Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30

A drug sale under subsection (b) is complete upon delivery to the buyer for a price, even if payment has not yet been made.

Robinson v. State · filed 1982-11-18(b)

Robinson argues further that because the General Assembly listed both “sell” and “deliver” among the unlawful acts in Code Ann. § 79A-811 (b) (now OCGA § 16-13-30 (b)), it intended them to be separate and distinct crimes. He then argues that because the state alleged a sale of phencyclidine and only proved a delivery of phencyclidine, there is a fatal variance between the allegata and the probata. We disagree. As we explained supra, a sale necessarily includes a delivery of goods for a price and the sale is complete upon delivery.

Subsection (b) does not require the State to prove that a person charged with selling marijuana lacked pharmacist authorization.

May v. State · filed 1986-06-23(b)

We do note, however, that the legal capability of certain pharmacists to sell marijuana to certain customers is not an element of the offense of selling marijuana. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30(b) covers the sale of cocaine and remained in force after the trafficking provision was repealed.

Sablon v. State · filed 1987-03-12(b)

Since the sale statute, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), was in no way affected by the repeal of OCGA § 16-13-31 (a), and sale was and is a lesser included offense of both the repealed and new statutes, the conviction on Count 1 is affirmed.

Section 16-13-30 permits an inference of intent to distribute cocaine from its quantity together with drug paraphernalia, marked envelopes, and a large sum of cash.

Doe v. State · filed 1989-01-05

Similarly, although “mere possession of contraband without more will not serve as the basis for a conviction for possessing contraband for purposes of sale, [cit.],” Wright v. State, 154 Ga. App. 400, 401-402 (1) (268 SE2d 378) (1980), the quantity of cocaine found, as well as the presence of other drug paraphernalia, marked envelopes, and a large sum of cash, give rise to a reasonable inference that appellant possessed the cocaine with the intention of distributing it.

Section 16-13-30 permits an inference of intent to distribute marijuana from evidence such as individual packaging, drug paraphernalia, guns, and cash.

Ward v. State · filed 1990-03-13

Not only did the officers find a large amount of drug paraphernalia, including scale, s they also found some 50 grams of marijuana, which was individually packaged, several guns and $1,724 in cash. "[A]lthough `mere possession of contraband without more will not serve as the basis for a conviction for possessing contraband for purposes of sale, (cit.),' [cit.], [the evidence in this case does] give rise to a reasonable inference that appellant possessed the [marijuana] with the intention of distributing it. [Cit.].... We find the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged violations of OCGA § 16-13-30. [Cits.]"

Section 16-13-30(b) allows a conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute even when the defendant is acquitted of selling it.

McCarthy v. State · filed 1990-09-11(b)

The verdict of not guilty of the sale is not inconsistent with the finding of guilt as to possession with intent to distribute.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) prohibits manufacturing marijuana, including by planting or cultivating it.

State v. Hunt · filed 1991-09-03(j)(1)

Thus, the Code section applies by its express terms to the cultivation or planting of marijuana.

The division and quantity of cocaine can support an inference of intent to distribute under subsection (b).

Shropshire v. State · filed 1991-10-07(b)

Furthermore, evidence regarding both the division and the quantity of the crack cocaine gave rise to an inference that Shropshire had the intent to distribute it.

Section 16-13-30(b) does not prohibit a pregnant woman’s transmission of cocaine metabolites to her fetus when she ingests cocaine.

State v. Luster · filed 1992-04-23(b)

By attempting initially to pass legislation creating the new crime of distributing controlled substances to unborn children, the legislature signaled unequivocally that it had not intended to include such activity in the “delivery” and “distribution” already prohibited under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30 includes an attempted transfer of a controlled substance within distribution.

Bowens v. State · filed 1993-06-23

Although Bowens correctly notes that an attempt to commit a violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act is prohibited under OCGA § 16-13-33, the statutory definition of distribution under OCGA § 16-13-30 also includes the “attempt to transfer.”

A person may be guilty of selling cocaine under subsection (b) even when the sale is carried out through a conduit or agent.

Farley v. State · filed 1993-10-19(b)

Dwayne Farley was tried before a jury and found guilty of selling cocaine, in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). ... “[T]he theory that one may [use].a conduit or . . .. agent . . . and thereby escape culpability as a seller has been considered and rejected by this court. [Cit.]” ... A rational trier of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced below proof of appellant’s guilt of selling cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 16-13-30 sets no quantity or purity threshold for distinguishing cocaine possession from possession with intent to distribute; intent to distribute requires evidence linking possession to sale.

James v. State · filed 1994-10-05

OCGA § 16-13-30, however, has no such quantitative or qualitative guidelines for differentiating between mere possession and possession with intent to distribute cocaine. ... While the evidence would clearly support a conviction on a charge of possession of cocaine, it is not sufficient to support the conviction of possession with intent to distribute.

A conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute requires evidence of intent to distribute beyond possession alone.

Bethea v. State · filed 1996-03-20(b)

While the evidence in this case would clearly support a conviction on a charge of cocaine possession, it is not sufficient to support Bethea’s conviction of intent to distribute and thus, the conviction must be reversed.

Section 16-13-30(b) does not require the State to prove a separate specific intent to commit possession with intent to distribute.

Price v. State · filed 1996-12-04(b)

The trial court also correctly rejected a requested charge necessitating that the State prove a “specific intent” to commit the crime of possession with intent to distribute. OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) contains no such requirement.

Subsection (b) prohibits both selling cocaine and giving it away.

Key v. State · filed 1997-04-23(b)

Selling cocaine and giving it away are both offenses under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), which makes it unlawful for any person to “deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any controlled substance.”

Section 16-13-30 requires proof of intent to distribute beyond mere possession; a prior similar offense alone does not establish that intent.

Parris v. State · filed 1997-06-17

To support a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the State must prove more than mere possession. ... Clearly, the jury was not authorized to infer an intent to distribute marijuana in this case from the similar transaction evidence alone. ... In the absence of any direct evidence of Parris’ intent to distribute, we are constrained to reverse. OCGA § 16-13-30.

Mere possession of cocaine does not establish intent to distribute, but evidence about a cutting tool and a quantity greater than that generally possessed for personal use can support that finding.

Morgan v. State · filed 1998-02-16(b)

While it is correct that mere possession will not support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, the evidence in this case supports the conviction. First, the arresting officer testified that he found a “straight type razor blade” in Morgan’s shirt pocket, and without objection, he further testified that based on his years of experience, training in drug interdiction, and schools he had attended, such razor blades are “used to cut crack cocaine up into pieces to be sold.” Second, the officer also testified without objection that the circumstances of Morgan’s possession showed an intent to distribute, because the number of “rocks” in the vial was greater than that generally possessed for personal use.

Mere possession of cocaine, without more, does not establish intent to distribute.

Burse v. State · filed 1998-06-03(b)

It is true that mere possession of cocaine, without more, will not support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Possession of cocaine alone does not support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute; additional evidence of intent is required.

Tate v. State · filed 1998-01-15(b)

But mere possession of cocaine, without more, will not support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Section 16-13-30(b) does not require the State to prove that crack cocaine is a Schedule II substance to convict someone of selling it.

Wright v. State · filed 1998-04-07(b)

The state was not required to prove that crack cocaine was a Schedule II substance in order to convict Wright of violating OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

A sale of cocaine under § 16-13-30(b) does not require actual or constructive possession of the cocaine.

Evans v. State · filed 1998-12-03(b)

Moreover, neither actual nor constructive possession of cocaine is an element of the offense of sale of cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) makes purchasing marijuana a separate offense from possessing it.

State v. Jackson · filed 1999-04-12(j)(1)

Under OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1), the purchase of marijuana is set forth as a separate unlawful act from the possession of that controlled substance.

Section 16-13-30 requires proof of possession and a link between that possession and the sale of the substance to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

King v. State · filed 1999-06-16

To support a conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove possession and link that possession to the enterprise of the sale. ... This evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier to find King guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of possession with intent to distribute.

Subsection (j) requires proof of intent to distribute for a possession-with-intent conviction; possession alone is insufficient.

Clark v. State · filed 2000-07-21(j)

Because the state failed to prove Clark intended to distribute the marijuana, we reverse the conviction entered on the possession with intent to distribute charge brought under OCGA § 16-13-30 (j).

Possession with intent to distribute requires proof of possession linked to sales, which may be established through circumstantial evidence.

Buckholts v. State · filed 2001-01-25(b)

To support a conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the State must prove possession and link that possession to the enterprise of the sale.

A charge of possession and sale of cocaine requires proof that the defendant both possessed and sold cocaine.

St. Romaine v. State · filed 2001-08-15(a), (b)

The necessary elements of the offense of possession and sale of cocaine are simply that a person possess and sell cocaine.

A sale-of-cocaine offense requires a sale of a controlled substance.

Anderson v. State · filed 2001-12-20(b)

The elements of the offense of “sale of cocaine” (as it was stated in the indictment herein) are simply (1) sale of (2) a controlled substance.

Possession of cocaine with intent to distribute can be established through joint constructive possession and circumstantial evidence of intent.

Baker v. State · filed 2001-08-24(b)

The conviction challenged here is the drug conviction, the essential elements of which are the possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. ... The material facts here tying Baker to the cocaine and to an intent to distribute are indistinguishable; indeed, we have the additional evidence that Baker purposely slowed down the vehicle so the passenger could escape into the cornfield. The evidence sufficed to sustain Baker’s drug conviction.

Subsection (b) supports separate convictions for selling cocaine and possessing additional cocaine with intent to distribute when the evidence establishes both offenses.

Harris v. State · filed 2002-03-06(b)

The state introduced the three rocks of cocaine to prove the sale and the additional twenty-three grams to prove the possession with intent to distribute charge. Thus, we find the evidence sufficient to support Harris’s conviction of both crimes.

Section 16-13-30(e) makes purchasing cocaine a felony.

Glaze v. State · filed 2002-01-17(e)

Purchasing a controlled substance such as cocaine is a felony.

Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute requires findings of both possession and intent to distribute.

Ellison v. State · filed 2004-02-05(j)(1)

Thus, the jury simply broke down the verdict into the two primary findings necessary to find Ellison guilty of the offense of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute.

Cultivating or planting marijuana violates the prohibition on manufacturing a controlled substance in § 16-13-30(b).

Maness v. State · filed 2004-01-20(b)

Under OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), it is unlawful for any person to manufacture any controlled substance. Cultivation or planting of marijuana is a violation. ... A rational juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Maness was growing the marijuana that her son found growing in the ground near the back porch.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof of intent to distribute beyond mere possession; drug quantity, packaging, and cash may show that intent.

Helton v. State · filed 2005-01-12(b)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), the state is required to prove more than mere possession. The state may show intent to distribute in many ways, including expert testimony that the amount of contraband possessed was inconsistent with personal use, evidence showing the manner of packaging, and the possession of certain amounts or denominations of currency.

Section 16-13-30 covers a person who accepts a buyer’s money and delivers cocaine, regardless of whether that person acts as a dealer or an intermediary.

Enoch v. State · filed 2006-01-09

Regardless of whether Enoch’s role in the transaction can best be characterized as that of a drug dealer, a middle man, a conduit or procuring agent, or a mule, he was a party to the sale of cocaine, as charged in the indictment.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof of intent to sell; paraphernalia, pay sheets, and prior convictions alone were insufficient without evidence that the drugs possessed were in quantities suggestive of sales or could be sold.

Ryan v. State · filed 2006-02-06(b)

Although this evidence certainly may be relevant to the issue, it is insufficient to support Ryan’s convictions for possession with intent to distribute without evidence that he actually possessed marijuana or methamphetamine in quantities typical or suggestive of drug sales or evidence that the amounts in his possession could be sold.

A positive field test alone can establish that the substance sold was cocaine; a crime lab test is not required.

Collins v. State · filed 2006-03-07(b)

Positive field test results are alone sufficient to sustain a conviction for selling or possessing cocaine.

Section 16-13-30(b) does not impose the cocaine trafficking statute’s 10 percent purity requirement on possession with intent to distribute.

Tate v. State · filed 2006-03-21(b)

We note that the trafficking statute, OCGA§ 16-13-31 (a) (1), requires “28 grams or more of cocaine or of any mixture with a purity of 10 percent or more of cocaine.” The jury, however, found Tate not guilty of trafficking in cocaine. And the statute under which Tate was convicted of possession with intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), contains no such limitation.

A prescription may authorize possession of a controlled substance, but it does not authorize its distribution.

Atkinson v. State · filed 2006-07-25(b)

Though Atkinson may have been authorized to possess Lorcet, he was not authorized to distribute the drug.

Subsection (b) prohibits manufacturing methamphetamine because methamphetamine is a controlled substance.

Gentry v. State · filed 2006-07-27(b)

At the time of the offense, the “manufacture” of methamphetamine was forbidden by subsection (b) of OCGA § 16-13-30, which provided that “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture . . . any controlled substance,” and methamphetamine is a “controlled substance” within the meaning of this Code section.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof of intent to distribute cocaine beyond proof of possession.

Hicks v. State · filed 2008-10-06(b)

While the evidence presented by the state was sufficient to convict Hicks of possession of cocaine, it was insufficient to prove that he intended to distribute it.

Subsection (b) requires proof of intent to distribute beyond mere possession.

Beck v. State · filed 2007-07-12(b)

“To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), the state is required to prove more than mere possession.” ... The evidence, though not overwhelming, was sufficient to support the charge of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof of intent to sell or distribute the controlled substance, which may be shown by its quantity and packaging and other evidence of drug sales.

Driscoll v. State · filed 2008-11-26(b)

The State must demonstrate that the defendant intended to sell or distribute the contraband in his or her possession. ... This evidence was sufficient to prove Driscoll’s intent to distribute the methamphetamine she possessed beyond a reasonable doubt.

Subsection (b) prohibits possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute without setting a minimum quantity.

Celestin v. State · filed 2009-02-18(b)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) makes it “unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any controlled substance.” The essential difference between the two crimes is the amount of the substance involved, as no amount is specified in OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana in addition to proof of possession.

Vines v. State · filed 2009-03-10(j)(1)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1) makes unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In addition to possession, the state must prove the specific criminal intent to distribute.

Intent to distribute marijuana or cocaine may be proved without expert testimony.

Haywood v. State · filed 2009-12-16(b), (j)(1)

But contrary to Haywood’s contention, the state is not required to present expert testimony on the issue of intent to distribute.

A person who acts as a purchaser’s conduit or procuring agent can be convicted as a party to the sale of cocaine.

Ware v. State · filed 2011-01-26(b)

It is easy to conclude that Ware aided and abetted the sale of cocaine to the undercover officer. “The theory that one may act as a conduit or procuring agent of the purchaser and thereby escape culpability as a seller has been considered and rejected by this Court.”

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana; possession or intent for personal use is insufficient.

Jackson v. State · filed 2012-02-22(j)(1)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1) proscribes that “[i]t is unlawful for any person to . . . possess with intent to distribute marijuana.” To support a conviction for this offense, the State must prove more than mere possession or intent for personal use.

Section 16-13-30 requires more than mere possession to prove cocaine possession with intent to distribute, but it requires no particular quantity of cocaine.

Bailey v. State · filed 2012-05-30

Unlike a conviction for cocaine trafficking, the State need not prove that a defendant possessed any particular quantity of the drug, although it must prove more than mere possession to support a conviction for cocaine possession with intent to distribute.

Subsection (j) requires evidence of intent to distribute marijuana beyond possession; five one-ounce bags did not establish that intent without evidence linking their amount or packaging to drug dealing.

Kelvin Beard v. State · filed 2012-10-19(j)

Beard asserts that this evidence was insufficient to establish the “intent to distribute” required for a conviction under OCGA § 16-13-30 (j). He asserts that the State merely proved that he possessed the marijuana. We agree. ... And although the five ounces of marijuana Beard possessed were separated into five separate bags containing one ounce each, the State presented no testimony indicating that the amount of the drugs or their packaging was indicative of drug dealing as opposed to personal use. ... We must therefore vacate Beard’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 16-13-30(b) sets no minimum drug weight for possession with intent to distribute; packaging and quantity evidence may show intent.

Horne v. State · filed 2012-10-25(b)

As reflected in the trial court’s response to the jury’s questions, OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) does not specify a legal weight limit for the offense of drug possession with the intent to distribute. Rather, various kinds of additional evidence may be considered as proof of intent to distribute, including circumstances regarding the packaging of the contraband and expert testimony that the amount of contraband possessed was consistent with larger amounts usually held for sale rather than personal use.

Intent to distribute marijuana may be inferred from its quantity and packaging in multiple small baggies.

Evans v. State · filed 2012-11-20(j)(1)

Under these ... circumstances, “the jury was authorized to reject a hypothesis that the marijuana was for personal use, as opposed to distribution.”

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) covers possession of marijuana with intent to distribute even when the amount is small and no remuneration is involved.

Moncrieffe v. Holder · filed 2013-04-23(j)(1)

In contrast, the fact of a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, standing alone, does not reveal whether either remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was involved. It is possible neither was; we know that Georgia prosecutes this offense when a defendant possesses only a small amount of marijuana, see, e.g., Taylor v. State, 260 Ga.App. 890, 581 S.E.2d 386, 388 (2003) (6.6 grams), and that "distribution" does not require remuneration, see, e.g., Hadden v. State, 181 Ga.App. 628, 628-629, 353 S.E.2d 532, 533-534 (1987).

Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a felony and does not require proof of the marijuana’s quantity.

Wiggins v. State · filed 2013-08-26(j)(1)

Although OCGA § 16-13-2 (b) provides that possession of one ounce or less of marijuana is a misdemeanor, the separate offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute (as set forth in OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1)) is a felony which does not require proof of the quantity of marijuana.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof that the defendant possessed cocaine with intent to distribute it to others.

King v. State · filed 2014-02-21(b)

To convict King of possession with intent to distribute, the State was required to prove that he possessed the cocaine at issue with the intent to distribute it to other people. See OCGA § 16-13-30. ... Here, after hearing the evidence and having the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, the jury concluded that the only reasonable hypothesis was that King possessed the drugs found hidden in his kitchen. Because the evidence supports this conclusion, we will not disturb the jury’s judgment.

Subsection (j)(1) covers possession with intent to distribute marijuana even when distribution involves no remuneration.

United States v. Martinez-Lugo · filed 2014-12-11(j)(1)

As illustrated by Moncriejfe, possession with intent to distribute under the Georgia statute may also include distribution for no remuneration.

Section 16-13-30(j) makes possession of marijuana with intent to distribute a felony regardless of the amount possessed.

United States v. Dixon · filed 2015-02-04(j)(1)–(2)

The statute under which Dixon was convicted makes it a felony for any person to “possess with intent to distribute marijuana.” Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1)–(2) (1998). Thus, the quantity of marijuana that Dixon possessed with intent to distribute is irrelevant.

Possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute requires proof of possession and intent to distribute.

Crankshaw v. the State · filed 2016-03-11(b)

The possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute offense required the state to prove that Crankshaw possessed the drug with the intent to distribute it.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled substance and intended to distribute it.

Calloway v. State · filed 2018-02-05(b)

The proof necessary to establish possession with intent to distribute is (1) possession of a controlled substance and (2) the intent to distribute it.

Section 16-13-30(b) requires the State to prove intent to sell when prosecuting a sale of methamphetamine.

David Moton, Jr. v. State · filed 2019-09-23(b)

The State had the burden to prove that Moton had the requisite intent to sell the methamphetamine.

Possession with intent to distribute under § 16-13-30(b) is a completed crime that qualifies as a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines.

United States v. Goins · filed 2020-11-04(b)

But he is wrong that possession with intent to distribute or deliver a controlled substance under either Georgia or Tennessee law encompasses attempt crimes and cannot qualify as a controlled substance offense under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Section 16-13-30(b) covers an intentional transfer of methamphetamine to another person even when no sale occurs.

Monroe v. State · filed 2026-04-21(b)

Thus, the definition of “distribute” covers more than just selling a controlled substance because it encompasses “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance.” OCGA § 16-13-21(11).

Possession of cocaine with intent to distribute requires proof of actual or constructive possession and intent to distribute.

Hargrove v. State · filed 2021-09-15(b)

To prove that Hargrove committed the charged crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, the State had to prove both that Hargrove had actual or constructive possession of the drugs and that he had the requisite intent to distribute them.

Possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute violates § 16-13-30(b) without an actual distribution.

Eubanks v. State · filed 2023-10-24(b)

A person commits the offense of possession with intent to distribute by possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it; no actual distribution is necessary.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana; possession or intent for personal use alone is insufficient.

Davis v. State · filed 2024-12-23(j)(1)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to possess . . . with intent to distribute marijuana.” As a result, to support a conviction ... for this offense, the State “must prove more than mere possession or intent for personal use.”

Section 16-13-30(b) requires proof that the defendant possessed the methamphetamine to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Drevoisier Brown v. State · filed 2025-05-16(b)

Just as with the trafficking conviction, the State failed to establish that Brown possessed the methamphetamine found hidden in the bedroom so as to support his conviction on possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (b).

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) prohibited possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in 2005, including marijuana defined at the time to include hemp.

United States v. Reid · filed 2025-06-11(j)(1)

As Dubois makes clear, Georgia law criminalized the possession with intent to distribute marijuana, including hemp, at the time of his conviction.

Section 16-13-30(j) requires proof that the defendant actually or constructively possessed marijuana and intended to distribute it.

Wade v. State · filed 2025-06-25(j)

“To prove that [Wade] committed the charged crime of possession of [marijuana] with intent to distribute, the State had to prove both that [Wade] had actual or constructive possession of the drugs and that he had the requisite intent to distribute them.”

Section 16-13-30(b) requires intent to possess, sell, or distribute a drug with knowledge of its chemical identity, so its mens rea matches the federal drug offense.

Goulbourne v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2022-10-18(b)

The mens rea element therefore matches between the two statutes.

Subsection (j) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana beyond mere possession or personal use; quantity, packaging supplies, scales, cash, and evidence of sales can establish that intent.

Kennedy v. State · filed 2024-03-15(j)

We first turn to Kennedy’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under OCGA § 16-13-30 (j). “[T]o support a conviction for this offense, the State must prove more than mere possession or intent for personal use. Instead, the evidence must show an intent to distribute.” ... The evidence was plainly sufficient in this case, and this argument is without merit.

A misdemeanor marijuana possession charge is unwarranted when the evidence could not support a finding that the defendant possessed less than one ounce.

Davis v. State · filed 1982-12-03

On the basis of the evidence, even as disputed by defendant, the jury would not have been authorized to find that defendant possessed marijuana, but less than one ounce. Therefore, the requested charge on misdemeanor possession did not comport to the evidence and the trial court properly refused it.

Section 16-13-30(a)’s prohibition on possessing or having a controlled substance under one’s control adequately defines actual and constructive possession for a jury absent a more specific request.

Black v. State · filed 1983-06-16(a)

The trial court instructed the jury generally .that, in order to convict appellant, it would have to find that he violated the provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) (Code Ann. § 79A-811), making it “unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control any controlled substance.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the absence of a more specific request on the issue, the instruction given by the trial court was an appropriate and adequate definition of both actual and constructive possession.

Section 16-13-30 makes unlawful possession of a controlled substance an offense regardless of the amount possessed.

Scott v. State · filed 1984-03-08

This was not a correct statement of the law, for the unlawful possession of any controlled substance, regardless of amount, constitutes an offense. OCGA § 16-13-30.

Section 16-13-30(a) prohibits possession of controlled substances unless authorized; a physician’s authorization covers possession connected with medical practice.

Felker v. State · filed 1984-09-10(a)

It is unlawful, under the Controlled Substances Act, for “any person” to possess or have under his control any controlled substance, “[e]xcept as authorized by this article.” OCGA § 16-13-30 (a). ... Rather, we read the two subsections as authorizing physicians to possess controlled substances to the extent they do so as physicians, i.e., to the extent such possession is for some use connected with their medical practice.

Section 16-13-30 prohibits possession of a controlled substance, including cocaine, regardless of amount.

Dixon v. State · filed 1986-09-04(a), (b)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) and (b) makes it “unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control any controlled substance” or to “manufacture, deliver, distribute, dispense, administer, sell, or possess with intent to distribute any controlled substance.” Under OCGA § 16-13-30, “the unlawful possession of any controlled substance, regardless of amount, constitutes an offense. [Cit.] Thus, this enumeration of error is without merit.”

Section 16-13-30’s cocaine possession offense may be based on actual or constructive knowledge.

Ramsay v. State · filed 1985-06-11

The court charged the jury in the actual words of the statute and of the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine. OCGA § 16-13-30. The major offense required actual knowledge, but the lesser offense may be based on either actual or constructive knowledge.

Section 16-13-30(a) prohibits possessing or controlling cocaine, and an indictment using the statute’s words sufficiently charges that offense despite surplus language.

Garvey v. State · filed 1985-09-10(a)

Secondly, OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) provides that "it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control any controlled substance." Cocaine is a controlled substance. ... The indictment is couched in the words of the statute and correctly informs the defendant of the offense sought to be charged.

Section 16-13-30(a) covers possession of a mixture containing less than 28 grams of cocaine.

Robinson v. State · filed 1986-07-16(a)

Reading the statute as changed by the legislature, in the context of the other related provisions of the chapter on controlled substances, we conclude that the omission of the "mixture" language signalled the abandonment of a phrase which permitted conviction under the higher-penalty provision for a small quantity of cocaine which was part of a larger quantity of an uncontrolled substance. It reassigned the act of possessing this to the coverage of OCGA § 16-13-30, for its lower penalties.

For a marijuana-manufacturing conviction under § 16-13-30, the equal access rule does not apply to plants growing in the ground because they are not portable.

Ward v. State · filed 1986-03-06

The plants in the case before us were not portable, thus negating application of the equal access rule.

Possession under § 16-13-30 requires a connection between the accused and the controlled substance beyond mere proximity.

Lewis v. State · filed 1988-03-14

To warrant a finding of possession there must be “some connection between the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity. . . . [M]erely having been in the vicinity of contraband does not, without more, establish possession.”

The equal access rule does not apply to marijuana plants growing outdoors that require months to mature.

Blitch v. State · filed 1988-09-06(j)(1)

Appellant argues that the equal access rule applies. It does not apply to “ ‘marijuana plants growing outside, which require a period of months to grow, mature, and be harvested.’ [Cits.]”

Possession of cocaine can be joint, and another person’s access to the cocaine does not by itself require acquittal.

Wright v. State · filed 1988-12-02(a)

Even if this had been accepted by the factfinder, that alone would not demand a finding that defendant was not guilty. The totality of the circumstances supports the factfinder’s conclusion that defendant had at least joint possession of the cocaine found in his safe in his bedroom.

Section 16-13-30(b) permits a conviction for possession with intent to distribute based on either actual or constructive possession.

Christopher v. State · filed 1989-02-21(b)

This error does not require the reversal of the conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute since possession sufficient to sustain a conviction pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) may be either actual or constructive.

A § 16-13-30 possession charge may rest on actual or constructive possession, either of which may be proved by circumstantial evidence.

Singleton v. State · filed 1989-11-29

The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual or constructive. ... Either type may be established by circumstantial evidence.

Subsection (a) prohibits possession or control of a controlled substance unless the Controlled Substances Act specifically authorizes it.

Medley v. State · filed 1990-01-02(a)

Even assuming that the diazepam and pentazocine pills found in Shirley Ann Medley’s possession were among those which had been dispensed to Steve Medley by the pharmacist, it would not follow that her possession of them was lawful. Generally speaking, it is unlawful for any person to possess or have under his or her control any controlled substances except as specifically authorized by the Controlled Substances Act. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (a).

Section 16-13-30(a) does not authorize possession of controlled substances prescribed to someone else when the drugs are outside the original prescription container.

Black v. State · filed 1990-02-08(a)

Benzphetamine and diazepam are controlled substances (OCGA §§ 16-13-27 (1) (B); 16-13-28 (a) (10)), the unauthorized possession of which is a felony. OCGA § 16-13-30 (a), (g). ... We find no indication that the General Assembly intended to authorize possession of controlled substances, a felony, allegedly prescribed for someone other than a defendant but not in the original container when found in the defendant’s possession while outlawing possession of dangerous drugs, a misdemeanor, under the same circumstances.

Section 16-13-30(b) permits a possession conviction based on either actual or constructive possession.

Walton v. State · filed 1990-02-13(b)

Possession sufficient to sustain a conviction pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-30 (b) may be either actual or constructive.

Section 16-13-30(b) allows constructive possession to support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Edwards v. State · filed 1990-02-20(b)

While constructive possession will support possession with intent to distribute, it will not support a trafficking conviction under the unamended statute.

Section 16-13-30 permits a cocaine possession conviction based on either actual or constructive possession.

Alvarado v. State · filed 1990-02-20

However, the offense of possession of cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-30 could be committed by having either actual or constructive possession of cocaine.

Possession of a controlled substance under § 16-13-30 may be based on actual or constructive possession.

State v. Alvarado · filed 1990-11-08

At the time that the alleged offense occurred, OCGA § 16-13-31 required proof of “actual” possession to constitute trafficking, whereas either actual or constructive possession constituted the offense of possession of a controlled substance under OCGA § 16-13-30.

Subsection (j)(1) defines the prohibited marijuana conduct clearly enough to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice.

Walker v. State · filed 1991-12-04(j)(1)

The conduct prohibited by the subsection is sufficiently definite to provide “a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute.” Mixon v. State, 226 Ga. 869, 870 (178 SE2d 189) (1970).

Joint constructive possession can support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute, and the equal access doctrine does not apply to defendants charged with jointly possessing contraband.

Fain v. State · filed 1993-11-29(b), (j)(1)

Although it is arguable that Hamilton, who spent some time in Fain’s bedroom with him, had equal access to the items, the equal access doctrine does not apply to those charged with being in joint constructive possession of contraband. ... The jury was charged on sole and joint possession, actual and constructive possession, and equal access. They were authorized to conclude that Fain and Hamilton were in joint possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and that Fain possessed marijuana.

A passenger's proximity to cocaine in a car he does not own or control, without further evidence connecting him to it, is insufficient to establish knowing constructive possession.

Reid v. State · filed 1994-03-16(b)

Nevertheless, since no presumption of possession arose here, we find no evidentiary basis upon which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Reid was in knowing possession of the cocaine.

Intent to distribute is an essential element of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Teasley v. State · filed 1994-08-04(b)

Review of the charge given shows the trial court charged that Teasley was charged with unlawful possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, that the State must prove the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and that intent was an essential element which must be proven.

Possession of marijuana is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute because it lacks the element of specific intent to distribute.

Hardeman v. State · filed 1995-01-30(j)(1)

Possession is a lesser included offense simply because it lacks the element of specific intent to distribute, Talley, supra, which the jury by its verdict found wanting.

A conviction for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute requires evidence connecting the defendant to the cocaine; mere presence near it does not establish constructive possession.

Paden v. State · filed 1995-02-01(b)

Paden offered a reasonable hypothesis for the events and the State failed to prove he was in constructive possession of cocaine sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Evidence connecting a defendant to cocaine beyond mere presence can support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute despite others’ equal access.

Sing v. State · filed 1995-05-31(b)

Because evidence other than mere presence implicated Sing, it was for the jury to determine his guilt or innocence.

Section 16-13-30 treats marijuana offenses separately from controlled substance offenses; marijuana possession under subsection (j) is not a controlled substance offense for purposes of the firearm statute.

Asberry v. State · filed 1996-01-30(j)

Consequently, when the legislature expressly incorporated only those provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 that concerned “controlled substances,” it excluded those provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30 that concern “marijuana.”

A conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute may rest on joint constructive possession when evidence connects the defendant to the cocaine beyond mere proximity.

Ryans v. State · filed 1997-05-29(b)

“Under these circumstances, we find the evidence against [Ryans] was sufficient to find [him] guilty of joint constructive possession, or at least as a party to the crime. [Cits.]”

Section 16-13-30(a) covers joint constructive possession of cocaine even when others previously brought drugs to the premises.

Moody v. State · filed 1998-05-07(a)

Finally, even if evidence had been presented that others had access to the apartment and had previously brought drugs to the apartment, such evidence does not preclude a finding that Moody was in joint constructive possession of the cocaine on the day of his arrest.

The equal access defense does not apply to co-indicted co-conspirators charged with joint possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

Copeland v. State · filed 1997-10-06(b)

The trial court did not err in refusing Copeland’s request for a charge on the equal access defense. This defense is not applicable to co-indicted co-conspirators such as Lacour and Copeland, who are charged with joint possession.

Possession under § 16-13-30(a) requires knowledge of the contraband; signing for sealed packages addressed to someone else does not establish possession without evidence of that knowledge.

Luke v. State · filed 1998-02-16(a)

Under OCGA § 16-13-30 (a), “[e]xcept as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, or have under his control any controlled substance.” ... In the case sub judice, there simply is no evidence that defendant Wesley Luke had any knowledge that, when he signed for the delivery, those sealed, opaque packages addressed to his father contained contraband.

Cocaine possession and possession with intent to distribute under § 16-13-30 may be proved through joint constructive possession when evidence beyond equal access connects the defendant to the cocaine.

Smith v. State · filed 1998-11-12(a), (b)

This evidence supports a finding of Smith's joint constructive possession, as defined in Shropshire v. State, [7] at the very least as an aider and abettor to Smith's two companions, both of whose guilty pleas were known to the jury.

Section 16-13-30 requires evidence connecting a passenger to cocaine hidden in a car to sustain a possession conviction.

Maxwell v. State · filed 1999-05-21

Here, there is no evidence the cocaine was visible to Maxwell. Since she was a mere passenger in the car, there arose no presumption that she possessed the cocaine.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires evidence connecting a defendant to the cocaine; mere proximity to it does not establish possession.

Johnson v. State · filed 2000-08-17(a)

The State must provide evidence of a connection linking the defendant to the contraband other than his mere spatial proximity.

Possession of cocaine under § 16-13-30 may be proved by evidence that the defendant constructively possessed it.

Brackins v. State · filed 2001-06-01

Reviewed in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Brackins had constructive possession of the cocaine found with the money in the windbreaker in the car he was driving.

Possession of methamphetamine can be proved by evidence and reasonable inferences showing more than mere proximity to the drug.

Harris v. State · filed 2001-10-11

However, the evidence, and the inferences that can be logically derived from the evidence, shows more than mere spatial proximity between Harris and the methamphetamine.

Section 16-13-30(a) permits a methamphetamine possession conviction when the evidence proves possession of the drug but not the quantity required for trafficking.

Hill v. State · filed 2002-02-11(a)

Since this evidence was sufficient to support a verdict on the lesser included offense of possession of methamphetamine, OCGA § 16-13-30 (a), we remand the case with direction that the judgment of Hill’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine be vacated and a judgment and sentence for possession of methamphetamine be entered.

Section 16-13-30(b)’s possession element can be established through circumstantial evidence of joint constructive possession of cocaine.

Davis v. State · filed 2004-12-06(b)

By showing circumstantially that Davis and his co-defendants had equal access to the cocaine and marijuana, the evidence established that Davis and his co-defendants were parties to the crime and thus guilty of joint constructive possession of the drugs.

Subsection (a) prohibits knowing possession of a controlled substance; ownership is unnecessary.

Walker v. State · filed 2004-02-05(a)

Walker’s protestation that the pipe belonged to someone else was of little import, since OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) ... criminalizes the knowing possession of a controlled substance.

A driver may be convicted of cocaine possession when the factfinder finds that evidence of others’ access to the vehicle does not rebut the inference that the driver possessed cocaine found inside.

Davis v. State · filed 2005-03-07(a)

Here, the trier of fact heard the stipulated facts and Davis’s claim that others had equal access to the cocaine, and apparently decided that the inference of Davis’s possession was not rebutted. Under the circumstances presented, the trial court was authorized to find Davis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing cocaine. See Cannon, supra, 211 Ga. App. at 836; OCGA § 16-13-30 (a).

Section 16-13-30(a) permits a finding of constructive possession of marijuana when evidence connects the person to it; proximity alone is insufficient.

In Re BJC · filed 2006-08-22(a)

We find that the evidence presented was sufficient to demonstrate that B.J.C. was in possession of the marijuana in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30. ... B.J.C. correctly asserts that his spatial proximity to the marijuana alone was not sufficient to deem him in constructive possession of the marijuana on the seat. ... As such, the evidence established a connection between B.J.C. and the marijuana that authorized the finding of B.J.C.'s constructive possession.

Constructive possession of marijuana can be established by proximity together with evidence connecting the accused to it, such as an admission of purchase and cash matching its approximate value.

In the Interest of B. J. C. · filed 2006-08-22(a)

We find that the evidence presented was sufficient to demonstrate that B. J. C. was in possession of the marijuana in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30. ... However, the state offered evidence that, not only was B. J. C. in close proximity to the marijuana, he confessed to the officer that he was purchasing the marijuana from the driver of the vehicle and also had money in his hand equal to its approximate street value. As such, the evidence established a connection between B. J. C. and the marijuana that authorized the finding of B. J. C.’s constructive possession.

Possession with intent to distribute may be based on actual or constructive possession; when the indictment does not specify which, the jury may be instructed on both if the evidence supports them.

Davis v. State · filed 2007-05-21(b)

The law recognizes that possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive. ... Because there was evidence in the instant case that Davis, at different times, had both actual and constructive possession of marijuana, the trial court’s jury charge on both types of possession was proper and did not impermissibly expand the indictment.

Possession of marijuana under § 16-13-30 may be established by showing that the accused knowingly had the power and intent to control it; proximity alone is insufficient.

In Re Qp · filed 2007-06-29

Beyond a defendant's spatial proximity to the drugs, constructive possession may be shown by demonstrating the defendant knowingly had both the power and intention at a given time to exercise control over the substance.

Section 16-13-30(a) permits a methamphetamine possession conviction based on constructive possession when evidence connects the defendant to the drug by more than spatial proximity.

Womble v. State · filed 2008-04-04(a)

But a finding that Womble had constructive possession of the methamphetamine oil must be based upon some connection between the contraband and Womble other than spatial proximity.

A passenger constructively possesses a controlled substance if he knows it is in the car and has the power and intent to control it.

Clewis v. State · filed 2008-08-22(a)

OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) makes it unlawful for any person to possess or have under his control any controlled substance such as methamphetamine. ... If a person is a passenger in a car in which he knows there are illegal drugs, and he has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the drugs, then he is in constructive possession of those drugs.

Section 16-13-30(b) allows possession with intent to distribute to be proved through constructive possession, which requires knowing power and intent to control the drugs.

Marshall v. State · filed 2008-12-19(b)

To prove constructive possession, the state is required to show that the defendant knowingly had both the power and intention at a given time to exercise control over the drugs.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1) does not require proof of the quantity of marijuana purchased.

Johnson v. State · filed 2009-03-18(j)(1)

First, the quantity of marijuana purchased is not an element of the crime of purchasing marijuana. See OCGA § 16-13-30 (j) (1) (unlawful for person to purchase marijuana); cf. State v. Jackson, 271 Ga. 5, 6 (515 SE2d 386) (1999).

A conviction for possessing a controlled substance under subsection (a) may rest on experienced officers’ identification testimony without scientific testing.

Kessinger v. State · filed 2009-06-23(a)

With respect to the identification of drugs, “identification testimony of experienced officers [is] admissible, and expert testimony based on scientific tests is not required to establish a substance is” a controlled substance. ... This testimony was evidence of the pills’ identity, and it was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find that the pills were oxycodone.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires evidence that a person knowingly possessed or controlled a controlled substance; proximity to concealed drugs alone does not establish constructive possession.

Millsaps v. State · filed 2009-10-07(a)

Absent evidence that might permit an inference that Millsaps hid the methamphetamine or at least knew of its presence, the jury was not authorized to find him in constructive possession of the contraband.

When the State charges only one occupant with marijuana possession, another occupant’s equal access requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant alone constructively possessed the marijuana.

Rogers v. State · filed 2010-01-20(j)

Because the only legal evidence linking Rogers to the marijuana in the back seat was his spatial proximity to it, the evidence adduced was insufficient as a matter of law to support Rogers’ conviction of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana.

Constructive possession of cocaine requires a connection to the drug beyond mere proximity and evidence of intent to control it.

In Re Js · filed 2010-04-16

"[A] finding of constructive possession must be based upon some connection between the defendant and the contraband other than mere spatial proximity." [4] ... We find that evidence that J.S. moved his hand in the area of the closed center console next to where he was sitting did not satisfy the state's burden of excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than that he intended to exercise dominion or control over contraband found within the console. [12] Thus, this evidence was insufficient to show that he had constructive possession of the cocaine.

Section 16-13-30 requires proof of possession for a cocaine possession adjudication; moving a hand near a closed console containing cocaine does not establish constructive possession when other reasonable explanations remain.

In the Interest of J. S. · filed 2010-04-16

We find that evidence that J. S. moved his hand in the area of the closed center console next to where he was sitting did not satisfy the state’s burden of excluding every reasonable hypothesis other than that he intended to exercise dominion or control over contraband found within the console.

Section 16-13-30(a) allows a joint possession conviction without proof that either defendant possessed the methamphetamine alone.

Peacock v. State · filed 2010-01-06(a)

Because the State charged both Peacock and his wife with joint possession of the methamphetamine, the State “did not bear the burden of showing that one or the other was in sole possession of the drug.” ... The evidence sufficed to sustain this conviction.

A defendant charged with possessing cocaine is not entitled to an equal access instruction when the state uses direct evidence, rather than a presumption, to prove possession.

Hill v. State · filed 2010-02-11(a)

Although not enumerated as error, the above evidence was sufficient to sustain Hill’s conviction for possession of cocaine. OCGA § 16-13-30 (a). ... Because the state did not rely on a presumption of possession in order to connect Hill to the cocaine, he was not entitled to an equal access charge relative to the wooded area.

Section 16-13-30(j)(1)'s knowing possession requirement may be proved through circumstantial evidence of constructive possession.

Lott v. State · filed 2010-03-31(j)(1)

Specifically, they argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that they knowingly possessed the cocaine and marijuana, as required by OCGA §§ 16-13-31 (a) and 16-13-30 (j) (1). We disagree. ... Based on this circumstantial evidence, the jury could infer that Lott and Watson had constructive possession of the drugs found in the house.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires knowing possession of the substance, but the State need not prove that the defendant knew it was legally classified as a controlled substance.

Duvall v. State · filed 2010-07-19(a)

Specifically, he claims that no evidence showed that he knew the pills were a controlled substance. This claim lacks legal merit, as the State was not obligated to show such.

Possession of cocaine with intent to distribute cannot be inferred from mere proximity to cocaine; the evidence must connect the defendant to it.

Jackson v. State · filed 2010-08-03(b)

While this evidence authorizes his conviction of misdemeanor marijuana possession, it does not permit an inference that he possessed the 37 baggies of cocaine that were hidden in a piggy bank in an upstairs bedroom. ... “A finding of constructive possession of contraband cannot rest upon mere spatial proximity to the contraband, especially where . . . the contraband is hidden.”

A passenger’s proximity to drugs alone does not establish constructive possession for a controlled-substance offense.

Scott v. State · filed 2010-08-18(a)

A passenger’s presence in a vehicle where drugs are found does not, by itself, show that the drugs were his. ... In this matter, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to show Scott’s constructive possession of the TFMPP pills.

Possession under § 16-13-30(a) may be established through joint constructive possession.

Edwards v. State · filed 2010-11-04(a)

Rather, the state could establish the element of possession by showing that Edwards was in joint constructive possession of the contraband.

A jury may find that a driver possessed methamphetamine found beside his seat even when a jointly charged passenger had access to it.

Dover v. State · filed 2010-11-24(a)

Because Holbrook and Dover were indicted and tried together for possession of methamphetamine, the jury was entitled to conclude that Dover was in possession of the methamphetamine-coated pipe, which was found in the car he drove, next to the driver’s seat.

When two vehicle occupants have equal access to marijuana and the state charges only one with possession with intent to distribute, it must prove that the charged occupant alone possessed the marijuana.

Bodiford v. State · filed 2010-08-24(b)

The state was required to show that Bodiford alone possessed the drugs, because it did not prosecute the car’s other occupant.

Spatial proximity to drugs, combined with other evidence such as possession of drug paraphernalia or similar transactions, can support a conviction for possession under § 16-13-30(a).

Taylor v. State · filed 2010-08-30(a)

Moreover, while mere spatial proximity to contraband is insufficient to exclude the possibility that someone else possessed the drugs, spatial proximity combined with other evidence, such as evidence of the defendant’s possession of drug paraphernalia or of similar transactions, will support a conviction for drug possession.

A vehicle’s sole driver may be presumed to possess contraband found inside it unless evidence rebuts that presumption.

Mangum v. State · filed 2011-02-24(a)

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the jury was authorized to consider the rebuttable presumption that Mangum, as the sole driver of the stolen vehicle in question, had possession of and control over the contraband contained within that vehicle.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires a person possessing a controlled substance to know the drug’s chemical identity.

Duvall v. State · filed 2011-07-11(a)

Possession of a controlled substance is not a strict liability offense. Here, the criminal intent required by OCGA §§ 16-13-30 (a) and 16-13-75 is intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug.

Section 16-13-30(a) permits a possession conviction based on joint constructive possession when evidence connects the defendant to the controlled substance beyond mere proximity.

Ferrell v. State · filed 2011-10-18(a)

A defendant’s joint constructive possession of contraband with another will sustain a conviction. ... Because the state presented evidence beyond Ferrell’s mere presence in the car, the issue of her guilt was properly within the jury’s discretion.

A conviction for possessing more than one ounce of marijuana may rest on joint constructive possession when the evidence shows knowing control over the marijuana.

Dennis v. State · filed 2012-01-18(j)(1)

Based upon this combined evidence, the trial judge was authorized to conclude that Dennis and Brown had equal access to and joint constructive possession of the marijuana, and that they participated as parties to the drug possession offense.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires proof that the defendant intended to possess a drug knowing its chemical identity; possession is not a strict liability offense.

Amin v. State · filed 2012-09-25(a)

Possession of a controlled substance is not a strict liability offense. Rather, “the criminal intent required by OCGA § 16-13-30 (a) … is intent to possess a drug with knowledge of the chemical identity of that drug.”

Cocaine possession under subsection (a) may be proved by constructive possession when evidence links the defendant to drugs found in his residence.

Garcia v. State · filed 2013-02-14(a)

Based on this evidence, the jury could infer that Calderon had constructive possession of both the cocaine and the methamphetamine found in the house.

Unlawful possession of MDMA may be proved through joint constructive possession; the State need not prove sole constructive possession.

Michael Benjamin Clark, Jr v. State · filed 2013-02-22(a)

And because Clark and his co-defendants were jointly charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of the MDMA, the State was not required to show that Clark was in sole constructive possession of the drugs.

A person can constructively possess a controlled substance when evidence shows control over it beyond mere proximity.

Mallard v. State · filed 2013-04-26(a)

Mallard’s possession of the canister earlier that day, along with her actions in attempting to conceal the canister and dispose of it, established a meaningful connection between Mallard and the contraband which showed that she actually exercised power and dominion over the drugs and authorized a finding that she had constructive possession of the methamphetamine.

Possession with intent to distribute cocaine or marijuana may be proved through joint constructive possession and evidence that the drugs were packaged for resale.

Ahmed v. State · filed 2013-06-10(b), (j)

Such evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that he and Vance were in joint constructive possession of the cocaine and marijuana. ... Furthermore, the cocaine and marijuana at issue were clearly not held for personal use, both in large quantities and bagged for apparent resale.

A defendant may be convicted of felony marijuana possession when the evidence establishes knowing constructive possession of more than one ounce.

Kirchner v. State · filed 2013-06-17(j)(2)

This presumption, considered with the other inculpatory evidence outlined above, authorized the jury to find that Kirchner knowingly had constructive possession of the marijuana found in the gun safe and, thus, was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony possession of marijuana.

Possession under § 16-13-30 may be constructive when the defendant knowingly has the power and intention to control the controlled substance.

Armstrong v. State · filed 2014-02-06(a), (j)

The evidence, direct and circumstantial, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that Armstrong knowingly had both the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the controlled substances (methamphetamine, oxycodone, and marijuana) found in the backpack, and that he was in constructive possession of those substances (Reyes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 496, 497-498 (745 SE2d 738) (2013); OCGA §§ 16-13- 31 (e); 16-13-30 (a); 16-13-30 (j); 16-13-2 (b)) and (2) that Armstrong knowingly drove the car while his license to drive was suspended (OCGA § 40-5-121).

A conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute may rest on joint constructive possession; the State need not prove sole possession.

McNeal v. State · filed 2014-03-21(j)

In this case, both McNeal and Walters were charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Therefore, the State was not required to show that McNeal was in sole constructive possession of the cocaine and marijuana, but rather that McNeal and Walters were in joint constructive possession of the drugs.

Section 16-13-30(a) covers constructive possession of cocaine when the defendant has the power and intention to control it.

Tanksley v. State · filed 2014-05-06(a)

This evidence authorized the trier of fact to find that Tanksley had the power and intention to exercise control over the cocaine necessary for constructive possession.

Section 16-13-30(j) permits proof of marijuana possession through constructive possession when a person knowingly has the power and intention to control the marijuana.

Copeland v. State · filed 2014-06-11(j)

We find that the State presented evidence sufficient for the jury to reject Copeland’s defenses and to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, because he knowingly had both the power and intention to exercise control over the contraband in and outside the property, he had constructive possession thereof.

Section 16-13-30(a) requires evidence linking a defendant to the drugs; renting a room where drugs are found does not establish possession when others had equal access.

Stewart v. State · filed 2014-07-09(a)

And there was affirmative evidence that others had equal access to the room, rebutting as a matter of law any presumption of possession arising from the fact that Stewart rented the room in her name.

Possession charges under § 16-13-30 require proof of actual or constructive possession of the drugs.

Morales v. the State · filed 2015-07-08

In order to prove the drug charges brought against Morales, the state was required to prove that he had possessed the methamphetamine and marijuana (in the required amounts, as specified in the indictment).4 Where, as here, the state provided no direct evidence that Morales had actual possession of the drugs, the state was required to prove that he had constructive possession thereof.

A conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute requires evidence connecting the defendant to the marijuana; mere presence where it is found is insufficient.

Holland v. the State · filed 2015-11-23(j)(1)

Because the State failed to show that a presumption of possession applies, and failed to adduce any evidence to connect Holland to the drugs found in the master bedroom and the attic, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.