Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Aggravated assault with intent to rob does not require possession of a firearm.

Murray v. State · filed 2002-07-26(a)(1)

Possession of a firearm is not an element of aggravated assault with intent to rob.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape can be established by threatening and striking a victim while unsuccessfully trying to rape her.

Jackson v. State · filed 2002-10-09(a)(1)

The evidence showing that Jackson threatened and struck the victim, combined with the evidence showing that he unsuccessfully tried to rape her, sufficed to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob is complete when the assailant points a pistol at the victim.

Johnson v. State · filed 2003-03-27(a)(1)

First, even if Johnson’s running from the taxi is seen as evidence of abandonment, the crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob Huerta was completed when Mitchell pointed the pistol at Huerta. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).

An assault with intent to rob supports an aggravated assault conviction when evidence of the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s fear permits the jury to find that intent.

Kirk v. State · filed 2005-02-15(a)(1)

The evidence summarized in Division 1 (a) coupled with Smith’s testimony that he was scared and tried to cover his head with his forearms so that Kirk would not shoot him in the head was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Kirk assaulted Smith with the intent to rob him.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) makes assault with intent to rob a form of aggravated assault that does not require an allegation of a deadly weapon.

Smith v. State · filed 2005-07-26(a)(1)

He argues, incorrectly, that Count 5 of the indictment was flawed because in charging him with aggravated assault, it failed to specify that the offense was committed with a deadly weapon, as provided in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). He fails to recognize, however, that this count alleged that Smith committed assault with intent to rob the victim, which is specified in the statute as another way of committing aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) covers punching a victim while aiding a robbery as aggravated assault with intent to rob.

Johnson v. State · filed 2006-04-21(a)(1)

In light of Alexander’s demand for the victim’s property, and as we have held in Division 1, Tracy’s punches amounted to an assault with attempt to rob, justifying one of his convictions for aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault is complete when a person commits an assault with the intent to rob.

Walker v. State · filed 2006-08-17(a)(1)

Under Georgia law, aggravated assault is complete when a person commits an assault with the intent to rob. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).

Intent to rape for aggravated assault may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Mobley v. State · filed 2006-05-18(a)(1)

Based upon this circumstantial evidence, the jury was authorized to find that Mobley had the requisite intent to detain, abduct, and rape the victim as charged.

Section 16-5-21(a) covers an assault committed with intent to murder, including striking a victim with a hammer.

Pitts v. State · filed 2007-09-13(a)

This evidence supported Count 6, the aggravated assault charge, because it showed that Pitts assaulted the victim with the intent to murder her by striking her with a hammer.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob does not require use of a beer bottle; a fist strike can support the charge.

In Re Jhm · filed 2008-12-05(a)(1)

Ignoring the beer bottle language and focusing instead on the "hitting" portion of the allegations, the petition adequately informed J.H.M. that he was being charged with assaulting the victim by "hitting [the victim] in the head," and the evidence that J.H.M. struck the victim with his fist was enough to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob can be sustained by proof that the accused struck the victim with a fist, even when the petition specified a beer bottle.

In the Interest of J. H. M. · filed 2008-12-05(a)(1)

Ignoring the beer bottle language and focusing instead on the “hitting” portion of the allegations, the petition adequately informed J. H. M. that he was being charged with assaulting the victim by “hitting [the victim] in the head,” and the evidence that J. H. M. struck the victim with his fist was enough to sustain his conviction of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) covers an assault committed with intent to rape; an attack followed by an attempted rape can supply a factual basis for the charge.

Clark v. State · filed 2009-08-05(a)(1)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) provides that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with intent to rape. OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) defines assault as attempting to commit a violent injury to the person of another. At Clark’s guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor provided the factual basis for this charge, stating that Clark attacked the second elderly woman and threw her down onto her bed before attempting to have sexual intercourse with her. The prosecutor also noted that the State recovered Clark’s DNA from the woman’s person and her bed. Thus, the prosecutor provided a factual basis supporting the charge of aggravated assault with intent to rape.

Intent to rape for aggravated assault may be inferred from the circumstances of the assault.

Mattox v. State · filed 2010-08-18(a)(1)

Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to infer that Mattox had the requisite intent to rape C.C. as charged and therefore was also authorized to find that Mattox was guilty of aggravated assault with intent to rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape can be supported by conduct showing both a reasonable fear of violent injury and an intent to rape.

Rawls v. State · filed 2012-05-17(a)(1)

But this ignores the statutory requirement that the victim’s fear of injury be “reasonable,” and the facts presented here — that Rawls disrobed D. R., forced her onto a bed, and attempted to have intercourse with her before she pushed him off — supported the finding that Rawls committed the elements of aggravated assault with intent to rape.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) covers an assault with intent to rape when the defendant takes a substantial step toward a battery with that intent.

Murrell v. State · filed 2012-07-16(a)(1)

“The crime of aggravated assault with intent to rape is complete when there is a substantial step toward a battery of the victim, i.e., an assault, coupled with intent to rape.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Butler v. State, 194 Ga. App. 895, 897 (2) (392 SE2d 324) (1990). As noted before, it was for the jury to assess the witnesses’ credibility, and based on the evidence in this case, the jury was authorized to conclude that Murrell intended to rape the victim.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) defines aggravated assault to include assault with intent to rob.

Singleton v. State · filed 2014-03-27(a)(1)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with the intent to rob.

Intent to rape for aggravated assault may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Jernigan v. the State · filed 2015-07-23(a)(1)

Thus, “[t]here was evidence, although circumstantial insofar as intent is concerned, sufficient to establish that the defendant assaulted the victim with intent to commit rape; a rational trier of fact was authorized to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) covers holding a victim at gunpoint with intent to rob when the act places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

TAYLOR v. the STATE. · filed 2017-12-20(a)(1)

The jury was authorized to find that the act of holding her at gunpoint placed her in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury and that the act was done with the intent to rob the victim. The evidence thus established each of the elements of the offense of aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob is supported when conduct aimed at taking money places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Parker v. State · filed 2020-01-28(a)(1)

These circumstances supported the jury’s conclusion that Parker committed aggravated assault by assaulting M. M. with the intent to rob.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob can be committed without using a firearm.

Brooks v. State · filed 2020-08-24(a)(1)

Indeed, aggravated assault with intent to rob may be committed without the use of a firearm.

Former § 16-5-21(a)(1) covers an assault committed with intent to rape; evidence that the defendant grabbed the victim by the throat, threatened her, and forced intercourse can support a conviction.

Johnson v. State · filed 2021-08-26(a)(1)

And former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) provided, in pertinent part: “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults . . . [w]ith intent to murder, to rape, or to rob[.]”8 ... Here, the State presented evidence that L. C. encountered Johnson twice during the same day for significant periods of time and, after walking with him for several blocks, he grabbed her by the throat, dragged her into an abandoned building, and twice forced her to engage in sexual intercourse while threatening to beat her with a stick. ... As a result, the evidence was sufficient to support Johnson’s convictions.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) requires an assault aggravated by an intent to rape.

Gibson v. State · filed 2022-03-15(a)(1)

Aggravated assault with intent to rape requires (a) an assault against the victim; and (b) aggravation of that assault by an intention to rape.

Section 16-5-21 defines aggravated assault completely without a jury instruction defining simple assault.

Willis v. State · filed 1983-07-15

This assertion has been decided by the Supreme Court adversely to appellant. “There is no merit in appellant’s contention that a charge on simple assault [OCGA § 16-5-20 (Code Ann. § 26-1301)] must be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault [OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302)]. The latter does not need the former to make it complete. [Cit.]”

Under § 16-5-21(a)(2), describing the same assault instrument as a deadly weapon or as an instrument likely to inflict serious bodily injury does not change the charged manner of assault.

Miller v. State · filed 1985-05-03(a)(2)

The question of whether the arrow constituted a deadly weapon as opposed merely to an instrument likely to inflict serious bodily injury had nothing to do with the manner in which the crime was committed. Consequently, the charge cannot reasonably be deemed to have presented the jury with an alternative basis for finding the appellant guilty of aggravated assault not charged in the indictment.

A jury may be told to disregard the subsection (a)(1) definition of aggravated assault when that definition is inapplicable.

Rashada v. State · filed 1986-11-06(a)(1)

The record clearly shows that the trial court’s recharge informed the jury to disregard only the previously given inapplicable definition of aggravated assault contained in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1). There was no error.

A general instruction on intent can adequately cover an aggravated assault charge even when the instruction on the offense does not repeat intent to injure.

Fowler v. State · filed 1988-10-20

The trial court subsequently charged the jury on the elements of assault set forth in OCGA § 16-5-21, but did not include intent to injure. Thus, the element of intent was not repeated during the portion of the trial court’s charge that focused directly on assault. However, we find the general charge on intent sufficient to enable the jury to apply it to the assault count, and “we find nothing in the transcript to support appellant’s contention that the jury could not, or did not, understand the charge on intent as applied to aggravated assault.”

A jury may be instructed on all of § 16-5-21 when the charge permits conviction only for the acts alleged in the indictment.

Grude v. State · filed 1989-01-23(a)(2)

Although appellant was indicted pursuant to subsection (a) (2) of OCGA § 16-5-21, the trial court’s charge to the jury included an instruction on the entirety of the code section. ... Since the charge as given nowhere authorized the return of a verdict of guilty based upon acts which were not alleged in the indictment, there was no error in fully instructing the jury on the offense of aggravated assault.

A charge covering every mode of aggravated assault under subsection (a) is harmless when the jury is instructed on the offenses in the indictment and must find that the crime was committed as charged.

Ross v. State · filed 1989-06-21(a)

However, we find no harm in fully charging the jury on OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) since the trial court read the indictment to the jury and instructed it specifically as to each of the crimes charged. The court further instructed that if the jury found the defendant guilty of any one or more of the counts charged, it must so find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the crime or crimes were committed in the manner in which it was charged in the indictment.

Under § 16-5-21, an instruction about assault with intent to murder does not require reversal of a deadly-weapon assault conviction when the jury is directed to the indictment and any confusion would only increase the State’s burden of proving intent.

Cail v. State · filed 1990-02-20

This enumeration of error establishes no ground for reversal for two reasons. First, the trial court corrected the asserted error by recalling the jury after they had begun their deliberations and instructing them to confine their considerations “to the indictment as it’s charged here, that is, assault with a deadly weapon. ...” Second, because there was no dispute over the fact that the victim had been shot with a firearm, to the extent the jury may have been misled by the instructions in question they could only have been misled into believing a more stringent standard of proof was required on the issue of criminal intent than was actually the case.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an instruction reciting both statutory alternatives when the charge as a whole ties conviction to the weapon alleged in the indictment and does not mislead the jury.

Diaz v. State · filed 1990-02-20(a)(2)

The charge of which appellant complains appears to be substantially a recital of the provisions of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... Moreover, as the jury was read the indictment and was subsequently instructed that they would be authorized to return a verdict of guilty if they found the assault on the person of the victim was made “with the knife, a deadly weapon,” no fair risk of prejudice to appellant exists, it being highly probable the verdict was not the product of a misleading instruction.

A charge using the statutory definition of aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2), supplemented by the definition of simple assault in response to jurors’ questions, adequately explains the offense.

Blackmon v. State · filed 1990-10-02(a)(2)

The trial court’s charges on aggravated assault were accurate statements of the law. Further, the trial court’s response to the jury’s inquiries regarding the basic elements of aggravated assault could not have reasonably misled or confused the jury.

A jury instruction on aggravated assault may be upheld when the charge, read as a whole, properly presents the offense.

Johnson v. State · filed 1993-01-05

Similarly, when read as a whole, the charge regarding aggravated assault was proper and we find no error. See generally OCGA § 16-5-21; Smith v. State, 140 Ga. App. 395 (1) (231 SE2d 143) (1976).

A jury instruction using subsection (a)(2)’s deadly-weapon language may be proper when the indictment specifies a knife, the evidence identifies only a knife, and the indictment frames the jury’s deliberations.

Simmons v. State · filed 1993-01-26(a)(2)

Furthermore, the jury could not have been confused or misled by the court’s definition of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which followed the wording of the statute but did not instruct the jury that it must find appellant guilty specifically of a knife attack, as alleged in the indictment. First, the evidence adduced at trial only points to one “deadly weapon” or “object likely to cause serious bodily injury,” a knife. In addition, the court began the charge by reading the indictment, the jury was instructed that the indictment framed the issues for its deliberations, and the indictment went out with the jury during the deliberations.

A jury charge using the exact language of § 16-5-21(a) is not error even if part of the charge is inapplicable to the facts.

Moore v. State · filed 1993-03-17(a)

A charge in the exact language of the statute shows no error. ... This is true even though a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts.

A jury instruction that tracks § 16-5-21(a)'s definition of aggravated assault correctly states the law.

Davis v. State · filed 1993-06-24(a)

The language of the charge by the court specifically tracked OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) which defines the offense. ... Considering the correctness of the charge, and the failure of the defendant to object to the charge before the jury retired, we conclude that the instruction was not erroneous.

An instruction that includes inapplicable methods of aggravated assault is cured when a later instruction limits the jury to the method charged in the indictment.

Cook v. State · filed 1993-09-21(a)

This recharge made specific reference to the potentially over-inclusive initial charge and eliminated any reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Cook of the crime in a manner not charged in the indictment.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon instruction that includes the simple assault element of placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Adams v. State · filed 1994-02-28(a)(2)

The instruction given was the pattern jury instruction for aggravated assault which includes reference to the elements of simple assault, one of which is putting the victim in apprehension of receiving a violent injury. ... It is apparent, therefore, that the trial court’s instruction on the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon did not change the nature of the crime with which appellants were charged and was not erroneous.

Reading all of subsection (a) in a jury charge on deadly-weapon assault is not reversible error when the indictment makes the charged offense clear and the additional alternatives do not mislead the jury.

Chandler v. State · filed 1994-04-18(a)

The provisions of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) define aggravated assault in part as “assault with intent to murder, to rape, or to rob.” While any reference to attempted rape or robbery certainly was extraneous, “we find it highly unlikely that the jury was misled by [this portion of] the charge, since the court also read the indictment to the jury verbatim in advising them of the offense of [assault with a deadly weapon] charged against appellant.”

Evidence that a defendant shot a gun at the victim’s head supports an aggravated assault charge despite his claim that the shooting was accidental.

Creson v. State · filed 1995-05-09(a)(2)

The record shows that both charges were supported by the evidence. Creson admitted drinking up to six beers immediately before the incident, and although he maintained the shooting was an accident, the overwhelming evidence showed Creson shot a gun at the victim’s head. Under these circumstances, neither charge was erroneous, and we cannot say that trial counsel’s performance was ineffective.

An aggravated-assault instruction that includes an uncharged statutory form is not reversible error when the jury is instructed to consider only the acts alleged in the indictment.

Robinson v. State · filed 1997-06-30

We disagree that the overbroad definition of aggravated assault in the charge was error. ... The trial court read the indictment to the jury and following the charge at issue instructed the jury that they were only authorized to find appellant guilty of the acts alleged in the indictment.

A jury charge may mention both methods of aggravated assault when the charge as a whole limits conviction to the method alleged in the indictment.

Martin v. State · filed 1997-11-03(a)(1), (a)(2)

The trial court did not violate Martin's due process rights because in its recharge on aggravated assault it instructed the jury on subsection (a)(1) as well as (a)(2) of OCGA § 16-5-21. [2] In its initial charge to the jury, the court instructed on the subsections and then limited the jury's consideration to the specific method of committing the offense alleged in the indictment; in fact, it tracked the language of the indictment. Thus, when considered in its entirety, the court's charge fairly instructed the jury that it could convict Martin only of the aggravated assault of Brown as charged in the indictment.

An indictment alleging that the defendant shot the victim with a deadly weapon during a robbery supports an instruction on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Isaac v. State · filed 1998-10-05(a)(2)

Isaac was indicted for assaulting the victim by shooting him with a deadly weapon in the course of a robbery. Since the shooting of the victim was a material element of the offense as set forth in the indictment, the trial court properly charged on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require an instruction defining “deadly weapon” when the charge rests on use of an object likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Stevenson v. State · filed 1998-08-24(a)(2)

As pointed out by the State, however, Stevenson was specifically charged with assault on an officer with an “object which when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury,” not with assault with a deadly weapon. The indictment and the appropriate section of the statute were also read to the jury during the charge, and there was no error in not charging the definition of deadly weapon.

An instruction on an uncharged method of aggravated assault does not invalidate a conviction unless there is a reasonable possibility the jury convicted on that method.

Gordon v. State · filed 2000-05-31(a)

While it is error to charge the jury that a crime may be committed by alternative methods when the indictment charges it was committed by one specific method, the conviction is not defective unless there is a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted the defendant of the commission of the crime in a manner not charged.

Section 16-5-21(a) sets out alternative ways to commit aggravated assault; when the evidence supports a way omitted from the indictment, the jury must be limited to the charged way.

Boone v. State · filed 2001-05-07(a)

Moreover, the trial court erroneously charged the jury that intent to murder, rape, or rob was a material element of the aggravated assault charges in the case. Clearly there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victims were assaulted with the intent to murder or rob — allegations not contained in the indictment. Accordingly, Boone’s due process rights were violated by the jury charge given by the trial court.

A jury instruction on aggravated assault may cover both methods alleged in the indictment when the instruction conforms to the evidence.

Scott v. State · filed 2001-06-04

Thus, unlike the Harwell case, the trial court did not instruct the jury on an alternative method of committing aggravated assault that was not alleged in the indictment. Since the indictment gave the defendant notice that he was charged with committing aggravated assault in two ways and the trial court conformed its charge to the evidence presented in the case, we affirm Scott’s convictions on both counts of aggravated assault.

When an indictment charges aggravated assault by a specific method, a jury instructed on other methods must be directed to consider only the charged method if the evidence could support an uncharged one.

Chapman v. State · filed 2001-06-04(a)(1)

A limiting instruction is necessary to direct the jury to consider only whether the defendants committed an aggravated assault with deadly weapons.

An aggravated assault instruction under subsection (a)(2), the deadly weapon provision, does not instruct the jury under subsection (a)(1), the specific intent provision.

Warren v. State · filed 2002-01-04(a)(2)

Warren charges the trial court with error in instructing the jury on aggravated assault under subsection (a) (1) of OCGA § 16-5-21 (“specific intent” aggravated assault). This complaint is also completely lacking in merit, as the transcript shows that the trial court charged the jury under subsection (a) (2) (“deadly weapon” aggravated assault) only.

When an aggravated assault indictment alleges shooting as the method, the jury must find that the defendant shot the victim; an instruction permitting conviction based on pointing a pistol and causing apprehension is reversible error.

Talton v. State · filed 2002-02-13

Consequently, the court’s instruction constructively amended the indictment to relieve the jury of finding one of the material allegations averred, that is, that Taitón committed the offense “by shooting” the victim. This was harmful error requiring reversal.

When an indictment alleges aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the jury charge need only cover that method, not the alternative method involving an object used offensively.

Diaz v. State · filed 2002-05-08(a)(2)

Diaz was indicted for aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon, a handgun; he was not charged with the alternative method of committing the crime. The trial court therefore properly charged the jury only on the method of aggravated assault alleged in the indictment, and not on the inapplicable alternative method.

A jury instruction may give all of § 16-5-21(a)’s aggravated-assault alternatives, even if some are inapplicable, when the indictment and instructions make clear what the State must prove.

Harris v. State · filed 2002-08-14(a)

In charging the jury, the trial court tracked the language of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a), informing jurors that “a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when that person assaults another person: with the intent to rob; or, with a deadly weapon; or with any object, device, or instrument, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to, or actually does, result in serious bodily injury.” ... “[I]t is not usually cause for [a] new trial that an entire Code section be given. This is so even though a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence.” ... Under these circumstances, the trial court’s instruction provides no basis for reversal.

An aggravated assault instruction does not present an uncharged method of committing the offense merely because it defines both ways to commit simple assault.

Heard v. State · filed 2002-09-06(a)(2)

Contrary to Heard’s contention, the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense.

A jury may be instructed on aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) as the predicate for felony murder when the instruction creates no reasonable possibility of conviction on a theory outside the indictment.

Sedlak v. State · filed 2002-10-15(a)(2)

The indictment charged Sedlak with the offense of felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault in that she assaulted the victim and caused his death by stabbing him with a knife, a deadly weapon. After instructing the jury on the elements of felony murder, the court went on to define aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). Since there is no reasonable possibility Sedlak was convicted of a crime in a manner not charged in the indictment, the instruction was not defective.

When a burglary indictment does not specify the means of the intended aggravated assault, an instruction covering both methods in § 16-5-21(a) is generally not grounds for a new trial.

Richardson v. State · filed 2003-05-05(a)

In its jury instruction on burglary, the trial court’s definition of aggravated assault encompassed subsections (1) and (2) of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). ... The burglary count of the indictment did not set forth the means by which the underlying aggravated assault was alleged to have occurred. It is not usually cause for a new trial that the jury was instructed on an entire Code section when only part of it is applicable under the facts in evidence.

Section 16-5-21(a) permits aggravated assault by assault with a deadly weapon, and a charge on that method is consistent with an indictment alleging that the defendant shot toward the victims with a handgun.

Dukes v. State · filed 2003-12-17(a)

The indictment averred that Dukes committed aggravated assault on Roberson and Wesby, respectively, by assaulting them “with a certain handgun, a deadly weapon, by shooting towards” them. The jury charge was on aggravated assault by assault with a deadly weapon, which is one of the three ways in which aggravated assault may be committed under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). We conclude that the trial court did not impermissibly charge the jury on aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on an attempted injury requires an intent to commit a violent injury; a jury instruction omitting that element requires reversal.

Chase v. State · filed 2004-02-02(a)(2)

The failure to inform the jury that appellant had to have attempted to commit a violent injury on the victim requires reversal of appellant’s conviction.

For aggravated assault with intent to rob, a jury instruction may describe robbery by force, intimidation, threats, coercion, or fear of immediate serious bodily injury when those means fit the indictment.

Williams v. State · filed 2005-05-18(a)(1)

Because Williams was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and with intent to rob, and because the jury could have found that Williams intended to rob the victim “by use of force” ... or “by intimidation, by the use of threat or coercion, or by placing such person in fear of immediate serious bodily injury to himself or to another,” ... the trial court’s charge was sufficiently tailored to the indictment so that Williams could not have been convicted of committing a crime in a manner not charged in the indictment.

An aggravated assault jury instruction need not separately define simple assault to be complete.

Brown v. State · filed 2005-08-12(a)(2)

There is no merit to this contention. A charge on simple assault is not necessary to make a charge on aggravated assault complete.

A jury instruction reciting all the ways to commit aggravated assault under § 16-5-21 does not warrant reversal when the evidence shows only the way alleged in the indictment.

Morris v. State · filed 2006-01-30

The jury charge included an instruction which tracked the language of the aggravated assault statute in its entirety. Morris urges that giving this instruction was erroneous, because the indictment did not allege the commission of aggravated assault in all of the ways enumerated in OCGA § 16-5-21. ... This is true because, unlike Harwell v. State, 270 Ga. 765, 766 (1) (512 SE2d 892) (1999) and similar cases, the prosecution did not introduce evidence that Morris or the co-defendants committed the crime of aggravated assault in any manner other than as was alleged in the indictment. Thus, there is no possibility that their due process rights were violated by subj ecting them to the possibility of conviction for an unindicted crime.

When an indictment charges aggravated assault by one statutory method, a jury instruction limited to that method does not authorize conviction by an uncharged method.

Johnson v. State · filed 2006-06-08(a)(2)

Instead, the court charged and then recharged the jury on only that part of the statute relating to the allegations of the indictment. Because neither the charge nor recharge authorized a conviction in a manner other than that alleged in the indictment, neither was erroneous.

A jury charge on aggravated assault is complete without a charge defining simple assault.

Dasher v. State · filed 2006-11-06

3. Dasher claims that the trial court erred in failing to charge the definition of simple assault, as requested by defense counsel, in conjunction with the charge on aggravated assault. We disagree. “There is no merit in appellant’s contention that a charge on simple assault must be given in order to complete the definition of aggravated assault. The latter does not need the former to make it complete.”

A jury instruction may recite all of subsection (a)(2) when part of it applies and the remaining language does not mislead the jury.

Dudley v. State · filed 2006-12-18(a)(2)

Furthermore, the allegedly erroneous portion of the trial court’s charge is taken from OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). “The well-established rule is that a charge citing a code section in its entirety is not error where a portion of the section is applicable so long as it does not appear that the inapplicable part misled the jury.” Davis, 184 Ga. App. at 231 (2). We find no error.

For aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a jury charge may define both methods of simple assault when the indictment alleges the use of a handgun.

Opio v. State · filed 2007-03-07(a)(2)

Contrary to Opio’s argument on appeal, the court’s charge was not error.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits aggravated assault to be proved through use of an object likely to cause serious bodily injury; a deadly-weapon instruction is unnecessary when that theory was not charged or pursued.

Boyd v. State · filed 2008-01-16(a)(2)

OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides for two distinct methods of showing aggravated assault: a person assaults (i) with a deadly weapon or (ii) with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. ... There was no need to instruct the jury on hands as deadly weapons, as that method of aggravated assault was not alleged nor pursued by the State.

A jury instruction on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon must adequately explain the underlying assault element.

Coney v. State · filed 2008-03-19(a)(2)

In light of Chase, Smith, and Brinson, under the circumstances of this case, without the statutory definition of “assault,” the final charge was fatally insufficient because it did not instruct on substantive points or issues involved in the case.

A jury may be charged on the entire aggravated assault section when the instructions as a whole require conviction on the allegations in the indictment.

Turner v. State · filed 2008-09-17

Viewing the charge in its entirety, we conclude that the trial court did not mislead the jury by charging the complete Code section. The trial court began the charge by reading the indictment to the jury, charged the jury that the burden of proof rested on the State to prove every allegation in the indictment, instructed the jury that it could convict only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Turner committed the offense as alleged in the indictment, and sent the indictment out with the jury during its deliberations.

An aggravated assault instruction requiring jurors to consider whether an object, when used offensively, is likely to cause serious bodily injury adequately covers the manner in which the object was used.

Griggs v. State · filed 2010-04-06(a)(2)

We hold that the trial court’s instruction that the jury had to find “that the assault was made with an object [that] when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury” (emphasis supplied), substantially covered the principle that the jury should consider the manner and means of the object’s use.

A jury charge on aggravated assault need not include a separate charge on simple assault to be complete.

Cantera v. State · filed 2010-06-03

It is well settled that a charge on simple assault is not required to make a charge on aggravated assault complete.

An aggravated assault jury instruction must inform the jury that the defendant attempted to cause a violent injury to the victim.

Fullwood v. State · filed 2010-06-07

Since the aggravated assault instruction in the present case clearly informed the jury that Fullwood must have attempted to cause a violent injury to the victim, there was no error.

An aggravated assault jury charge need not include a simple assault instruction when the shooting was intentional, intent is not in question, and the jury was properly instructed on general intent.

Cantera v. State · filed 2011-06-27(a)(2)

Where, as here, however, the jury has already been properly instructed on general intent and there is no question regarding the perpetrator’s intent in shooting the victim (and then shooting him three more times after that), there is no need for the trial court to instruct the jury on simple assault in connection with its charge on aggravated assault.

A jury instruction on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is sufficient when it defines that offense and the applicable form of simple assault.

Scott v. State · filed 2012-04-24(a)(2)

As to Scott’s complaint that the trial court’s jury instruction on aggravated assault neglected to define the necessary element of simple assault, it too fails. The record reveals that the trial court’s instructions included the definition of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) and tracked the applicable definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (l).

An aggravated assault instruction may define both forms of simple assault without adding an uncharged method of committing aggravated assault.

Clayton v. State · filed 2013-02-07(a)(2)

Unlike in Talton, in the instant case, “the trial court did not charge a separate, unalleged method of committing aggravated assault, but simply defined both methods of committing simple assault, a lesser included offense.”

A jury instruction on aggravated assault need not include a simple assault instruction when the jury was properly instructed on general intent and the defendant’s intent in shooting the victim is not in question.

Taylor v. State · filed 2014-05-07

Where, as here, . . . the jury has already been properly instructed on general intent and there is no question regarding the perpetrator’s intent in shooting the victim ..., there is no need for the trial court to instruct the jury on simple assault in connection with its charge on aggravated assault.

Under former § 16-5-21(a)(2), an object likely to cause serious bodily injury is a mode of deadly weapon aggravated assault, so a jury instruction may refer to a deadly weapon when the indictment alleges such an object.

State v. Easter · filed 2015-06-01(a)(2)

As we found in Green, here the court’s use of the phrase “deadly weapon” in the jury instructions was a general reference to the aggravating circumstance in former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which also included “any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” 291 Ga. at 295.

A jury instruction on subsection (b)(2) need not define “likely” because it is a word of common understanding.

Allaben v. State · filed 2016-06-20(b)(2)

Appellant faults the trial court for failing to instruct the jury on a definition of the word “likely” as used in OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2). ... We agree with the trial court that “likely” is a word of common understanding, and, thus, the trial court was not required to define the word for the jury.

When an aggravated assault indictment alleges only the deadly weapon method, a jury instruction covering other statutory methods is overly broad; providing the indictment and instructing the jury on the State’s burden of proof cures the error.

Hall v. the State · filed 2016-03-11(b)(1), (2)

As conceded by the State, the trial court’s definition of aggravated assault was overly broad given the indictment in this case. ... This cured any error that the trial court committed in overcharging the jury.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging an assault by shooting permits an instruction on both forms of simple assault when the jury is instructed to convict only for the aggravated assault alleged.

Hollins v. the State · filed 2017-02-08(b)(2)

It follows that the trial court did not err in giving the complete definition of simple assault, and Hollins has failed to show he is entitled to a new trial on this basis.

When an indictment charges aggravated assault by shooting, the jury must be instructed to decide whether the State proved that charged manner of assault; a limiting instruction can cure a broader instruction.

State v. Thomas · filed 2019-06-24(a)(2)

Given the specific language in the indictment, and the trial court’s curative instruction, the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Thomas shot the victim with a handgun in order to find him guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. When viewed as a whole, we find the jury charge did not impermissibly broaden the manner in which the jury could convict Thomas of aggravated assault, nor did it relieve the State of its burden of proving that Thomas shot Gee in order for the jury to find Thomas guilty of that crime.

An aggravated assault jury charge does not improperly broaden an indictment alleging a shooting when the charge requires the jury to find that the defendant shot the victim.

NIXON v. the STATE. · filed 2019-03-08(a)(2)

However, we have already found that the evidence supported the allegation in the indictment that Nixon shot Davis, and we disagree that the trial court’s charge created the possibility that the jury could have found defendant guilty based on evidence that varied from such proof.

An aggravated assault verdict form may present alternative methods of committing the offense when it clearly directs the jury to choose only one.

HARRIS v. the STATE. · filed 2019-06-17

Additionally, inclusion of the capitalized, bolded “OR” between the two sections of the verdict form necessarily communicated to the jury that Harris could only be found guilty of one or the other type of aggravated assault, but not both.

When an aggravated assault indictment alleges stabbing with a knife, an instruction allowing conviction based on placing the victim in reasonable fear of violent injury is erroneous.

Turner Benton v. State · filed 2021-08-26(a)(2)

Applying Talton, the error in the trial court’s aggravated-assault instruction is clear and obvious because, while the indictment specifically alleged that Benton stabbed Ransom with a knife, the court instructed that the State was not required to show that any injury occurred, and instead, it only needed to prove Benton’s actions placed the victim “in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury.”

An aggravated assault instruction adequately conveys the deadly weapon element when the charge as a whole tells jurors that the defendant must assault another person with a deadly weapon.

Johnson v. State · filed 2021-09-21(a)(2)

Considering the instructions as a whole, the jury was adequately informed that a defendant commits aggravated assault when he assaults another person with a deadly weapon.

When an aggravated assault charge alleges strangulation under subsection (a)(3), the jury need not be instructed on whether the defendant’s hands were deadly weapons.

Turkia v. State · filed 2021-08-26(a)(3)

Thus, “[t]here was no need to instruct the jury on hands as deadly weapons, as that method of aggravated assault was [neither] alleged nor pursued by the State.” Boyd, 289 Ga. App. at 345 (3).

A separate simple-assault instruction is unnecessary when undisputed evidence of serious bodily injury caused with a weapon means the jury could not convict of aggravated assault without finding a simple assault.

Wood v. State · filed 2022-12-09(a)(2)

Because the undisputed evidence showed that Wood caused Ruiz serious bodily injury using a deadly weapon or an object which, when used offensively, is likely to or actually results in serious bodily injury, the trial court did not err, much less commit plain error, in failing to charge the jury on simple assault.

When aggravated assault counts allege both an attempted violent injury and an act causing reasonable apprehension of violent injury, the jury may be instructed on both forms of assault.

Huber v. State · filed 2024-04-30(a)(2)

However, Huber was charged with aggravated assault by attempting to commit a violent injury in Counts 3 and 4 and with aggravated assault by committing an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury in Count 5,3 so the trial court properly gave the suggested pattern jury instructions concerning assault based on the allegations and evidence presented in the case.

Section 16-5-21 provides alternative ways to prove aggravated assault. When the State charges assault with intent to rob, it is bound to that theory and cannot obtain a conviction based on an uncharged form of assault.

Griffin v. State · filed 1983-11-01

Griffin was charged under a statute authorizing conviction upon proof of one or more of several modes of assault, i.e., with a deadly weapon, or with intent to commit murder, rape, or robbery. OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302). The state elected to charge and prove an assault aggravated by the intent to rob. The state thus was bound by its election. To expose Griffin to conviction of another form of assault than that alleged would be to countenance a material variance between the allegata and the probata, a result that has been prohibited and condemned by this state.

When an aggravated-assault indictment charges use of a deadly weapon, instructing the jury on the statute’s intent-to-murder alternative is erroneous if the evidence could support that uncharged method and no limiting instruction is given.

Hunley v. State · filed 1997-07-10

The instruction as given suggested that the jury could convict Hunley if it found she assaulted the victim either with a deadly weapon or with the intent to murder her. This is problematic because in contrast to the indictment’s specific language, the record contains a modicum of evidence from which an intent to murder could be inferred — that after a struggle, Hunley cut the victim’s chin and throat. Given the indictment, the charge, the evidence, and the absence of limiting instructions, we find the charge was erroneous.

When an aggravated assault indictment alleges cutting with a box cutter, proof of a threat with the box cutter alone does not satisfy the charge.

Rowland v. State · filed 1997-08-08

A mere showing that Rowland threatened Lego with the box cutter would have fallen short of the indictment’s charge of cutting Lego with the box cutter.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape is not included in kidnapping as a matter of law, so the offenses may be punished separately.

Strozier v. State · filed 1984-06-18(a)(1)

In this case, the offenses charged were kidnapping and aggravated assault with intent to rape. One is not included in the other as a matter of law.

Under subsection (a)(2), evidence that a passenger held a knife to a taxi driver’s throat while forcing him to drive elsewhere is sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction.

Fair v. State · filed 1984-09-06(a)(2)

During the ride, appellant grabbed the shirt of the victim and reached from the back seat to place a knife to his throat, diverting the driver from appellant’s originally requested destination. ... Our review of the record reveals evidence sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Shooting people with a shotgun can support an aggravated assault conviction under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Howard v. State · filed 1985-02-27(a)(2)

Appellant pulled up behind Wilkerson’s car. Barnes was acquainted with appellant, but there was a history of hostility between them. Appellant came up to Wilkerson’s car, pointed a shotgun at the occupants and fired, breaking out the windshield and passenger window. Both Wilkerson and Barnes were hit. ... The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault in the shootings of Wilkerson and Cummings and aggravated battery in the wounding of Barnes’ leg resulting in its amputation.

Evidence that the accused started disrobing the victim and placed his finger in her genitalia despite her protests can support aggravated assault with intent to rape under § 16-5-21(a)(1).

McCrary v. State · filed 1985-11-01(a)(1)

The older victim testified that on two separate occasions appellant started disrobing her and placed his finger in her genitalia despite her tears and protests. ... The *684 evidence summarized above was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with intent to rape and simple battery.

Evidence that a defendant stabbed a victim in the back with a butcher knife can support an aggravated-assault conviction under subsection (a)(2) despite a claim of self-defense.

Roberts v. State · filed 1986-10-22(a)(2)

Although expressing concern for her safety, appellant admitted that she saw nothing but the victim’s closed fist and that she stabbed the victim with an 8" long butcher knife. The wound to the victim was in her back, between her shoulder blades and puncturing her lung, although appellant said she stabbed the victim in the shoulder. The sole defense was self-defense. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, there was sufficient evidence to authorize the trial judge, as trier of fact, to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence of intent can support a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rape when the evidence permits a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Williams v. State · filed 1988-01-26(a)(1)

There was evidence, although circumstantial insofar as intent is concerned, sufficient to establish that the defendant assaulted the victim with intent to commit rape; a rational trier of fact was authorized to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports an aggravated assault conviction when the evidence shows the defendant struck and continued to beat the victim with a wooden stick.

Young v. State · filed 1988-09-28(a)(2)

Suddenly, defendant hit the victim with a wooden stick and the victim fell to the ground. Defendant continued to beat the victim. ... The evidence was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. See Nelson v. State, 181 Ga. App. 455, 456 (1) (352 SE2d 636); OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Evidence that the accused stabbed a security guard in the chest and upper legs can support a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Davis v. State · filed 1989-06-21(a)(2)

The security guard scuffled with appellant and chased him into the parking lot, where appellant stabbed the security guard in the chest and upper legs. ... The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and shoplifting.

Evidence that a defendant shot and wounded a victim can support an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

Arnold v. State · filed 1989-10-16(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, the State’s evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding that defendant was guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard of proof required in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560). See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Aggravated assault may be proved by evidence that a defendant threatened to shoot a victim and then fired toward the victim, allowing a jury to find an intent to injure or reasonable apprehension of immediate injury.

Smiley v. State · filed 1994-01-10(a)

Aggravated assault is defined as an assault committed on the victim that is aggravated by an intention to murder, rape, or rob, or through the use of a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have determined that Smiley intended to commit a violent injury by shooting at the victim or that such act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate violent injury.

A charge of aggravated assault with fists as a deadly weapon may be supported by circumstances and injuries showing that the victim was struck, even if the victim did not see the assailant.

Hill v. State · filed 1994-02-28(a)(2)

With respect to the count charging both defendants jointly with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon consisting of fists, it may reasonably be inferred from the circumstances and injuries described that Mr. Harrell was struck in this manner even though he was not in a position to have seen his assailant.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports aggravated assault convictions when a defendant brandishes knives and terrifies four occupants.

Williams v. State · filed 1994-10-14(a)(2)

While he brandished the knives, Gaudy ant her daughters huddled in a closet and her son cowered on the othe side of the room. ... We have no hesitation i finding this evidence sufficient to authorize the jury to find Willian guilty of four counts of aggravated assault, ... under the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Holding a gun to a person’s head is sufficient evidence for a jury to find aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt under § 16-5-21.

Adside v. State · filed 1995-01-23

The State presented testimony from the victim, Pitts, that Ad-side held a gun to her head. This testimony was clearly sufficient to allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Adside was guilty of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 and was guilty of possessing a firearm during the commission of the felony offense of ... aggravated assault in violation of OCGA § 16-11-106.

A defendant’s threat to cut a police officer with a knife can support a conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer.

Elrod v. State · filed 1996-09-10(c)

The foregoing evidence, construed in a light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Elrod guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault on a peace officer and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer.

Chasing a victim with a knife and dropping it while stabbing at her can support a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Nash v. State · filed 1996-09-16(a)(2)

Evidence that Nash chased the victim with a knife and dropped it while stabbing at her was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Pointing a loaded shotgun at a victim, threatening to kill him, and firing at his car as he flees is sufficient evidence of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Cannon v. State · filed 1996-10-16(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, evidence was introduced that appellant threw an object at the victim’s car, pointed a loaded sawed-off shotgun at the victim’s head, threatened to kill him, and shot at and hit the car as the victim raced away. ... Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports an aggravated assault conviction when a defendant shoots at a police officer during a traffic stop.

Livingston v. State · filed 1997-03-17(a)(2)

In our view, the evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault on a police officer, as alleged in the indictment.

Intentionally swinging a knife at someone to place that person in reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury can support an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

McSears v. State · filed 1997-04-04(a)(2)

McSears acknowledged during cross-examination that he intentionally swung the knife at the victim so as to place her in reasonable apprehension of receiving a serious bodily injury. The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude that McSears was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon, and evidence of pointing a pistol at someone while threatening to kill her can support a conviction.

Taylor v. State · filed 1997-04-23(a)(2)

The evidence in the case sub judice was more than sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses of making terroristic threats, aggravated assault, and pointing a pistol at another.

Evidence that a defendant beat a victim and tried to remove her jeans to force her to submit to sexual advances can establish aggravated assault under subsection (a)(1).

Miller v. State · filed 1997-10-08(a)(1)

The victim’s testimony that Miller beat her and attempted to remove her jeans with the intent to force her to submit to his sexual advances establishes the elements of aggravated assault.

A witness’s identification of the defendant as the shooter can support a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Hawkins v. State · filed 1998-02-17(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, the testimony of Taylor identifying defendant as the shooter is sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdicts that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the offenses of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon as alleged in the indictment.

Evidence that a defendant shot at three people from a car and wounded one supports an aggravated assault finding under § 16-5-21.

In the Interest of J. J. K. · filed 1998-05-05

And, regardless of these conflicts, there was competent evidence elicited at trial to prove each element of the State’s case: that J. J. K. was an occupant of the car, that he shot at Lundy and his friends, and wounded Lundy. ... See OCGA § 16-5-21. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence from which any rational trier of fact could conclude that J. J. K. was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when evidence establishes an unprovoked assault with a deadly weapon.

Cheney v. State · filed 1998-06-23(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, both the victim and his friend Rusty Blaydes testified that defendant’s assault with a deadly weapon was unprovoked. This was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 1 of the indictment.

Repeatedly striking a victim with a two-by-four board provides sufficient evidence of aggravated assault.

Jones v. State · filed 1998-07-07

Tommy Jones appeals his conviction for aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21) arising out of his acts of repeatedly striking a victim with a two-by-four board. ... The evidence of aggravated assault is overwhelming.

Pointing a pistol at a security guard while demanding car keys can support an aggravated assault conviction when the evidence refutes self-defense.

Richardson v. State · filed 1998-07-29(a)(2)

Here, the security guards’ testimony refuted Richardson’s claim of self-defense and was clearly sufficient to establish each element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hightower v. State, 224 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 (2) (481 SE2d 867) (1997); OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2); 16-11-102; 16-11-127 (a).

Evidence that a juvenile stabbed another person several times with a knife can support an adjudication based on aggravated assault.

In Re TT · filed 1999-01-15

T.T. was adjudicated delinquent after the juvenile court found he committed an act which, had he been an adult, would have supported a conviction for aggravated assault, a designated felony. OCGA §§ 16-5-21; 15-11-37(a)(2)(B)(ii). ... According to Mann, T.T. then stabbed him with a knife several times before he knew what was happening. ... We find this evidence sufficient to authorize the juvenile court to adjudicate T.T. delinquent.

Pointing a handgun at a person can support an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon conviction.

Ringo v. State · filed 1999-01-15(a)(2)

She observed that defendant “jumped back and . . . pulled a gun out of his pants, and . . . pointed it at [Diane McElroy].” ... In the case sub judice, the evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, supra, to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2); Harper v. State, 127 Ga. App. 359, 360 (3) (193 SE2d 259).

Evidence that the accused stabbed the victim several times with a knife is sufficient to support an aggravated assault finding under § 16-5-21.

In the Interest of T. T. · filed 1999-01-15

T. T. was adjudicated delinquent after the juvenile court found he committed an act which, had he been an adult, would have supported a conviction for aggravated assault, a designated felony. OCGA §§ 16-5-21; 15-11-37 (a) (2) (B) (ii). ... According to Mann, T. T. then stabbed him with a knife several times before he knew what was happening. ... We find this evidence sufficient to authorize the juvenile court to adjudicate T. T. delinquent.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon that, when used offensively, is likely to or does cause serious bodily injury; evidence that the defendant shot the victim in the back was sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction.

Landers v. State · filed 1999-02-09(a)(2)

An aggravated assault is an assault which is committed with, inter alia, “a deadly weapon . . . which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... The State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Landers was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

A victim’s testimony identifying the defendant as the shooter can support an aggravated assault conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Butura v. State · filed 1999-06-01(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, the victim’s testimony identifying defendant as the shooter is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560), to authorize the jury’s verdict that defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the offense of aggravated assault as alleged in Count 2 of the indictment.

A victim’s prior statements, injuries, and medical testimony can support an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2) despite her trial recantation.

Grant v. State · filed 1999-08-13(a)(2)

This evidence was sufficient to establish an aggravated battery, OCGA § 16-5-24 (a), an aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), and possession of hashish, a controlled substance, OCGA § 16-13-30 (a). ... Story’s prior statements, along with the evidence of her disfiguring injuries and the doctor’s opinion testimony that those injuries were most likely the result of an assault, authorized a rational trier of fact to find Grant guilty of aggravated assault and aggravated battery.

Shooting a victim in the neck with a handgun supports a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Wright v. State · filed 1999-11-10(a)(2)

In this case, the question presented to the jury was clear — did Wright commit aggravated assault by shooting the victim in the neck with a deadly weapon, i.e., a handgun? The jury found that she did, and the overwhelming, uncontradicted evidence supported their verdict.

Subsection (a)(2) covers assault with a deadly weapon, and eyewitness testimony that the accused struck and shot the victim with a gun can support a conviction.

Lowery v. State · filed 2000-02-15(a)(2)

The offense of aggravated assault is committed by a person who assaults ... “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Based upon the eyewitness testimony, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Lowery guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Evidence that a defendant shot two people with a gun can support aggravated assault convictions under subsection (a).

Carr v. State · filed 2000-04-13(a)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) provides: “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” ... In the struggle, Calloway was shot in the arm. Sheffield joined the struggle and was shot by Carr. Sheffield, on the floor, begged Carr not to kill him, yet Carr fired a second shot which hit Sheffield. After the shooting, Carr told his grandmother that he had shot Calloway. This evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that Carr is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault upon Calloway and Sheffield.

Pointing a loaded rifle at a person’s head and chest in anger is sufficient evidence of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Bartlett v. State · filed 2000-05-17(a)(2)

Proof that Bartlett, in anger, pointed the loaded rifle at Len Land’s head and chest is sufficient ... to authorize the jury’s verdict that. Bartlett is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon as alleged in Count 1 of the indictment.

A victim’s identification of the defendant as a shooter, supported by a prompt identification and polygraph testimony, can provide sufficient evidence for an aggravated assault conviction.

Shepherd v. State · filed 2000-07-27

In the instant case, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of ... aggravated assault ... beyond a reasonable doubt based on Roseberry’s in-court identification of Shepherd as one of the men who shot him, the detective’s confirmation that shortly after the shootings Roseberry identified Shepherd as one of his assailants, and the polygraph examiner’s testimony that the polygraph results show that Shepherd was involved in the shooting of Roseberry.

Evidence that a robber held a gun close to victims’ faces and fled while brandishing it can sustain an aggravated-assault conviction under subsection (a).

Young v. State · filed 2000-08-28(a)

Clearly, a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of violating both OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) ... and 16-8-41 (a).

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports an aggravated assault conviction when evidence identifies a defendant as a shooter who fired into an occupied car.

White v. State · filed 2001-01-19(a)(2)

In the cases sub judice, the co-defendants were identified as the shooters in and out of court. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts and leaving evidentiary weight and witness credibility to the jury, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon; testimony that the defendant stabbed the victim with a large knife supported an aggravated assault conviction.

Silas v. State · filed 2001-02-02(a)(2)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), an aggravated assault is committed when a person assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” Bailey testified that Silas stabbed him in the arm, and that the knife he observed in Silas’ possession was “maybe six or eight inches long with a handle on it.” Jenkins and Davis testified that they saw Silas stab Bailey with a large knife. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence authorized the jury to reject the self-defense claim and to find Silas guilty of the crimes charged.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction based on testimony that the defendant stabbed the victim with a knife blade exceeding three inches.

Etheridge v. State · filed 2001-04-11(a)(2)

Notwithstanding any claim of self-defense, the testimony of Lowrance, corroborated by Brooks, that Etheridge stabbed Lowrance with a knife blade exceeding three inches is sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that Etheridge is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the aggravated assault alleged in Count 1 of the indictment.

A victim’s testimony that the defendant threatened her with a knife can support an aggravated assault conviction under § 16-5-21(a)(2); the jury resolves challenges to her credibility.

Banks v. State · filed 2001-07-25(a)(2)

In this case, Banks admitted engaging in intercourse and sodomy with the victim and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the elements that the sex acts were committed forcibly and against the victim’s will and that he threatened the victim with a knife, as alleged in the indictment. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2); 16-6-1; 16-6-2. The victim’s testimony, which Banks contends was compromised by contradictions and by gaps in her recollection, supplied the only evidence of her lack of consent to the sex acts and Banks’ use of the knife. ... After a careful review of the entire record, we find that the evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Banks guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses of rape, aggravated sodomy, and aggravated assault.

Repeatedly striking a victim with a belt on her legs and body can provide sufficient evidence of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Reyes v. State · filed 2001-07-26(a)(2)

Under the circumstances here, the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find Reyes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault by striking E. B. repeatedly with a belt on her legs and body, ... as alleged in the indictment.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits aggravated-assault convictions when a driver aims a car at police officers and accelerates toward them, forcing them to jump to safety.

Townsend v. State · filed 2001-08-06(a)(2)

The evidence was sufficient to authorize a jury to find Townsend guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of obstruction of an officer, reckless driving, two counts of aggravated assault (upon police officers), leaving the scene of an accident, and two counts of theft by receiving stolen property (car and tag).

Evidence that an assailant struck a victim while holding a handgun on her was sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction.

Hall v. State · filed 2001-10-29(a)(2)

1. In two enumerations of error the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that his motion for directed verdict as to Count 2 (aggravated assault upon Shanta Patel) should have been granted. We disagree. The evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find the defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

A witness’s testimony that the accused shot the victim can support an aggravated assault conviction even when the victim cannot identify the shooter.

Harrison v. State · filed 2002-01-09

Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the evidence, including Swindle’s testimony that Harrison shot the victim, was sufficient to authorize the jury’s finding of guilt of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

An assault with a knife that cuts the victim’s arm and neck can support a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Harrell v. State · filed 2002-02-13(a)(2)

As to the charge of aggravated assault, we also find that the evidence was sufficient to support Harrell’s conviction. A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. ... Long testified that Harrell assaulted him with a knife, cutting him on his arm and neck.

Evidence that a defendant struck a person in the head with a hammer is sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

Richards v. State · filed 2002-04-03(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” We find the evidence that Richards beat Deon Penn in the head with a hammer more than ample to support Richards’ conviction for aggravated assault.

Cutting a person with a knife can provide sufficient evidence of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Townsend v. State · filed 2002-07-30(a)(2)

“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... We find that the State properly charged Townsend with aggravated assault, and that the evidence was more than sufficient to authorize a jury to find Townsend guilty of that crime under the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person uses a gun to place another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Render v. State · filed 2002-09-19(a)(2)

Here, the evidence reveals that Render retrieved a gun from his house in order to persuade the victim to give him some money. The jury could infer that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, as even Render admitted that the victim expressed concern that Render was going to shoot him.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon; evidence that a defendant held a knife to a victim’s neck can support a conviction.

Alvarado v. State · filed 2002-09-24(a)(2)

Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from which a ... rational trier of fact could have found Alvarado guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault ... and two counts of family violence battery.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers assault with a deadly weapon or an object likely to cause or actually causing serious bodily injury; evidence that the defendant struck the victim with a handgun supports a conviction.

McLendon v. State · filed 2002-10-22(a)(2)

“A person commits the ofíense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). The evidence was sufficient under the standard announced in ... for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault charge based on striking someone with a handgun can be supported by the victim’s earlier statement, even if the victim later equivocates at trial.

Hurst v. State · filed 2002-12-03

Hurst contends the evidence was insufficient, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict, as to Count 8 of the indictment which charged him with aggravated assault upon Carr “with a handgun, a deadly weapon, by intentionally striking [Carr] with said handgun.” ... Thus, the investigative statements Carr gave at the scene of the accident constituted substantive evidence of Hurst’s guilt as to Count 8, despite Carr’s subsequent recantation or equivocation. Id. ... The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Hurst guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a) supports an aggravated assault conviction when the evidence shows the defendant held a gun to one victim’s head and pointed it at another.

Duckett v. State · filed 2003-02-24(a)

The evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Duckett guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of armed robbery and aggravated assault.

Evidence that a defendant pointed a shotgun at a victim and shot him, causing serious injury, supports an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

Wilson v. State · filed 2003-04-03(a)(2)

A person is guilty of aggravated ássault “when he or she assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. . . .” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... Here the victim testified that Wilson pointed a shotgun at him and shot him while the victim was standing at least six feet away from Wilson. The gunshot caused serious injury to the victim’s thigh and groin. ... Ample evidence sustained the conviction for aggravated assault.

Evidence that a defendant pulled out a gun and threatened others can support an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

Pennymon v. State · filed 2003-06-03(a)(2)

Moreover, Green had already testified that after words were exchanged at the party, Pennymon pulled a gun out of his shirt and said, “well, I got 17 for all y’all.” Green’s testimony was sufficient for the jury to find Pennymon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Evidence that a defendant joined in beating a victim and pulled at her purse can support a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob.

Trumpler v. State · filed 2003-06-05

He began beating her head with the telephone receiver, and Trumpler started punching her in the face. Veraldi fell to the ground, and Jones and Trum-pler continued to beat and kick her. Trumpler pulled at Veraldi’s purse. ... Considered in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that Trumpler was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault with the intent to rob and robbery by force.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause, or that actually causes, serious bodily injury; evidence of cuts inflicted with a box cutter can support a conviction despite a conflicting claim of self-defense.

Benham v. State · filed 2003-07-14(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. ... The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Benham guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.

Evidence that a defendant struck the victim with a baseball bat during an attack can support an aggravated-assault conviction under § 16-5-21.

Cummings v. State · filed 2004-04-07

Cummings ducked the swing and hit Burris in the head with the bat. ... Cummings again hit Burris with the bat. ... This evidence was sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia to convict Cummings of the crime of aggravated assault.

Evidence identifying a defendant as the gunman who ordered a victim to surrender his car keys and drove away in the car suffices to sustain an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a).

Baskin v. State · filed 2004-05-05(a)

The record shows that the victim unequivocally identified Baskin as the gunman who ordered him to give up his car keys and who drove the victim’s vehicle away, and that shortly after the robbery, police found Baskin in possession of $80 and the gold chain stolen from the victim and witnessed him stripping the victim’s stolen vehicle, with the ski masks and a 9 millimeter gun lying nearby. The evidence sufficed to sustain the convictions for armed robbery (OCGA § 16-8-41 (a)), hijacking a motor vehicle (OCGA § 16-5-44.1 (b)), and aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a)).

Stabbing a person with a knife can support an aggravated assault conviction when the jury is authorized to reject a claim of self-defense.

Williams v. State · filed 2004-07-07(a)(2)

The State presented evidence that Williams stabbed Markell several times with a butcher knife. Williams argues on appeal that he was merely defending himself against Markell’s attack with a bat. But given the evidence presented, including that Markell hit Williams with a bat to protect his mother from Williams, who forced his way into their house, that Williams then charged Markell, pushed him down, and stabbed him, and that Markell suffered several stab wounds, including a defensive wound, the jury was authorized to reject Williams’ justification claim and find him guilty of aggravated assault.

Evidence that an armed robber fired a shot into the ceiling and pointed a gun at a manager was sufficient to sustain an aggravated assault conviction under § 16-5-21(a)(1).

Blake v. State · filed 2005-03-14(a)(1)

Here, eyewitnesses whom Blake forced into the walk-in cooler positively identified him as the robber who fired a shot into the ceiling and stole $1,800 from the safe. Ample evidence supported the convictions. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (1); 16-5-40 (a); 16-8-41 (a); 16-11-106 (b).

Shooting one person and firing in the direction of others can support aggravated assault convictions under subsection (a)(2).

Baker v. State · filed 2005-05-16(a)(2)

Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Baker was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault because he shot Shepherd and shot in the direction of Trahan and Newman.