N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for legal malpractice claims, with the limitations period beginning when continued representation on the matter ends.

Citibank v. Suthers · filed 1979-07-06(6)

Although the Statute of Limitations in a legal malpractice action runs from the time of the alleged malpractice, an exception arises when the attorney continues to represent the client concerning the matter out of which the claim arises.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to a legal malpractice claim even when it is labeled as indemnification.

Bunker v. Bunker · filed 1981-03-31(6)

The defendant’s claim against the third-party defendant is for legal malpractice, not indemnification, and therefore the three-year limitations period applies.

Section 214(6) sets the limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Pace v. Perk · filed 1981-07-06(6)

The Statute of Limitations ran against the malpractice claim in July, 1978 (CPLR 214, subd 6), one year before Hall first sought to interpose the defenses.

CPLR 214(4) and (6) impose a three-year limitations period when the essence of a claim is negligence or malpractice, even if it is pleaded as contract or fraud.

Johnson v. Gold · filed 1979-09-28(4), (6)

Viewed in that light the wrong complained of, although arising from plaintiff’s retainer of defendant, essentially consists of a claim that defendant failed to use due care and thus is cognizable in either negligence or malpractice both of which actions are limited by a three-year statute (CPLR 214, subds 4, 6).

CPLR 214(6)’s limitations period does not bar claims that do not sound in professional malpractice.

Arnold v. New City Condominiums Corp. · filed 1980-11-17(6)

On this record, it cannot be said that plaintiffs’ causes of action sound in professional malpractice (see Cubito v Kreisberg, 69 AD2d 738). Therefore, defendant’s claim that the causes of action are barred by the Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (subd 6) must be rejected.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on medical malpractice claims.

Brush v. Olivo · filed 1981-05-11(6)

In this case, the defendant has met his burden of proving that plaintiff’s first and second causes of action were barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 (subd 6) under the general rules concerning claim accrual and interposition.

Former CPLR 214(6) imposed a three-year limitations period on medical malpractice acts committed before July 1, 1975.

Salato v. Gross · filed 1981-10-19(6)

With respect to acts committed before July 1, 1975, the governing Statute of Limitations is the three-year period set forth in former CPLR 214 (subd 6).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action; continuous representation tolls that period until the representation ends.

Glamm v. Allen · filed 1982-07-02(6)

Since the cause of action for malpractice was in existence at the date of the attorney’s death, CPLR 210 (subd [b]) is applicable and, thus, the Statute of Limitations did not commence to run in this case until April 14, 1978, 18 months after attorney Reinhart’s death. This action, having been commenced on April 7, 1980, was clearly within the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to attorney malpractice. (CPLR 214, subd 6.)

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for accounting malpractice claims.

Yandel v. Troper · filed 1981-11-17(6)

Since this action was commenced on or about December 13,1979, the second cause is time barred under the three-year statute governing accounting malpractice (CPLR 214, subd 6).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period applies to ordinary accounting malpractice and conversion claims; an informal service agreement does not turn them into contract claims.

Topal v. Exclusive Envelope Corp. · filed 1982-01-25

But surely such a simple contract cannot convert all ordinary malpractice actions into contract claims. Such a holding would practically read the specific malpractice provisions out of CPLR 214, thus making the statutory provisions surplusage. ... As to the third counterclaim, alleging that the accountants converted the corporations’ books and records, we conclude that the claim is a simple tort which falls squarely under and is thus governed by the three-year limitation in CPLR 214.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from the alleged accounting malpractice to bring a claim.

Chemical Bank v. Louis Sternbach & Co. · filed 1982-12-07(6)

The Statute of Limitations for accounting malpractice is three years from the date of the commission of the alleged malpractice (Carr v Lipshie, 8 AD2d 330, affd 9 NY2d 983; CPLR 214, subd 6). Thus, plaintiff’s action is barred because it concededly did not commence its action until April, 1977, which was more than three years after it received and relied upon the certified statements to extend credit to Wahl.

Section 214(6) gives three years to bring an attorney malpractice action; when continuous representation ends with the attorney’s death, the court measures that period from the appointment of the executrix.

Glamm v. Allen · filed 1981-11-19(6)

In the instant case, since we must apply the continuous representation doctrine, the accrual of the cause of action was suspended during the period of representation and was inchoate until the termination of the attorney-client relationship, i.e., upon the death of the attorney (Grago v Robertson, supra). Therefore, the ordinary three-year Statute of Limitations would apply, measured from the date of the appointment of the executrix.

Section 214’s time limit may begin when a patient could reasonably discover malpractice if the foreign objects doctrine applies; an allegation that improper silicone was injected can raise that possibility.

Mateo v. Rish · filed 1982-01-28

Surely such an allegation gives rise to the possible application of the “foreign objects” doctrine which establishes that the time limitation is to commence at that point in time when the patient could reasonably have discovered the malpractice (see Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427, 431). To have granted summary judgment under these circumstances would have been inappropriate and erroneous.

Section 214(6) requires attorney malpractice actions to be commenced within three years; continued service as an escrow agent does not extend that period after the attorney-client relationship ends.

Lazzaro v. Kelly · filed 1982-04-02(6)

An action for malpractice must be commenced within three years (CPLR 214, subd 6). Plaintiffs contend that under the rule of continuing representation (see Muller v Sturman, 79 AD2d 482; cf Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151), the three-year period had not expired when suit was brought. Since plaintiffs’ argument is founded solely upon appellant Kelly’s continued service as escrow agent until 1980, it must be rejected. Application of the continuous representation doctrine in an action for attorney malpractice “envisions a relationship between the parties that is marked with trust and confidence” (Muller v Sturman, supra, p 486). Here, the trust and confidence inherent in the attorney-client relationship came to an end, at the latest, in 1975 when plaintiffs retained another attorney to bring a malpractice suit against appellants.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which may be tolled during continuous representation.

Albany Savings Bank v. Caffry, Pontiff, Stewart, Rhodes & Judge, P. C. · filed 1983-06-09(6)

We cannot agree that the “continuous representation” rule applies to extend the malpractice cause of action. Since defendant’s services were completed on September 1, 1978 and this lawsuit was not commenced until May 19,1982, Special Term properly dismissed the first cause of action as untimely (CPLR 214, subd 6).

Section 214’s three-year period is not extended by the foreign-object exception when the alleged malpractice is misdiagnosis or follow-up care concerning an object implanted by another doctor.

Dunaway v. Ball · filed 1982-06-21

In this medical malpractice action, defendant has moved for an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214. ... Hence, this is a case involving alleged misdiagnosis and/or improper follow-up treatment and, as such, is untimely.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims based on an attorney’s negligence.

Vollgraff v. Block · filed 1982-10-26(6)

In addition, the action may be based upon the negligence theory of malpractice, that is the failure of the attorney to use due care in the representation of the client, in which case the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (subd 6) applies.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limit on legal malpractice claims based on negligent performance under a general retainer, even when pleaded as breach of contract.

Brainard v. Brown · filed 1983-01-27(6)

Extending the Sears approach to fact patterns akin to that presented here would gravely undermine the Legislature’s intent to have actions for malpractice, other than medical malpractice, controlled by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(6) runs from completion of an accountant’s work for malpractice claims; a foreseeable third party’s negligence claim has a three-year period running from injury.

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. · filed 1983-05-13(6)

Although an action for an accountant’s malpractice is governed by CPLR 214 (subd 6) and runs from the time of the completion of the accountant’s work (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978, affd 36 NY2d 780), an action brought by an individual or group of individuals, not in privity with the accountant but whose reliance on the accountant’s work was foreseeable and within the accountant’s contemplation (Palsgraf v Long Is. R.R. Co., 248 NY 339), is essentially an action for negligence (White v Guarente, 43 NY2d 356, 361-363, supra). Such an action should be governed, therefore, by a three-year Statute of Limitations running from the date of injury.

Section 214(6) requires an accounting malpractice action for negligent preparation of a tax return to be commenced within three years of the return’s filing deadline.

Goulding v. Solomon · filed 1984-03-09(6)

Plaintiffs’ above contentions are clearly wrong. As a ‘ general rule, a malpractice action against an accountant for negligence in preparing an income tax return must be commenced within three years from the deadline for filing such a return.

Section 214(6) gives a professional malpractice claim three years from completion of the professional’s work; a foreseeable user’s negligence claim against an accountant without privity is not a malpractice claim.

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. · filed 1984-05-03(6)

Even though an action for professional malpractice is governed by CPLR 214 (subd 6) and must be brought within three years from the time of the completion of a professional’s work (Sosnow v Paul, 43 AD2d 978, affd 36 NY2d 780), an action brought by an individual or group of individuals, not in privity with a professional such as an accountant, but whose reliance on that professional’s work was forseeable, is an action for negligence and not one for malpractice.

Section 214 sets a three-year limit for legal malpractice claims, which may be tolled during continuous representation.

Kramer v. Belfi · filed 1984-12-31

These causes of action were asserted well within the three-year time limit for malpractice (CPLR 214), since defendants’ representation was continuous until at least 1981 (see Glamm u Allen, 57 NY2d 87; Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86).

Section 214(6) makes the discovery date relevant to the timeliness of this malpractice action; when that date remains a factual issue, the limitations defense may be reasserted.

Bidetti v. Salter · filed 1985-02-25(6)

With regard to the Statute of Limitations defense, we note that the timeliness of the instant action will ultimately depend upon the date when plaintiffs discovered, or should have discovered, the complained-of injuries (CPLR 214 [6]; Flanagan v Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 NY2d 427, 431). ... Hence, the defense based on the Statute of Limitations should not be dismissed at this juncture.

Section 214 bars a hospital negligence claim filed more than three years after the alleged act; continued treatment by a physician does not toll the period because the continuous treatment doctrine applies only to malpractice actions.

Sheehy v. Angerosa · filed 1985-04-22

The court finds that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). ... The plaintiff’s suit against the hospital sounds in simple negligence, rather than in malpractice. ... Though the plaintiff points to her continuing visits to Dr. Angerosa’s office, and relies upon the continuous treatment doctrine to toll the Statute of Limitations, that doctrine applies in malpractice actions only.

Section 214’s three-year period for medical malpractice is not tolled by continuous treatment when a patient keeps using a prescribed drug after treatment with the prescribing doctor ends.

Bikowicz v. Nedco Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 1985-10-31

However, the continuous treatment doctrine has no application where, as here, the patient undertakes self-treatment by continuing use of a drug prescribed many years before, long after she has discontinued treatment by the prescribing doctor (Bernardo v Ayerest Labs., 99 AD2d 430, 431).

Section 214(6)'s three-year legal malpractice period does not begin to run while the attorney continues to represent the client on the related matter.

Drab v. Baum · filed 1985-11-25(6)

The action was also commenced within the three-year malpractice Statute of Limitations, since, pursuant to the "continuous representation” doctrine (see, Siegel v Kranis, supra, at p 480), defendant continued to represent plaintiff through August 11, 1980 in the action brought against plaintiff by NYHESC, which was directly related to the preparation of the bankruptcy petition by defendant.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for professional malpractice claims; a third party’s negligence claim against an accountant accrues when the third party is injured.

Fleet Factors Corp. v. Werblin · filed 1985-11-25(6)

However, where, as here, the action is brought by a third party who was not the client, the action is not, strictly speaking, one for malpractice, but is one for simple negligence, and the statute begins to run, in such a case, from the date of the injury (see, Cubito v Kreisberg, supra, at pp 742-743).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on medical malpractice claims arising from events before July 1, 1975.

Dunaway v. Staten Island Hospital · filed 1986-08-04(6)

The plaintiff Mary Dunaway’s cause of action for loss of services was properly dismissed as time barred because it was commenced beyond the three-year Statute of Limitations for medical malpractice claims relating to events occurring before July 1, 1975 (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims; continuous representation can toll it only while the attorney-client relationship remains ongoing.

Pittelli v. Schulman · filed 1987-03-09(6)

Even if the complaint states a cause of action, it is untimely under CPLR 214 (6). ... Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, the doctrine of continuous representation is inapplicable to toll the running of the Statute of Limitations. ... There is a significant lapse in representation in this case well exceeding the applicable Statute of Limitations period, and the representation cannot be said to be continuous under these circumstances (see, Sherry v Queens Kidney Center, 117 AD2d 663).

Former subdivision (6) of section 214 supplies the limitations period for a medical malpractice action, which is barred when that period expires and no statutory extension applies.

Scharlack v. Richmond Memorial Hospital · filed 1988-11-07(6)

Since the statutory six-month extension is not available, the plaintiff’s instant action is barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [former (6)]; 208).

Dental malpractice acts committed before the 1985 amendment to section 214(6) took effect are governed by a three-year limitations period.

Ciciless v. Lane · filed 1987-04-27(6)

Inasmuch as the acts complained of were committed prior to the effective date of the amendments to CPLR 214 (6) and 214-a ...imposing a 2Vi year Statute of Limitations on actions for dental malpractice (L 1985, ch 760, §§ 2, 10), the instant action is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(6) bars a legal malpractice claim filed more than three years after the lawyer’s representation in the matter ended.

Winkler v. Messinger · filed 1989-02-27(6)

Additionally, the complaint is time barred as a result of the plaintiff’s failure to institute this action within three years of the date that the defendants’ representation of the plaintiff in the criminal matter terminated (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Boorman v Bleakley, Platt, Schmidt, Hart & Fritz, 88 AD2d 942; Lazzaro v Kelly, 87 AD2d 975).

An owner’s claim against an architect for defective construction accrues when construction is completed.

Farash Construction Corp. v. Stanndco Developers, Inc. · filed 1988-04-08(4), (6)

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for negligence of the architect accrued in 1971 and was untimely commenced in 1983 (CPLR 214 [4], [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for professional malpractice claims against accountants.

Shochat v. Weisz · filed 1991-02-21(6)

Under New York law, the statute of limitations for a claim of professional malpractice against an accountant or accounting firm is three years (CPLR 214[6]; Poloron Prods., Inc. v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 72 F.R.D. 556, 562 [S.D.N.Y.1976] [construing New York law]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for nonmedical malpractice actions, but continuous representation can toll the period while related professional services continue.

Hall & Co. v. Steiner & Mondore · filed 1989-06-22(6)

CPLR 214 (6) establishes a three-year limitation in all malpractice actions except those involving medical malpractice. ... However, under certain circumstances, the statute is tolled during the period of time when professional services are being rendered to a plaintiff. ... On the basis of the allegations of the complaint admitted in the answer, affidavits and discovery contained in the record, we can only conclude that if any malpractice occurred the statute did not begin to run until 1985.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to subrogation claims for legal malpractice.

National Union Fire Insurance v. Davis · filed 1990-01-23(6)

Any subrogation claims are barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations for legal malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for tort claims alleging professional malpractice.

Golub v. Baer, Marks & Upham · filed 1991-04-01(6)

Furthermore, we find that the plaintiffs’ causes of action sounding in tort for professional malpractice would not be barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations.

Section 214 gives New York plaintiffs three years to bring negligence or professional malpractice claims against a federal tax preparer, measured here from the first IRS 90-day deficiency notice or an earlier settlement or payment.

Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1992-11-10(4), (6)

For New York plaintiffs, claims of negligence and professional malpractice are governed by a Statute of Limitations of three years (CPLR 214 [4], [6]). ... Based upon the foregoing, an Atkins test appropriate to these facts and the New York plaintiffs is adopted, and the claims of any such plaintiff are held to be stale if such plaintiff more than three years prior to the commencement of this action either (a) received a 90-day notice in relation to any investment in this group of partnerships, or (b) signed a settlement agreement or paid a disputed amount in relation to the Rule of 78’s computation.

Section 214(6) does not necessarily bar a negligence claim on the face of the complaint when an alleged continuing professional relationship may affect the limitations period.

De Rubbo v. Wayner Associates · filed 1993-04-22(6)

We similarly find that the Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [б] ) should not on its face bar causes of action for negligence.

The three-year period for legal malpractice claims is subject to the continuous representation doctrine when the lawyer continues to represent the client in the matter giving rise to the claim.

Bass & Ullman v. Chanes · filed 1992-08-06(6)

Contrary to the IAS Court’s determination, we find that the continuous representation doctrine applies. The law firm’s representation with respect to the matter out of which the malpractice claims arise, i.e., the review and approval of advertising copy, continued, as this record shows, until July 1985, well within the three-year period immediately prior to the commencement of the within action.

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for professional malpractice is not tolled by a continuing general professional relationship; continued representation must concern the particular transaction at issue.

Zaref v. Berk · filed 1993-04-06(6)

Since plaintiffs have offered nothing more than defendants’ general and unfettered control of their financial, tax and investment affairs, the pleadings are insufficient to sustain the timeliness of any transactions completed more than three years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit insofar as professional malpractice is alleged (CPLR 214 [6]) and six years where the claim for breach of fiduciary duty is involved (see, Lamontagne v Board of Trustees, 183 AD2d 424, lv denied 80 NY2d 759).

Under former subsection (6), whether continued dental work involved the same allegedly negligently treated condition can be a jury question under the continuous treatment doctrine.

Yelin v. American Dental Center · filed 1992-06-22(6)

As such, the issue of whether or not the continuous treatment doctrine may be applied to this case remains a question of fact for a jury’s resolution (see, Edmonds v Getchonis, 150 AD2d 879; McKinney v Bay Ridge Med. Group, 126 AD2d 711; Levy v Schnader, 96 AD2d 854).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Bergman v. Fingerit · filed 1991-11-26(6)

This action, for legal malpractice, commenced on or about July 24, 1986, and based on defendants’ alleged failure to advise plaintiffs that their purchase and acquisition of certain real estate and mortgage instruments could subject them to an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy to set aside the conveyances as fraudulent, should have been dismissed as barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period governs a legal-malpractice claim when no contractual relationship supports a longer period.

Hirsch v. Weisman · filed 1993-01-14

There being no contractual relationship with the Bondy defendants, the three-year Statute of Limitations governs, and leave should not have been granted to commence this action against those defendants after that period had expired.

Section 214(6) bars legal malpractice claims filed after the limitations period expires.

Syms v. Syms · filed 1993-03-23(6)

The IAS Court also correctly determined that the Statute of Limitations bars plaintiff’s causes of action for fraud (CPLR 203 [f]; 213 [8]; Smith v Sarkisian, 63 AD2d 780, affd 47 NY2d 878) and legal malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]; Little Princess Truck Rentals v Pergament Distribs., 143 AD2d 179, 180).

Section 214(6) sets the limitations period for professional malpractice claims.

Campbell v. Chabot · filed 1993-01-11(6)

On the record before us we find that the Supreme Court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s causes of action to recover damages for professional malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that the applicable Statutes of Limitation had expired prior to the commencement of ...this action (see, CPLR 214 [6]; 215 [3]).

Section 214(6) gives accountant malpractice claims three years from the client’s receipt of the accountant’s work product.

Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse · filed 1994-12-06(6)

In a malpractice action against an accountant, the Statute of Limitations begins to run on the date the accountant’s work product is received by the client since this is the first time the client can rely on the alleged negligent work product. Therefore, in this case, we conclude that only those claims relating to defendant’s negligence in connection with its advice and preparation of plaintiffs’ limited partnerships’ financial statements and tax returns, including Schedules K-l, arising in the three years prior to the commencement of this action are timely under CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6)’s three-year limit does not bar a legal malpractice claim when a factual question remains whether the attorneys continued to represent the client in the matter within three years before suit.

Weiss v. Manfredi · filed 1994-06-30(6)

We reject defendants’ alternative claim that this action is untimely, as it was commenced within three years of November 21, 1985, until which time there is at least a question of fact as to whether defendants continued to represent plaintiff in connection with this matter (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh 78 NY2d 700, 707-709; Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 93-94).

Section 214(6) permits a malpractice claim to be timely under the continuous representation rule when the professional continues work on the same matter.

Zwecker v. Kulberg · filed 1994-11-14(6)

We further find that under the continuous representation rule, the plaintiffs’ malpractice claim in connection with the WACO partnership was timely brought (CPLR 214 [6]; see generally, Greene v Greene, 56 NY2d 86, 93-94; Hayden v Josim Assocs., 148 AD2d 495, 496). Significantly, the plaintiffs specifically alleged that the individual defendant continued to utilize deductions regarding the WACO partnership in preparing their tax returns up through the tax year 1987 knowing that the shelter was being investigated by the IRS and likely to be invalidated.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period.

Baker v. Levitin · filed 1995-01-17(6)

... and was therefore already barred by the three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214 [6]) by the time the instant motion was made.

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years to bring an optometrical malpractice claim; continuous treatment may toll that period, but routine checkups do not qualify.

Cassara v. Larchmont-Mamaroneck Eye Care Group · filed 1993-06-21(6)

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion for partial summary judgment is granted, and the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges acts of malpractice occurring prior to November 1, 1985. ... The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the three year Statute of Limitations governing optometrical malpractice (see, CPLR 214 [6]) barred any cause of action based on any acts or omissions on their part prior to November 1985. The court denied the motion. We reverse.

Section 214(6) gives accountant malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which may be tolled by continuous representation.

Kearney v. Firley · filed 1996-12-30(6)

Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action alleging accountant malpractice upon the ground that it is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]). ... Under limited circumstances, not present here, the statute is tolled pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine. ... The record establishes that the work that is the basis for the malpractice cause of action was completed more than three years before this action was commenced.

Continuous representation can make an accountant malpractice claim timely under CPLR 214(6).

D'Ambrosio v. Abraham Soloman & Co. · filed 1996-01-29(6)

Significantly, in these two causes of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants continuously, negligently, and in breach of an agreement, created and managed the plaintiffs’ pension plan through 1983. Since the action was commenced in July 1985, these two causes of action were within the applicable Statutes of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]; 213 [2]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limit on legal malpractice claims; the remedy sought can determine whether a claim falls under that limit even when the allegations could also support a contract theory.

Elliott v. Jacobs · filed 1995-11-30(6)

Although defendant does not dispute that plaintiff’s claim seeking return of the retainer fee sounds in contract, he argues here that, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint also alleges "negligence” on his part, it is actually stating a cause of action for legal malpractice, which is governed by a three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [6]). ... Since this claim sounds in legal malpractice, we conclude that it must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(6) gives professional malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled while professional services continue.

Fred Smith Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Christensen · filed 1996-11-19(6)

A cause of action alleging professional malpractice, i.e., that a professional failed to perform services with due care and in accordance with the recognized and accepted practices of the profession, is governed by the three year Statute of Limitations applicable to negligence actions stated in CPLR 214 (6) (Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541). ... Under certain circumstances, the Statute of Limitations is tolled during the period of time when professional services are being rendered.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limit for malpractice actions; continuous treatment tolls that limit while treatment for the same original condition or complaint continues.

Schneider v. Friedman · filed 1997-06-23(6)

The determinative question is whether the three-year Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214 (6) was tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine. ... The record supports the court’s determination that the June 17, 1992, office visit did not fall within the continuous course of treatment exception to the Statute of Limitations.

Continuous accounting representation can defeat a statute of limitations defense to an accounting malpractice claim.

Fred Smith Plumbing and Heating Co. v. Christensen · filed 1997-09-11(6)

Since our review of the record, including the deposition testimony of respondent Christensen, and the invoices from respondent CHR spanning from August 1990 to March 1992, reveals that the defendants were engaged in providing continuous accounting representation until discharged in May 1992, during which time period they allegedly failed to properly advise plaintiff with respect to, inter alia, the reasonableness of its executive compensation and the option of electing Subchapter S status, the motion is granted and the affirmative defense stricken (Hall & Co. v Steiner & Mondore, 147 AD2d 225, 228).

Section 214(6)'s three-year limitations period applies to a claim that is in substance legal malpractice rather than fraud.

Ainbinder v. Chernis · filed 1998-03-02(6)

We agree with the Supreme Court that in reality the plaintiffs complaint asserted a claim of legal malpractice, not fraud (see, Garber v Ravitch, 186 AD2d 361), and, thus, was barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]; see also, Panigeon v Aliance Nav. Line, 1997 WL 473385 [US Dist Ct, SD NY, Aug. 19, 1997]; Russo v Waller, 171 Misc 2d 707).

Section 214(6) gives nonmedical malpractice claims a three-year filing period whether pleaded in contract or tort. A claim newly barred by the 1996 amendment must be filed within a reasonable time after it takes effect.

Brzozowski v. Zio Italian Bistro · filed 1998-10-06(6)

Effective September 4, 1996 (L 1996, ch 623), CPLR 214 (6) provides that all causes of action for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, must be commenced within three years “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort”. ... Under the circumstances of this case, where the cause of action accrued approximately two and one-half years before the effective date of the amendment, such delay is unreasonable. The action is, therefore, time barred and the Brokerage’s additional request for severance need not be considered by the court.

Section 214(6)’s three-year limitations period may be tolled while an accountant continues to provide professional services concerning the matter underlying a malpractice claim.

David v. Rashba · filed 1998-10-29(6)

Although the complaint itself fails to allege any basis for tolling the Statute of Limitations, we grant leave to replead because plaintiffs’ other submissions are sufficient to support an amended complaint alleging that defendant accounting firm continued after the date three years prior to commencement of this action to render professional services to plaintiffs Walter David, Marian David, Sheldon J. David, and Marilyn David in support of their litigation with the IRS arising out of the taking of the deductions (CPLR 214 [6]; 3211 [e]; see, Weiss v Manfredi, 83 NY2d 974, 977; Zaref v Berk & Michaels, 192 AD2d 346).

Section 214’s limitations period runs from when an actionable injury occurs; later discovery does not delay accrual unless a discovery exception applies.

Konigsberg v. State · filed 1998-12-24

In support of claimant’s assertion that his claim is not barred by the Statute of Limitations (see, Court of Claims Act § 10; CPLR 214), claimant argues that it did not accrue until June 28, 1997 when he acquired knowledge of the settlement check and the hospital director’s letter returning it. We find petitioner’s argument unpersuasive. ... Although certain exceptions exist when the date of accrual is measured from the date of the discovery of the wrong (see, CPLR 213 [8]; 214-a, 214-b, 214-c), none of the exceptions is applicable here. ... Therefore, we find that the claim was properly dismissed as time barred.

Section 214(6)'s three-year limit for professional malpractice does not apply to claims against insurance agents and brokers.

Port Authority v. Evergreen International Aviation, Inc. · filed 1999-01-22(6)

While this court intends no disrespect toward insurance agents and brokers, it does not believe that they should be considered professionals within the meaning and intent of CPLR 214 (6).

CPLR 214(6) gives a contractor three years to bring a negligence claim against an engineer; a claim based on bid documents accrues no later than the contractor’s commitment to a price set in reliance on them.

IFD Construction Corp. v. Dietz · filed 1999-02-23(6)

It is not disputed that the three-year limitation of CPLR 214 (6) controls in a negligence action against a professional, ... Thus, IFD was injured when the forces alleged to have produced that injury were put in motion, that is, at least by the time IFD agreed to its formulated bid price by entering into a construction contract with the City on April 21, 1993, more than three years before the June 25, 1996 commencement of this action.

Section 214(6)'s three-year limit applies to a legal malpractice claim arising before the amendment when the claimant had a reasonable time to sue after the amendment took effect.

Svenska Finans International BV v. Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen, Lawler & Burstein, P.C. · filed 1999-03-03(6)

The New York State Legislature, effective September 4, 1996, amended CPLR § 214(6) to provide that legal malpractice actions are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, regardless whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort. ... With respect to Plaintiff, considering two years remained in which to file suit under the amended statute, it would appear that a reasonable time was afforded. Consequently, any perceived malpractice claim on the part of Plaintiff would be time barred, since Plaintiff did not file its original complaint until October 6, 1998 — one week after the statute of limitations would have expired.

Section 214(6)'s three-year malpractice period does not apply to an exterior walls consultant operating as an ordinary business corporation rather than a licensed professional service corporation.

New York & Presbyterian Hospital v. Tishman Construction Co. · filed 1999-03-23(6)

The court concludes that Smith, as an “Exterior Walls Consultant”, is not entitled to invoke the shorter, three-year Statute of Limitations for professional malpractice. ... CPLR 214 (6) provides that the three-year limitation applies to “an action to recover damages for malpractice,” other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice.

Section 214(6), as amended, governs the limitations period for a legal malpractice action filed after an earlier action was discontinued without relation back.

Marr v. Meyers · filed 1999-04-13(6)

Thus, when plaintiff instituted this second action in June 1997 to recover for the same malpractice, the governing Statute of Limitations was CPLR 214 (6), as amended, and, pursuant to that statute, this action is time-barred.

For a legal malpractice claim that accrued before the 1996 amendment to section 214(6) but was filed afterward, six months and one day after the amendment’s effective date was not a reasonable time to commence the action.

Lefkowitz v. Preminger · filed 1999-05-10(6)

Contrary to the finding of the Supreme Court, the commencement of this action six months and one day after the amendment’s effective date was not within a reasonable time (see, e.g., Panigeon v Alliance Nav. Line, supra; Coastal Broadway Assocs. v Raphael, supra), and the complaint should have been dismissed.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims.

Spence v. Bear Stearns & Co. · filed 1999-09-16(6)

However, the record reveals that plaintiffs legal malpractice claims were barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations when the third-party action was commenced (CPLR 214 [6]).

A legal malpractice claim that was timely under prior law but unfiled when the 1996 amendment to section 214(6) took effect had to be filed within a reasonable time afterward.

Ruggeri v. Menicucci · filed 1999-06-07(6)

On the facts presented, the plaintiff failed to interpose his claim within a reasonable time after the effective date of the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) and the complaint must be dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants.

Section 214 (6)’s three-year professional malpractice limitations period does not apply to claims against insurance brokers.

Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Associates, L.P. · filed 1999-09-16(6)

An insurance broker is not capable of committing “professional malpractice” in accordance with CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims.

Sutherland v. Milstein · filed 1999-11-09(6)

Defendants’ representation of plaintiffs in the underlying medical malpractice action ceased in 1987. Thereafter, in 1997, plaintiffs commenced the present action alleging legal malpractice in connection with the settlement of the medical malpractice action. To the extent that the present action is alleged on behalf of plaintiff Hester Sutherland, it is time-barred (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period bars a tort claim for legal malpractice brought after that period expires.

Pilewski v. Solymosy · filed 1999-11-18

It is clear that, as of January 1996, when plaintiff commenced his legal malpractice action against Brody & Fabiani, a contract claim was viable under the six-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 213, but a tort claim was barred under the three-year limitations period of CPLR 214.

Section 214 (6) requires a legal malpractice action, whether sounding in tort or contract, to be commenced within three years of accrual.

Rachimi v. Robinson Brog Leinwand Greene Genovese & Gluck, P. C. · filed 2000-01-06(6)

Plaintiff commenced this action more than four years subsequent to the accrual of his legal malpractice claims and more than 10 months after the 1996 amendments to CPLR 214 (6) made clear that, whether sounding in tort or contract, a legal malpractice action must be commenced within three years of accrual.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that may be tolled during continuous representation in the specific matter at issue.

Nobile v. Schwartz · filed 2000-01-23(6)

Under New York state law, the statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action is three years. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). Generally, the action accrues from the date of malpractice, but the statute may be deemed tolled under the theory of continuous representation until the attorney ceases representing the client in the specific matter at issue. ... We hold that because there is a dispute regarding the material facts of the representation relationship, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year period for legal malpractice claims regardless of whether they sound in contract or tort, but that amendment does not apply to actions commenced before it took effect.

Schweizer v. Mulvehill · filed 2000-03-31(6)

Subsequent to the Court of Appeals ruling in Santulli, the legislature amended the relevant statute, making the malpractice limitations period three years "regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6), as amended by chapter 623 of the Laws of 1996, effective September 4, 1996; ... The new rule does not apply retroactively, that is, to cases such as plaintiff's, which was commenced in 1995.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on legal malpractice claims for pecuniary or property loss, including claims that accrued before the 1996 amendment.

Cadieux v. Gough · filed 2000-06-16(6)

Plaintiffs, however, did not seek leave to commence the action against defendant until September 1998, approximately one year after the Statute of Limitations had run on the legal malpractice cause of action under the amended statute and two years after the effective date of the amendment.

For property and pecuniary damages, nonmedical professional malpractice actions commenced between January 16, 1992, and September 4, 1996 were governed by a six-year limitations period.

Aaron v. Kamen · filed 2000-07-27(6)

It is now well settled that an action for professional malpractice (other than medical, dental or podiatric), insofar as it seeks recovery for property and pecuniary damages, commenced between January 16, 1992, the date of the Court of Appeals’ decision in Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh (78 NY2d 700), and September 4, 1996, the effective date of an amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (see, L 1996, ch 623), is governed by a six-year Statute of Limitations (see, Ruffolo v Garbarini & Scher, 239 AD2d 8).

Section 214(6)’s three-year malpractice limitations period does not apply to insurance brokers and agents because they are not professionals.

20 Clarke Place Realty Corp. v. Rudges & Co. · filed 1999-12-21(6)

Defendant insurance brokers and agents are not professionals and, accordingly, the three-year Statute of Limitations for malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]) is not applicable as a bar to plaintiff’s action (see, Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assocs., 264 AD2d 624).

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice claims is subject to the continuous representation doctrine when the attorney continues to represent the client in the same matter.

Ainbinder v. Jacobi · filed 2000-01-24(6)

For the continuous representation doctrine to apply to an action sounding in legal malpractice, “there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependant relationship between the client and.the attorney” (Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505, 506). ... Therefore, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the respondent as time-barred (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

CPLR 214’s three-year limitations period for legal malpractice is tolled by ongoing representation in connection with the same matter.

Mancino v. Levin · filed 2000-01-24

As to the plaintiff’s cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214) was tolled by the defendants’ ongoing representation of the plaintiff in connection with enforcement of the stipulation of settlement.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period; continuous representation may toll that period while the attorney continues representing the client in the same matter.

Shumsky v. Eisenstein · filed 2000-03-06(6)

The instant action is therefore untimely, unless the continuous representation doctrine applies to toll the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus, the continuous representation doctrine does not apply to toll the Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(6)'s three-year period for legal malpractice stops being tolled by continuous representation when the client’s trust and reliance on the attorney end, even before formal withdrawal.

Aaron v. Roemer, Wallens & Mineaux, L. L. P. · filed 2000-05-18(6)

In these special circumstances, where the attorney promptly moves to withdraw and the client acknowledges in writing an irreparable deterioration of the attorney-client relationship, we conclude that the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous treatment rule did not persist until formal termination of the nominal representation by defendants, but rather ceased with the disruption of the client’s trust and reliance prior to November 8, 1995.

Section 214(6)’s three-year limitations period bars an architectural malpractice action filed more than three years after substantial completion when the parties’ agreement sets that accrual point.

Breslin Realty Development Corp. v. Lituchy · filed 2000-02-28(6)

Accordingly, this action, which was commenced in August 1998, is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the claim accrues.

Kahn v. Hart · filed 2000-03-06(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), an action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim.

Section 214(6)'s limitations period for legal malpractice claims runs from when the malpractice was committed, not when the client discovered it.

Julian v. Carroll · filed 2000-03-27(6)

A cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice accrues on the date the malpractice was committed, not when the client discovered it (see, Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87; Goicoechea v Law Offs. of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 AD2d 507). The representation of the plaintiff by the defendants terminated in December 1991. Thus, the legal malpractice causes of action in this case, which was commenced in November 1998, are time-barred (see, Glamm v Allen, supra; CPLR 214 [6]), even under prior case law which applied a six-year Statute of Limitations to legal malpractice claims (see, Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice claim to be brought within three years of accrual.

Savarese v. Shatz · filed 2000-06-05(6)

Here, the appellants met their burden by demonstrating that the plaintiffs’ claim accrued more than three years before the commencement of the instant action (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6)'s three-year limit for legal malpractice does not apply to an action commenced before the September 1996 amendment; the prior six-year period applies.

Berman v. Cullen & Dykman · filed 2000-10-10(6)

A six-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to this legal malpractice case since it was commenced in January 1996, before the September 1996 amendment which shortened the six-year period to three years (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700, 708-709; Budget Installment Corp. v Levy, Ehrlich & Kronenberg, 259 AD2d 649; Dowd v Law Plan Hyatt Legal Servs., 249 AD2d 503).

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for an owner’s claim against a design professional begins when the professional completes significant contractual duties, including required as-built drawings.

Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. v. EnergyPro Construction Partners · filed 2000-04-06(6)

Parsons then moved to stay the arbitration, alleging it was barred by CPLR 214 (6)’s three-year Statute of Limitations. ... Because the majority of “as built” drawings required by the specific language of the agreement were issued after October 1995, EnergyPro’s claims are not barred. The obligation to furnish “as built” drawings to Energy Pro was a significant contractual obligation. ... EnergyPro’s demand for arbitration, brought within three years of the date all of the “as built” drawings were completed, was therefore timely.

Section 214(6) supplies the limitation period for professional malpractice claims against architects.

Rooney v. Thorson · filed 2000-04-07(6)

There is no question that New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214(6) provides the applicable limitation period for plaintiffs’ claims, which in essence constitute an action for professional malpractice.

Section 214(6) supplies the limitations period for claims that are in substance professional malpractice against architects.

In Re Dawnwood Properties/78 · filed 2000-04-07(6)

There is no question that New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 214(6) provides the applicable limitation period for plaintiff's claims, which in essence constitute an action for professional malpractice.

Section 214(6)’s three-year malpractice limitations period does not apply to an action against an unlicensed home inspection corporation.

Gebhardt v. Allspect, Inc. · filed 2000-05-16(6)

This Court therefore concludes that the three-year statute of limitations of N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 214(6) is inapplicable to this action.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to nonmedical malpractice claims, including claims that accrued before the 1996 amendment but had not yet been filed when it took effect.

Wenger v. Tarshis · filed 2000-10-30(6)

The Supreme Court correctly determined that the action was time-barred by CPLR 214 (6), as amended September 4, 1996, which applies a three-year Statute of Limitations to malpractice claims which are non-medical in nature. The amendment applies to claims which, as here, accrued before the effective date of the amendment, but had not yet been interposed as of the effective date.

For nonmedical malpractice claims that accrued before the 1996 amendment, the deadline is the earlier of the time remaining under the former six-year period or one year from the amendment’s effective date.

Thruway Investments v. O'Connell & Aronowitz, P. C. · filed 2000-12-14(6)

CPLR 214 (6), which governs plaintiffs’ malpractice action, was amended on September 4, 1996 and shortened the Statute of Limitations for, inter alia, legal malpractice actions from six years to three years from the latest date of accrual (see, L 1996, ch 623). ... Inasmuch as plaintiffs commenced this action within one year of the amendment’s effective date, the action was timely commenced.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, whether they sound in tort or contract.

Uehigashi v. Kanamori · filed 2001-04-05(6)

Under New York law, the applicable statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is three years, whether the claim sounds in tort or in contract.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, tolled while the attorney continuously represents the client on the matter.

Piliero v. Adler & Stavros · filed 2001-04-09(6)

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint as the action was commenced over 3V2 years after the conclusion of the representation (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Kahn v Hart, 270 AD2d 231).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for nonmedical malpractice claims regardless of whether they sound in contract or tort; continuous representation of the client on the same matter can toll that period.

Shumsky v. Eisenstein · filed 2001-05-10(6)

Effective September 4, 1996, CPLR 214 (6) was amended, shortening the limitations period in nonmedical malpractice claims from six to three years to the extent that the claims sought breach-of-contract damages, and directing that a uniform limitations period applied “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6], as amended by L 1996, ch 623). ... We thus conclude that, on these facts, defendant was continuously representing plaintiffs at least until, after his extended failure to return their telephone inquiries of October 1996, they may have been put on sufficient notice that the representation had ceased. Even calculating the limitations period from that time, this action, brought just under 14 months from that date, was still timely.

Section 214(6)’s 1996 amendment gave legal malpractice claims that had already accrued the shorter of the time remaining under the former six-year period or one year from the amendment’s effective date.

Ruggiero v. Powers · filed 2001-06-07(6)

The September 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6), which was effective immediately (see, L 1996, ch 623, § 2), permitted commencement of actions which accrued prior thereto within “the shorter of either the remaining time under the former six-year limitations period or one year from [the] amendment’s effective date” (Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290, 305).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years after the malpractice occurs, unless continuous representation tolls the limitations period.

Sitkiewicz v. Willis & Ng · filed 2001-11-15(6)

It is beyond cavil that an action to recover damages for legal malpractice accrues when the alleged malpractice is committed (see, e.g., Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164) and must be commenced within three years thereafter (see, CPLR 214 [6]) unless tolled under the “continuous representation” doctrine (Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 93; see, Shumsky v Eisenstein, supra).

Section 214(6) bars legal malpractice claims filed more than three years after the alleged malpractice occurred.

Benedict v. Estate of Noumair · filed 2001-12-11(6)

Inasmuch as the claims for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty comprising plaintiffs’ complaint accrued in 1991, when the alleged malpractice and breach, i.e., the failure to record a mortgage after a closing, occurred (see, Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 166; Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 95), the complaint, filed in 1999, is time barred (see, CPLR 214 [6]; see also, Kahn v Hart, 270 AD2d 231).

Section 214(6)’s limitations period for criminal legal malpractice begins when the criminal proceeding ends without a conviction.

Britt v. Legal Aid Society, Inc. · filed 2000-11-30(6)

Accordingly, we hold that the date on which plaintiff Britt’s cause of action accrued against defendants was March 7, 1996 when the indictment against him was dismissed. Because Britt commenced this action against defendants on September 27, 1997, the action is timely (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214 (6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, tolled while the attorney continues representing the client on the same matter.

Cherry v. Mallery · filed 2001-02-08(6)

Defendant also argues that the action is time barred by the three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims pursuant to CPLR 214 (6). This issue turns on when defendant’s representation of the public administrator ceased, for “[w]hile a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues on the date on which the claimed malpractice occurred, under the rule of continuous representation the Statute of Limitations is tolled while representation on the same matter in which the malpractice is alleged is ongoing” (Pollicino v Roemer & Featherstonhaugh, 260 AD2d 52, 54; see, Weiss v Manfredi, 83 NY2d 974, 977; Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 94). Here, the Surrogate’s Court proceeding in which defendant was the attorney of record for the public administrator continued at least until issuance of the decree on March 11, 1996. There is also unrebutted evidence that defendant continued to provide representation beyond that date. Since the instant action was commenced on March 10, 1999, Supreme Court properly denied defendant’s motion on Statute of Limitations grounds as to plaintiffs legal malpractice cause of action.

Section 214(6)'s three-year limitations period for legal malpractice is tolled until continuous representation in the same matter ends.

Gaslow v. Phillips Nizer Benjamin Krim & Ballon, L. L. P. · filed 2001-09-17(6)

However, pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine, the three-year limitations period (see, CPLR 214 [6]) in the instant case was tolled until August 1996 when the defendants completed their representation of the plaintiff (see, Shumsky v Eisenstein, supra; Glamm v Allen, supra).

Section 214(6) provides a three-year limitation period for architectural malpractice claims, but dismissal requires a record sufficient to determine when the professional relationship ended.

Viola v. Kirshenbaum & Tambasco, P. C. · filed 2001-03-05(6)

Although the appellant contends that the plaintiffs claim for architectural malpractice is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]), the record is insufficient to determine when the appellant’s professional relationship with the plaintiff ended (see, Methodist Hosp. v Perkins & Will Partnership, 203 AD2d 435).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a malpractice action; later reports that renew a completed professional relationship do not toll that period under the continuous relationship doctrine.

Highland Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rust Environment & Infrastructure of New York, Inc. · filed 2001-03-19(6)

The Supreme Court incorrectly determined that the continuous relationship doctrine tolled the applicable Statute of Limitations. The services rendered by Dunn were discrete and complete in 1985, and the subsequent reports prepared in 1991 and 1994 constituted a renewal, rather than a continuation, of the relationship between the plaintiff and Dunn and/or the defendant (see, Rizk v Cohen, 73 NY2d 98, 105; Meier v Huntington Hosp. Assn., 186 AD2d 637, 638; Barrella v Richmond Mem. Hosp., 88 AD2d 379, 384). Therefore, under either the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to malpractice actions (see, CPLR 214 [6]) or the six-year Statute of Limitations applicable to breach of contract actions (see, CPLR 213), the action was untimely.

Section 214(6) does not treat alleged misfeasance by insurance agents and brokers toward their clients as malpractice.

Santiago v. 1370 Broadway Associates, LP · filed 2001-03-22(6)

We agree with the Appellate Division that the alleged misfeasance of insurance agents and brokers toward their clients is not “malpractice” within CPLR 214 (6) (see, Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20 [decided today]).

Section 214 (6) does not treat insurance brokers as professionals, and the continuous representation doctrine does not apply to them.

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Prometheus Funding Corp. · filed 2001-05-10(6)

Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the continuous representation doctrine is not applicable to insurance brokers and they are not professionals within the purview of CPLR 214 (6) (see, *217Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for architectural malpractice claims.

Landow & Landow Architects, P. C. v. Shorefront Jewish Geriatric Center, Inc. · filed 2001-12-24(6)

Accordingly, the demand for arbitration, which was dated June 28, 2000, is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations involving an architectural malpractice claim (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v Lituchy, 269 AD2d 554).

Section 214(6) gives a contractor three years to bring a negligence claim arising from its reliance on design documents, measured here from its bid or, at the latest, the contract award.

A.H.A. General Construction, Inc. v. Edelman Partnership · filed 2002-02-07(6)

Concerning the negligence causes of action, assuming in plaintiff’s favor that its relationships with Edelman and RG were such as to approach privity (see, id. at 485), such causes of action must nevertheless be dismissed as barred by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214 (6). If plaintiff, as it claims, did not perform its own inspections respecting the structural integrity of the wall because it relied on Edelman’s and RG’s documents, then the injury it claims was sustained not when it was held in default in March 1997, but when it formulated its bid in December 1992 in reliance on the documents (see, IFD Constr. Corp. v Corddry Carpenter Dietz & Zack, 253 AD2d 89, 92-93, citing Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541), or, at the latest, when plaintiff was awarded the contract in May 1993. The commencement of the action in May 1998 was therefore untimely.

Section 214(4) gives a negligence claim three years to be filed; a claim for lost insurance protection accrues when the deficient coverage is first issued.

Mauro v. Niemann Agency, Inc. · filed 2003-03-10(4)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract is six years (see CPLR 213 [2]), and for a negligence claim is three years (see CPLR 214 [4]). ... This loss of a property right to greater insurance protection took place upon the first issuance of the coverage in 1989, more than three years prior to the commencement of this action (see Busker on Roof Ltd. Partnership Co. v Warrington, 283 AD2d 376 [2001]; Cappelli v Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 276 AD2d 458, 459 [2000]).

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice actions did not apply to an action commenced before the September 1996 amendment.

Berman v. Cullen & Dykman · filed 2002-02-25(6)

A six-year statute of limitations is applicable to this legal malpractice case since it was commenced in January 1996, ... before the September 1996 amendment which shortened the six-year period to three years (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700, 708-709; Budget Installment Corp. v Levy, Ehrlich & Kronenberg, 259 AD2d 649; Dowd v Law Plan Hyatt Legal Servs., 249 AD2d 503).

Professional malpractice claims are subject to a three-year limitations period under CPLR 214(6).

Hirschfeld v. Weinick, Sanders & Co. · filed 2002-03-04(6)

Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is three years (see, CPLR 214 [6]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse, 84 NY2d 535, 541).

Section 214(6) requires an action for legal malpractice damages to be commenced within three years after the claim accrues.

Carnevali v. Herman · filed 2002-04-29(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214 (6), an action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim. ... Accordingly, the plaintiffs causes of action sounding in legal malpractice should have been dismissed as time barred.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Calcutti v. SBU, INC. · filed 2002-09-16(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the claim’s accrual.

CPLR 214(6) bars untimely legal malpractice counterclaims against proposed additional defendants when relation back does not apply.

Bereck, P.C. v. Hamza · filed 2002-11-25(6)

The applicable statute of limitations expired (see CPLR 214 [6]), and the additional counterclaim defendants can be joined in the action only if the relation-back doctrine applied (see Buran v Coupal, 87 NY2d 173, 177). The relation-back doctrine does not apply to the present case.

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice action, and continuous representation can toll that period.

Griffin v. Brewington · filed 2002-12-02(6)

Accordingly, assuming that the alleged acts of malpractice occurred no later than 1992, the plaintiff met her burden of establishing that the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine until June 1995 (see Pellati v Lite & Lite, supra; Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH v Lerner, 166 AD2d 505). The malpractice action, which was commenced less than three years later, is not time-barred (see CPLR 214 [6]; Brothers v Florence, 95 NY2d 290).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from the alleged legal malpractice to file a claim.

Hoffenberg v. Hoffman & Pollok · filed 2003-03-05(6)

The statute of limitations for a claim of legal malpractice is three years. ... Thus, under any circumstances, Hoffen-berg’s claim is time-barred under 214(6) and, therefore, dismissed.

Section 214(4) and (6) set a three-year limitations period for conversion and legal malpractice claims.

Mohan v. Hollander · filed 2003-03-10(4), (6)

At bar, the facts set forth in the- complaint allege no more than causes of action to recover damages for conversion and legal malpractice, which are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4], [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from when legal malpractice is committed to bring an action, absent an applicable toll.

Barbieri v. Shayne, Dachs, Stanisi, Corker, & Sauer · filed 2003-04-07(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of the accrual of the claim (see CPLR 214 [6]; Carnevali v Herman, 293 AD2d 698 [2002]), and such a claim accrues when the malpractice is committed, not when it is discovered (see Santulli v Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 NY2d 700 [1992]).

Section 214(6)’s three-year period for legal malpractice is not tolled by later representation on matters unrelated to the alleged malpractice.

Dignelli v. Berman · filed 2002-04-15(6)

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the continuous representation doctrine is not applicable here. The defendants’ representation as to the matter for which the malpractice is alleged, the purchase of Primrose, ended with the closing on January 10, 1995.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which may be tolled by continuous representation in the matter where the alleged malpractice occurred.

Corless v. Mazza · filed 2002-06-27(6)

As the restaurant sale occurred on August 31, 1994, the malpractice action is clearly barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see, CPLR 214 [6]), unless the statute was tolled by the continuous representation rule (see, Glamm v Allen, 57 NY2d 87, 94). ... Accordingly, we concur in Supreme Court’s determination that questions of fact regarding the application of the continuous representation doctrine require denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for nonmedical professional malpractice claims, whether based on tort or contract.

Saint Alexander's Church v. McKenna · filed 2002-05-09(6)

To the extent that they are grounded in malpractice, as is the fifth cause of action, they are governed by the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6). In 1996, “the Legislature amended CPLR 214 (6) to apply a three-year limitations period to all nonmedical malpractice actions, whether based on tort or contract” (Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group, 96 NY2d 20, 25).

CPLR 214 (6) does not govern claims for negligent actuarial services because actuaries are not professionals within its meaning.

Castle Oil Corp. v. Thompson Pension Employee Plans, Inc. · filed 2002-11-25(6)

Guided by this definition, we reject the plaintiff’s contention that its cause of action alleging negligent performance of actuarial services is governed by CPLR 214 (6).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for nonmedical professional malpractice claims, whether based in contract or tort.

Levin v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers, LLP · filed 2003-02-25(6)

CPLR 214 (6) imposes a three-year limitations period on (nonmedical) professional malpractice claims, “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort.”

Section 214(6) sets a three-year period for legal malpractice claims; continuous representation may toll it when the attorney’s further work concerns the alleged malpractice.

Gravel v. Cicola · filed 2002-09-09(6)

Here, the defendant sustained this initial burden by offering evidentiary proof that the malpractice complained of occurred on February 18, 1997, when he allegedly erroneously advised the plaintiffs that the property they intended to purchase was benefitted by an easement, and that this action was not commenced until on or about October 18, 2000, after the expiration of the three-year limitations period (see CPLR 214 [6]). ... Because there are factual issues to be resolved regarding whether the continuous representation toll applies, the Supreme Court erred in denying the motion on the ground that, as a matter of law, the three-year statute of limitations was tolled.

The continuous representation doctrine does not extend the limitations period for legal malpractice when the attorney-client relationship has ended.

Daniels v. Lebit · filed 2002-11-04(6)

The continuous representation doctrine does not apply since there is no evidence of any ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants after that date (see Piliero v Adler & Stavros, 282 AD2d.511; Wester v Sussman, supra; Goicoechea v Law Offs, of Stephen R. Kihl, 234 AD2d 507). Accordingly, the cause of action alleging legal malpractice is barred by the statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

CPLR 214 (6)’s three-year period for malpractice does not apply to claims of insurance agent or broker misfeasance toward clients.

Federal Insurance v. Spectrum Insurance Brokerage Services, Inc. · filed 2003-04-01(6)

Contrary to the court’s finding, the malpractice and/or negligence causes were not time-barred under the three-year statutory period prescribed in CPLR 214 (6) since that statutory period only applies to allegations of “malpractice” and “the alleged misfeasance of insurance agents and brokers toward their clients is not ‘malpractice’ within CPLR 214 (6)” (Santiago v 1370 Broadway Assoc., 96 NY2d 765, 766 [2001]).

Section 214(4) and (6) provide three-year limitations periods for conversion and legal malpractice claims, respectively.

Sciaraffo v. LaMattina · filed 2003-04-14(4), (6)

Moreover, to the extent the complaint purports to allege causes of action to recover damages for legal malpractice or conversion, those causes of actions are time-barred (see CPLR 214 [4], [6]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from the alleged malpractice, regardless of when the client discovers it.

Adler v. Gershman · filed 2003-05-05(6)

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them since the plaintiffs failed to allege a single act or omission of legal malpractice committed by the defendants within the applicable three-year limitations period.

Section 214(6) gives professional malpractice claims a three-year limitations period regardless of whether they are based in contract or tort.

6645 Owners Corp. v. GMO Realty Corp. · filed 2003-06-12(6)

Under these circumstances, all of plaintiffs’ claims against these defendants are barred by the three-year statute of limitations, which governs actions to recover damages for professional malpractice (with certain exceptions not relevant here) “regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” (CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Saferstein v. Rein · filed 2003-10-02(6)

This case raises the issue of whether the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff-Appellant Norman Saferstein’s pro se legal malpractice complaint as time-barred pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). ... An independent review of the record and relevant state law reveals that Saferstein’s complaint was time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice is committed.

Hoffenberg v. Hoffman & Pollok · filed 2003-10-23(6)

Even if the statute of limitations is deemed not to run until July 31, 1996, when HPP was discharged, the three-year limitation period expired on July 31, 1999. Thus, under any circumstances, Hoffen-berg’s claim is time-barred under 214(6) and, therefore, is dismissed.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on professional malpractice claims against architects.

County of Rockland v. Kaeyer, Garment & Davidson Architects, P.C. · filed 2003-10-27(6)

The plaintiffs action against KGD was commenced more than three years after that date, and thus, the professional malpractice cause of action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that runs from the alleged malpractice, regardless of when the client discovers it.

Alicanti v. Bianco · filed 2003-12-01(6)

The appellants met their initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the applicable three-year statute of limitations expired before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [6]; Duran v Mendez, 277 AD2d 348 [2000]; Savarese v Shatz, 273 AD2d 219 [2000]; Assad v City of New York, 238 AD2d 456 [1997]; Siegel v Wank, 183 AD2d 158 [1992]).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period whether pleaded in contract or tort, with the period tolled during continuous representation.

Kearins v. GRUBERG, McKAY & STONE · filed 2004-01-29(6)

Pursuant to CPLR 214(6), an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, must be commenced within three years regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort. ... However, given the discrepancy in the final date of representation, defendants' CPLR 3211(a)(5) motion is denied.

CPLR 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for malpractice actions.

Henry v. Leeds & Morelli, Esqs. · filed 2004-02-24(6)

The court properly held that plaintiffs action, commenced in November 2001, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]).

CPLR 214(6)’s three-year period applies to claims labeled restitution or unjust enrichment when they rest on the same allegations as legal malpractice claims.

Spinale v. Tenzer Greenblatt, LLP · filed 2003-10-21(6)

Although plaintiffs pleaded causes of action nominally for restitution and unjust enrichment, those causes are based on the same allegations as their causes for legal malpractice. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ causes are governed by the three-year limitations period for legal malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]) and, as such, are time-barred.

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from the occurrence of actionable injury.

Romano v. Romano · filed 2003-12-01(6)

The plaintiffs allege that Nicolosi committed legal malpractice when he released the note and mortgage executed by his client Geraldine Romano to the mortgagee in or after June 2000, within the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). The mortgage was not recorded until on or about August 15, 2000. A cause of action sounding in legal malpractice accrues upon the occurrence of “actionable injury” (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 302 [2002]) which could only occur after Nicolosi released the documents (see Munoz v Wilson, 111 NY 295 [1888]).

Section 214(6) gives a party three years after the alleged malpractice to bring a legal-malpractice claim.

Proskauer Rose v. Asia Electronics Holding Co. · filed 2003-12-09(6)

The proposed counterclaims for legal malpractice were correctly rejected as time-barred since defendant moved to amend more than three years after the alleged acts of malpractice (CPLR 214 [6]; see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]).