Statute Annotations › Georgia › Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Aggravated assault: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Georgia
Case notes
1,003
Cited in passing
658
Citing cases indexed
1,801
Case dates
1983–2026
Screened through
2026-06-29
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-20
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,661 citing cases reviewed of 1,801 in the citation index: 1,003 interpreted the section (annotated below), 658 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1984 Ga. L. 1984, p. 900 added a higher, three-to-20-year sentencing range for aggravated assault against a person at least 65 years old. Source
  • 2010-07-01 Ga. L. 2010, p. 999/HB 1002 added a five-to-20-year range for knowingly assaulting an officer of the court in connection with official duties. Source
  • 2014-07-01 Ga. L. 2014, p. 441/HB 911 added aggravated assault through offensive use of an object, device, or instrument likely to or actually causing strangulation, without having to prove the deadly-weapon or serious-injury method. Source
  • 2015-07-01 Ga. L. 2015, p. 422/HB 310 expanded the officers of the court covered by the special sentencing provision to include community supervision and juvenile probation officers. Source
  • 2016-07-01 Ga. L. 2016, p. 582/HB 979 added a five-to-20-year range for knowingly assaulting an emergency health worker in connection with official duties. Source
  • 2017-07-01 Ga. L. 2017, p. 500/SB 160 rewrote the officer provision to cover public safety officers, including more occupations, and imposed a ten-year minimum for a qualifying firearm discharge and a three-year minimum for certain other assaults by adults. Source
  • 2023-07-01 Ga. L. 2023, p. 637/HB 188 made a new aggravated assault with intent to rape by a person previously convicted of a listed sexual felony punishable by life imprisonment or a split sentence followed by life probation and electronic monitoring; the punishment applies to offenses committed on or after this date. Source
  • 2023-07-01 Ga. L. 2023, p. 308/HB 383 added a three-to-20-year range for aggravated assault upon an emergency health worker or healthcare worker on a hospital campus to perform official duties, applying to offenses committed on or after this date. Source
  • 2024-07-01 Ga. L. 2024, p. 528/SB 421 expanded the vehicle-discharge method to shots fired immediately after exiting a vehicle and shots toward an occupied motor vehicle or building. Source
  • 2024-07-01 Ga. L. 2024, p. 646/HB 1033 added a three-to-20-year range for aggravated assault upon a utility worker acting in the course of employment or performing official duties, applying to offenses committed on or after this date. Source
  • 2026-07-01 Ga. L. 2026, p. 20/HB 483 extended subsection (m)'s three-to-20-year penalty for aggravated assault upon a utility worker to code enforcement officials, for offenses committed on or after this date. Source

Assault with a deadly weapon

Assault with a gun is aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and is a felony.

Richardson v. State · filed 1983-02-03(a)(2)

While it is true that appellant pointed his rifle at Turpin prior to shooting him in the back at close range, a gun is a deadly weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon constitutes aggravated assault, a felony. OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302). Appellant’s unlawful act was a felony, and under these facts the requested charge on felony grade involuntary manslaughter was properly denied.
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Section 16-5-21 defines aggravated assault to include an assault committed with a deadly weapon.

Doss v. State · filed 1983-04-20(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302) provides that “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults... (2) with a deadly weapon.” ... The state proved aggravated assault, as statutorily defined, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 16-5-21 makes an assault with a deadly weapon aggravated assault.

McKinney v. State · filed 1983-05-20(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302) provides that “A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults. . . (2) With a deadly weapon.” ... The record discloses no conflict in the evidence that appellant did indeed commit the offense as charged.
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Subsection (a)(2) defines assault with a deadly weapon as aggravated assault.

Green v. State · filed 1985-06-10(a)(2)

Aggravated assault is defined as, among other things, assault with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... Since the jury, as the rational trier of fact, could have found from the evidence ás summarized above the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt, it was not error to deny the motion for directed verdicts of acquittal.
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Section 16-5-21(a) treats assault with a deadly weapon as a separate form of aggravated assault, so an indictment alleging that form need not allege the other forms.

Cook v. State · filed 1986-03-07(a)

Clearly, this code section specifies five different ways in which an assault may be aggravated; i.e., an assault is aggravated if it is committed (1) with intent to murder, (2) with intent to rape, (3) with intent to rob, (4) with a deadly weapon, or (5) with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. In this case, the state alleged that both assaults were committed with a deadly weapon. The state was under no obligation to indict Cook for additional varieties of the offense.
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An automobile can be a deadly weapon under § 16-5-21(a) depending on how it is used, even if no one is injured.

Blalock v. State · filed 1983-01-31(a)

An automobile is not per se a deadly weapon, but may become one depending upon the manner and means of the vehicle’s use. ... Even considering, as suggested by appellant, the relative size and weight of the two automobiles involved, as well as the lack of any personal injuries, the evidence certainly justified a factual finding that appellant’s use of the sports car made it a deadly weapon.
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An air rifle’s status as a deadly weapon is for the jury when the victim may reasonably have perceived it as a firearm.

Moore v. State · filed 1983-11-23(a)(2)

Although a firearm is apparently a deadly weapon per se (Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 240 (6), supra) the “deadliness” issue in regard to an air rifle is for the jury. As we are unable to conclude as a matter of law that the air rifle was not reasonably perceived by the victim of the alleged aggravated assault to be a firearm, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for directed verdict of acquittal.
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A ceramic statue may be a deadly weapon for aggravated assault when the manner of its use is likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

Banks v. State · filed 1984-01-04

A ceramic statue is not per se an offensive or deadly weapon, just as many other things are not. ... From the evidence the jury could have found that the ceramic statue was not used against Mrs. Benton in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily injury, but was so used on the police officer.
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An apparently inoperable firearm can satisfy the deadly weapon element of aggravated assault when the victim reasonably believes it might be loaded.

Drayton v. State · filed 1983-07-14

We hold that if it reasonably appears to the assault victim that the firearm is or might be loaded then the assailant should be held to the consequences of using a deadly weapon whether or not the weapon in fact is loaded. ... The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.
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Section 16-5-21 treats pointing a pistol at another person as felony aggravated assault.

Smith v. State · filed 1984-10-31

Here, appellant pointed a pistol at the victim. That constitutes the felony of aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits a jury to find that fists are deadly weapons based on the manner and means of their use.

Gabler v. State · filed 1985-11-12(a)(2)

Fists, per se, are not deadly weapons but may be found to be so by a jury depending upon the manner and means of their use.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon that places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury; actual injury is unnecessary.

Daughtry v. State · filed 1986-10-30(a)(2)

The facts here establish clearly that appellant committed an act with a deadly weapon which placed Carter in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. This is sufficient to support the charge of aggravated assault. ... There is no requirement that a victim be actually injured and the crime is complete without proof of injury.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be proved when gunfire places people nearby in reasonable apprehension of violent injury.

Richardson v. State · filed 1988-10-21(a)(2)

However, the jury could have found that appellant’s actions placed Carter and Hood in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury in that the shooting occurred in an enclosed office, and both men testified that they fled into other rooms because they feared that they too would be shot.
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Pointing a gun at a person can support aggravated assault when the circumstances allow a jury to find reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, even if the person does not testify to that apprehension and the accompanying threat is conditional.

Curtis v. State · filed 1989-02-06(a)(2)

While the police officer did not testify that he was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury when appellant pointed the gun at him, and the threat accompanying the use of the revolver may have been indicative only of a conditional threat to inflict bodily harm, “the circumstances also clearly disclose a situation whereby the jury could determine that the alleged victim, with a [gun] pointed at him, was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” ... Thus, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a guilty verdict on the count alleging aggravated assault upon the police officer.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes pointing a firearm aggravated assault when it places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Rhodes v. State · filed 1987-09-09(a)(2)

Thus, if the victim is not placed in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury by the pointing of the firearm, only the misdemeanor of pointing a firearm (and not the felony of aggravated assault) has been committed.
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An automobile can qualify as a deadly or offensive weapon for aggravated assault depending on how it is used.

Spaulding v. State · filed 1988-02-02(a)(2)

Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means of the vehicle’s use.
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An automobile can qualify as an offensive weapon under § 16-5-21 depending on how it is used, and the jury decides whether it was used that way.

Butler v. State · filed 1990-09-04(a)(2)

Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means of the vehicle’s use. ... The question of whether an automobile, or other instrumentality, has been used so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is properly for the jury’s determination. ... The evidence here was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the offense of aggravated assault of [Argo] beyond a reasonable doubt.
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An unloaded rifle can support an aggravated assault conviction when it is used to strike someone and break a thumb.

Conley v. State · filed 1988-06-01(a)

The evidence was sufficient to establish an aggravated assault with the rifle. Even though it was not loaded, it was used to break McClendon’s thumb and hit him on the head. The motion was properly denied.
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Whether grasping a holstered gun and trying to remove it constitutes use of a deadly weapon in an aggravated assault is a question for the jury.

Hall v. State · filed 1988-09-14(a)(2)

Whether the appellant’s use of the weapon by placing his hand on it and trying to pull it from its holster constituted use of a deadly weapon under the circumstances was properly for the jury’s determination.
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Section 16-5-21(a) covers a weapon that reasonably appears deadly to the victim, even if it cannot actually inflict deadly harm.

Veal v. State · filed 1989-04-19(a)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) a person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the weapon used in commission of the charged act reasonably appeared to the victim to be deadly even if the weapon was not actually capable of inflicting deadly harm.
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A weapon that reasonably appears deadly to the victim can qualify as a deadly weapon under § 16-5-21(a)(2), even if it is an empty pellet gun.

Clark v. State · filed 1989-04-21(a)(2)

After reviewing the record, we find that “the [pellet] gun in this case, in the way it was used as established by uncontradicted evidence, was per se a ‘deadly weapon.’ ” Watts v. State, 142 Ga. App. 857, 859 (4) (237 SE2d 231) (1977).
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with an object when its offensive use is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.

Lubiano v. State · filed 1989-06-26(a)(2)

Further, the trial court’s response accurately informed the jury that an object is an “ ‘offensive’ weapon” when it “is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury,” as contemplated by OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Intentionally firing a gun at another person without justification is sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction.

Steele v. State · filed 1990-07-12(a)(2)

However, intentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault.
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Section 16-5-21 permits a dog used to attack a person to be treated as a deadly weapon.

Perkins v. State · filed 1990-09-04(a)(2)

The use of a dog can be considered a deadly weapon.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(1) does not require proof that an assault with intent to murder used a deadly weapon or a method likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Scroggins v. State · filed 1990-12-05(a)(1)

The State indicted appellant Greg Scroggins for assault with intent to murder; this was all it needed to allege. There was no requirement to prove the method of assault was deadly or likely to inflict serious bodily injury.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, but does not require an intent to injure.

Turner v. State · filed 1992-10-07(a)(2)

“Intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. ... It is the reasonable apprehension of harm by the victim of an assault by a firearm that establishes the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant’s intent to injure.” ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of the offenses of aggravated assault, the offense of criminal damage to property, and the offense of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers assault with a deadly weapon, and intentionally firing a gun at another without justification can support a conviction.

Belins v. State · filed 1993-08-19(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon, which, when used offensively, is likely to or actually causes serious bodily injury. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). The act of intentionally firing a gun at another, in the absence of justification, is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault under this statute.
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Under § 16-5-21, a shotgun aimed at a truck driver and fired into the truck is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.

Brown v. State · filed 1993-12-03

However, the charge went only to the issue of whether the weapon was a deadly weapon; it was a deadly weapon as a matter of law.
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A gun is a deadly weapon, and an assault with a gun constitutes aggravated assault.

Strickland v. State · filed 1991-02-13

We find no grounds for reversal. This instruction was properly given to aid the jury in understanding the crime, as “a gun is a deadly weapon, and assault with a deadly weapon constitutes aggravated assault, a felony. OCGA § 16-5-21. . . .” Richardson v. State, 250 Ga. 506, 508 (3) (299 SE2d 715).
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when pointing a firearm puts the victim in reasonable apprehension of harm, without proof of intent to murder, rape, or rob.

Williams v. State · filed 1993-02-17(a)(2)

Both Ferrell and his father testified that they were frightened when appellant pointed the gun at them; thus, the State sufficiently established the elements of aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)), and the evidence was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of aggravated assault against both victims beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Intentionally firing a gun at another person, absent justification, is sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction.

Quinn v. State · filed 1993-06-01(a)(2)

We have no hesitation in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt. ... “[I]ntentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault. See Williams v. State, 249 Ga. 6, 8 (287 SE2d 31) (1982). See generally OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).”
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) defines assault with a deadly weapon as aggravated assault; the phrase “when used offensively” applies to the alternative method involving an object likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Green v. State · filed 1993-06-28(a)(2)

During the instructions to the jury the trial court defined aggravated assault as assault with a deadly weapon. That is the offense with which defendant was charged and the charge is accurate based on the definition of the offense contained in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to use the phrase “when used offensively” in its definition of the crime. The phrase referred to by defendant is contained within the statutory definition of aggravated assault but describes an alternative method of committing the offense of aggravated assault by employing “any object . . . which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Hands and fists may qualify as deadly weapons under subsection (a)(2), depending on the circumstances and the victim’s injuries.

Wright v. State · filed 1993-12-03(a)(2)

Hands and fists may be deadly weapons depending upon the circumstances, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.
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A metal pipe can qualify as a deadly weapon for aggravated assault when used offensively.

McKinney v. State · filed 1995-10-03(a)(2)

A metal pipe is capable of causing serious injury when used offensively.
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For aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the test for a pellet pistol is whether it reasonably appeared to the victim to be a deadly weapon.

Mitchell v. State · filed 1996-09-24(a)(2)

But the proper test is whether the pellet pistol used by defendant reasonably appeared to the victim to be a deadly weapon.
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Holding a gun to a person’s head while the person acknowledges an imminent threat of violent injury constitutes aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Rameau v. State · filed 1996-11-04(a)(2)

Rameau’s act of holding the gun to the head of the victim, and the victim’s verbal acknowledgment that the threat of violent injury was imminent, constituted the felony of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault in which the attacker cuts the victim with a steak knife.

In the Interest of S. S. · filed 1997-01-21(a)(2)

The victim and three other witnesses testified that during the disagreement, S. S. attacked the victim with a steak knife and cut her around the face and neck. Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), this act constitutes aggravated assault using a deadly weapon.
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Evidence of the victim’s injuries is relevant to the State’s burden of proving aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2).

Clay v. State · filed 1994-07-27(a)(2)

Proving serious bodily injury is a part of the State’s burden of proof. The trial court did not err in admitting the photographs depicting the victim’s injuries.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports an aggravated assault conviction when a person intentionally fires a gun at another without justification.

Lewis v. State · filed 1994-11-09(a)(2)

"The act of intentionally firing a gun at another, in the absence of justification, is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault under [OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)]. ... It follows that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal as to Count 4.
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Fists used offensively can support aggravated assault when they are likely to cause serious bodily injury, even if the victim’s actual injuries are not serious.

Durden v. State · filed 1995-12-20(a)(2)

Additionally, the results of the attack on Payton would have justified the jury’s concluding that the defendant’s fists, used offensively, were likely to cause serious bodily injury to Bledsoe, even if his actual injuries were not considered serious.
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For aggravated assault under § 16-5-21, whether hands were used as a deadly weapon is a question for the jury.

Richards v. State · filed 1996-09-24

Whether hands are used as a deadly weapon is a jury question.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits circumstantial evidence to establish that the object used in an assault was a knife.

Littleton v. State · filed 1997-03-18(a)(2)

As for Littleton’s conviction on the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a knife, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides that one commits that crime when he or she assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” Id. Although the victim did not initially know the exact identity of the “blunt, hard object” held to her neck, she testified that shortly after the incident she realized that the object was an unfamiliar knife. This evidence, in addition to her son’s testimony that he saw the knife hanging from Littleton’s pocket, and the police officer’s testimony that the knife was hidden under Littleton’s leg, was sufficient circumstantial evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to determine that the State had excluded all reasonable hypotheses, except that of Littleton’s guilt.
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Pointing a loaded gun at another person may constitute aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Ross v. State · filed 1997-06-09(a)(2)

Pointing a loaded gun at another person may be an unlawful act amounting to an aggravated assault.
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Hands and feet can be deadly weapons under § 16-5-21(a)(2) depending on how they are used, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.

Dixon v. State · filed 1997-06-02(a)(2)

Although hands and feet are not considered per se deadly weapons within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), the jury may find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when hands and feet are used in a manner likely to cause, or that actually causes, serious bodily injury.

Wright v. State · filed 1997-09-19(a)(2)

Under this language, a person may properly be found to have committed aggravated assault where hands and feet are used in a manner which is likely to or actually does produce serious bodily injury.
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An iron used to strike and burn a victim can be an offensive weapon under the aggravated assault statute.

Hill v. State · filed 1998-01-30(a)(2)

In the case sub judice, the victim testified that defendant struck her legs and face with a hot iron. Photographs of the victim’s wounds reveal that defendant used this iron as an offensive weapon as proscribed by OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require the State to admit the deadly weapon into evidence to obtain an aggravated assault conviction.

Lattimer v. State · filed 1998-03-25(a)(2)

It is not necessary for the State to admit into evidence the deadly weapon used by the defendant in order for the defendant to be found guilty of aggravated assault.
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Under subsection (a)(2), fists, feet, and a telephone receiver can qualify as deadly weapons depending on how they are used and the injuries inflicted.

Wheeler v. State · filed 1998-06-03(a)(2)

Given the circumstances of the attack, the nature of the victim’s wounds, and the manner in which Wheeler used his fists, feet, and the telephone receiver to beat the victim, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Wheeler guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt under the standard set forth above.
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Fists and hands are not deadly weapons per se under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Brown v. State · filed 1998-06-04(a)(2)

Further, fists and hands are not “deadly weapons” per se within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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A stun gun used to shock the victim's leg in the manner shown here was not an instrument likely to or actually resulting in serious bodily injury under subsection (a)(2).

Harwell v. State · filed 1998-06-15(a)(2)

We must give some credit to the jury for common sense, for knowing that a stun gun used in the manner it was used in this case is not an "object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury."
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when use of a vehicle was likely to cause serious bodily injury, without proof that it actually caused such injury.

Gutierrez v. State · filed 1998-12-14(a)(2)

Despite the conjunctive wording of the indictment, the aggravated assault statute requires only that one or the other be shown, ... so a showing that Gutierrez’s assault with the vehicle was likely to cause such injury sufficed.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a gun that causes reasonable apprehension of injury, even if the defendant did not intend injury or the gun was unloaded or inoperable.

Head v. State · filed 1998-07-07(a)(2)

Although the latter part of the charge could have been better worded, a reasonable juror would only have understood it to mean that if the victim was reasonably apprehensive of receiving bodily injury, the crime of aggravated assault has been committed regardless of whether defendant intended to injure the victim or whether the gun was loaded or could be fired.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers assault with an object used in a way likely to cause serious bodily injury; evidence of repeated blows with a fence post was sufficient to support a conviction.

Peek v. State · filed 1998-10-15(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) provides: “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” ... An eyewitness testified that she saw Peek pick up an object that looked like a pole or stick and use it to repeatedly strike the victim. ... The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Peek guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Aggravated assault based on use of a knife requires evidence that the defendant used the knife offensively against the victim; unsuccessfully reaching for it and struggling over it is insufficient.

Nichols v. State · filed 1999-06-02(a)

At most, the officer’s testimony can be construed as showing that Nichols unsuccessfully reached for the knife and briefly struggled with the officer over it. But absent any evidence that he actually used the knife against the officer, we cannot find that he committed an aggravated assault.
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Subsection (a)(2) covers repeatedly stabbing and cutting an unarmed person with a knife.

Van Doran v. State · filed 2000-06-13(a)(2)

In the instant case, the evidence established all the elements of aggravated assault with a knife. The state proved that Van Doran and Crawford got into a verbal and physical fight, that Crawford was unarmed, that Van Doran pulled a knife from his pants pocket, and that Van Doran then repeatedly stabbed and cut Crawford.
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A jury may find that a stun gun is a weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury based on the circumstances of its use.

Harwell v. State · filed 1999-03-01(a)(2)

The victim’s acts of cooperation when he recognized that his assailants were armed with a stun gun, the testimony of the victim’s intense reaction to being repeatedly assaulted by the gun’s electronic discharge, and the legal recognition that the stun gun was an “offensive weapon” constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim was assaulted with a weapon likely to result in serious bodily injury.
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An axe or hatchet used offensively can cause serious bodily injury and qualify under the aggravated assault provision.

McLeod v. State · filed 2000-08-24(a)(2)

An axe or a hatchet, when used offensively, is capable of serious bodily injury.
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Intentionally firing a gun at another person without justification is sufficient for aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Yawn v. State · filed 1999-03-23(a)(2)

The act of intentionally firing a gun at another person, in the absence of justification, is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person intentionally fires a gun at another without justification.

Goodman v. State · filed 1999-04-28(a)(2)

“[I]ntentionally firing a gun at another, absent justification, is sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction of aggravated assault” under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... This evidence is sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia, supra, to support the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Tony committed the offense of aggravated assault.
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A toy replica gun can support an aggravated assault conviction when the victim reasonably believes it is real.

Anderson v. State · filed 1999-06-11(a)(2)

That Anderson’s gun was a toy replica is of no import, because Halliday reasonably believed that it was real.
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Whether fists and hands are objects likely to cause serious injury for aggravated assault is a question of fact for the jury.

Scott v. State · filed 2000-03-22(a)(2)

Whether Scott’s fists and hands constituted objects likely to result in serious injury was a question of fact for the jury.
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Hands and feet may qualify as deadly weapons when the circumstances of their use, including the victim’s injuries, support that finding.

Braswell v. State · filed 2000-08-18(a)(2)

The injuries sustained by the victim supports the jury’s decision that Braswell used his hands and feet as “deadly weapons” in his assault of the victim.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits aggravated assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury; a deadly weapon is not required.

Johnson v. State · filed 2000-08-31(a)(2)

But neither the statute nor the indictment requires the use of a deadly weapon. The applicable section of the statute provides that the assault is committed “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”
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A lit cigarette used to threaten a person doused with gasoline can qualify as an offensive weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Johnson v. State · filed 2000-09-22(a)(2)

Accordingly, the jury was authorized to find that the cigarette, in conjunction with the gasoline, constituted an offensive weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury.
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A person who helps assault a victim during an attempted armed robbery may be convicted of aggravated assault when an accomplice threatens the victim with a handgun.

Hopkins v. State · filed 2001-07-27(a)(2)

Further, the evidence that he did not flee when Graham drew his weapon — but rather stayed to assist in the assault by hitting the victim as he struggled for control of the gun — undermined his defense that he was merely a bystander. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Hopkins willingly participated in an attempted armed robbery in which Graham threatened the victim with a handgun; therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict him of aggravated assault.
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Subsection (a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon.

Strozier v. State · filed 2002-03-27(a)(2)

Strozier’s first claim is that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of aggravated assault. The elements of that offense, as charged in the indictment here, are an assault with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Hands used to choke a victim satisfy the deadly weapon or dangerous object element of aggravated assault.

Crider v. State · filed 2000-11-13(a)(2)

The use of hands to choke a victim satisfies the deadly weapon or dangerous object element of the aggravated assault statute.
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Pointing a pistol at another person can support an aggravated assault conviction under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Thurman v. State · filed 2001-04-10(a)(2)

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault by pointing a pistol at another.
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An automobile may qualify as a deadly weapon depending on how it is used.

Bogan v. State · filed 2001-04-13(a)(2)

Further, while an automobile is not in and of itself a deadly weapon, it may become such a weapon dependent upon the circumstances attendant to its use.
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Aggressive use of an automobile during a chase can provide probable cause to believe the driver committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Pace v. Capobianco · filed 2002-03-01(a)(2)

First, we conclude that — given Davis’s aggressive use of his automobile during the chase — probable cause existed to believe Davis had committed a felony involving the threatened infliction of serious physical harm: aggravated assault per Georgia Code § 16-5-21.
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A BB gun can support aggravated assault when it reasonably appears to the victim to be a deadly weapon.

In Re Ca · filed 2001-04-19(a)(2)

When the deadly weapon used in the commission of aggravated assault is in fact a BB gun, the proper test is whether the gun that the accused used reasonably appeared to the victim to be a deadly weapon.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated-assault finding involving a BB gun when the gun reasonably appeared to the victim to be a deadly weapon.

In the Interest of C. A. · filed 2001-04-19(a)(2)

When the deadly weapon used in the commission of aggravated assault is in fact a BB gun, the proper test is whether the gun that the accused used reasonably appeared to the victim to be a deadly weapon.
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Under § 16-5-21(a)(2), hands may be found to be deadly weapons depending on how they are used and the extent of the victim’s injuries.

Mallon v. State · filed 2001-11-28(a)(2)

While hands are not considered deadly weapons per se within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), the factfinder may — and in this case, did — find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.
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Section 16-5-21 is satisfied when threats and use of a knife place victims in fear of immediately receiving bodily harm.

In the Interest of A. A. · filed 2002-02-21

The victims’ testimony, although in conflict with that of A. A., was sufficient to authorize the finding that through A. A.’s threats and use of the knife, the victims were placed in fear of immediately receiving bodily harm as required by OCGA § 16-5-21.
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Aggressive use of a car during a chase can give officers probable cause to believe the driver committed aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia · filed 2002-03-01(a)(2)

First, we conclude that -- given Davis’s aggressive use of his automobile during the chase -- probable cause existed to believe Davis had committed a felony involving the threatened infliction of serious physical harm: aggravated assault per Georgia Code § 16-5-21.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on reasonable apprehension requires intent to use the weapon and proof that its use caused reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, but does not require intent to cause that apprehension.

Maynor v. State · filed 2002-08-22(a)(2)

A general intent to injure is not a necessary element in a reasonable apprehension type of simple assault. Proof of the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon which placed the victims in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury would be sufficient for conviction. It is the intention to commit the act of using the deadly weapon that must be shown, not the intention to make the victims apprehensive.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require proof of a threat to kill for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Thomas v. State · filed 2002-08-30(a)(2)

Further, such threat is not an essential element of the indicted form of aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) — assault with a deadly weapon.
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Section 16-5-21 defines assault with a deadly weapon as aggravated assault.

Milton v. State · filed 2003-02-13

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21. The jury was free to believe or disbelieve Milton’s story that the shooting happened by accident. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Milton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of aggravated assault.
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An ordinary object can support an aggravated assault conviction when used offensively in a way likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Knox v. State · filed 2002-04-11(a)(2)

Here, the evidence shows that Knox grabbed a milk crate and used it offensively against another person and that the crate when so used was likely to or did inflict serious bodily harm.
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An automobile can be a deadly or offensive weapon under § 16-5-21(a)(2) when the manner in which it is used makes it one.

Thomas v. State · filed 2002-06-13(a)(2)

Based on this evidence, the jury was authorized to determine that Thomas intentionally used the car in such a manner that it became a deadly or offensive weapon. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found Thomas guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault.
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An automobile can become a deadly weapon for aggravated assault depending on how it is used.

Frayall v. State · filed 2003-01-23(a)(2)

Although an automobile is not a deadly weapon per se, it may become one depending upon the manner in which it is used.
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An automobile can be an offensive weapon under § 16-5-21(a)(2) depending on how it is used, and the State need prove only a general intent to injure.

Riels v. State · filed 2003-02-03(a)(2)

Contrary to Riels’ argument, a person commits aggravated assault when he assaults “with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... In this case, the evidence, including Riels’ testimony that he was aware that Corporal Saunders “had a hold of me with both hands” when he put the car in motion, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Riels possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated assault.
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Section 16-5-21(a) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person threatens to kill someone and pursues the fleeing victim with a shotgun in hand, even without evidence that the gun was pointed.

Weaver v. State · filed 2002-07-16(a)

Weaver’s threat to kill his wife, coupled with evidence that he immediately retrieved the shotgun and pursued his fleeing wife with the shotgun in hand, was sufficient to establish the commission of an aggravated assault.
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A person who aims a motor vehicle at another may be convicted of aggravated assault even if the vehicle does not touch or injure the victim.

Webb v. State · filed 2002-07-23(a)(2)

Thus, one who aims a motor vehicle at another person may be convicted of aggravated assault regardless of whether the victim sustained any injuries or was even touched by the vehicle.
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Hands and feet can qualify as deadly weapons for aggravated assault depending on how they are used, the injuries inflicted, and the surrounding circumstances.

Miller v. State · filed 2002-10-28(a)(2)

Although hands and feet are not considered to be deadly weapons per se, the jury may find them to be so depending upon their use, the injuries inflicted, and other surrounding circumstances.
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An intentional shooting supports a conviction for aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2).

Ellis v. State · filed 2002-09-17(a)(2)

Here, the evidence — particularly Ellis’s statement — supports the conclusion that Ellis intentionally shot Walker, which constitutes aggravated assault.
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Whether a defendant’s feet are objects likely to inflict serious injury under aggravated assault is a question of fact for the jury.

Anderson v. State · filed 2002-09-26(a)(2)

Whether Anderson’s feet constituted objects likely to inflict serious injury was a question of fact for the jury.
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Under subsection (a)(2), advancing toward a person while swinging a chain can support an aggravated assault conviction when the person backs away to avoid being struck.

Chancey v. State · filed 2002-11-08(a)(2)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. . . .” Although Chancey claimed that he was using the chain to “establish a perimeter” so that he could breathe, and that he was backing away from the officer and had no intention of hurting him, there was evidence that he came at the officer with the chain and that the officer backed away to avoid being struck.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers pointing a shotgun directly at a person when it discharges and strikes that person.

Tripp v. ALL STATE INS. CO. · filed 2003-07-01(a)(2)

In this case, Tomlinson’s actions were criminal. The court found that Tomlinson “pointed a shotgun which discharged directly at the deceased,” given that the “trajectory of the shot follow [ed] a straight line from barrel to body with no one else in the group being injured. (Aggravated Assault).” This is a crime as defined in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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A pellet gun can be a deadly weapon for aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2).

Flores v. State · filed 2004-04-27(a)(2)

A pellet gun can be, and certainly was in this case, a deadly weapon.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires likely or actual serious bodily injury; the victim need not die.

Skaggs v. State · filed 2004-05-03(a)(2)

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof that the victim was likely to, or actually did, suffer serious bodily injury, not that he died. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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A simple assault committed with a deadly weapon is aggravated assault; evidence that the victim saw what he believed was a gun, heard a click and apparent gunshot, and fled in fear supported the conviction.

Jefferies v. State · filed 2004-06-04(a)(2)

A simple assault will be considered aggravated when it is committed with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). The evidence summarized above demonstrates that Smith observed Jefferies remove what Smith believed was a gun from his waistband; that Smith heard a clicking noise; and that he was so afraid of being shot that he jumped from a moving car. Additionally, Smith testified that he heard what sounded like a shot being fired as he jumped. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Aggravated assault includes an assault with a deadly weapon that, when used offensively, is likely to or actually does cause serious bodily injury.

Williams v. State · filed 2004-09-09(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) treats a handgun as a deadly weapon; the word “serious” applies to an alternative method of aggravated assault.

Wyman v. State · filed 2004-09-13(a)(2)

The omitted word “serious” is part of the statute related to an alternative method of committing the offense of aggravated assault. ... That alternative method was not charged in the indictment, and a handgun is a deadly weapon as a matter of law.
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Hands and fists can support an aggravated assault conviction when the circumstances of their use, including the victim’s injuries, show they were used as deadly weapons.

Lewis v. State · filed 2003-09-05(a)(2)

Here, given the extent of Hinkle’s injuries, the jury certainly was authorized to find him guilty of aggravated assault.
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Hands are not deadly weapons per se under aggravated assault law, but a factfinder may treat them as deadly weapons based on how they were used and the victim’s injuries.

Hughes v. State · filed 2004-03-10(a)(2)

We have held that while hands are not considered deadly weapons per se within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), the factfinder may find them to be so depending on the circumstances surrounding their use, including the extent of the victim’s injuries.
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An aggravated assault conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence of an offensive weapon even when the victim did not see or accurately describe it.

Garrett v. State · filed 2003-09-19(a)

The presence of an offensive weapon or the appearance of such may be established by circumstantial evidence, and a conviction for armed robbery or aggravated assault may be sustained even though the weapon was neither seen nor accurately described by the victim.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault committed by stabbing someone with a knife.

Chalvatzis v. State · filed 2004-02-19(a)(2)

A person commits an aggravated assault when he or she assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” ... The testimony of both the victim and the defendant show that Chalvatzis stabbed Hewell with a knife. ... Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to authorize any rational trier of fact to find Chalvatzis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both offenses.
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A vehicle may be a deadly weapon for aggravated assault, depending on how it is used.

Bush v. State · filed 2004-06-29(a)(2)

Because a jury may find a vehicle to be a deadly weapon (depending on the manner and means by which it is used), sufficient evidence sustained the aggravated assault convictions.
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An automobile may qualify as a deadly or offensive weapon depending on how it is used; whether it does is a question for the jury.

Scott v. State · filed 2004-08-04(a)(2)

The question of whether an automobile has been used so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is a matter for the jury. ... The evidence here was sufficient to enable the jury to find Scott guilty of the offense of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Evidence that a driver accelerated toward officers, putting them in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury, supports an aggravated assault conviction under subsection (a)(2).

Williams v. State · filed 2004-11-08(a)(2)

There was evidence to support the jury’s verdict that Williams committed aggravated assault when he accelerated toward the police officers, putting them in reasonable apprehension of immediate injury.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers assault with a deadly weapon that, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does cause serious bodily injury.

Hampton v. State · filed 2005-03-17(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon, which when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes a simple assault committed with a deadly weapon an aggravated assault.

Harris v. State · filed 2005-04-21(a)(2)

A person is chargeable with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) when he commits the offense of simple assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon.”
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers shooting a gun toward a person when the act places that person in reasonable apprehension of violent injury.

Thompson v. State · filed 2006-01-23(a)(2)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Thompson assaulted the victim with his gun, a deadly weapon, by shooting it toward the victim, an act which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon covers making stabbing or throwing motions toward a person while holding knives.

Williams v. State · filed 2006-03-03(a)(2)

Here, it is obvious from the jury’s verdict that it found Williams guilty of aggravated assault against Officer Johnson and Officer Brainard because Williams, while holding knives, actually made stabbing or throwing motions toward these two officers.
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Striking a person with a loaded gun amounts to aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2).

Gore v. State · filed 2005-03-11(a)(2)

This witness’s theory presumes that Gore was committing a felony, since the act of striking the victim with a loaded gun amounted to aggravated assault. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (aggravated assault involves use of a deadly weapon “which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury”) (emphasis supplied).
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Section 16-5-21 permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person fires repeatedly into an occupied vehicle and the evidence supports finding that the shots were directed at its occupants.

Cornelius v. State · filed 2005-06-21

Any rational trier of fact could have found Cornelius guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon upon Lambert and her daughter.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person uses their hands offensively as objects likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Sullivan v. State · filed 2006-02-23(a)(2)

The indictment charged Sullivan with committing aggravated assault by shaking D. G. and thereby using his hands as objects which, when used offensively against a person, are likely to result in serious bodily injury. Based on the statements Sullivan made to the police, the evidence of D. G.’s severe injuries, and the expert medical testimony concerning those injuries and their consistency with shaken baby syndrome, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found Sullivan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment.
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An assault with a deadly weapon constitutes aggravated assault when the weapon, used offensively against a person, is likely to cause or actually causes serious bodily injury.

Moss v. State · filed 2006-03-14(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon, which when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. ... The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Moss guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of that crime.
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An aggravated assault conviction can rest on pointing a rifle that appears to be a deadly weapon, even if the rifle is broken.

Stancil v. State · filed 2006-04-13(a)(2)

Moreover, as we held in Division 1, the question whether the rifle was broken at the time of the incident had no bearing on Stancil’s guilt or innocence for pointing what appeared to be a deadly weapon at the officer.
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A tree limb can qualify as a deadly weapon for aggravated assault depending on how it is used, and the factfinder decides that issue.

In Re Tw · filed 2006-07-26(a)(2)

Accordingly, because this was an issue for the factfinder, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to find T.W. guilty of aggravated assault with a tree limb beyond a reasonable doubt.
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A tree limb may qualify as a deadly weapon for aggravated assault depending on how it is used; that determination is for the fact-finder.

In the Interest of T. W. · filed 2006-07-26(a)(2)

Accordingly, because this was an issue for the fact-finder, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court to find T. W. guilty of aggravated assault with a tree limb beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 16-5-21(a) allows fists to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how they are used and the injuries inflicted.

Ferrell v. State · filed 2007-02-06(a)

Here, given that Ferrell beat Wolford with his fists until she was rendered unconscious, fracturing bones in her face, the jury was authorized to find him guilty of aggravated assault.
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A driver who intentionally uses a car to threaten officers with a serious collision can be guilty of aggravated assault on a peace officer.

Adams v. State · filed 2006-07-27(a)(2), (c)

Given this evidence, the jury could infer Adams intended to threaten the deputies with a catastrophic collision with his car to force them from the road. Because the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on both counts of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a defendant intentionally uses an automobile in a way that causes another person reasonably to fear immediate violent injury.

Kirkland v. State · filed 2006-11-08(a)(2)

Use of a deadly weapon constitutes one of the “aggravating circumstances” necessary for aggravated assault, OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (2), and no question exists that an automobile can be a “deadly weapon.” Rhodes testified that he was in fear for his life when he was dragged along by Kirkland’s car as Kirkland drove quickly out of the car wash. That apprehension was reasonable under the circumstances, and Rhodes’s testimony, if believed, together with a finding that Kirkland intended to drive rapidly out of the car wash, was sufficient to authorize the jury to find Kirkland guilty of aggravated assault as charged in the indictment.
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A factfinder may use circumstantial evidence, including the victim’s wounds and an object found at the scene, to find that the accused used a weapon in an aggravated assault.

In Re Mvh · filed 2006-09-06(a)(2)

Here, the cuts on M.M.'s face and neck, the officer's testimony, and the fact that a broken pencil, identified by M.M. as the weapon, was found at the scene, provided circumstantial evidence corroborating M.M.'s belief that M.V.H. wielded the broken pencil during the attack. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to enable the juvenile court to find that M.V.H. committed an act of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Circumstantial evidence of a weapon’s use can support a finding of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

In the Interest of M. V. H. · filed 2006-09-06(a)(2)

Some physical manifestation is required or some evidence from which the presence of a weapon may be inferred, but OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) does not require proof of an actual deadly weapon. ... Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to enable the juvenile court to find that M. V. H. committed an act of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when a person points a gun at vehicle occupants and places them in fear of being shot.

Adams v. State · filed 2006-11-27(a)(2)

Here, Mrs. Hunt and two of her sons testified that Adams pointed his gun at their vehicle and that as a result they were in fear of being shot. Given this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Under § 16-5-21(a)(2), the jury may determine whether the use of a baseball bat amounts to assault with a deadly weapon.

Fields v. State · filed 2007-05-10(a)(2)

Referencing the indictment itself, this charge properly directed the jury to determine whether Fields’s use of the baseball bat amounted to assault with a deadly weapon, and therefore to aggravated assault as alleged in the indictment.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes an assault with a deadly weapon aggravated assault; pointing a loaded gun after threatening to shoot can establish reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Moore v. State · filed 2007-07-05(a)(2)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), a person commits aggravated assault when he or she assaults someone with a deadly weapon. ... Although Moore claimed that he and the victim were just joking around, we find that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a finding that Moore’s act placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers threatening a person with a sharp, knife-like letter opener as aggravated assault.

Bryant v. State · filed 2007-07-10(a)(2)

Here, the evidence showed that Bryant was identified by Kaufmann as the person who broke down the door to enter her apartment, threatened to harm her with a sharp, knife-like letter opener unless she complied with his demands, and stole her camera before fleeing. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Bryant’s convictions on the counts of burglary, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require intent to injure.

Ganaway v. State · filed 2007-07-13(a)(2)

However, intent to injure is not an element of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
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Section 16-5-21(a) allows the presence of a weapon to be inferred from witness testimony even when the weapon is not introduced into evidence.

Johnson v. State · filed 2007-08-07(a)

Here, two police officers testified that Johnson fired a gun, and such testimony was sufficient to infer the presence of a weapon even though no weapon was introduced into evidence.
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A jury may find an improvised shank to be a deadly weapon based on how it was used and the injuries it caused.

Ellison v. State · filed 2007-11-13(a)(2)

The jury was authorized to infer from the evidence that the instrument was a deadly weapon.
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An assault committed with a deadly weapon is aggravated assault, and testimony that the accused pointed a handgun at the victim and shot her can support a conviction.

Jones v. State · filed 2008-01-17(a)(2)

If the assault is committed with a deadly weapon, the defendant is guilty of aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... Here, the ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend both testified at trial to the facts as set out above, including that Jones entered the bedroom, pointed his handgun at the ex-girlfriend, and shot her in the leg. ... This testimony was more than sufficient to support Jones’ conviction, since “[t]he testimony of [even] a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a fact.”
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An object that is not deadly by nature qualifies as a deadly weapon only if the State shows that the manner of its use made it one; striking someone with the blunt end of a box cutter and causing minor injuries did not suffice.

Ware v. State · filed 2008-02-29(a)(2)

Considering the evidence concerning the manner in which Ware used the box cutter and the wounds she inflicted with it, the State did not meet its burden of showing that the box cutter was a deadly weapon in this case.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when the victim reasonably believes the object used in the assault is a gun, even if it is a tape recorder.

Dixon v. State · filed 2007-06-05(a)(2)

Thus, under either version, the jury would necessarily have to find that Denise had a reasonable belief that Dixon had a gun in order to convict him of assault. Such a finding supports a conviction only for aggravated assault.
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A threat to slit someone's throat while opening a knife can support an aggravated assault adjudication under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

In Re Dd · filed 2007-09-11(a)(2)

So viewed, the evidence shows that on December 6, 2006, D.D. approached a group of teenagers at the Sargent Baptist Church and threatened to slit the victim's throat. When the victim stood up prepared to fight, D.D. took a knife out of his pocket and opened the blade. ... Although not specifically enumerated, the evidence was also sufficient to support an adjudication of guilt on the remaining counts of aggravated assault and misdemeanor obstruction of an officer. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21(a)(2); 16-10-24(a).
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Eyewitness testimony that the defendant used a metal knife or shank to stab the victim can establish the instrument element of aggravated assault even when the weapon is not introduced at trial.

Cail v. State · filed 2007-09-13(a)(2)

Even without that evidence, both the victim and an eyewitness testified that Cail used a metal knife or shank to repeatedly stab the victim. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to show that the aggravated assault was accomplished through the use of an “object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Driving a vehicle directly toward a person who must jump out of its path can support a finding of the intent and reasonable apprehension required for aggravated assault.

Taul v. State · filed 2008-02-29(a)(2)

Based upon this evidence, the jury was authorized to determine that Taul had the requisite criminal intent to commit an aggravated assault against the deputy, who was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.
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A handgun intentionally pointed at a victim is a deadly weapon as a matter of law, even if loaded only with blanks.

Chappell v. State · filed 2008-04-01(a)(2)

Intentionally pointing a handgun at a victim means that the handgun “is a ‘deadly weapon’ within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) as a matter of law even [if it were] loaded only with blanks.”
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A pistol used to beat a victim in the manner described here is a deadly weapon for aggravated assault, so a battery instruction was not required.

Ortiz v. State · filed 2008-05-02(a)

Thus, the pistol in this case, if used in the manner testified to by Correa, was per se a deadly weapon, and “the offense was either aggravated assault or no offense at all.”
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An assault committed with a deadly weapon is aggravated assault.

Lewis v. State · filed 2008-05-27(a)(2)

If the defendant commits the assault using a deadly weapon, he is guilty of aggravated assault.
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Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury; intent to injure is not required.

Atwell v. State · filed 2008-09-18(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. ... The assailant’s intent to injure is not an element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. ... Under these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Thomas had a reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate, violent injury.
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Pointing a gun at a victim and firing it into the floor near him establishes aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Rouse v. State · filed 2008-12-02(a)(2)

Specifically, evidence that Rouse pointed a gun at the victim and fired it at the floor near him three times established aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, as charged in Count 1 of the indictment.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes an assault committed with a deadly weapon aggravated assault.

In Re TOJ · filed 2008-12-18(a)(2)

If the assault is committed with a deadly weapon, the defendant is guilty of aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). ... Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at the delinquency hearing and set out above clearly was sufficient to allow a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of seven counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes an assault committed with a deadly weapon aggravated assault.

In the Interest of T. O. J. · filed 2008-12-18(a)(2)

If the assault is committed with a deadly weapon, the defendant is guilty of aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).
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Striking a person with a gun constitutes felony aggravated assault.

Moon v. State · filed 2008-05-13(a)(2)

In Gore, as here, the only “unlawful act” supported by the evidence was the striking of the victim with a gun, which constitutes the felony of aggravated assault.
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A jury may find aggravated assault on a peace officer when a driver deliberately rams a patrol car with his vehicle.

Branton v. State · filed 2008-06-19(a)(2), (c)

Here, after coming to a complete stop and making eye contact with the approaching officer, Branton accelerated and struck Sheirling’s patrol car, “mov[ing] it to the left across into the southbound lane” and causing damage to the vehicle. Sheirling testified that Branton “deliberately rammed” the patrol car “in order to get away.” Branton then drove away at a high rate of speed. There was no evidence whatsoever that Branton lost control of his vehicle. Under these circumstances, the jury was entitled to conclude that Branton committed aggravated assault on a peace officer.
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Fists may qualify under § 16-5-21(a)(2) depending on how they are used and the wounds inflicted.

Jones v. State · filed 2008-11-14(a)(2)

While fists per se are not a deadly weapon within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-21, nevertheless, they may be found to be a deadly weapon by the jury depending on the manner and means of their use, the wounds inflicted, etc. ... We find that the evidence was sufficient to authorize any rational trier of fact to find Jones guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers assault with a deadly weapon likely to cause, or that actually causes, serious bodily injury; threatening and shooting someone in the face with a firearm is sufficient evidence.

In Re RS · filed 2009-01-28(a)(2)

A person commits "aggravated assault when he ... assaults [w]ith a deadly weapon ... which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury." [10] In this case, the evidence shows that C.S. used a firearm to threaten and shoot Kanotra in the face, resulting in serious and lasting injury. Thus, the juvenile court's judgment that C.S. committed aggravated assault was supported by sufficient evidence.
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Fists can qualify as objects used offensively in a manner likely to cause serious bodily injury; their manner of use and the victim’s injuries bear on that determination.

Sims v. State · filed 2009-03-05(a)(2)

Here, “[t]he evidence that [Sims] beat the victim about the head and face with his hands is sufficient to authorize the jury’s verdict that he is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of aggravated assault,” particularly in light of the deputy’s concussion and fractured face bone caused by Sims’s punches.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) treats hands as deadly weapons when they are used in a manner likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Lord v. State · filed 2009-03-26(a)(2)

His hands, under the circumstances, were deadly weapons as they were used in a manner likely to, and which did, cause serious bodily injury.
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Hands and feet may qualify as deadly weapons for aggravated assault depending on how they are used and the injuries inflicted.

Dasher v. State · filed 2009-04-28(a)(2)

The jury was authorized to conclude that appellants’ hands and feet were used as deadly weapons and we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that the hands and feet used to inflict injuries upon the victim were not deadly weapons.
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Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon or an object whose offensive use is likely to cause or actually causes serious bodily injury; an assault committed with hands and feet can support a conviction under it.

Wilkinson v. State · filed 2009-06-03(a)(2)

A person commits aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon or any object which, when used offensively, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). In addition to testimony that Rouse took a running kick at the victim’s face and voluminous other testimony regarding the blows Rouse struck while Wilkinson was present, the victim also testified that Wilkinson kicked the back of his legs. The evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction on this count.
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Section 16-5-21 covers an aggravated assault by shooting when the shooting uses a deadly weapon or means likely to cause serious bodily injury, or involves discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle toward the victim.

McDaniel v. State · filed 2009-06-25(a)(2) and (3)

The only way he could be guilty of an aggravated assault is by shooting her with a deadly weapon, or with a means likely to result in serious bodily injury, or by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward her. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) and (3).
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Aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2)'s deadly weapon provision does not require the malicious intent associated with subsection (a)(1).

Williams v. State · filed 2009-10-06(a)(2)

Second, Williams was not charged with aggravated assault under the malicious intent provision of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1), as discussed in Edge. Instead, she was charged under the deadly weapon provision of subsection (a) (2).
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Aggravated assault by means of a deadly weapon may be established when a person holds a knife inches from a victim, causing reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, even without pointing the knife directly at the victim.

Preston v. State · filed 2009-10-08(a)(2)

A jury could reasonably conclude from this evidence that Preston’s act of sitting down immediately next to the victim with a knife in his left hand put the victim “in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,” OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), by means of a deadly weapon, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). The evidence was thus sufficient to sustain Preston’s conviction for aggravated assault.
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Aggravated assault includes an assault with an object that, when used offensively, is likely to or actually does cause serious bodily injury.

Works v. State · filed 2009-11-17(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument that, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.
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Aggravated assault charged under subsection (a)(2) requires proof of an assault with a deadly weapon.

Nava v. State · filed 2009-11-23(a)(2)

And in order to establish aggravated assault as alleged in this case, the State was required to establish an assault with a deadly weapon.
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Notes 1–150 of 1,003, oldest cases first.

658 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Brown v. State, the court cites the section to identify the conviction but decides only that the evidence was sufficient; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Davis v. State, the court makes a general sufficiency determination; § 16-5-21 appears only in a supporting string cite, with no decision about the section’s rules. opinion →
Ward v. State, the court decided whether an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was required. It cited § 16-5-21 to identify aggravated assault as a felony, without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Bert v. State, the court decided whether the prosecutions involved the same conduct under § 16-1-7; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
State v. Hightower, the citation to § 16-5-21 appears only in the dissent. The majority decides a lesser-included-offense issue under § 16-1-6, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Luke v. State, the court decides merger under § 16-1-7(a), not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Shepherd v. State, the court decides a general sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge and lists § 16-5-21(a) among several offenses without deciding any rule of that section. opinion →
Buchanan v. State, the court decided whether the indictment sufficiently alleged simple battery, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Allen v. State, the citation accompanies a report of the verdict and sentence below; the court’s own decision addresses jury admonitions. opinion →
Cole v. State, the court decides the application of the felony murder rule, not any rule of § 16-5-21. The citation to that section appears in its account of the defendant’s argument. opinion →
Crawford v. State, this statement appears only in the chief justice's separate concurrence, not the court's majority decision. opinion →
Doughty v. State, the court cites the section to identify the charge but decides evidentiary and jury-instruction issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Cater v. State, the court decided whether the jury instruction about simple battery was harmless; it cited § 16-5-21(a)(1) to identify the charged offense. opinion →
Watson v. State, the court decided only that the evidence supported the convictions; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Turner v. State, the court decides a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Few v. State, the court treated the dispute over the aggravated-assault theories as moot; its observation about what the evidence could have supported was conditional. opinion →
Catchings v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported a felony-murder instruction; it cited § 16-5-21 only to identify the underlying felony. opinion →
Lummen v. State, this statement appears only in a special concurrence, so it is not the court’s holding. opinion →
Williams v. State, the section identifies a conviction, but the court decides whether the jury instructions violated due process and whether the error was harmless. It does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Alexander v. State, the court identifies the section as the statute of conviction but decides issues about jury instructions and rebuttal evidence, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Allen v. State, the court decides the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Henderson v. State, the court decided the sufficiency of the felony murder conviction, but did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hooper v. State, the court decides evidentiary and fair-trial issues, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Parrish v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 as a charge but decides no rule of that section; its later analysis concerns the defense of habitation. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court decides whether evidence was admissible, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Coalter v. State, the subsection-specific statement appears only in a special concurrence, not the court's majority decision. opinion →
Allison v. State, the court applies a general sufficiency-of-evidence standard without deciding any rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Caplinger v. State, the court finds the evidence sufficient for the convictions but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Stephens v. State, the court decides evidentiary sufficiency and trial issues, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Lewis v. State, the court decides whether the evidence satisfies the standard for conviction, but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Cranford v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Franklin v. State, the court identifies an aggravated assault conviction but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Benford v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides evidentiary and appellate issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Knight v. State, the court decides whether the convictions merge under OCGA § 16-1-7; it cites § 16-5-21 only to identify the aggravated assault charge. opinion →
Christian v. State, the court identifies the aggravated-assault conviction but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mapp v. State, the court decided whether the jury charge caused harm, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Barnett v. State, the court decides jury selection and identification issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of JO, the court decides juvenile-court procedure and the burden of proof; the citation to § 16-5-21 (a) (2) only identifies the delinquent act. opinion →
Mims v. State, the court decides whether the evidence identifies Mims as the attacker; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Redding v. State, the court decides whether the convictions merge under OCGA § 16-1-7 (a), without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Clark v. State, the court decides whether the aggravated-assault acquittal precludes the firearm-possession conviction; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Phelps v. State, the court identifies the charge in the indictment while resolving an inconsistent-verdict argument; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Roberts v. State, the court decides the scope of voir dire under OCGA § 15-12-133; it mentions § 16-5-21 only as a charged offense. opinion →
McClanahan v. State, the court decided constitutional speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance issues; it cited § 16-5-21 only to identify the conviction. opinion →
Green v. State, the court decides issues concerning the insanity defense and a request for psychiatric evaluation, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Morgan v. State, the court cites the section to identify a conviction but decides only whether it can modify sentences within statutory limits; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Henderson v. State, the court cites this section to identify the offense, but decides accomplice liability and evidentiary issues without deciding this section’s rules. opinion →
Stith v. State, the court decides an identification and evidence sufficiency challenge, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Head v. State, the discussion of § 16-5-21 is in a dissent. The majority decides merger under other sections. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court decided factual merger under §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Snell v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hilson v. State, the court identifies the conviction but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21; its rulings concern witness testimony, the motion for new trial, and general sufficiency of the evidence. opinion →
Walls v. State, the citation reports the charge, rather than a decision by this court about the section. The court decides evidentiary objections. opinion →
Chambers v. State, the court decides whether the evidence required an involuntary manslaughter instruction under § 16-5-3; it uses aggravated assault as a comparison, without deciding a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Gidden v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides jury instruction and deliberation issues, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Young v. State, the court decided whether the knife was properly admitted into evidence, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Moore v. State, No. The court reports the aggravated-assault conviction but makes no decision about § 16-5-21. opinion →
Milan v. State, the court decides objections to cross-examination and venue, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mitchell v. State, the court decided identification and other trial issues, but did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court describes the Georgia section for comparison while deciding an Alabama impeachment issue; it does not decide the Georgia section’s rules. opinion →
Vincent v. State, the court lists the aggravated assault conviction and decides general sufficiency of the evidence, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Kelly v. State, the court mentions the aggravated assault charge but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Briscoe v. State, the court decided which conviction merges under the felony-murder rule; it cited § 16-5-21(b) only to compare potential punishments. opinion →
Barker v. State, the aggravated assault ruling was the trial court’s; this court did not decide an issue under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Daniel v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides whether evidence of a prior obstruction conviction was admissible. opinion →
Leaver v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify a conviction and uses the assault as evidence bearing on identity in the armed-robbery charge; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Morris v. State, the court decides issues about DNA evidence and does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Walker v. State, the court identifies aggravated assault as a conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault charge but decides claims about counsel and the guilty plea, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides impeachment and jury-instruction issues, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Hasty v. State, the court decides whether Hasty validly waived counsel; it does not decide any rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Hewatt v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported the burglary convictions; it did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Reese v. State, the opinion only reports Curtis's conviction under this section; this court dismisses his appeal for failure to file a brief. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides jury-instruction issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in the list of convictions. opinion →
Jordan v. State, the court decides merger under Georgia’s general merger statutes, not a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Judkins v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Martin v. State, the court addressed general sufficiency and evidentiary issues, but did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Scott v. State, the court lists the aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Moore v. State, the only mention of § 16-5-21 reports the jury’s verdict; the court does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Chapman v. State, the court decides whether § 16-11-108 can support felony murder; it cites § 16-5-21(a)(2) only as an example from an earlier case and does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Looney v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports Looney’s liability as a party to the crime and whether the justification instruction was adequate. It does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Davis v. State, the court decided whether newly available testimony warranted a new trial; it did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Cherokee County v. North Cobb Surgical Associates, P. C., the citation appears only in a special concurrence, not the court's majority decision. The concurrence also does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Upshaw v. State, the court decided whether a jury instruction on parties to a crime was proper; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Pierce v. State, the court decides evidentiary sufficiency and the appointment of counsel, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Bates v. Guaranty National Insurance, the court mentions the intent element while deciding insurance coverage, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Reddin v. State, the court finds the evidence sufficient to support the convictions but does not decide a rule specific to § 16-5-21; the section is cited only to identify the charge. opinion →
Mullins v. State, the court identifies the conviction under this section but decides procedural and evidentiary issues, not the section's rules. opinion →
Stocks v. State, the court identifies the aggravated-assault convictions but decides issues about counsel and the admissibility of a statement, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Penn v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported justification instructions, not a rule of the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
Dutton v. State, the opinion mentions § 16-5-21 only while listing the charges; the court's own decision addresses the delusional compulsion defense. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides whether Pearce applies to the sentence; it cites § 16-5-21 only alongside the State’s recommendation and does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
State v. Ritter, the court decides whether Ritter’s confession was voluntary; it cites the aggravated assault penalty only to explain the effect of the detective’s deception. opinion →
Knox v. State, the court identifies the aggravated-assault conviction but decides only whether the trial court properly denied a continuance under OCGA § 17-8-25. opinion →
Bowman v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 while distinguishing an earlier aggravated-assault case; it decides the sufficiency of a child-molestation indictment, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the court decides notice and ineffective-assistance issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Rivers v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports Rivers’ conviction under party-to-a-crime principles, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court mentions the aggravated assault conviction but does not decide a rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Banks v. State, the only reference to § 16-5-21 lists a charge in the trial below, not this court’s decision about that section. opinion →
Louis v. State, the court applies the general standard for sufficiency of the evidence but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides evidentiary and jury-instruction issues, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Puglise v. Cobb County, Ga., the court decided whether the officers’ use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Howard v. State, the citation appears in the court's report of the jury's verdict, not in a decision about this section. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides a jury selection issue under Batson, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Wilson v. State, the court reports the aggravated-assault charge and acquittal but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Sims v. State, the court decides the cruelty-to-children convictions and a hearsay issue, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Fuller v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify the aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Nash v. State, the court mentions the aggravated assault conviction as background but decides evidentiary and recidivist sentencing issues, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Seese v. State, the court decides issues about jury instructions and preservation of error, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Shorter v. State, the court decided whether a slip of the tongue made the jury charge improper; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court identifies an aggravated assault conviction but decides evidentiary and trial-error issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Graham v. State, the court decides whether the evidence established the assailant’s identity, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify a conviction but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the court identifies aggravated assault as an offense of conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Martin v. State, the court decides the effect of an acquittal on the felony murder verdict, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decided whether the jury recharge improperly addressed self-defense, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Evans v. State, the court mentions the aggravated assault conviction but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hooker v. State, the court decides whether OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) bars a successive prosecution; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Arnold v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to describe a prior case, but decides whether a jury instruction in this child molestation case was harmless error; it does not decide a rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Gilbert v. State, the court cites the section to identify a conviction but decides no rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Cox v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the convictions and addresses other trial issues, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Howard v. State, the only reference to § 16-5-21 is in the dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Paul v. State, the court decides evidentiary and ineffective-assistance issues, but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Green v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the verdict under general sufficiency and self-defense principles, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Caldwell v. State, the court identifies the aggravated-assault conviction but decides evidentiary, jury-instruction, and counsel issues, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decides factual merger under OCGA § 16-1-6, rather than a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Phillips v. State, the court decides the effect of an acquittal under double jeopardy principles, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Nealy v. State, the court decided a due process challenge to the jury charge, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Henderson v. State, the court decides whether resentencing is needed under the recidivist sentencing rules. Section 16-5-21(b) supplies the maximum sentence but is not itself construed. opinion →
Kirkland v. State, the court identifies an aggravated assault conviction but decides collateral estoppel and trial issues, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In Re BJW, the court decides the requirements for transferring a juvenile case, not any rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
In the Interest of B. J. W., the court decides the requirements for transferring a juvenile case, not the rules of § 16-5-21; the section identifies only an underlying charge. opinion →
Odett v. State, the only reference to § 16-5-21 is a footnote to an illustrative list in a special concurrence, not the court's decision about that section. opinion →
In Re Earle, the court decides a contempt issue; the footnote only lists the charges in an underlying indictment and does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Rolader v. State, the court lists § 16-5-21 only as an example of a crime to which a different sentencing provision could apply; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Upshaw v. State, the court lists the aggravated assault convictions but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Arnold v. State, the court decides whether the bailiff was properly sworn under § 15-12-140; it does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Cannon v. State, the court decides whether the aggravated assault and rape convictions merge under OCGA §§ 16-1-6 and 16-1-7; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Lynn v. State, the court decides merger under OCGA § 16-1-7; § 16-5-21 identifies the charged offenses but supplies no rule the court decides. opinion →
Sanders v. State, the court decided an ineffective-assistance claim, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Haugland v. State, the court used § 16-5-21 as a comparison while deciding the weapon requirement of the motor vehicle hijacking statute; it did not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides discovery, evidence, and jury issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Kirkland v. State, the court lists the aggravated assault conviction but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In Re QML, the court decided whether self-defense justified the stabbing under OCGA § 16-3-21(a); it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of Q. M. L., the aggravated assault elements were conceded; the court decided the separate justification defense under OCGA § 16-3-21. opinion →
Davis v. State, the court decides waiver of counsel and discovery issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Curtis v. State, the court identifies aggravated assault as a conviction but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Bates v. State, the court found the evidence sufficient to support the convictions but did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21 specifically. opinion →
Baker v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Baker as the assailant; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
James v. State, the court decides whether James was a party to the crimes under OCGA § 16-2-20, not any rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Williams v. State, the citation to § 16-5-21 reports the jury’s conviction. The court’s own analysis addresses only the obstruction convictions. opinion →
Sallie v. State, the only reference to § 16-5-21 is a footnote citation; the opinion contains no sentence stating a holding about it. opinion →
London v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 (a) only to identify a conviction; it decides juror procedure and ineffective assistance, not a rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Eason v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported the verdict and the jury could reject justification; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Lewis v. McDougal, the court uses aggravated assault as a comparison while deciding a jury charge issue concerning kidnapping; it does not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court applies a general sufficiency standard to the offenses charged without deciding a rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court declined to decide whether the aggravated assault instruction expanded the indictment and held only that appellant could not challenge a charge he had agreed to. opinion →
Mayfield v. State, the court decided speedy trial and due process claims; § 16-5-21 appears only as a citation identifying an indicted offense. opinion →
Marshall v. State, the court cites the section’s sentencing provisions while deciding an ineffective-assistance claim; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Strickland v. State, the court recites the statutory definition but decides whether the trial court had to give a defense-of-property instruction, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Davis v. State, the court decided a general evidence-sufficiency challenge based on witness credibility, without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
McNeil v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified McNeil as the shooter and whether character evidence was admissible; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court mentions aggravated assault charges but does not decide any rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court decided whether the guilty plea was valid, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only as a citation for an aggravated assault charge. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported Bryant’s conviction under general sufficiency and party-to-a-crime rules; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
People v. Shawn, this court cites a Georgia decision as authority from another jurisdiction while deciding Colorado law; it does not make its own decision about Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21. opinion →
Banks v. State, the court applies general sufficiency and evidentiary rules but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Nguyen v. State, the court decides Miranda waiver and character-evidence issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court cited the section to explain the charge, but decided whether the challenged testimony was harmless, not a rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Botts v. State, the citation appears in the State’s argument, not a ruling the court adopted. The court decides the validity of § 17-10-17. opinion →
Mondragon v. State, the court decides whether Mondragon validly proceeded without counsel; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the offense of conviction. opinion →
Duffy v. State, the court decides whether the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, not any rule of the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
Lewis v. State, the court makes a general sufficiency ruling across the convictions but does not decide a rule specific to § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated assault charge. opinion →
Stinson v. State, the court decided whether the felony murder indictment was sufficient, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Caldwell v. State, the court mentions the aggravated assault convictions but decides issues about waiver of counsel and judicial comments, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Buchanan v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim; it reports the trial court’s merger of the aggravated-assault convictions without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Harris v. State, the court cites the sentencing provision while deciding whether counsel’s failure to present more mitigation evidence caused prejudice; it does not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Stuart v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
In the Interest of K. B. F., the court decided whether the evidence supported delinquency based on aiding an assailant; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Gaines v. State, the citation reports the jury’s verdict; this court decides a juror-misconduct issue, not a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the citation reports the jury's aggravated-assault convictions, not this court's own decision about § 16-5-21. opinion →
Ledford v. State, the court decided whether similar transaction evidence was admissible, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
State v. Robinson, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify the acquitted charge, but decides the effect of inconsistent verdicts and the sufficiency of the firearm conviction, not any rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Garibay v. State, the court decides whether gang evidence was admissible; it does not decide any rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Garcia v. State, the court decides whether the appeal was premature, not any rule of the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
Ros v. State, the court resolved a challenge to the felony murder instructions and the connection between the assault and the death; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hankerson v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only when listing the convictions; it decides no rule under that section. opinion →
Austin v. State, the court decided whether the victim’s deposition was admissible; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Ely v. State, the court used the aggravated assault counts to assess prejudice from withheld evidence; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decides severance and sequestration issues. It mentions § 16-5-21 only when listing the convictions and does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Richards v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides whether the claim-of-right defense applies to robbery by intimidation. opinion →
Sullivan v. State, the section appears only in a dissent’s citation, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
Lloyd v. State, the court cites this section to identify the aggravated assault charge but decides no rule under it. opinion →
Herndon v. State, the court decides a constitutional speedy trial claim; it does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jefferson v. State, the opinion only reports the trial court’s treatment of aggravated assault; this court decides whether Jefferson showed a defect in his armed robbery sentence. opinion →
Tillman v. State, the Georgia statute appears only in a string citation in a separate concurrence, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Sapp v. State, the court decided party and conspiracy liability, not a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Gentry v. State, the court describes a ruling in Eidson; its own decision concerns a methamphetamine charge, not § 16-5-21. opinion →
Souder v. State, the court decided Souder’s liability as a party to the crimes under § 16-2-20, rather than a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Foster v. State, the court decided whether the guilty plea had a sufficient factual basis under the plea rules; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
McRae v. State, the court decided whether photographs were admissible, not a rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Thomas v. State, the court applied a general rule about the sufficiency of a victim’s testimony; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
McDowell v. State, the court decided whether McDowell could withdraw his guilty plea, not any rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only as a citation identifying the aggravated assault charges. opinion →
Hill v. State, the court decided whether the evidence supported Hill’s conviction as a party to the crimes, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Banta v. State, the court uses aggravated assault as one example while deciding how the rule of lenity applies to other statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court notes that the evidence was sufficient and cites § 16-5-21(a), but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court decides whether the ineffective-assistance claim was waived. Section 16-5-21 appears only as a citation identifying the aggravated-assault conviction; the court does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Starling v. State, the court decided an ineffective-assistance claim concerning the aggravated assault charge, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Cross v. State, the court finds the evidence sufficient but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21; it cites the section without construing it. opinion →
Skaggs-Ferrell v. State, the court decides whether counsel’s failure to object was ineffective assistance, not what § 16-5-21 requires or covers. opinion →
Humphrey v. Wilson, the court cites § 16-5-21(b) but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Robinson v. State, the court found a proposed jury charge moot after acquittal; it did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Reeves v. State, the court decides the sufficiency of the terroristic threats conviction; it does not decide a rule under the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Beals v. State, the court discusses aggravated assault only to distinguish an earlier case while deciding whether Beals’ armed-robbery indictment was sufficient. opinion →
Gaines v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21(a)(2) to identify the charge, but decides venue and jury-charge issues, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Wallace v. State, the court decided whether the victim’s identification was sufficient to support the convictions; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Goss v. State, the court used the aggravated-assault charge in deciding merger under OCGA § 16-1-7; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Knox v. State, the court decided that any jury-instruction error was harmless because Knox was acquitted on that count; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hawkins v. State, the court decides whether accomplice testimony supports the convictions, not a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21(a)(2) only to identify an aggravated assault charge; it does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
White v. State, the court decided whether the jury instruction adequately explained justification, a general defense, rather than a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Styles v. State, the court decides jurisdiction under § 15-11-5. It cites § 16-5-21(c) only in a footnote about sentence length, which Styles did not challenge. opinion →
Newland v. Hall, this reports the trial court’s ruling; the appellate court does not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hyde v. State, the court identifies an aggravated assault conviction but decides issues about a mistrial and similar transaction evidence, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Bethune v. State, the court applies Georgia’s rule on inconsistent verdicts without deciding what § 16-5-21 means or requires. opinion →
Lemming v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides recusal and ineffective assistance issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Felder v. State, the court decided whether the jury needed a self-defense instruction on retreat, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Sillah v. State, the court decides witness, evidence, and ineffective-assistance issues, but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated assault charge. opinion →
Hernandez v. State, the court decides whether Hernandez waived his right to be present at a hearing; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21, which appears only as a citation for his conviction. opinion →
Jennings v. State, the court identifies an aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Fair v. State, the court reports the parties’ agreement about the aggravated assault charge and decides the knowledge requirement of the death penalty aggravating circumstance, not a disputed rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Waddell v. State, the court decides whether Waddell should have received different appointed counsel; it does not decide a rule under the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify the conviction, then decides evidentiary sufficiency and admissibility without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Simpson v. State, the opinion reports the trial court’s merger of the aggravated assault convictions; this court does not decide an issue under § 16-5-21. opinion →
In Re AA, the court decided whether the evidence identified A.A. as the shooter; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of A. A., the court decided whether the evidence identified A. A. as the shooter; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
McCLOON v. State, the court decides issues about armed robbery and the guilty plea, but does not decide any rule of the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
McCoon v. State, the court decides the out-of-time appeal and the challenges to the armed robbery plea; it does not decide any rule under the aggravated assault section, which appears only in a footnote identifying a count. opinion →
Harris v. State, the court decided a jury-instruction issue, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Bradshaw v. State, the court cites aggravated assault’s possible sentence to compare punishments; it decides the constitutionality of a sex offender registration sentence, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Rayshad v. State, the court cites the section to identify the charged offense but does not decide its rules. opinion →
Lankford v. State, the court decides severance and mistrial issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section identifies an indicted offense. opinion →
Washington v. State, the court decides whether expert funding was required; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Washington v. State, the court decided whether denying expert funding was an abuse of discretion; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Stone v. State, the court decides whether Stone’s custodial statement was admissible under the Sixth Amendment, not a rule of § 16-5-21. The statute appears in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Reed v. State, the court decided the sufficiency of the felony murder conviction; it cited § 16-5-21(a)(3) to identify the underlying aggravated assault without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Manning v. State, the citation reports the jury’s aggravated-assault convictions; the court makes no decision about § 16-5-21. opinion →
Everett v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Freeman v. State, the court cites the section in a footnote but gives no sentence of its own deciding the section’s rules; the weapon rule appears in a description of an earlier case. opinion →
Gresham v. State, the court decided whether the evidence established Gresham’s participation in the crimes, without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Canty v. State, the court decides confession admissibility and evidentiary sufficiency without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21; the citation identifies a conviction. opinion →
Sheppard v. State, the court mentions the aggravated-assault conviction but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Robins v. State, the court decided identification and severance issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a footnote identifying an indicted offense. opinion →
Hayes v. State, the court decides a constitutional speedy trial claim, not a rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only as a footnote citation. opinion →
Frazier v. State, the court decided an ineffective-assistance claim concerning a custodial statement, not a rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only as the aggravated-assault charge. opinion →
Leftwich v. State, the footnote reports the offense and its sentencing merger; the court does not decide a rule under this section. opinion →
Gonzales v. State, the court decides merger under the aggravated battery statute; it mentions § 16-5-21 only in discussing analogous aggravated assault decisions. opinion →
Bonker v. State, the court decides ineffective assistance and evidentiary issues; it cites § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction. opinion →
Allen v. State, the court decided jury selection issues; it cited § 16-5-21(a)(2) only to identify the offense of conviction. opinion →
Jacobs v. State, the court decides jury waiver and ineffective assistance, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In Re RW, the court decided whether the evidence supported transfer to superior court under § 15-11-30.2. It did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21, which appears only in a citation. opinion →
In the Interest of R. W., the court decides whether there were reasonable grounds for a juvenile transfer under OCGA § 15-11-30.2; it cites § 16-5-21(a) only to identify an alleged offense. opinion →
Biggins v. State, the court decides an aggravated battery evidence issue and an ineffective assistance claim; § 16-5-21 appears only as a citation identifying a conviction. opinion →
Brown v. State, the court decides whether the sentence punished Brown for going to trial; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Abernathy v. State, the court decides whether the movement satisfies the kidnapping statute’s asportation element, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Pinkins v. State, the court decided whether the photographic lineup was impermissibly suggestive; it did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying an aggravated assault conviction. opinion →
Tolbert v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides arrest and juror misconduct issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hill v. State, the court reversed the aggravated assault conviction because of an erroneous accident instruction, but decided the rules of the accident defense rather than the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decided whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the indictment, rather than deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Merritt v. State, the court decides a general challenge to the evidence and identification, but does not decide any rule of OCGA § 16-5-21. opinion →
Collins v. State, the court decided ineffective-assistance claims, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a footnote identifying a conviction. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court resolves a general evidence sufficiency challenge without deciding any rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In Re Mdp, the court decided the armed robbery challenge and did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of M. D. P., the court decided the challenge to armed robbery, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of A. Z., the court decides whether accomplice testimony required corroboration under OCGA § 24-4-8. It cites § 16-5-21 only to identify the aggravated assault offense. opinion →
Crawford v. State, the court decides whether the evidence established Crawford’s identity, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Arnold v. State, the court decided claims about perjured testimony and an unpreserved objection, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
SURH v. State, the court addressed which charges remained pending, but did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Morgan v. State, the court identifies and affirms the aggravated assault conviction, but decides justification and evidentiary issues without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Marcia-Hernandez v. State, the court decides a hearsay issue; it does not decide any rule under the aggravated assault statute, which appears only in a charge citation. opinion →
Shivers v. State, the section appears in a special concurrence as an example drawn from prior decisions, not in the court's holding. The majority does not decide a rule under this section. opinion →
Lewis v. State, the court decided an ineffective assistance claim, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Cobb v. State, the court decides evidentiary and mistrial issues, not the rules of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying the conviction. opinion →
Collier v. State, the court identifies an aggravated-assault conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Varner v. State, the court identifies the aggravated-assault conviction and finds the evidence sufficient for the charged crimes generally, but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Colbert v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 (b) for an undisputed sentencing range; it decides whether the recidivist sentencing provisions in § 17-10-7 permitted the sentence. opinion →
ESCOFFIER v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports kidnapping; it does not decide any rule under the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Powers v. State, the court gives only a general sufficiency conclusion for all convictions; it does not state a holding about § 16-5-21 specifically. opinion →
In Re Dc, the court decided the juvenile-transfer requirements under OCGA § 15-11-30.2. It cited § 16-5-21(a)(2) only to identify a charge. opinion →
In the Interest of D. C., the court decides the requirements for transferring a juvenile case, not the rules of § 16-5-21; it cites that section only to identify a charged offense. opinion →
Miller v. State, the court decided whether denying a continuance was an abuse of discretion, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Dixon v. State, the court mentions aggravated assault while deciding whether the victim’s movement satisfied the kidnapping statute; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Newton v. State, the court decided jury-instruction waiver and ineffective assistance, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
United States v. Sandoval, the court cited the Georgia provision while deciding whether the conduct was a RICO predicate; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Jones v. State, the court decides evidentiary and justification issues, not a rule of the aggravated assault statute; this section appears only as the citation for the conviction. opinion →
Simmons v. State, the court decided a constitutional speedy-trial claim; § 16-5-21 appears only as a citation identifying an aggravated-assault charge. opinion →
Watkins v. State, the court lists § 16-5-21 (a) among several unchallenged convictions but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Bryant v. State, the court decided whether the evidence proved the alleged act, but did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a conviction footnote. opinion →
Bearfield v. State, the court affirms the sufficiency of the evidence generally but does not decide a rule or element of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a list of citations. opinion →
Bearfield v. State, the court affirms the convictions collectively; its only section-specific statement is a citation in a list, with no sentence explaining or applying § 16-5-21. opinion →
United States v. Epps, the court decided whether the seizure was lawful under the Fourth Amendment; it cited § 16-5-21 as the possible felony supporting probable cause without deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
Crowder v. State, the citation reports the jury’s conviction, not this court’s decision about § 16-5-21. The court decides an evidentiary issue under § 24-9-84.1. opinion →
Carmichael v. State, the court decides evidentiary sufficiency and merger under other law, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Wallin v. State, the court affirms the aggravated assault conviction because the error concerning the separate battery counts did not affect it; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Scott v. State, the citation only identifies a charge from the trial below; the appellate court makes no decision about this section. opinion →
Hall v. State, the footnote reports the conviction below and cites subsection (j) for background; the court does not decide an issue under that subsection. opinion →
Gutierrez v. State, the court decided armed robbery and juvenile-court jurisdiction. Section 16-5-21(a)(1) appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated-assault counts. opinion →
Williams v. Taylor-Lee, the court expressly declined to decide whether arguable probable cause existed under § 16-5-21, so it decided no rule of that section. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides whether the Edge modified merger rule applies to this charge; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Doe v. State, the reference to § 16-5-21 only describes a prior case; this court decides an indictment concerning a lottery offense. opinion →
Anderson v. State, the court mentions § 16-5-21 only to identify a conviction; it decides joinder and merger of firearm possession counts, not any rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Martinez v. State, the court does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21; it appears only as a bare footnote citation identifying a charge. opinion →
Daniels v. State, the court decided a general accomplice-corroboration and sufficiency issue, but did not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying an aggravated-assault conviction. opinion →
Regent v. State, the court decides waiver and merger; it cites § 16-5-21(b) only as part of the possible combined sentence, without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Rainly v. State, the opinion recites and cites the section but does not decide its rules or application. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the court makes a general sufficiency ruling but does not decide or explain any rule of § 16-5-21; it cites the section in a list of offenses. opinion →
In Re Tcs, the court decided whether the evidence supported the adjudication, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of T. C. S., the court decides the sufficiency of the evidence identifying T. C. S. as the shooter, but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Amaya v. State, the opinion identifies the aggravated-assault conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court expressly says compliance with the section’s sentencing limits was not contested; it decides the request for a new trial without deciding a rule under this section. opinion →
Lee v. State, the court cites this section to identify the aggravated assault conviction but decides evidentiary and new trial issues, not the section’s rules. opinion →
Watson v. State, the court decided Watson’s participation under a conspiracy theory, not a rule of the aggravated assault section. opinion →
Redford v. State, the opinion reports the ruling in Fulton v. State; this court decides a racketeering jury-instruction issue, not aggravated assault. opinion →
Gresham v. State, the court applied merger rules to the aggravated assault conviction; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Kenny v. State, the court decided whether Kenny’s conduct was justified under the defense-of-habitation statute; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Badger v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of § 16-5-21; the section identifies the offense of conviction. opinion →
Hill v. State, the court resolved the sufficiency issue through its self-defense analysis; it did not decide a rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Britton v. State, the court describes the aggravated assault charges but decides whether the jury instruction error required a mistrial, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Holcomb v. State, the court decides whether the verdicts are mutually exclusive and discusses the simple-assault rules of § 16-5-20; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Philpot v. State, the court decides whether the evidence supports the conviction, but does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hickman v. State, the citation reports the trial court’s aggravated-assault conviction, not this court’s decision about the section. opinion →
Campbell v. State, the court decided the sufficiency of the evidence for attempted murder, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Douglas v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Douglas as a participant, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Tolbert v. State, the opinion cites § 16-5-21(a) but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Alexis v. State, the court does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. It cites the section among the convictions and reports the trial court’s merger order. opinion →
Morrell v. State, the court decides the inconsistent-verdict and jury-instruction issues, but does not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Billington v. State, the court decides ineffective assistance of counsel; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Calloway v. State, the court mentions the aggravated-assault conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21; the appeal addresses counsel and kidnapping. opinion →
Pennington v. State, the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and counsel’s performance without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mims v. State, the court decides evidentiary issues; it cites § 16-5-21(a)(2) only to identify the aggravated-assault charge. opinion →
Carson v. State, the court decides whether Carson’s guilty plea waived his merger claim, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Kemp v. State, the court decides a constitutional speedy-trial claim; it does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
State v. Hipp, the court decides the timing of self-defense immunity under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, not a rule of the aggravated assault statute. opinion →
Angulo v. State, the court decides voir dire, evidence, and ineffective-assistance issues; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mitchell v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Mitchell as the perpetrator, without deciding a rule or element of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Kirkland v. State, the court mentions Bailey’s conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Pate v. State, the court identifies an aggravated-assault conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21; its rulings concern evidence and trial procedure. opinion →
REDINBURG v. State, the court found the evidence sufficient under the general standard of review but did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Morales v. State, the court decides whether the trial court properly admitted a video. It cites § 16-5-21 (a) only to identify the aggravated assault conviction and does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Solis-Morales v. State, the court decides whether the video recording was admissible. Section 16-5-21(a) appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated assault conviction; the court decides no rule of that section. opinion →
Seabrook v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 (a) (2) to identify a charge but decides only whether Seabrook can challenge his plea through postconviction remedies. opinion →
Seabrook v. State, the court decides whether coram nobis relief is available; it does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Gordon v. State, the court decides whether the firearm-possession instruction was harmful; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Gordon v. State, the court decided whether Gordon was liable as a party to the crimes, but did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21 itself. opinion →
Lee v. State, the citation appears in a factual account quoted from Lee I, not in this court's decision about the section. This appeal decides ineffective-assistance claims. opinion →
Lee v. State, the opinion identifies the aggravated assault conviction and reports the trial court’s merger, but decides ineffective-assistance claims rather than a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest Of: L. R., the court decided whether OCGA § 15-11-63 required credit for pre-disposition detention; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Williams v. Kelley, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim using a general rule about jury instructions, rather than deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
In the Interest of L. R., the court decides whether the juvenile must receive credit for time served under OCGA § 15-11-63, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Roesser v. State, the court decides the double jeopardy effect of the aggravated assault acquittal, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Roesser v. State, the court decides whether double jeopardy bars retrial for voluntary manslaughter, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court resolved whether the identification evidence supported the convictions; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Boynton v. State, the court lists an aggravated assault conviction but decides similar transaction evidence and ineffective assistance, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court resolved a witness credibility challenge and assessed overall sufficiency without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Boynton v. State, the court decides evidentiary and ineffective-assistance issues, not any rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in the list of convictions. opinion →
State v. Tafoya, the court cites Georgia’s aggravated-assault provision only as a comparison while interpreting a New Mexico statute; it decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Womack v. State, the court decided whether the search warrant was sufficiently specific; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Womack v. State, the court cited § 16-5-21 as an offense listed in the search warrant and decided whether the warrant described the property to be seized with reasonable certainty, not any rule of aggravated assault. opinion →
Sherrell v. State, the court cites the aggravated-assault provision but decides venue, an evidence issue, and ineffective assistance without deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
Sherrell v. State, the court decides venue, an evidence issue, and ineffective assistance; it does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mahone v. State, the citation appears in an account of the trial court’s acceptance of the plea. This court decided whether Mahone received a proper hearing on his motion to withdraw it, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mahone v. State, the court decides how Mahone’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was heard, not any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnson v. Niehus, the court uses the aggravated-assault statute to assess the officers’ use of force under the Fourth Amendment; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Skinner v. State, the court identifies the aggravated assault conviction but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Skinner v. State, the court mentions the aggravated-assault charge but decides no rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hutchinson v. State, the court decided whether admitting burglary testimony was harmless; it did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Hutchinson v. State, the court makes a general sufficiency finding but does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the charge. opinion →
Chatman v. Brown, the court uses aggravated assault as a separate offense in its kidnapping asportation analysis; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Johnathan Love v. State, the court decides whether the evidence corroborated Love’s identification as a participant. It does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21(a), which appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated-assault counts. opinion →
Love v. State, the court decided whether the evidence identified Love as a participant, not the rules of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mickens v. State, the court applied a general sufficiency standard without deciding any rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Mickens v. State, the court cites § 16-5-21 to identify the aggravated assault charge but does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Ransom v. State, the court decides mistrial and self-defense instruction issues. It cites § 16-5-21(a) only to identify an offense of conviction, without deciding that section’s rules. opinion →
Ransom v. State, the court decides a mistrial issue and a self-defense instruction issue; it cites this section only to identify the aggravated-assault convictions. opinion →
Russell v. State, the citation appears only in the court’s report of the jury’s convictions, not in a decision about this section. opinion →
Russell v. State, the court lists an aggravated assault conviction but decides identification, jury instruction, and ineffective assistance issues, without deciding a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Barnes v. State, the merger sentence reports what happened at sentencing; this court does not decide a rule under § 16-5-21. opinion →
Barnes v. State, the merger sentence reports what happened at sentencing; the appellate court does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
White v. State, the court upheld the verdict based on evidence identifying White and did not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
White v. State, the court identifies an aggravated-assault conviction but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Copeland v. State, the court decided the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Copeland v. State, the court decides the sufficiency of eyewitness identification evidence, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Glenard Rico Wright v. State, the court resolves an evidence sufficiency challenge based on conflicting testimony; it does not decide a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Wright v. State, the court does not decide any rule of § 16-5-21; the section is cited only to identify the aggravated-assault charge. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of OCGA § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a citation identifying a conviction. opinion →
Riley v. State, the court addresses witness credibility and ineffective assistance, but decides no rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Riley v. State, the court decides a witness credibility challenge to the verdict, not a rule of § 16-5-21; the section appears only in a footnote identifying the aggravated assault charges. opinion →
Williams v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim, not a rule of § 16-5-21. The section appears only in a footnote identifying a conviction. opinion →
Causey v. State, the court decides an ineffective-assistance claim about juror contact, not a rule of § 16-5-21. opinion →
Taylor v. State, the discussion of § 16-5-21 (c) reports a ruling in Cornwell; this court decides a question under § 16-5-24. opinion →
…and 258 more.

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