are framed as breach of contract.

Mitschele v. Schultz · filed 2006-11-30(6)

This is nothing more than a rephrasing of the claim of malpractice in the language of breach of contract, and is specifically covered by the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (6), which applies “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (see 6645 Owners Corp. v GMO Realty Corp., 306 AD2d 97, 98 [2003]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Amodeo v. Kolodny, P.C. · filed 2006-12-26(6)

A cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Zorn v Gilbert, 27 AD3d 731 [2006]; Williams v Lindenberg, 24 AD3d 434 [2005]; Shivers v Siegel, 11 AD3d 447 [2004]).

CPLR 214 (6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action.

St. Stephens Baptist Church, Inc. v. Salzman · filed 2007-02-13(6)

This action was commenced on April 25, 2005, more than three years later, and therefore was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214 (6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual, unless continuous representation extends the period.

Iser v. Kerrigan · filed 2007-02-20(6)

An action to recover damages arising from an attorney’s alleged malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]; CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus, as the plaintiffs did not allege continuous representation by either defendant to extend the relevant limitations period, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) which were to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from accrual, with the limitations period tolled during continuous representation on the same matter.

Zorn v. Gilbert · filed 2007-04-03(6)

An action to recover damages arising ... from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; 203 [a]). “The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306 [2002]; see also Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 167-168 [2001]). ... Inasmuch as this action was commenced in May 2001, the Appellate Division erred in holding that plaintiff’s cause of action alleging legal malpractice was time-barred (see McCoy, 99 NY2d at 305; Shumsky, 96 NY2d at 167-168).

Section 214(6) sets the time limit for bringing a legal malpractice claim; defendants seeking dismissal must show that the time to sue has expired.

Gallina v. Fedrizzi · filed 2007-04-03(6)

Contrary to their further contentions, Katsorhis and Fedrizzi failed to show that the time in which to sue had expired (see CPLR 214 [6]; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001]; Pollicino v Roemer & Featherstonhaugh, 260 AD2d 52, 53 [1999]; cf. Gravel v Cicola, 297 AD2d 620 [2002]; Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d 511 [2001]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the claim accrues.

Cohen v. Wallace & Minchenberg · filed 2007-04-17(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), an action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which a timely tolling agreement can extend.

HSBC Bank USA v. Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC · filed 2007-06-04(6)

Therefore, because the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]), the four shareholders’ claims for malpractice against C&G are timely.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period; representation in a distinct matter does not extend that period.

Goldman v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP · filed 2007-12-27(6)

The claim was correctly dismissed as time-barred based on the fact that the action was commenced more than three years after the sale closed (CPLR 214 [6]; see Bergman v Fingerit, 177 AD2d 448 [1991], lv denied 79 NY2d 759 [1992]; see also Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994] [malpractice cause of action accrues when injury occurs even if aggrieved party is then ignorant of the wrong or injury]), and documentary evidence that effectively precludes plaintiffs from arguing that defendants’ representation in the arbitrations was continuous with their representation in the sale.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice other than medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, whether the claim is based in contract or tort.

In re the Arbitration between Stantec Consulting Group & Fonda-Fultonville Central School District · filed 2007-01-11(6)

Indeed, in 1996 the Legislature amended CPLR 214 (6) to provide that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives accounting malpractice claims a three-year limitations period regardless of whether they are pleaded in contract or tort; a factual dispute over whether the claims sound in malpractice can preclude summary judgment on that basis.

Malmsteen v. BERDON, LLP · filed 2007-03-20(6)

Accounting malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, “whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). ... Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, defendants have not shown that the claims are in essence malpractice claims; at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the nature of Mitnick and plaintiffs relationship that precludes summary judgment based on the three-year limitations period for malpractice claims.

Section 214(6) gives accounting malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Giarratano v. Silver · filed 2007-12-13(6)

The claim for accounting malpractice is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994]).

CPLR 214 (6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled while the attorney continues representing the client on the same matter.

TVGA Engineering, Surveying, P.C. v. Gallick · filed 2007-11-09(6)

The three-year statute of limitations for a legal malpractice cause of action pursuant to CPLR 214 (6) may be tolled while the attorney continues to represent the client on the same matter in which the malpractice is alleged to have occurred (see Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 94 [1982]; Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86, 93-95 [1982]; Amendola v Kendzia, 17 AD3d 1105, 1108-1109 [2005]), but “ ‘there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney’ ” for the continuous representation doctrine to apply (Kanter v Pieri, 11 AD3d 912, 913 [2004]; see Amendola, 17 AD3d at 1108-1109).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limit on accounting malpractice claims; a continuing general professional relationship does not extend the time to sue.

Serino v. Lipper · filed 2007-11-20(6)

Since the action was not commenced until January 13, 2005, more than three years later, all of the malpractice claims asserted in Holdings are time-barred (CPLR 214 [6]; Levin v PricewaterhouseCoopers, 302 AD2d 287 [2003]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims, whether pleaded in contract or tort.

RGH Liquidating Trust v. Deloitte & Touche LLP · filed 2008-01-24(6)

The breach of contract claim is, as defendants correctly contend, in essence a claim of professional malpractice (as are all plaintiff’s claims) (see American Tissue, Inc. v Arthur Andersen, L.L.P., 275 F Supp 2d 398, 405 n 7 [SD NY 2003]), and was properly dismissed as barred by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice claims “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538 [2004]).

An engineering malpractice claim has a three-year limitations period that begins when the engineer completes its contractual obligations and the professional relationship ends.

Town of Wawarsing v. Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc. · filed 2008-03-27(6)

Inasmuch as this was less than three years prior to the commencement of the action, we find that it was timely.

Section 214(6) requires legal and accounting malpractice actions to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Arnold v. KPMG LLP · filed 2008-03-28(6)

An action to recover damages for professional malpractice, either legal or accounting, must be commenced within three years from the date of accrual. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). ... Applying the three-year statute of limitations to those dates, Arnold’s claims were time-barred as of May 13, 2001, and August 28, 2001, respectively' — nearly four years before the filing of the original complaint on August 19, 2005.

Section 214(6) may bar a professional malpractice claim against an architect; when the professional relationship ended can present a factual issue affecting timeliness.

Serradella v. Lords Corp. · filed 2008-04-08(6)

Concerning plaintiffs’ cause of action against the architect for professional malpractice alleging, inter alia, his failure to obtain a certificate of no harassment, issues of fact exist, including when the architect’s professional relationship with plaintiffs ended, and thus whether the complaint as against him is time-barred under CPLR 214 (6) (see N. R. S. Constr. Corp. v Board of Educ., Cent. School Dist. No. 2, Towns of Yorktown, New Castle & Cortlandt, 82 AD2d 876 [1981]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from accrual; continuous representation tolls that period only when the attorney continues work on the matter involving the alleged malpractice.

Chicago Title Insurance v. Mazula · filed 2008-01-29(6)

Since Keable performed no further work for defendant, either personally or in her capacity as executor of the estate after January 2000 in regard to this transaction, the commencement of this third-party action for legal malpractice was not timely.

Section 214(6) sets the limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Shefa Unlimited, Inc. v. Amsterdam · filed 2008-03-04(6)

However, that cause of action was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, tolled while the attorney continues to represent the client on the same matter.

Kvetnaya v. Tylo · filed 2008-03-11(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; 203 [a]). Pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine, the statute of limitations to recover damages for legal malpractice is tolled while the attorney continues to represent the client as to the same matter underlying the malpractice claim (see Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 167-168 [2001]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for legal malpractice claims; continued representation tolls that limit only when it concerns the same matter.

Hasty Hills Stables, Inc. v. Dorfman · filed 2008-06-10(6)

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice cause of action by demonstrating that the statute of limitations expired on October 10,1999 (see CPLR 214 [6]). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine (cf. Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d at 168).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, whether the underlying theory is contract or tort.

Scantek Medical, Inc. v. Sabella · filed 2008-10-17(6)

Therefore, at the latest, Sabella’s malpractice cause of action accrued in May 2004, when she last invested in Scantek, and expired three years later, in May 2007.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Nickel v. Tortora · filed 2008-12-02(6)

The plaintiffs cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

The limitations period for legal malpractice under § 214(6) may be tolled by continuous representation; a triable issue about tolling prevents dismissal as time-barred.

Rehberger v. Garguilo & Orzechowski, LLP · filed 2008-04-08(6)

In support of their respective motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), each of the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the time in which to sue had expired and that the complaint was time-barred as against them (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]; Sabadie v Burke, 47 AD3d 913 [2008]; Matter of Schwartz, 44 AD3d 779 [2007]; Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219 [2000]; CPLR 214 [6]). However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine (see Town of Wallkill v Rosenstein, 40 AD3d 972 [2007]; Tropp v Lumer, 23 AD3d 550 [2005]; Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219 [2000]). Thus, the complaint should not have been dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for legal malpractice claims; continued representation tolls that limit only when it concerns the particular transaction at issue.

Maurice W. Pomfrey & Associates., Ltd. v. Hancock & Estabrook, LLP · filed 2008-04-25(6)

... and this action was not commenced until October 2005, well past the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. ... Although plaintiffs allege that defendant continued to provide legal services to them between 1994 and 2004, they did not seek or obtain defendant’s services in connection with the employment agreement until March 2000, more than three years after the statute of limitations had expired (see Carnevali, 293 AD2d at 699).

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice claims may be tolled by continuous representation on the matter underlying the claim.

Deep v. Boies · filed 2008-07-24(6)

The commencement of this action on October 28, 2005 fell outside the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). The action must be dismissed unless the time within which to commence it is tolled by the continuous representation doctrine (see Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166-168 [2001]; Sitk-iewicz v Willis & NG, 288 AD2d 644, 645 [2001]).

Section 214(6)'s limitations period for legal malpractice began when the merger was completed and the law firm filed the merger documents.

Mark ex rel Smart Tone Authentication, Inc. v. Dechert, LLP · filed 2009-01-27(6)

Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claim is barred by the statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]), which began to run in January 2000, when the merger of the corporate plaintiffs was completed and defendant law firm filed the merger documents.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims that are essentially legal malpractice claims, even when pleaded as contract or fraud claims.

Kinberg v. Garr · filed 2009-03-31(6)

The IAS court properly determined that plaintiffs breach of contract and fraud claims are essentially legal malpractice claims that are barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 543 [2004]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be brought within three years after the alleged malpractice.

Byron Chemical Co. v. Groman · filed 2009-04-28(6)

Here, the defendants established that the legal malpractice cause of action was time-barred by demonstrating that the alleged malpractice occurred in 1993 and the action was commenced in 2006 (see CPLR 214 [6]).

CPLR 214 (6) imposes a three-year limit on accounting malpractice claims, even when pleaded as breach of contract or fiduciary duty.

Harris v. Kahn, Hoffman, Nonenmacher & Hochman · filed 2009-02-03(6)

Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims sound in accounting malpractice and are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6) (see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538 [2004]; RGH Liquidating Trust v Deloitte & Touche LLP, 47 AD3d 516 [2008]; 6645 Owners Corp. v GMO Realty Corp., 306 AD2d 97 [2003]).

Section 214(6) allows three years to bring a legal malpractice action, and notice that the attorney has ended representation can end the continuous representation toll without a formal withdrawal.

Frenchman v. Queller, Fisher, Dienst, Serrins, Washor & Kool, LLP · filed 2009-03-03(6)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action is three years (CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus, the failure of the Wachsman Firm to seek leave to withdraw as counsel, in and of itself, is not a basis to apply the continuous representation doctrine to the circumstances herein, where plaintiff acknowledges receipt of the Wachsman Firm’s notice of termination of their relationship, where plaintiff considered the Wachsman Firm to have “abandoned” her action, and where plaintiff began seeking new counsel, all in November 2004.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from accrual; continuous representation in the same matter tolls that period even when the attorney moves to another firm.

Waggoner v. Caruso · filed 2009-09-29(6)

A legal malpractice action must be commenced within three years of accrual (CPLR 214 [6]; 203 [a]). ... Guided by this precedent, we now hold that the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation during the time that Caruso represented plaintiffs in the underlying matter while he was a partner at Chadbourne and Bracewell.

CPLR 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Morris v. Astor Holdings Inc. · filed 2009-04-02(6)

Robot Wars’ malpractice counterclaim should have been dismissed as time-barred. “An action to recover damages arising from an attorney’s malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual (see CPLR 214 [6])” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]).

Section 214(6) gives nonmedical malpractice claims a three-year limitations period regardless of whether the underlying theory sounds in contract or tort.

Balta v. AYCO COMPANY, LP · filed 2009-05-20(6)

Moreover, in 1996 the New York State Legislature reduced the six-year period referred to in Mejia-Ricart to three years. ... CPLR 214(6) provides that all causes of action for malpractice other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice must be commenced within three years 'regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.’

Section 214(6) bars repleading a legal malpractice claim after the limitations period has expired.

Natural Organics Inc. v. Anderson Kill & Olick, P.C. · filed 2009-11-17(6)

The dismissal is with prejudice, since repleading would be barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]; Byron Chem. Co., Inc. v Groman, 61 AD3d 909, 910 [2009]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period that began here when the client signed a consent relieving the attorney as counsel.

Loria v. Cerniglia · filed 2010-01-05(6)

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice, as time-barred. The action was commenced on August 14, 2008, and the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]) began to run on August 12, 2005, when the plaintiff signed a consent to change attorney form, relieving the defendant as counsel in the underlying action (see Frost Line Refrig., Inc. v Gastwirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP, 25 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2006]; Sommers v Cohen, 14 AD3d 691, 692 [2005]; Marro v Handwerker, Marchelos & Gayner, 1 AD3d 488 [2003]; Daniels v Lebit, 299 AD2d 310 [2002]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, and a defendant seeking summary judgment must show that the action was filed after that period expired.

730 J & J, LLC v. Polizzotto & Polizzotto, Esqs. · filed 2010-01-12(6)

Summary judgment based on the defense of the statute of limitations requires that a defendant make a prima facie showing that an action to recover damages for legal malpractice was filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued (see CPLR 214 [6]; Rachlin v LaRossa, Mitchell & Ross, 8 AD3d 461 [2004]), when “all the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002] [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... Here, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the legal malpractice cause of action by demonstrating that the statute of limitations expired (see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

Section 214(6) gives legal and accounting malpractice claims three years from accrual, which occurs when the malpractice is committed rather than when the client discovers it.

Arnold v. KPMG LLP · filed 2009-06-01(6)

Under New York law, an action for professional malpractice, either legal or accounting, must be commenced within three years from the date of accrual. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). ... We agree with the district court that the three-year statute of limitations period began to run on the accounting malpractice claim against KPMG no later than May 13, 1998, the date when KPMG issued its formal opinion letter to Plaintiff.

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years to bring a professional malpractice claim; later work on unrelated matters does not toll that period.

Weiss v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP · filed 2009-06-23(6)

The plaintiffs’ claim relating to D & T’s advice regarding those tax returns was time-barred since the plaintiffs commenced this action more than three years after the alleged malpractice was committed. For reasons other than those cited by the Supreme Court, we find that the continuous representation doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a nonmedical professional malpractice claim, including an accounting malpractice claim pleaded as breach of contract.

Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP · filed 2009-10-27(6)

Contrary to Symbol’s contentions, the breach of contract cause of action alleging, inter alia, that Deloitte violated its agreement with Symbol to provide audit services for the fiscal years 1998 through 2001 in accordance with good and accepted professional standards is, in essence, an accounting malpractice claim which is governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim against a design professional for breach of contract or malpractice.

Sendar Development Co. v. CMA Design Studio P.C. · filed 2009-12-10

It is well established that a cause of action against a design professional, whether the claim is based upon breach of contract or malpractice, is to be brought within a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214).

Section 214 (6)’s three-year malpractice limitations period governs claims for treble damages under Judiciary Law § 487 in the Second Department.

Cinao v. Reers · filed 2010-01-15(6)

In the Second Department, a claim for treble damages pursuant to Judiciary Law § 487 is governed by the “three-year malpractice Statute of Limitations” found in CPLR 214 (6).

Subsection (6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years after the malpractice is committed.

Lincoln Place, LLC v. RVP Consulting, Inc. · filed 2010-02-25(6)

The third-party complaint alleging legal malpractice is time-barred, the action having been commenced more than three years after the malpractice was committed (CPLR 214 [6]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice actions a three-year limitation period running from when the malpractice was committed, subject to applicable tolling doctrines.

International Electron Devices (USA) LLC v. Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C. · filed 2010-03-19[6]

As plaintiffs correctly concede, the three-year statute of limitations applicable to a legal malpractice cause of action accrued on October 26, 2004, the date of the closing and thus when the malpractice was committed, and it expired on October 26, 2007 (see CPLR 214 [6]; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]; see also Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 NY3d 1, 7 [2007]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years after accrual.

Tsafatinos v. Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP · filed 2010-07-13(6)

Here, the defendants demonstrated that the plaintiffs’ cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice accrued no later than July 2005, more than three years before the commencement of the instant action in August 2008 (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Nickel v Goldsmith & Tortora, Attorneys at Law, P.C., 57 AD3d 4-96 [2008]).

Subsection 214(6) permits the continuous representation doctrine to toll the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim when supporting facts are alleged.

Minsky v. Haber · filed 2010-06-01(6)

Furthermore, dismissal of the complaint as time-barred pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) was error, since the plaintiff alleged facts supporting the application of the continuous representation doctrine to toll the statute of limitations for legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]; Griffin v Brewington, 300 AD2d 283 [2002]; Mancino v Levin, 268 AD2d 507 [2000]; Kuritzky v Sirlin & Sirlin, 231 AD2d 607 [1996]), and the remaining causes of action also were timely interposed under the circumstances.

Section 214(6) permits tolling of the three-year limitations period under the continuous representation doctrine.

Lytell v. Lorusso · filed 2010-06-08(6)

Thus the “pleading is sufficient to establish that the parties mutually contemplated that [Levinson’s] work and representation for [the transaction] would continue after [the closing date] and, therefore, the continuous representation doctrine applies,” and the statute of limitations was tolled (Symbol Tech., Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 69 AD3d 191, 195 [2009]; see Carnevali v Herman, 293 AD2d 698, 699 [2002]; Kahn v Hart, 270 AD2d 231 [2000]). ... Accordingly, the legal malpractice claims should not have been dismissed since Levinson failed to establish that they were time-barred (see Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934 [2007]; 730 J & J, LLC v Polizzotto & Polizzotto, Esqs., 69 AD3d 704 [2010]; Town ofWallkill v Rosenstein, 40 AD3d 972, 974 [2007]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice actions a three-year limitations period that may be tolled during continuous representation.

New Kayak Pool Corp. v. Kavinoky Cook LLP · filed 2010-06-11(6)

Kavinoky contends that the action against it is time-barred because it was commenced more than three years after the attorney in question left Kavinoky and the consent to change attorney form was executed by plaintiffs (see CPLR 214 [6]). We reject that contention inasmuch as the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation during the time that the same attorney represented plaintiffs in the underlying action (see Waggoner v Caruso, 68 AD3d 1, 7 [2009], affd 14 NY3d 874 [2010]; HNH Intl., Ltd. v Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn LLP, 63 AD3d 534, 535 [2009]).

Section 214(6) sets a three year limitations period for legal malpractice actions, subject to tolling by continuous representation.

Kennedy v. Fischer · filed 2010-11-23(6)

Here, Fischer satisfied this initial burden by demonstrating that the alleged legal malpractice occurred more than three years before the instant action was commenced in January 2009 (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years after accrual, subject to tolling under continuous representation.

Leon Petroleum, LLC v. Carl S. Levine & Associates, P.C. · filed 2011-01-11(6)

“An action to recover damages arising from an attorney’s malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; see CPLR 214 [6]). ... In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Town of Wallkill v Rosenstein, 40 AD3d 972 [2007]; Tropp v Lumer, 23 AD3d 550, 551 [2005]; N&S Supply v Simmons, 305 AD2d 648 [2003]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice claims to be commenced within three years from the actionable injury.

McCormick v. Favreau · filed 2011-03-31(6)

Plaintiffs’ claim of legal malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations which accrued when the actionable injury occurred — that is, at the time of the malpractice, not the time of its discovery (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years.

Coleman v. Korn · filed 2012-02-23(6)

Plaintiff was required to commence this legal malpractice action within three years of defendant’s withdrawal as his counsel, but failed to do so (see CPLR 214 [6]; cf. Gonzalez v Ellenberg, 300 AD2d 173, 174 [2002]).

Section 214(6) bars a legal malpractice action commenced more than three years after the claim accrued.

Daniels v. Turco · filed 2011-05-10(6)

The cause of action alleging legal malpractice accrued no later than April 18, 2005, when the defendants returned the case file to the plaintiff with an accompanying letter of discharge. That date was more than three years before the commencement of this action in June 2009 (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749 [2011]).

Section 214(6) provides a three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims.

Scott v. Fields · filed 2011-06-07(6)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]; Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749 [2011]).

Section 214(6) requires an action for legal malpractice to be commenced within three years after accrual.

R. BROOKS ASSOCIATES, INC. v. HARTER SECREST & EMERY LLP · filed 2012-01-31(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), an action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of accrual.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice actions a three-year limitations period regardless of whether the claim is pleaded in contract or tort, and section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year period.

Morson v. Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP · filed 2011-09-28(2), (6)

Under these circumstances all of plaintiffs claims against [defendant] are barred by the three-year statute of limitations, which governs actions to recover damages for professional malpractice ... regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.” ... N.Y. CPLR § 214(6)(Three-year statute of limitations for “an action to recover damages for [legal] malpractice ... regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.”); ... Section 349 has a three-year statute of limitations, see C.P.L.R. § 214(2), ... and “accrues when plaintiff becomes injured by the prohibited deceptive act or practice.” Parejas v. GE Capital Servs., No. 10-CV-3348, 2011 WL 2635778, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71996 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2011).

Section 214(6) requires legal-malpractice actions to be commenced within three years after accrual, subject to tolling for continuous representation.

DeStaso v. Condon Resnick, LLP · filed 2011-12-20(6)

An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after accrual (see CPLR 214 [6]; 203 [a]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Rakusin v Miano, 84 AD3d 1051, 1051-1052 [2011]; Goldman v Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 46 AD3d 481 [2007]; Carnevali v Herman, 293 AD2d 698 [2002]). The action accrues when the malpractice is committed (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d at 301; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]; Carnevali v Herman, 293 AD2d at 698-699).

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years.

Fleyshman v. Suckle & Schlesinger, PLLC · filed 2012-01-10(6)

The defendants sustained their initial burden by demonstrating, prima facie, that the alleged legal malpractice occurred more than three years before this action was commenced in May 2010 (see CPLR 214 [6]; Rupolo v Fish, 87 AD3d 684, 685 [2011]; Krichmar v Scher, 82 AD3d 1164, 1165 [2011]).

CPLR 214(6) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on legal malpractice actions.

Walter v. Castrataro · filed 2012-04-10(6)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the action, commenced almost six years after the alleged legal malpractice was committed, was barred by CPLR 214 (6), and, thus, properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives nonmedical professional malpractice actions a three-year limitations period.

Soffler v. Isla · filed 2012-06-13(6)

Actions for malpractice against nonmedical professionals are governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6) (see Town of Wawarsing v Camp, Dresser & McKee, Inc., 49 AD3d 1100, 1101 [2008]).

Section 214(3) requires conversion claims to be brought within three years.

Nasso v. Bio Reference Laboratories, Inc. · filed 2012-09-24(3)

Additionally, plaintiff's claim for conversion fails because it was not brought within the requisite three-year statute of limitations period. ... Plaintiff filed this suit on April 22, 2011 — more than three years after he completed his probation term and contacted Grodman and Tolan regarding his commissions, and therefore beyond the requisite limitations period.

Section 214 requires actions based on statutory violations to be commenced within three years.

Osberg v. Foot Locker, Inc. · filed 2012-12-06

Therefore, the appropriate limitations period is the three year period governing statutory violations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; cf. Romero v. Allstate Corp., 404 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir.2005).

CPLR 214(6) provides a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, subject to tolling under the continuous representation doctrine.

Sun Graphics Corp. v. Levy, Davis & Maher, LLP · filed 2012-04-26(6)

Plaintiffs failed to establish that the three-year statute of limitations on their cause of action alleging legal malpractice was tolled pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine (CPLR 214 [6]; see CLP Leasing Co., LP v Nessen, 12 AD3d 226 [2004]).

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years to bring a legal malpractice claim; intermittent phone calls do not establish continuous representation that tolls the deadline.

Hadda v. Lissner & Lissner LLP · filed 2012-10-09(6)

Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact whether the doctrine of continuous representation applied here to toll the limitations period (see Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 94 [1982]; CLP Leasing Co., LP v Nessen, 12 AD3d 226 [1st Dept 2004]). ... Even assuming the husband had the authority to speak for plaintiffs, the intermittent telephone contact between himself and defendants does not constitute “clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship between the client and the attorney” or of “a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim” (see Matter of Merker, 18 AD3d 332, 332-333 [1st Dept 2005] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Section 214(6) gives a nonmedical professional malpractice claim a three-year limitations period; later work on a separate matter does not toll that period through continuous representation.

Rodeo Family Enterprises, LLC v. Matte · filed 2012-10-10(6)

OBG’s second and fourth cross claims, which were premised upon Hertz Herson’s allegedly negligent advice and assistance in the drafting and incorporation of the valuation method for RJM in the 2004 Buy/Sell Agreement, were time-barred. ... Contrary to OBG’s contentions, the continuous representation doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations.

CPLR 214(6) bars a legal malpractice claim brought more than three years after it accrues.

Americana Capital Corp. v. Nardella · filed 2012-06-19[6]

Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim was not barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). Plaintiff alleges that the deceased negligently drafted a security agreement preventing plaintiff, as the creditor, from being able to enforce the agreement as against the debtor once the debtor defaulted. Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim accrued no earlier than when the agreement was executed, which occurred on November 29, 2002, the date of the last signature on the agreement (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]), and this action was commenced less than three years later.

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Bullfrog, LLC v. Nolan · filed 2013-01-16(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the accrual of the cause of action (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim seeking monetary damages to be brought within three years.

Debevoise & Flimpton LLP v. Candlewood Timber Group LLC · filed 2013-01-29(6)

The court properly found that defendants’ legal malpractice counterclaim was time-barred to the extent defendants seek monetary damages (see CPLR 214 [6]). The most recent allegation of negligence occurred in May 2006—more than three years before this action was commenced in November 2009—and defendants failed to show that the continuous representation doctrine applies.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to professional negligence and malpractice claims, beginning when the professional delivers the last report.

Southern Wine & Spirits of America, Inc. v. Impact Environmental Engineering, PLLC · filed 2013-03-28(6)

Indeed, the three-year statute of limitations on the professional negligence/malpractice claim did not begin to run until Impact delivered its last report to Southern Wine (see CPLR 214 [6]; Levin v PricewaterhouseCoopers, 302 AD2d 287, 288 [1st Dept 2003]).

Section 214(6) requires state law legal malpractice claims to be brought within three years.

Maye v. State of New York · filed 2013-04-25(6)

Public defenders acting in their role as advocates are not amenable to suit under § 1983, see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-25 (1981), and any state law legal malpractice claims are barred by New York’s three-year statute of limitations, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6).

Section 214 imposes a three-year statute of limitations on the claim at issue.

Mathews v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 2013-07-12

New York’s statute of limitations is only 3 years, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. Therefore, the 3-year statute of limitations governs.

Section 214(2) requires NYHRL claims to be filed within three years, subject to tolling while the EEOC charge is pending.

Senecal v. B.G. Lenders Service LLC · filed 2013-09-30(2)

According to New York State law, claims alleging violations of NYHRL must be filed in court within three years of the date on which the alleged violation occurred. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); ... Based on this authority, the Court finds that the tolling rule applies to Plaintiffs case and makes her NYHRL claims against Defendant Keena timely.

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice actions to be commenced within three years.

Champlin v. Pellegrin · filed 2013-11-07(6)

The statute of limitations on a cause of action for legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

DISCHIAVI, GARY M. v. CALLI, JR., WILLIAM S. · filed 2013-11-08[6]

To the extent that defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action on the ground that the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [6]; see generally Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 933-934), we conclude that they met their initial burden on their respective motions. We further conclude, however, that plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations (see generally Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 167-168). The court therefore properly determined that defendants were not entitled to the relief sought based on the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action after it accrues, unless the limitations period is tolled.

McDonald v. Edelman & Edelman · filed 2013-11-12(6)

Plaintiff then had three years to commence a malpractice action against defendants (see CPLR 214 [6]), absent an applicable ground for tolling the limitations period.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Landow v. Krauss · filed 2013-11-20(6)

In a legal malpractice action, the statute of limitations is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives legal-malpractice claims a three-year statute of limitations.

Aseel v. Jonathan E. Kroll & Associates, PLLC · filed 2013-05-29(6)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice measured from the alleged malpractice, subject to tolling under the continuous representation doctrine.

Louzoun v. Kroll Moss & Kroll, LLP · filed 2014-01-08(6)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years measured from the date of the alleged malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]; Singh v Edelstein, 103 AD3d at 873), but may be tolled by operation of the continuous representation doctrine (see Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934 [2007]; Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d at 167).

CPLR 214(6) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on legal malpractice actions.

Elmakies v. Sunshine · filed 2014-01-29(6)

The Sunshine defendants made a prima facie showing that the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]) expired before the action was commenced, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a question of fact in opposition (see Hadda v Lissner & Lissner LLP, 99 AD3d 476, 477 [2012]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on professional malpractice claims, except medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the claim is pleaded in contract or tort.

Livingston v. En-Consultants, Inc. · filed 2014-03-05(6)

An action alleging professional malpractice, with the exception of medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, is governed by a three-year statute of limitations period regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort (see CPLR 214 [6]; Castle Oil Corp. v Thompson Pension Empl. Plans, 299 AD2d 513, 514 [2002]).

Section 214(6) provides a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

Kitty Jie Yuan v. 2368 West 12th Street, LLC · filed 2014-07-09(6)

Here, the defendant Ronen Shiponi established his prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the cause of action, inter alia, to recover damages for legal malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6)’s three-year malpractice limitations period does not apply to a contract claim for fees paid for professional services that were not rendered.

New York Workers' Compensation Board v. Madden · filed 2014-07-03(6)

We reject Glaser’s assertion that the surviving portion of the cause of action is a disguised professional malpractice claim subject to a three-year statute of limitations, as it does not allege that Glaser’s professional services were negligently performed, but instead alleges a breach of the contract between the trust and Glaser in that the trust paid for services that Glaser did not render to it.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled by continuous representation.

TOWN OF AMHERST v. WEISS, ESQ., PAUL D. · filed 2014-09-26(6)

The statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]) and, therefore, the statute expired on June 26, 2004 unless it was tolled. ... Although defendants contended that their representation was not continuous, as evidenced by the fact that there were three separate and distinct actions by the Town to retain them and numerous gaps in their representation of the Town, we conclude that the Town nevertheless raised triable issues of fact concerning continuous representation.

Section 214 gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which may be tolled during continuous representation.

Grace v. Law · filed 2014-10-21

Regarding the Law defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's claims against them are time-barred, the statute of limitations in a legal malpractice action is three years from the accrual of the claim (see CPLR § 214). ... Plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations because it is unclear when the Law defendants' representation of plaintiff ended.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Tsafatinos v. Law Office of Sanford F. Young, P.C. · filed 2014-10-22(6)

Here, the defendants sustained their initial burden by demonstrating that the cause of action alleging legal malpractice accrued, at the latest, on April 22, 2008, a date more than three years before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [б]; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 796 [2013]; Bullfrog, LLC v Nolan, 102 AD3d at 719).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

Beroza v. Sallah Law Firm, P.C. · filed 2015-03-11(6)

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint based on the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Kitty Jie Yuan v 2368 W. 12th St., LLC, 119 AD3d at 674-675; Bill Kolb, Jr., Subaru, Inc. v LJ Rabinowitz, CPA, 117 AD3d 978, 980 [2014]; Macaluso v Del Col, 95 AD3d 959, 960-961 [2012]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period, which continuous representation tolls until that representation ends.

Alizio v. Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. · filed 2015-03-11(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]). ... The defendant met its prima facie burden by establishing that the statute of limitations expired on April 20, 2013, three years after the consents were executed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and new counsel.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an architectural malpractice claim, whether pleaded as negligence or breach of contract.

797 Broadway Group, LLC v. Stracher Roth Gilmore Architects · filed 2014-12-11(6)

Inasmuch as plaintiff did not commence this action until December 2012, plaintiff's fourth and fifth causes of action are time- barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives accounting malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled by continuous representation.

Schwartz v. Leaf, Salzman, Manganelli, Pfiel, & Tendler, LLP · filed 2014-12-17(6)

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to dismissal of the complaint based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the cause of action, inter alia, to recover damages for accounting malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]; Regency Club at Wallkill, LLC v Appel Design Group, P.A., 112 AD3d 603 [2013]). In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation (see Howish v Perrotta, 84 AD3d 1312 [2011]; Symbol Tech., Inc. v Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 69 AD3d 191, 196 [2009]; Rehberger v Garguilo & Orzechowski, LLP, 50 AD3d 760 [2008]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Benjamin v. Allstate Insurance · filed 2015-04-29(6)

The Odierno defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the present action was commenced after expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiffs legal malpractice cause of action (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions; a defendant meets its initial burden by showing the action began more than three years after the alleged malpractice.

MELNICK, BENEDETTA D. v. FARRELL, ESQ., PAUL J. · filed 2015-05-01(6)

Defendants thus met their initial burden with respect to the statute of limitations by establishing that the action was commenced more than three years after the alleged malpractice (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) bars a legal malpractice arbitration commenced more than three years after the representation ended.

Herrick Feinstein LLP v. Baram · filed 2015-10-15(6)

The IAS court correctly determined that the legal malpractice arbitration commenced by respondents was barred by the statute of limitations, having been commenced more than three years after the representation ended (CPLR 214 [6]).

A legal malpractice claim has a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice is committed, not when the client discovers it.

Yardeny v. Tanenbaum · filed 2015-10-28(6)

The three-year statute of limitations on a cause of action alleging legal malpractice begins to run when the malpractice is committed, not when the client discovers it (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 796 [2013]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim; continuous representation may toll that period until the representation ends.

O.K. Petroleum International, Ltd. v. Palmieri & Castiglione, LLP · filed 2016-02-10(6)

The defendant demonstrated that the alleged legal malpractice occurred more than three years before this action was commenced on June 11, 2012, through evidence showing that the plaintiffs had substituted counsel by June 3, 2009 (see CPLR 214 [6]; Rupolo v Fish, 87 AD3d at 685).

Section 214(6) bars untimely accounting malpractice claims.

Hustedt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Jones, Little & Co. · filed 2015-06-03(6)

supplemental claims of accounting malpractice were time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action.

Lindsay v. Pasternack Tilker Ziegler Walsh Stanton & Romano LLP · filed 2015-06-10(6)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice cause of action is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus, this legal malpractice action accrued on November 27, 2009, and the statute of limitations expired three years later, on November 27, 2012. This action was commenced on November 15, 2012. Therefore, this action was not time-barred.

Section 214(6) requires an accounting malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual.

CRC Litigation Trust v. Marcum, LLP · filed 2015-10-28(6)

Marcum established, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s malpractice claim against it accrued in February 2007, more than three years before the commencement of this action.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an accounting malpractice claim.

Weight v. Day · filed 2015-12-09(6)

A claim sounding in accounting malpractice is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]), and, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty is also governed by a three-year statute of limitations since, inter alia, the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature and it cannot be said that an allegation of fraud is essential to that claim (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]; Loeuis v Grushin, 126 AD3d 761, 764 [2015]; McDonnell v Bradley, 109 AD3d 592, 594 [2013]; cf. Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 541-542 [2004]; RGH Liquidating Trust v Deloitte & Touche LLP, 47 AD3d 516, 517 [2008]).

Section 214(6) applies to claims sounding in legal malpractice and bars them when its limitations period has expired.

Schottland v. Brown Harris Stevens Brooklyn, LLC · filed 2016-03-16(6)

To the extent that it does, Costello demonstrated that any claim for legal malpractice would be time-barred by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6)'s three-year period for legal malpractice does not apply to a contract claim for excessive legal fees that alleges no deviation from accepted legal practice.

Stewart v. Berger · filed 2016-03-23(6)

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (6) for legal malpractice claims does not apply here because the plaintiff made no claim that the defendants deviated from accepted standards of legal practice in the handling of his legal matters (see Postiglione v Castro, 119 AD3d 920, 922 [2014]; Loria v Cerniglia, 69 AD3d 583, 583 [2010]; see generally Estrada v Selman, 130 AD3d at 563; Rockland Tr. Mix, Inc. v Rockland Enters., Inc., 28 AD3d 630, 630-631 [2006]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice action.

Oliveto Holdings, Inc. v. Denis W. Light, PLLC · filed 2016-03-23(6)

The defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff’s legal malpractice cause of action accrued more than three years prior to the time this action was commenced.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from accrual, and the client's death ends continuous representation that could toll that period.

Davis v. Cohen & Gresser LLP · filed 2016-03-24(6)

An action to recover damages arising from an attorney's malpractice must be commenced within three years from accrual. A legal malpractice claim accrues when all facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and an injured party can obtain relief in court (CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 300-01 [2002]). The death of a client severs the attorney-client relationship ( Pace v Raisman & Assoc., Esq., LLP, 95 AD3d 1185 [2d Dept 2012]). Thus, a legal malpractice claim commenced more than three years after the client's death is untimely as a matter of law ( Id. ).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim to be brought within three years after the alleged malpractice occurs, unless the limitations period is tolled.

MAHRAN, KHALID S. v. BERGER, ESQ., MICHAEL B. · filed 2016-03-25(6)

With respect to the cause of action for legal malpractice, we further conclude that the court properly granted that part of the motion seeking summary judgment dismissing it on the ground that it was time-barred. “A cause of action for legal malpractice accrues when the malpractice is committed” (Priola v Fallon, 117 AD3d 1489, 1489 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and must be interposed within three years thereafter (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Quinn v. McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP · filed 2016-04-27(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]; Farage v Ehrenberg, 124 AD3d 159, 163 [2014]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Balanoff v. Doscher · filed 2016-06-22(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), the statute of limitations for a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice is three years. The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues (see CPLR 203 [a]). The defendant did not assert his counterclaim alleging legal malpractice until after the statute of limitations had expired.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Hahn v. Dewey & LeBoeuf Liquidation Trust · filed 2016-10-18(6)

Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint as time-barred under the three year statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice claims (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice action; the period is tolled while a court order eliminates the actionable injury, until reversal restores it.

Billiard Balls Management, LLC v. Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers, LLP · filed 2016-11-02(6)

It is undisputed that a legal malpractice action must be commenced within three years from accrual (CPLR 214 [6]). ... As the statute of limitations was tolled during the 504 days (or, one year, four months, 16 days) between the time Billiard’s ability to sue was extinguished and subsequently restored, the instant action filed on April 26, 2015 was timely filed.

Section 214(6) gives nonmedical professional malpractice claims three years from accrual, subject to tolling for continued work on the specific matter.

Jefferson Apts., Inc. v. Mauceri · filed 2016-07-25(6)

Here, the relevant statute of limitations is CPLR 214 (6), which provides that an action for non-medical professional malpractice must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual. ... Here, the recertification of the 2011 financials by Mauceri in his financial statement dated September 28, 2012, constituted an undertaking to perform further work on the 2011 audit. The branch of the motion seeking dismissal of the professional malpractice claims based upon the audit performed on the 2011 financials by Mauceri is, therefore, denied.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to a breach of contract claim insofar as it rests on professional malpractice.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Fuller & LaFiura, CPAs, P.C. · filed 2017-01-12(6)

The remaining part of the breach of contract claim is predicated upon Fuller's alleged malpractice, and we agree with Supreme Court that it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period (see CPLR 214 [6]). Thus, the remaining part of the breach of contract cause of action against Fuller for services provided prior to May 31, 2010 is time-barred (see New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v SGRisk, LLC, 116 AD3d at 1151; see generally Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 NY3d 1, 8 [2007]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims.

Risk Control Associates, Inc. v. Maloof, Lebowitz, Connahan & Oleske, P.C. · filed 2017-03-07(6)

The instant claims are also time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the claim accrues.

3rd & 6th, LLC v. Berg · filed 2017-04-12(6)

An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed (see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]; Rakusin v Miano, 84 AD3d 1051 [2011]; Tsafatinos v Lee David Auerbach, P.C., 80 AD3d 749 [2011]).

Legal malpractice actions have a three-year limitations period regardless of whether the claim sounds in contract or tort.

Hershco v. Gordon & Gordon · filed 2017-11-29(6)

The statute of limitations applicable to actions sounding in legal malpractice is three years “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6]). ... Accordingly, this action, commenced on or about October 27, 2014, was untimely.

Section 214(6) did not bar a legal malpractice claim where an underlying court order prevented the client from exercising a legal remedy until the order was reversed.

Billiard Balls Mgt., LLC v. Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers, LLP · filed 2018-01-02(6)

The motion court also properly determined that the action was timely commenced (CPLR 214[6]). Assuming that the malpractice claim accrued on January 11, 2013, when the time to answer the underlying complaint expired, or the earlier date of December 28, 2012, when the insurer disclaimed coverage, Billiard was prevented from exercising any legal remedy by virtue of the underlying motion court's order, which denied the underlying plaintiff's motion for a default judgment against Billiard, until that order was subsequently reversed by the Second Department in September 2015 ( Gershman v Ahmad , 131 AD3d 1104 [2d Dept 2015]; see Coyle v Lefkowitz , 89 AD3d 1054, 1056 [2d Dept 2011] ; Brown v State of New York , 250 AD2d 314, 319 [3d Dept 1998]).