N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(6)'s three-year limit did not bar a legal malpractice claim arising from tax advice given during the firm's ongoing representation of the client.

Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc. v. Proskauer Rose, LLP · filed 2015-07-02(6)

The motion court correctly determined that the legal malpractice claim, based on allegedly deficient tax advice provided by defendants beginning in 2005 and continuing throughout the course of its ongoing representation of plaintiff, is not time-barred ( see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 168 [2001]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse , 252 AD2d 179, 205-206 [1st Dept 1998]; see also Zwecker v Kulberg , 209 AD2d 514, 515 [2d Dept 1994]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which is tolled while the attorney continues to represent the client on the specific matter underlying the claim.

Tantleff v. Kestenbaum & Mark · filed 2015-09-02(6)

Based on that accrual date, the applicable three-year statute of limitations would have expired on October 3, 2004, approximately two years prior to the commencement of this action on September 15, 2006. However, it is undisputed that, pursuant to the doctrine of continuous representation, the three-year statute of limitations pertaining to the defendants’ alleged legal malpractice in October 2001 was tolled during the time period when the defendants continued to represent the plaintiffs before the IRS on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim.

Section 214(6) provides a three-year limitations period for accounting malpractice claims, subject to a continuous representation toll.

Stokoe v. Marcum & Kliegman LLP · filed 2016-01-28(6)

Nor was the complaint untimely, whether based on the three ... year limitations period of CPLR 214 (6) or the similar contractual limitations period in the engagement letters. Plaintiffs carried their burden of demonstrating evidentiary facts showing that the continuous representation toll applied (see CRC Litig. Trust v Marcum, LLP, 132 AD3d 938 [2d Dept 2015]), based on the “mutual understanding” set forth in the engagement letters that defendants could be called upon in a government investigation to justify their audit findings.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period; continuous representation does not toll it without a mutual understanding that the lawyer will continue work on the matter underlying the claim.

Rohe v. Bertine, Hufnagel, Headley, Zeltner, Drummon & Dohn, LLP · filed 2016-02-01(6)

Under New York law, malpractice actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(6) (McKinney 2015). ... There is simply no evidence of a mutual understanding between plaintiffs and defendants that concrete tasks remained to be performed in connection with the trusts or related entities. ... Therefore any claim for legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty occurred outside of the three-year window applicable to this action and is time-barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a professional malpractice claim, and continuous representation may toll that period.

Bronstein v. Omega Construction Group, Inc. · filed 2016-04-20(6)

Contrary to Cetera’s contentions, in response to his prima facie showing that the action was commenced against him more than three years after his withdrawal, the plaintiffs succeeded in raising a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine is applicable so as to toll the running of the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives three years to bring a nonmedical professional malpractice claim, subject to tolling when the professional undertakes further work on the same matter.

Jefferson Apartments, Inc. v. Mauceri · filed 2016-07-25(6)

Here, the relevant statute of limitations is CPLR 214 (6), which provides that an action for nonmedical professional malpractice must be commenced within three years of the date of accrual. ... The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 306 [2002]). Here, the recertification of the 2011 financials by Mauceri in his financial statement dated September 28, 2012 constituted an undertaking to perform further work on the 2011 audit.

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for a legal malpractice claim runs from the end of continuous representation.

25 Avenue C New Realty, LLC v. Law Offices of Jeffrey Samel & Partners · filed 2016-11-15(6)

Accepted as true, the allegations in the complaint establish ... that this action was commenced within three years after defendant Bigelow was relieved of his continuous representation of plaintiff by court order in January 2010 (see Booth v Kriegel, 36 AD3d 312, 314 [1st Dept 2006]; CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6)’s limitations period for legal malpractice claims may be tolled by continuous representation, including work on a sufficiently related matter.

Berger & Associates Attorneys, P.C. v. Reich, Reich & Reich, P.C. · filed 2016-11-22(6)

The motion court correctly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, because issues of fact exist whether the continuous representation doctrine applied to work performed by defendants in February 2012, and thus whether the statute of limitations was tolled until then (CPLR 214 [6]; ... 12 AD3d 226, 227 [1st Dept 2004]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, subject to the continuous representation doctrine when the representation concerns the matter underlying the claim.

Johnson v. Law Off. of Kenneth B. Schwartz · filed 2016-12-29(6)

Absent the continuous representation doctrine, the statute of limitations would have run in September 2010 (CPLR 214 [6]; see also Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 539, 541-543 [2004]). Plaintiff did not sue until March 2013. However, in opposition to Stetch’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff submitted an affidavit saying that he was continually represented by Stetch up to and including February 2012.

CPLR 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which the continuous representation doctrine tolls while both parties understand that further representation is needed on the matter underlying the claim.

CARBONE, ALISON M. v. BRENIZER, JON W. · filed 2017-03-31(6)

To the extent that defendants moved in the alternative to dismiss the action as barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions (see CPLR 214 [6]; 3211 [a] [5]), we agree with plaintiff that defendants are not entitled to that alternative relief. “ ‘The continuous representation doctrine tolls the statute of limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the malpractice claim’ ” (Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 934; see R. Brooks Assoc., Inc. v Harter Secrest & Emery LLP, 91 AD3d 1330, 1331). Regardless of when plaintiff’s claim accrued, defendants’ representation of plaintiff in the underlying action ended, at the earliest, upon entry of the judgment of divorce in June 2014 (see Zorn, 8 NY3d at 934; Gaslow v Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim & Ballon, 286 AD2d 703, 706, lv dismissed 97 NY2d 700).

Section 214(6)'s limitations period for legal malpractice may be tolled by continuous representation, which may continue when the client has no notice that the attorney has left the firm handling the case.

Cordero v. Koval Retjig & Dean PLLC · filed 2017-06-20(6)

However, the evidence raised triable issues whether the malpractice statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]) was tolled under the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from accrual, subject to tolling under the continuous representation doctrine.

Encalada v. McCarthy, Chachanover & Rosado, LLP · filed 2018-04-10(6)

Defendant as movant met its prima facie burden on summary judgment by showing that plaintiff's legal malpractice case was untimely as it was not commenced within three years of the date of accrual of each legal malpractice claim ( see CPLR 214[6]). However, plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the three-year statute of limitations was tolled under the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which continuous representation may toll.

Spitzer v. Newman · filed 2018-07-25(6)

Accordingly, he contends, the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice expired in 2012, before this action was [*2]commenced in 2015 ( see CPLR 214[6]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations as to this action ( see Grace v Law, 24 NY3d 203, 212; Stein Indus., Inc. v Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, 149 AD3d at 789-790; Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP, 138 AD3d 1085, 1086; cf. Red Zone LLC v Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, 27 NY3d 1048, 1049-1050). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the complaint was not subject to dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (5) ( see Stein Indus., Inc. v Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, 149 AD3d at 790; Louzoun v Kroll Moss & Kroll, LLP, 113 AD3d 600, 601-602).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, and continuous representation may toll that period.

Schrull v. Weis · filed 2018-11-14(6)

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations until July 29, 2014, when Weis [*3]allegedly informed the plaintiff that he did not have a case. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the legal malpractice cause of action as time-barred.

Section 214(6)'s three-year period for claims against engineering professionals is tolled by continuous representation when the engineer continues related corrective services, even under a separate agreement.

Mutual Redevelopment Houses, Inc. v. Skyline Eng'g, L.L.C · filed 2019-12-19(6)

Although this work was completed under a separate agreement, Skyline rendered these services to correct the engineering and construction defects that it failed to identify during its Phase 1 inspection in 2012. Since Skyline continued to provide services in connection with Phase I in 2014, the action commenced in 2016 is timely under CPLR 214(6) ( see Matter of Clark Patterson Engrs., Surveyor, & Architects, P.C. [City of Gloversville Bd. of Water Commrs.] , 25 AD3d at 986-987).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an architectural malpractice claim, but continuous representation may toll that period when the architect continues working to remedy problems.

Creative Rest., Inc. v. Dyckman Plumbing & Heating, Inc. · filed 2020-06-24(6)

Here, in opposition to the architect's prima facie showing that this action was commenced against it more than three years after it completed the contemplated work, the plaintiffs raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine applied to toll the running of the limitations period ( see Jeffrey Berman Architect v Kodsi , 169 AD3d 1019, 1020; Bronstein v Omega Constr. Group, Inc. , 138 AD3d 906, 908).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, and a factual question about continuous representation can prevent dismissal as untimely.

Keshner v. Hein Waters & Klein · filed 2020-07-15(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]). ... Here, the defendants met their initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the legal malpractice cause of action was untimely ( see CPLR 214[6]). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation ( see Kitty Jie Yuan v 2368 W. 12th St., LLC , 119 AD3d 674, 674; Macaluso v Del Col , 95 AD3d at 960; Kennedy v H. Bruce Fischer, Esq., P.C. , 78 AD3d 1016, 1017-1018).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that continuous representation can toll.

Ray-Roseman v. Lippes Mathias Wexler Friedman, LLP · filed 2021-08-26(6)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is three years ( see CPLR 214 [6]; McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]). ... We conclude that plaintiffs, in opposition, raised a triable issue of fact whether the continuous representation doctrine applied to toll the statute of limitations with respect to the malpractice claim insofar as it related to the 2014 loan transaction ( see generally Carbone v Brenizer , 148 AD3d 1806, 1807 [4th Dept 2017]).

Section 214(6)'s three-year limit on legal malpractice claims is not tolled by later representation on a different matter.

Goodman v. Weiss, Zarett, Brofman, Sonnenklar & Levy, P.C. · filed 2021-11-03(6)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the legal malpractice cause of action at issue was time-barred under CPLR 214(6), and the continuous representation doctrine did not toll the statute of limitations. ... Although the plaintiff alleges that the defendant continued to provide legal services to him between January 2011 and November 2013, he did not seek or obtain the defendant's legal services at any time during that period and, when the plaintiff did subsequently engage the defendant's legal services, that engagement was with regard to the performance of distinct services related to a different subject matter.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action, with the period tolled during the attorney's continuous representation on the matter.

York v. Frank · filed 2022-10-12(6)

The doctrine of continuous representation tolls the three-year statute of limitations "for the period following the alleged malpractice until the attorney's continuing representation of the client on a particular matter is completed" ( Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d at 164). Here, the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the action was commenced more than three years after the plaintiff's claims alleging legal malpractice in connection with the divorce action accrued.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which the continuous representation doctrine tolls until the representation ends.

Ellison v. Seltzer · filed 2022-10-18(6)

Supreme Court correctly determined that the legal malpractice claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]). While the claim accrued at the latest on September 23, 2016, the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations until December 8, 2016, when defendants informed plaintiff that they would not represent him on his appeal in the underlying employment action, but plaintiff did not commence this action until December 13, 2019 ( see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 170-171 [2001]).

Section 214(6)'s three-year period for legal malpractice may be tolled by continuous representation; disputed facts about that representation can prevent dismissal before an answer.

Basile v. Law Offs. of Neal Brickman, P.C. · filed 2022-11-01(6)

The legal malpractice claim may not be barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6]). ... These factual contentions concerning whether defendant continued to represent plaintiff during the relevant time period so as to toll the limitations period give rise to factual issues that cannot be resolved in this pre-answer motion to dismiss ( see Boesky v Levine , 193 AD3d 403 [1st Dept 2021]; Johnson v Law Off. of Kenneth B. Schwartz , 145 AD3d 608, 612 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period, which is tolled while the lawyer continuously represents the client on the same matter.

Kralik v. Marai · filed 2023-05-11(6)

Contrary to the court's determination, plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6]). Although the claim accrued on November 4, 2017, when defendant filed for arbitration of the underlying claims on plaintiff's behalf, the statute of limitations was tolled until the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding on October 10, 2018, when the underlying claims were dismissed, under the continuous representation doctrine ( see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 168 [2001]). Defendant's representation of plaintiff in the arbitration proceeding pertained to the same subject matter as that underlying the legal malpractice claim ( see id. ; see also Davis v Cohen & Gresser, LLP , 160 AD3d 484, 486 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 911 [2018]). Accordingly, this action, commenced August 3, 2021, was timely.

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice is not delayed by continuous representation when the attorney’s work on the matter was limited and the attorney-client relationship had broken down.

Link Motion Inc. v. DLA Piper LLP (US) · filed 2023-05-26(6)

Far from being “ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent,” De Carlo, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 636, DLA’s representation was effectively over within days of acting on LKM’s behalf. Accordingly, no facts alleged in the Complaint support application of the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an accounting malpractice claim, but continuous representation on the same matter can toll that period.

Island Consol. v. Grassi & Co., Certified Public Accountants PC · filed 2025-01-07(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214[6], the statute of limitations for accounting malpractice is three years. ... Here, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts establishing that the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations for professional malpractice in this case.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, subject to tolling for continuous representation.

Chester v. List · filed 2026-05-13(6)

In opposition to the defendant's prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation tolled the applicable statute of limitations based on the defendant's alleged intermittent representation of the plaintiff (see Byron Chem. Co., Inc. v Groman, 61 AD3d 909, 911).

Section 214(4) provides that the limitations period for a continuous trespass does not begin while the trespass continues.

Lauersen v. Antonopolous · filed 2014-07-03(4)

As to the trespass cause of action, the applicable statute of limitations does not commence while the trespass is continuous and ongoing (see Bloomingdales, Inc. v New York City Tr. Auth., 52 AD3d 120 [1st Dept 2008], affd 13 NY3d 61 [2009]; CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4)’s three-year limitations period does not govern these derivative claims; the six-year period under section 213(7) applies.

Zelouf International Corp. v. Zelouf · filed 2014-12-22(4)

In the Decision, the court erred by applying CPLR 214 (4)’s three-year statute of limitations to Nahal’s derivative claims.

Section 214(4) gives common law copyright infringement claims a three-year limitations period because infringement is an injury to property; each new infringement starts a new period.

Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc. · filed 2015-01-15(4)

After thinking about the issue, I conclude that three years is the correct limitations period for Flo and Eddie’s common law copyright claims. I disagree with the court in Harrison Greenwich; copyright infringement is an “injury to property.”

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for injury-to-property claims does not apply to New York common-law copyright infringement claims.

Capitol Records, LLC v. Harrison Greenwich, LLC · filed 2014-05-29(4)

Harrison argues, unpersuasively, that CPLR 214 (4), which sets a three-year statute of limitations for actions “to recover damages for an injury to property,” applies. ... Hence, where, as here, the CPLR does not provide a statute of limitations for common-law copyright infringement claims, the most faithful reading of the CPLR calls for the application of the six-year limitations period under CPLR 213 (1).

Section 214(6)'s three-year malpractice limit does not bar fraud, excessive-fee, or unjust-enrichment claims that are distinct from malpractice.

Johnson v. Proskauer Rose LLP · filed 2015-04-30(6)

This contention derives from CPLR 214 (6), which was enacted to prevent plaintiffs from circumventing the three-year statute of limitations for professional malpractice claims by characterizing a defendant’s failure to meet professional standards as something else, such as a breach of contract (for which there is a six-year statute of limitations) ... Here, the essences of the fraud and malpractice claims are sufficiently distinct from one another that the court properly did not invoke the duplicative claims doctrine. ... The excessive fee and unjust enrichment claims are also not duplicative of the malpractice claim.

Section 214(6) governs malpractice claims whether pleaded in contract or tort, but does not apply to a contract claim for a refund of legal fees that alleges no negligent performance of legal services.

Marte v. Graber · filed 2011-03-02(6)

Therefore, while defendant properly contends that CPLR 214 (6) governs malpractice cases, regardless of whether based on a theory of contract or tort, this provision is inapplicable to the instant action.

Section 214 (6) gives a chiropractic malpractice action a three-year limitations period when the chiropractic treatment is not integral to medical treatment by a physician.

ANDREWS, SUSAN M. v. RENAISSANCE CHIROPRACTIC, P.C. · filed 2015-05-08(6)

We thus conclude that plaintiff’s chiropractic malpractice action is governed by the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214 (2)’s three-year limit does not apply to a fraud claim under Executive Law § 63 (12) because that claim does not depend on a liability created by statute.

Matter of People of the State of N.Y. by Eric T. Schneiderman v. Trump Entrepreneur Initiative LLC · filed 2016-03-01(2)

Turning now to the statute of limitations issue, we find, for the reasons already stated, that the fraud claim under section 63 (12) is not subject to the three-year statute of limitations imposed by CPLR 214 (2), but rather, is subject to the residual six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213 (1) (see Morelli v Weider Nutrition Group, 275 AD2d 607, 608 [1st Dept 2000]).

CPLR 214 (2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims under Executive Law § 296.

Richardson v. Tops Mkts., LLC · filed 2025-11-21(2)

A cause of action based on Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (2) ( see Goldin v Engineers Country Club , 54 AD3d 658, 659 [2d Dept 2008], lv dismissed in part & denied in part 13 NY3d 763 [2009]; Henderson v Town of Van Buren , 15 AD3d 980, 981 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 710 [2005]; Karczewski v Sharpe , 260 AD2d 606, 606 [2d Dept 1999], lv dismissed 94 NY2d 858 [1999]).

CPLR 214(4) gives a claimant three years to bring a de facto taking claim, measured from the taking or, at the latest, when it becomes apparent, regardless of when the claimant discovers it.

Matter of South Richmond Bluebelt, Phase 3. 594 Assoc., Inc. (City of New York) · filed 2016-07-20(4)

Here, the record established that the headwall and overflow outlet were readily visible when the alleged taking occurred in September 2005. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly determined that the claimant’s time to bring any claim for damages for the alleged de facto taking expired in September 2008, and so properly granted the City’s motion to strike the claimant’s appraisal report and preclude it from offering any testimony concerning the report’s contents on that ground.

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitations period applies to a claim for inverse condemnation damages.

Matter of Billeris v. Incorporated Vil. of Bayville · filed 2017-10-18(4)

That cause of action should not have been dismissed since, inter alia, it stated a cause of action to recover damages for inverse condemnation (see generally Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777 [2012]), and was timely commenced (see CPLR 214 [4]; Linzenberg v Town of Ramapo, 1 AD3d 321, 322 [2003]).

Section 214(3) applies a three-year limitations period to the claims for unjust enrichment and money had and received when the plaintiff seeks money damages.

Finkel v. Dwyer · filed 2024-09-17(3)

Because Plaintiff seeks money damages, the CPLR § 214(3) three-year statute of limitations governs and therefore the Sixth Cause of Action is barred.

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on unjust enrichment claims seeking monetary damages.

Carter v. CIOX Health, LLC · filed 2017-05-30(3)

But because Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief has been dismissed, Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period applies to an unjust enrichment claim based on taking or detaining property and seeking damages.

City of Almaty, Kazakhstan v. Sater · filed 2020-11-30(3)

Because their claim for unjust enrichment rests on “the taking or detaining” of their property, it most closely resembles the types of actions defined in C.P.L.R. § 214. ... The Court therefore concludes that a three-year limitations period applies to their claim for unjust enrichment.

Section 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for unjust enrichment claims seeking monetary relief.

Davidoff v. Hershfield · filed 2024-12-24(3)

A three-year statute of limitations governs causes of action alleging unjust enrichment when the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief ( see CPLR 214[3]).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on an unjust enrichment claim seeking monetary relief for injury to property.

Gan v. GSUIG Real Estate Member LLC · filed 2025-08-21

But the Court notes that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for unjust enrichment is independently subject to dismissal as time-barred. See IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 139 (2009) (“Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of CPLR § 214.”); see also Ingrami v. Rovner, 45 A.D.3d 806, 808 (2d Dep’t 2007) (applying three-year statute of limitations to unjust enrichment claim because plaintiff sought monetary, as opposed to equitable, relief).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period does not apply to an unjust enrichment claim based on a quasi-contract theory; Section 213(2)’s six-year period applies.

Ghost in the Machine, Inc. v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. · filed 2025-01-21

There is general agreement among courts in this District that, depending on the type of unjust enrichment claim that is pled, either the three-year or six-year limitations period of Section 214 and 213, respectively, may apply. ... Because Snake Nation’s claim for unjust enrichment is a quasi-contract claim, the six-year limitations period in Section 213(2) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules applies.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for New York Civil Rights Law claims, to which the continuing violations doctrine can apply.

Jingrong v. Chinese Anti-Cult World Alliance · filed 2018-04-23

Plaintiffs' three surviving causes of action, assault and battery, New York Civil Rights Law, and Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, are governed by statutes of limitations of one, three, and four years, respectively. N.Y. CPLR 215 ; N.Y. CPLR 214 ; 28 U.S.C. § 1658. Incidents alleged in the complaint took place from 2009 to 2015, shortly before the case was filed. The continuing violations doctrine applies to all of these claims.

Section 214(2) gives Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period; denial of one employment application is not a continuing violation that tolls it.

Carrington v. New York State Off. for People With Dev. Disabilities · filed 2019-03-15(2)

We reject plaintiff's contention that Supreme Court erred in granting defendant's pre-answer motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was time-barred by CPLR 214 (2). ... Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the denial of an employment application is a single act rather than an ongoing policy of discrimination, and thus the continuing violation exception did not apply to toll the statute of limitations ( see generally Burroughs Corp. , 73 AD2d at 801; Martinez-Tolentino , 277 AD2d at 899).

Section 214(5)’s three-year period runs from the alleged wrongful conduct; the continuing effects of that conduct do not extend the period.

Williams v. Georgopoulos · filed 2020-06-03(5)

We agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiffs' causes of action accrued on the date of the child's birth, when the defendants allegedly failed to investigate Williams's fitness and filed a false report with ACS ( see Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill , 174 AD3d 720, 721-722; Bratge v Simons , 167 AD3d 1458, 1459-1460, Harrington v Suffolk County , 102 AD3d 923, 923-924). Since the plaintiffs filed their complaint more than three years after their causes of action accrued, their causes of action are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations ( see CPLR 214[5]; 215[3]; Calamari v Panos , 131 AD3d 1088, 1090; Elmakies v Sunshine , 113 AD3d 814, 815). Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply here, because ACS's custody of the child from the date of birth to February 20 was a continuing effect of the defendants' earlier, allegedly negligent conduct, and not a series of independent, distinct wrongs ( see Matter of Salomon v Town of Wallkill , 174 AD3d at 721-722; Bratge v Simons , 167 AD3d at 1460; Harrington v Suffolk County , 102 AD3d at 924).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL hostile work environment claims a three-year limitations period; a continuing violation is timely if an act in the pattern occurred within that period.

Brandenburg v. Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of North America · filed 2021-06-01(2)

In general, to bring a claim under the NYSHRL, the actionable conduct must occur within a three-year statute of limitations. Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... And at least one act in furtherance of the overall pattern of sexual harassment directed toward each Plaintiff occurred within the three-year limitations period, which began on March 18, 2017.

Section 214(2)'s three-year limitations period does not prevent earlier conduct from being considered in a timely hostile work environment claim.

Long v. Aerotek, Inc. · filed 2022-02-10(2)

At the outset, we reject defendants' contention that a sequence of events in early 2015 — in which LaRocca, plaintiff's supervisor for much of that year, forcibly kissed plaintiff, repeatedly propositioned her and made a veiled threat to impede her career after she rejected his advances — could not be considered in assessing plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because said conduct occurred beyond the statute of limitations for this action commenced in June 2018.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims to recover no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity.

Pinder v. Sonnet Serv. Co., Inc. · filed 2023-11-15(2)

Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, a claim to recover no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity such as the defendant is subject to the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214(2) ( see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 31 NY3d 187, 192; Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v NYC Off. of the Comptroller , 164 AD3d 853, 853-854).

Section 214(2) gives a claimant three years to sue a self-insurer for no-fault benefits because the self-insurer's liability is created by statute.

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. New York City Tr. Auth. · filed 2018-05-01(2)

We conclude that the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2), which governs disputes with respect to liabilities created by statute, should control this case.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on no-fault claims against a self-insurer.

Healthy Way Acupuncture, P.C. v. City of NY Off. of Comptroller · filed 2018-06-18(2)

The three year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(2) applies to no-fault claims against a self-insurer ( see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , ___ NY3d ___, 2018 NY Slip Op 03093 [2018]; Richard Denise M.D. P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 96 AD3d 561 [2012]).

CPLR 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims to recover no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity.

Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v. NYC Off. of the Comptroller · filed 2018-08-22(2)

As the Court of Appeals recently determined, a claim to recover no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity such as the defendant is subject to the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214(2) ( see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 31 NY3d 187, 192). Accordingly, the plaintiff's action is time-barred, and the defendant's motion to dismiss should be granted.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for an action to recover assigned no-fault benefits from a self-insurer.

Shirom Acupuncture, P.C. v. NYCTA-MABSTOA · filed 2018-11-09(2)

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5), to, among other things, dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action had been commenced after the expiration of the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2), which, defendant contended, was applicable to self-insurers such as defendant. ... For the reasons stated in Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (31 NY3d 187 [2018]), the judgment is affirmed.

Section 214 (2) sets a three-year limitations period for an assigned first-party no-fault benefits action against a self-insurer.

Super Acupuncture & Herbology, P.C. v. NYC Off. of Comptroller · filed 2018-11-09(2)

In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action had been commenced after the expiration of the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2), which, defendant contended, was applicable to self-insurers such as defendant. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment and argued, among other things, that the action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. By order entered May 20, 2015, the Civil Court granted defendant's motion and denied plaintiff's cross motion. For the reasons stated in Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. (31 NY3d 187 [2018]), the order is affirmed.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover no-fault benefits from self-insurers.

Midwood Total Rehab Med., P.C. v. Republic W. Ins. Co. · filed 2021-12-10(2)

Consequently, defendant's cross motion papers established, prima facie, that the action had been commenced after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to self-insurers ( see CPLR 214 [2]; Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 31 NY3d 187 [2018]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limit for no-fault benefits claims against self-insurers because their liability arises from statute.

Blano Med., P.C. v. Hertz Co. · filed 2023-12-15(2)

When a no-fault action is commenced against a self-insurer, the action is subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2), as the no-fault benefits are not being sought pursuant to a contract with a private insurer, which carries a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [2]), but rather because the liability exists solely due to a statute ( see Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth. ,31 NY3d 187, 196-197 [2018]; Greenway Med. Supply Corp. v Repwest Ins. Co. , 77 Misc 3d 135[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 51269[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2022]; Midwood Total Rehab Med., P.C. v Republic W. Ins. Co. ,73 Misc 3d 142[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 51206[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2021]). ... Therefore, the branch of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) and 214 (2) on the ground that a three-year statute of limitations had expired is denied.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period gives way to the six-year period under CPLR 213(2) when a claim for withheld no-fault benefits rests on both contractual and statutory obligations.

Contact Chiropractic, P.C. v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2013-12-03(2)

In Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. (37 AD3d 775 [2007]), the Second Department recognized the existence of a six-year statute of limitations on claims arising from wrongfully withheld first-party no-fault benefits. ... “as a matter of strict statutory interpretation, where the plaintiff’s action is based upon both a ‘contractual obligation or liability’ and upon a ‘liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute,’ the longer, six-year statute of limitations, as provided in CPLR 213 (2), is applied to the exclusion of the three-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR 214 (2)” ... Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.

For a continuing wrong subject to Section 214(4), money damages are limited to losses incurred within three years before the action began.

Soloway v. The CIM Group · filed 2024-02-02(4)

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and an accounting fail by virtue of the three-year limitations period afforded to by CPLR 214(4). To extent Plaintiff can show that Defendants breached their continuing duties to protect his interest in his units and to generate fair rental returns, however, these failures may "constitute[] a continuing wrong that is not referable exclusively to the day the original wrong was committed'" (Kaymakcian v Board ofManagers of Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407,407 [1st Dept 2008], quoting 1050 Tenants Corp. v Lapidus, 282 145, 146 [1st Dept 2001]). To the extent Plaintiff is seeking money damages, as opposed to equitable relief, "the claim is limited to any alleged damages that occurred within three years of the commencement of the instant action" (id. 49 AD3d 407-08 [citation omitted]).

Section 214(4)'s limitations period does not bar a nuisance claim when the continuing wrong doctrine applies.

Great Jones Studios Inc. v. Wells · filed 2021-01-21(4)

The continuing wrong doctrine also applies to plaintiff's nuisance claims, so that they are not barred by the applicable statute of limitations (CPLR 214[4]).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period from accrual, which the continuing violation doctrine can toll.

Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc. v. Lighthouse Living LLC · filed 2021-09-20(2)

The statute of limitations for a NYSHRL claim is “three years from the date that the claim accrues.” Allen v. New York City Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 51 F. Supp. 3d 504, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2)). Like the FHA, the statute of limitations for this statute is tolled by the continuing violation doctrine. ... As discussed above, the continuing violations doctrine applies in this case, and therefore Plaintiff’s state law claim is also timely.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for State Human Rights Law claims; earlier discriminatory acts may be considered when they form a continuing pattern extending into that period.

Farmer v. Mizuho Sec. USA LLC · filed 2026-05-12(2)

Although plaintiff's February 2021 termination is the only act occurring within the three-year limitations period governing claims under the State and City HRLs (see CPLR 214[2]; New York City Administrative Code § 8-502[d]) the complaint, as pleaded, sufficiently alleges that the termination was the culmination of a single continuing pattern of discriminatory or retaliatory conduct extending into the limitations period, thus linking the wrongful conduct to the termination.

Section 214(2) gives a cause of action for an Insurance Law violation a three-year limitations period.

Roumi v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. · filed 2021-02-17(2)

A cause of action based upon a violation of the Insurance Law is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[2]; Odierna v RSK, LLC , 171 AD3d 769, 771; Pike v New York Life Ins. Co. , 72 AD3d 1043, 1047; Dolce v Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 272 AD2d 432).

Section 214(5)’s three-year period for negligence claims does not apply to claims governed by the Montreal Convention.

Mata v. Avianca, Inc. · filed 2023-06-22(5)

In opposition, Mata urges that his claim should be governed by CPLR 214(5), which establishes a three-year limitations period for negligence claims. But Cohen recently rejected the argument that state tort law can supplant or supersede the Montreal Convention. ... The two-year limitations period of the Montreal Convention governs Mata’s claim.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for property damage does not apply to right of publicity claims under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.

Gibson v. SCE Grp., Inc. · filed 2023-06-28(4)

Our recent decision in Souza forecloses Plaintiffs’ argument that the district court erred in concluding that almost all of their right of publicity claims under NYCRL sections 50 and 51 were time-barred. In Souza, this Court definitively rejected the argument, advanced by Plaintiffs here, that because the right of publicity protects a commercial property interest rather than a personal interest, Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim should be governed by the three-year limitations period for property damage set forth in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4) instead of the one-year statute of limitations applicable to right-to-privacy claims under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury claim; an applicable COVID-19 toll extends that deadline by 228 days.

Bernard-Moses v. Chick-Fil-A, Inc. · filed 2024-02-06(5)

That the statute of limitations governing Plaintiff's claims against Prospective Defendant Sublessee Melbo expired on October 26, 2022, more than six months after Plaintiff's counsel discovered the involvement of this entity toward the end of April of 2022 ( see id. at 5, lines 11-18), is indubitable, as the October 26, 2022 date in question falls 228 days after the expiration of the standard three-year March 12, 2022 statute of limitations deadline that would have controlled this case absent the COVID-19 pandemic-related toll.

Section 214(5) generally gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action; the COVID-19 executive orders tolled that period from March 20 through November 3, 2020.

Cruz v. Guaba · filed 2024-04-24(5)

In March 2020, at the time the tolling provision of then Governor Cuomo's executive orders went into effect, the plaintiff had approximately 10 months remaining on the three-year limitations period to commence this action. This remaining period "started to run after the toll was lifted on November 4, 2020" ( Ruiz v Sanchez , 219 AD3d at 1364; see Brash v Richards , 195 AD3d 582, 583-585), and the plaintiff commenced this action approximately 6 months later.

Section 214 gives private nuisance claims a three-year limitations period that begins when injury is incurred.

Board of Mgrs. of the Promenade Condominium v. Eshaghpour · filed 2024-08-20(4), (5)

The statute of limitations for private nuisance claims is three years; it begins to run when injury is incurred. (See CPLR 214 [4], [5]; Kamath v Bldg. New Lifestyles, Ltd., 146 AD3d 765, 767 [2d Dept 2017].) Therefore, defendants’ private-nuisance cause of action is time-barred to the extent that it is based on conduct occurring more than three years before defendants filed their counterclaims.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover statutory penalties.

Boyle v. L-3 Communications Corporation · filed 2024-09-30

In New York, the limitations period for actions to recover statutory penalties is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214.