Statute Annotations › Georgia › Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56

Summary judgment: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Georgia
Case notes
3,252
Cited in passing
855
Citing cases indexed
4,412
Case dates
1973–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

4,107 citing cases reviewed of 4,412 in the citation index: 3,252 interpreted the section (annotated below), 855 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-56?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1975-07-01 Georgia Laws 1975, Act 502, § 3 changed § 9-11-56(h) so denials require an interlocutory appeal application, rather than a trial judge’s certification alone. Source
  • 1985-07-01 Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3 established oral argument on timely written request; the Georgia Supreme Court confirmed in 1987 that § 9-11-56(c) does not require argument when none is requested. Source
  • 1991-06-27 Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins held that a defendant without the trial burden may identify an absence of evidence on an essential element rather than affirmatively disprove the claim. Source

Summary-judgment standard — decisions through January 2001

Summary judgment cannot include a claim added by amendment when no evidence verifies or supports that added claim.

Stubbs v. Olshan · filed 1978-10-16

While the allegations in the original complaint were fully supported by affidavit, there is absolutely no verification of the claim contained in the amendment. Therefore, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the entire claim.
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Law changed since Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins (Ga. June 27, 1991) held that a defendant without the trial burden may identify an absence of record evidence on an essential element instead of affirmatively disproving the claim.

A defendant moving for summary judgment must affirmatively negate at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s case, with all doubts resolved against the movant.

Georgia Highway Express, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1982-11-22(c)

The movant has the burden of establishing the nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact, and all doubts are to be resolved against him. Ham v. Ham, 230 Ga. 43 (195 SE2d 429) (1973). When the movant is the defendant, he must affirmatively negate at least one essential element of the plaintiffs case, and if he does not do so, he is not entitled to summary judgment. Griffin v. Wittfeld, 143 Ga. App. 485 (238 SE2d 589) (1977).
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Section 56(c) permits summary judgment when no substantial issue of fact remains for determination.

Robinson v. Stevens Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-04-15(c)

No substantial issue of fact remains to be determined. Code § 81A-156 (c); Mathews v. Cleveland, 144 Ga. App. 423 (2) (241 SE2d 286) (1977). No error appears in the grant of summary judgment to the defendant.
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Conflicting evidence on whether a defendant intentionally used its authority to coerce payment prevents summary judgment under subsection (c).

Wright v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1984-01-05(c)

The evidence being clearly in conflict as to whether Bell used the demand for the security deposit and subsequent termination of service in a coercive manner, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the first count. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) (Code Ann. § 81A-156).
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Section 56 permits summary judgment when the record fulfills the statutory criteria for judgment as a matter of law.

Seymour v. Vaughn · filed 1987-01-26

The criteria for summary judgment as set forth in OCGA § 9-11-56 being fulfilled, we find no error in the proceedings below.
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Section 56(e) requires a challenged affidavit to be evaluated with the other evidence to determine whether pleaded defenses have been pierced.

Jernigan Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank · filed 1988-03-08(e)

While it directly opposes much of Jernigan’s affidavit, that is to be expected in moving for summary judgment. OCGA § 9-11-56 (e). It does not serve only to affect the weight of the evidence, but must be assessed along with the other evidence to determine if defendants’ defenses are pierced.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine material factual issue remains and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Southern States Landfill, Inc. v. Walton County · filed 1989-12-05(c)

“Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A court may grant judgment to a nonmoving party only after the opponent has a fair opportunity to contest it.

Howell Mill/Collier Associates v. Pennypacker's, Inc. · filed 1990-01-04

It is well-settled that summary judgment can be granted to a non-moving party provided the grant is proper in all other respects.
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Subsection (c) permits summary judgment only when the listed record materials show no genuine material factual issue and entitlement as a matter of law.

CURRY CORPORATION v. Mooro · filed 1990-03-14(c)

The grant of summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Subsection (c) authorizes summary judgment when the listed record materials show no genuine material factual issue and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Turman v. Southern General Insurance · filed 1990-04-03(c)

OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions . . ., together with the affidavits, . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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Summary judgment eliminates jury trials when no genuine material factual issue exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Porter v. Felker · filed 1991-06-20(c)

The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate jury trials where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A court cannot grant declaratory relief sua sponte without notice and an opportunity to respond; a party must seek judgment under section 56(a) or the pleadings rule.

Smith v. TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA · filed 1991-07-16(a)

There is no procedure pursuant to which the trial court may simply grant a complaint for declaratory judgment sua sponte, without affording the opposing party notice or an opportunity to be heard.
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A plaintiff cannot use a summary-judgment motion to obtain judgment based on the defendant's alleged default.

Watson v. GEORGIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CREDIT UNION · filed 1991-11-05

A motion for ‘. . . summary judgment’ is not an appropriate means by which a plaintiff can secure a judgment based upon the defendant’s alleged default.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Harrison v. Golden · filed 1996-01-04(c)

To prevail at summary judgment. . . the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment cannot be granted when none of the grounds advanced establishes both the absence of a genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Century 21 Pinetree Properties, Inc. v. Cason · filed 1996-02-27(c)

We agree because none of the grounds for summary judgment advanced by the Casons proves that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Allen v. Roscoe Weston Motels Georgia, Inc. · filed 1996-02-29(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors · filed 1996-03-07(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

McDonald v. COCA-COLA ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 1996-03-11

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Under subsection (c), the movant must show no genuine material factual issue and that undisputed facts viewed most favorably to the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hall v. Holbrook · filed 1996-03-14(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, CTM, the movant, must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Hall, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Subsection (c) requires the movant to show no genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Young v. John Deere Co. · filed 1996-04-16(c)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a movant must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Sullivan v. Horn · filed 1996-05-06

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Palermo v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc. · filed 1996-05-06

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Subsection (c) permits summary judgment only when the pleadings and affidavits show no genuine material factual issue and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Perry v. Soil Remediation, Inc. · filed 1996-05-13(c)

Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Morrison v. Anderson · filed 1996-05-14

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Subsection (c) requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Duncan v. City of Macon · filed 1996-05-24(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Fremichael v. Doe · filed 1996-06-13

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Alpharetta First United Methodist Church v. Stewart · filed 1996-06-18

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Under subsection (c), the movant must show no disputed material fact and that undisputed facts viewed most favorably to the nonmovant warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Coweta County v. Adams · filed 1996-06-26(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the County, as movant, must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of disputed material fact, and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Adams, the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must establish no genuine material factual issue and that the evidence, viewed for the nonmovant, warrants judgment as a matter of law.

Brown v. JMIC Life Insurance · filed 1996-08-05

To obtain summary judgment, JMIC as the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the material evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56.
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Subsection (c) requires a movant to establish both that no genuine material factual issue remains and that the undisputed facts, viewed for the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Ingram v. Toccoa Triple Cinema, Inc. · filed 1996-08-05(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the Cinema as the movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Ingram, the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must establish that no genuine material factual issue exists and that the facts, viewed for the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Nolley v. Maryland Casualty Insurance · filed 1996-09-09

Under OCGA § 9-11-56, for the moving party to prevail they must show “there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Potts v. UAP-GA AG CHEM, INC. · filed 1997-07-14(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Carlock v. Kmart Corp. · filed 1997-07-15(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Dawson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority · filed 1997-07-16(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper when the movant shows no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Pullen v. Oxford · filed 1997-07-16(c)

Summary judgment is proper when the moving party shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Williams v. Stepler · filed 1997-07-25(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Gosule v. Bestco, Inc. · filed 1997-07-31(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hargett's Telephone Contractors, Inc. v. McKeehan · filed 1997-08-05(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of • material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence viewed favorably to the nonmovant leaves no material factual issue and entitles the movant to judgment as a matter of law.

Key v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. · filed 1997-08-28(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, construed in the nonmovant’s favor, shows no issue of material fact remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Subsection (c) requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Deloach v. Food Lion, Inc. · filed 1997-09-05(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine material factual issue and that material evidence viewed most favorably to the nonmovant warrants judgment as a matter of law.

Tucker Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Balogh · filed 1997-09-11

To obtain summary judgment, the bank as the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the material evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrants judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56.
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Boggs v. Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. · filed 1997-09-11

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

MacOn-bibb County Hospital Authority v. Reece · filed 1997-09-16

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Subsection (c) requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Cumberland Center Associates v. Southeast Management & Leasing Corp. · filed 1997-09-19(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Subsection (c) requires no genuine material factual issue and undisputed facts that, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Williams v. St. Paul Companies · filed 1997-10-01(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Subsection (c) permits summary judgment when no genuine material factual issue exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Hellvig v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. · filed 1997-11-06(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Nkosi v. Atlanta Postal Credit Union · filed 1997-12-04(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. [Cit.]”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Gustafson v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance · filed 1998-01-23

In order to prevail at summary, judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, “the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. [Cit.]”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Brogdon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1998-01-27

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. . . .”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hemphill v. Johnson · filed 1998-02-06

In order to prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, “the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. [Cit.]”
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A summary-judgment motion is properly granted only when no issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Griffin v. Travelers Insurance · filed 1998-02-06(c)

A grant of a motion for summary judgment is proper when there is no issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hovendick v. Presidential Financial Corp. · filed 1998-02-10(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hall County School District v. C. Robert Beals & Associates, Inc. · filed 1998-02-17(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Autrey v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, INC. · filed 1998-02-25(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene · filed 1998-02-26(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Jenkins v. Brice · filed 1998-03-12(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Denham v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n & Youth Center of Thomasville, Inc. · filed 1998-03-13(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

New Madison South Ltd. Partnership v. Gardner · filed 1998-03-18(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of ... law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the material evidence, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrants judgment as a matter of law.

Choo Choo Tire Service, Inc. v. Union Planters National Bank · filed 1998-03-19

To obtain summary judgment, the bank as the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the material evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrants judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Straughter v. J. H. Harvey Company, Inc. · filed 1998-03-20(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Maddox v. Southern Engineering Co. · filed 1998-03-20(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Scarbrough v. Dover Elevator Co. · filed 1998-03-30(c)

In order “[t]o prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, ... viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ... warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Carter v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1998-03-31(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Risner v. R. L. Daniell & Associates, P. C. · filed 1998-03-31

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

American Southern Insurance v. Abbensett · filed 1998-04-02(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of ... material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light, most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Chen v. Tai · filed 1998-05-20(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Hardin v. City Wide Wrecker Service, Inc. · filed 1998-05-21(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

McCoy v. West Building Materials of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1998-05-21(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Blanton v. Whelan · filed 1998-05-21(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Mabou v. Eller · filed 1998-05-22

“To prevail at summary judg ... ment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. [Cit.]”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Daniels v. Gordon · filed 1998-06-09(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Davis v. GBR Properties, Inc. · filed 1998-06-11(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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Summary judgment is authorized when the listed record materials show no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Meadow River Lumber Co. v. University of Georgia Research Foundation, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30(c)

A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, construed in the nonmovant’s favor, shows no material factual issue remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Thomas v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 1998-06-30(c)

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, construed in the nonmovant’s favor, shows no issue of material fact remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

D. N. Garner Co. v. Georgia Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp. · filed 1998-07-02(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Head v. Sears Roebuck & Co. · filed 1998-07-10(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Taylor v. Gelfand · filed 1998-07-30(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

La Petite Academy, Inc. v. Prescott · filed 1998-08-19(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must .demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc. · filed 1998-08-19

In order to prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial and that the undisputed facts and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Roberts v. City of Macon · filed 1998-09-09(c)

“ ‘To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hannah v. Hampton Auto Parts, Inc. · filed 1998-09-16(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Shield Insurance v. Smiley · filed 1998-10-20(c)

“ ‘Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.’
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Nichols v. Westfield Insurance · filed 1998-11-12(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Pacrim Associates v. Turner Home Entertainment, Inc. · filed 1998-11-30(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Odem v. Pace Academy · filed 1998-12-04(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is appropriate when the admissible record shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Hall v. Carney · filed 1999-02-01(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate when the admissible evi ... dence of record shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Carter v. Moody · filed 1999-02-05(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Brown v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. · filed 1999-02-05(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Brown v. Brewer · filed 1999-02-11(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Tyner v. Comfort Rest Sleep Products, Inc. · filed 1999-02-11(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Capital Alliance Insurance v. Cartwright · filed 1999-02-19(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Jackson v. Post Properties, Inc. · filed 1999-03-01(c)

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Cagle v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. · filed 1999-03-02(c)

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Calhoun/Johnson Co. v. Houston Family Trust No. 1 · filed 1999-03-05

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Ingles Markets, Inc. v. Martin · filed 1999-03-08

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.”
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Summary judgment is authorized only when the undisputed facts and reasonable inferences, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, leave no triable issue on at least one essential element.

O'NEAL v. Home Town Bank of Villa Rica · filed 1999-03-12(c)

Summary judgment is authorized only when all undisputed facts and their reasonable inferences, viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, preclude a triable issue as to at least one essential element of the case.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Jones v. Wellon · filed 1999-03-17(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Brown v. Cooper · filed 1999-03-17(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Watkins & Watkins, P.C. v. Colbert · filed 1999-04-13

On appeal from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court conducts a de novo review of the evidence. To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Autumn Trace Homeowners Ass'n v. Brooks · filed 1999-05-14(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence, as well as all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Nall v. Bill Heard Chevrolet Co. · filed 1999-05-19(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

McCoy v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-05-26(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Frank v. FLEET FINANCE, INC. OF GEORGIA · filed 1999-05-27

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56, summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Edwards v. Department of Children & Youth Services · filed 1999-06-04

“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. . . .”
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Jamsky v. HPSC, INC. · filed 1999-06-07(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Williams v. MAYFLOWER INS. CO., LTD. · filed 1999-06-16(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Brown v. Ohio Casualty Insurance · filed 1999-06-23(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

Sheehan v. Delaney · filed 1999-06-24(c)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Wright v. JDN Structured Finance, Inc. · filed 1999-06-28(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Physician Specialists in Anesthesia, P.C. v. Wildmon · filed 1999-06-28(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Bell v. Sasser · filed 1999-07-07(c)

Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Parks v. Multimedia Technologies, Inc. · filed 1999-07-08(c)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, “the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Southwestern Composite Technology Corp. v. Americus-Sumter Payroll Development Authority · filed 1999-07-28(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the'evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

AAA Truck Sales, Inc. v. Mershon Tractor Co. · filed 1999-07-29

[t]o prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

BTH Holdings, Inc. v. BET USA, Inc. · filed 1999-08-17(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

John Hewell Trucking Co., Inc. v. Brock · filed 1999-09-08(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Webster v. Dodson · filed 1999-09-10

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Wolf v. McCollum · filed 1999-09-14(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Hartford Insurance v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1999-10-04(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

J. H. Harvey Co. v. Reddick · filed 1999-10-21

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Bernstein v. Flagstar Bank, FSN · filed 1999-10-27(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Huncke · filed 1999-11-01

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Askari v. Dolat · filed 1999-11-02(c)

To prevail on her motion for summary judgment, Dolat must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Hooks v. Cobb Center Pawn & Jewelry Brokers, Inc. · filed 1999-11-10(c)

when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard , of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Erwin · filed 1999-11-16(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Matthews v. Tele-Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-11-17(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ... Applying the de novo standard of review to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Thornton v. Kumar · filed 1999-11-18(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Jacobs v. Littleton · filed 1999-11-18(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Alfred v. Right Stuff Food Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-11-18(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

BUFORD-CLAIRMONT CO., LTD. v. Cato Corp. · filed 1999-11-22(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant [or denial] of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Washington v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1999-11-23(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Palombi v. Frito-Lay, Inc. · filed 1999-11-30(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Manley v. Willis · filed 1999-11-30(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Brown v. Allied Printing Ink Co. · filed 1999-12-06

To win summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, Allied had to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to Brown, warranted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Allied.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Myers v. North Georgia Title & Tax Free Exchange, LLC · filed 1999-12-09(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Our review is de novo, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Davis v. Beasley Timber Co., Inc. · filed 1999-12-15(c)

Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party can show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Under subsection (c), summary judgment should be granted when no material factual issue remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence and inferences viewed for the nonmovant.

Hortman v. Guy · filed 2000-02-01(c)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), the trial court should grant summary judgment when no issue of material fact remains to be decided and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with the evidence and reasonable inferences viewed in the nonmovant’s favor.

Nairon v. Land · filed 2000-02-07(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Our review is de novo, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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A summary-judgment movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Johnson v. Rodier · filed 2000-02-10

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and .that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the evidence, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrants judgment as a matter of law.

Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors v. Visiting Nurse Health System of Metropolitan Atlanta, Inc. · filed 2000-03-24(c)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, warrants judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issues of material fact and that the evidence, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrants judgment as a matter of law.

Garrett v. Women's Health Care of Gwinnett, P.C. · filed 2000-03-24(c)

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, warrants judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Tom's Amusement Co. v. Total Vending Services · filed 2000-03-30(c)

Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Shadburn v. Whitlow · filed 2000-04-13(c)

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence and inferences viewed for the nonmovant.

Russell v. Barnett Banks, Inc. · filed 2000-05-05(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Under subsection (c), summary judgment should be granted when no material factual issue remains and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, with evidence and inferences viewed for the nonmovant.

Bixler v. Merritt · filed 2000-05-18(c)

Under OCGA § 9-11-56 (c), the trial court should grant summary judgment when no issue of material fact remains to be decided and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
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Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Ashman v. Marshall's of MA, Inc. · filed 2000-05-26(c)

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the undisputed facts, viewed for the opponent, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Hodor v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc. · filed 2000-05-31

Summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56 is appropriate in cases in which there are no genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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A summary-judgment movant must show no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law.

Jackson v. City of Hahira · filed 2000-06-02

To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.
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Summary judgment is proper when the listed record materials show no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Bartlett v. Holder Construction Co. · filed 2000-06-09(c)

Summary judgment is properly granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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Summary judgment is proper when the listed record materials show no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Tucker Materials (Georgia), Inc. v. Devito Contracting & Supply, Inc. · filed 2000-06-20(c)

We agree. Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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Notes 1–150 of 3,252, oldest cases first.

855 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Ideal Paint Contractors, Inc. v. Home Mart Building Centers, Inc., the defendant alleged that the supporting affidavit did not comply with section 56, but the court expressly pretermitted that issue and affirmed on unanswered admissions instead. opinion →
Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler, the opinion mentioned the statute's notice-and-hearing requirements after observing that a motion to dismiss had been converted to summary judgment, but expressly stated that no issue about that procedure was presented because no objection was made; the appeal was decided from the absence of an evidentiary transcript. opinion →
Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc., the court mentioned subsection (h) only as one example of a special appealability exception while deciding the appealability of Rule 54(b) dismissals; no summary-judgment order was involved. opinion →
M & R Investment, Inc. v. Long, the opinion mentions the grant and denial of summary-judgment motions only as procedural posture and decides the meaning of the parties’ option agreement without citing or construing section 56. opinion →
Holmes v. Worthey, the opinion decides whether homebuyers stated contract and negligence claims against builder-sellers and contains no citation to or construction of § 9-11-56; the index match appears to be a false positive from reporter pagination. opinion →
Baker v. Baker, the case is an affirmance without opinion under Rule 59 and contains no citation to or analysis of section 56. opinion →
Edwards v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., the opinion is expressly a dissent; its discussion of the summary-judgment standard and its disagreement with the majority do not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Wade v. Thomasville Orthopedic Clinic, Inc., the appellant invoked section 56(e) to challenge an affidavit, but the court expressly refused to consider the issue because no objection had been made below; the remaining rulings concern limitations and malpractice proof. opinion →
City of Cave Spring v. Mason, the only discussion of § 9-11-56 appears in a dissent addressing the majority's treatment of municipal liability; it is not the court's holding. opinion →
Stafford v. Allstate Insurance, the opinion is expressly a dissent, so its discussion of the summary-judgment standard and its disagreement with the majority do not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Marsh v. Way, the opinion merely cited subsection (a) while rejecting two enumerations concerning evidentiary support and damages in a default judgment; it did not construe or apply summary-judgment procedure, and the case was decided under the default and remittitur statutes. opinion →
J.A.T.T. Title Holding Corp. v. Roberts, the opinion is expressly a dissent, so its extensive construction of subsection (f) and disagreement with the majority do not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Roberts v. Grigsby, the only discussion of subsection (e) appears in a special concurrence explaining one judge's separate rationale; it is not the court's holding. opinion →
Acker v. Jenkins, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent; it states no holding of the court. opinion →
Thomas v. Carlisle, the opinion is expressly a special concurrence; its discussion of oral evidence and hearings on summary-judgment motions does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Voyager Life & Health Insurance v. Pulaski Banking Co., the only discussion of subsection (c) is in a special concurrence explaining one judge's disagreement with the majority's fact-finding language; it is not the court's holding. opinion →
Stanger v. Cato, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Nowlin v. Parker, the opinion is expressly a dissent; its discussion of the summary-judgment standard and disputed evidence does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Thompson v. Crownover, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Roe v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., the opinion is expressly a dissent and rehearing discussion, so its application of the summary-judgment standard does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Parker v. Bellamy-Lunda-Dawson, the opinion cites the statute only while reporting that summary judgment and final judgment were entered; the appeal was decided under the discretionary-appeal statutes and the rule governing motions to set aside or for new trial. opinion →
Universal Underwriters Life Insurance v. Mason, the only discussion of § 9-11-56 appears in a dissent contending that the insurer failed to prove an exclusion; it is not the court's holding. opinion →
Zorn & Son Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Jim Altman Insurance, the opinion concerns a post-trial compulsory-counterclaim issue; references to § 9-11-56 describe the earlier appeal and denial of summary judgment only as procedural history. opinion →
Ware County v. Medlock, the opinion is entirely a dissent criticizing the majority's summary-judgment ruling; it does not state the court's holding. opinion →
Haile v. Pittman, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Lineberger v. Williams, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Gresham, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Anderson, the opinion is entirely a dissent disputing the majority's conclusion about the sufficiency of a bank affidavit; it is not the court's holding. opinion →
Walker v. McLarty, the opinion is expressly a dissent, so its discussion of whether brief exhibits may support summary judgment does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Adams v. Perdue, the only statement about § 9-11-56 is a footnote observing that findings in the trial court's order were helpful but unnecessary; the appeal's holding concerns sovereign and official immunity. opinion →
Board of Natural Resources v. Walker County, section 9-11-56 appears only in a footnote noting that the Administrative Procedure Act does not expressly provide summary judgment; the court decides an administrative summary-determination appeal under other statutes and rules. opinion →
Smith v. North Fulton Medical Center, the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Fugate v. Gayfers Mercantile Department Stores, Inc., the passage containing section 56 is solely a dissent and states no holding of the court. opinion →
Re-Max Executives, Inc. v. Wallace, the opinion is expressly a dissent, so its discussion of partial summary judgment and unresolved attorney fees does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Dozier v. Clayton County Hospital Authority, the opinion decided whether an expert affidavit satisfied the pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1; it mentioned § 9-11-56 only to contrast summary-judgment evidentiary standards with that separate pleading standard. opinion →
McDaniel v. Peterborough Cablevision, Ltd., the only reference appears in a footnote noting that appellants did not challenge notice or opportunity to respond after conversion to summary judgment; the issue was waived and not decided. opinion →
Taylor v. Schander, the opinion is solely a special concurrence discussing subsection (c)'s entire-record requirement; it does not establish the court's majority holding about the statute. opinion →
Cain v. Moore, the subsection (c) discussion appears only in a special concurrence; the court's binding disposition concerned the route for appealing denial of a motion to set aside, not the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Langford v. Royal Indemnity Co., the opinion mentions section 9-11-56 only in a parenthetical observation that a bumper or photograph was not entered in the record in a compliant manner; it does not decide what the section requires or whether any particular submission complied. opinion →
Hudson v. Quisc, Inc., the opinion cites Section 9-11-56 only in passing while stating that it reviewed the evidence favorably to the opponent; it decides premises-liability issues and does not construe or substantively apply the statute. opinion →
Pope v. Department of Human Resources, the only Section 9-11-56 citation reports the trial court's reason for finding an expert affidavit insufficient; the appellate court resolved the negligence claims without construing or substantively applying the section. opinion →
Wright v. Transus, Inc., the Section 9-11-56 discussion appears only in an opinion expressly concurring in part and dissenting in part, so it is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Riverdale Pools & Construction, Inc. v. Evans, the opinion merely recounts that an earlier direct appeal was taken under subsection (h) and withdrawn; its jurisdictional holding concerns the later consent judgment and mootness, not Section 9-11-56. opinion →
Hewett v. Kalish, the opinion decided whether an expert affidavit met OCGA § 9-11-9.1's pleading requirements and mentioned Section 9-11-56 only to contrast summary-judgment evidentiary requirements with that separate pleading standard. opinion →
Tante v. Herring, the opinion cites section 56 only generally after resolving substantive fiduciary-duty and malpractice issues; it does not interpret or decide any requirement of the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Wallace v. Boys Club of Albany, Georgia, Inc., the entire staged passage is a dissent criticizing the majority's evidentiary analysis, so its subsection (e) discussion is not the court's holding. opinion →
Morgan v. Braasch, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the routine proposition that it viewed the evidence in favor of the summary-judgment opponents before deciding negligence and causation issues; it does not construe the statute. opinion →
Southern Mutual Insurance v. Mason, the opinion cites subsection (c) only while introducing facts viewed favorably to the nonmovant and then decides an insurance-policy exclusion; it does not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Howell v. Southern Heritage Insurance, the opinion merely states that the appellant filed the appeal pursuant to subsection (h); it decides insurance-penalty issues and does not construe or apply the subsection. opinion →
Hutchinson v. Divorce & Custody Law Center of Arline Kerman & Associates, P. C., the opinion concerns the pleading-affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and mentions Section 9-11-56 only to contrast summary-judgment evidentiary standards with that separate pleading standard. opinion →
Conklin v. Zant, the court disposed of an enumeration concerning specification of facts with only an unexplained see citation to subsection (d); a bare citation supplies no holding about the statute. opinion →
Nationwide Mortgage Resources, Inc. v. Stalzer, the subsection (h) discussion appears only in a special concurrence and therefore does not establish the court's holding about appealability. opinion →
Sisk v. Patel, the case decides the pleading requirements of section 9-11-9.1 and mentions section 9-11-56 only to contrast its stricter evidentiary standard; no summary-judgment issue was before the court. opinion →
Daniel v. JOHN Q. CARTER ENTERPRISES, INC., the opinion is a dissenting opinion; its discussion of subsection (e)'s personal-knowledge requirement is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Okekpe v. Commerce Funding Corp., the opinion is a special concurrence; its discussion of subsection (h) and the unavailability of summary judgment in Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law filings is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Forest Lakes Home Owners Ass'n v. Green Industries, Inc., the court was deciding the timing and evidentiary rules for a post-settlement attorney-fee motion under section 9-15-14; its references to subsections (c) and (e) merely described another case's analogous summary-judgment procedure. opinion →
Holbrook v. Executive Conference Center, Inc., the opinion is a dissenting opinion; its application of the section 9-11-56 defendant-movant standard is not a holding of the court. opinion →
American Car Rentals, Inc. v. Walden Leasing, Inc., the opinion mentions Section 9-11-56 only while recounting that an earlier appeal vacated a dismissal order for procedural noncompliance; that reported prior ruling is procedural history, not a holding in this appeal. opinion →
Sheriff v. HOSPITAL AUTH., HOUSTON CTY., the statute appears only as a bare citation in the opening description of an appeal from summary judgment; the opinion decides premises-liability rules and does not construe Section 9-11-56. opinion →
Cardin v. Outdoor East, the Section 9-11-56 discussion appears only in a special concurrence and therefore is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Freeman v. Pittman, the opinion's Section 9-11-56 reference merely contrasts summary-judgment affidavit standards with the separate pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1; the court decides the malpractice claim and pleading-affidavit issue rather than construing Section 9-11-56. opinion →
Powley v. Precision Plumbing Co., the opinion is a special concurrence; its statement that subsection (c) did not authorize summary judgment is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Allstate Insurance v. Sapp, the opinion cites Section 9-11-56 only after resolving the substantive insurance-permission issue and concluding that the insurer was entitled to judgment; it does not construe the statute. opinion →
Vitner v. Miller, the opinion decides whether an expert affidavit satisfied OCGA § 9-11-9.1's pleading requirement and mentions Section 9-11-56 only to contrast that separate evidentiary standard. opinion →
Ramirez v. Golden, the opinion cites subsection (c) only after resolving the substantive defenses and concluding that the prevailing party was entitled to judgment; it does not construe the statute or state a distinct procedural rule. opinion →
Blake v. Kroger Co., the Section 9-11-56 analysis appears only in a special concurrence and therefore is not a holding of the court. opinion →
G & MSS TRUCKING, INC. v. Rich, the statute is cited only in a hypothetical statement that an uninsured-motorist carrier would have been entitled to summary judgment; the court decides insurance-coverage and limitation issues, not Section 9-11-56. opinion →
Beasley v. Agricredit Acceptance Corp., the opinion cites subsection (e) only after resolving the substantive novation defense and concluding that the claimant was entitled to judgment; it does not construe or distinctly apply the subsection's evidentiary rule. opinion →
Dorsey v. CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY, INC., the opinion invokes subsection (h) only to state the procedural route by which the partial-summary-judgment appeal was filed; it does not decide any issue about the subsection. opinion →
Ford v. Whipple, the Section 9-11-56 discussion appears only in a dissenting opinion and therefore is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Johnson & Johnson v. Kaufman, the entire staged passage is a dissent discussing appellate discovery procedure and cites subsection (c) only by analogy to the distinction between state and federal procedural law. opinion →
Stout v. Cincinnati Insurance, the opinion mentions section 56 only in a hypothetical statement that an uninsured-motorist carrier would be entitled to summary judgment if the tortfeasor were insured; it does not decide a summary-judgment issue. opinion →
Utica Mutual Insurance v. Mitchell, the Section 9-11-56 references appear only in a dissenting opinion and therefore are not holdings of the court. opinion →
Adams v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the Section 9-11-56 discussion appears only in a dissenting opinion and therefore is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Aycock v. Calk, the only express Section 9-11-56 citation recounts a prior appellate ruling that converted a dismissal into summary judgment for lack of notice; that ruling is procedural history, while this appeal concerns preclusion and compulsory counterclaims. opinion →
Aycock v. Calk, the opinion mentions Section 9-11-56 only while recounting a prior appeal's procedural ruling; the current decision addresses res judicata, collateral estoppel, and compulsory counterclaims. opinion →
Dental One Associates, Inc. v. JKR Realty Associates, Ltd., the opinion cites subsection (a) only in procedural history to identify the motion the plaintiff filed; it decides appeal timeliness and substantive contract issues, not the statute. opinion →
Jones v. Ingles Markets, Inc., the subsection (e) burden-shifting analysis appears only in a concurrence, so it does not establish the court's majority holding about the statute. opinion →
Desai v. Silver Dollar City, Inc., the opinion is a dissenting opinion; its discussion of subsection (e)'s burden of production is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Sharfuddin v. Drug Emporium, Inc., the only opinion text discussing § 9-11-56 is a dissent; it does not state a holding of the court. opinion →
Supchak v. Pruitt, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only to describe the procedural vehicle for an appeal while the claim against another defendant remained pending; it does not decide what subsection (h) means or requires. opinion →
Kobryn v. McGee, the opinion cites subsection (c) only with a general ‘see generally’ signal while evaluating whether an affidavit supports a boundary-line claim; it does not construe or decide any requirement of the statute. opinion →
Harris v. Murray, the only passage mentioning § 9-11-56 is a special concurrence focused on the separate malpractice-affidavit pleading statute, not a holding of the court about summary judgment. opinion →
Guinn Transport, Inc. v. Canal Insurance, the opinion cites subsection (h) only in procedural history to identify the authority under which the parties appealed; it decides insurance coverage and does not construe the statute. opinion →
Armstrong State College v. McGlynn, the opinion cites subsection (h) only to identify the procedural basis for the defendants’ direct appeal; it does not decide what subsection (h) means or requires. opinion →
Dominy v. Shumpert, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only to report that the plaintiff filed a direct appeal; it decides the merits of defamation privilege and does not construe the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Oxley v. Kilpatrick, the special concurrence invokes the statute only while criticizing the Supreme Court’s analysis and does not state or join a precedential holding construing the statute. opinion →
Ruby-Collins, Inc. v. Cobb County, the opinion cites subsection (h) only to report that the party brought a direct appeal from the trial court’s partial-summary-judgment order; it does not decide what subsection (h) means or requires. opinion →
Lostocco v. D'Eramo, the opinion cites subsection (e) only in a concluding string citation after resolving the cross-motions under contract and federal tax law; it does not construe any requirement of subsection (e). opinion →
Ackerman v. First National Bank of Grady County, the opinion cites subsection (h) only to report that the defendant brought a direct appeal from the trial court’s summary-judgment order; it does not decide the subsection’s meaning or application. opinion →
Frame v. Booth, Wade & Campbell, a Georgia General Partnership, the subsection (c) citation appears only in the appellant’s conditional argument about documents the trial court expressly said it did not rely on; the court did not decide the statute’s timing rule. opinion →
Mahan v. McRae, the Mahan custody opinion does not cite or decide section 9-11-56; the summary-judgment discussion in the staged text belongs to an unrelated slip-and-fall opinion appended after the Mahan majority and dissent. opinion →
Herndon v. Ajayi, the subsection (e) citation appears only in a footnote supporting an affidavit issue the court expressly said it need not address because it was not enumerated as error; the holding rests on unrebutted expert evidence, not construction of the statute. opinion →
Ahearn v. Westrec Management, Inc., the opinion mentions subsection (a) only in its case-specific conclusion that the appellant’s inadequate brief showed no argued reason to disturb partial summary judgment; it does not construe or decide a requirement of the statute. opinion →
Anthem Casualty Insurance v. Murray, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Finch v. Doe, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Rent To Own, Inc. v. Bragg, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Thompson v. City of Fitzgerald, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Herman Homes, Inc. v. Smith, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Preferred Real Estate Equities, Inc. v. Housing Systems, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Tongnan Fa Corp. v. Wang, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Roach v. Gwinnett County, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Mitchell Motors, Inc. v. Barnett, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Johnston v. Conasauga Radiology, PC, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Holman v. Ferrell, the statute appears only in a footnote or supporting citation while the court decides another issue without independently construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
Patrick v. MacOn Housing Authority, the only supplied opinion is a dissent; its discussion of subsection (e), inferences, and the need to deny summary judgment therefore is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Snipes v. Housing Auth. of DeKalb County, the supplied opinion is solely a dissent; its detailed discussion of subsections (c) and (e) does not constitute a holding of the court. opinion →
Palmer v. Constantin, the subsection (f) citation appears only in Palmer’s rejected argument; the court held that the dismissal was not converted into a summary-judgment motion and therefore did not apply the statute. opinion →
Northside Equities, Inc. v. Hulsey, the supplied opinion is solely a dissent, so its discussion of subsection (c) and the proposed summary-judgment analysis is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Southcom Group, Inc. v. Plath, section 9-11-56 appears only in a footnote reporting the appellant's unaddressed claim that it lacked 30 days to respond; the court resolved the appeal on a different arbitration issue and expressly declined to reach remaining claims. opinion →
Department of Transportation v. Dupree, the section appears only in a parenthetical description within a string of authorities about the separate professional-affidavit requirement; the court did not decide what section 9-11-56 means or requires. opinion →
Stewart v. Milliken, the subsection (h) discussion appears only in a dissent criticizing the majority’s jurisdictional ruling; it is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Kellett v. Klein, the only section 9-11-56 reference appears in a footnote explaining that the judge's stray statement meant counsel could file conforming affidavits; the court held that the proceeding was not a summary-judgment proceeding and decided contempt issues instead. opinion →
John Deere Co. v. Haralson, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only while recounting the procedural history of an earlier appeal from partial summary judgment; it does not decide any issue about subsection (h). opinion →
Thompson v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., the court mentioned section 9-11-56 only to distinguish the derivative-action motion before it from a usual summary-judgment motion; it expressly stated that the motion did not technically fit that category and did not construe the statute. opinion →
Dickens v. State, the opinion cites section 9-11-56 only as an example of statutory authority permitting affidavits in summary-judgment proceedings while deciding a different question about affidavits on a motion for new trial. opinion →
Mason v. Chateau Communities, Inc., the section 9-11-56 discussion appears only in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, so it does not establish the court's holding about the statute. opinion →
Waste Management of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Systems, LLC, the opinion quotes its prior appeal's instruction to provide notice and a hearing under subsection (c) only while recounting procedural history; the present holding addresses contract interpretation rather than the statute. opinion →
Charles H. Wesley Education Foundation, Inc. v. State Election Board, the section 9-11-56 conversion-and-notice discussion appears only in a dissent, so it does not establish the court's holding about the statute. opinion →
Dickson v. Amick, the only section 9-11-56 language is contained in the opinion's quotation of the trial court's order, which is reported procedural history rather than an appellate holding about the statute. opinion →
Abimbola v. Pate, the opinion mentions subsection (c) only while reporting the trial court's reconsideration ruling that a marshal's affidavit was untimely; the appellate court did not decide that statutory issue. opinion →
Rothschild II v. Columbus Consolidated Government, the opinion mentions section 9-11-56 only as a general observation that the government could later move for summary judgment on the merits; the court decided a standing procedure issue, not the statute. opinion →
McCullers v. Harrell, the subsection (c) citation appears in the appellant’s argument, but the court held the underlying motion was not one for summary judgment and that the statute had not been shown to control. opinion →
Robinson v. GLOBAL RESOURCES, INC., the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the general summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether the defendants had responded to requests for admission under section 9-11-36. opinion →
Williams v. Baker County, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general summary-judgment standard; it decides the substantive respondeat-superior issue and does not construe section 9-11-56. opinion →
Reynolds Properties, Inc. v. Bickelmann, the opinion recites section 9-11-56's general standard and then decides a contractual right to a real-estate commission without construing the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Harrell v. Houston County, the section appears only in a footnote supporting the routine summary-judgment standard; the court's holdings concern municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983. opinion →
CARRAGHER v. Potts, the citation to subsection (c) supplies only the general summary-judgment standard; the court's holdings concern the attorney-lien statute and factual disputes under that law. opinion →
Bradley v. Johnston, the opinion cites subsection (c) only after resolving a contingent-fee contract dispute; it does not interpret or state a rule about the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
King v. Pioneer Regional Educational Service Agency, the subsection (c) citation is only a routine statement of the summary-judgment standard; the court decided federal due-process and sovereign-immunity issues. opinion →
Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, the opinion quotes section 9-11-56 only as the general summary-judgment framework and resolves the parties' employment-contract and fiduciary-duty claims under other law. opinion →
OCONEE LAND & TIMBER, LLC v. Buchanan, the subsection (c) citation appears only in the boilerplate standard of review; the decision turns on the legal sufficiency of a land description in a contract. opinion →
Davis v. Overall, the subsection (c) citation merely states the general summary-judgment standard before the court resolves substantive easement, nuisance, trespass, and declaratory-judgment claims. opinion →
Jones v. Warner, the court cites subsection (c) only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard before deciding tort claims and official-immunity issues under other law. opinion →
Onbrand Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., the subsection (c) citation is part of the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided the plaintiffs' numerous substantive contract and tort claims. opinion →
Krachman v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the routine summary-judgment standard and resolves statutory immunity and false-imprisonment issues under other law. opinion →
Solley v. MULLINS TRUCKING CO., INC., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the standard governing summary judgment and decides whether an employer owed or breached a substantive tort duty. opinion →
Techbios, Inc. v. Champagne, the appellant argued that consideration of outside materials required treatment under section 9-11-56, but the court expressly declined to consider that enumeration after reversing on pleading sufficiency. opinion →
Radha Krishna, Inc. v. Desai, the subsection (c) citation is part of the general standard of review; the holdings concern a commercial lease, tenancy at will, and the statute of limitation. opinion →
Northland Insurance Co. v. American Home Assurance Co., the subsection (c) citation supplies only the general summary-judgment standard; the court's holdings construe competing insurance policies and their contribution obligations. opinion →
Stefano Arts v. Sui, the opinion uses subsection (c) only to introduce the general summary-judgment standard and resolves contract and tortious-interference issues under substantive law. opinion →
Western Surety Co. v. Apac-Southeast, Inc., the opinion recites the familiar summary-judgment burden framework but decides contractual assignment, payment-bond liability, and preservation of prejudgment-interest issues without construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
YUREVICH v. Williams, the court cites subsection (c) only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard and resolves payment under a promissory note, divorce decree, and attorney's lien under substantive law. opinion →
Georgia Messenger Service, Inc. v. Bradley, the only section 9-11-56 citation states the routine subsection (c) standard; the procedural ruling about unfiled depositions rests on section 9-11-29.1 and precedent, not a construction of section 9-11-56. opinion →
Rasnick v. KRISHNA HOSPITALITY, INC., section 9-11-56 appears only in a footnote supporting the general standard of review; the holding concerns whether an innkeeper owed a substantive duty to render aid. opinion →
Richardson v. Phillips, the subsection (c) citation accompanies only the general summary-judgment standard; the opinion decides whether claims for declaratory relief and removal from office were moot. opinion →
Frier v. Frier, the subsection (c) citation only states the routine standard of review; the court resolved a substantive dispute over a payable-on-death account and divorce settlement. opinion →
Drury v. HARRIS VENTURES, INC., the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the general summary-judgment standard; the opinion decides negligent-hiring and respondeat-superior liability under substantive tort law. opinion →
Gliemmo v. Cousineau, the opinion mentions section 9-11-56 only in a parenthetical describing another case while deciding the constitutionality of a different medical-malpractice statute; it does not decide anything about section 9-11-56. opinion →
Aequicap Insurance Co. v. Canal Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation merely states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided insurance coverage under an MCS-90 endorsement and federal motor-carrier law. opinion →
Jimenez v. Gilbane Building Co., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general summary-judgment standard and resolves whether an enforceable written indemnity agreement existed under contract law. opinion →
Dixie Group Inc. v. Shaw Industries Group, Inc., subsection (c) appears only in a footnote supporting the routine standard, and subsection (h) is cited conditionally as one possible jurisdictional basis; the holdings concern product liability and declaratory relief. opinion →
Mandato & Associates, Inc. v. Sepulveda Masonry, the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard of review; the decision turns on the insurance subrogation statute's written-consent requirement. opinion →
Georgia State Financing & Investment Commission v. XL Specialty Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation is only the routine standard of review; the holdings concern construction of a roof bond and evidence of defective construction work. opinion →
C. Ingram Co. v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., the court cites subsection (c) only for the familiar summary-judgment standard and decides insurance coverage, cancellation, exclusion, and rescission issues under other law. opinion →
Barrett v. Georgia Department of Transportation, the opinion recites the ordinary summary-judgment standard before deciding the Department of Transportation's statutory and premises-liability duties; it does not construe section 9-11-56. opinion →
Beacham v. CALVARY PORTFOLIO SERVICES, LLC, the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the general summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether a creditor proved compliance with statutory notice requirements for a vehicle deficiency claim. opinion →
Columbia County v. Branton, section 9-11-56 supplies only the general standard; the appeal is decided by whether separate limitation statutes tolled the deadline for serving an ante litem notice. opinion →
Lampkin v. FIRST COMMUNITY BANK OF TIFTON, section 9-11-56 appears only in a routine statement of the summary-judgment standard; the court decided substantive fraud and foreclosure issues. opinion →
Dowdell v. Wilhelm, the subsection (c) citation states only the standard of review, while the holding concerns superseding proximate cause in a wrongful-death action. opinion →
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Neal, the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote supporting the routine summary-judgment standard; the opinion decides whether an intentional shooting was an accident under a homeowner's policy. opinion →
Decision One Mortgage Co. v. Victor Warren Properties, Inc., the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote supporting the general summary-judgment standard; the holdings concern equitable relief from a foreclosure sale contract. opinion →
Bailey v. STONECREST CONDOMINIUM ASS'N, the subsection (c) citation is only the general standard; the opinion resolves discriminatory-intent, Fair Housing Act, fiduciary-duty, damages, and fee issues under substantive law. opinion →
USF Corp. v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., the subsection (c) citation merely states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court interpreted successive security-services contracts and resolved breach and negligence claims. opinion →
Paschal v. FULTON-DEKALB HOSP. AUTH. EMPLS., subsection (c) appears only in a footnote supporting the routine standard, and the court decides limitations and fiduciary-duty issues concerning retirement benefits. opinion →
Geiger v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation only introduces the standard of review; the court decided insurance coverage and related substantive claims arising from a default judgment. opinion →
Paschal v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority Employees Retirement Plan, the only citation to subsection (c) is a footnote to the general summary-judgment standard; the holdings concern accrual, tolling, and fiduciary duties under a retirement plan. opinion →
Pew v. One Buckhead Loop Condominium Ass'n, the subsection (c) citation is only a routine statement of the summary-judgment standard; the opinion resolves condominium assessments, fees, estoppel, and discovery-management issues under other law. opinion →
Rakusin v. Radiology Associates of Atlanta, P.C., the subsection (c) citation merely states the general summary-judgment standard; the court interpreted statutory procedures governing valuation and payment for a deceased shareholder's stock. opinion →
Rolan v. Glass, the subsection (c) citation only introduces the general standard; the decision addresses bona fide purchaser status, lis pendens, contract expiration, and laches. opinion →
Rel Development, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., the subsection (c) citation only states the routine summary-judgment standard; the opinion decides substantive issues concerning mitigation and acceleration of promissory notes. opinion →
Fulton County v. T-Mobile South, LLC, subsection (h) appears only in a footnote within a list of appeal statutes; the jurisdictional analysis turns on the discretionary-appeal statute and the finality of the order, while the merits concern tax-refund law. opinion →
Cagle Construction, LLC v. Travelers Indemnity Co., section 9-11-56 is cited only for the general standard and in applying undisputed contract evidence; the holdings concern indemnity liability, damages, and the limitation period. opinion →
Stone Mountain Collision Center v. General Casualty Co. of Wisconsin, the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether an insurer waived a contractual two-year limitation period. opinion →
Newton's Crest Homeowners' Ass'n v. Camp, the opinion states only the ordinary summary-judgment and appellate-review standards before resolving contractual indemnity, nuisance, and trespass issues. opinion →
Lake v. APH ENTERPRISES, LLC, section 9-11-56 is cited only for the general movant standard and absence-of-evidence formulation; the holding concerns an out-of-possession landlord's substantive liability. opinion →
Baxter v. Fairfield Financial Services, Inc., the subsection (c) citation merely supplies the standard of review; the opinion decides res judicata, choice-of-law, guaranty, fraud, and attorney-fee issues under other law. opinion →
Naraine v. City of Atlanta, the opinion invokes subsections (c) and (e) while applying the usual summary-judgment framework, but its holdings concern municipal duties, notice, causation, and sovereign immunity. opinion →
Ellis v. Ingle, the subsection (c) citation merely states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided substantive claims concerning a closing attorney's handling of an indemnity agreement. opinion →
Nesbitt v. Wilde, the subsection (c) citation only introduces the standard of review; the opinion decides real-party-in-interest issues arising from a mortgage assignment and bankruptcy. opinion →
Shaw v. Robertson, the subsection (c) citation only introduces the general standard; the court decides fraud, due diligence, and disclosure duties in a real-estate transaction. opinion →
Smith v. HILLTOP POOLS AND SPAS, INC., the subsection (c) citation is a routine statement of the summary-judgment standard; the holdings concern limitation periods and the absence of substantive fraud evidence. opinion →
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the court cites subsection (c) only for the routine summary-judgment standard and resolves priority and enforceability issues involving security deeds. opinion →
Lankford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation merely states the general standard of review; the court decided whether notice of an uninsured-motorist claim complied with the insurance policies. opinion →
Pendley v. Southern Regional Health System, Inc., the opinion recites the general subsection (c) and burden-shifting standards while deciding medical-malpractice proof, physician agency, and expert-qualification issues under other law. opinion →
Bruscato v. O'BRIEN, section 9-11-56 supplies only the general summary-judgment standard in a footnote; the opinion's holdings concern medical-malpractice injury and public-policy defenses. opinion →
Ansley v. Ansley, subsection (c) appears only in a footnote to the standard of review; the decision turns on shareholder agreements, parol evidence, and limitation law. opinion →
Powerhouse Custom Homes, Inc. v. 84 Lumber Co., the subsection (c) citation supplies only the general standard, and the court decides whether the parties formed an enforceable settlement agreement. opinion →
Gibson Construction Co. v. GAA Acquisitions I, LLC, the opinion cites subsection (c) solely for the familiar summary-judgment standard and decides claims involving foreclosure proceeds, conversion, and declaratory relief. opinion →
WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC. v. Lambdin, the subsection (c) citation is only the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether evidence supported negligence in an automobile collision. opinion →
Textile Rubber & Chemical Co. v. Thermo-Flex Technologies, Inc., the subsection (c) citation is part of the routine standard of review; the holdings concern contract damages, statutory attorney fees, fraud, reliance, and indemnity. opinion →
AAF-McQuay, Inc. v. Willis, the subsection (c) citation only introduces the general summary-judgment standard; the court resolved substantive partnership-contract, fiduciary-duty, and waiver issues. opinion →
Costello Industries, Inc. v. Eagle Grooving, Inc., the subsection (c) citation merely states the general standard; the opinion resolves whether disputed facts showed formation and breach of a construction subcontract. opinion →
Yancey v. Watkins, the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard of review; the court decided substantive negligence and trespass liability for chemical drift. opinion →
Duke Galish, LLC v. Manton, section 9-11-56 is cited only for the routine movant and appellate standards, while the holdings concern contract breach and the availability of nominal damages. opinion →
Wright v. VIF/Valentine Farms Building One, LLC, the subsection (c) citation introduces the standard of review; the appeal is decided under trespass, successor-liability, and spoliation principles. opinion →
Office Depot, Inc. v. District at Howell Mill, LLC, the subsection (c) citation merely states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided substantive lease, estoppel, termination, and attorney-fee issues. opinion →
Madison Retail Suwanee, LLC v. Orion Enterprises Sales & Service, Inc., subsection (c) appears only in a footnote supporting the general standard of review; the opinion resolves commercial lease and contract issues under substantive law. opinion →
Crouch v. Bent Tree Community, Inc., section 9-11-56 is cited only in applying the ordinary no-genuine-issue standard to covenant enforcement; the attorney-fee ruling turns on a separate statute. opinion →
Perdue v. Atlanta Building Maintenance Co., section 9-11-56 appears only in a footnote supporting the general summary-judgment standard; the opinion decides substantive premises and contractor-liability issues. opinion →
Lewis v. RITZ CARLTON HOTEL CO., LLC, the opinion recites the general absence-of-evidence standard before deciding false-imprisonment and malicious-prosecution claims under substantive tort law. opinion →
Saiia Construction, LLC v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., the subsection (c) citation only states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decides which limitation period governs professional-malpractice claims. opinion →
Cohen v. ALFRED & ADELE DAVIS ACADEMY, INC., the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote giving the familiar summary-judgment standard; the holding concerns offer-of-settlement and damages law. opinion →
Wilhelm v. Houston County, the section is cited only for the general summary-judgment and appellate-review standard; the holdings concern repose, fraud, nuisance, and county control. opinion →
Georgia Neurology & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Hiller, the subsection (c) citation merely supplies the general standard, while the opinion decides collateral estoppel and the effect of an incomplete appellate record. opinion →
City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, section 9-11-56 appears only in a footnote reciting the ordinary summary-judgment standard; the opinion resolves municipal taxation and constitutional issues. opinion →
Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the standard of review and resolves insurance notice, defense, indemnity, and exclusion issues. opinion →
Legacy Communities Group, Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., the section is used only to state the general standard of review; the court decided substantive disputes involving promissory notes, foreclosures, and guaranties. opinion →
Cotton v. Smith, the section 9-11-56 discussion is only the general summary-judgment and appellate standard; the holdings concern official immunity and school-release duties. opinion →
Coca-Cola Bottlers' Sales & Services Co. LLC v. Novelis Corp., the subsection (c) citation merely accompanies the routine standard of review; the court resolved substantive contract claims, counterclaims, and affirmative defenses. opinion →
Crawford v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp., the subsection (c) citation states only the general standard, and the decision turns on a title-insurance exclusion, actual knowledge, and unanswered admissions. opinion →
Campbell v. THE LANDINGS ASS'N, INC., section 9-11-56 is cited only for de novo review of summary judgment; the opinion decides title and prescription issues concerning real property. opinion →
Thompson v. Floyd, the opinion states the ordinary subsection (c) burden framework and then resolves fact disputes concerning contract, promissory-estoppel, and fraud claims without construing the statute. opinion →
Barna Log Homes of Georgia, Inc. v. Wischmann, the subsection (c) citation is limited to the routine standard of review; the ruling concerns whether written statements were actionable libel. opinion →
Sutter Capital Management, LLC v. Wells Capital, Inc., the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the routine standard of review; the court decided whether an investor list qualified as a trade secret. opinion →
Boller v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Center, Inc., the opinion quotes the general movant and burden-shifting standards but resolves substantive wrongful-death, duty, causation, and third-party-beneficiary issues. opinion →
WILLINGHAM LOAN & REALTY CO. v. Washington, the section is cited only to state the general summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether evidence established causation in a premises-liability action. opinion →
Laun v. AXA Equitable Life Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation merely states the routine standard of review; the court interpreted disability-insurance policy provisions. opinion →
Griffin v. STATE BANK OF COCHRAN, the subsection (c) citation only supplies the general standard of review; the opinion resolves promissory-note, guaranty, fraud, securities-law, estoppel, and attorney-fee issues. opinion →
In Re Estate of Tapley, section 9-11-56 is cited only for the general summary-judgment standard; the opinion's holdings concern law of the case, damages, jury trial, and attorney fees in an estate dispute. opinion →
Fundus America (Atlanta) Ltd. Partnership v. RHOC Consolidation, LLC, subsection (c) appears only in a footnote supporting the ordinary summary-judgment standard; the opinion resolves commercial lease and contract claims under substantive law. opinion →
Flynt v. Life of the South Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard of review; the holdings concern insurance incontestability, coverage, prejudgment interest, and bad-faith penalties. opinion →
Paragon Technologies, Inc. v. InfoSmart Technologies, Inc., the subsection (c) citation only states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided the enforceability of a restrictive covenant. opinion →
Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Agriculture, the court cites subsection (c) only for the familiar summary-judgment standard and decides compliance with the Georgia Open Records Act. opinion →
Hawkins v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc., the opinion uses the general summary-judgment standard while deciding specialized medical-causation and expert-evidence issues under wrongful-death and medical law. opinion →
Rector of Christ Church v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., the staged passage mentions subsection (c) only in a dissent arguing that factual disputes precluded summary judgment; it is not the court’s holding. opinion →
Jones v. Allen, the subsection (c) citation is only the general standard of review; the court decided substantive official-immunity questions involving medical treatment. opinion →
Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. Fairlawn on Jones Homeowners' Ass'n, subsection (c) appears only in a footnote to the standard of review; the holdings concern condominium liens, construction obligations, and attorney fees. opinion →
Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Baxter, the only Section 9-11-56 issue was an affidavit objection reported from the appellee's argument that the court expressly declined to consider because it did not affect the holding. opinion →
Watts & Colwell Builders, Inc. v. Martin, the subsection (c) citation supplies only the ordinary standard, and the decision turns on premises liability and a landlord's notice of an allegedly defective door. opinion →
Omni Builders Risk, Inc. v. Bennett, the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard for summary judgment; the opinion decides whether a mediated settlement agreement bound a principal. opinion →
Prine v. Blanton, the section 9-11-56 citation gives only the general review standard; the opinion decides testamentary capacity, undue influence, and admissibility of medical records. opinion →
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bauman, section 9-11-56 is merely cited after the court construes an insurance policy's child-care exclusion; the decision does not construe the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Wingate Land, LLC v. Valuefirst, Inc., the section 9-11-56 citation only states the ordinary movant standard; the holding concerns negligent real-estate appraisal and the economic-loss rule. opinion →
Hays v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., subsection (c) is cited only for the general standard of review, and the opinion resolves the scope of a homeowner's insurance exclusion. opinion →
Sands v. Lindsey, the subsection (c) citation supplies only the familiar standard; the appeal is decided under premises-liability rules concerning invitees, licensees, and wilful or wanton conduct. opinion →
Ghodrati v. Stearnes, the subsection (c) citation only states the routine summary-judgment standard; the court decided whether evidence showed severe emotional distress. opinion →
Mough v. Progressive Max Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation merely introduces the general summary-judgment standard; the court decided uninsured-motorist coverage for an intentional shooting. opinion →
Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Wabash National Corp., the opinion recites the standard and essential-element formulation but resolves product-defect, assignment, and damages claims without construing section 9-11-56. opinion →
James v. Intown Ventures, LLC, subsection (c) is cited only in applying the general no-genuine-issue standard to disputed service and res judicata in a quiet-title case. opinion →
Littlefield Construction Co. v. Bozeman, the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote supporting the routine summary-judgment standard; the opinion resolves substantive construction and negligence claims. opinion →
Dunn-Craft v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote supporting the general standard; the holdings concern automobile-insurance coverage and policy interpretation. opinion →
Bd of Commissioners . v. City Commissioners, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 only in a footnote accompanying the general summary-judgment standard; its holding concerns construction of the parties’ waste-service contract, not the statute. opinion →
Board of Commissioners v. City Commissioners, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 only as support for the familiar summary-judgment standard before deciding a contract-construction dispute; it does not construe or otherwise decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Fox v. Korucu, the opinion recites § 9-11-56(c)’s general standard before deciding whether evidence created a factual dispute under child-custody modification law; it does not interpret the statute. opinion →
Fox v. Korucu, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general summary-judgment standard and resolves the appeal under the substantive law governing child-custody modification. opinion →
Windermere Development, Inc. v. Bank of North Ga, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general summary-judgment standard; its holding interprets the foreclosure-confirmation statute and whether related debts were inextricably intertwined. opinion →
Bank of North Georgia v. Windermere Development, Inc., the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general summary-judgment standard; its holding concerns the separate foreclosure-confirmation statute and inextricably intertwined debts. opinion →
Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co. v. State, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only after reciting the general summary-judgment standard; its holdings concern maritime preemption, the borrowed-servant doctrine, and contract damages rather than the statute. opinion →
Zions First National Bank v. MacKe, the opinion merely recites § 9-11-56(c)’s familiar standard before resolving fiduciary-duty, restrictive-covenant, conspiracy, and wrongful-foreclosure claims under other law. opinion →
Greenway v. Northside Hospital, Inc., section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening statement of the general summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern potential tort liability for the euthanasia of the plaintiff’s dogs. opinion →
Courter v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, the statute appears only in a footnote supporting the general summary-judgment standard, while the court decides a premises-liability issue concerning the plaintiff’s knowledge of a slippery surface. opinion →
Graham v. Cobb County, Georgia, the court recites § 9-11-56(c)’s ordinary standard at the outset but decides claims arising from an inmate’s medical care under immunity, contract, and tort law rather than construing the statute. opinion →
Wright v. Cofield, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general summary-judgment standard before deciding whether an alleged oral employment agreement was sufficiently definite and supported by disputed evidence. opinion →
Graham v. Cobb County, the opinion recites § 9-11-56(c)’s general standard before resolving immunity and tort claims arising from an inmate’s medical treatment; it does not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Zions First National Bank v. Macke, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only as part of the routine standard of review; the court’s holdings address fiduciary duties, restrictive covenants, conspiracy, and wrongful foreclosure. opinion →
Courter v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC, the statute appears only in a footnote to the general summary-judgment standard, and the appeal is decided under premises-liability rules concerning equal knowledge of a hazard. opinion →
Wright v. Cofield, the court quotes § 9-11-56(c)’s general standard only as a preface to deciding whether evidence supported an enforceable oral employment agreement; it does not construe the statute. opinion →
Tallahassee State Bank v. MacOn, the opinion invokes § 9-11-56 only to state the established burdens and review standard for summary judgment before deciding priority between competing security deeds under other statutes and common-law merger principles. opinion →
Tallahassee State Bank v. Macon, the court cites § 9-11-56 only while reciting the ordinary summary-judgment burdens; its holdings concern merger by deed and the priority of security interests, not the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Smith v. Lott, section 9-11-56(c) appears only inside a footnote’s quotation from another case about when a hearing transcript is unnecessary; this court’s holdings concern the appellate record and official immunity. opinion →
Contract Furniture Refinishing v. Remanufacturing, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the routine summary-judgment standard and resolves contract, fraud, limitations, trade-secret, and discovery issues under other law. opinion →
Smith v. Lott, section 9-11-56(c) is quoted only within a footnote discussing another case’s exception to the need for a hearing transcript; the opinion itself decides appellate-record and official-immunity issues. opinion →
Contract Furniture Refinishing & Maintenance Corp. v. Remanufacturing & Design Group, LLC, the statute is cited only in the opening recitation of the general summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern contract definiteness, limitation periods, trade secrets, and discovery. opinion →
Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general summary-judgment standard before deciding workers’ compensation exclusivity and corporate-officer liability under other law. opinion →
Gaulden v. Green, the court cites § 9-11-56(c) only while stating the ordinary summary-judgment standard and resolves the appeal under substantive professional-negligence law concerning a medical director’s duty. opinion →
Gaulden v. Green, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening general standard; the court’s holdings concern whether a medical director owed duties supporting professional- and ordinary-negligence claims. opinion →
Georgia Cash America, Inc. v. Greene, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the familiar summary-judgment standard before deciding arbitration, payday-lending, de facto lender, and Georgia RICO issues. opinion →
Georgia Cash America, Inc. v. Greene, the statute is mentioned only in the general summary-judgment standard; the holdings concern arbitration sanctions and whether the defendant was the de facto lender in unlawful payday loans. opinion →
Harris v. Peterson, the opinion quotes a general summary-judgment standard under § 9-11-56 before resolving factual disputes about an attorney-in-fact’s authority and self-dealing; it does not construe the statute. opinion →
Meek v. Mallory & Evans, Inc., the court cites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c) only to state the ordinary standard before deciding lease extension, surrender, damages, and attorney-fee issues under substantive contract law. opinion →
Foster v. Southern Regional Health, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general standard of review and decides whether emergency-room physicians were hospital agents under a separate healthcare-liability statute. opinion →
Foster v. Southern Regional Health System, Inc., section 9-11-56(c) is cited only in the opening general standard; the court’s holding interprets a separate statute governing hospital agency for healthcare professionals. opinion →
H. O. P. E. Through Divine Interventions v. Fulton, the statute is cited only for the routine summary-judgment standard, while the opinion decides whether property qualified for a charitable-use ad valorem tax exemption. opinion →
H.O.P.E. Through Divine Interventions, Inc. v. Fulton County Board of Tax Assessors, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in a footnote to the general summary-judgment standard; the court’s holding concerns the statutory tax exemption for property used by a public charity. opinion →
Old Republic National Title Ins v. Panella, the opinion references § 9-11-56(c) only in a footnote to the general standard before resolving title-insurance agency, indemnification, and limitation issues under other law. opinion →
Johnson v. Price Omondi, the only discussion of § 9-11-56 appears in a dissent criticizing the majority's disposition, so it is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Johnson v. Omondi, this staged passage is expressly a dissent, so its discussion of § 9-11-56 is not a holding of the court. opinion →
Eaddy v. Precision Franchising, LLC, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only while recounting the procedural history of an earlier withdrawn appeal; the court's holding concerns attorney fees under section 9-11-68, not summary-judgment procedure. opinion →
Eaddy v. Precision Franchising, LLC, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only while recounting the procedural history of an earlier withdrawn appeal; the court's holding concerns attorney fees under section 9-11-68, not summary-judgment procedure. opinion →
Georgia Farm Bureaus Mutual Insurance Co. v. Franks, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only in a footnote stating the general summary-judgment standard; its holdings concern an insured’s interest and entitlement under a homeowner’s policy. opinion →
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Franks, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in a footnote reciting the ordinary standard, while the court resolves homeowner-policy and insurable-interest issues under substantive insurance law. opinion →
Citifinancial Services, Inc. v. Varner, the court cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general standard of review and decides the bank’s entitlement to equitable subrogation under substantive lien law. opinion →
Citifinancial Services Inc. v. Varner, section 9-11-56(c) is quoted only as the routine opening standard; the holding concerns equitable subrogation and lien priority, not the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Garrett v. Southern Health Corporation of Ellijay, Inc., the opinion recites § 9-11-56(c)’s general standard before construing an option agreement and deciding contract, fraudulent-inducement, and damages issues under substantive law. opinion →
Garrett v. Southern Health Corp. of Ellijay, Inc., the statute appears only in the opening summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern construction and breach of an option agreement and a fraudulent-inducement counterclaim. opinion →
Rich v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only for the general standard before the court decides whether a creditor timely sent statutory notice after repossessing a vehicle. opinion →
Rich v. Ford Motor Credit Co., the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only as a general preface and resolves the appeal under the separate statute governing notice before recovery of a vehicle-loan deficiency. opinion →
Garner and Glover Company v. Barrett, the statute is cited only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard; the court’s holding is the substantive rule that an expert affidavit cannot create a legal duty where none otherwise exists. opinion →
Garner & Glover Co. v. Barrett, the opinion merely cites § 9-11-56(c) in its general standard before deciding under substantive tort law whether an insurance producer owed a legal duty to an additional insured. opinion →
United Community Bank v. Pack, the court invokes § 9-11-56 only for the familiar movant burden and de novo review standard before deciding whether a divorce decree conveyed specifically described real property. opinion →
United Community Bank v. Pack, section 9-11-56 is cited only for the standard of review; the opinion decides under property and domestic-relations law whether a divorce decree specifically described and conveyed land. opinion →
Nash v. Township Investments, LLC, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the routine summary-judgment standard before applying promissory-note and consideration law to conflicting evidence. opinion →
Nash v. Township Investments, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) is merely part of the opening standard; the court’s holding concerns whether conflicting evidence created a defense of lack of consideration for a promissory note. opinion →
Sherman v. City of Atlanta, the opinion mentions subsection (e) only hypothetically to contrast what allegations and a verification might accomplish at summary judgment with the evidence required at a bond-validation trial; no summary-judgment issue was before the court. opinion →
McGraw v. IDS Property & Casualty Insurance, the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the opening standard and decides the amount of uninsured-motorist coverage under the insurance statutes and policy. opinion →
Panik v. Dunes Village Properties LLC, the court recites § 9-11-56(c)’s familiar standard before deciding under South Carolina substantive law whether evidence supported the elements of fraud. opinion →
Panik v. Dunes Village Properties, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard; the holding is that the plaintiff lacked evidence of a representation causing its fraud damages under South Carolina law. opinion →
Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. v. the City of McDonough, Georgia, the statute is cited only for the standard of review before the court resolves constitutional and statutory challenges to municipal development-impact fees. opinion →
Greater Atlanta Home Builders Ass'n v. City of McDonough, section 9-11-56(c) appears only as the general summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern municipal impact fees and substantive constitutional and statutory law. opinion →
Nixon v. Pierce County School District, the opinion cites subsection (c) while stating the ordinary burdens and jury-trial safeguard, but its holding turns on substantive causation law and the sufficiency of medical expert testimony. opinion →
Nixon v. Pierce County School District, the statute is referenced in footnotes to the ordinary standard and jury-trial safeguard; the decision addresses substantive medical causation and whether the expert evidence created a jury question. opinion →
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Croft, the opinion cites subsection (c) for the general standard before deciding insurance-policy and county-ordinance issues; it does not construe the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Herren v. Mitchell Electric Membership Corporation, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the routine standard of review; the court resolves easement, property-damage, and injunctive-relief issues under substantive law. opinion →
Marino v. Clary Lakes Homeowners Association, Inc., the opinion recites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c)’s general burden before resolving homeowners-association covenant and fee claims under substantive property and contract law. opinion →
Benfield v. Wells, the opinion concerns a statutory hybrid motion to dismiss a shareholder derivative action and mentions section 9-11-56 only to contrast that procedure with an ordinary summary-judgment motion; it does not decide any requirement of section 9-11-56. opinion →
Stc Two, LLC v. Irma Fox Shulman-Weiner, the court cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the general standard before deciding whether the parties formed an enforceable lease modification under substantive contract law. opinion →
STC Two, LLC v. Shulman-Weiner, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening general standard; the holding concerns formation and enforceability of a purported lease modification. opinion →
Everette Freeman v. Cassandra Smith, the opinion cites subsection (c) only as the general summary-judgment standard before resolving whistleblower causation, at-will employment, contract, and due-process claims. opinion →
Freeman v. Smith, the statute is quoted only in the standard of review; the court’s holdings concern substantive whistleblower, employment-contract, and due-process law. opinion →
Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. T & G Enterprises, Inc., the opinion cites § 9-11-56(c) only for the ordinary standard before deciding substantive insurance-coverage and contract issues. opinion →
Live Oak Group LLC v. City of Tybee Island, Georgia, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard; the court decides ripeness and inverse-condemnation issues under substantive land-use law. opinion →
City of Tybee Island v. Live Oak Group, LLC, the statute is cited only as the routine summary-judgment standard before the court resolves the ripeness of an inverse-condemnation claim. opinion →
Herren v. Sucher, the opinion mentions subsection (h) only while reporting how an earlier partial-summary-judgment order reached the appellate court; its holdings concern exculpatory agreements and successor liability. opinion →
Wade v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Company, the court cites subsection (c) only for the standard of review and decides uninsured-motorist exhaustion and apportionment issues under substantive insurance law. opinion →
Wade v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Co., section 9-11-56(c) is merely part of the opening standard; the holding addresses uninsured-motorist benefits, policy exhaustion, and apportionment of tortfeasor fault. opinion →
Herren v. Sucher, subsection (h) is mentioned only as procedural history explaining how one order was appealed; the opinion’s holdings concern releases, negligence, and successor liability. opinion →
Williams v. Contemporary Services Corporation, the opinion cites subsection (c) only in an analogy showing that a superior-court rule must yield to statutory law; it does not decide any issue under the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Williams v. Contemporary Services Corp., the opinion cites subsection (c) only in an analogy showing that a superior-court rule must yield to statutory law; it does not decide any issue under the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Thomas J. Burke D/B/A American Transport v. Prime Rate Premium Finance Corporation, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 only for the ordinary summary-judgment and appellate-review standards before deciding liability under an insurance premium finance agreement. opinion →
Dexter Swanstrom, Jr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard; the holding concerns corporate and individual liability for a business line of credit and an illegible guaranty. opinion →
Swanstrom v. Wells Fargo Bank, the statute is cited only for the opening standard before the court decides contract proof and the effect of an illegible personal guaranty. opinion →
Burke v. Prime Rate Premium Finance Corp., the court invokes § 9-11-56 only while reciting the general standard and resolves the appeal under the substantive terms of an insurance premium finance agreement. opinion →
First Chatham Bank v. Liberty Capital, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only in the opening standard; the court decides whether disputed evidence showed mutual mistake warranting reformation of a loan-purchase agreement. opinion →
First Chatham Bank v. Liberty Capital, LLC, the statute appears only in the general standard before the court resolves a substantive contract-reformation dispute concerning alleged mutual mistake. opinion →
Mastec North America, Inc. v. Wilson, the court recites subsection (c)’s ordinary standard and applies substantive negligent-hiring, retention, supervision, and entrustment law; it does not construe the statute. opinion →
Mastec North America, Inc. v. Wilson, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general review standard; the holdings concern substantive negligent-hiring, supervision, retention, and entrustment claims. opinion →
Wooden v. Synovus Bank, the subsection (c) citation merely accompanies the conclusion that the borrower was liable under unambiguous promissory notes; the holding rests on substantive negotiable-instrument and contract law. opinion →
Wooden v. Synovus Bank, the statute is cited for the ordinary standard and as support for the result; the court’s holding concerns liability under promissory notes and the inadmissibility of parol evidence. opinion →
L & K Enterprises, LLC v. City National Bank, N. A., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the opening standard before deciding wrongful-foreclosure and eviction claims under substantive lending and property law. opinion →
Debbie J. Sauls as Temporary Administrator of the Estate of Cheyenne Lane Sauls v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insuranc, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general standard of review before interpreting a homeowner-policy motor-vehicle exclusion under substantive insurance law. opinion →
Sauls v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening standard; the holding concerns whether a homeowner-policy exclusion bars claims arising from a fatal vehicle accident. opinion →
Dougherty Equipment Company, Inc. v. Roper, the opinion invokes § 9-11-56 only for the ordinary standard before resolving respondeat-superior, negligent-hiring, and negligent-entrustment claims under substantive tort law. opinion →
Dougherty Equipment Co. v. Roper, the statute appears only in the general standard; the holdings concern the substantive scope-of-employment presumption and negligent hiring and entrustment. opinion →
Fabian v. Pontikakis, the court cites subsection (c) only for the general standard before deciding whether integrated written real-estate contracts barred contrary parol evidence. opinion →
Fabian v. Pontikakis, section 9-11-56(c) is merely part of the opening standard; the holding concerns the parol-evidence rule and an integrated land-sale contract. opinion →
Assaf v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, the statute appears only in a footnote to the general summary-judgment standard; the court decides uninsured-motorist coverage under substantive insurance law. opinion →
Assaf v. Cincinnati Insurance, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only in a footnote stating the general standard before the court resolves an uninsured-motorist coverage dispute. opinion →
Nisbet v. Johnny J. Davis, as Surviving Spouse of Brenda Davis, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the standard of review and decides the applicability and evidentiary burden of a separate emergency-medical-care statute. opinion →
ANTHONY D. ADAMS, SR. v. DEWITT, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard; the holding concerns whether a real-estate appraiser owed a substantive duty of care to third parties. opinion →
Nisbet v. Davis, the statute is cited only for the ordinary standard before the court applies a separate medical-negligence statute and evaluates gross-negligence evidence. opinion →
Adams v. DeWitt, the subsection (c) citation is only a general procedural preface; the court’s holding addresses an appraiser’s substantive negligent-misrepresentation duty. opinion →
Taylor v. McGraw, the opinion quotes subsection (c)’s general standard before deciding substantive premises-liability and parental-supervision issues arising from a child’s burn injuries. opinion →
Cope v. Evans, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 only for the general movant burden before resolving substantive professional-negligence and causation issues. opinion →
Hill v. Vns Corporation D/B/A Choo Choo Lake Oconee, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening standard before the court decides a factual dispute over the amount of a materialman’s lien. opinion →
BOSTON Et Al. v. ATHEARN Et Al., the statute is quoted only for the general summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern parental supervision, defamation, and landowner duties under substantive tort law. opinion →
Owen v. Bank of the Ozarks, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the standard of review and resolves the enforceability of alleged oral banking agreements under substantive federal banking law. opinion →
Beamon v. Mahadevan, the statute appears only in the general standard before the court applies medical-malpractice and consortium limitation periods. opinion →
Beamon v. Mahadevan, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only in the opening standard; the holding determines accrual and limitation periods for medical-malpractice and loss-of-consortium claims. opinion →
Freeman v. Ltc Health Care of Statesboro Inc. D/B/A Westwood Nursing Center, the court states the general defendant-movant burden under subsection (c), but its holding concerns whether a nurse was qualified to give a medical-causation opinion. opinion →
Schaff v. Snapping Shoals Electric Membership Corporation, the subsection (c) citation appears only in a footnote to the general standard; the opinion decides negligence and duty issues involving a utility pole and guy wire. opinion →
Freeman v. LTC Healthcare of Statesboro, Inc., the opinion recites the general summary-judgment burden before deciding the substantive admissibility and scope of a nurse’s expert medical-causation opinion. opinion →
Schaff v. Snapping Shoals Electric Membership Corp., section 9-11-56(c) appears only in a footnote to the standard of review; the holding concerns substantive negligence, duty, and causation. opinion →
Rollins v. Rollins, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general standard of review before resolving trust, fiduciary-duty, and related substantive claims. opinion →
Hill v. Kone, Inc., the statute is cited only in the opening standard; the holding concerns a statutory spoliation presumption and elevator evidence. opinion →
RUMSEY v. GILLIS Et Al., the opinion references § 9-11-56 as the general standard and as procedural history; its holdings concern a contractual liquidated-damages clause and remaining counterclaims. opinion →
Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, the court recites the general burden under § 9-11-56 before deciding substantive premises-liability, negligence, causation, and superior-knowledge issues. opinion →
Holcomb v. Long, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard of review; the court’s holding interprets statutory immunity under the Equine Activities Act. opinion →
9766, LLC v. Dwarf House, Inc., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general summary-judgment standard before deciding the parties’ substantive property and contract dispute. opinion →
9766, LLC v. Dwarf House, Inc., section 9-11-56(c) appears only as the ordinary standard of review; the court’s holdings concern substantive property and contract issues. opinion →
Elekima v. Abbey Road Condominium Ass'n, the statute is cited only for the general summary-judgment standard before the court resolves substantive condominium-association claims. opinion →
Roberts v. Community & Southern Bank, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the ordinary standard and decides substantive banking and contract claims. opinion →
River Forest, Inc. v. Multibank 2009-1 Res-Adc Venture, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) is used only as a general procedural preface; the holdings concern promissory-note and banking issues. opinion →
Nelson v. Hamilton State Bank, the statute appears only in the general standard before the court decides substantive lender and borrower claims. opinion →
Nelson v. Hamilton State Bank, the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard of review; the court’s holding rests on substantive banking and contract law. opinion →
River Forest, Inc. v. Multibank 2009-1 RES-ADC Venture, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening summary-judgment standard before resolution of substantive promissory-note claims. opinion →
Mickey J. Barron v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard and resolves substantive foreclosure and lending issues. opinion →
The Medical Center Hospital Authority v. Baker, the opinion references § 9-11-56 only for the general summary-judgment standard before deciding substantive hospital and liability issues. opinion →
Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Property Owner's Association, Inc., the subsection (c) references merely state the standard of review; the court’s holdings concern jurisdiction and an anticipatory-nuisance claim. opinion →
McElvaney v. Roumelco, LLC, the court cites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c) only for the general movant burden before resolving contract formation and receivership issues. opinion →
Seaboard Construction Company v. Kent Realty Brunswick, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening standard before the court decides substantive construction and real-property claims. opinion →
Monyak v. Barking Hound Village, LLC, the statute is cited only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard before resolution of substantive claims involving veterinary care and damages. opinion →
Barron v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the opinion cites subsection (c) only as the standard of review and resolves substantive foreclosure and banking claims. opinion →
Hardison v. Enterprise Holdings, Inc., section 9-11-56(c) is cited only for the general standard before the court decides substantive rental-car and tort-liability issues. opinion →
Hutchins v. Cochran, Cherry, Givens, Smith & Sistrunk, P.C., the statute appears only in the routine standard of review; the court’s holding concerns substantive legal-malpractice claims. opinion →
Bowden v. the Medical Center, Inc., the only section 9-11-56 citation appears in a footnote reporting that a motion under subsection (f) remained pending and had not been ruled on; the opinion decides a discovery-scope issue, not the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
Bowden v. the Medical Center, Inc., the only section 9-11-56 citation appears in a footnote reporting that a motion under subsection (f) remained pending and had not been ruled on; the opinion decides a discovery-scope issue, not the summary-judgment statute. opinion →
McDonald v. West Point Food Mart, Inc., the opinion applies substantive premises-liability law and contains no citation to or construction of section 9-11-56; summary judgment appears only as procedural posture. opinion →
Fletcher v. Water Applications Distribution Group, Inc., subsection (f) is discussed only in a separate concurrence describing pending discovery; the majority’s holdings resolve substantive asbestos duty and liability issues. opinion →
Jefferson Lakeside L. P. v. Allan, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c) only for the general summary-judgment standard before deciding substantive premises-liability claims. opinion →
Stonecrest Land, LLC v. Res-Ga Scl, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the standard of review; the court resolves substantive lending and real-property issues. opinion →
Seki v. Groupon, Inc., the subsection (c) references merely state the ordinary standard before the court decides substantive contract and consumer claims involving Groupon. opinion →
Qenkor Construction, Inc. v. Everett, the statute is cited only for the general summary-judgment standard before resolution of substantive construction and tort claims. opinion →
Safari v. Res-Ms Bayfront, LLC, the opinion uses subsection (c) only as the opening standard and decides substantive lending and contract issues. opinion →
DOLAN Et Al. v. AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, section 9-11-56(c) is cited only for the ordinary standard before the court interprets an insurance policy and related substantive claims. opinion →
FLETCHER v. WATER APPLICATIONS DISTRIBUTION GROUP, INC. Et Al., subsection (f) appears only in a special concurrence reporting the plaintiff’s outstanding-discovery motion; the concurrence reaches the result on a separate substantive duty ground. opinion →
Jefferson Lakeside L. P. v. Allan, the opinion cites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c) only for the general standard before deciding substantive premises-liability issues. opinion →
GRAVITT Et Al. v. OLENS, the statute is invoked only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard; the court’s holdings concern substantive constitutional and governmental claims. opinion →
ETOWAH ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP, LLC v. WALSH Et Al., the opinion cites § 9-11-56 and subsection (c) only as the standard of review before deciding substantive environmental and land-use claims. opinion →
SCULLY v. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA Et Al., the statute is mentioned only as part of the general summary-judgment standard before the court resolves employment and governmental-liability issues. opinion →
Clayton County v. Segrest, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the opening standard; the holding concerns substantive governmental and employment claims. opinion →
Capital City Bank v. Jones, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the general standard before resolving substantive banking and real-property claims. opinion →
McCumber v. Petroleum Services Group, LLC, section 9-11-56(c) is used only as the standard of review before the court decides substantive employment and business claims. opinion →
California Insurance Guarantee Association, Oklahoma Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, and Texas Pro, the opinion references § 9-11-56 only for the ordinary summary-judgment standard before deciding insurance-guaranty and allocation issues. opinion →
Quintez Brown v. Dekalb County, the subsection (c) citation merely states the standard of review; the holding concerns substantive governmental immunity and tort claims. opinion →
SMITH Et Al. v. DANSON Et Al., the only citation to § 9-11-56 appears in a dissent discussing the trial court's handling of a medical-malpractice claim, so it is not a holding of the court. opinion →
West Asset Management, Inc. v. Nw Parkway, LLC, the subsection (c) references state the general summary-judgment standard before the court resolves substantive lease and damages issues. opinion →
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND HILL Et Al. v. MAIA, section 9-11-56(c) appears only in the general standard before resolution of substantive municipal and tort claims. opinion →
Zook v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company, the opinion cites subsection (c) only for the ordinary standard and decides substantive insurance-coverage issues. opinion →
…and 455 more.

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