N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

Weslowski v. Zugibe · filed 2015-03-31(5)

“In New York, the personal injury statute of limitations that applies to [§ ] 1983 actions is three years.” ... Accordingly, because Plaintiff filed this action on December 3, 2012, more than three years after he delivered his resignation letter, his § 1983 claim also is dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for claims within the Federal Civil Rights Act.

PILARZ, MICHAEL v. HELFER, KEVIN · filed 2017-03-24(5)

Where the substance of a petitioner’s claim falls within the purview of the Federal Civil Rights Act, the applicable statute of limitations for such a cause of action is three years, and thus petitioner’s converted proceeding is not barred by the statute of limitations (see Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 237-239, 251; see also CPLR 214 [5]; Freeland v Erie County, 122 AD3d 1348, 1351; Matter of Doorley v DeMarco, 106 AD3d 27, 33).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a claim within the purview of the Federal Civil Rights Act.

Pilarz v. Helfer · filed 2017-03-24(5)

Where the substance of a petitioner’s claim falls within the purview of the Federal Civil Rights Act, the applicable statute of limitations for such a cause of action is three years, and thus petitioner’s converted proceeding is not barred by the statute of limitations (see Owens v Okure, 488 US 235, 237-239, 251 [1989]; see also CPLR 214 [5]; Freeland v Erie County, 122 AD3d 1348, 1351 [2014]; Matter of Doorley v DeMarco, 106 AD3d 27, 33 [2013]).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Bivens actions brought in federal court in New York.

Robinson v. Foster · filed 2019-12-05(5)

The statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff’s civil rights claim is three years. ... Accordingly, any alleged violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights accrued well before April 29, 2016 - at the very latest, in 2007, when Plaintiff’s original federal complaint containing allegations against Defendant was filed - and are barred by the three-year applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions that applies to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Sharp v. County of Putnam, New York · filed 2019-05-24(5)

Here, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. Id. (citing, inter alia, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5)).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to the § 1983 claims.

Cox v. The City of New Rochelle · filed 2019-08-12(5)

Here, New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies. ... The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s claims arising out of the events of October 19, 2014 — those of retaliation, false arrest, and excessive force — are time-barred, and, accordingly, must be dismissed.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to § 1983 claims in New York.

Whyte v. Tompkins County Sheriff · filed 2020-08-14(5)

In New York, a three-year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to § 1983 actions. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Thus, in the absence of some basis for tolling or disregarding the limitations period, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims, which accrued more than five years before Plaintiff commenced this action, are untimely.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

DiJoseph v. Erie County · filed 2020-07-21(5)

Federal courts borrow state law personal injury statutes of limitations for § 1983 civil rights actions, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985), in New York State the analogous limitations period is three years, Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1989); see N.Y. CPLR 214(5).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in New York.

Banchs v. Noworyta · filed 2021-04-27

In New York State, the statute of limitations for actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the three-year period in New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“NY CPLR”) § 214(2).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Maldonado v. Gunsett · filed 2021-08-02(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Jones v. City Of New York · filed 2021-09-30(5)

“[T]he Supreme Court [has] decided that the three-year statute of limitations of New York CPLR 214(5), which governs general personal injury actions, should be applicable to any and all Section 1983 actions filed in New York.” ... Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Virtuoso are therefore barred by the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in New York.

Gulledge v. Jefferson County · filed 2021-05-06

As relevant here, the statute of limitations for actions brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [2]; Fields v Board of Higher Educ. of City of N.Y. , 94 AD2d 202, 205 [1983], affd 63 NY2d 817 [1984]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

S-King v. New York County/City · filed 2022-02-22(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff therefore had until 1999 to file a timely claim. Because Plaintiff filed this complaint in 2021 – at least 22 years after the events giving rise to his claims occurred – his claims are untimely.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Latouche v. Hammer · filed 2022-03-29(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Plaintiff’s claims arising more than three years before he filed this complaint on February 22, 2022 therefore are time-barred, including his claims arising from his 2004 arrest, his 2005 conviction, his medication with Rameron at Rockland County Jail in 2005, and his dental treatment in 2016.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 USC § 1983.

Peralta v. City of New York · filed 2022-06-02(5)

While plaintiff's claims under 42 USC § 1983 were timely asserted within the applicable three-year limitations period ( see CPLR 214[5]; Cruz v City of New York , 148 AD3d 617, 617 [1st Dept 2017]), and a notice of claim was not required to be filed in connection with those claims ( see Matter of Orozco v City of New York , 200 AD3d 559, 563 [1st Dept 2021]), they lack adequate factual allegations to support the claims ( see generally Rodrigues v City of New York, 193 AD2d 79, 84 [1st Dept 1993]).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Massey-Smith v. The City of New York · filed 2022-08-08(5)

In New York, the relevant limitations period is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), so Smith’s complaint “must have been filed within three years of the accrual of [his] claim,” Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2015).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Blowers v. Novak · filed 2022-11-02(5)

In New York, a three-year statute of limitations applies for personal injury actions and thus to Section 1983 actions.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Handsome Debonair Guy v. Family Dollar Store Owner · filed 2023-03-06(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Cassidy v. New York State Insurance Fund · filed 2023-03-07(5)

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations governing Section 1983 claims in New York.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Quiroz v. Elmira Psychiatric Center/Hospital · filed 2023-04-04(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for such actions is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... The three-year limitations period would therefore have expired between March and November 1995.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Manley v. State of New York · filed 2023-07-27(5)

The statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims, which is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” is three years. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York, subject here to a 229-day toll.

Ndemenoh v. Boudreau · filed 2023-09-19(5)

Applying the 229-day toll, pursuant to the applicable executive orders, to the three-year statute of limitations, Plaintiff thus could bring his claims based upon the November 28, 2016 and March 26, 2017 arrests up until July 14, 2020 and November 10, 2020, respectively; and Plaintiff could bring his claims based on the terminations of his prosecutions on May 31, 2017 and June 26, 2017 until January 15, 2021 and February 10, 2021, respectively.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New York, regardless of the defendant’s identity.

Nolan v. Western Regional Off Track Betting Corp. · filed 2023-09-25(5)

The three-year statute of limitations applies to all Section 1983 claims arising in New York, regardless of the defendant’s identity.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Liboy v. Russ · filed 2023-09-29(5)

In New York, the applicable limitations period is three years. See id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990)). ... Thus, the Court is persuaded that Liboy’s Due Process Clause and Housing Act claims, both brought under Section 1983, accrued shortly after December 11, 2018, and as the instant action was initiated on December 7, 2022, the claims are time-barred.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New York.

Bernier v. Carter · filed 2023-10-03(5)

Furthermore, because this Section 1983 action concerns events which took place in 2015, the statute of limitations has long expired, and so this action is dismissed with prejudice. See Kane v. Mt. Pleasant C. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2023) ("[l]n New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.").

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York; the court applied a 228-day toll and denied dismissal because the complaint did not establish that the claims were late.

Wik v. The Village of Holley · filed 2023-10-20(5)

“[I]n New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.” ... I therefore conclude that defendants have not carried their burden in that regard, and their motion to dismiss the federal claims as time-barred is denied.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims filed in federal court in New York.

Pearson v. City Of New York · filed 2024-03-26

In New York, the applicable statute of limitations is three years. NY CPLR § 214 (2022); Owens, 488 U.S. at 251.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims arising in New York.

Burris v. Nassau County District Attorney · filed 2024-03-30(5)

In addition, any attempt to name a John Doe defendant in a Section 1983 case brought in New York is subject to the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Pearl v. Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R § 214(5)).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Banks v. Bellvue Hospital · filed 2024-08-06(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Cavaluzzi v. County of Sullivan · filed 2024-12-27(5)

For claims arising in New York State, that limitations period is three years. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims that applies to federal Section 1983 claims in New York.

Narayanan v. Garland · filed 2025-02-28(5)

New York has a three-year statute of limitations for “non-specified personal injury claims.” BL Doe 3 v. Female Acad. of the Sacred Heart, 199 A.D.3d 1419, 1419 (4th Dep’t 2021); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). That statute of limitations applies here.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Ahmed v. City of New York · filed 2025-03-27

Section 1983 actions filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, starting from the time “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2002); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. ... Similarly, here, the majority of Ahmed’s allegations regarding the nature of his employment and hiring at the New York Presbyterian Hospital occurred outside of the three-year statute of limitations period, and thus, any claims arising out of those allegations are untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in New York.

Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach · filed 2025-04-10(5)

“[T]he applicable limitations period” for § 1983 actions “is found in the ‘general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,’” which in New York is three years. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989)); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which courts apply to § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Stokes v. Slayton · filed 2025-07-25(5)

“[I]n New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is New York's general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.” Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2023). Plaintiffs’ claims therefore must have accrued within the three years preceding the date that the Complaint was filed, April 10, 2024, to survive dismissal.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Solomon v. NY Office of the Professions · filed 2025-08-11(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Alexander · filed 2026-01-16

Section 1983 actions filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013) (first citing Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir.2002); and then citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2013)).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on Civil Rights Act claims under subsection (2) and on tort claims under subsections (4) and (5).

Boruski v. Stewart · filed 1974-09-13(2), (4), (5)

That case ruled that Civil Rights Act complaints are subject to the three year statute of limitations on actions created by statute according to N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(2). Under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4) and (5) relief on a tort theory would also be barred. Since plaintiff has known of his alleged injury and has had the opportunity to litigate the issues presented at least from 1957, doctrines of concealment, misrepresentations and other equitable mitigation and suspension of periods of limitation do not apply.

Section 214(2) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in New York.

Greenwald v. Axelrod (In Re Greenwald) · filed 1984-10-29(2)

Borrowing from the analogous state law provision, ... this Circuit has adopted a three year limitation for § 1983 actions pursuant to CPLR § 214(2).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for a federal malicious prosecution claim under 42 USC § 1983.

Palmer v. State · filed 2008-12-18(5)

Claimant’s federal claim was dismissed as time-barred because it was brought more than three years after the underlying criminal charges against him were dismissed (CPLR 214 [5]; see Pearl, 296 F3d at 79).

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions against sheriffs and their deputies.

Bradley v. RELL · filed 2010-03-26(2)

The Court rejects Defendants' argument that the governing limitations period is one year and ninety days, under the circumstances. See Taylor v. Mayone, 626 F.2d 247, 253 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that "the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions against sheriffs and their deputies is the three-year provision of CPLR § 214(2) rather than the one-year provision of § 215(1)"; and pointing out, among other things, that "Courts [such as Davis v. Krauss, 478 F.Supp. 823 (E.D.N.Y.1979), which] have stated that [§ ] 50 — i, rather than CPLR [§ ] 214(2), applied to a [§ ] 1983 action have done so only when neither provision would bar the action”).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

Cortes v. City of New York · filed 2010-03-30(5)

In New York, the statute of limitations for claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is three years from the date of accrual.

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year filing period, which can be tolled while a related EEOC charge is pending.

Shin v. NBC Universal Media, LLC · filed 2025-02-07(2)

“Claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are generally governed by a three-year statute of limitations.” ... Because that date is more than three years and 228 days before Plaintiff filed suit, Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims are presumptively time-barred. ... Applying this tolling period, Plaintiff’s claims arising from gender-based discrimination and retaliation are timely.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL discrimination claims.

Knight v. MTA- New York City Transit · filed 2024-09-30

Discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Davis-Bell, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d)).

Section 214(2) gives State Human Rights Law discrimination and harassment claims a three-year filing period, subject to applicable tolls.

Callahan v. City of New York · filed 2024-11-30(2)

Claims under the State and City HRL “must be commenced within three years after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice or act of discriminatory harassment” (Acala v Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 222 AD3d 706, 707 [2d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Mejia v T.N. 888 Eighth Ave. LLC Co., 169 AD3d 613, 614 [1st Dept 2019]; CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for discrimination actions under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Pichardo v. Carmine's Broadway Feast Inc. · filed 2021-11-23(2)

In support of his claim of a hostile work environment based on his race or color, which he commenced in October 2015, plaintiff cited incidents of allegedly harassing conduct in 2011 and early 2012, outside the three-year limitations period for commencing a discrimination action under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the City Human Rights Law (City HRL) (CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code of City of the City of New York § 8-502[d]).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on employment discrimination claims against individual supervisors.

Campbell v. New York City Dept. of Educ. · filed 2021-12-09(2)

As for plaintiff's claims against her individual supervisors, all claims based on conduct occurring more than three years before her termination are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502[d]; see also Herrington v Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. , 118 AD3d 544 [1st Dept 2014]).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Johnson v. Wendy's Restaurant Corporation · filed 2021-01-25(2)

NYSHRL, NYCHRL, and Rehabilitation Act claims are subject to three-year statutes of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (NYSHRL); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502(d) (NYCHRL); Mohamed v. NYU, No. 14 Civ. 8373 (GBD) (MHD), 2015 WL 5307391, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (NYSHRL and NYCHRL); Maccharulo v. Gould, 643 F. Supp. 2d 587, 592–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citations omitted) (Rehabilitation Act).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a Human Rights Law claim for unlawful discrimination.

Benedict v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1989-06-20(2)

By failing to commence a State suit prior to the 1985 deadline, plaintiff’s State claim of a Human Rights Law violation is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(4) gives an insurer three years to bring a subrogated claim for intentional damage to its insured’s property.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Advocate · filed 1991-10-15(4)

The Statute of Limitations governing that cause of action is three years (CPLR 214 [4]). It is not six years, as the lower courts concluded, because this first cause of action is not a fraud claim in any respect. Inasmuch as the subrogee Hartford’s lawsuit against Advocate was begun on May 23, 1988, the first cause of action is beyond the three-year limitation and should be dismissed.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for unlawful employment discrimination.

Yasinosky v. New York City Transit Authority · filed 1993-05-17(2)

Further, we note that the action, commenced more than three years after the alleged unlawful discrimination, is time barred (see, CPLR 214 [2]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307).

Section 214(2) limits recovery on a gender-based unequal pay claim to damages arising within three years before the action commenced.

Blaise-Williams v. Sumitomo Bank, Ltd. · filed 1993-01-07(2)

Regarding the third cause of action, alleging unequal pay ... based upon gender, plaintiff concedes that a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]) applies and that cause of action should be limited accordingly.

Section 214(2) gives employment discrimination claims a three-year limitations period; each alleged discriminatory failure to promote gives rise to a separate claim.

Nielsen v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1994-12-08(2)

Both parties agree that the applicable Statute of Limitations is three years (see, CPLR 214 [2]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307). ... Thus, to the extent that plaintiffs claims are premised on incidents occurring prior to August 30, 1990, they are untimely.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under Executive Law § 296.

Morrison v. New York City Police Department · filed 1995-04-13(2)

Moreover, claims under Executive Law § 296 are governed by the three-...year Statute of Limitations prescribed by CPLR 214 (2) ... and the within action was, therefore, timely brought.

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York Human Rights Law § 296 a three-year limitations period.

Brown v. Middaugh · filed 1999-02-19(2)

but claims brought under § 296 “are governed by the three-year statute of limitations prescribed by CPLR 214(2).”

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for damages claims alleging unlawful employment discrimination under Executive Law § 296.

Mitchell v. Nassau Community College · filed 1999-10-18(2)

The Supreme Court properly found that the plaintiff’s action to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices was time-barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York-Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 446; Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501; Yasinosky v New York City Tr. Auth., 193 AD2d 731).

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York’s Human Rights Law a three-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Hansen v. Danish Tourist Board · filed 2001-05-19(2)

The statute of limitations for actions premised on New York’s Human Rights law is three years from the date on which the cause of action accrued. ... Hansen initiated this action on March 13, 2000. Therefore, only those claims that accrued after March 13, 1997 may be pursued. Hansen’s state-law sex discrimination causes of action stem from conduct that allegedly occurred in 1995. Therefore, those claims are dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on a retaliation claim under the State Human Rights Law.

Leszczynski v. Kelly & McGlynn · filed 2001-03-19(2)

The proposed cause of action against Drago based on allegations of retaliation is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [2]; Karczewski v Sharpe, 260 AD2d 606).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under New York’s Human Rights Law.

Wilson v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. · filed 2002-03-25(2)

Claims asserted under New York’s Human Rights Law are governed by a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 gives claims under New York State Executive Law § 296 a three-year limitations period.

Copeland v. Rosen · filed 2002-06-24

Pursuant to CPLR § 214, claims brought under New York State Executive Law § 296 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for Human Rights Law discrimination claims.

Pacheco v. United Medical Associates, P.C. · filed 2003-05-01(2)

These claims could have been included in the prior suit and, indeed, some were asserted therein and, thus, the claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata (see Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., supra at 347; O’Brien v City of Syracuse, supra at 357) or by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Koerner v State of New York, Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 446 [1984]).

Section 214(2) gives claims alleging violations of Executive Law § 296 a three-year limitations period.

Kwarren v. American Airlines · filed 2003-03-31(2)

Further, the plaintiffs causes of action alleging violations of Executive Law § 296 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307 [1983]). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory conduct prior to October 1995 are time-barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for gender-based employment claims under the Human Rights Law.

Mascola v. City University of New York · filed 2005-01-18(2)

The alleged gender-based employment violations under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 296 [1] [a]) are keyed to federal standards (see Ferrante v American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 629 [1997]), and governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2]; Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442 [1984]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for Human Rights Law claims.

Henderson v. Town of Van Buren · filed 2005-02-04(2)

The action was commenced over three years and two months following the last alleged discriminatory act, and thus the action is untimely under the three-year statute of limitations for the Human Rights Law (see CPLR 214 [2]; Martinez-Tolentino v Buffalo State Coll., 277 AD2d 899 [2000]) or the one-year and 90-day statute of limitations for an action against the Town (see Town Law § 67 [2]).

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not govern New York Human Rights Law claims against a school district; Education Law § 3813(2-b) imposes a one-year limit.

Bucalo v. East Hampton Union Free School District · filed 2005-01-03(2)

Nonetheless, the Plaintiff argues that the Court should disregard this limitation and apply the three year Statute of Limitations for discrimination actions as set forth in CPLR 214(2). The cases that the Plaintiff relies on for this position, ... are analogous but inapplicable to this issue.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims; delayed accrual, equitable tolling, and estoppel require grounds that warrant their application.

Milani v. International Business Machines Corp. · filed 2005-07-01(2)

He does not contend that claims based on these acts accrued within the three-year statute of limitations for the NYSHRL and NYCHRL. See N.Y. CPLR § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d). Rather, Milani claims that he may assert these claims based on either a delayed accrual, equitable estoppel, or equitable tolling theory. The district court properly held that Milani is not entitled to delayed accrual, and did not abuse its discretion in holding that equitable tolling and estoppel are unwarranted in this case.

Section 214(2) applies a three-year limitations period to sexual harassment claims under the Human Rights Law.

Miccio v. Fits Systems, Inc. · filed 2006-01-17(2)

However, the cause of action is time-barred insofar as based on acts that occurred more than three years before commencement of the action (CPLR 214 [2]), i.e., before June 18, 2001, and we modify accordingly.

Section 214(2) gives State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period, tolled while an NYDHR or EEOC complaint is pending.

Sundaram v. Brookhaven National Laboratories · filed 2006-03-29(2)

The statute of limitations applicable to the state Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 297, is three years. ... The statute is tolled, however, during the pendency of any complaint that is filed with the NYDHR. ... Because complaints filed with the EEOC are deemed constructively to be cross-filed with the NYDHR, the statute is also tolled during the pendency of a claim filed with the EEOC.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims under the New York Human Rights Law.

Mahmud v. Kaufmann · filed 2006-09-27(2)

These claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). The claims under the New York Human Rights Law are substantially the same as the claims under § 1981 and arise from the same incidents which ended around May 2002. Plaintiff had until May 2005 to file her complaint alleging violations of the NYHRL. As stated, plaintiff did not file her Complaint until September 15, 2005. Therefore, plaintiffs third cause of action under NYHRL is untimely and is therefore dismissed.

Section 214(2) gives employment discrimination claims a three-year limitations period.

Ponterio v. Kaye · filed 2006-01-05(2)

Inasmuch as this action was commenced in 2003, after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired (see CPLR 214 [2]), his employment discrimination claim is time-barred.

Section 214(2) gives sexual harassment claims under New York State human rights law a three-year limitations period.

Kwan v. Schlein · filed 2006-07-14(2)

Similarly, sexual harassment claims under the New York City and State human rights laws are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... Thus, whether brought pursuant federal or state law, Kwan’s sexual harassment claims are time-barred.

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for Executive Law § 296 discrimination claims yields to the one-year period in Education Law § 3813(2-b) for claims against school districts.

Amorosi v. South Colonie Independent Central School District · filed 2006-11-22(2)

Since Supreme Court had no discretion to extend the time in which to serve the notice of claim beyond the time limit for commencement of the action ... the question on appeal is whether the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) is applicable to this discrimination claim which is normally governed by a three-year limitation period (see CPLR 214 [2]). ... We read the statute as applying to all actions, including Executive Law § 296 discrimination claims.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims based on a liability imposed by statute, including the state law claims at issue here.

SW BY JW v. Warren · filed 2007-11-16(2)

The court determined that the most analogous state action was an action to recover upon a liability imposed by statute under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... Because plaintiff B.F. did not have all the factual circumstances to state a claim against the County until at least June 2005 when he was diagnosed with autism, his claims also fall within the three-year statute of limitations. ... We therefore conclude that all of the state claims are timely.

CPLR 214 (2)'s three-year limitations period does not apply to discrimination claims against school districts; Education Law § 3813 (2-b)'s one-year period governs.

Amorosi v. S COLONIE SCH DIST. · filed 2007-12-18(2)

Despite any provision for a longer statute of limitations, such as the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2), as urged by petitioner, the one-year limitation prescribed in Education Law § 3813 (2-b) should govern discrimination claims against a school district.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period for a continuing hostile work environment claim begins with the last discriminatory act.

Kimmel v. State · filed 2008-03-14(2)

We further conclude that plaintiff has alleged a continuing violation based on the allegations of “ ‘specific and related instances of discrimination [that were] permitted by [defendants] to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice,’ ” and thus the three-year limitations period did not begin to run until the last discriminatory act, which allegedly occurred in December 1994 (Clark v State of New York [appeal No. 2], 302 AD2d 942, 945 [2003]).

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years from the challenged adverse action to bring a New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claim.

Ortiz-Moss v. New York City Department of Transportation · filed 2008-04-18(2)

Under New York law, claims of discrimination must be brought within three years of the adverse action being challenged. ... Plaintiffs 2002 reassignment and office claims arose on or about April 1, 2002, and this action was not filed until April 27, 2005. Thus, they are time-barred under New York law as well.

Section 214(2) gives a plaintiff three years from an alleged discriminatory act to bring a New York Human Rights Law claim.

Pilgrim v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. · filed 2009-02-18(2)

New York HRL and CHRL allow a party three years from the date of any allegedly discriminatory act to file suit. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); ... Since Henson filed suit on July 23, 2007, all alleged denials of promotion that occurred prior to July 23, 2004, are time barred by the HRL and CHRL.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for New York Human Rights Law employment discrimination claims against school principals.

Carlson v. Geneva City School District · filed 2010-01-08(2)

Instead, the Court finds that the NYHRL claims against Pullen and Calabria are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) § 214[2], See, Kimmel v. State, 49 A.D.3d 1210, 1211, 853 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (4th Dept.2008) (Stating that limitations period for NYHRL employment discrimination claims is three years, citing CPLR § 214[2]).

Section 214(2) gives New York State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period from accrual, tolled while an EEOC complaint is pending.

Allen v. New York City Department of Environmental Protection · filed 2014-09-30(2)

As for Plaintiffs New York State Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”) claims, “the statute of limitations for claims under the [NYHRL] ... is three years from the date that the claim accrues.” ... N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... Therefore, Plaintiffs NYHRL claims are limited to those events that occurred no earlier than May 14, 2006.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period governs these property and Building Code claims, including a claim for breach of a settlement agreement that added no duty beyond the Building Code.

Barklee 94 LLC v. Oliver · filed 2015-01-15(2), (4)

These causes of action, which sound variously in trespass, private nuisance, violation of property rights and Building Code provisions, and breach of a prior settlement agreement in which the parties agreed not to build any wall taller than six feet along their common lot line, are barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [2], [4]; see Mindel v Phoenix Owners Corp., 17 AD3d 227 [1st Dept 2005]; Jemison v Crichlow, 139 AD2d 332, 336 [2d Dept 1988], affd 74 NY2d 726 [1989]). The three-year statute governs the breach of contract cause of action because the settlement agreement resolved plaintiff’s claim, brought in a prior action, that defendants’ proposed construction of a yard wall taller than six feet would violate the Building Code, and thus added nothing new to defendants’ duties under the Building Code (Mindel, 17 AD3d at 228).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Derrick v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 2015-03-19(2)

According plaintiffs submissions “their most favorable intendment” for purposes of defendants’ CPLR 3211 (a) (5) motion to dismiss (Arrington v New York Times Co., 55 NY2d 433, 442 [1982], cert denied 459 US 1146 [1983]), her claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, governed by a three-year limitations period, are timely in the present procedural posture (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293, 307 [1983]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for New York age-discrimination claims.

Wang v. Palmisano · filed 2014-09-30(2)

Plaintiffs state-law age-discrimination claim is subject to a three-year limitations period under either Massachusetts or New York law.

Section 214(2) gives State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period.

Santiago-Mendez v. City of New York · filed 2016-02-04(2)

Her allegations of matters occurring before August 28, 2010 are time-barred, since the statute of limitations for claims under both the State and City Human Rights Law (HRL) is three years (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]; Mascola v City Univ. of N.Y., 14 AD3d 409, 409 [1st Dept 2005] [State HRL]; Herrington v Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 118 AD3d 544, 544 [1st Dept 2014] [City HRL]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Jeudy v. City of New York · filed 2016-09-15(2)

The statute of limitations under the State and City HRLs is three years (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]; Santiago-Mendez v City of New York, 136 AD3d 428 [1st Dept 2016]). Since plaintiff filed his complaint in this action on May 23, 2014, allegedly discriminatory acts committed before May 23, 2011 are facially untimely (see Stembridge v New York City Dept. of Educ., 88 AD3d 611 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 802 [2012]).

Section 214(2) gives New York State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period.

Chung v. Mary Manning Walsh Nursing Home Co. · filed 2017-02-07(2)

Since plaintiff filed the complaint in this action on January 17, 2015, more than three years after the stipulated date of her resignation, her claims under the New York State and City Human Rights Laws are time-barred under the applicable three-year limitations periods (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]; Santiago-Mendez v City of New York, 136 AD3d 428, 428 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 214(2) sets a three-year filing period for New York State Human Rights Law claims.

Whitt v. Kaleida Health · filed 2018-03-27(2)

The three-year limitations period, with the addition of the tolling period of nine years, two months, two weeks, and three days, renders NYSHRL claims based on events after March 31, 2003, timely.

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for an estate discovery proceeding treated as a conversion or replevin action; the period does not begin with lawful possession of the property.

Matter of Asch · filed 2018-08-22(3)

A discovery proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 21 has been likened to an action for conversion or replevin and a three-year statute of limitations has been applied ( see Matter of Chung Li , 95 AD3d 881, 881; Matter of King , 305 AD2d 683, 683; CPLR 214[3]). A conversion cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run on the date the conversion allegedly occurred ( see Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex ., 87 NY2d 36, 44; Matter of Rausman , 50 AD3d 909, 910).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for statutory employment discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation claims.

Mira v. Harder · filed 2019-11-12(2)

Plaintiff's claims of discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation, pursuant to the New York State and New York City Human Rights Law are time-barred (CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502[d]; see Herrington v Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. , 118 AD3d 544 [1st Dept 2014]). Plaintiff's allegations stem from events that occurred more than three years before she initially commenced the action in federal court in December of 2015.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims.

Bermudez v. Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc. · filed 2020-01-09(2)

However, NYSHRL has a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(3) applies to claims for replevin or conversion of chattels, rather than claims sounding in contract or quasi-contract.

Moskovits v. Grigsby · filed 2020-02-20(3)

In addition, the cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable, as they relate to claims for replevin or conversion of chattels under CPLR § 214(3), not for claims that lie in contract or quasi-contract under CPLR § 213(2).

Section 214(3) covers replevin and conversion of chattels, not claims that lie in contract or quasi-contract.

Moskovits v. Grigsby · filed 2020-06-09(3)

In addition, the cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable, as they relate to claims for replevin or conversion of chattels under CPLR § 214(3), not for claims that lie in contract or quasi-contract under CPLR § 213(2).

Section 214(2) requires discrimination claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL to be brought within three years of the alleged unlawful act.

Mouscardy v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2020-07-01(2)

Actions alleging discrimination under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL must be commenced within three years after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice or act of discriminatory harassment ( see CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code § 8-502[d]; Mejia v T.N. 888 Eighth Ave. LLC Co. , 169 AD3d 613, 613-614). The plaintiff commenced this action on February 20, 2008. Thus, his allegations of matters occurring before February 20, 2005, are time-barred ( see Santiago-Mendez v City of New York , 136 AD3d 428, 428).

Section 214(3) provides a three-year limitations period for conversion and for breach of a constructive bailment that does not arise from a contractual relationship.

Jackson v. Casino Towing Serv., Inc. · filed 2023-05-05(3)

The applicable statute of limitations for conversion is three years and this action was not commenced until March 2, 2020, more than three years after it had accrued ( see CPLR 214 [3]; Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v Housing Auth. of City of El Paso, Tex. , 87 NY2d 36 [1995]). ... As the cause of action for breach of a constructive bailment was not a result of a contractual relationship between the parties, a six-year statute of limitations does not apply ( see Wikiert v City of New York , 128 AD3d 128, 138 [2015]), but, rather, a three-year statute of limitations pursuant to CPLR 214 (3) applies.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for claims under the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws.

Glowatz v. City of New York · filed 2026-03-10(2)

Accordingly, the complaint was timely filed because plaintiff's claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[2]; see Koerner , 62 NY2d at 447; Pichardo v Carmine's Broadway Feast Inc. , 199 AD3d 593 [1st Dept 2021]).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Asemota · filed 2025-09-16(2)

Plaintiff’s claims under the NYSHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(4) gives three years to sue for injury to real property; a continuing trespass can give rise to successive claims.

Lewis v. Steiner · filed 2025-12-03(4)

"Generally, an action to recover damages for injury to real property must be commenced within three years of accrual" ( Listwon v 500 Metro. Owner, LLC , 188 AD3d 1028, 1029-1030; see CPLR 214[4]). However, "a trespass that constitutes an unlawful encroachment on a plaintiff's property will be considered a continuous trespass giving rise to successive causes of action" ( Bloomingdales, Inc. v New York City Tr. Auth. , 13 NY3d 61, 66; see Board of Mgrs. of Oceanview Condominium v Riccardi , 229 AD3d 595, 597). Here, Steiner failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the alleged encroachments and intrusions ceased more than three years prior to the filing of the second amended complaint ( see Listwon v 500 Metro. Owner, LLC , 188 AD3d at 1030; Izzo v Town of Smithtown , 151 AD3d 1035, 1035-1036).

Section 214(1) gives three years to sue a City Marshal for failing to pay over money collected on an execution.

Prada v. Swift · filed 1990-05-18(1)

The exclusion of an action to recover money collected upon an execution of judgment from the one-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 215 is consistent with CPLR 214 which provides a three-year Statute of Limitations for such an action.

Section 214 gives three years to bring an action against a sheriff for failing to pay over money collected on an execution.

Memorial Hospital v. McGreevy · filed 1991-09-24

CPLR 215 (1) provides for a one-year Statute of Limitations for most actions against a Sheriff while CPLR 214 provides a three-year Statute of Limitations for an action against a Sheriff for the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution. ... The court holds that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the plaintiffs claim arose when it learned that the representations made to it about the status of its income execution were false.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for prima facie tort claims.

Stacom v. Wunsch · filed 1991-05-28(4)

Furthermore, plaintiff’s prima facie tort claims are barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations period (CPLR 214 [4]) and, in any event, are inadequately pleaded (Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period applies to conversion and prima facie tort claims.

Melnitzky v. North Fork Savings Bank · filed 2005-04-12(3), (4)

Moreover, the claims for conversion and prima facie tort are time-barred (CPLR 214 [3], [4]).

Section 214 gives a three-year limitations period to prima facie tort claims seeking monetary relief.

Matter of Bernard v. City of New York · filed 2025-07-07

While prima facie tort is subject to the one-year statute, when a party seeks monetary relief, it is subject to the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 ).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on claims for damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty.

Ackerman v. National Property Analysts, Inc. · filed 1992-09-09

A three year statute of limitations applies to claims for damages resulting from a breach of fiduciary duty. ... Because plaintiffs’ claims against Brownstein, Lipkin, Cherin, Spitz, Price Waterhouse, and Weiner Zuckerport all allege breaches of fiduciary duty prior to December 19, 1988, they are dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages.

Geren v. Quantum Chemical Corp. · filed 1993-09-21(4)

I conclude that Count IV falls under the three year limitation of CPLR § 214(4) for an action at law for breach of fiduciary duty and not under the six year statute of § 213(1) for actions seeking equitable relief. Count IV must therefore be dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(4) gives breach of fiduciary duty claims a three-year limitations period.

In re the Arbitration between Prudential Securities Inc. & Pesce · filed 1996-03-11(4)

CPLR 214 (4) provides that breach of fiduciary claims must be commenced within three years (Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 573 F Supp 1355). Even if the court were to apply the two-year discovery exception embodied in CPLR 203 (g), respondent’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty is time barred.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim that seeks no equitable relief and is not based on a contractual relationship.

In Re Prudential SEC. Inc. Ltd. Partner. Lit. · filed 1996-06-10(4)

This type of action is subject to a three-year limitations period in New York since plaintiffs’ claim neither seeks equitable relief nor is based on a contractual relationship between the parties. CPLR § 214(4).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to seek legal relief for breach of fiduciary duty.

Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Associates, Inc. · filed 1997-04-07(4)

A request for legal relief for a breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the three year statute of limitations of N.Y. CPLR 214(4), while a request for equitable relief is governed by the six-year residual limitations period prescribed by N.Y. CPLR 213(1).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking damages for injury to property.

Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. · filed 1998-09-14(4)

A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by the underlying concomitant claim, thus, where it is a claim for an action to recover damages for any “injury to property,” pursuant to CPLR § 214(4), a three year statute of limitations applies.

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitations period applies to a claim seeking monetary relief for inducing a breach of fiduciary duty.

Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. · filed 1998-10-07(4)

Initially, we agree with the district court that the applicable statutory period for this claim is the three-year period provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). ... We see no reason why this rule should not apply to a claim seeking monetary relief for inducing a breach of fiduciary duty such as IOF’s.

Section 214(2) and (4)'s three-year limitations periods do not apply to corporate breach of fiduciary duty and unlawful dividends claims covered by the six-year period in § 213(7).

Lippe v. Bairnco Corp. · filed 1999-01-06(2), (4)

Because this specific statute of limitations encompasses the breach of fiduciary duty and payment of unlawful dividends claims at issue, ... the more general limitations periods outlined in CPLR ... §§ 214(2) and (4) do not apply.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only monetary damages.

Sferra v. Mathew · filed 2000-06-28(4)

As the plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty seek only monetary damages, the three year statute of limitations applies.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only money damages as injury to property.

Kaufman v. Cohen · filed 2003-05-27(4)

On the other hand, where suits alleging a breach of fiduciary duty seek only money damages, courts have viewed such actions as alleging “injury to property,” to which a three-year statute of limitations applies (see CPLR 214 [4]; Yatter v William Morris Agency, 256 AD2d at 261; Whitney Holdings, Ltd. v Givotovsky, 988 F Supp at 741).

Section 214(4) gives a claim for monetary damages from breach of fiduciary duty a three-year limitations period.

Silvester v. Time Warner, Inc. · filed 2003-06-20(4)

Moreover, actions for monetary damages from breach of fiduciary duty are governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (4). ... Plaintiffs’ claims that creation and distribution of their works through digital media resulted in a breach of fiduciary duty accrued in the early 1980’s when digital audio files on CD’s were first released and sold.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking only money damages.

Tatko v. Sheldon Slate Products Co. · filed 2003-12-11(4)

To the extent that plaintiff alleges a more general breach of fiduciary duty, such claims would fall under either a three-year or six-year limitations period, depending on the nature of the relief sought (see CPLR 214 [4]; Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 266 [1987]; Yatter v William Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]). Because plaintiffs claim effectively seeks only money damages through recoupment of past bonuses, the applicable limitations period is three years, precluding plaintiff’s challenges to corporate expenditures made prior to November 14, 1997.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking monetary damages.

Sotheby's Financial Services, Inc. v. Baran · filed 2004-06-29(4)

The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty is three years. ... Because Baran’s claims are predicated on two specific incidents, and Baran was aware of these facts by October 29, 1997, the latest a complaint could have been filed was October 29, 2000 — three years later.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period to breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only money damages, but a claim based on actual fraud has a six-year period.

Klein v. Gutman · filed 2004-11-08(4)

Moreover, while suits alleging breach of fiduciary duty which seek only money damages have been viewed as alleging “injury to property” to which a three-year statute of limitations applies (CPLR 214 [4]; see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118 [2003]), it has been held that where, as here, a cause of action alleging breach of fiduciary duty is based on allegations of actual fraud, it is subject to a six-year limitations period (see Kaufman v Cohen, supra; Goldberg v Schuman, 289 AD2d 8 [2001]; Unibell Anesthesia v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 239 AD2d 248 [1997]).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims seeking only money damages.

Bouley v. Bouley · filed 2005-06-10

If the relief sought is equitable, the six-year period set forth in CPLR 213 (1) applies, but if only money damages are sought, the three-year period set forth in CPLR 214 applies (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118 [2003]; Matter of Kaszirer v Kaszirer, 286 AD2d 598 [2001]; Yatter v William Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]).

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitation period to a claim that a condominium board breached its fiduciary duty by selectively requiring an alteration agreement.

Brasseur v. Speranza · filed 2005-08-18(4)

Further, the third cause of action is time-barred, not having been brought within the applicable three-year limitation period (see CPLR 214 [4]; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113 [2003]; Yatter v William Morris Agency, Inc., 256 AD2d 260 [1998]), as is the fourth cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was not brought within the applicable one-year period (CPLR 215 [3]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking monetary relief.

Ross v. Louise Wise Services, Inc. · filed 2006-04-13

We agree with the motion court that plaintiffs’ second cause of action, sounding in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, was properly dismissed as time-barred, as a cause of action asserting breach of fiduciary duty, which seeks monetary relief, is governed by a three-year limitations period (CPLR 214; Papp v Debbane, 16 AD3d 128 [2005]; Deutsch v Polly N. Passonneau, PC., 297 AD2d 571, 572 [2002]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only money damages.

Wiesenthal v. Wiesenthal · filed 2007-05-29(4)

Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the court properly concluded that the counterclaims are not time-barred. A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is governed by a six-year statute of limitations where the relief sought is equitable in nature (see CPLR 213 [1]), or by a three-year statute of limitations where the only relief sought is money damages (see CPLR 214 [4]; ... [2002]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking only money damages.

Weiss v. Waterhouse · filed 2007-11-20(4)

Here, because the plaintiff seeks only money damages, the three-year statute of limitations applies. As it is undisputed that the action was commenced well beyond the three-year limit, the breach of fiduciary cause of action was time-barred.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims seeking only money damages.

Ciccone v. Hersh · filed 2008-01-08(4)

In the instant case, Plaintiffs seek monetary damages, therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is three years.

Section 214(3)’s three-year period for conversion does not apply when the claim arises from an attorney-in-fact’s breach of fiduciary duty.

In re the Estate of Francis · filed 2008-03-05(3)

Respondent contends that regardless of the validity of the transfers, petitioner may not recover because the three-year statute of limitations for conversion (CPLR 214 [3]) has expired. ... Here, the cause of action arises out of respondent’s breach of his fiduciary duty as an attorney-in-fact. The allegations clearly set forth such a claim. ... Accordingly, the proceeding is timely and respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Section 214(4) limits monetary damages for a continuing wrong to damages occurring within three years before the action began.

Kaymakcian v. Board of Managers of the Charles House Condominium · filed 2008-03-18(4)

However, inasmuch as plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages, the claim is limited to any alleged damages that occurred within three years of the commencement of the instant action (see Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118 [2003]; CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) gives a breach of fiduciary duty claim a three-year limitations period when the relief sought is primarily monetary.

IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. · filed 2009-03-26(4)

Consequently, we conclude that this is not a fraud allegation, and that the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214 (4) applies.

Section 214(3) imposes a three-year limitations period on damages claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on non-fraudulent tortious conduct.

Lefkowitz v. Bank of New York · filed 2009-12-22(3)

The pertinent statute of limitations for claims of breach of fiduciary duty based on non-fraudulent tortious conduct is three years under CPLR § 214(3) for cases in which the plaintiff, as here, seeks damages.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only monetary relief; a claim with an essential fraud allegation is subject to a six-year period.

Monaghan v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 2010-03-16(4)

Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the action as alleging “injuries to property” within the meaning ... of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period (see e.g. Yatter v Morris Agency, 256 AD2d 260, 261 [1998]).

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking monetary relief, including disgorgement of attorney fees.

Kerik v. Tacopina · filed 2014-12-03(4)

“Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property within the meaning of CPLR 214(4), which has a three-year limitations period.” ... The plaintiff seeks monetary damages and disgorgement of his attorney fees paid to the defendant, which also qualifies as monetary damages. ... Therefore, as the plaintiff concedes, the limitations period for these claims is three years.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking purely monetary relief.

Loeuis v. Grushin · filed 2015-03-11(4)

Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period. ... Since the plaintiffs right to the subject property is in issue, awarding damages would not be adequate. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations for causes of action sounding in equity should be applied (see Loengard v Santa Fe Indus., 70 NY2d 262, 267 [1987]).

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages when fraud is not essential to the claim.

ITT Corp. v. Lee · filed 2016-10-18(4)

Lastly, the plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim is also time-barred. In New York, breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4).

Section 214(4) gives a breach of fiduciary duty claim a three-year limitations period when the remedy sought is purely monetary and fraud is not essential to the claim.

State of New York Workers' Compensation Board v. Wang · filed 2017-01-05(4)

Turning to plaintiff's fourth and fifth causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, each is subject to a three-year statute of limitations as "the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature ... and it cannot be said that an allegation of fraud is essential to [these] claim[s]" (Weight v Day, 134 AD3d 806, 808 [2015]; see CPLR 214 [4]; see generally IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]; compare New York State Workers' Compensation Bd. v Consolidated Risk Servs., Inc., 125 AD3d 1250, 1253-1254 [2015]).

Section 214 (4) gives a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim seeking only money damages a three-year limitations period; fraud allegations raised solely to answer a limitations defense do not change that period.

Block 2829 Realty Corp. v. Community Preservation Corp. · filed 2017-03-23(4)

With regard to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, as here, where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging “injury to property” within the meaning of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period (IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]). ... Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud, release and rescission against CDC, which were not asserted in their original claim for breach of fiduciary duty, but were asserted in the Halstead affidavit merely as a statute of limitations defense, do not alter the three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking primarily monetary relief.

Romanoff v. Romanoff · filed 2017-03-28(4)

Where, as here, the remedy sought is purely or primarily monetary, a breach of fiduciary duty claim is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]; Carlingford Ctr. Point Assoc. v MR Realty Assoc., 4 AD3d 179, 179-180 [1st Dept 2004]).

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking damages for injury to property when there is no viable fraud claim; the claim accrues when actual damage is sustained.

Vestal v. Pontillo · filed 2018-02-22(4)

In the absence of a viable fraud claim, the statute of limitations applicable to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking to recover damages for injury to property is three years ( see CPLR 214 [4]; State of N.Y. Workers' Compensation Bd. v Wang , 147 AD3d 104, 111 [2017]). The claim accrues as soon as it "becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint" and, because damages are an element of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, that occurs when actual damage has been sustained ( Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp. , 81 NY2d 90, 94 [1993]; accord IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co. , 12 NY3d 132, 140 [2009]). The damages from any breach of fiduciary duty in obtaining a valid policy arose when ReliaStar determined that the policy had never been in force and denied plaintiff's claim in December 2015 ( see Bond v Progressive Ins. Co. , 82 AD3d 1318, 1321 [2011]). This action was commenced days later, rendering timely the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking monetary relief.

Pirri v. Cheek · filed 2019-06-13(4)

“Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging ‘injury to property’ within the meaning of [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4)], which sets a three-year limitations period, Where . . . the relief sought is equitable in nature, the six-year limitations period of [N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(1)] applies.” ... Even so, because Pirri first brought this damages claim in January 2019, nearly six years after May 2013, it is quite untimely, when measured against the three-year limitations period for claims seeking monetary relief.

CPLR 214 (4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim seeking only money damages.

Shoreham Hills, LLC v. Sagaponack Dream House, LLC · filed 2020-03-04(4)

When, as here, a plaintiff alleging breach of fiduciary duty seeks only money damages, courts have viewed such actions as alleging injury to property to which the three-year statute of limitations found in CPLR 214 (4) applies ( Kaufman v Cohen , 307 AD2d 113, 118).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking purely monetary relief; a six-year period applies when fraud is essential to the alleged breach.

Sands Bros. Venture Capital II, LLC v. Metropolitan Paper Recycling, Inc. · filed 2020-05-08(4)

When the remedy sought by a plaintiff is purely monetary, the lawsuit alleges "injury to property" under CPLR § 214 (4) and the action is subject to a three-year limitation period ( id. ). ... As Mr. Bean's purported breach of fiduciary duty involves the fraudulent conveyance of O2HR funds during the 2010 Transactions, these allegations require a finding that the alleged fraud is essential to Mr. Bean's breach of his fiduciary duty and the six-year limitation period should apply ( id. ).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking monetary relief, and the open repudiation doctrine does not apply to that period.

Wagley v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. · filed 2020-09-26(4)

Because Plaintiffs seek monetary relief, the applicable statute of limitations is three years, and the open repudiation doctrine does not apply.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking money damages.

Grabis v. Navient Solutions, LLC · filed 2020-12-11(4)

Therefore, the breach of fiduciary claim is time barred pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(4).

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only money damages.

Massey-Hughes v. Massey · filed 2021-12-23(4)

"A cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty is governed . . . by a three-year statute of limitations where[, as here,] the only relief sought is money damages" ( Wiesenthal v Wiesenthal , 40 AD3d 1078, 1079 [2d Dept 2007]; see CPLR 214 [4]; Bouley v Bouley , 19 AD3d 1049, 1051 [4th Dept 2005]).

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages.

Dau v. 16 Sutton Place Apt. Corp. · filed 2022-05-19(4)

To the extent that the fifth cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty) relies on any alleged breach that occurred before July 7, 2017, it is time-barred because claims for breach of fiduciary duty seeking money damages are subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[4]; see Romanoff v Romanoff , 148 AD3d 614, 616 [1st Dept 2017]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking purely monetary relief.

In re Lifetrade Litigation · filed 2023-09-25(4)

If the remedy sought is “purely monetary,” courts construe the suit as alleging “injury to property” within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), and a three-year limitations period applies.

CPLR 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only monetary damages when fraud is not essential to the claim.

Kefalas v. Pappas · filed 2024-04-10(4)

"Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging injury to property within the meaning of CPLR 214(4), which has a three-year limitations period" ( id. at 912-913 [internal quotation marks omitted]). ... Here, the second and third causes of action are subject to the three-year statute of limitations, since they merely seek monetary damages and are not based on an allegation of fraud.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking only monetary damages for injury to property.

William F. Nicklin · filed 2024-05-08(4)

“Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging “injury to property” within the meaning of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period. ... The three-year New York statute of limitations for injury to property applies.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking only money damages.

Orion HealthCorp, Inc. v. Parmar · filed 2024-12-06(4)

Further, because Parmar Entities’ Counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty relates solely to monetary damages, that Counterclaim is subject to the three-year statute of limitation.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period for a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking purely monetary relief.

Dixie v. Scheer · filed 2025-01-11(4)

Where the remedy sought is purely monetary in nature, courts construe the suit as alleging "injury to property" within the meaning of CPLR 214 (4), which has a three-year limitations period. ... However, the only relief sought in the complaint is monetary. ... Thus, the three-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 214(4) gives a three-year limitations period to a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking money damages when the claim is not based on fraud.

Berejka v. Huntington Med. Group, P.C. · filed 2025-02-19(4)

Here, the sixth cause of action was subject to a three-year statute of limitations since the relief sought was monetary in nature and was not based on an allegation of fraud. The statute of limitations for the sixth cause of action began to run on June 1, 2015, when NYU failed to provide health insurance coverage to Moriarty and her family.

Section 214(4) gives a fiduciary duty claim sounding in conversion a three-year limitations period.

Katzoff v. BSP Agency, LLC · filed 2025-03-21(4)

Thus, the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214(4) applies to the fiduciary duty claims.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for breach of fiduciary duty claims seeking money damages; claims seeking equitable relief have a six-year period.

Matter of Sandler · filed 2025-09-15(4)

However, if money damages are sought, as Klein contends here, the three-year period set forth in CPLR 214(4) applies (id.). ... Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the "gravamen" of the relief sought in the petition was equitable in nature and thus a six-year limitations period applies to Petitioner's turnover claim.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on a breach of fiduciary duty claim seeking only monetary damages and not based on fraud.

Breslin Brookhaven, LLC v. Rose · filed 2026-03-25(4)

Since the second cause of action merely seeks monetary damages and is not based on an allegation of fraud, it is subject to a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; Kefalas v Pappas , 226 AD3d 757, 763). Thus, so much of the second cause of action as seeks to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty based on a 2017 exchange of real property pursuant to 26 USC § 1031 is time-barred.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on an action for damages based on a fiduciary obligation.

Dinerman v. Sutton · filed 1965-03-11(4)

However, it also holds that an action for damages based upon a fiduciary obligation is governed by the three-year statute. Tobias v. Celler (37 N. Y. S. 2d 399, affd. 265 App. Div. 1065), which relies upon subdivision 7 of section 49 of the former Civil Practice Act (now CPLR 214, subd. 4), is additional authority for the latter proposition.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for injury to property claims does not govern a breach of fiduciary duty claim based on fraud.

Paolucci v. Mauro · filed 2010-06-10(4)

Defendants contend that the amendment lacks merit as the action is time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for injury to property (see CPLR 214 [4]). The applicable statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty varies, however (see generally IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139-140 [2009]). We agree with Supreme Court that as plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty is based on allegations of fraud, the six-year limitations period of CPLR 213 (8) applies (see IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d at 139; Kaufman v Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 119 [2003]).