N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice action, subject to tolling for continuous representation.

Roubeni v. Dechert, LLP · filed 2018-03-21(6)

"An action to recover damages arising from legal malpractice must be commenced within three years, computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is interposed" ( 3rd & 6th, LLC v Berg, 149 AD3d 794, 795; see CPLR 214[6]; McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295). ... Here, the defendants satisfied their initial burden by demonstrating that this legal malpractice action accrued, at the latest, when the bankruptcy proceeding was terminated in October 2006, which was more than three years before the commencement of this action ( see Stein Indus., Inc. v Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, 149 AD3d at 789; Tsafatinos v Law Off. of Sanford F. Young, P.C., 121 AD3d 969, 969).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim.

Davis v. Cohen & Gresser, LLP · filed 2018-04-12(6)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice claim is three years (CPLR 214[6]; McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]). Here, the latest date on which the claim could have accrued is March 9, 2011, because that is when decedent died, thereby severing the attorney-client relationship between decedent and defendant ( see Pace v Raisman & Assoc., Esqs., LLP , 95 AD3d 1185, 1188 [2d Dept 2012]; see also Velazquez v Katz , 42 AD3d 566, 567 [2d Dept 2007]). March 9, 2011 is more than three years prior to the commencement of this action on August 12, 2014.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitation period for legal malpractice claims.

Estate of Smulewicz v. Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein & Breitstone, LLP · filed 2018-04-19(6)

Defendant established its entitlement to dismissal on statute of limitation grounds by submitting evidence that the malpractice occurred in 2008, but plaintiff did not commence this action until March 2016, well beyond the three-year limitation period for legal malpractice (CPLR 214[6]; see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002]; Ackerman v Price Waterhouse , 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994] ; Glamm v Allen , 57 NY2d 87, 93 [1982]).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year statute of limitations.

Stein Industries, Inc. v. Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP · filed 2017-04-05(6)

The statute of limitations for the cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years (see CPLR 214 [6]; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C., 126 AD3d 733, 735 [2015]).

Section 214(6) gives professional malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that accrues when the malpractice is committed.

Collins v. Felder · filed 2017-04-11(6)

The three-year statute of limitations governing professional malpractice actions under New York state law “accrues when the malpractice is committed.” Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 N.Y.2d 164, 166, 750 N.E.2d 67, 69, 726 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (2001); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice occurs, rather than when the client discovers it.

Palmeri v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP · filed 2017-07-25(6)

Claims for legal malpractice are subject to a three-year statute of limitations and accrue when the malpractice is committed, not when the client learns of it (Lincoln Place, LLC v RVP Consulting, Inc., 70 AD3d 594 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]; CPLR 214 [6]). Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim first accrued on or about June 25, 2009, when defendant terminated its legal representation of him, but continued to represent Ramius in the ongoing FINRA investigation.

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period that begins when the malpractice occurs, not when the client learns of it.

Palmeri v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP · filed 2017-12-28(6)

Claims for legal malpractice are subject to a three-year statute of limitations and accrue when the malpractice is committed, not when the client learns of it (Lincoln Place, LLC v RVP Consulting, Inc., 70 AD3d 594 [1st Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 710 [2010]; CPLR 214 [6]). Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim first accrued on or about June 25, 2009, when defendant terminated its legal representation of him, but continued to represent Ramius in the ongoing FINRA investigation. He did not, however, file his claim until February 15, 2013, more than three years later.

Legal malpractice claims have a three-year limitations period, which continuous representation may toll while the attorney continues substantive work on the matter.

Knobel v. Wei Group, LLP · filed 2018-04-03(6)

The motion court correctly determined that the legal malpractice claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214[6]). No triable issue of fact exists as to whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations.

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limitations period on nonmedical malpractice claims, whether pleaded in contract or tort.

Risk Control Associates Insurance Group v. Maloof, Lebowitz, Connahan & Oleske, P.C. · filed 2017-06-13(6)

National Specialty’s claims are time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to nonmedical malpractice actions, whether sounding in breach of contract or tort (see CPLR 214 [6]; Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 542 [2004]; Berger & Assoc. Attorneys, P.C. v Reich, Reich & Reich, P.C., 144 AD3d 543, 544 [1st Dept 2016]; Voutsas v Hochberg, 103 AD3d 445, 446 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 853 [2013]).

CPLR 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for malpractice claims against nonmedical professionals.

Schwartz v. Leaf, Salzman, Manganelli, Pfiel & Tendler, LLP · filed 2017-11-08(6)

Actions to recover damages for malpractice against nonmedical professionals are governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (6) (see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.], 3 NY3d 538, 539 [2004]; 730 J & J, LLC v Polizzotto & Polizzotto, Esqs., 69 AD3d 704, 705 [2010]).

An accounting malpractice claim subject to Section 214 accrues when the client files the tax returns, but continuous representation can toll the limitations period.

Lemle v. Regen, Benz & MacKenzie, C.P.A's, P.C. · filed 2018-10-02

Her claim accrued in October 2013, when she filed the tax returns ( see Ackerman v Price Waterhouse , 84 NY2d 535, 541 [1994]; CPLR 214). However, because the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to the continuous representation doctrine, the claim is not time-barred ( see Williamson v PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP , 9 NY3d 1 [2007]).

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual, subject to tolling for continuous representation.

King Tower Realty Corp. v. G & G Funding Corp. · filed 2018-07-05(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of accrual ( see CPLR 214[6]; McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301; Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP , 138 AD3d at 1086; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. , 126 AD3d at 735; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159, 163; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C. , 111 AD3d at 796).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period measured from accrual.

Webster v. Sherman · filed 2018-10-03(6)

The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice is three years [*3]from the accrual of the cause of action ( see CPLR 214[6]; Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP , 138 AD3d 1085, 1086; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159, 163).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, which the continuous representation doctrine may toll.

Potenza v. Giaimo · filed 2018-10-24(6)

The statute of limitations for causes of action alleging legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. , 126 AD3d 733, 735). ... Here, the defendants satisfied their initial burden by demonstrating, prima facie, that the alleged legal malpractice occurred more than three years before this action was commenced in 2014. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the applicable statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination dismissing the plaintiff's legal malpractice causes of action as untimely.

Section 214(6) sets the limitations period for legal malpractice claims, and equitable estoppel does not toll it when the plaintiff had timely notice sufficient to prompt an inquiry.

Brean Murray, Carret & Co. v. Morrison & Foerster LLP · filed 2018-10-30(6)

The malpractice claim was properly dismissed as time-barred ( see CPLR 214[6]), and the doctrine of equitable estoppel "will not toll a limitations statute where plaintiffs possessed timely knowledge sufficient to have placed them under a duty to make inquiry and ascertain all the relevant facts prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations" ( Rite Aid Corp. v Grass , 48 AD3d 363, 364-365 [1st Dept 2008]).

Section 214(6) gives attorney malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Gurvey v. Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, PC · filed 2018-12-04(6)

Gurvey’s attorney malpractice claim is subject to New York’s three-year statute of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim a three-year limitations period.

Soloway v. Kane Kessler, PC · filed 2019-01-03(6)

Plaintiff, a New Jersey resident, alleged legal malpractice in connection with defendants' representation of him for numerous real estate transactions, a cause of action which has a three year statute of limitations in New York (CPLR 214[6]), and a six year limitations period in New Jersey (NJ Stat Ann 2A:14-1). The latest that the alleged malpractice could have occurred was February 7, 2013, the date set for closing on the last of the real estate matters. Because plaintiff commenced the action on October 28, 2016, more than three years later, it was correctly dismissed as untimely.

Section 214(6) requires a legal malpractice action to be commenced within three years of accrual, whether the claim is based in contract or tort.

Sclafani v. Kahn · filed 2019-02-13(6)

An action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three years of accrual, "regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort" (CPLR 214[6]; see McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301; Chase Scientific Research v NIA Group , 96 NY2d 20; Quinn v McCabe, Collins, McGeough & Fowler, LLP , 138 AD3d at 1086; Alizio v Ruskin Moscou Faltischek, P.C. , 126 AD3d at 735; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159, 163; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C. , 111 AD3d at 796). ... Here, the defendants established that the plaintiffs' legal malpractice cause of action was time-barred, as it accrued on June 24, 2009, at the conclusion of the closing ( see Rudolf v Shayne, Dachs, Stanisci, Corker & Sauer , 8 NY3d 438, 442).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims, subject to the continuous representation doctrine.

RJR Mech. Inc. v. Ruvoldt · filed 2019-03-14(6)

The statute of limitations on a cause of action for legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214[6]). Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the claim was not tolled by the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) gives attorney malpractice claims a three-year limitations period; a claim that an attorney performed none of the paid-for services sounds in breach of contract.

Mendez v. Robbins · filed 2019-01-04(6)

We note that, contrary to defendant's contention, where, as here, a client claims that an attorney has failed to perform any services for which the client has paid, the claim sounds in breach of contract, which has a six-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 213 [2]; Reidy v Martin , 77 AD3d 903 [2010]; Marte v Graber , 31 Misc 3d 70 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2011]), rather than attorney malpractice, which has a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) gives professional malpractice claims against architects a three-year limitations period that begins when the professional relationship ends after completion of significant contractual duties.

City of New York v. George G. Sharp, Inc. · filed 2019-12-10(6)

"A cause of action to recover damages against an architect for professional malpractice is governed by a three-year statute of limitations, which accrues upon termination of the professional relationship — that is, when it completes its performance of significant (i.e. non-ministerial) duties under the parties' contract" ( New York City Sch. Constr. Auth. v Ennead Architects LLP, 148 AD3d 618, 618 [1st Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted]; CPLR 214[6]). Here, the City has sufficiently alleged that defendant completed its performance under the contract, and the parties' professional relationship terminated, on or about February 2, 2010, when defendant allegedly delivered its completed as-built designs. Because the City commenced this suit a year later, on or about January 28, 2011, its malpractice claim was timely (CPLR 214[6]).

Section 214(6) imposes a three-year limit on legal malpractice claims; representation in a separate action under a separate retainer does not extend that period through the continuous representation doctrine.

Etzion v. Blank Rome, LLP · filed 2019-07-09(6)

The motion court correctly found that this action, which was commenced 12 years after the divorce action ended, is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations ( see Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]; CPLR 214[6]). Contrary to plaintiff's contentions, the continuous representation doctrine is inapplicable, because defendants were retained under two separately executed retainer agreements in the divorce action and the fraud action ( see Glamm v Allen , 57 NY2d 87, 93-94 [1982]; see also Shumsky , 96 NY2d at 168).

Section 214(6) gives legal malpractice claims a three-year limitations period, which the continuous representation doctrine may toll.

Leeder v. Antonucci · filed 2019-07-31(6)

Defendant met his burden on that part of the cross motion by establishing that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice is three years ( see CPLR 214 [6]), that the estate cause of action accrued on November 1, 2010, the last date on which to file objections to the accounting ( see generally International Electron Devices [USA] LLC v Menter, Rudin & Trivelpiece, P.C. , 71 AD3d 1512, 1512 [4th Dept 2010]), and that the estate cause of action was therefore untimely when this malpractice action was commenced on November 15, 2013. ... Those efforts could be viewed as "attempt[s] by the attorney to rectify an alleged act of malpractice" ( Luk Lamellen U. Kupplungbau GmbH , 166 AD2d at 506-507), and thus plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims; the attorneys did not establish that their relationship with the clients ended more than three years before suit was filed.

Courtney v. McDonald · filed 2019-10-31(6)

Contrary to defendants' argument, the malpractice cause of action with respect to the 175 W 12th Street matter is not time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice claims (CPLR 214[6]). Defendants failed to demonstrate that the attorney-client relationship ceased to exist within three years of August 28, 2017, the date plaintiffs filed this action.

Section 214(6) gives plaintiffs three years from the alleged malpractice to bring a legal malpractice action, subject to tolling during continuous representation.

Marzario v. Snitow Kanfer Holzer & Millus, LLP · filed 2019-12-12(6)

An action to recover damages arising from an attorney's malpractice must be commenced within three years of accrual ( McCoy v Feinman , 99 NY2d 295, 301 [2002], citing CPLR 214[6]), and the claim accrues when the malpractice is committed ( Shumsky v Eisenstein , 96 NY2d 164, 166 [2001]).

Section 214(6) gives a three-year limitations period for nonmedical professional malpractice claims; for architectural work on a single project, the period begins when the entire project is completed.

Anderson v. Pinn · filed 2020-07-01(6)

"[A]n action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort" is subject to a three-year statute of limitations (CPLR 214[6]; see Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.] , 3 NY3d 538, 541). ... Further, contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the 2015 agreement did not demonstrate otherwise, since both the 2005 and 2015 agreements concerned a single project, and the statute of limitations did not begin to run until completion of the entire project ( see Board of Mgrs. of Ocean Club at Long Beach Condominium v Mandel , 235 AD2d 382).

Section 214(6) gives a legal malpractice claim three years from the alleged malpractice to be filed.

Noskov v. Roth · filed 2020-07-17(6)

As the Complaint is devoid of any alleged malpractice on the part of Defendants after July 2014, Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim accrued––at the latest––in July 2014 and elapsed three years later, in July 2017. The malpractice claim is thus time-barred under § 214(6).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years from accrual to bring a legal malpractice claim; damages were sufficiently calculable for accrual when the jury rendered its verdict.

Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Rubin, Fiorella & Friedman, LLP · filed 2020-11-17(6)

Any damages arising from defendant's alleged malpractice were sufficiently calculable for pleading purposes when the jury rendered its verdict on July 29, 2013, and the action commenced on September 17, 2018 is time-barred.

An accounting malpractice claim under section 214(6) can survive a limitations defense when factual issues remain about equitable estoppel or tolling based on a fiduciary relationship or continuous representation.

Gerzog v. Goldfarb · filed 2022-06-28(6)

Partial dismissal of the accounting malpractice claim on statute of limitations grounds ( see CPLR 214 [6]) is precluded by issues of fact as to whether Migden is equitably estopped from asserting the defense because his alleged concealment of the misconduct induced plaintiff to refrain from filing a timely action ( see Simcuski v Saeli , 44 NY2d 442, 448-449 [1978]; Langston v MFM Contr. Corp. , 172 AD3d 583, 584 [1st Dept 2019]), whether the statute of limitations was tolled because Migden was in a fiduciary relationship with the firm ( see Robinson v Day , 103 AD3d 584, 586 [1st Dept 2013]), and whether it was tolled under the continuous representation doctrine ( see Booth v Kriegel , 36 AD3d 312, 314 [1st Dept 2006]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims and Judiciary Law § 487 claims arising from the same transactions.

Pergament v. Government Employees Ins. Co. ("GEICO") · filed 2026-01-21(6)

"The statute of limitations for a cause of action alleging legal malpractice, and a cause of action alleging a violation of Judiciary Law § 487 arising out of the same transactions as the legal malpractice cause of action, is three years" ( Fraumeni v Law Firm of Jonathan D'Agostino, P.C. , 215 AD3d 803, 804; see CPLR 214[6]; Farage v Ehrenberg , 124 AD3d 159). ... The P & S defendants' contention that the proposed amendment insofar as asserted against them was patently devoid of merit because it was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations is without merit.

Section 214(6) gives three years to bring a professional malpractice claim against an architect, running from completion of the work and termination of the professional relationship.

450 Gin Lane SH, LLC v. Gentry Constr. Co., Inc. · filed 2026-01-21(6)

Here, D & C and Shope made a prima facie showing that the third-party action was commenced more than three years after the completion of the work on the project, as the certificate of occupancy was issued on January 23, 2018, and the third-party complaint was filed more than three years later on March 23, 2023 ( see CPLR 214[6]; Trump Vil. Section 4, Inc. v Lawless & Mangione Architects & Engrs., LLP , 235 AD3d 928, 930-931).

Section 214(6) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a legal malpractice claim, subject to tolling for continuous representation on the matter involving the alleged malpractice.

Kuzar v. Spar & Bernstein · filed 2026-02-11(6)

Pursuant to CPLR § 214 (6), an action to recover damages for legal malpractice must be commenced within three (3) years of when the alleged malpractice was committed. ... Defendant's own submissions in support of its motion raises issues of fact as to whether defendant continuously represented plaintiff, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for professional malpractice claims against architects.

Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Associates · filed 1975-06-04

Accordingly, it is clear that under its borrowing statute, the State of Michigan would elect to apply the New York Statute of Limitations of three years for malpractice (CPLR 214).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for accountant-malpractice claims, rather than breach-of-contract claims.

Bay Terrace Cooperative Section XII, Inc. v. Hornstein · filed 1989-05-01(6)

Therefore, the applicable Statute of Limitations was six years (see, CPLR 213 [2]), rather than the three-year period of limitations applicable to causes of action sounding in accountant malpractice (see, CPLR 214 [6]).

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims whether they are based in contract or tort.

Somer & Wand, P. C. v. Rotondi · filed 1998-06-22(6)

Contrary to the contentions of the individual shareholders, the 1996 amendment to CPLR 214 (6) (L 1996, ch 623), which makes an action to recover damages for legal malpractice subject to a three-year Statute of Limitations regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or in tort, is of no consequence to the timeliness of the amended counterclaim because the proposed amended counterclaim was asserted more than six years after the alleged malpractice.

Section 214(6) gives accountant malpractice claims a three-year limitations period.

Quinn v. Thomas H. Lee Co. · filed 1999-08-24(6)

To the extent that there is any claim of accountant’s malpractice, the Court need not consider where the action accrued because the statute of limitations for accountant’s malpractice in New York, Virginia and Maryland is three years.

Section 214(6) applies a three-year limitations period to a professional malpractice claim even when it is pleaded as breach of contract on the same facts as a negligence claim.

Apple Bank for Savings v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP · filed 2012-11-20(6)

Plaintiffs breach of contract claim is based on the same facts as its negligence claim. Plaintiff’s arguments that defendant never sought to dismiss the breach of contract claim and that such claim is governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (2) are unavailing. Defendant previously moved to dismiss plaintiffs causes of action for negligence and breach of contract as time-barred, arguing that they are claims for professional malpractice subject to a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [6]). ... Thus, the motion court’s denial of plaintiffs motion in limine was entirely proper.

Section 214(6) sets a three-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims.

Selene Finance, LP v. County of Sacramento · filed 2025-08-19(6)

New York’s statute of limitations is two years longer than California’s statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.6(a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(6). ... Therefore, even if the claim is timely under New York law and not timely under California law, the choice of law provision is enforceable because New York law does not contravene a fundamental policy of California.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period does not directly bar a maritime indemnity claim; admiralty laches governs and is guided by the applicable limitations period.

Middle East Export Co. v. Concordia Line, Skibs A/S Hilda Knudson · filed 1970-09-18(4)

Equally without merit is American’s further claim that Concordia’s impleader action is barred by New York’s three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, subd. 4). This case is governed by the admiralty doctrine of laches, which in turn is guided in application by the appropriate Statute of Limitations.

Section 214(5)’s three-year limit does not independently bar a longshoreman’s maritime injury suit; the state limit guides the court’s assessment of laches.

Vasquez v. Intermaritime Carriers S.A. · filed 1977-10-31(5)

Defendant Intermaritime Carriers, the vessel owner, has moved before this Court for a dismissal of plaintiff longshoreman’s personal injury claim as time-barred by New York State’s three-year statute of limitations, CPLR § 214(5). ... Admiralty courts consider an analogous state statute of limitations as a guideline in determining laches, but its effect is limited to the burden of persuasion on the issue. ... For these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions.

De Hart v. State · filed 1977-12-28(5)

Unquestionably, the three-year Statute of Limitations for an action for personal injuries (CPLR 214, subd 5) has been satisfied for the purposes of this application.

Section 214 gives a plaintiff three years from the accident to bring a personal injury action, even if the no-fault serious injury threshold is reached later.

Corrello v. Costello · filed 1978-05-08

On December 20, 1977 — three years and one day after the accident — defendant was served with a summons; the Statute of Limitations for personal injuries is three years (CPLR 214). ... The cause of action in this case accrued on the date of the accident when the wrong was done. ... This action was not commenced until the three-year Statute of Limitations had expired. It is barred.

Section 214(5)’s three-year limit does not conclusively govern a longshoreman’s personal injury action against a vessel owner in state court; federal laches governs timeliness.

Guzman v. Farrell Lines, Inc. · filed 1979-04-19(5)

The better rule, it seems to us, is to measure the timeliness of the action in the State court by the Federal standard, in order to assure that a longshoreman is afforded the full benefit of Federal law to which he is entitled.

Section 214(4)’s three-year period for property damage guides maritime laches when recovery under a towing contract requires proof of a failure to exercise due care.

Hartford Fire Insurance v. Callanan Marine Corp. · filed 1973-01-07(4)

However, in the Court’s view, plaintiff in order to recover must establish third-party defendant’s failure to exercise due care in the handling of plaintiff’s cargo. Accordingly the 3 year statute of limitation should be deemed the one most pertinent.

Section 214(4)'s three-year period does not govern a fair representation claim brought alongside a related contract claim against the employer; both claims use the six-year contract period.

Abrams v. Carrier Corporation · filed 1970-11-04(4)

In so holding the district court found that 'the duty of fair representation is a fiduciary obligation,' and applied the three-year limitation period provided in N.Y. CPLR 214(4). ... While we agree that the district court properly looked to New York State law in determining the limitation period, we disagree as to the particular statute which applies and conclude that the unfair representation claim against the Steelworkers was not time-barred.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims brought in New York.

Carter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-12-07(2)

This Circuit has consistently held that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in N.Y. CPLR § 214(2) governs § 1981 cases brought in New York.

Section 214(4) bars trespass and negligence counterclaims first asserted more than three years after the underlying events.

Rochester Atlas Wrecking Co. v. E. J. Del Monte Corp. · filed 1978-04-14(4)

Defendant’s first and second counterclaims, asserted for the first time on December 9, 1975, contain causes of action in trespass and negligence based on occurrences in 1969. The counterclaims were not timely (CPLR 214, subd 4) and were properly dismissed.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Saunders v. State of NY · filed 1986-03-05(5)

Although CPLR § 214(5), the negligence statute of limitations, is not as close an analogue to § 1983 actions as § 215(3), the three-year period of limitation in § 214(5) better serves the interest in providing a federal civil rights remedy and should be applied to § 1983 actions.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period for section 1983 claims seeking damages for personal injuries.

423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. City of Syracuse · filed 1986-11-20(5)

We disagree, however, with its argument that the one-year 90-day period established by General Municipal Law § 50-i (1), rather than the three-year period governing actions for damages for personal injuries (CPLR 214 [5]), applies under the Wilson rationale.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Salahuddin v. Harris · filed 1987-04-03(5)

A comparison of the two New York statutes at issue suggests that the three-year statute under CPLR § 214(5) governs. That provision broadly covers all “personal injury” torts except those causes of action specifically enumerated in § 215.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period for all § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Tom U.U. Okure v. Javan Owens and Daniel G. Lessard · filed 1987-04-06(5)

We agree with the district court, and with the plaintiff, that the proper limitation to apply to all section 1983 claims in New York is three years, based on the state's general personal injury statute, N.Y.C.P.L.R. Sec. 214(5).

The three-year malpractice limitations period in CPLR 214(6) does not govern a public employee’s claim against a union for breach of the duty of fair representation.

Baker v. Board of Education · filed 1987-10-13(6)

Based on Video Corp. v Flatto Assocs. (58 NY2d 1026) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v Enco Assocs. (43 NY2d 389), plaintiff would then have us apply the six-year Statute of Limitations for contract actions (CPLR 213 [2]), instead of the three-year statute for malpractice actions (CPLR 214 [6]), reasoning that ultimately the rights and obligations as established by the collective bargaining agreement between the union (as exclusive representative of the employees) and the district are at the root of the issues raised against the union in this action. In our view, this analogy also is flawed ... but we are nonetheless led to the result urged by plaintiff — a six-year limitations period — because this is the period the Legislature ... has prescribed for "an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law”.

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1981 claims; section 214(5) would supply the same period if subsection (2) did not apply.

Grubb v. Broadcast Music, Inc. · filed 1987-10-21(2)

Even if CPLR § 214(2) did not apply to § 1981 claims, CPLR § 214(5) would, and the period under both sections is three years. The instant suit was filed in November 1986, more than three years after Márchese assumed his duties in August 1983.

Section 214 bars tort claims subject to its limitations period when they are filed after the deadline measured from accrual.

Schlotthauer v. Sanders · filed 1989-08-28

Consequently the tort claims interposed more than six years after the sale, are barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214, 215).

Section 214 bars applicable tort claims filed after the limitations period runs from the date they accrue.

Schlotthauer v. Sanders · filed 1989-08-28

These claims accrued on March 17, 1980, the date of the Sheriff’s sale, and were therefore barred by the applicable Statute of Limitations when interposed more than six years after the sale (CPLR 214, 215).

Section 214(4) sets a three-year limitations period for actions to recover property damage.

Dormitory Authority v. Baker · filed 1991-12-12(4)

Grace’s second cause of action and Baker’s sixth cause of action against Engineering Controls should have been dismissed as time-barred pursuant to the four-year Statute of Limitations applicable to the sale of goods (UCC 2-725) and the three-year Statute of Limitations applicable to actions to recover for property damages (CPLR 214 [4]), since the third-party complaints are based upon a contract with Engineering Controls for the sale of the waste heat boilers together with component parts and other equipment, rather than a contract for installation services.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 in New York.

Yoonessi v. State University of New York · filed 1994-08-26(5)

Actions under these statutes are governed by the state statute applicable to personal injury claims, which is three years in New York under CPLR § 214(5).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury claims, which applies to § 1981 actions.

Frank v. New York State Electric & Gas · filed 1994-12-12(5)

Actions under § 1981 are governed by the state statute applicable to personal injury claims, which is three years in New York under CPLR § 214(5).

CPLR 214 (2) gives a plaintiff three years to bring an action for damages for discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296.

Lane-Weber v. Plainedge Union Free School District · filed 1995-03-20(2)

Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, an action to recover damages for discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by a three year Statute of Limitation as prescribed by CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442; Mills v County of Monroe, 89 AD2d 776, affd 59 NY2d 307, cert denied 464 US 1018; Alaimo v New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 203 AD2d 501).

Section 214(5) bars a negligence claim filed after the applicable limitations period.

Guerrera v. Foundation Title & Escrow Corp. · filed 2003-03-10(5)

The plaintiffs second cause of action, sounding in negligence, is time-barred and therefore should have been dismissed (see CPLR 214 [5]; DiPilato v Martinelli, 274 AD2d 412 [2000]).

Section 214(2) supplies a limitations period for claims under Insurance Law § 2123.

Catanzano v. Warren Rosen & Co. · filed 2005-06-21(2)

Inasmuch as the representations that allegedly induced plaintiffs purchase of the purportedly nonconforming insurance coverage were made no later than 1990 and this action was not commenced until 2002, plaintiffs negligent misrepresentation and Insurance Law § 2123 claims were time-barred (see CPLR 213 [1]; Fandy Corp. v Lung-Fong Chen, 262 AD2d 352 [1999]; and see CPLR 214 [2]; Goldberg v Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 242 AD2d 175, 180 [1998], lv dismissed in part and, denied in part 92 NY2d 1000 [1998]).

Section 214(4) provides a three-year limitations period for the negligence claim at issue.

Tenenbaum v. Gibbs · filed 2006-03-28(4)

Moreover, any negligence claim would be barred by the three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [4]; Wider v Omni Tit. Agency, Inc., 18 AD3d 868 [2005]).

Section 214(2) gives claims under General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period.

Gristede's Foods, Inc. v. Unkechauge Nation · filed 2007-11-28(2)

Accordingly, Sections 349 and 350 are governed by CPLR § 214(2).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period bars a conversion claim for shares brought more than three years after the alleged taking.

Lubov v. Welikson · filed 2008-09-29

Thus, plaintiffs real claim appears to be one of conversion (shares stolen or expropriated by the EC.). This fourth cause of action came into being as part of the third amended complaint in 2003. Thus, on its facts, it would be time-barred under CPLR 214 as a conversion claim.

Section 214 (2) does not bar an attorney’s fee claim under Debtor and Creditor Law § 276-a; the claim is subject to a six-year limitations period.

Fiber Consultants, Inc. v. Fiber Optek Interconnect Corp. · filed 2008-11-18(2)

Contrary to his contention, the eighth cause of action was not time-barred based on the two-year limitations period contained in CPLR 214 (2).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for negligence claims.

Schulz v. Waldorf · filed 2010-01-26(5)

A triable issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant’s alleged conduct constituted an assault and/or battery subject to a one-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 215 [3]) or negligence governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims.

Ingenito v. Riri USA, Inc. · filed 2015-03-03(2)

The statute of limitations for a NYSHRL claim is three years.

Section 214(2) gives claims under Executive Law § 296 a three-year limitations period.

Cahill v. State of New York Stony Brook University Hospital · filed 2016-05-11(2)

Causes of action alleging violations of Executive Law § 296 are governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214 [2]; Koerner v State of N.Y., Pilgrim Psychiatric Ctr., 62 NY2d 442, 447 [1984]; Kwarren v American Airlines, 303 AD2d 722 [2003]).

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for discrimination claims against a union.

Thompson v. District Council 37 · filed 2017-11-14(2)

All of her discrimination claims against the union relating to events alleged to have occurred prior to September 10, 2012 are untimely under the governing three-year limitations periods (see CPLR 214 [2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502 [d]; Santiago-Mendez v City of New York, 136 AD3d 428, 428 [1st Dept 2016]).

Section 214(4) bars negligence claims filed ten years after they accrued.

Union St. Tower, LLC v. First Am. Tit. Co. · filed 2018-05-09(4)

Here, those causes of action accrued in 2003. The plaintiff commenced this action in 2013. Accordingly, those causes of action are time-barred ( see CPLR 214[4]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1982 actions brought in New York.

273 Lee Ave. Tenants Ass'n v. Steinmetz · filed 2018-08-16(5)

For actions pursuant to § 1982, federal courts in New York follow the three-year limitations period set by the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions.

Section 214(4)'s limitations period bars an untimely claim to compel completion of a decorative panel on a party wall.

Barklee 94 LLC v. Oliver · filed 2018-12-04(4)

Moreover, the motion court correctly found that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations ( see RPAPL 2001; CPLR 214[4]).

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period, which begins when the plaintiff purchases the product.

Fullerton v. Corelle Brands, LLC · filed 2019-09-30(2)

“Claims brought under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.” Martin Hilti Family Tr., 137 F. Supp. 3d at 466; NY CPLR § 214(2). The cause of action begins to accrue at the time Plaintiffs purchased the inherently defective Products. Gould v. Helen of Troy Ltd., 16 Civ 2033 (GBD), 2017 WL 1319810, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2017). Plaintiff Slepian purchased the Products in 2013. [26] ¶ 95. Her claims, then, are time-barred as she purchased her Pyrex product more than three years ago. Thus, this Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 16 and 17.

Section 214(2) gives claims under New York General Business Law §§ 349 and 350 a three-year limitations period.

Chu v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. · filed 2020-03-23(2)

Claims brought under sections 349 and 350 of New York’s GBL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Reid v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr. · filed 2021-02-16

It is undisputed that the claims are untimely if the one-year statute of limitations for intentional tort claims is applied, but timely if the two-year statute of limitations for wrongful death claims or the three-year statute of limitations for negligence or statutory violation claims is applied ( see CPLR 214[2], [5]; 215[3]; EPTL 5-4.1[1]; Havell v Islam , 292 AD2d 210 [1st Dept 2002]). ... The fourth claim sounds in negligence and thus is timely.

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for IDEA claims brought directly in court without first pursuing administrative remedies.

Rutherford v. Florida Union Free School District · filed 2022-02-04(2)

See also Piazza, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 688–89 (“Courts in the Second Circuit considering IDEA claims that are permissibly unexhausted have followed this rule by applying a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2).” (collecting cases)). Plaintiffs filed the initial Complaint on December 15, 2016, (see Compl.), and as such, the relevant limitations period stretches back three years to December 15, 2013.

Section 214(2) provides a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims.

Postell v. Wells · filed 2022-04-08(2)

Claims under the NYSHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Title IX violation and retaliation claims.

Austin v. Fordham University · filed 2022-09-30(5)

The Second Circuit has held that “Title IX claims are most closely analogous to personal injury actions,” applying the three-year general personal ... injury statute of limitations found in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Id. (citations omitted). Thus, a three-year statute of limitations applies to counts one and two of the complaint.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for age discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Gabin v. Greenwich House, Inc. · filed 2022-11-15(2)

The limitations period for claims of age discrimination under the State and City Human Rights Laws is three years ( see CPLR 214[2]; Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-502[d]).

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period measured from the filing of the court action.

Hernandez v. Kwiat Eye and Laser Surgery, PLLC · filed 2023-01-24(2)

"As for claims under the NY[S]HRL, the statute of limitations is three years from the date that the claim accrues, measured from the filing of the action in court." ... Regarding Plaintiff's NYSHRL claim, in which the Court may consider all three incidents, the Court additionally finds that those incidents, while offensive and inappropriate, ... were not so severe or pervasive as to establish a hostile work environment.

Section 214(2) gives NYSHRL claims a three-year limitations period.

Kurtanidze v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. · filed 2024-03-13(2)

Claims under both statutes are subject to a three-year limitations period.

CPLR 214(3) sets a three-year limitations period for conversion claims.

dMY Sponsor, LLC v. Glatt · filed 2024-04-05(3)

Further, although counterclaim defendants also argue that the claim is barred by the [*6]statute of limitations, as the three-year limitations period for conversion claims ( see CPLR 214 [3]) applies in this case, it is unclear from the proposed additional allegations whether three years have expired since the alleged conversion occurred.

Section 214(5) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a negligence claim for personal injury.

Smith v. Johnson · filed 2024-06-14(5)

New York law ... gives a plaintiff two years and six months to bring a medical ... malpractice claim and three years to bring a negligence claim.

Section 214(2) supplies a three-year limitations period for IDEA claims that may be brought directly in federal court without exhausting administrative remedies.

C.Q. v. New York City Department of Education · filed 2024-12-03(2)

Instead, courts in the Second Circuit have applied a three-year statute of limitations borrowed from N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) to ... permissibly unexhausted IDEA claims. ... Accordingly, this Court will apply a three-year (1095-day) statute of limitations to all the claims at issue and address each potential basis for tolling the statutes in turn.

Section 214 gives negligence claims a three-year limitations period.

Barnes v. The City of New York · filed 2025-02-19

The negligence claims are subject to a three-year limitations period under CPLR § 214.

Section 214 gives State Human Rights Law claims a three-year limitations period, tolled from the filing of an EEOC charge until receipt of a Right to Sue notice.

Hinds · filed 2026-02-02

For City and State HRL claims, it is three years, and tolls for the period between filing an EEOC charge and receiving a Right to Sue notice. Bloomberg, 967 F.Supp. 2d 816, 831 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214; N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d)).

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, running from the date of injury.

J.M. v. New York State · filed 2026-04-16(5)

Inasmuch as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act lack an express statute of limitations, New York's three-year statute of limitations rule for personal injury actions applies and the limitations period here began to accrue on the date of the injury (see CPLR 214 [5]; Snyder v Town Insulation, 81 NY2d 429, 432 [1993]; see generally Purcell v New York Inst. of Tech. - Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 931 F3d at 63).

Section 214 governs the limitations period for a parent’s independent claim for interference with custody; the child’s false imprisonment limitation period does not bar that claim.

Lisker v. City of New York · filed 1972-11-02

The parent’s cause of action is independent of the child’s. Even assuming that the child’s cause of action would be time-barred by the false imprisonment period of limitation, the parent’s cause of action is predicated on interference with custodial, relations and would not be affected. (See Orr v. Orr, 36 N. J. 236; CPLR 214.)

CPLR 214’s three-year period does not apply to claims whose gravamen is injury to reputation, even when pleaded as interference with contractual relations.

Kartiganer Associates, P. C. v. Town of Newburgh · filed 1977-05-09

In opposing the motion, plaintiff described those causes of action as dealing with the "prima facie tort of interference with contractual relationship[s]” and argued that they were timely commenced under the applicable three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214). ... Plaintiff cannot circumvent the one-year limitation period applicable to defamation actions "by mis-describing the tort as * * * interference with economic relations” (see Noel v Interboro Mut. Ind. Ins. Co., 31 AD2d 54, 55).

Section 214(5) gives an insurer three years from the accident to bring a subrogation claim for no-fault benefits.

Transamerica Insurance v. Lumbermen's Casualty Insurance · filed 1980-10-09(5)

The dispositive legal issue is whether, as petitioner contends, the appropriate Statute of Limitations is six years pursuant to CPLR 213 (subd 2) or, as respondent maintains, three years in accordance with CPLR 214 (subd 5). The application of either of these limitations is wholly dependent upon whether the payment of no-fault benefits to a covered party is in the nature of subrogation or indemnification. If the former, then the application for arbitration must have been made within three years of the date of the accident. ... Accordingly, petitioner’s claim, which we determine to be in the nature of subrogation, was untimely filed.

Section 214(5)’s three-year negligence limitations period applies to a first-party insurer’s reimbursement claim against the insurer of another party to the accident.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Regional Transit Service, Inc. · filed 1980-12-12(5)

Special Term correctly ruled that the three-year negligence period of limitation (CPLR 214, subd 5) applies to a first-party insurer’s claim for reimbursement from the insurer of the other party involved in the accident pursuant to section 674 of the Insurance Law (Transamerica Ins. Co. v Lumbermen’s Cas. Ins. Co., 77 AD2d 5).

Section 214’s three-year tort limitations period runs from the accident for an insurer’s subrogation claim against the insured’s alleged tortfeasors, even when the insurer pays benefits later.

Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Schwartz · filed 1997-03-19(5)

As such, plaintiff’s subrogation rights are subject to the same three-year tort Statute of Limitations, measured from the date of the accident, as though the cause of action had been brought by its insured (see, Seven Sixty Travel v American Motorists Ins. Co., supra).

The three-year limitations period for loss-transfer arbitration claims between private insurers runs from the date of the underlying injury.

In re the Arbitration between Allstate Insurance & Clarendon National Insurance · filed 1999-03-19(5)

It is well-settled that loss-transfer arbitration claims between private insurers accrue on the date of the underlying injury (see, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Regional Tr. Serv., 79 AD2d 858, 859; Transamerica Ins. Co. v Lumbermen’s Cas. Ins. Co., 77 AD2d 5, 7, lv denied 53 NY2d 602; cf., Matter of MVAIC v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214 [involving an agency of statutory creation]).

Section 214(5) bars a subrogated negligence claim when it is filed after the limitations period measured from the date of the accident, rather than the insurer’s payment.

Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Clark · filed 2002-07-08(5)

Thus, since the plaintiff did not commence this action until more than six years after the accident, any claim for subrogation that it might have had was time-barred (see CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214’s three-year limitations period for an insurer’s APIP subrogation claim runs from the date of the accident.

Jimenez v. The Hartford · filed 2022-05-17

Because Allstate Ins. Co. is thus directly on point for limitations purposes, the Court concludes that the three-year statute of limitations under CPLR § 214 has run from April 10, 2018, the date of the accident.

Section 214’s three-year limit bars a personal injury negligence action when the plaintiff could understand and protect his legal rights and therefore does not qualify for insanity tolling under CPLR 208.

McCarthy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. · filed 1980-11-03

Special Term, after a hearing, found that plaintiff had been insane within the meaning of CPLR 208, and consequently concluded that the Statute of Limitations contained in CPLR 214 was tolled, rendering the instant action timely. Special Term erred in making this finding.

Section 214’s three-year limit for personal injury actions is tolled while an application for leave to sue MVAIC is pending, but not from the date of injury before the application is made.

Betances v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. · filed 1994-12-27

In light of the holding in Barchet v New York City Tr. Auth. (supra), the First Department held, in Matter of Velez v MVAIC (supra), under facts virtually identical to those at bar, that the applicable Statute of Limitations was tolled "only during the pendency of the proceeding seeking leave" (Matter of Velez v MVAIC, supra, at 765; see also, Matter of Schultz v MVAIC, 84 Misc 2d 640). ... We take this occasion to expressly overrule Creswell v Doe (supra). ... Accordingly, since the petitioner’s application for an order granting her leave to bring an action against MVAIC was not made until almost six years after the accident giving rise to her cause of action for personal injuries, the application is denied.

The three-year period for conversion claims may be equitably tolled for mental incapacity; disputed facts about incapacity should be resolved after a motion to dismiss.

Mandarino v. Mandarino · filed 2006-05-11(3)

We conclude that, in the circumstances presented, the District Court should not have resolved the fact-specific equitable tolling issue on defendants’ motion to dismiss. When, as here, the facts are disputed, the best practice is to analyze a question of mental incapacity in the context of summary judgment.

CPLR 214(2)’s three-year limit does not apply to rent-stabilization overcharge claims that arose before April 1984; the six-year limit applies.

Blodgette v. Melohn · filed 1984-07-09(2)

CPLR 214 (subd 2) requires that an action must be instituted within three years to “recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiture created or imposed by statute”. ... However, the 1983 amendment to CPLR 213 (subd 2), excepting claims for rent overcharges from the six-year statute, would tend to indicate the Legislature’s belief that the six-year statute was theretofore applicable to such claims. The memorandum of its legislative sponsors indicates that the intent in creating a four-year limitation was to shorten the period of limitations. Accordingly, the court finds that the six-year limitation is applicable.

Section 214(2)’s three-year limitations period does not apply to rent-overcharge refund claims because an overcharge is a violation of the rent stabilization law, not a statutory penalty or forfeiture.

Charles H. Greenthal Co. v. State Division of Housing & Community Renewal · filed 1984-12-26(2)

CPLR 214 (2), imposing a three-year Statute of Limitations, refers to a liability, penalty, or forfeiture created or imposed by statute. The Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, the amended Code and the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (L 1974, ch 576, § 4) are statutes setting forth the manner in which lawful stabilized rents are to be established and fair rent increases maintained, in addition to providing penalties for the violation of its provisions. The rent overcharge is not the penalty or forfeiture created by the statute but rather the violation of the statute and, therefore, the application of CPLR 214 (2) would be inappropriate.

CPLR 214’s three-year limitation period applies to small claims actions.

Ryder v. Tannenbaum · filed 1985-10-02

The initial inquiry in considering the merits of the defense that plaintiff’s action is time barred is whether the three-year Statute of Limitations of CPLR 214 applies to actions in Small Claims Court. ... In light of this strong public policy, Statutes of Limitation, as set forth in CPLR article 2, are matters of substance that apply to proceedings in Small Claims Court.

Section 214(4) applies a three-year limitations period to waste claims, which accrue when the injury occurs.

PBN Associates v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1987-07-01(4)

Clearly, waste actions are included under CPLR 214 (4). ... Any additional contaminants released into the soil during the remainder of the tenancy create a new claim for waste, which would accrue, as here, as of the time of injury.

Section 214(4) gives a plaintiff three years to bring a claim for waste.

P.B.N. Associates v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1988-06-27(4)

We find that the act alleged to constitute waste, the accidental leaking of the contaminant, took place in or about 1979 or 1980. Consequently, the cause of action to recover damages for waste is barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [4]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year period for personal injury claims; a wrongful death claim is barred if that period expired before the decedent died.

Debrino v. Benaquista & Benaquista Realty, Inc. · filed 1987-12-30(5)

There can be no question that the wrongful death claims asserted in the instant action are barred by the Statute of Limitations, which expired three ... years after March 14, 1980 (CPLR 214 [5]) and were not revived upon the death of plaintiffs decedent in 1985 (see, e.g., Kelliher v New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. ... Co., 212 NY 207, 212; Myers v City of Plattsburgh, 13 AD2d 866).

Section 214(2)’s three-year period for Human Rights Law claims is tolled while a complaint is pending before the Division of Human Rights.

Sciss v. Metal Polishers Union Local 8A · filed 1989-04-06(2)

With the filing of an administrative complaint with DHR on May 6, 1982, plaintiff tolled the three-year Statute of Limitations. All of her claims of discrimination, including those alleged to have occurred in March 1980, were valid as they were within the three-year period. Thus, the statute was tolled from May 6, 1982 until January 16, 1985 when petitioner commenced the State judicial proceeding and must be deemed to have abandoned the administrative proceedings. Therefore, plaintiff’s assertion of claims which had been tolled and remained intact was not time barred.

Section 214(2) sets a three-year limitations period for NYSHRL claims, which is tolled while an EEOC charge is pending.

Humphreys v. New York City health and Hospitals Corporation · filed 2019-09-23(2)

Claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are generally governed by three-year statutes of limitations. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); Taylor v. City of N.Y., 207 F. Supp. 3d 293, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). ... Since the earliest discriminatory conduct alleged by Plaintiff occurred in March through July 2013, the three-year statutes of limitations do not bar Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL claims.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims filed in New York.

McNeil v. Van Houten · filed 2025-07-22(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... To the extent Plaintiff is secking to bring claims arising out of his arrest and prosecution, his claims were filed beyond the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims in New York.

Barnes v. New York State · filed 2023-05-22(5)

The statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” ... In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims filed in New York.

Izeh v. Officer Boy'ls New Rochelle Police · filed 2023-05-31(5)

The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” ... In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 (5) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 USC § 1983.

Johnson v. McKay · filed 2022-09-29(5)

As to Supreme Court's granting of defendants' summary judgment motion based upon their statute of limitations defense, plaintiff's 42 USC § 1983 access-to-court claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations ( see CPLR 214 [5]; McFadden v Amodio , 149 AD3d 1282, 1283 [3d Dept 2017[*2]]).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for Section 1983 claims brought in New York.

Yifru v. Tietz · filed 2022-03-29(5)

In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). ... Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims arising more than three years before he filed this complaint on February 18, 2022 (that is, all claims arising before February 18, 2019) are time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year personal injury limitations period borrowed for federal civil rights claims.

Cain v. County of Niagara, New York · filed 2022-03-02(5)

In contrast, Plaintiff’s federal civil rights claims (First and Fifth Causes of Action and the federal aspects of Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action) borrow New York limitations period of 3 years for personal injury claims, N.Y. CPLR 214(5) (Docket No. 8, Pl. Memo. at 14), Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988) (notice of claim and timing for commencing action not required for federal civil rights action against municipality).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

Morris v. Trump · filed 2021-06-01(5)

The statute of limitations for section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions,” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5).

Section 214 provides a three-year limitations period that applies to § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Johnson v. NYS Dept of Correctional Sus · filed 2021-02-26

The statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is “that which the State provides for personal-injury torts,” which in New York is three years.

CPLR 214 (5) provides a three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, including claims under 42 USC § 1983.

Corbett v. Reynolds · filed 1989-06-01(5)

In New York the general personal injury statute, contained in CPLR 214 (5), provides for a three-year limitations period. Inasmuch as the action was commenced within three years of the alleged violations, the motion court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the second cause of action on Statute of Limitations grounds.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

McGuire v. Switzer · filed 1990-03-27(5)

As the Magistrate determined, the appropriate statute of limitations is three years, that being the statute of limitations for the New York general personal injury statute, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“C.P.L.R.”) § 214(5).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions, including actions against municipalities.

Meiselman v. Richardson · filed 1990-08-20(5)

In view of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the applicable statute of limitations, as well as the persuasive reasoning in Burroughs v. Holiday Inn, supra, this Court holds that the one-year and ninety day statute of limitations period in General Municipal Law § 50 — i, is inapplicable to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this Court’s view, the appropriate statute of limitations in such actions is three years, pursuant to CPLR section 214(5), New York’s general personal injury statute.

CPLR 214 (2) provides a three-year limitations period for civil actions seeking damages for unlawful discrimination under Executive Law § 296.

Stoetzel v. Wappingers Central School District · filed 1990-10-22(2)

It is well established that the institution of civil actions to recover damages for unlawful discriminatory practices under Executive Law § 296 is governed by the three-year Statute of Limitations prescribed in CPLR 214 (2) (see, Koerner v State of New York, 62 NY2d 442; Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 58 NY2d 293; Jones v State of New York, 149 AD2d 470; Koeppel v Wachtler, 141 AD2d 613).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims of false arrest and unlawful search and seizure.

Day v. Moscow · filed 1992-01-24(5)

Though our prior decision did not purport to foreclose the commencement of a new action against any persons other than those who were then parties to the action, it established that the three-year statute of limitations provided in CPLR § 214(5) governs Day's claims, Day I, 909 F.2d at 78-79. Dismissal of the asserted claims against the new defendants thus was correct on statute of limitations grounds.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims filed in New York.

Leon v. Murphy · filed 1993-03-05(5)

New York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries applies to these claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York, and CPLR 215(8) does not extend that period.

Bezerra v. County of Nassau · filed 1994-03-14(5)

It does not apply to toll and extend the three-year statute of limitations applicable in causes of action governed by section 214. Because section 1983 claims are subject to the statute of limitations provided in section 214, the tolling provision in section 215(8) is inapplicable to such claims.

Section 214(5) supplies the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which the court applied to a § 1983 claim.

Perez v. Police Department of New York · filed 1994-12-30(5)

Ac cordingly, in this ease, the Court must apply New York’s three-year statute of limitations governing personal injury actions.

Section 214 (5) gives claims under 42 USC § 1983 a three-year limitations period.

Caponigro v. White · filed 1996-01-09(5)

Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, while timely because subject to the three-year Statute of Limitations set forth in CPLR 214 (5) (Corbett v Reynolds, 151 AD2d 227), fail to state a cause of action.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period for a § 1983 action in New York, including one against a public health corporation.

Feuer v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. · filed 1996-09-23(5)

However, the general, three-year period has been held to be the applicable limitations period in a section 1983 action. ... Plaintiff filed this civil rights action after the one year and 90-day limitations period, but within the three-year Statute of Limitations. ... Therefore, defendants’ motion for dismissal is denied.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in New York.

Lagana v. Dillon · filed 1996-12-19(5)

Because Lagana stated that she was evicted on August 13, 1986, and did not file her complaint in federal court until October 3, 1994, her claim is barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5) (McKinney 1990); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989).

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

McArthur v. Caputo · filed 1996-01-31

In any event, McArthur’s federal claims are barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989) (three-year statute of limitations of CPLR 214 governs § 1983 claims in New York). McArthur commenced this action on June 2, 1994. Thus, any claims that accrued before June 2, 1991 are time-barred. Because McArthur’s federal claims are grounded in events that allegedly occurred during the state proceedings prior to June 1991, his federal claims are barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims in New York.

Legal Aid Society v. City of New York · filed 1997-09-11(5)

In New York, the 3-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214 [5]) is applicable to such claims ... Accordingly, the third cause of action is not time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for a 42 USC § 1983 cause of action.

Beers v. Incorporated Village of Floral Park · filed 1999-06-01(5)

However, the petitioner’s first cause of action under 42 USC § 1983 is timely because the Statute of Limitations for that cause of action is three years (see, CPLR 214 [5]; 423 S. Salina St. v City of Syracuse, 68 NY2d 474, cert denied 481 US 1008; cf., Collard v Kentucky Bd. of Nursing, 896 F2d 179), and contrary to the Library’s contention, the petitioner’s assertion that she was deprived of a hearing presents a substántive due process claim (see, Carter v Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Ctr., 767 F2d 270).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Muller v. State · filed 2000-03-28(5)

Additionally, this motion was made within the three-year Statute of Limitations for negligence actions and thus is timely (see, CPLR 214 [5]).

Section 214(5) sets a three-year limitations period for claims under 42 USC § 1983.

Kubik v. New York State Department of Social Services · filed 2000-12-14(5)

While we agree with plaintiffs that a three-year Statute of Limitations is applicable to causes of action under 42 USC § 1983 (see, Matter of Beers v Incorporated Vil. of Floral Park, 262 AD2d 315, 316; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552), we nevertheless conclude that the complete dismissal of the ninth and tenth causes of action is appropriate under the particular circumstances presented herein.

Section 214(5) gives federal civil rights claims a three-year limitations period because they are treated as personal injury claims.

Mompoint v. City of New York · filed 2002-11-25(5)

A federal civil rights claim is a personal injury claim that is governed by the three-year statute of limitations contained in CPLR 214 (5) ... Thus, his third cause of action was interposed within the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and should not have been dismissed as time-barred.

Section 214(5) provides the three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in New York.

Houghton v. Cardone · filed 2003-12-02(5)

Although defendants do not appear to contend that the federal claims are likewise time-barred, I note that § 215(1) does not apply to § 1983 actions, which in New York are governed by the three-year limitations period for personal injury actions under § 214(5).

Section 214(5) provides a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims brought in New York.

Lipton v. County of Orange, NY · filed 2004-04-14(5)

Indeed, as the County correctly points out, any such claims arising out of the November 1996 traffic stop are time-barred under § 1983 because the Complaint was dated February 1, 2002, and plaintiff knew or had reason to know of any potential traffic stop-related civil rights claims when it occurred.

Section 214(5) supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 claims arising in New York.

Velez Ex Rel. Velez v. Reynolds · filed 2004-07-10(5)

For claims brought-pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal. law determines when the cause of action accrues, but state law determines the length of the limitations period, and the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in New York is three years.

Section 214 supplies a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal court in New York.

Dibbs v. Roldan · filed 2005-02-14

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) section 214 provides that the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions brought in federal court in New York is three years.

Section 214's limitations period bars negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims brought more than four years after the underlying transaction.

Wider v. Omni Title Agency, Inc. · filed 2005-05-31

The Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint based upon the statute of limitations, as the defendant demonstrated definitively through documentary evidence that the transaction upon which the plaintiffs’ claim was predicated occurred in April 2000, more than four years prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214; Berardino v Ochlan, 2 AD3d 556 [2003]; Heffernan v Marine Midland Bank, 283 AD2d 337 [2001]).

Section 214 sets a three-year limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York.

Buric v. Kelly · filed 2005-12-06

The “repeated terminations” and “restricted duty assignments” that Buric claims were retaliatory all took place prior to 2000 and thus are beyond the three-year statute of limitations for this case, which Buric commenced in 2003. See Jewell v. County of Nassau, 917 F.2d 738, 739 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 governs limitations period for § 1983 actions brought in federal district court in New York); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214 (McKinney 2003).

CPLR 214 (5) sets a three-year limitations period for negligence actions.

Etienne v. H. Schrier & Co. · filed 2008-07-01(5)

Accordingly, pursuant to the three-year limitations period for negligence actions set forth in CPLR 214 (5), the last date upon which the plaintiff could timely commence the action was January 8, 2006.

Section 214 supplies the limitations period for damages claims under 42 USC § 1983.

Level 3 Communications, LLC v. DeBellis · filed 2010-01-19

Likewise, the causes of action to recover damages pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 are not time-barred (see CPLR 214; Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261 [1985]; Lopez v Shaughnessy, 260 AD2d 551, 552-553 [1999]) and, under the circumstances, are not subject to the requirement of exhaustion of remedies (see Patsy v Board of Regents of Fla., 457 US 496, 500 [1982]; McNeese v Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187, 373 US 668, 671-673 [1963]; cf. Prison Litigation Reform Act [42 USC § 1997e (a)]).