N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims enforcing liabilities created by statute, including both price and non-price claims under the Cable Act’s leased-access provision.

Goldstein v. Time Warner New York City Cable Group · filed 1998-04-24(2)

Thus, the Court rules that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) provides the appropriate limitations period for actions — concerning both price and non-price claims — under § 612(d).

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for liabilities created by statute does not govern claims under Insurance Law §§ 4224 and 4226 or General Business Law § 349 that are analogous to fraud claims.

Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1997-03-27(2)

Defendants contend that the applicable statute of limitation is the three-year period of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 1990), which applies to actions “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” ... We are inclined to follow the reasoning of the Ediciones court, and we therefore con- ... elude that the applicable limitations period for Plaintiffs claims under §§ 4224, 4226 and 349 is the six-year period for claims based on fraud.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year period for actions to recover upon a liability created by statute.

People ex rel. Holland v. Parkway Mobile Homes, Inc. · filed 1997-12-18(2)

Supreme Court correctly determined the applicable Statute of Limitations pursuant to CPLR 214 (2), which creates a three-year period for actions to recover upon a statutorily-created liability.

Section 214(2) gives a claim under Insurance Law § 2123 for an agent’s misleading statements three years from the date the statements are made.

Goldberg v. Manufacturers Life Insurance · filed 1998-04-21(2)

Similarly, the cause of action under Insurance Law § 2123 for misleading statements made by an insurer’s agent or representative, which survived the dismissal motion only as to HSMR and is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]), begins to run at the time the false or misleading statements are made. Again, since the alleged misrepresentations were made in connection with the purchase of the policy, the three years began to run in 1988 and expired in 1991.

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to claims under Article 4-A of New York’s Uniform Commercial Code because the liability has no common-law antecedent.

Banca Commerciale Italiana, New York Branch v. Northern Trust International Banking Corporation · filed 1998-10-26(2)

We hold that (1) claims brought under Article 4-A of New York’s Uniform Commercial Code are governed by CPLR § 214(2)’s three-year statute of limitations, and, thus, BCI-NY’s claim under Article 4-A is time-barred; and (2) BCI-NY’s common law claims fail because its telex to Northern Trust stating that it considered Northern Trust’s indemnification “null and void” constituted a general release of its claims.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not apply to actions governed by CPLR 213, including actions brought on behalf of a corporation.

Rupert v. Tigue · filed 1999-03-19(2)

Even if an action brought pursuant to Business Corporation Law § 720 is one “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214 [2]), the three-year period of limitations of CPLR 214 (2) does not apply to actions governed by CPLR 213.

Section 214(2) does not govern a tenant’s plenary rent overcharge action merely because the tenant obtained a DHCR order.

Bowen v. East 13th Street Realty Co. · filed 1999-09-15(2)

Plaintiffs plenary action for rent overcharges should have been dismissed as time barred under the applicable fourr year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213-a). Plaintiff incorrectly characterizes this action as one to recover upon a penalty pursuant to the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) order entered only against the building’s managing agent in January 1997 (cf., CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims seeking damages for a liability created by statute.

Dolce v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2000-05-15(2)

The plaintiff’s claims that the defendants Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (hereinafter Northwestern) and Robert P. Flanagan failed to comply with the regulations of the New York State Insurance Department concerning the sale of new life insurance policies to replace existing coverage are governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to actions seeking to recover damages for a liability created by statute (see, CPLR 214 [2]; Goldberg v Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 242 AD2d 175,181; see also, Buccino v Continental Assur. Co., 578 F Supp 1518, 1526).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim under General Business Law § 349.

Rabouin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1999-11-09(2)

With the foregoing in mind, plaintiff’s third cause of action, based on claimed violations of General Business Law § 349, must be dismissed because of the expiration of the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; Avdon Capitol Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 353 [2d Dept 1997]).

CPLR 214 (2) provides a three-year limitations period for General Business Law § 349 claims.

Cole v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States · filed 2000-04-13(2)

The General Business Law § 349 cause of action is barred by the three-year limitations period in CPLR 214 (2) (see, Avdon Capitol Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 353).

Section 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349(h) claim three years from the first compensable injury to be brought.

Gaidon v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America · filed 2000-05-02(2)

As to defendant’s Statute of Limitations argument, we hold ... that although the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (2) applies, the cause of action under General Business Law § 349 (h) is timely, inasmuch as it first accrued when plaintiffs first suffered compensable injury.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under General Business Law § 349.

Morelli v. Weider Nutrition Group, Inc. · filed 2000-09-07(2)

Claims pursuant to General Business Law § 349 are governed by the three-year limitation period set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (Cole v Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 271 AD2d 271, 272; Avdon Capitol Corp. v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 240 AD2d 353).

CPLR 214 (2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period that the date of discovery does not extend.

Wender v. Gilberg Agency · filed 2000-10-12(2)

Plaintiffs claims under General Business Law § 349, however, are time-barred as the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214 (2) applies to causes of action predicated thereon and the date of discovery rule is not applicable and cannot serve to extend that limitations period (see, Cole v Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 271 AD2d 271; Russo v Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 274 AD2d 878).

CPLR 214 (2)'s three-year limitations period does not apply to a State action to recover benefits improperly paid due to fraud.

In re the Claim of Barr · filed 2000-03-02(2)

Further, neither the two-year period set forth in Labor Law § 594 nor the three-year limitations period under CPLR 214 (2) have any application to an action by the State to recover benefits improperly paid out due to fraud (see, Matter of Soto [Catherwood], supra, at 396).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for deceptive trade practices claims under New York General Business Law § 349.

Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc. · filed 2000-08-29(2)

The statute of limitations for deceptive trade practices under New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349 is also three years.

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period.

Gaidon v. Guardian Life Insurance of America · filed 2001-05-08(2)

For these reasons, we hold that the three-year period of limitations for statutory causes of action under CPLR 214 (2) applies to the instant General Business Law § 349 claims.

CPLR 214 (2)’s three-year limit does not apply to a claim that existed at common law before it was codified by statute.

Mertz Trust v. Fox Meadow Partners, Ltd. · filed 2001-11-19(2)

Contrary to the appellants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly concluded that Action No. 1, which sought a judgment declaring null and void the release of lien on lot five, was not time-barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2) gives claims under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff is injured.

Soskel v. Handler · filed 2001-12-10(2)

For purposes of this motion and cross motion then, the court finds that plaintiff’s causes of action under sections 349 and 350 accrued on July 23, 1993. Consequently, the three-year statute of limitations expired on July 23, 1996, long before the commencement of this action in February of 2001.

Section 214(2) applies to liabilities created by statute, but restitution of payments made under a contract remains subject to the six-year contract limitations period even if a statute makes the contract unenforceable.

Doe v. Roe · filed 2002-01-15(2)

As the defendant attorney correctly observes, CPLR 214 (2) applies only to actions to “recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” The pertinent inquiry is whether the statute creates a liability for wrongs not recognized in the common or decisional law, and which would not exist but for the statute. ... A proceeding to obtain the restitution of sums paid pursuant to a contract, notwithstanding the fact that the contract is of a kind statutorily rendered unenforceable, is nonetheless one founded in contract and is thus covered by the six-year contractual statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limit for claims created by statute, but the court applied a different limitation period to a General Business Law § 349 claim it found sufficiently rooted in common-law fraud.

Matter of Coordinated Tit. Ins. Cases · filed 2004-01-08(2)

The statute of limitations for claims created by statute is three years. (CPLR 214 [2]). ... At this point in the litigation, with all claims intact, the court finds the General Business Law § 349 claim to have sufficient lineage with the common-law fraud claim to obtain coverage under CPLR 213 (1).

CPLR 214 (2) governs liabilities created by statute, so its rule for statutory liabilities does not apply to an APIP insurer’s equitable subrogation claim.

Allstate Insurance v. Stein · filed 2004-02-19(2)

Noting that the statute of limitations contained in CPLR 214 (2) “only governs liabilities which would not exist but for a statute” (67 NY2d at 174), this Court in Aetna held that the liability there at issue was in that category. ... This case is different from MVAIC and Aetna because it involves a traditional equitable subrogation, not a liability created by statute.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for private actions under General Business Law §349.

Bello v. New England Fin. · filed 2004-05-20(2)

The three (3) years statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(2) is applicable to private actions brought pursuant to General Business Law §349.

CPLR 214 (2) gives an insurer three years from each no-fault benefit payment to demand arbitration of a statutory loss-transfer claim.

In re the Arbitration between Liberty Mutual Insurance & Hanover Insurance · filed 2003-06-13(2)

We agree with respondent that a loss-transfer claim is statutorily created and that this case therefore is governed by CPLR 214 (2), which provides for a three-year statute of limitations for actions to recover upon liability created or imposed by statute. We further agree with respondent that its loss-transfer claim is timely because it seeks reimbursement for payments made within three years of its demand for arbitration of the loss-transfer claim.

Section 214(2) gives an insurer three years from its first no-fault payment to demand arbitration for reimbursement.

Allcity Insurance v. Eagle Insurance · filed 2003-09-03(2)

The Civil Court determined, upon granting Allcity’s first petition and remanding the matter for arbitration, that the arbitrator’s award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence and that it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since Allcity timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment (see CPLR 214 [2]; ...). Upon a review of the record, we agree with the October 30, 2000 determination of the court below and note that inasmuch ... as the parties had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate this issue, said determination constituted the law of the case and the August 2002 order of the court below erroneously fails to abide by same (see People v Evans, 94 NY2d 499 [2000], rearg denied 96 NY2d 755 [2001]).

Section 214(2) allows three years from the first no-fault payment to demand arbitration for reimbursement.

Empire Insurance v. Eagle Insurance · filed 2004-05-04(2)

Consequently, we find that the arbitrator’s award dismissing the claim as barred by the statute of limitations was not based on the evidence, and it was arbitrary and capricious for the arbitrator to dismiss the claim since petitioner timely made its demand for arbitration within three years of its first no-fault payment (see CPLR 214 [2]; Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d at 219-220, supra; Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 175 [1986]; Matter of Budget Rent-A-Car [State Ins. Fund], 237 AD2d 153 [1997]; Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. v GEICO-Government Empls. Ins. Co., 2003 NY Slip Op 50898[U]).

Section 214(2) gives a judgment creditor three years from becoming a judgment creditor to bring a direct claim for officer or director misconduct under B.C.L. § 720.

JSC Foreign Economic Ass'n Technostroyex-Port v. International Development & Trade Services, Inc. · filed 2003-12-20(2)

When a judgment creditor sues directly on a claim of officer or director misconduct, it is “an action to recover upon a liability imposed by statute,” subject to the three-year statute of limitations of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2), which runs from the date that the plaintiff became a judgment creditor.

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to statutory no-fault loss transfer claims between insurers.

Allcity Insurance v. Eagle Insurance · filed 2004-09-20(2)

As the rights and relationships between the parties were created by statute and did not exist in the common law, the statute of limitations found in CPLR 214 (2) must be applied.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not bar a county clerk’s ministerial entry of a judgment on a Workers’ Compensation Board award.

Workers' Compensation Board v. Rizzi · filed 2005-01-24(2)

The defendant’s contention that entry of the clerk’s judgment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 214 (2) is without merit. That limitations period applies only to actions commenced to enforce other judgments, whereas the entry of the judgment here was merely a ministerial act by the County Clerk, and no further court action was necessary to obtain the judgment.

CPLR 214(2)’s three-year limitations period applies to claims based on duties imposed by statute, even when a stipulation repeats those duties.

Mindel v. Phoenix Owners Corp. · filed 2005-04-21(2)

The causes of action for declaratory judgment and reimbursement of moneys, based on requirements set forth in both Administrative Code of the City of New York § 27-860 (adjoining chimneys) and a 1988 stipulation of settlement between the parties in a related action, were subject to the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]).

CPLR 214 (2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period.

Shelton v. Elite Model Management, Inc. · filed 2005-09-06(2)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to General Business Law § 349 claims under CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2) gives three years to bring a claim for no-fault benefits against a self-insurer because the self-insurer’s liability arises from statute.

Alleviation Supplies Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car · filed 2006-04-10(2)

Clearly, defendant’s liability in this case “would not exist but for a statute” (Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 174 [1986]), and since there is no contract of insurance pursuant to which plaintiff may be entitled to coverage for payment of first-party benefits, the court holds that the action is “an action to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute” and is controlled by the three-year limitation period contained in CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2) gives taxpayers three years to bring an action alleging illegal official acts or waste of municipal funds.

Espie v. Murphy · filed 2006-12-05(2)

A taxpayers’ action alleging illegal official acts or waste of municipal funds (see General Municipal Law § 51) is subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see Charleson v City of Long Beach, 297 AD2d 775, 777 [2002]; Shechtman v Sverdrup & Parcel Consultants, 226 AD2d 268 [1996]; but see Clowes v Pulver, 258 AD2d 50 [1999] [applying one-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 215 (4)]).

Section 214(2) gives three years to sue for a statutory penalty, starting when the penalty assessment becomes final.

Espada 2001 v. New York City Campaign Finance Board · filed 2007-03-05(2)

Petitioners initially assert that respondent’s counterclaim is untimely in that CPLR 214 (2) requires that “an action to recover upon a . . . penalty . . . created or imposed by statute” be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim. However, the Act sets forth no limitation as to when the Board must render a determination, and here there was no penalty upon which it could have sued until it rendered its determination in March 2006. There is no dispute that petitioners timely commenced this proceeding, and that the Board interposed its counterclaim well within three years after the assessment became final, which is when the claim accrued.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limit on statutory liability for negligent aiding and abetting fraud when the claim has no common-law analogue.

Baena v. Woori Bank · filed 2007-09-11(2)

The portion of plaintiffs claim which asserts negligence on the part of defendants in the aiding and abetting of fraud would not exist but for the KCA. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is the three-year bar set forth in CPLR § 214(2).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350-d.

People v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach · filed 2007-11-21(2)

Finally, we are of the view that the three-year statute of limitations provided for in CPLR 214 (2) applies to petitioner’s fifth, sixth and ninth causes of action pursuant to General Business Law §§ 349 and 350-d (see e.g. Morelli v Weider Nutrition Group, 275 AD2d 607, 608 [2000]), whereas the residual six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (1) applies to petitioner’s fourth and eighth causes of action (see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 89 [1975]).

Section 214(2) gives three years from the imposition of a statutory penalty to bring an action to recover it.

Espada 2001 v. New York City Campaign Finance Board · filed 2008-12-30(2)

CPLR 214 (2) applies a three-year limitations period to actions “to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” The statute requires that the action be commenced within three years of the imposition of the “penalty.”

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on liabilities that would not exist but for a statute, including claims under the French forced heirship law.

Estate of Meyer v. Heymann · filed 2009-03-19(2)

While the court below did not address this issue, we cannot ignore that the action is time-barred. Plaintiffs French forced heirship claims are “to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute” (CPLR 214 [2]), and thus are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) gives a claimant three years to sue for a statutory liability arising from a wrong not recognized at common law.

Hales v. HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A. · filed 2009-10-01(2)

New York C.P.L.R. 214(2) provides a three-year statute of limitations for “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.” For a liability to be created by statute, the statute “must impose a liability for wrongs not recognized in the common or decisional law.”

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to claims for first-party no-fault benefits against self-insurers; those claims have a six-year limit.

Spring World Acupuncture, P.C. v. NYC Transit Authority · filed 2009-05-22(2)

Defendant asserted that, since its liability as a self-insurer arose solely from the No-Fault Law (Insurance Law § 5101 et seq.) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, the action was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (2), applicable to actions “to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute.” ... In our opinion, defendant’s argument lacks merit. ... Accordingly, we hold that an action to recover first-party no-fault benefits from a self-insured entity is subject to the same six-year statute of limitations as an action against an insurer pursuant to the policy.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims based on statutorily imposed liability; the period begins when damages are ascertainable.

People v. Nationwide Asset Services, Inc. · filed 2009-10-09(2)

Third, to the extent that the petition seeks and this court is inclined to award damages and restitution based upon past acts of deceptive business practices and false advertising outlawed by General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 and statutory fraud made actionable by Executive Law § 63 (12), the claims would not appear to be time-barred even under the three-year limitations period governing an action to recover upon a statutorily imposed liability ... Thus, it does not appear that any of the consumers in question were in a position to ascertain their damages, thus giving rise to a choate right of action against respondents, more than three years prior to commencement of this proceeding.

CPLR 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover liabilities, penalties, or forfeitures created or imposed by statute.

People v. Pharmacia Corp. · filed 2010-02-03(2)

CPLR 214 (2) prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for “an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute.”

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice actions a three-year limitations period from accrual regardless of whether the claim is framed in contract or tort.

Rafter v. Liddle · filed 2010-03-30(6)

Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6), the statute of limitations for an action to recover damages for legal malpractice is three years from the time of accrual, “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.”

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for replevin actions, subject to the demand rule when property was lawfully obtained.

In re the Accounting of Flamenbaum · filed 2010-03-30(3)

The parties agree that pursuant to CPLR 214 (3), the applicable statute of limitations in a replevin action is three years; the parties disagree on whether the statute began to run in 1945, at the time the tablet initially disappeared, or 61 years later, when claimant’s demand for the tablet was made and refused. ... The museum filed its claim within three years after the estate rejected its demand. Accordingly, this proceeding is not barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions to recover upon a liability created or imposed by statute.

Corsello v. Verizon New York, Inc. · filed 2012-03-29(2)

That claim is subject to the three-year limitations period imposed by CPLR 214 (2), which applies to actions “to recover upon a liability . . . created or imposed by statute” (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 208 [2001]). The complaint here alleges no successful deception of plaintiffs within three years of the time the action was brought, and thus Verizon’s statute of limitations defense to the General Business Law claim is prima facie valid.

Section 214(2) gives a claim for no-fault benefits against the New York City Transit Authority a three-year limitations period because the authority’s obligation arises from the no-fault statute.

Denise v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 2012-06-19(2)

Because defendant New York City Transit Authority’s obligation to provide no-fault benefits arises out of the no-fault statute, the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in CPLR 214 (2) bars plaintiffs claim (see M.N. Dental Diagnostics, P.C. v New York City Tr. Auth., 82 AD3d 409 [2011]).

Section 214(2) gives claims based on liabilities created by statute a three-year time limit.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Excel Imaging, P.C. · filed 2012-06-21(2)

Because New York’s no-fault laws substantively altered defendants’ liability for common law fraud and unjust enrichment, CPLR 214(2) applies to those claims.

Section 214(2) requires actions on statutory liabilities, penalties, or forfeitures to be commenced within three years.

Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP · filed 2013-01-17(2)

An “action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214 [2]).

Section 214(2) does not govern claims for attorney deceit when the liability existed at common law and the statute only adds remedies.

Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP · filed 2014-04-01(2)

A cause of action for attorney deceit therefore existed as part of New York’s common law before the first New York statute governing attorney deceit was enacted in 1787 (see Amalfitano, 12 NY3d at 12 [discussing L 1787, ch 35, § 5]). The 1787 statute enhanced the penalties for attorney deceit by adding an award for treble damages, but did not create the cause of action (see State of New York v Cortelle Corp., 38 NY2d 83, 85 [1975] [“Statutory provisions which provide only additional remedies or standing do not create or impose new obligations,” within the meaning of CPLR 214 (2)]; see also Orr v Kinderhill Corp., 991 F2d 31, 34 [2d Cir 1993] [“That the statute merely enlarges the common-law scheme of liability or grants additional remedies is insufficient to bring it within CPLR 214 (2)”]).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on liabilities created or imposed by statute, including claims under the Banking Law.

Hutter v. Countrywide Bank, N.A. · filed 2014-08-22(2)

Liability under the Banking Law is likewise created or imposed by statute, ... such that the same three-year statute of limitations applies, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). Thus, as Plaintiffs claim accrued in December 2006, the PFAC would be futile as against Dragna.

Section 214(2) gives claims for violations of Real Property Law § 339-bb a three-year limitations period, including claims for aiding and abetting those violations.

Pomerance v. McGrath · filed 2015-01-20(2)

The three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (2), as opposed to the six-year statute of limitations under CPLR 213 (1), applies to the underlying statutory violation at issue (see Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438, 443-444 [1995]). Accordingly, the fourth cause of action is untimely.

Section 214(2) gives a county three years to recover a town’s community college chargebacks because the town’s liability exists solely by statute.

Town of North Hempstead v. County of Nassau · filed 2016-05-26(2)

The three-year period contained in CPLR 214 to recover upon liabilities created by statute, therefore, is the more appropriate period.

CPLR 214(2)’s three-year limit applies only to liabilities that would not exist without a statute; it does not bar a misrepresentation claim based on common-law principles codified by Insurance Law § 3105.

CIFG Assurance North America, Inc. v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC · filed 2016-11-29(2)

CPLR 214 (2) applies “only where liability would not exist but for a statute,” and “does not apply to liabilities existing at common law which have been recognized or implemented by statute” ... Thus, CPLR 214 (2) does not bar the misrepresentation claim.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not apply to an Executive Law § 63(12) fraud claim based on conduct actionable at common law.

People Ex Rel. Schneiderman v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC · filed 2016-12-13(2)

Accordingly, section 63 (12) is not subject to the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR 214 (see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169, 174 [1986]).

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to a reimbursement claim created by statute that did not exist at common law.

Town of North Hempstead v. County of Nassau · filed 2017-04-26(2)

Since the County’s right to seek reimbursement from the Town was created by statute, and did not exist at common law, such an action would be governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period only for claims that would not exist without a statute; it does not cover common-law claims merely because their damages arise from statutory assessments.

Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. · filed 2017-05-04(2)

Here, the only cause of action governed by CPLR 214 (2) is the General Business Law § 349 claim. The remaining state-law claims alleged in the Complaint are common-law causes of action that are not brought pursuant to any statute, and the RICO claim is brought pursuant to a federal statute that is governed by a federally-prescribed limitations period.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for liability created by statute that was not recognized at common law.

New York v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2017-05-25(2)

Under New York law, the applicable limitations period for an action to recover upon a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created or imposed by statute is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2).

Section 214(2)'s three-year period does not apply to a contractual liability merely because a statute requires the contract to impose it.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Any-Time Home Care Inc. · filed 2017-12-07(2)

“[A]n action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute except as provided in [CPLR] 213 and 215” must be commenced within three years of the accrual date (CPLR 214 [2]), while an action based upon a liability or obligation imposed by contract must be commenced within six years (see CPLR 213 [2]). ... However, we agree with Supreme Court that the claims are contractual in nature and, thus, that the action is timely.

CPLR 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for causes of action alleging a statutory violation.

People v. Trump · filed 2018-11-21(2)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(2), causes of action alleging a statutory violation have a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period applies to liabilities created by statute, not common-law fiduciary duty claims that a statute permits an officer to bring directly.

Paul Schmidt, M.D. v. Stone · filed 2020-03-23(2)

Here, Stone-Jozwiak’s potential liability for breaching her fiduciary duty to Astoria Medical existed at common law well before enactment of NY BCL § 720 and its predecessors. ... This suit therefore falls outside the ambit of § 214(2).

CPLR 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a statutory claim that expands common-law liability and would not exist without the statute.

ELM Suspension Sys., Inc. v. 45 E. 33rd St. Condominium · filed 2022-01-13(2)

The motion court correctly applied the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions to recover on liabilities created or imposed by statute (CPLR 214[2]) to plaintiff's claim under Real Property Law § 339-l. Although CPLR 214(2) does not apply to "claims which, although provided for in a statute, merely codify or implement an existing common-law liability," it was properly applied here because the Real Property Law § 339-l claim, although " akin to" a common law constructive trust claim, expands upon the common law of constructive trust such that it " would not exist but for the statute " ( see People v Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC , 31 NY3d 622, 629, 632-633 [2018]).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not apply when a claim arises from an insurance contract and relief does not require a violation of insurance law.

Brettler v. Allianz Life Insurance Company of North America · filed 2022-05-31(2)

With a violation of the insurance laws unnecessary to plaintiff’s complete relief in the cause of action alleged, the limitations period established by § 214(2) has no applicability.

CPLR 214 (2) sets a three-year limitations period for a claim that a municipal development agreement is void because of an official’s conflict of interest.

Rural Community Coalition, Inc. v. Village of Bloomingburg · filed 2014-06-05(2)

The Second Department, in a case affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has held that the three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 (2) applies to such a claim (see Stettine v County of Suffolk, 105 AD2d 109, 113 [1984], affd 66 NY2d 354 [1985]). The Berensten deeds had been a matter of public record since 2009, before the 2010 development agreement was executed. Any conflict was known or should have been known as of the execution in 2010 of the development agreement, which was also a public document. This action was not brought until 2014.

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitations period does not apply to a claim that a condominium owner breached the bylaws by refusing to reimburse repair costs; that claim sounds in contract.

Board of Mgrs. of Top of the Ridge Condominiums v. Uhlfelder · filed 2025-07-02(4)

The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, contending that the complaint sounded in negligence and, therefore, was subject to the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214(4). ... Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the complaint, which alleges that the defendant breached the bylaws by failing to reimburse the plaintiff for its repair costs, sounds in breach of contract, not negligence ( see Wikiert v City of New York , 128 AD3d 128, 136).

Section 214(5)’s three-year period does not govern a breach-of-warranty claim arising from a sale of goods, even when the breach causes personal injury.

Bort v. Sears · filed 1969-01-21(5)

This court concludes that the “ essence ” of this case is breach of contract. ... Commercial reasonableness demands that the four-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to breach of warranty regarding the sale of the goods in this case.

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitation does not govern an employer's claim against an employee for breach of duties arising from their contractual relationship.

Western Electric Co. v. Brenner · filed 1976-03-16(4)

Defendant contends that the complaint sounds in tort and is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 4). ... The employer-employee relationship is clearly contractual in nature, be that contract express or implied (36 NY Jur, Master and Servant, § 10), and therefore the complaint is governed by a six-year limitation period and is not time-barred (CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 214’s three-year period does not govern an employer’s claim for an employee’s breach of loyalty arising from the employment relationship; that claim is contractual.

Western Electric Co. v. Brenner · filed 1977-02-17(4)

Contract, not tort, forms the basis of plaintiff’s causes of action.

CPLR 214’s three-year period for conversion does not bar a payee’s timely contract claim against a bank that collected a check over a forged indorsement.

Hechter v. New York Life Insurance · filed 1978-12-06

Reduced to its essence, defendant’s contention is that section 3-419 (subd [1], par [c]) ... of the Uniform Commercial Code abolishes the precode contract action against a collecting bank, restricting the payee’s remedy to a suit in conversion with its attendant three-year limitation period (CPLR 214). To adopt this position would be to evince a fundamental misapprehension concerning the nature of the pre-code contract cause of action. ... Left undisturbed is the plaintiffs right to elect a contract rather than tort remedy, and concomitantly, to shroud his claim in the longer six-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a malpractice claim, measured here from delivery of the allegedly negligent opinion letter.

Central Trust Co. v. Goldman · filed 1979-05-22(6)

The order is modified and the first cause of action alleging malpractice is dismissed. That claim accrued when the opinion letter was drafted and delivered on August 8, 1972 and is therefore barred by the three-year statute (see CPLR 214, subd 6; Schwartz v Heyden Newport Chem. Corp., 12 NY2d 212).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions but does not govern a breach of warranty claim covered by the Uniform Commercial Code’s four-year limit.

McCarthy v. Bristol Laboratories, Division of Bristol-Myers Co. · filed 1978-01-23(5)

Thus, we think that the Uniform Commercial Code contemplates in precise language a remedy for recovery of damages for personal injury arising from a breach of warranty and that the time limitations for the bringing of the action for personal injury arising from breach of warranty legislated in the code is "a different time * * * prescribed by law” (see CPLR 201) which, accordingly, is excepted from the operation of CPLR 214 (subd 5), which applies to actions to recover for personal injuries on other theories of liability.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for injury to property does not apply to a negligence claim arising from a contract for sale between parties in privity; UCC 2-725 governs the claim.

Great Atlantic Insurance v. Courier/Citizen Co. · filed 1982-03-29(4)

However, CPLR 214 (subd 4) is not available to plaintiff in this case. ... By pleading in such case a cause of action sounding in negligence, the applicable limitations period does not change but is still governed by section 2-725, because the origin and nature of the liability asserted is still breach of warranty.

Section 214(3)’s three-year period does not apply when the facts establish a claim for breach of contract, even if the complaint is framed as conversion.

Brew v. Mason · filed 1982-07-09(3)

County Court concluded that the gravamen of plaintiff’s action was conversion or replevin and, applying the three-year ...Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 3), dismissed the complaint as untimely. This was error. ... Accordingly the six-year Statute of Limitations was applicable (see CPLR 213, subd 2).

Section 214’s three-year tort limitation period does not bar claims for property or pecuniary loss arising from a contractual relationship when the six-year contract period applies.

Baratta v. Kozlowski · filed 1983-06-27(2), (3)

Since the claimed damage is to property or pecuniary interests and the asserted liability not only relates in part to an alleged failure to use due care, but also “had its genesis in the contractual relationship of the parties” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assoc., supra, p 396), application of the six-year Statute of Limitations to the claims against the Bank is mandated by Sears and Video Corp. (supra).

Section 214’s three-year limit does not govern a counterclaim whose essential claim is breach of contract, even if it also sounds in tort.

Marine Midland Bank, N. A. v. Jerry Hamam, Inc. · filed 1983-09-23

In granting plaintiff’s motion, Special Term held that the counterclaim states causes of action for intentional infliction of economic harm to defendants’ business and for conversion, and that those causes of action are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214. ... While we agree that the counterclaim may be viewed as attempting to plead a cause of action for prima facie tort or for conversion, we conclude nonetheless that it alleges breaches of an agreement which governed the relationship of the parties and their conduct toward one another.

Section 214's three-year limitation period applies to a claim seeking tort damages for a telephone company's gross negligence or willful misconduct in providing service.

Columbe v. New York Telephone Co. · filed 1984-06-07(5)

Since plaintiffs must demonstrate gross negligence or willful misconduct in order to recover, and are seeking tort damages (recovery of consequential damages for apparent loss of profits), the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to negligence actions applies and serves to bar this action (Zuckerbrod v New York Tel. Co., 87 AD2d 574, 575).

Section 214(5)'s three-year period does not govern a personal-injury claim for breach of implied warranty against a remote product supplier when the four-year warranty period applies.

McGregor v. J. & L. Adikes, Inc. · filed 1985-07-08(5)

It is appellants’ contention that, as there is an absence of privity between plaintiff and them, the applicable Statute of Limitations is found in CPLR 214 (5), providing for a three-year period of limitation, rather than the four-year period found in Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725 (1) ... We cannot agree. ... Special Term therefore acted properly in denying that part of appellants’ motion which sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for breach of implied warranty as time barred.

Section 214(5)’s three-year personal injury period does not govern a third-party beneficiary’s reimbursement claim under a no-fault insurance policy; the contract limitations period applies.

Hanover Insurance v. Fleisher · filed 1983-08-15(5)

Appellant’s claim against the no-fault insurers is based on a policy of insurance under which he is a recognized third-party beneficiary; therefore, the proper limitation period for his cause of action is that applicable for contract actions, i.e., six years (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 193; Nahmias v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 91 AD2d 680; Micha v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 94 AD2d 835; cf. Matter ofDe Luca [MVAIC], 17 NY2d 76).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims; a claim for breach of a bank’s agreement is governed by the six-year contract period instead.

Simcoe & Erie General Insurance v. Chemical Bank · filed 1991-07-15

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214 (McKinney's 1990) (“CPLR § 214" or “§ 214”), governing negligence claims, provides for a three-year limitations period. CPLR § 213 applies to actions for breach of contract and allows a six-year limitations period. ... Therefore, the six-year period set forth in CPLR § 213 governs this action.

Section 214(4)’s three-year negligence period does not govern a full-service garage bailment claim seeking only contract damages; the six-year contract period applies.

Rodriguez v. Central Parking System of New York, Inc. · filed 2005-10-18(4)

This case brings up for review the single issue of the statute of limitations to be applied in bailment cases and, more specifically, defendants’ contention that all such cases are governed by the three-year negligence statute (CPLR 214 [4]) and not by the six-year “contractual obligation or liability” statute (CPLR 213 [2]). ... Accordingly, given that the complaint and bill of particulars request only contract damages and disclaim any theory of negligence, the claim raised is properly subject to a six-year limitations period.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period does not apply to a claim for no-fault benefits based on an insurance contract, even when statutes mandate the contract’s terms.

Mandarino v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance · filed 2007-02-27(2)

Although the relevant terms of such contracts are mandated by various provisions of the Insurance Law, we find that the six-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR 213 (2) applies to the exclusion of the three-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not govern uninsured motorist benefit claims against self-insured vehicle owners because those claims are contractual and subject to a six-year period.

ELRAC, Inc. v. Suero · filed 2007-03-06(2)

We disagree. The respondents’ claim for uninsured motorist benefits against a self-insured vehicle owner, while statutorily mandated, remains “contractual rather than statutory in nature” (Matter of Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth. v Evans, 95 AD2d 470, 472 [1983]; cf. Matter of De Luca [Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp.], 17 NY2d 76, 79 [1966]) and, as such, is subject to the six-year statute of limitations (see Matter of New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Degorter], 133 Misc 2d 93, 97 [1986]).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not govern no-fault benefit claims against self-insured motor vehicle rental companies; those claims have a six-year limit.

Pinnacle Open MRI, P.C. v. Republic Western Insurance · filed 2008-01-03(2)

As is apparent from the foregoing, to suggest that motor vehicle ownersAessors, who choose to operate as self-insurers, should benefit from the shorter statute of limitations provided by CPLR 214 (2), for “liability . . . created or imposed by statute except as provided in sections 213 and 215,” because they do not physically issue a policy of insurance or a no-fault endorsement, overlooks the fact that the very same obligations are imposed upon insurance companies by mandating that their policies contain such endorsements. ... Accordingly, it is the holding of this court that a claim for no-fault first-party benefits against a self-insured motor vehicle rental company will be subject to the six-year statute of limitations provided by CPLR 213 (2), and the motion of Republic Western to dismiss this action as untimely is denied.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to a medical provider’s claim for no-fault first-party benefits; the claim is subject to a six-year limit.

Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut v. Glenwood Medical, P.C. · filed 2008-02-21(2)

The claim, which is subject to the six-year statute of limitations in CFLR 213 (2), not the three-year statute in CPLR 214 (2) ... was not timely interposed where it had been denied in full by the insurer, for lack of medical necessity, more than six years before the provider demanded arbitration (see Benson).

Section 214(2) gives a provider three years from accrual to bring a claim against MVAIC for assigned first-party no-fault benefits.

Kings Highway Diagnostic Imaging, P.C. v. MVAIC · filed 2008-04-14(2)

Because plaintiff did not commence this action until November of 2004, it was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [1996]; cf. Mandarino v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 37 AD3d 775 [2007]).

Section 214’s three-year period does not govern a property-damage claim based on breach of a lease’s repair duties merely because the complaint also alleges negligence.

Gross v. 420 East 72nd Street Tenants Corp. · filed 2008-09-15(4)

Here, however, the first cause of action is for breach of the lease, which breach allegedly caused a substantial diminution in the value of the apartment, and is governed by the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. Although the complaint alleges that some of the problems were caused by negligence, it also alleges that defendant failed to comply with contractual provisions of the lease requiring it to keep the apartment in good repair.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitation period for negligence claims.

Cordero v. Epstein · filed 2008-10-10

The negligence claims against the other moving defendants are time-barred by the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214.

Section 214(2)'s three-year period does not govern contractual claims merely because they have statutory underpinnings.

New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v. 21st Century Constr. Corp. · filed 2018-01-09(2)

In a recent and virtually identical collection action, however, the Third Department ruled that the causes of action asserted by the Board are contractual in nature, regardless of their statutory underpinnings, and, therefore, are governed by the six-year statute of limitations of CPLR 213 (2) ( see Any-Time Home Care , 2017 NY Slip Op 08595 at *2-3; see also Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. , 55 Misc 3d 1216 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50609[U], *9-10 [*7] [Sup Ct, Albany County 2017]). ... Given that the Board first levied assessments on January 31, 2011 and members were given 45 days to respond ( see Papa Aff., Ex. B, pp. 2-3; Ex. G, ¶ 2256), the Board's claims accrued no earlier than March 18, 2011, and this action timely was commenced on January 31, 2014 ( see id. , Ex. D).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Kraemer v. Edelstein · filed 2025-02-24(6)

Moreover, as with the claims against the other defendants, these claims are also barred by either the three-year statute oflimitations for legal malpractice, or the six-year statute oflimitations for fraud (CPLR 214 [6]; CPLR 214 [8]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period, which continuous representation may toll.

99th Ave. Holdings, LLC v. Schatz · filed 2025-03-13(6)

An action to recover damages arising from an attorney's malpractice must be commenced within three years from the accrual (see CPLR § 214 [6]). ... At this juncture, particularly because plaintiff retained new counsel in the TSI Litigation, the court can not determine whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period that runs from when the malpractice is committed.

Onco360 Holdings 1, Inc. v. McDermott Will & Emery, LLP · filed 2025-05-14(6)

"The statute of limitations for a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice is three years, which accrues at the time the malpractice is committed" ( Tulino v Hiller, P.C. , 202 AD3d 1132, 1135 [citations omitted]; see CPLR 214[6]). Here, the defendants satisfied their initial burden by demonstrating that the cause of action alleging legal malpractice accrued, at the latest, in 2014, and that the instant action was commenced in 2020, more than three years later ( see Roubeni v Dechert, LLP , 159 AD3d 934, 935).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled during continuous representation.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Leopold & Assoc., PLLC · filed 2025-05-28(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]; Fraumeni v Law Firm of Jonathan D'Agostino, P.C. , 215 AD3d 803, 804; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159, 163). ... Instead, under the circumstances presented, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the relationship ceased to exist on June 27, 2018. ... Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives a professional malpractice claim, other than medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, a three-year limitations period regardless of whether the claim sounds in contract or tort.

Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. v. Lawless & Mangione Architects & Engrs., LLP · filed 2025-02-19(6)

The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the architect defendants' motion which were to dismiss, as time-barred, the fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, sounding in professional malpractice. "[A]n action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort is subject to a three-year statute of limitations" ( Anderson v Pinn , 185 AD3d 534, 535 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 214[6]).

CPLR 214 (6) sets a three-year limitations period for architectural malpractice claims.

Providence State St. Hous. Dev. Fund Co., Inc. v. Buckingham Constr., LLC · filed 2025-01-31(6)

The causes of action asserted by East House against Pardi arise from allegations of architectural malpractice and thus are governed by the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214 (6) ( see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.] , 3 NY3d 538, 541-542 [2004]; Gelmac Quality Feeds, Inc. v Ronning , 23 AD3d 1019, 1020-1021 [4th Dept 2005]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims against architects.

Board of Mgrs. of Cipriani Club Residences at 55 Wall Condominium v. Howard L. Zimmerman Architects & Engrs. DPC · filed 2024-09-26(6)

Plaintiff's cause of action for professional malpractice against Zimmerman is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for a claim sounding in professional malpractice against an architect (CPLR 214[6]; New York City Sch. Constr. Auth. v Ennead Architects, LLP , 148 AD3d 618, 618 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, including related contract and fiduciary duty claims arising from the same alleged misconduct.

Page v. Ellenoff Grossman & Schole LLP · filed 2024-09-16(6)

Under the relevant statute, the three-year malpractice limitations period applies “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). Accordingly, related claims for, for example, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, that arise out of the same alleged malpractice misconduct, are governed by the malpractice limitations period.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions.

Mehmeti v. Karlin · filed 2024-10-24(6)

The motion court also correctly found that plaintiff's action against defendant, his former attorney, sounds in legal malpractice and is time-barred. The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice cause of action is three years ( McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; CPLR 214[6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which the continuous representation doctrine may toll.

Dellwood Dev., Ltd. v. Coffinas Law Firm, PLLC · filed 2024-12-11(6)

The defendants established, prima facie, that these causes of action alleging legal malpractice were time-barred, as they accrued more than three years before the plaintiffs commenced this action ( see CPLR 214[6]). However, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised questions of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214(6)'s three-year period for accounting malpractice begins when a missed tax filing deadline creates an actionable injury and can be tolled by continuous representation.

Gagliardi v. Prager Metis CPAs LLC · filed 2024-06-28(6)

The Court next finds that Plaintiffs’ accounting malpractice claim began to accrue when Defendants failed to timely file Plaintiffs’ tax returns, but that the three-year statute of limitations is tolled by the doctrine of continuous representation.

Section 214(6) gives accounting malpractice claims a three-year limitations period even when they are pleaded as breach of contract.

Lateral Inv. Mgt., LLC v. Marcum, LLP · filed 2024-10-29(6)

Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims are also presumptively untimely under CPLR 214(6) because they are malpractice claims "based in contract" (see also Pannone v Silberstein, 118 AD3d 413, 415 [l st Dept 2014]).

Section 214(6) requires an accounting malpractice action to be commenced within three years.

Getzel Schiff & Pesce, LLP v. Shtayner · filed 2024-12-11(6)

An action to recover damages for accounting malpractice must be commenced within three years ( see CPLR 214[6]; Schwartz v Leaf, Salzman, Manganelli, Pfiel & Tendler, LLP , 155 AD3d 803, 803).

CPLR 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims.

Jobar Holding Corp. v. Halio · filed 2025-01-09(6)

Thus, this cause of action should not have been dismissed at this stage of the litigation, as it was commenced in 2017 and therefore does not run afoul of the applicable three-year limitations period for professional malpractice set forth in CPLR 214(6) ( see Hsu v Liu & Shields LLP , 127 AD3d 522, 523 [1st Dept 2015] appeal dismissed in part, lv denied in part 26 NY3d 996 [2015]).

Section 214(6) sets the limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Sang Seok Na v. Pulvers, Pulvers & Thompson, LLP · filed 2024-02-27(6)

To the extent his claims are reviewable and are based on the order on appeal, we conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss because the record establishes that the statute of limitations on plaintiff's legal malpractice claim expired on April 1, 2018, and plaintiff did not initiate the instant action until, at minimum, September 25, 2019 ( see CPLR 214[6]; Sharp v Ferrante Law Firm , 220 AD3d 587, 587-588 [1st Dept 2023]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims.

Gaudinier v. Wrobel · filed 2024-03-14(6)

Since the parties' professional relationship concluded no later than January 2017, when plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant with the Grievance Committee, and plaintiff commenced this action more than three years later, the Poughkeepsie City Court correctly concluded that plaintiff's claim for legal malpractice was barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the alleged malpractice occurs.

Sebco Dev., Inc. v. Siegel & Reiner, LLP · filed 2024-03-20(6)

Pursuant to CPLR § 214(6) the statute of limitations for claims of non-medical malpractice is three years from the time the cause of action accrues, irrespective of whether the claim is premised on contract or tort. ... Thus, this claim accrued in 2015 and the applicable three year statute of limitations expired in 2018. To the extent that this action was commenced in 2023, eight years after the alleged malpractice occurred and the cause of action accrued, it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

RSD857 LLC v. Wright · filed 2024-05-13

In addition, a cause of action for legal malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR § 214), and Wright did not bring a claim against Cohen until after the statutory period expired.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to sue for accountant malpractice; continuous representation tolls that period only while both parties understand that work on the specific matter will continue.

Open House Manhattan Inc. v. de Visser · filed 2024-02-22(6)

Causes of action alleging accountant malpractice have a three-year statute of limitation period. ... And since plaintiff's allegations related to defendant's subsequent conduct do not create issues of fact as to the existence of defendant's continued representation, it was required to commence this action by July 31, 2019.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Sharp v. Ferrante Law Firm · filed 2023-10-24(6)

Therefore, the statute of limitations for plaintiff's malpractice claim expired in July 2021, three years after the attorney-client relationship ended ( see CPLR 214[6]). As plaintiff did not commence this action until June 23, 2022, the malpractice claim is time-barred.

Section 214(6) requires legal malpractice claims to be filed within three years of accrual, whether based in contract or tort.

Catsiapis v. Pardalis & Nohavicka, LLP · filed 2023-08-09(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the cause of action regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort ( see CPLR 214[6]).

Section 214(6) gives three years to bring a claim against a design professional whether framed as contract or malpractice; dismissal requires a clear accrual date.

Clover Communities Beavercreek, LLC v. Mussachio Architects P.C. · filed 2023-06-07(6)

Under New York law, a cause of action against a design professional, “whether the claim is based upon breach of contract or malpractice,” is subject to a three-year statute of limitations period. ... Because it is not clear from the face of the amended complaint when Plaintiffs’ breach of contract and professional malpractice claims accrued, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that any of Plaintiffs’ claims is untimely.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice actions.

Cooper v. Guilor · filed 2023-02-22(6)

The defendants made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the action was not commenced until after the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice actions ( see CPLR 214[6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.] , 3 NY3d 538, 541-542; Willis Ave Dev., LLC v Block 3400 Constr. Corp. , 142 AD3d 993, 995).

Section 214(6) gives a civil legal malpractice claim three years from when the malpractice is committed; pursuing an appeal that was not necessary does not toll that period.

Colucci v. Rzepka · filed 2022-10-27(6)

"An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after accrual" ( Zorn v Gilbert , 8 NY3d 933, 933-934 [2007] [citation omitted]; see CPLR 214 [6]). In the civil context, the claim "accrues when the malpractice is committed" ( Ruggiero v Powers , 284 AD2d 593, 594 [3d Dept 2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 638 [2001]), "not at the time that the injury is discovered" ( Lavelle-Tomko v Aswad & Ingraham , 191 AD3d 1142, 1143 [3d Dept 2021]; see McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]). ... If plaintiffs believed the best course of action was to also file an appeal, they were certainly free to, but this did not toll the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice occurs, rather than when the client discovers it.

Kreutzberg v. Law Offs. of John Riconda, P.C. · filed 2022-11-16(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]; Tulino v Hiller, P.C. , 202 AD3d at 1135), which accrues at the time the malpractice is committed, not when the client discovers it ( see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 166; Goodman v Weiss, Zarett, Brofman, Sonneklar & Levy, P.C. , 199 AD3d 659, 661; Sclafani v Kahn , 169 AD3d 846, 848).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim to be brought within three years of accrual.

Wiggins v. Liakas Law, P.C. · filed 2023-03-08(6)

“An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed.” 3rd & 6th, LLC v. Berg, 149 A.D.3d 794, 795 (2d Dep’t 2017) (citing CPLR 214(6)). ... Given the uncertainties as to the outcome of Wiggins’s ongoing claims in the New York Supreme Court and the likelihood that the limitations period for Wiggins’s legal malpractice claim elapsed after the commencement of this action, the Court concludes that a stay is appropriate.

CPLR 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Simmons v. Jones Law Group, LLC · filed 2023-03-15(6)

"'An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed'" ( Joseph v Fensterman , 204 AD3d 766, 769, quoting Schrull v Weis , 166 AD3d 829, 831; see CPLR 214[6]). "Accrual is measured from the commission of the alleged malpractice, when all facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred and the aggrieved party can obtain relief in court" ( Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159, 164; see McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301). Here, the defendants failed to satisfy their initial burden of demonstrating, prima facie, that the cause of action alleging legal malpractice was untimely. Since the alleged malpractice occurred on September 26, 2016, when the defendants failed to appear for trial on Simmons's behalf, this action, commenced less than three years later, was timely.

Section 214(6) provides a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims and Judiciary Law § 487 claims arising from the same transactions.

Fraumeni v. Law Firm of Jonathan D'Agostino, P.C. · filed 2023-04-19(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 arising out of the same transactions as the legal malpractice cause of action, is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159). ... Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's legal malpractice and Judiciary Law § 487 causes of action were time-barred, as they accrued when the underlying actions were commenced in 2013 and 2015 ( see Sclafani v Kahn , 169 AD3d 846, 849; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d at 167-168).

Section 214(6)’s three-year limit applies to nonmedical professional malpractice claims only when the defendant qualifies as a professional; the proposed allegations did not establish that the testing contractor did.

Blackhawk Development, LLC v. Krusinski Construction Company · filed 2022-06-01(6)

Whether CPLR §214(6)’s three-year statute of limitations applies turns on whether plaintiff’s allegations establish that Advance is a “professional” under the statute. ... In sum, in my view, plaintiff’s allegations in its proposed First Amended Complaint do not support Advance’s statute of limitations defense.

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, and continuous representation may toll that period.

Tulino v. Hiller, P.C. · filed 2022-02-23(6)

Here, the defendants satisfied their initial burden by demonstrating that the alleged [*3]legal malpractice accrued on February 14, 2013, the deadline to file the note of issue in the underlying action, which was more than three years prior to the commencement of the instant action ( see CPLR 214[6]; Roubeni v Dechert, LLP , 159 AD3d 934, 935). However, in opposition, the plaintiffs raised a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine tolled the running of the statute of limitations until June 24, 2013, when the Supreme Court, upon reargument, in effect, vacated the March 18, 2013 order, and thereupon granted W & H's motion for leave to withdraw as counsel.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice actions; continuous representation can delay the running of that period.

Walsh v. Wallace Law Off. · filed 2022-03-31(6)

Defendants established prima facie that this legal malpractice action was time-barred, as it was commenced on May 26, 2020, more than three years from the date it accrued. The three-year statute of limitations began to run on March 16, 2017, when a consent to change attorney form was executed by plaintiff, defendant Wallace Law Office, and defendant Leav & Steinberg, LLP (L&S), the incoming counsel (CPLR 214[6]; Frost Line Refrig., Inc. v Gaswirth, Mirsky & Stein, LLP , 25 AD3d 532, 532-533 [2d Dept 2006]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, with the period potentially tolled by continuous representation on the particular matter.

Joseph v. Fensterman · filed 2022-04-13(6)

"'An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed'" ( Schrull v Weis , 166 AD3d 829, 831, quoting 3rd & 6th, LLC v Berg , 149 AD3d 794, 795; see CPLR 214[6]). ... Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that the third cause of action was untimely. In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the continuous representation doctrine or any other legal basis applied to toll the statute of limitations ( see Potenza v Giaimo , 165 AD3d 1186, 1187-1188).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Golden Jubilee Realty, LLC v. Castro · filed 2021-07-28(6)

"An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years after the accrual of the cause of action" ( Bullfrog, LLC v Nolan , 102 AD3d 719, 719-720; see CPLR 214[6]). ... Under the circumstances of this case, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until specific performance was awarded in the Karpen action, on April 2, 2015 ( see Frederick v Meighan , 75 AD3d 528, 531-532). The instant action was commenced on December 29, 2017. Thus, Pacht failed to meet his initial burden of establishing that the plaintiffs' cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice was time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period beginning when the alleged error occurs; representation of a separate entity does not toll that period.

Morgan & Mendel Genomics, Inc. v. Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP · filed 2022-01-06(6)

While the court did not reach the issue, the complaint was also untimely. A claim for legal malpractice is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6]). The malpractice accrues, and the limitation period starts running, when the act, error, or omission occurs ( Shumsky v Einstein , 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]). Here, the alleged malpractice would have occurred no later than December 14, 2012, the last day that plaintiff contends that the patent application could have been timely filed. Plaintiff did not commence this action until November 22, 2019. The continuous representation doctrine does not save plaintiff's claim, given that plaintiff is not entitled to any tolling that might have occurred while defendant was representing nonparty Albert Einstein College of Medicine, a separate entity.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Xue v. Jensen · filed 2020-11-19(6)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for legal malpractice is time barred by the three-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice in New York, as Jensen and the Jensen Law Firm did not provide legal services to Xue within three years of the filing of the Complaint.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice action; continuous representation on the same matter may toll that period.

Lavelle-Tomko v. Aswad & Ingraham · filed 2021-02-18(6)

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 25, 2016, more than nine years after accrual and well beyond the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [6]). ... Accordingly, although plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment granting dismissal of the statute of limitations defense, we find that Supreme Court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants based on that defense.

Section 214(6)'s three-year malpractice limitations period does not govern claims based on intentional acts rather than negligence.

Wimbledon Fin. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Hallac · filed 2021-03-25(6)

The first and second causes of action — for aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, respectively — are not time-barred malpractice claims in disguise ( see e.g. Johnson v Proskauer Rose LLP, 129 AD3d 59, 68, 70 [1st Dept 2015]; Mitschele v Schultz, 36 AD3d 249, 255 [1st Dept 2006]). The essence of these claims is not negligence or "a failure to utilize reasonable care" ( Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 541 [2004] [quoting legislative history of CPLR 214(6)]); rather, plaintiff alleges intentional acts.

Under section 214(6), an architectural malpractice claim by an intended third-party beneficiary accrues when the architect completes performance, even if the plaintiff discovers damage later.

Town of W. Seneca v. Kideney Architects, P.C. · filed 2020-10-02(6)

Because plaintiff "is not a 'stranger to the contract,' " its professional malpractice cause of action accrued upon completion of performance by defendant ( Lizza Indus., Inc. , 22 NY3d at 1030; see City School Dist. of City of Newburgh , 85 NY2d at 538). Therefore, the complaint is time-barred ( see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for malpractice by a real estate appraiser, including claims labeled negligent misrepresentation or breach of contract when they rest on the same professional duty.

ShareStates Invs., LLC v. Creagh & Assoc., Inc. · filed 2020-10-14(6)

Thus, the negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract causes of action are merely incidental to the professional malpractice cause of action, and all of the plaintiff's causes of action are subject to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to professional malpractice ( see Scott v Fields , 85 AD3d 756, 758; LSF6 Mercury Reo Inv., LLC v Mitchell Assoc. , 2012 NY Slip Op 33435[U]).

Under CPLR 214(6), the limitations period for negligent legal advice given during continuous representation does not begin until the related litigation is completed.

Marine Midland Trust Co. of the Mohawk Valley v. Penberthy, De Iorio & Rayhill · filed 1969-05-20(6)

The only correct interpretation is to apply the “ continuous treatment ” doctrine ... and thus find the Statute of Limitations did not start to run until the litigation was completed.

Section 214(6)’s three-year malpractice period does not begin before an injury occurs; an implanted prosthesis caused no injury until it broke.

Murphy v. St. Charles Hospital · filed 1970-07-20(6)

As was correctly noted by the Special Term, the plaintiffs’ cause of action could not have accrued before the prosthesis broke because a necessary element of the cause of action—injury—had not yet occurred.

Section 214(3)’s three-year period for recovering a chattel begins when a lawful custodian refuses a demand for its return.

Wiel v. Curtis · filed 1970-12-07(3)

Thus, no wrong had been committed by the defendant until plaintiff demanded the files on or about February 17, 1969. When the defendant refused to comply with the demand, a cause of action for either conversion or replevin accrued.

Section 214(6) gives a patient three years to bring a malpractice claim; a claim based on misdiagnosis accrues when the negligence occurs, not when the patient discovers it.

Schiffman v. Hospital for Joint Diseases · filed 1971-02-22(6)

An action to recover damages for malpractice must be instituted within three years from the time the cause .of action accrued (;CPLR 203, subd. [a]; 214, subd. 6). ... We do not think we should further contract the general rule applicable to diagnostic negligence by marking the beginning of the time permitted for the commencement of an action for malpractice by the date of the patient’s discovery of the physician’s negligence.

Section 214 does not bar a radiation-injury negligence claim before the injury manifests.

Le Vine v. Isoserve, Inc. · filed 1972-07-18

To bar plaintiffs from bringing their lawsuit before any manifestation of injury is, on the facts presented, unwarranted.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an attorney malpractice action; when counsel continues treating the same matter, the claim accrues when that treatment ends.

Instrument Systems Corp. v. Whitman, Ransom & Coulson · filed 1974-02-22(6)

Thus, the cause of action accrued at the date of that meeting, whether one relies on the continuous treatment doctrine or the line of cases holding that the cause of action accrues when the act or failure to act constituting the malpractice occurs, irrespective of when the damage results or the client discovered or should have discovered the facts. ... Since the action was commenced within three years of this accrual date, the action is not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(6) gives malpractice actions a three-year limitations period; in foreign-object cases, the period does not begin until the patient could reasonably discover the malpractice.

Slagen v. Marwill · filed 1974-06-07(6)

An action based on malpractice is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations. (CPLR 214, subd. 6.) ... Therefore, where a foreign object has been negligently left in the patient’s body, the Statute of Limitations will not begin to run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the malpractice.

Section 214’s three-year period applies to a physician’s failure to warn a patient about the dangers of an oral medication when the claim sounds in malpractice.

Abril v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1975-01-07(6)

The question has then arisen whether such a cause of action is governed by the one-year Statute of Limitations applicable to assault (CPLR 215, subd 3) or the three-year statute applicable to actions to recover damages for personal injuries and malpractice (CPLR 214, subds 5, 6). ... This seems to me much closer to traditional concepts of malpractice than of assault. ... Accordingly I hold that the one-year Statute of Limitations applicable to assault does not bar the seventh cause of action, and the defense is stricken.

Section 214(6) gives a negligence claim against an accountant a three-year limitations period when no agreement to achieve a particular result is alleged.

Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co. · filed 1973-08-08(6)

No contract or agreement is alleged, either in the complaint or in the affidavits on this motion, which would indicate an intent to achieve a particular objective in the performance of a service. The six-year statute is not applicable but the three-year period of limitations applies.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to legal malpractice claims.

Gilbert Properties, Inc. v. Millstein · filed 1973-12-27(6)

Consequently, since the plaintiff’s suit for malpractice was commenced in 1970, the determination of the Appellate Division that the-plaintiff’s action was time-barred by the three-year period of limitations (CPLR 203; CPLR 214, subd. 6), though based on an earlier date of accrual, should be affirmed.

Section 214(6)'s three-year malpractice period is not tolled by continuous treatment when the defendant did not treat the same or a related condition after the alleged malpractice.

Fonda v. Paulsen · filed 1974-07-17(6)

In any event, in this case neither of these defendants is subject to any tolling of CPLB 214 (subd. 6) by the “ continuous treatment” doctrine.

Section 214’s three-year period applies to architect malpractice, but a claim involving continuous professional efforts to correct the original problem accrues when those efforts end.

County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc. · filed 1974-08-14

Although the relationship between these parties originated in contract, the gravamen of the action against defendant Lacey is professional malpractice and the applicable limitation period is three years. ... The latter doctrine holds that when a course of treatment by a professional which includes wrongful acts and omissions has been continuous and is related to the original condition or complaint, the claim accrues at the end of the treatment. ... It is clear that the professional relationship between these parties continued through the entire period that defendant Lacey acted on the county’s behalf with respect to the problem of the leaking roof.

Section 214 provided a three-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions under the provisions applicable before July 1, 1975.

Rubinstein v. French Hospital · filed 1976-01-19

The applicable period within which this action for medical malpractice had to be commenced was three years, as governed by the then applicable provisions of CPLR 214.

At the time of the alleged malpractice, subdivision 6 required a medical malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the claim accrued.

Burwell v. Whitmoyer · filed 1977-03-10(6)

At the time the alleged medical malpractice occurred CPLR 214 (subd 6) provided that an action for damages be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued. ... On this record, therefore, it is our view that the cause of action against defendant accrued during September, 1972.

Section 214(6) gives architectural malpractice claims a three-year limitation period; continuous treatment of the same problem can delay accrual.

Naetzker v. Brocton Central School District · filed 1975-12-12(6)

Trial Term, therefore, correctly concluded that appellant’s cause of action was grounded in malpractice governed by the three-year period of limitation under CPLR 214 (subd 6). ... Thus, appellant’s cause of action accrued upon termination of the professional relationship between the parties with reference to the subject project, being September 22, 1970, and was, therefore, time-barred under CPLR 214 (subd 6).

Former subdivision 6 of CPLR 214 governs the timeliness of medical malpractice actions.

Jackman v. St. Vincent's Medical Center · filed 1976-04-12(6)

On the record in this case, it is clear that plaintiff’s action was not timely commenced (see CPLR 214, subd 6 [as it read prior to its amendment in 1975]).

Section 214(6) gives attorney malpractice claims a three-year limitations period; when representation on the matter continues, the claim accrues when that representation ends.

Dura-Bilt Remodelers, Inc. v. Albanese · filed 1976-04-16(6)

The Statute of Limitations period applicable to allegations of professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, is three years (CPLR 214, subd 6). ... In the present case, however, there is no indication that the plaintiff should have concluded that the particular case in question had been concluded prior to the time when the over-all attorney-client relationship was terminated in December, 1973. Therefore, in applying the continuous treatment doctrine to the present case, plaintiffs cause of action should be deemed to have accrued no earlier than December, 1973 and the present action was timely commenced within three years thereafter.

Under the then applicable three-year limitations period, a medical malpractice claim based on a continuing course of treatment accrues when that treatment ends.

Miller v. Wells · filed 1977-07-28(6)

Assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, as we must on this appeal, we hold that the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until the conclusion of the August, 1970 telephone conversation regardless of the fact that plaintiff was in no way injured by the defendant’s negligent act of advising the plaintiff during that telephone conversation ... (Borgia v City of New York, supra).

Former subdivision (6) imposed a three-year limit on medical malpractice actions; these claims were untimely even when measured from the later dates allowed by the continuous-treatment and foreign-object exceptions.

Kearney v. Jewish Memorial Hospital · filed 1978-12-21(6)

Both Rothschild and the Hospital interposed as part of their defense the bar of the then three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 6). Each defendant moved at Special Term to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Special Term denied the motion, relying on the "foreign-object” rule. We would reverse and dismiss the complaint against each defendant as time-barred.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for accountant malpractice claims; a claim remains time barred if that period has expired even after assuming tolling during a related class action.

Douglas v. Arthur Andersen & Co. · filed 1979-05-15(6)

Even allowing for a tolling of the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd 6) during the pendency of the class action ... the statute has run and the action is time barred.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for this personal injury claim; treatment by a doctor unconnected to the defendant did not delay its start.

Dixon v. Sheriff of Suffolk · filed 1979-03-05

The Statute of Limitations governing this action is three years (see CPLR 214). ... This contention is rejected. The "continuous treatment” given the plaintiff was rendered by a doctor at a different facility (The Suffolk County Home Infirmary). There is no allegation, and there are no facts alleged which would support an allegation, that the treating doctor was employed by, or associated with, the defendant in any way.

The three-year period for an Insurance Law § 167(1)(b) claim begins when a judgment against the insured remains unsatisfied for 30 days after notice of its entry is served on the insured and insurer, not on the accident date.

Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. North River Insurance · filed 1980-12-12(2)

The cause of action under section 167 (subd 1, par [b]) accrues when a judgment against the insured remains unsatisfied at the expiration of 30 days from service of notice of its entry upon the insured and the insurer. Contrary to defendant’s contention, the statute does not run from the date of the accident.