N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims, but does not cover intentional torts such as abuse of process or malicious prosecution.

Bittner v. Cummings · filed 1992-12-14(5)

The operative distinction between causes of action governed by the one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215), and those within the scope of the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [5]) is whether the cause of action sounds in an intentional tort or sounds in negligence (see, Gallagher v Director’s Guild, 144 AD2d 261, 263). Abuse of process and malicious prosecution are both intentional torts which are governed by CPLR 215, the one-year Statute of Limitations (see, Hansen v Petrone, 124 AD2d 782).

Section 214(5)'s three-year period does not apply to abuse of process, which is subject to a one-year period as an intentional tort.

Cuillo v. Shupnick · filed 1993-04-23(5)

CPLR § 214, which governs actions covered by a three-year statute of limitations, lists actions to recover damages for an injury ... to property or for personal injury among several other items. ... These authorities require dismissal of the abuse of process claim on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period does not govern abuse-of-process claims; a one-year period applies.

Riddell Sports Inc. v. Brooks · filed 1995-01-05

The parties dispute whether the claim for abuse of process is governed by the three year statute of limitations in CPLR § 214 or the one year period in CPLR § 215(3). This Court finds that the one year period is the applicable one.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for injury-to-property actions does not govern Lanham Act § 43(a) claims; the fraud limitations period is the better fit.

Gordon & Breach Science Publishers S.A. v. American Institute of Physics · filed 1994-08-15(4)

Defendants contend that the New York statute of limitations most appropriate for the Lanham Act is CPLR § 214(4), the three-year statute governing “action[s] to recover damages for an injury to property.” ... While we find the issue a close one, we find PepsiCo’s analogy to fraud somewhat more persuasive. While Section 43(a) claims contain elements of both fraud and injury to property, we think the “better fit” is to fraud claims.

CPLR 214 (2) gives the Attorney General three years to bring a Martin Act claim because the Act creates liabilities that did not exist at common law.

People v. Credit Suisse Sec. · filed 2018-06-12(2)

We therefore conclude the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (2)—applicable to "a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute"—governs Martin Act claims.

The 1996 amendment to § 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for nonmedical malpractice claims regardless of whether they sound in contract or tort, but does not apply to this earlier action.

Board of Managers of Ocean Club v. Mandel · filed 1997-01-13(6)

We note that the recent amendment to CPLR 214 (6) effective September 4, 1996 (L 1996, ch 623), making an action to recover damages for malpractice (other than medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice) subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort is not applicable to this case.

Section 214(6)'s 1996 amendment shortened the limitations period for nonmedical malpractice claims to three years, but does not retroactively bar a pending claim that was timely when filed.

Durkin v. Shea · filed 1997-03-06(6)

Pursuant to CPLR § 214(6), “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice” must be commenced within three years. ... Rather, the 1996 amendment effectively shortened the statute of limitations for non-medical malpractice actions from six years to three. ... Given these circumstances, retroactive application of the 1996 amendment is precluded.

The 1996 amendment imposing a three-year limitations period for nonmedical professional malpractice does not apply to actions filed before the amendment took effect.

Mason Tenders District Council Pension Fund v. Messera · filed 1997-03-26(6)

In light of the Second and Third Departments’ recent decisions, the six-year statute of limitations will be applied to the Funds’ malpractice claims against the Levin and Cunningham Defendants.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for malpractice claims whether framed in contract or tort, but the 1996 amendment cannot be applied retroactively to bar a claim that was timely when filed.

Estate of Re v. Kornstein Veisz & Wexler · filed 1997-04-02(6)

Though it appears likely that New York’s legislature intended for the amended C.P.L.R. 214[6] to apply retroactively, the Court finds that such an application would offend basic notions of due process under New York law.

The amended three-year limitations period for nonmedical malpractice cannot apply to an existing claim if it would bar the claim immediately upon taking effect, leaving no time to sue.

Davis v. Isaacson, Robustelli, Fox, Fine, Greco & Fogelgaren, P. C. · filed 1997-11-12(6)

Under these circumstances, where no time at all remained for plaintiff to commence an action against Kuttner, the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) cannot be applied consistent with constitutional requirements.

The 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) shortened the limitations period for legal malpractice claims from six years to three years and does not bar claims filed before its effective date.

Rome v. Schmidt · filed 1997-11-19(6)

Because those counterclaims were interposed in May 1995, they are not barred by the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), effective September 4, 1996 (L 1996, ch 623), which reduces the Statute of Limitations for claims of legal malpractice from six years to three years.

Legal malpractice actions commenced before the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6) are governed by a six-year limitations period.

Dowd v. Law Plan Hyatt Legal Services · filed 1998-04-27(6)

The legal malpractice actions in this case, commenced prior to the' recent amendments to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623, § 2), are governed by a six-year limitations period (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700; Sears Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389, 396; see also, Ruffolo v Garbarini & Scher, 239 AD2d 8; Romeo v Schmidt, 244 AD2d 860).

Former § 214(6) bars untimely legal malpractice claims for damages different from or greater than those customarily recoverable for breach of contract.

Scanio v. Palmiere & Pellegrino, P. C. · filed 1998-06-10(6)

Finally, to the extent that the complaint seeks damages different from or greater than ... those customarily recoverable for breach of contract, the Statute of Limitations has expired with respect to that relief sought (see, CPLR 214 [former (6)] [prior to 1996 amendment]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700, 707; see also, Romeo v Schmidt, 244 AD2d 860).

The shortened limitations period in CPLR 214(6) does not apply to a claim that accrued before the amendment took effect when the action was commenced within a reasonable time afterward.

Shirley v. Danziger · filed 1998-07-08(6)

We conclude that due process requires that a plaintiff be afforded a reasonable time to commence an action after the effective date of the amendment ... Thus, the shortened Statute of Limitations does not apply to this action.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for accountant malpractice claims, whether pleaded in contract or tort.

Kelly v. Cesarano, Haque & Khan, P. C. · filed 1998-07-24(6)

In accordance with the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), the Statute of Limitations applicable to a cause of action for alleged malpractice, other than for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, is three years, regardless whether the underlying theory is based upon contract or tort.

Section 214’s three-year limitations period bars a legal malpractice counterclaim brought more than three years after the claim accrued.

Darby & Darby, P. C. v. VSI International, Inc. · filed 1998-08-28

The defendants, however, never brought a legal malpractice claim against the plaintiff until the present action was commenced by the plaintiff in August 1996 and their counterclaim is thus barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained under CPLR 214.

The 1996 amendment imposing a three-year limit on malpractice actions does not apply to actions commenced before the amendment took effect.

White of Lake George, Inc. v. Bell · filed 1997-07-07(6)

In this case, however, the court determines that the proposed amendment to the defendant’s answer lacks merit because the amended statute should not be applied retroactively to cases in which the lawsuit had been commenced prior to the enactment of the amendment.

Section 214(6) applies only to cases commenced after its enactment.

Amateur Hockey Ass'n of the United States v. Parson · filed 1997-11-18(6)

CPLR 214 (6) applies only to cases commenced after its enactment, not the situation here (see, Board of Mgrs. v Mandel, 235 AD2d 382; Estate of Re v Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, 958 F Supp 907, 918-919).

The 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6) cannot retroactively bar a legal malpractice action that was timely when filed.

Ruffolo v. Garbarini · filed 1998-01-20(6)

In any event, application of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) so as to render this action, timely when commenced, time barred by virtue of retroactive application of the amendment is impermissible.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to legal malpractice claims based on tort or contract, but its amendment does not bar actions commenced before its effective date.

Vogel v. Lyman · filed 1998-01-20(6)

Finally, the recent amendment to CPLR 214 (6), which ap...plies a three-year Statute of Limitations to legal malpractice claims whether the underlying theory is one of tort or contract, does not apply to bar actions, such as this one, commenced prior to its effective date.

Amended CPLR 214 (6) applies to actions commenced after September 4, 1996, but a claimant whose existing claim was immediately barred by the amendment must have a reasonable time to sue.

Coastal Broadway Associates v. Raphael · filed 1998-01-22(6)

While amended CPLR 214 (6) applies to actions, such as this, commenced after its September 4, 1996 effective date (Amateur Hockey Assn. v Parson, 244 AD2d 222), due process requires that plaintiff be given a reasonable period after September 4, 1996 to pursue a claim theretofore existing but immediately barred upon the immediately effective enactment of the amendment (see, Alston v Transport Workers Union, 225 AD2d 424). Based upon the record before us, we find that the commencement of the action five and a half months after September 4, 1996 was reasonable.

The 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) sets a three-year limit for malpractice claims regardless of whether they sound in contract or tort, but does not apply retroactively to pending actions.

Martin v. Canale · filed 1998-07-30(6)

In our view, plaintiffs legal malpractice action, commenced prior to the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623, § 2), is governed by a six-year limitations period (see, CPLR 213 [2]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, supra; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs., 43 NY2d 389).

The 1996 amendment imposing a three-year limit on nonmedical malpractice claims, whether pleaded in contract or tort, applies prospectively only.

Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1998-12-01(6)

We have recently held that the amendment is to be given prospective application only ... Thus, the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions is applicable here.

The 1996 amendment to § 214(6) does not apply to malpractice actions pending when it took effect; the six-year limitations period applies to those actions.

Dawnwood Properties/78 v. Thorson (In Re Dawnwood Properties/78) · filed 1999-04-05(6)

This Court, as well as others in this district, have rejected the retroactivity position and have applied the six-year statute of limitations to cases pending at the time the amendment went into effect.

For a legal malpractice claim that accrued before the September 4, 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) but was filed afterward, the action must be commenced within a reasonable time after the amendment took effect; almost one year and eight months was unreasonable.

Brothers v. Florence · filed 1999-06-01(6)

The plaintiffs’ causes of action were not interposed and pending as of September 4, 1996, the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623). ... The commencement of the instant action almost one year and eight months after the effective date of the amendment was not reasonable (see, Lefkowitz v Preminger, supra; Brzozowski v Zio Italian Bistro, 178 Misc 2d 761; Kelly v Cesarano, Haque & Khan, 178 Misc 2d 176).

Section 214(6) applies to appraiser malpractice claims that accrued before its 1996 amendment but had not yet been filed, giving claimants a reasonable time after the amendment to sue.

Early v. Rossback · filed 1999-06-28(6)

Further, as to the Rossback defendants, CPLR 214 (6), as amended, is applicable to a claim of appraiser malpractice, such as here, that accrued prior to the effective date of the amendment but was not yet interposed as of the effective date of the amendment, regardless of how pleaded (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, supra; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447). In such a case, a claimant is given a “reasonable” time from the effective date of the amendment to interpose a claim (see, Lefkowitz v Preminger, supra). The plaintiffs failed to interpose their claim against the Rossback defendants within a reasonable time, as the action was not commenced until April 2, 1997, approximately seven months after the September 4, 1996, effective date of the 1996 amendment.

The 1996 amendment imposing a three-year limit on nonmedical malpractice actions applies prospectively; a professional malpractice action commenced in 1995 and seeking pecuniary damages remained subject to the prior six-year limit.

17 Vista Fee Associates v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America · filed 1999-07-15(6)

The Legislature did not amend CPLR 214 (6) until 1996 (L 1996, ch 623) to provide that all nonmedical malpractice actions are subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations, whether pleaded in contract or tort. That amendment is to apply prospectively only (see, Ruffolo v Garbarini & Scher, 239 AD2d 8). Accordingly, as the third-party action was commenced within five years from the time the building was sold in 1990, the action was timely.

The amendment to Section 214(6) does not apply retroactively when a legal malpractice claim accrued and the action began before its September 4, 1996 effective date.

Budget Installment Corp. v. Levy, Ehrlich & Kronenberg · filed 1999-03-22(6)

CPLR 214 (6), as recently amended, is not applied retroactively where the cause of action accrued and the action was commenced prior to September 4, 1996, the effective date of the amendment (see, Dowd v Law Plan Hyatt Legal Servs., 249 AD2d 503; see also, Ruffolo v Garbarini & Scher, 239 AD2d 8, 13; Romeo v Schmidt, 244 AD2d 860).

The three-year limitations period for nonmedical malpractice cannot be applied retroactively to dismiss an action that was viable when filed.

Merz v. Seaman · filed 1999-10-12(6)

The Supreme Court erred in granting the motion on the ground that the action was barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations for actions based on nonmedical malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]; L 1996, ch 623, as amended). Although the Legislature provided that the amendment “shall take effect immediately” (L 1996, ch 623, as amended), the statute cannot be applied retroactively to dismiss an action that was viable at the time it was filed.

A non-medical professional malpractice claim that became time-barred immediately when section 214 (6) took effect may be filed within a reasonable time after the amendment.

Iocovello v. Weingrad & Weingrad, P. C. · filed 1999-06-17(6)

A litigant whose cause of action was not yet time-barred on September 4, 1996, the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) shortening the Statute of Limitations for all non-medical professional malpractice claims from six to three years, but was immediately time-barred by the new limitation is entitled to a reasonable period of time to commence his or her action (Coastal Broadway Assocs. v Raphael, 246 AD2d 445). We find that here, where the action would have been governed by the six-year limitation period under the prior statute (see, Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700), and was commenced eight months after the effective date of the amendment and five weeks after expiration of the newly imposed three-year Statute of Limitations, the action was filed within a reasonable time and the court erred in dismissing it as untimely (see, Alexander, Supp Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C214:6, 1999 Pocket Part, at 156).

A claim that accrued before the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6) had to be filed within a reasonable time after the amendment took effect; a delay of 21 months was unreasonable.

Easton v. Sankel · filed 2000-01-20(6)

Initially, we agree with Supreme Court’s analysis concerning the legal effect of the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) upon plaintiffs action. ... It is our further conclusion that a period of 21 months following the effective date of the amendment is unreasonable as a matter of law (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, 262 AD2d 391 [delay of 12 months is not reasonable]; Brothers v Florence, supra [delay of 20 months is not reasonable]; Lefkowitz v Preminger, supra [delay of six months and one day is not reasonable]).

For claims that accrued before the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6), an action filed after the amendment took effect must be commenced within a reasonable time; 13 months was too long.

Parkhurst v. Molinoff · filed 2000-03-20(6)

The plaintiffs causes of action had not been interposed and were not pending as of September 4, 1996, the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623). ... The commencement of the instant action 13 months after the effective date of the amendment was not reasonable (see, Lefkowitz v Preminger, supra; Early v Rossback, supra).

Section 214(6) allows a reasonable time to file a legal malpractice claim that was timely under prior law but unfiled when the 1996 amendment took effect; 57 days was reasonable.

Marine Midland Bank v. McCarthy, Fingar, Donovan, Drazen & Smith · filed 2000-04-03(6)

Under the facts of this case, the interposition of the plaintiff’s claim against the appellant 57 days after such date was within a reasonable time.

Section 214(6) gives a claimant, including a municipal corporation, a reasonable time after the amendment took effect to file a nonmedical malpractice claim that was timely under prior law.

Town of Newburgh v. Chumard · filed 2000-04-17(6)

Where a nonmedical professional malpractice claim accrued and would have been timely under prior case law, but was not yet interposed on the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6), a party is given a reasonable time from the effective date of the amendment to commence an action (see, Ruggeri v Menicucci, 262 AD2d 391; Lefkowitz v Preminger, 261 AD2d 447; McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 59, at 131). We agree with the Supreme Court that the plaintiff, a municipal corporation, is entitled to the same reasonable time to interpose its claim as is afforded a private litigant (see, People ex rel. Rodgers v Coler, 166 NY 1, 11; People v Ingersoll, 58 NY 1, 29-30; Town of Walton v Adair, 96 App Div 75, 80; Matter of Crespo, 123 Misc 2d 862; Rivera v Laporte, 120 Misc 2d 733).

Amended CPLR 214(6) applies its three-year limitations period to legal malpractice claims interposed after September 4, 1996, but due process allows claims brought within a reasonable time after that date.

Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn L. L. P. v. Munao · filed 2000-03-23(6)

While amended CPLR 214 (6), which reduced what would have been a six-year Statute of Limitations in this case to three years, applies to claims, such as these, interposed after its effective date of September 4, 1996, due process requires that such claims be entertained if brought within a reasonable time after September 4, 1996 — clearly the case here, where the claims were presumably interposed only one month, and actually interposed only four months, after September 4, 1996 (see, Coastal Broadway Assocs. v Raphael, 246 AD2d 445).

The 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6) applies to previously accrued nonmedical malpractice claims and provides up to one year after its effective date to sue on claims it would immediately bar.

Brothers v. Florence · filed 2000-10-19(6)

Therefore, we conclude that the Legislature intended that this amended limitations period should apply not only to causes of action accruing after its effective date but also to previously accrued claims not yet interposed by that date. ... Thus, upon consideration of the foregoing factors, we think an outside one-year grace period for claims immediately time-barred upon the effective date of the amendment to CPLR 214 (6) strikes the appropriate balance between State and litigants’ personal interests for Procedural Due Process purposes.

For actions commenced before the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214(6), the limitations period is six years when the alleged damages arise from a contractual relationship.

Drummond v. Petito · filed 2000-04-04(6)

Moreover, the appropriate limitations period is six years since the damages, as alleged, arise out of the contractual relationship between plaintiff and appellants and the action was commenced prior to the 1996 amendment of CPLR 214 (6) (see, Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, supra).

Section 214's state limitations period does not apply to a tort claim governed by federal maritime law.

O'HARA v. Bayliner · filed 1997-03-25

With that guidance, we note that applying the New York State Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214) and its accompanying tolling provisions {see, CPLR 208) here would generate the sort of nonuniform procedural bar that we have disavowed.

Section 214 does not bar a claim when the defendant fails to establish on the record that the applicable limitations period has run.

Continental Custom Wood Finishing Corp. v. Chestnut Homes, Inc. · filed 1998-03-16

Chestnut Homes, Inc., has failed to establish on this record that the plaintiffs causes of action insofar as asserted against it are barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214; Jensen v General Elec. Co., 82 NY2d 77; Gold Sun Shipping v Ionian Transp., 245 AD2d 420; Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v Hunter Turbo Corp., 241 AD2d 505).

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a personal injury action; a timely motion to add defendants with proposed amended pleadings tolls that period only until the order granting leave is entered.

Schlapa v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. · filed 2019-07-31(5)

While the limitations period is tolled where, as in this case, a motion for leave to file and serve a supplemental summons and amended complaint is made prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations and includes a copy of the proposed amended pleadings ( see Perez v Paramount Communications , 92 NY2d at 754-756; Abreu v Casey , 157 AD3d 442), the toll encompasses only the period from the date the motion for leave to amend is filed until the date the order granting that motion is entered, with the limitations period commencing to run again "after entry of the order" ( Perez v Paramount Communications , 92 NY2d at 756).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for New York trade secret misappropriation claims.

Amimon, Inc. v. Shenzhen Hollyland Tech Co. Ltd · filed 2021-11-30(4)

The statute of limitations to bring a trade secrets misappropriation claim under New York state law is also three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4); DT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 907 N.E.2d 268 (N.Y. 2009); Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v. Svane, Inc., 830 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).

Section 214(4) gives trade secret misappropriation and unfair competition claims a three-year limitations period that does not begin upon discovery of the claim.

Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1999-09-16(4)

The parties agree that New York’s three-year statute of limitations for actions to recover damages for injury to property applies to these claims. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). ... In the absence of any authority from New York state courts supporting the application of a discovery rule to these counterclaims, I decline to apply such a rule here.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year limitations period on unfair competition claims based on misappropriation.

Norbrook Laboratories Ltd. v. G.C. Hanford Manufacturing Co. · filed 2003-12-03(4)

Norbrook’s unfair competition claim is governed by the three-year statute of limitations imposed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). ... The court concludes, however, that Norbrook’s unfair competition claim accrued on January 24, 2002, when Hanford applied to the FDA to amend its commercial manufacturing process for PGP injections.

Section 214(4) bars the trade secret misappropriation claim because it was filed more than three years after disclosure and the continuing tort rule did not save it.

Chow v. Chak Yam Chau · filed 2014-01-10(4)

Though we review this issue de novo, we reach the same conclusion as the district court. A review of the record confirms the district court’s view that the Philippe Restaurants had adequately disclosed Mr. Chow’s alleged trade secret recipes and techniques. Moreover, it is unclear under Mr. Chow’s reading of the continuing tort rule when, if ever, the statute of limitations would commence on its trade secrets claim, a claim it concedes it knew of more than three years before it ... filed its complaint. We conclude that the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law on this claim.

Section 214(4) gives a trade-secret misappropriation claim a three-year limitations period when the claim principally seeks damages.

Universal Instruments Corp. v. Micro Sys. Eng'g, Inc. · filed 2019-05-08(4)

In New York, a cause of action for the misappropriation of trade secrets is governed by a three‐year statute of limitations, while claims for equitable relief are subject to a six‐year statute of limitations. ... Therefore, because the reality of the cause of action is that it is one for damages, not injunctive relief, the three‐year statute of limitations applies.

Section 214(2) gives a workers’ compensation insurer three years from settlement of the employee’s third-party action to enforce its lien.

Nunes v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2000-05-08(2)

The three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (2) for the liabilities created by statute is applied to actions under Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (see, Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 57 Misc 2d 764, 767; see also, Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v Nelson, 67 NY2d 169). The Statute of Limitations runs from the time the third-party action is settled (see, Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., supra). As the third-party action was settled more than three years before any action by National Union to enforce the lien, vacatur of the lien was appropriate.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limit for personal injury actions; a claim against a defendant added after that period does not relate back when the plaintiff's failure to join the defendant timely was due to inexcusable neglect.

Christiansen v. City of New York · filed 1988-11-07(5)

Shortly before the expiration of the three-year period of limitations (CPLR 214 [5]), the plaintiff moved by order to show cause for leave to serve a supplemental summons and an amended complaint naming Volkswagenwerk, AG. (hereinafter VWAG), the manufacturer of the vehicle, as a defendant. ... The plaintiff having failed to demonstrate that the failure to timely join VWAG was not due to his own inexcusable neglect, the belated claim against VWAG was properly dismissed (see, County of Rockland v Spring Val. Water Co., 134 AD2d 317, 319).

Section 214(2)'s three-year limitation does not bar arbitration claims that relate back to an action at law commenced within the period.

Brua Cab Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co. · filed 2000-09-25(2)

Brua and Washington contend that the arbitrator misapplied the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [2]), and should not have awarded Royal reimbursement ... for any payments made more then three years before the filing of the claims for arbitration. However, the arbitration claims related back to the inadvertent commencement of the action at law, which was timely (see, 11 NYCRR 65.10 [d] [5] [i]; Matter of MVAIC v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 221-222; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 AD2d 412; Matter of Brinks, Inc. v Commercial Union Ins. Co., 217 AD2d 620, 621).

CPLR 214 bars a personal-injury action against a new defendant when the limitations period has expired and the relation-back doctrine does not apply.

Gatto v. Smith-Eisenberg · filed 2001-02-26

The defendant was not united in interest with her husband, and therefore, the relation-back doctrine does not apply. As a result, this action is time-barred (see, CPLR 214; see also, CPLR 3211 [a] [5]).

CPLR 214 gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim, though an amendment adding a defendant may relate back after that period expires.

Tyz v. Integrity Real Estate & Development, Inc. · filed 2007-09-18

While the three-year statute of limitations to set forth a cause of action alleging negligence (see CPLR 214) expired prior to the plaintiffs cross motion, the plaintiff demonstrated the applicability of the relation-back doctrine (see generally Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173 [1995]).

Section 214(2) imposes a three-year limitations period on actions for tuition reimbursement under Education Law § 3202(4)(a).

Board of Education of City School District v. County of Westchester · filed 2001-04-16(2)

However, an action for tuition reimbursement pursuant to Education Law § 3202 (4) (a), is subject to the three-year limitation period of CPLR 214 (2) (see, Connetquot Cent. School Dist. v Greenport Union Free School Dist., 100 AD2d 923). Therefore, the first cause of action of the amended complaint is dismissed to the extent that it seeks recovery of tuition costs for periods before June 29, 1996.

Section 214(3) gives conversion claims a three-year limitations period.

Jean-Laurent v. Hennessy · filed 2011-10-24(3)

The statute of limitations for a conversion claim is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214[3] (McKinney’s 2011); Beesmer v. Besicorp Dev., Inc., 72 A.D.3d 1460, 900 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476 (3d Dep’t 2010). Plaintiff is deemed to have asserted his conversion claim on February 2, 2005, less than three years after the June 11, 2002 incident. Therefore, plaintiffs conversion claim is timely and defendants’ motion in limine to dismiss this claim as untimely is denied.

Section 214(4) does not bar a takings claim when the defendant fails to show that the claim challenges an earlier resolution rather than a later denial of modification.

Blue Island Development, LLC v. Town of Hempstead · filed 2015-08-12(4)

Absent such a showing, Blue Island’s cause of action alleging an unconstitutional taking cannot be dismissed as time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4]; see generally Linzenberg v Town of Ramapo, 1 AD3d 321, 322 [2003]).

Section 214(2) does not bar these taxpayer claims challenging city appointments.

Charleson v. City of Long Beach · filed 2002-09-30(2)

Finally, the plaintiffs’ causes of action are not barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201; Hartnett v New York City Tr. Auth., 86 NY2d 438; Shechtman v Sverdrup & Parcel Consultants, 226 AD2d 268; cf. Clowes v Pulver, 258 AD2d 50).

Section 214(4) allows recovery for a continuing public nuisance only for damages incurred during the three years before the action began.

Agoglia v. Benepe · filed 2010-10-26(4)

Further, a public nuisance is a continuing harm and damages are recoverable to the extent they are incurred during the three years prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 214 [4]; 7806; State of New York v General Elec. Co., 199 AD2d 595 [1993]).

Section 214(4) requires property injury actions to begin within three years of the injury, while a continuing nuisance permits recovery for damages sustained during the three years before suit.

Pilatich v. Town of New Baltimore · filed 2012-11-21[4]

While an action to recover damages for injury to property must be commenced within three years from the date of the injury (see CPLR 214 [4]), actions premised on a continuing nuisance involve a continuous wrong and, therefore, “generally give rise to successive causes of action that accrue each time a wrong is committed” (Smith v Town of Long Lake, 40 AD3d 1381, 1383 [2007]). In such cases, “damages are only recoverable to the extent that they were sustained during the three years immediately preceding commencement” of the action (Cippitelli v Town of Niskayuna, 203 AD2d 632, 634 [1994]; see Kearney v Atlantic Cement Co., 33 AD2d 848, 849 [1969]). Here, plaintiffs claim of private nuisance is premised upon the existence of on-going damage being caused to his property by defendants’ wall and iron posts. Thus, his claim for damages for the three-year period immediately prior to the commencement of this action is not untimely (see Petti v Town of Lexington, 92 AD3d 1111, 1114-1115 [2012]; Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 911 [2010]).

Section 214(4) bars claims for property damage from flooding that occurred more than three years before the complaint was filed, even when recurring flooding gives rise to successive claims.

Kehagias v. Waldo Avenue Building · filed 2015-10-29(4)

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs claim damages for flooding that occurred before August 18, 2007 (three years prior to the filing of the complaint), those claims are time-barred (see Lucchesi v Perfetto, 72 AD3d 909, 912 [2d Dept 2010]; see also CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(4) and (2) impose a three-year limitations period on common-law and statutory public nuisance claims, respectively.

City of New York v. College Point Sports Ass'n · filed 2009-01-20(4), (2)

The Casalino defendants argued before the Supreme Court, and reiterate on appeal, that both of these causes of action are barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to nuisance, as set forth in CPLR 214 (4) and (2), respectively. The City correctly conceded in its brief, and confirmed during its oral argument, that both nuisance causes of action were time-barred to the extent not encompassed in the seventh cause of action, i.e., the crime victim cause of action. Accordingly, the causes of action alleging common-law and statutory public nuisance should have been dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contract claims.

McDerman v. Doe · filed 2025-06-23

Mr. McDerman has demonstrated entitlement to proceed in this action against defendant “John Doe” – but only up through the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations on his ... invasion of privacy claims (see CPLR 215) and the three-year statute of limitations on his tortious interference with contract claims (see CPLR 214).

Section 214(4) gives a tortious interference with contract claim three years from the date damages are sustained.

Wagschal v. Ecconergy · filed 2025-08-06(4)

A cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to accrue on the date damages are sustained ( see CPLR 214[4]; Sapienza v Notaro , 172 AD3d 1418, 1420).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship.

Braddock v. Shwarts · filed 2023-10-06(4)

However, these claims must be dismissed as time-barred, as they are being brought for the first time after the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations. The statute of 1imitations for tortious interference with a prospective business relationship is three years ( see CPLR 214 (4); see also Thome v Alexander & Louisa Calder Found. , 70 AD3d 88, 108 [1st Dept 2009]).

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to a claim for tortious interference with collection of a money judgment.

Priestley v. Panmedix, Inc. · filed 2022-02-01(4)

Although this claim was not asserted until the second amended complaint, which was not filed until after expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; Thome , 70 AD3d at 108), it should nonetheless be deemed timely insofar as asserted against HW because it arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original fraudulent conveyance claims and thus relates back to the filing of the first amended complaint (FAC) ( see CPLR 203[f]; Cady v Springbrook NY, Inc. , 145 AD3d 846, 846-847 [2d Dept 2016]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contract claims.

Morales v. Arrowood Indem. Co. · filed 2022-03-11(4)

Plaintiff's 11th cause of action, which seeks to recover for, in essence, tortious interference with business relations, is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see generally Amaranth LLC v J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. , 71 AD3d 40, 47-48 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed in part and denied in part 14 NY3d 736 [2010]), as is her 12th cause of action for tortious interference with contract ( see CPLR 214 [4]; Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v Svane, Inc. , 36 AD3d 1094, 1099 [3d Dept 2007]).

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference with contract claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the claim becomes enforceable.

Novartis Pharma AG v. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. · filed 2022-01-31(4)

To that end, “the statute of limitations for tortious interference claims is three years.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Amersham PLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 217, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4)). ... In other words, the statute of limitations would have run out on Regeneron’s tortious interference claims no later than December of 2018.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tortious interference with contract claim; public deception does not equitably estop a defendant from invoking that deadline.

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Novartis Pharma AG · filed 2022-01-31(4)

To that end, “the statute of limitations for tortious interference claims is three years.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Amersham PLC, 981 F. Supp. 2d 217, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4)). ... In other words, the statute of limitations would have run out on Regeneron’s tortious interference claims no later than December of 2018. ... Because a public deception cannot justify equitable estoppel, Regeneron’s claims are not timely and must be dismissed.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to claims for tortious interference with contract.

Niche Music Group, LLC v. Orchard Enters., Inc. · filed 2020-12-01(4)

The claim is also barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[4]; American Fed. Group Ltd. v Edelman , 282 AD2d 279 [1st Dept 2001]).

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference with contract claims a three-year limitations period that accrues when the tort is completed, ordinarily when damages are sustained.

St. John's University, New York v. Bolton · filed 2010-12-10(4)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for tortious interference with contract is subject to the three-year limitations period imposed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). Under New York law a tortious interference with contract claim accrues when the tort is completed — ordinarily when Plaintiff sustains damages.

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference claims a three-year limitations period.

Ullmannglass v. Onieda, Ltd. · filed 2011-07-21(4)

A one-year statute of limitations applies to a claim sounding in defamation (see CPLR 215 [3]; Ramsay v Mary Imogene Bassett Hosp., 113 AD2d 149, 151 [1985], Ivs dismissed 67 NY2d 608, 1028 [1986]), whereas a claim for tortious interference with a contract is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v Svane, Inc., 36 AD3d 1094, 1099 [2007]), as is a tortious interference with prospective contractual relations claim (see CPLR 214 [4]; see e.g. Besicorp, Ltd. v Kahn, 290 AD2d 147, 150 [2002], Iv denied 98 NY2d 601 [2002]).

Section 214 imposes a three-year limitations period on negligence claims, running from the date of the negligent act.

City of Syracuse v. Loomis Armored US, LLC · filed 2012-09-28

Under New York law, a negligence claim is governed by a three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214. This limitations period begins to run from the date of the alleged negligent act, regardless of when it was allegedly discovered or should have been discovered.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on claims sounding in negligence.

Matana v. Merkin · filed 2013-07-30(4)

A three-year statute of limitations applies to claims sounding in negligence. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4). A cause of action for negligence accrues at the time of the injury.

Section 214(4) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on tortious interference claims.

Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Amersham PLC · filed 2013-10-22(4)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for tortious interference claims is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4); Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 29 (2009).

CPLR 214 sets a three-year limitations period; once it expires, the Court of Claims cannot extend the time to serve a claim.

Miles v. City University of New York · filed 2015-03-24

However, the statute of limitations had expired by the time of claimant’s first service of the new claim (see CPLR 214; Koerner v State of N.Y., Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442 [1984]).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Jones v. Bay Shore Union Free School District · filed 2016-03-16

For Section 1983 actions filed in New York, the applicable statute of limitations is Section 214 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”), which allows three years to file suit.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Neal v. Wilson · filed 2017-03-09

For section 1983 actions filed in New York, the applicable statute of limitations is section 214 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”), which allows three years to file suit.

CPLR 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Phillips v. City of N.Y. · filed 2018-01-09(5)

The three-year statute of limitations of New York CPLR 214(5) applies to all Section 1983 actions filed in New York, with the claim accruing on the date the discriminatory decision was communicated to the employee.

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claims.

Deadco Petroleum v. AG · filed 2017-06-15(4)

The intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim, which did not arise under the PSA, is also time-barred, because it accrued, at the latest, in December 2009, and plaintiff did not commence this action until well beyond the expiration of the applicable three-year limitations period (see CPLR 214 [4]; Susman v Commerzbank Capital Mkts. Corp., 95 AD3d 589, 590 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 810 [2012]).

CPLR 214 (4) applies a three-year limitations period to a counterclaim for tortious interference with a contractual right of first offer.

California Capital Equity, LLC v. IJKG, LLC · filed 2017-06-29(4)

The doctrine of equitable recoupment, as codified in CPLR 203 (d), applies to IJKG’s counterclaim for tortious interference with its contractual right of first offer, which otherwise would be barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214 gives claims for tortious interference with prospective business relations a three-year limitations period that runs from the date of injury.

Brown Media Corp. v. K & L Gates, LLP · filed 2018-02-28

Under New York law, a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations' three-year statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the injury.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a tortious interference with contract claim; the period runs from the alleged interference.

Seidenfeld v. Zaltz · filed 2018-06-20(4)

Similarly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant dismissal of the third cause of action, which alleged tortious interference with contract, as time-barred since, assuming that Sheila was a party to the 1986 agreement, the Zaltzes alleged interference in persuading Elsie to transfer her interest occurred in 2000. Thus, the three-year limitations period [*2]applicable to this cause of action expired in 2003 ( see CPLR 214[4]; Pursnani v Stylish Move Sportswear, Inc ., 92 AD3d 663, 664; Chung v Wang , 79 AD3d 693, 694).

Section 214(4)'s three-year limitations period applies to a claim for tortious interference with contract.

Golia v. State of New York · filed 2018-06-20(4)

In addition, his proposed claim alleging tortious interference with contract is time-barred ( see CPLR 214[4]; Pursnani v Stylish Move Sportswear, Inc., 92 AD3d 663, 664).

Section 214(4) generally gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for tortious interference with business relationships.

Gym Door Repairs, Inc. v. Young Equip. Sales, Inc. · filed 2018-09-19(4)

The statute of limitations for tortious interference with business relationships is generally three years.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years from the date of injury to bring a tortious interference claim.

Sapienza v. Notaro · filed 2019-05-29(4)

A tortious interference claim has a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; Pursnani v Stylish Move Sportswear, Inc. , 92 AD3d 663, 664). ... Here, the Kofsky defendants failed to meet their burden because Sapienza alleged that he was injured by Performance Team's nonrenewal of his employment contract, an event that allegedly occurred within three years of commencement of this action ( see Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp. , 81 NY2d at 96; Amaranth LLC v J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. , 71 AD3d 40, 48).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Birkett v. N.Y.C.D.O.C. Comm. John/Jane Doe · filed 2019-06-10(5)

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years.

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference claims three years from the date the plaintiff first sustains damages.

Bandler v. DeYonker · filed 2019-07-11(4)

The statute of limitations for tortious interference with contract and with prospective business relations is three years from the date of injury, which is triggered when a plaintiff first sustains damages (CPLR 214[4]; Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp. , 81 NY2d 90, 94 [1993]).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Marcinkowski v. City of Buffalo · filed 2019-08-19

In New York, that statute of limitations is three years.

Section 214(4) gives a tortious interference claim three years from accrual to be filed.

Moon v. Moon · filed 2019-12-19(4)

Because plaintiff filed the initial complaint over three years after his alleged suspension, any tortious interference claim is time-barred. NY CPLR § 214(4).

Section 214(4) generally gives plaintiffs three years to bring a tortious interference with business relations claim.

Deaton v. Napoli · filed 2019-09-27(4)

Under New York law, claims for tortious interference with business relations are generally governed by a three-year statute of limitations. ... The letters mailed to the wives of Shrader & Associates employees were sent in November 2013, and thus any claim based on those letters must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York.

Ayers v. Olles · filed 2020-10-16

But “New York’s three year statute of limitations . . . governs [when] [section] 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York” must be filed. Jewell v. Cty. of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2)). ... The Court therefore agrees with the moving defendants that any claim related to the 2012 disciplinary charges must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference claims.

Mendler v. Jane-Horatio LLC · filed 2021-02-09(4)

The statute of limitations is six years for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and constructive trust claims ( see CPLR 213[2] [contract]; Maya NY, LLC v Hagler , 106 AD3d 583, 584-585 [1st Dept 2013] [unjust enrichment]; Knobel v Shaw , 90 AD3d 493, 496 [1st Dept 2011] [constructive trust]; 10 years for RPAPL article 15 claims ( see CPLR 212[a]); and three years for tortious interference claims ( see CPLR 214[4]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 malicious abuse of process claims.

Li v. Village of Saddle Rock · filed 2021-03-30(5)

Section 1983 malicious abuse of process claims are time-barred if they stem from arrests or tickets for criminal violations predating a civil complaint by more than three years.

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for tortious interference with contract claims.

S.A.R.L. Galerie Enrico Navarra v. Marlborough Gallery Inc. · filed 2021-05-06(4)

The claims for tortious interference with contract and aiding and abetting tortious interference with contract, which it is undisputed relate back to the federal action filed in October 2010 ( see CPLR 205[a]), may be timely under the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[4]; Kenneth D. Laub & Co. v Bear Stearns Cos. , 262 AD2d 36, 37 [1st Dept 1999]; Pomerance v McGrath , 124 AD3d 481, 484 [1st Dept 2015], lv dismissed 25 NY3d 1038 [2015]). We agree with Supreme Court that there is a question of fact as to when the claims accrued.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Shepherd v. Kings County District Attorney Gonzales · filed 2021-08-05

For Section 1983 actions filed in New York, the applicable statute of limitations is in Section 214 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, which allows three years to file suit.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims.

Nimham-El-Dey v. Vasquez · filed 2022-02-28(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is three years. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Corines v. The Westchester County Dept. of Correction · filed 2022-09-19(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Rivera v. Annucci · filed 2022-10-24(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Because Plaintiff filed his complaint more than three years after August 28, 2016, and he does not allege facts suggesting that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled in this case, his complaint is dismissed as time barred.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in New York.

White v. Gutwein · filed 2022-12-21

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted in New York based on personal injuries, such as Plaintiff’s claims premised on Eighth Amendment violations, are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214); Patterson v. Cty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). Assuming Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed on the day he signed the Complaint, June 5, 2020, any claims that accrued prior to June 5, 2017 are time barred.

Section 214(4) gives tortious interference claims a three-year limitations period.

Scanni v. New York Life Insurance and Annuity Company · filed 2023-03-30(4)

The statute of limitations for tortious interference claims is three years, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(4), and “begins to run when the defendant performs the action (or inaction) that constitutes the alleged interference.”

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 takings claims filed in New York.

Billeris v. The Incorporated Village of Bayville, New York · filed 2023-09-25(5)

“[I]n New York, the statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.”

Section 214(4) gives a tortious-interference-with-contract claim three years from the occurrence of injury; the claim cannot be dismissed as untimely when the record does not establish when damages first arose.

Downstate at Lich Holding Co., Inc. v. Fortis Prop. Group, LLC · filed 2024-04-05(4)

A claim for tortious interference with contract must be brought within three years of the occurrence of the injury ( see CPLR 214 [4]; Kronos, Inc. v AVX Corp. , 81 NY2d 90, 94 [1993]; Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v Svane, Inc. , 36 AD3d 1094, 1099 [3d Dept 2007]). ... The Court concludes that the present record is inconclusive as to the earliest date upon which NYUHC's alleged tortious interference caused Fortis to sustain damages.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Avant v. County of Erie · filed 2024-07-30(5)

The statute of limitations for a section 1983 claim is three years. See Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 108 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[I]n New York, the statute of limitations for [s]ection 1983 claims is New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.”). ... So Avant cannot invoke the “relation back” doctrine to avoid the statutes of limitations here, and her claims against the proposed defendants therefore are time barred.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Bramble v. Hynes · filed 2024-09-26(5)

“Under well-settled law, claims under Section 1983 . . . are governed by New York’s general statute of limitations for personal injury actions under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5), which is three years.” ... Because Bramble’s complaint was filed long after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the Court sua sponte dismisses his claims as time-barred.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 actions filed in New York.

Colson v. Mingo · filed 2025-01-16

Section 1983 actions filed in New York are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002); see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2024). Claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injuries forming the basis of the action, see Pearl, 296 F.3d at 80, which in this case was August 2016. As such, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s claims arising out of this action elapsed in August 2019.

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period for NYCHRL claims.

Saint-Jean v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., Inc. · filed 2025-02-19

The applicable statutes of limitation are two years under the FHA and the ECOA, and three years under the NYCHRL. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (FHA); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (eff. Oct. 28, 1974) (ECOA); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (NYCHRL).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Cato v. Dietschler · filed 2025-03-21(5)

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is governed by a three-year statute of limitations period.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period applied to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Simpara v. New York District Authority · filed 2025-08-20(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... As Plaintiff filed his complaint in 2024, these claims are time-barred and subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which applies to Section 1983 claims in New York.

Fisher v. Valley Stream Central High School District · filed 2025-08-27(5)

Fisher filed this action on May 8, 2023; thus, under the three-year statute of limitations, only claims concerning alleged incidents that occurred on or after May 8, 2020 are timely, unless the continuing violation doctrine applies.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims.

Gehlaut v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ. · filed 2025-09-08(2)

Because Gehlaut filed his first charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on July 20, 2020, and waited more than three years after the June 2019 reassignment before filing suit, we agree with Johnson and the DOE that Gehlaut’s federal, state, and city claims based on that reassignment are untimely. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (300-day time limit to file an EEOC charge); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (three-year statute of limitations for NYSHRL claims); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8–502(d) (three-year statute of limitations for NYCHRL claims); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2-b) (one-year statute of limitations for claims against the DOE).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Jordan · filed 2026-02-20(5)

However, to the extent the plaintiff bases this claim on the CFB’s September 12, 2019 decision to fine him (ECF No. 11-1, at 2–4), his claim is time-barred, because the plaintiff did not initiate this action until October 11, 2024 — over five years after the CFB penalized him. See Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990)) (applying New York’s three-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions to Section 1983 claims).

CPLR 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for actions brought under a statute and does not govern proceedings before administrative agencies.

Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Center, Inc. v. Novello · filed 2011-01-20(2)

Nor is there any merit to plaintiffs argument that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions pursuant to a statute (see CPLR 214 [2]) applies here. The CPLR does not govern proceedings before administrative agencies (Matter of Hicks v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 75 AD3d 127 [2010]).

CPLR 214 limits the time to commence certain court actions but does not apply to administrative proceedings.

Matter of Brownell v. New York State Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs · filed 2023-01-19

It follows that the findings were not rendered untimely by CPLR 214 and, in short, that neither Brownell nor Norton demonstrated their entitlement to dismissal of the findings against them as time barred.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not govern a challenge to a Medicaid rate decision that could have been brought under CPLR article 78.

New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette · filed 1994-06-30(2)

Initially, we note that the Appellate Division’s reliance on Hollander v Brezenoff (supra) was misplaced. The only issue in Hollander was whether a proceeding to enforce a social service agency’s obligation to pay a Medicaid provider was governed by the six-year limitations period for actions on a contractual obligation (CPLR 213 [2]) or was instead governed by the three-year period for actions on a liability imposed by statute (CPLR 214 [2]). The court was not called upon to consider whether the shorter four-month limitations for proceedings against a body or officer (CPLR 217) was applicable. Consequently, its holding has no persuasive significance here.

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period running from injury by a deceptive act or practice.

Butry v. National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-3 · filed 2024-08-16(2)

The statute of limitations for GBL § 349 claims is three years from the date “when [a] plaintiff has been injured by a deceptive act or practice.” Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 N.Y.2d 201, 210 (2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (“an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute” “must be commenced within three years’’).

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period that runs from injury; discovery does not extend that period.

Malek v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co. · filed 2023-03-29(2)

Section 349 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period. See Corsello, 18 N.Y.3d at 789. The New York Court of Appeals has held that the statute of limitations “runs from the time when the plaintiff was injured.” See id. at 789-90 (rejecting argument that statute of limitations for Section 349 runs “from the date when the plaintiff learns, or reasonably should learn, that he or she has been deceived”); see also Wender v. Gilberg Agency, 276 A.D.2d 311, 312 (1st Dep’t 2000) (noting that plaintiff’s Section 349 claims were “time-barred as the three-year limitations period set forth in CPLR 214(2) applies to causes of action predicated thereon and the date of discovery rule is not applicable and cannot serve to extend that limitations period”). ... Plaintiff’s Section 349 claims are dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(2) requires an action under General Business Law § 349 to be commenced within three years after the plaintiff suffers the injury.

Jackling v. Brighthouse Life Insurance Company · filed 2022-07-10(2)

An action under General Business Law §349 must be commenced within three years after the plaintiff suffers the injury, pursuant to New York CPLR §214(2).

Section 214(2) gives claims under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 three years from the date of injury to be filed.

MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. · filed 2021-09-29(2)

Plaintiffs do not and cannot dispute defendants’ assertion that: (1) their New York General Business Law (“GBL”) §§ 349 and 350 claims are subject to a three-year limitations period that begins accruing at the date of injury;7 ... As plaintiffs did not file this action until June 14, 2019, nearly eight years later, plaintiffs do not and cannot dispute that the New York Claims were filed after the statute of limitations period expired.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349.

Reyes v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. · filed 2021-04-20(2)

The Court also finds that the Plaintiffs’ fourth count under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349 is outside the statute of limitations. In New York, the statute of limitations for Section 349 is controlled by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) and is three years.

Section 214(2) requires General Business Law causes of action to be brought within three years of when the plaintiff is injured by a deceptive act or practice.

ENZINNA, NICOLE M. v. D'YOUVILLE COLLEGE · filed 2011-05-06(2)

The General Business Law causes of action must be asserted within three years of when the plaintiff “has been injured by a deceptive act or practice” (Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 210; see CPLR 214 [2]; Beller v William Penn Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 8 AD3d 310, 314). Here, contrary to defendant’s contention, plaintiffs were not injured when they initially enrolled in defendant’s Doctor of Chiropractic program and began paying tuition. Rather, the injury occurred when plaintiffs graduated and allegedly learned that their degrees did not render them “eligible for licensure examination in all states,” as stated in defendant’s promotional catalog. It was at that point and not sooner that plaintiffs’ “expectations were actually not met” (Gaidon, 96 NY2d at 212).

Section 214 gives a General Business Law § 349 claim a three-year limitations period, running here from the first notice of increased mortgage payments.

Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. · filed 2014-08-28

Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of General Business Law § 349 was properly held untimely, as it accrued upon defendants’ first notice of mortgage payment increases in April 2009, more than three years before the July 2012 service of the pleadings in this action (see CPLR 214).

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period, measured from when the consumer is injured by the deceptive act.

Marshall v. Hyundai Motor America · filed 2014-09-30(2)

This claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. ... To the extent that Plaintiffs’ § 349 claims are based upon Defendant’s conduct that caused Plaintiff to purchase the vehicles at issue in this case, however, these claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

CPLR 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349 claim three years from accrual to be commenced.

Loiodice v. BMW of North America, LLC · filed 2015-02-11(2)

As this cause of action is predicated on the sale of the vehicle, which took place in October 2010, it was timely commenced on November 22, 2011, within the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d at 210).

Under § 214(2), defendants did not establish that a General Business Law § 349 claim was time-barred when the alleged concealment ended shortly before the complaint was filed.

Pirrelli v. OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2015-06-03(2)

The plaintiffs alleged that the OCWEN defendants affirmatively concealed the existence of facts showing the allegedly deceptive business practices until January 2012. The complaint was filed in February 2012. Under these circumstances, the OCWEN defendants failed to show that the cause of action to recover damages under General Business Law § 349 was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [2]; Ostrower v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 720 [2001]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 272 AD2d 60, 61 [2000], affd 96 NY2d 201 ... [2001]).

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the transaction, not discovery of the alleged deception.

Salvaggio v. American Express Bank, FSB · filed 2015-06-10(2)

Further, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff’s General Business Law § 349 claim accrued, insofar as asserted against the American Express defendants, on the date she closed on the purchase of the subject property, and not when she discovered the alleged deceptive act ... Since this action was commenced over five years after the date of closing, the plaintiff’s General Business Law § 349 claim is time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under General Business Law § 349, running from the alleged injury.

Williams-Guillaume v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2015-07-29(2)

The cause of action alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349, which is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc., 18 NY3d 777, 778 [2012]; Gaidon v Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 96 NY2d 201, 208 [2001]), was also time-barred, as the plaintiffs alleged injury occurred in February 2007, and she did not commence this action until December 2013.

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period.

Martin Hilti Family Trust v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC · filed 2015-09-30(2)

Claims brought under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2).

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York General Business Law § 349 a three-year limitations period.

Shak v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. · filed 2016-01-12(2)

Plaintiffs’ NYGBL § 349 claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... Plaintiffs’ § 349 claims thus are time-barred — they expired in early 2014, about a year before the complaints were filed.

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period.

Kainer v. Christie's Inc. · filed 2016-07-07(2)

New York courts have applied CPLR 214 (2)’s three-year period of limitations for statutory causes of action to General Business Law § 349 claims (id.). ... Accordingly, the action was properly dismissed based on the statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) gives General Business Law § 349 claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the plaintiff is injured.

King v. New York City Employees Retirement System · filed 2016-07-25(2)

Claims pursuant to GBL section 349 are governed by a three-year limitations period. ... Alternatively, the claim fails because it was brought two years after the three-year statute of limitations had elapsed. The limitations period began to run on September 4, 2008, the date that plaintiff was informed that he would no longer be eligible for Tier 1 benefits.

Section 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349 claim three years from the date of injury; when an alleged defect exists at purchase, the period begins then.

Argabright v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 2016-08-15(2)

Because she also alleges that the defect was in place at the time of purchase, the “factual circumstances necessary to establish a right of action” were present in 2010, at least four and a half years before this Complaint was filed. Plaintiffs’ claim falls outside the statute of limitations.

Section 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349 claim three years from accrual to be interposed.

Belair Care Ctr., Inc. v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc. · filed 2019-01-03(2)

Accordingly, the General Business Law § 349 cause of action should not have been dismissed, except as against Hickey-Finn, to the extent that such claim accrued within three years of when it was interposed by each respective plaintiff ( see CPLR 214 [2]).

CPLR 214(2) gives a General Business Law § 349 claim a three-year limitations period.

Lewis v. KMT Group, Inc. · filed 2019-06-26(2)

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that both the one-year statute of limitations applicable to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 USC § 1692 et seq .) cause of action ( see 15 USC § 1692k[d]), and the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the General Business Law § 349 cause of action ( see CPLR 214[2]), which each arose in 1999, had expired by the time the plaintiff commenced this action in 2016.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for GBL § 349 claims.

Chizniak v. Certainteed Corporation · filed 2020-01-30(2)

Gaidon sets out the specific three-year period of limitation for GBL § 349 claims established in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2). ... Therefore, the Court finds that all of these claims are barred by their respective statutes of limitation because her vinyl siding was allegedly defective when it was delivered and installed on her home in 2008, and she did not file this lawsuit until 2017.

Section 214(2) gives claims alleging violations of General Business Law § 349 a three-year limitations period.

Cisco v. Verizon N.Y., Inc. · filed 2025-12-10(2)

Here, the defendants demonstrated, prima facie, that this action was commenced beyond the expiration of the applicable three-year statute of limitations for the causes of action alleging violations of General Business Law § 349 ( see CPLR 214[2]; Corsello v Verizon N.Y., Inc. , 18 NY3d 777, 789; Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 161 AD3d 926), which began to accrue no later than April 6, 2015.

Section 214(2) gives claims under General Business Law § 349 a three-year limitations period.

Shen v. Ferncliff Cemetery Assn. · filed 2026-06-24(2)

A cause of action alleging a violation of General Business Law § 349 is governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[2]; Williams-Guillaume v Bank of Am., N.A. , 130 AD3d at 1017). Here, to the extent that the complaint alleged violations of General Business Law § 349, the statute of limitations on any such cause of action would have expired in December 2016.

Negligence and products liability claims involving a malfunctioning implanted medical device accrue when the plaintiff first experiences injury from the malfunction, even if the cause is discovered later.

Diddy v. Stryker Corporation · filed 2025-04-10(5)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims accrued when he began to suffer from left-leg pain in September 2020. ... Because the injury accrued more than three years before Plaintiff filed the complaint, his negligence and products-liability claims are untimely.

Section 214 starts the three year limitations period when all facts necessary for the cause of action have occurred and the plaintiff could obtain relief in court.

Rapaport v. Robin S. Weingast & Associates, Inc. · filed 2012-04-30

Under New York law, for purposes of N.Y. CPLR § 214, a cause of action accrues when all of the facts necessary to the cause of action occur such that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court.

Under section 214(4), negligence and gross negligence claims based on actuarial reports are time-barred if filed more than three years after the reports were delivered.

New York State Workers' Compensation Board v. Program Risk Management, Inc. · filed 2017-11-30(4)

Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff’s negligence or gross negligence claims are premised on reports delivered to the trust prior to January 2, 2011—i.e., more than three years prior to the commencement of the action—such claims are time-barred. ... Plaintiff commenced this action against Regnier on January 2, 2014 and the applicable statute of limitations, which is not in dispute, is three years (see CPLR 214 [4]; IDT Corp. v Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 NY3d 132, 139 [2009]).

Section 214(4) requires a negligence action to be commenced within three years after the wrong or injury arises, even if the injured party is unaware of it.

Huss v. Rucci Oil Co., Inc. · filed 2017-12-22(4)

A cause of action alleging negligence must be commenced within three years from the time the wrong or injury has arisen even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the injury ( see CPLR 214 [4]; Varga v Credit-Suisse , 5 AD2d at 292-293, affd 5 NY2d 865).

Section 214(2) gives a claim under Administrative Code § 27-860 three years from the completion of construction to be brought.

New York Yacht Club v. Lehodey · filed 2019-04-04(2)

The cause of action under Administrative Code § 27-860 accrued at the time of the completion of construction, and is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[2]; see e.g. West Chelsea Bldg. LLC v Guttman , 139 AD3d 39 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 214(4) gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period, but whether a defective-construction claim accrued when construction was completed can depend on the plaintiff’s relationship to the contractor.

Community Association Underwriters of America Inc. v. Main Line Fire Protection Corp. · filed 2020-08-28(4)

In New York, negligence claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations. CPLR § 214(4). ... The parties dispute the nature of the relationship between Plaintiff and Main Line and whether there is any privity between them, which is an essential fact in determining the statute of limitations in this case. The Court, therefore, concludes that because “resolution of the [D]efendants’ statute of limitations argument requires a fact-specific evaluation,” it would be premature at this stage to deny the Third Amended Complaint as time barred.

Section 214(4) gives a negligence claim against insurance brokers a three-year limitations period that runs from the insurer's coverage disclaimer.

Johnson v. Northeast Agencies Inc. · filed 2025-10-02(4)

Supreme Court properly concluded that plaintiff's cause of action accrued in April 2018, at the time of injury, when his insurer disclaimed coverage ( see Lavandier v Landmark Ins. Co. , 26 AD3d 264, 264 [1st Dept 2006]). Accordingly, the cause of action was untimely because it was commenced more than three years after the claim accrued ( see CPLR 214[4]; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group , 96 NY2d 20, 30-31 [2001]).

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Florance v. Town of Dickinson · filed 2026-01-08

A negligence claim has a three-year statute of limitations. CPLR § 214. Claims against a municipality must be brought within one-year and ninety days. CPLR § 217-a. Plaintifr s Complaint was filed almost 3 ½ years after the Planning Board's determination, so a negligence claim would be time barred by CPLR § 214 and§ 217-a.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years from the onset of injury to bring a products liability claim involving a defective implanted medical device.

Diddy v. Stryker Corp. · filed 2026-04-30(5)

We decline to do so because it is clear that under New York law, the three-year statute of limitations for products liability claims arising from defective implanted medical devices runs from the onset of injury.

Section 214 sets three-year limitation periods for conversion and accountant malpractice claims.

Maya NY, LLC v. Hagler · filed 2013-05-21(3), (6)

An action for conversion is subject to a three-year limitation period (see CPLR 214 [3]; Sporn v MCA Records, 58 NY2d 482, 488-489 [1983]). ... The conversion claim is untimely as it was brought more than three years after the cause of action accrued. ... Plaintiffs fifth and eleventh causes of action alleging accountant malpractice with respect to the loan and investment transactions were properly dismissed as untimely. A three-year statute of limitations applies (see CPLR 214 [6]; Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 9 NY3d 1 [2007]), and such causes of action accrued at the time the negligent investment advice was given, or, at the very latest, when Hagler, without apparent explanation, failed to pay both the loan when due (on or about June 23, 2005), and the initial payment on the investment that was due on or about November 28, 2006 (see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541-542 [1994]).

CPLR 214(6) gives a malpractice plaintiff three years to commence an action, subject to applicable tolling.

McDonald v. Edelman & Edelman, P.C. · filed 2014-06-19(6)

The first cause of action, alleging legal malpractice, accrued at the time that plaintiff’s appeal of the order that granted summary judgment dismissing his underlying Labor Law claims was dismissed for want of prosecution, in July 2006, notwithstanding his lack of knowledge of the dismissal (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]). Plaintiff then had three years to commence a malpractice action against defendants (see CPLR 214 [6]), absent an applicable ground for tolling the limitations period. He did not commence this action until March 2012.

CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period can apply to a negligence claim against an employer even when an employee’s alleged intentional assault caused the injury.

De La Cruz v. Nour · filed 2015-12-16

... the defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that the three-year statute of limitations for negligence (see CPLR 214) did not apply to the causes of action interposed by the plaintiff against Advanced (see N.X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 97 NY2d 247, 250-251 [2002]; Santo B. v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 51 AD3d 956, 957-958 [2008]).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for a negligence claim alleging property damage.

Ubiles v. Ngardingabe · filed 2021-05-04(4)

The negligence claim was properly dismissed as time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations as there were no allegations to indicate any work was done on the driveway following April 2009, and evidence showed that plaintiffs were experiencing water problems at that time, and had submitted water damage claims to both their property insurer and defendants' property insurer thereafter ( see generally CPLR 214[4]; Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v 341-347 Broadway, LLC, 96 AD3d 473 [1st Dept 2012]).

Section 214(3) applies a three-year limitations period to an SCPA article 21 discovery proceeding likened to conversion or replevin; for conversion, the period begins when the alleged conversion occurs.

Matter of Chustckie · filed 2022-03-09(3)

"A discovery proceeding pursuant to SCPA article 21 has been likened to an action for conversion or replevin and a three-year statute of limitations has been applied" ( Matter of Asch , 164 AD3d 787, 788; see CPLR 214[3]; Matter of Chung Li , 95 AD3d 881, 881). "A conversion cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run on the date the conversion allegedly occurred" ( Matter of Asch , 164 AD3d at 788; see Matter of Chung Li , 95 AD3d at 881-882).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims that may be tolled by continuous representation.

Dischiavi v. Calli · filed 2013-11-08(6)

To the extent that defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of action on the ground that the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [6]; see generally Zorn v Gilbert, 8 NY3d 933, 933-934 [2007]), we conclude that they met their initial burden on their respective motions. We further conclude, however, that plaintiffs raised a ... triable issue of fact whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations (see generally Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 167-168 [2001]). The court therefore properly determined that defendants were not entitled to the relief sought based on the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, but continuous representation concerning the same matter can toll that period.

DeepvBoies · filed 2014-10-23(6)

Since this action was not commenced until October 28, 2005, ... outside of the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]), plaintiff's burden of proof at trial was to establish that the copyright litigation was part of a "continuing, interconnected representation" (53 AD3d at 952) by defendants. If so, the statute would have been tolled through November 4, 2002 and the action would have been commenced on a timely basis.

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice claims is tolled during continuous representation, but the toll ends when the client actually discharges the attorney, even if a consent to change attorney is filed later.

Farage v. Ehrenberg · filed 2014-11-19(6)

Thus, the consent to change attorney does not identify, for continuing representation purposes, the benchmark date that the parties’ attorney-client relationship was actually terminated by the plaintiff. ... For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly, in effect, granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 214 (6), and the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from.