Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-35

Section 5-6-35(1) requires compliance with the appeal procedures applicable when a superior court reviews a lower court’s decision by certiorari, and noncompliance requires dismissal of the appeal.

Wiggins v. City of Millen · filed 1983-01-04(1)

However, Wiggins has failed to follow the appeal procedures required by law where the superior court has reviewed the decision of a lower court by certiorari. Code Ann. § 6-701.1 (1) (now OCGA § 5-6-35 (1)). Therefore, this appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings to begin with an application for discretionary appeal.

Valeria Sanders A/K/A Valeria Cruz A/K/A Valeria Montez Sanders v. Sunny Asset, LLC · filed 2021-12-06(a)(1), (b)

Appeals from superior court decisions reviewing lower court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals within its scope to follow the discretionary-appeal procedure and provides no authority for an out-of-time application.

Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Meeks · filed 1983-01-31

Because the appeal was not brought under the discretionaray appeal provisions of OCGA § 5- 6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1), it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. ... We find no authority to grant such a motion under OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6- 701.1).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary appeal application to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order at issue.

Hawk v. Walker · filed 2012-10-10(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order at issue. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Adams v. State · filed 2013-12-03(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED, and Adams shall have ten days from the date of this order to file a notice of appeal with the trial court.

Subsection (j) authorizes the court to grant a discretionary-review application when the order being reviewed is directly appealable.

Murray v. State · filed 2014-12-04(j)

When a party applies for discretionary review of a directly appealable order, we grant the application under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary-appeal application within 30 days, but that deadline may be excused when necessary to remedy a constitutional violation concerning the appeal; in termination-of-parental-rights cases, the discretionary appeal is the parent’s first appellate review.

In the Interest Of: B. R. F. F/K/A B. R. M., a Child (Mother) · filed 2015-03-30(a)(12), (d)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), an application for a discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order being appealed. ... In the context of termination of parental rights cases, the discretionary appeal process is the one and only first appeal as of right. ... It is evident that the Georgia legislature incorporated the discretionary application appeal procedure as an integral part of the system for finally adjudicating termination of parental rights cases, and this system, which entitles indigent parents to court-appointed counsel for appeals and provides appellate review of termination orders and a possibility for a full appeal, must be applied in accordance with the requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Section 5-6-35 places termination-of-parental-rights appeals in the discretionary-appeal process and generally requires an application within 30 days, but a court may excuse that deadline to remedy a due-process violation caused by counsel’s failure to provide the statutorily required appellate assistance.

In THE INTEREST OF B. R. F., a Child · filed 2015-04-10(a)(12), (d)

We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, this court has jurisdiction to grant an out-of-time application for discretionary appeal from an order terminating parental rights. ... Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), an application for a discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order being appealed. ... In the context of termination of parental rights cases, the discretionary appeal process is the one and only first appeal as of right. ... As the remedy for this due process violation, we acknowledge that we have jurisdiction of the discretionary appeal and, as determined previously in granting the application, we proceed to review the appeal on the merits.

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Monroe v. Excel Federal Credit Union · filed 2019-12-04(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this discretionary application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary appeal within 30 days after entry of the order or judgment, and its requirements are jurisdictional.

Tillery v. State · filed 2021-09-07(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Section 5-6-35(b) requires an application for discretionary appeal when appealing the denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60.

Actavo Engineering Services, LLC v. Insight Global, LLC · filed 2021-09-07(b)

[T]he denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 is not directly appealable and instead requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b).

Subsection 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary-appeal application within 30 days of the order or judgment, and compliance with the statute's requirements is jurisdictional.

In the Interest of S. O., Children (Father) · filed 2021-10-08(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. ... The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60(d).

JAMES v. NEAL · filed 2021-10-08(a)(8)

An appeal from an order denying a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary appeal within 30 days of the order or judgment, and compliance with the statute is jurisdictional.

Cotton v. State · filed 2021-12-07(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance with the statute.

Subsection 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Richards v. Progressive Corporation Insurance Company · filed 2021-12-09(j)

We will grant an otherwise timely application for discretionary appeal if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner appealing a civil action to initiate the appeal by filing an application for discretionary review.

RECO COUSINS v. TERRY LANGLEY · filed 2021-12-30

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, an appeal in a civil action filed by a prisoner must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 42-12-8, cross-referencing OCGA § 5-6-35; Brock v. Hardman, 303 Ga. 729, 731 (2) (814 SE2d 736) (2018).

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary application to be filed within 30 days of the order sought to be appealed, and compliance with the section's requirements is jurisdictional.

Gant v. State · filed 2022-01-24(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d). The requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 are jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance therewith.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or trial court order being appealed.

Hixson v. State · filed 2022-03-09(d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or trial court order sought to be appealed.

Subsection 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary-review application when the lower court’s order is directly appealable.

Roberts v. McCoy · filed 2022-03-10(j)

This Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection (j) directs the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Mack v. State · filed 2022-04-19(j)

Mack was not required to file a discretionary application in order to challenge the trial court’s dismissal of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Ordinarily, we will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely application for discretionary review when the lower court's order is subject to direct appeal.

Lamoureux v. Brown · filed 2022-04-26(j)

This Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Subsection 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely application for discretionary review when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Rachel Leigh McVey F/K/A Rachel Leigh Moon v. Moon · filed 2022-05-05(j)

This Court will grant a timely application for discretionary review if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary-appeal application within 30 days, and subsection (c) requires the applicant to include the petition or motion that led directly to the order or judgment.

Cooper v. Cooper · filed 2022-05-12(c), (d)

An application for discretionary appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order to be appealed. ... Although a motion for new trial may extend the time in which appellate relief may be sought, such motion must also be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. ... Further, an applicant must include “a copy of any petition or motion which led directly to the order or judgment being appealed[.]” OCGA § 5-6-35 (c); Court of Appeals Rule 31 (e). By omitting the motion for new trial from his application materials, James Cooper has failed to demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction to consider his application.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires a discretionary appeal application to be filed within 30 days of the challenged order, decision, or judgment, and makes that deadline jurisdictional.

Wright v. Nealie M. Wright · filed 2022-05-24(d)

To be timely, a discretionary application must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the order, decision or judgment complained of. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d); Hill v. State, 204 Ga. App. 582, 583 (420 SE2d 393) (1992). This statutory deadline is jurisdictional, and this Court cannot accept an application for appeal not made in compliance with OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Subsection 5-6-35(j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant a timely discretionary application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

In the Interest of G. L., a Child (Father) · filed 2022-06-01(j)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (j), this Court will grant a timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(d) requires an application for discretionary review to be filed within 30 days after entry of the termination order, and an untimely application cannot invoke appellate jurisdiction.

In THE INTEREST OF J. L. O., Children (Father) · filed 2023-01-18(d)

We hold today that because the juvenile court’s grant of the right to out-of-time appellate review did not comport with the very limited circumstances recognized in B. R. F., 299 Ga. at 294, the grant was not effective to extend the time in which the father could file his application for discretionary review. And because the 30-day period for filing such an application from the September 9, 2022, order terminating his parental rights has long passed, any application the father might file would be untimely. See OCGA §§ 5-6-35 (a) (12), (d).

Subsection (j) requires the Court of Appeals to grant an otherwise timely discretionary-appeal application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal.

In the Interest of E. M. F., Children (Grandmother) · filed 2023-11-07(j)

This Court will grant an otherwise timely discretionary application if the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j). Accordingly, this application is hereby GRANTED.

Subsection 5-6-35(j) ordinarily permits the Court of Appeals to grant a discretionary-appeal application when an order canceling a lis pendens is directly appealable.

Yeung v. Humphrey · filed 2026-05-14(j)

Ordinarily, this Court would grant Yeung’s application under OCGA § 5-6-35(j) because an order canceling a lis pendens may be appealed directly.

Subsection (a)(13) requires an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to cancel a lis pendens to be brought by discretionary application rather than by direct appeal.

MADISON v. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC. · filed 2026-06-25(a)(13)

In addition, Madison is not entitled to a direct appeal from the trial court’s cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(13) (appeals from orders granting or denying a motion canceling a lis pendens must come by discretionary application).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) treats an action involving rights and obligations arising from a divorce decree, without child custody, as a domestic-relations matter requiring discretionary review.

Berry v. Berry · filed 2018-01-30(a)(2)

Where, as here, the underlying action involves rights and obligations arising out of a divorce decree, and does not involve child custody, the case is a domestic relations matter within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) treats a domestic-relations appeal involving rights and obligations from a divorce decree, when child custody is not involved, as requiring discretionary review; compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional.

Medlin v. Medlin · filed 2017-10-20(a)(2), (b)

Where, as here, the underlying action involves rights and obligations arising out of a divorce decree, and does not involve child custody, the case is a domestic relations matter within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) (619 SE2d 679) (2005). Appeals in such matters must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); accord Voyles v. Voyles, 301 Ga. 44, 47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017) (an appeal in a domestic relations case in which custody is not at issue must be brought by discretionary application).

Section 5-6-35 requires an alimony-related contempt order to be pursued through an application for discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court rather than a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Cale v. Byrdwell · filed 1983-06-15

This is an attempt to appeal a contempt order in an alimony action, which by law is subject to application for discretionary appeal (OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1)) to the Supreme Court (Georgia Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV (Code Ann. § 2-2804)).

Section 5-6-35 requires appellants to follow the discretionary appeal procedures in applicable cases.

Kimble v. Rollins Leasing Corp. · filed 1986-07-16

Appellants having failed to follow the discretionary appeal procedures required by OCGA § 5-6-35 in such cases, the appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35 governs appeals of specified interlocutory orders in divorce cases through the discretionary-application procedure, with the application due within 30 days under subsection (d).

Straus v. Straus · filed 1990-07-12(d)

The first is whether a party seeking to appeal an interlocutory order in a divorce case must follow the interlocutory-application procedure of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) or the discretionary-application procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35. We conclude that § 5-6-35 controls.

Section 5-6-35(a)(6) requires an appellant seeking discretionary appellate review to comply with the discretionary-appeal procedures; a direct appeal cannot be converted into a timely discretionary-appeal application when those procedures were not followed.

Akins v. Life Investors Insurance Co. of America · filed 1990-11-14(a)(6)

On July 23, 1990, appellant filed a direct appeal to this court from an order entered on July 2, 1990, granting summary judgment for damages of less than $2,500. On August 31, 1990, appellant moved that his direct appeal be treated as an application for appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), and that we consider the application as timely filed within 30 days of the judgment. Appellant has failed to comply with the discretionary appeal procedures. The motion is therefore denied, and the appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(8) makes appeals from orders denying a motion to set aside a judgment under Code Section 9-11-60(d) discretionary and requires an application for leave to appeal.

Robenolt v. CHRYSLER FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP. · filed 1991-09-10(a)(8)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8) provides that appeals from “orders under subsection (d) of Code Section 9-11-60 denying a motion to set aside a judgment” are discretionary, requiring application for leave to appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal when a state court reviews a magistrate-court decision de novo in a matter with no right of direct appeal.

Crowder v. Citizens Trust Bank · filed 1994-05-27(a)(11)

“Because the appeal to this Court is taken from the decision of a state court reviewing a decision of a magistrate court by a de novo proceeding involving a subject matter not otherwise subject to a right of direct appeal, the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 were required and this appeal must be dismissed. [Cit.]; OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11).”

Section 5-6-35(a)(10) makes an appeal from an award of litigation expenses discretionary when the award is not appealed as part of a directly appealable judgment.

Cheeley-Towns v. Rapid Group, Inc. · filed 1994-02-11(a)(10)

An appeal from an award of expenses of litigation under OCGA § 9-15-14 is likewise discretionary, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (10), when not “appealed as part of a judgment that is directly appealable.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for appeal in divorce cases and does not allow a party to avoid discretionary review by seeking a writ of prohibition.

Self v. Bayneum · filed 1995-02-13(a)(2)

Since the underlying subject matter is divorce, Self was required to file an application for appeal as provided in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2); he cannot avoid the discretionary review procedure by challenging the trial court’s rulings via writ of prohibition.

Section 5-6-35 requires an indigent prisoner's appeal from denial of a free trial transcript for a post-conviction collateral attack to follow the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Coles v. State · filed 1996-11-06

OCGA § 42-12-8 mandates the use of the discretionary appeal procedures established by OCGA § 5-6-35 for appeals in all civil actions filed by indigent prisoners. ... Specifically, appeals from the denial of any such applications for free transcripts for post-conviction collateral attack must comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner's appeal to follow the statute's discretionary-appeal procedures, and noncompliance deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Brown v. Levine · filed 1998-11-02

Appellant Brown did not comply with the requisite discretionary procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 when he filed this appeal. We therefore have no jurisdiction to consider appellant Brown’s appeal.

Section 5-6-35 requires a prisoner appealing an action to follow the discretionary-appeal procedure, and failing to do so deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Chambers v. Abellana · filed 1999-04-08

Since appellant Chambers has not followed the discretionary appeal procedure provided in OCGA § 5-6-35, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Section 5-6-35(7) requires an application for discretionary appeal to challenge the denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial unrelated to an original appeal.

Crawford v. State · filed 2004-06-07(7)

At least prior to the 2003 amendment of OCGA § 5-5-41 which added subsection (c), the denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial unrelated to an original appeal could only be appealed by the filing of an application for discretionary appeal in the proper appellate court. OCGA § 5-6-35(7). Crawford argues, however, that he is entitled to a direct appeal of the trial court's denial of his request for DNA testing based upon the following portion of the recent amendment to OCGA § 5-5-41: The petitioner or the state may appeal an order, decision, or judgment rendered pursuant to this Code section. OCGA § 5-5-41(c)(13). We conclude that this language emphasizes the General Assembly's intent that the denial of a motion seeking DNA testing made as part of an extraordinary motion for new trial be recognized as an appealable issue, but we also conclude that the filing of an application for discretionary appeal is the proper form of appeal in such a case. Concluding otherwise would yield the absurd result that the denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial would be appealable only as a discretionary appeal while the denial of a motion seeking DNA testing filed as part of that extraordinary motion for new trial would be appealable directly.

Section 5-6-35(a)(10) requires a party seeking review of a standalone OCGA § 9-15-14 attorney-fee award to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Robinson v. Williams · filed 2006-09-18(a)(10)

Should the trial court enter an award of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14 on remand, the party against whom the award is levied must use the discretionary appeal procedure to obtain appellate review of that order. OCGA§ 5-6-35 (a) (10).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedures, including an application for discretionary review, before a separate appeal from a contempt order is proper.

Norman v. Ault · filed 2010-06-07(a)(2)

Moreover, that separate appeal was not proper in the absence of compliance with the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). No application seeking discretionary review of the contempt order has ever been filed in this Court.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to use discretionary-appeal procedures.

Clarke v. Green Tree House Group Inc. · filed 2012-05-30(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Clarke was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from the denial of a request for free transcripts for a post-conviction collateral attack to follow the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Ronald T. J. Adams, Jr. v. State · filed 2012-07-16

[I]f no petition for habeas corpus is pending at the time an indigent prisoner makes any application for a transcript . . . for purposes of collateral attack upon his conviction or sentence, that application will be treated as a separate civil action subject to the procedures and requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. Specifically, appeals from the denial of any such application for free transcripts for post-conviction collateral attack must comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35 governs discretionary appeals but does not eliminate the additional interlocutory-appeal requirements of § 5-6-34(b).

Lewis v. State · filed 2012-07-26

OCGA § 5-6-35, which governs discretionary appeal procedure, does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior-court appeal is a de novo appeal from a magistrate court ruling.

Harris v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2012-09-24(a)(1)

Because this appeal involves a de novo appeal of a magistrate court ruling, Harris was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

An appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary appeal.

Lokenauth v. Le · filed 2012-11-15(a)(8)

An appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) must be taken by application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use discretionary-appeal procedures.

Williams v. Modeste · filed 2012-11-21(a)(1)

We lack jurisdiction. Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Williams was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Her failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 requires a party seeking to appeal a prisoner's civil action to file an application for discretionary appeal, so the prisoner has no right to a direct appeal.

Cobble v. Stanley Williams, Warden · filed 2013-01-18

And under OCGA § 5-6-35, the party wishing to appeal must file an application for discretionary appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a prisoner has no right of direct appeal in civil cases, we lack jurisdiction to consider this direct appeal from the superior court’s order.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal rather than a direct appeal from a superior-court judgment resolving a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision.

Chestnut v. Citimortgage, Inc. · filed 2013-02-22(a)(1)

Chestnut, however, had no right of direct appeal from the judgment entered against him in superior court. Because the superior court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Chestnut was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(b) requires an application for discretionary appeal when appealing the denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60.

Freehome Pizza LLC D/B/A Johnny's New York Style Pizza v. Sysco Atlanta, LLC · filed 2013-05-20(b)

“[T]he denial of a motion to set aside a final judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 is not directly appealable and instead requires the filing of an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (b).”

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal from the denial of an indigent prisoner's application for free transcripts sought for a post-conviction collateral attack when no habeas petition is pending.

Darcy Fuller v. State · filed 2013-09-05

“[I]f no petition for habeas corpus is pending at the time an indigent prisoner makes any application for a transcript . . . for purposes of collateral attack upon his conviction or sentence, that application will be treated as a separate civil action subject to the procedures and requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. Specifically, appeals from the denial of any such application for free transcripts for post-conviction collateral attack must comply with the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35.” ... Because Fuller is seeking the victim’s records for a collateral attack on his conviction – and because Fuller has not shown a pending habeas petition – his failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1)'s discretionary-appeal procedures do not apply to a case concerning zoning matters that is not an appeal from a zoning decision, and subsection (j) ordinarily supports granting a timely application when the lower court's order is directly appealable.

Olympus Media, LLC v. City of Dunwoody, Georgia · filed 2014-11-19(a)(1), (j)

The trial court’s order is directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h). Although this case concerns zoning matters, it is not an appeal from a zoning decision. Accordingly, the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) do not apply. See Mid-Georgia Envtl. Mgmt. Group, L.L.L.P. v. Meriwether County, 277 Ga. 670 (1) (594 SE2d 344) (2004). Ordinarily, we will grant a timely application when the lower court’s order is subject to direct appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires discretionary applications for appeals from judgments in divorce cases, but it does not eliminate the interlocutory-appeal prerequisites when the order is not final.

Ernestine Starling v. Starling · filed 2017-07-24(a)(2)

Further, while appeals from judgments in divorce cases generally must be sought by discretionary application, pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), “[t]he discretionary appeal statute does not excuse a party seeking appellate review of an interlocutory order from complying with the additional requirements of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b).” Bailey v. Bailey, 266 Ga. 832, 833 (471 SE2d 213) (1996).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an appeal from an order in a divorce case to be brought by application for discretionary review, including when the appeal seeks mandamus relief concerning the divorce case.

Dixit v. Christopher Brasher, Judge · filed 2017-10-20(a)(2)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) provides that appeals from orders in divorce cases must be taken by application for discretionary review. “Where the underlying subject matter, i.e. the issues sought to be appealed, clearly arises from or is ancillary to divorce proceedings . . . the appeal is within the ambit of this statute.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations cases to proceed by discretionary application, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2021-03-16(a)(2)

appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). “[C]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations cases must be initiated by discretionary application, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Bloomfield v. Bloomfield · filed 2021-03-16(a)(2), (b)

“Appeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b).

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires appeals from divorce, alimony, and other domestic-relations orders to proceed by discretionary application, and compliance is jurisdictional.

Bailey v. Bailey · filed 2021-03-24(a)(2)

appeals from “judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” must be made by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). “[C]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.”

An appeal involving rights and obligations arising from a divorce decree, without child custody, must proceed by discretionary application under section 5-6-35(a)(2) and (b).

Vettukallel v. Augustian · filed 2021-04-20(a)(2), (b)

Where, as here, the underlying action involves rights and obligations arising out of a divorce decree and does not involve child custody, an appeal must be pursued by discretionary application.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (2) requires an application for discretionary review to initiate an appeal in a domestic-relations matter involving rights and obligations from a divorce decree when child custody is not at issue.

Werkman v. Powell · filed 2022-04-05(a)(2), (b)

Where, as here, the underlying action involves rights and obligations arising out of a divorce decree and does not involve child custody, the case is a domestic relations matter within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). ... Appeals in such matters must be initiated by filing an application for discretionary review.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an appeal from a judgment in a divorce proceeding to be brought through the discretionary-appeal application procedure.

Hanna v. Hanna · filed 2022-12-09(a)(2)

But because he appeals the trial court’s judgment in a divorce proceeding, he is subject to our discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-33 (a) (2) (providing that [a]ppeals from judgments or orders in divorce, alimony, and other domestic relations cases” are subject to this Court’s discretionary appeal procedures); Ford v. Ford, 347 Ga. App. 233, 234 (818 SE2d 690) (2018) (explaining that because the appeal arose from an order issued in a divorce proceeding, “the appellant was required to bring the appeal via the discretionary application procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2)”). Thus, because the appellant is not entitled to a direct appeal, and he has not filed an application for a discretionary appeal or requested an extension of time to do so, his motion is hereby DENIED.

Subsection (2) requires a party appealing a final judgment in a divorce case to seek a discretionary appeal.

Navedo v. Ramos · filed 2023-07-03(2)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (2), appeals from final judgments in divorce cases must come by way of an application for a discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires a discretionary appeal application when the underlying subject matter of an appeal arises from or is ancillary to divorce proceedings.

DUNN v. BRIAN M HOUSE · filed 2025-05-19(a)(2)

Here, it appears that the underlying subject matter giving rise to this appeal stems from Dunn’s initial divorce proceeding. Accordingly, Dunn was required to file an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2) to garner appellate review of the trial court ruling at issue.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of judgments or orders in divorce cases.

Monroe v. Monroe · filed 2025-11-12(a)(2)

However, Monroe has an adequate legal remedy, as she may seek review through the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2) (mandating an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of judgments or orders in divorce cases); Evans v. Jackson, 368 Ga. App. 170, 173 (1) (b) (889 SE2d 343) (2023) (explaining that compliance with OCGA § 5-6-35 is the “exclusive means” to appeal a final order where the underlying subject matter involves a domestic relations decree).

Subsection (a)(2) requires appeals from final judgments in divorce cases to be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

Abawa v. Alebachew · filed 2025-12-05(a)(2)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), appeals from final judgments in divorce cases must come by way of an application for a discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for a discretionary appeal from orders in divorce cases.

Chastain v. Chastain · filed 2025-12-30(a)(2)

First, under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), appeals from orders in divorce cases must come by way of an application for a discretionary appeal.

Subsection (a)(2) requires an application for discretionary appeal from a judgment or order in a divorce case.

Nast v. Nast · filed 2026-04-22(a)(2)

“[G]iven that the underlying subject matter of this case was divorce, the appropriate method for appeal from the [October 2025 order] was an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2), which applies to appeals from judgments or orders in divorce cases.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(2) requires an application for discretionary appeal from an order in a divorce case, including an order vacating an arbitration award.

King v. King · filed 2020-03-13(a)(2)

Furthermore, given that the underlying subject matter of this case was divorce, the appropriate method for appeal from the May 2019 Order was an application for discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2),3 which applies to appeals ... from judgments or orders in divorce cases, rather than a direct appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1),4 which applies to final judgments generally.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) applies to appeals from superior court decisions, not state court decisions.

Littlefield v. Smith · filed 1987-04-23(a)(1)

It would therefore fit within the bounds of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) except that section refers only to “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts.”

Appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must follow the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Wimbish v. State · filed 1983-04-06(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (formerly Code Ann. § 6-701.1) — “(a) Appeals in the following cases shall be taken as provided in this Code section: (1) Appeals from decisions of... lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings ...” Thus, the instant case should have been brought under the provisions of the code section pertaining to discretionary appeals and the failure to do so subjects it to dismissal.

Section 5-6-35(a) governs appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings, and an appeal not brought under the statute must be dismissed.

Manley v. Williams · filed 1983-04-15(a)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (Code Ann. § 6.701.1 (a)) provides: “Appeals in the following cases shall be taken as provided in this Code section. (1) Appeals from decisions of ... lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings . . ... As this appeal was not brought under the foregoing statute, the appeal and cross appeal are dismissed.

(a) requires an application to appeal a superior-court decision reviewing a decision of a state administrative agency, including the agency’s issuance of an investigative demand.

Tri-State Building & Supply, Inc. v. REID, ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS · filed 1983-05-12(a)

We therefore hold that the agency’s decision to issue an investigative demand is a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (Code Ann. § 6- 701.1) and that this appeal should be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of that Code section.

Section 5-6-35 requires compliance with its appeal procedures for an appeal from a superior-court order denying certiorari from a city court; failure to comply deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction.

Fowler v. City of East Point · filed 1983-06-13

Appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1) and, therefore, this court is without jurisdiction over the case.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from a superior-court order affirming an administrative employment decision to proceed through the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Summerset v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation · filed 1983-09-06

Such appeals must be brought under the discretionary provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35 (Code Ann. § 6-701.1). Our jurisdiction is invoked only by the following of the appropriate procedure.

Section 5-6-35 requires an appeal from a superior-court decision reviewing a state or local administrative agency decision to proceed by timely application for permission to appeal, with the proposed errors and jurisdictional basis stated.

Beckman v. Black · filed 1984-02-22

OCGA § 5-6-35 mandates that appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of state and local administrative agencies shall be by application for permission to appeal including enumerations of error to be urged on appeal and stating why the appellate court has jurisdiction. Such application must be filed with the clerk of this court within 30 days of the order of the superior court of which complaint is made.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings.

Sloan v. Brooks · filed 1985-11-18(a)(1)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings” are required to be made by application. No application for appeal having been filed in this case, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) exempts appeals involving decisions of probate courts from the discretionary-appeal requirement, so a direct appeal is appropriate.

Copeland v. White · filed 1986-03-19(a)(1)

The appellees initially attack the propriety of Copeland's direct appeal here, contending that the discretionary appeal procedures were required in this case under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). Generally, appeals from decisions of the superior court reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo are discretionary with this court, but that Code section specifically exempts cases concerning decisions of the probate courts. Accordingly, this direct appeal is appropriate.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) exempts decisions from the probate court from the requirement of filing discretionary appeals, which must be filed directly with the Court of Appeals.

Walker v. State · filed 1986-06-23(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) specifically exempts decisions from the probate court from the requirement of filing discretionary appeals. Such appeals are required to be filed directly with this court.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary application to appeal a superior court decision reviewing a state-agency decision.

Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Department of Revenue · filed 1986-11-05(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires an application for review of appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of state agencies.

Subsection (a) makes the discretionary-appeal procedures inapplicable to appeals arising from decisions of probate courts.

Hamrick v. Bonner · filed 1987-03-09(a)

While the discretionary appeal procedures are generally applicable to appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower tribunals, they specifically do not apply to appeals arising from decisions of probate courts. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a); Copeland v. White, 178 Ga. App. 644 (344 SE2d 436) (1986).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) generally requires an application for discretionary appeal from a superior court decision reviewing an administrative agency decision, although probate-court decisions remain subject to direct appeal.

Strohecker v. Gwinnett County Police Department · filed 1987-05-13(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) generally requires applications for discretionary appeal of decisions of superior courts reviewing administrative agency decisions and lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings; an appeal from a superior court’s review of a probate court decision, however, is excepted and remains a matter of direct appeal. Apparently because OCGA § 35-3-37 (c) provides that appeals such as in the instant case “shall be entered in the same manner as appeals are entered from the probate court,” the appellants filed both direct and discretionary appeals. This matter involves an appeal of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of an agency, and requires the discretionary appeal procedures. Accordingly, the direct appeal must be dismissed.

Subsection (a)(1) requires discretionary appeal procedures for appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local zoning tribunals, whether the superior court dismissed the appeal or ruled on the merits.

Ross v. Mullis Tree Service, Inc. · filed 1987-07-10(a)(1)

This court has previously held that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) is applicable to appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of local zoning tribunals, regardless of whether the appeal was dismissed by the superior court or whether a ruling on the merits was issued.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal to obtain review of a superior court decision reviewing a local administrative agency.

Rybert & Co. v. City of Atlanta · filed 1988-06-09(a)(1)

The appellant’s appeal to this Court from the superior court’s affirmance of the BZA decision, in the superior court’s review thereof in appellant’s administrative appeal, is not properly before this Court, in that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) clearly requires that an application for discretionary appeal be filed in order to obtain appellate review of the trial court’s disposition of the administrative appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal from a superior-court decision reviewing a lower-court decision by certiorari or a de novo proceeding.

Anderson v. City of Alpharetta · filed 1988-05-13(a)(1)

If, however, appellant’s appeal was a “de novo proceeding,” her appeal to this court must be dismissed for failure to comply with the discretionary appeal provisions of OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) makes appeals to the Court of Appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings discretionary.

Fellman v. State · filed 1988-10-24(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) provides that “appeals to this court from decisions of the superior court reviewing decisions of lower courts ‘by certiorari or de novo proceedings’ are discretionary.”

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when the appeal is from a superior-court decision reviewing a decision of a lower court.

Hardwick v. Barnes · filed 1989-10-06(a)(1)

Because appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts are subject to the discretionary appeal process, see OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), the appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35 requires appeals from superior-court judgments reviewing state-agency decisions to be filed as discretionary appeals; failure to follow that procedure deprives the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction.

Wiley v. Tanner · filed 1989-11-09

Under OCGA § 5-6-35, appeals from the judgment of a superior court after review of the decision of a state agency must be filed as discretionary appeals. An appeal from such a judgment, which is not filed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in OCGA § 5-6-35, falls outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; such an appeal must therefore be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) does not require an application for appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a probate court judgment; a direct appeal is available.

Phillips v. State · filed 1991-04-15(a)(1)

Under the plain language of the statute, no application for appeal is required for decisions of superior courts reviewing judgments of the probate courts. The statute mandates a conclusion that a direct appeal is available from the superior court affirmance of a probate court case.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application to appeal when the superior court reviews a decision of a state administrative agency.

Olin Corp. v. Collins · filed 1992-02-06(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires an application to appeal in “[ajppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state . . . administrative agencies. . . .” In this case the superior court was reviewing the Department’s decision pursuant to the authority of OCGA § 48-2-35 (b) (4). As such, a granted application to appeal is required to permit Olin appellate review, and the direct appeal before us must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal when a state court reviews a magistrate court decision by de novo proceeding involving a subject matter not otherwise subject to a right of direct appeal.

Lewis v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN/MORTGAGE CORPORATION · filed 1992-04-24(a)(11)

Because the appeal to this Court is taken from the decision of a state court reviewing a decision of a magistrate court by de novo proceeding involving a subject matter not otherwise subject to a right of direct appeal, the discretionary appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-35 were required and this appeal must be dismissed.

Appeals from a state court's de novo review of a magistrate-court decision must be pursued by application for discretionary appeal, even when the judgment under review is summary judgment.

Brown v. Rutledge · filed 1993-09-20(a)(11)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11) provides that appeals from the “decisions of the state courts reviewing the decisions of magistrate courts by de novo proceedings” shall be made by application for discretionary appeal. It is immaterial in this instance that Brown’s appeal was from the grant of a summary judgment.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for appeal when the underlying subject matter is a superior court’s review of a state administrative agency decision, including when a declaratory judgment action is used to attack that decision.

Miller v. Georgia Department of Public Safety · filed 1995-02-27(a)(1)

Similarly, since Miller was using the declaratory judgment action as a method for attacking the decision of the DPS to suspend his license, the underlying subject matter of the action was the administrative decision, and Miller’s appeal must be characterized as an appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency. Miller was therefore required to follow the application procedures of § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from superior-court review of a state administrative agency decision to proceed through a granted discretionary application.

Recycle & Recover, Inc. v. Georgia Board of Natural Resources · filed 1996-01-22(a)(1)

A superior court's review of the decision of a state administrative agency can be appealed only by means of a granted discretionary application. OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1); Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 448 S.E.2d 192 (1994).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires discretionary-appeal procedures for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing state administrative agencies, including review of an agency’s investigative-power enforcement.

Rankin v. Composite State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1996-03-01(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), the discretionary appeal procedures are required in appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of state administrative agencies.

Section 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires the discretionary-appeal procedure for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing decisions of state and local administrative agencies.

Gurley v. Gordon County Board of Education · filed 1998-01-08(a)(1)

However, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) enumerates “[ajppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . state and local administrative agencies” among those appeals which require adherence to the discretionary appeal procedure.

Section 5-6-35(a) governs appeals from superior-court review of traffic cases from lower courts other than probate courts; probate-court traffic appeals proceed by direct appeal under § 5-6-34(a).

Power v. State · filed 1998-03-11(a)

Therefore, any appeal from a superior court review under OCGA § 40-13-28 of any lower court, except the probate court, shall be under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a); however, an appeal from the superior court review under OCGA § 40-13-28 of a traffic case from the probate court shall be by direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires discretionary review for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing Department of Revenue Commissioner decisions, except ad valorem tax cases.

Bankers Trust Co. v. Jackson · filed 1999-02-16(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), all appeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue for the State of Georgia, with the exception of cases involving ad valorem taxes, are by discretionary appeal. ... Since there is no specific statutory exemption allowing a direct appeal from a superior court’s review of the State Revenue Commissioner’s denial of a request for refund of intangible recording taxes, an appeal must be perfected by filing an application for discretionary appeal, which was not done in this case. Therefore, this direct appeal must be dismissed.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from a superior-court decision reviewing a state or local administrative-agency decision to proceed through the discretionary-appeal procedure, even when the order concerns mandamus.

Ferguson v. Composite State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 2002-06-10(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(1) requires that all appeals from "decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of ... state and local administrative agencies" must be brought to this Court by way of the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35. ... In that situation, this Court has established that an application to appeal is required, because the underlying subject matter is listed in OCGA § 5-6-35(a). ... Where both the direct and discretionary appeal statutes are implicated, it is always the underlying subject matter that will control whether the appeal must be brought pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 or OCGA § 5-6-35. Accordingly, before proceeding to this Court, a party should always "`review the discretionary application statute to see if it covers the underlying subject matter of the appeal. If it does, then the party must file an application for appeal as provided under OCGA § 5-6-35.'" ... This is true even where the order being appealed from concerns a trial court's ruling on mandamus relief.

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary-appeal application to obtain review of a superior-court judgment reached through a de novo appeal from magistrate court, even when the judgment grants partial summary judgment.

Bullock v. Sand · filed 2003-03-26(a)(1), (b)

Further, even though the appeal was expanded in the superior court to include matters not raised initially in the magistrate court, the litigation reached the superior court through a de novo appeal from magistrate court. The clear and unambiguous language of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) requires that an application for appeal be filed to obtain appellate review of the superior court’s judgment.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) governs when a party must seek discretionary rather than direct appellate review, including appeals involving local administrative zoning decisions.

Mid-Georgia Environmental Management Group, L.L.L.P. v. Meriwether County · filed 2004-03-22(a)(1)

The underlying subject matter, however, is relevant to determining whether a party is entitled to a direct appeal or must file an application to appeal from a mandamus action. ... Thus, only if the Board of Commissioners's decision refusing to issue the verification letter was a "zoning decision" would an application be required in this case. ... Therefore, Mid-Georgia was entitled to a direct appeal from the denial of its mandamus action, and this Court properly dismissed its application to appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) does not authorize discretionary review of an order enforcing an agency's final order under OCGA § 12-5-189 when the superior court did not review the agency decision; such an order is directly appealable, and subsection (j) requires granting the application.

City of Rincon v. Couch · filed 2005-03-23(a)(1), (j)

Although the City brought this case to this court through an application to appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) (“decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of... state and local administrative agencies”), this court determined that the appeal did not fall within OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) because it was not from a superior court’s review of an agency decision. ... As such, an order entered pursuant to OCGA § 12-5-189 is not subject to discretionary review under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), but is subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1) as an appealable final judgment. Given these circumstances, we were required to grant the City’s application by OCGA § 5-6-35 (j).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing local administrative agencies, but does not require discretionary appeal when a zoning case does not involve that kind of review.

White v. Board of Com'rs of McDuffie County · filed 2001-10-02(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of. . . local administrative agencies” must proceed through application, rather than direct appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing lower-court decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings to be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

Hickman v. Rob Carpenter D/B/A Lightning Automotive · filed 2012-05-17(a)(1)

“[A]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings shall be by application for discretionary appeal.” Bullock v. Sand, 260 Ga. App. 874, 875 (581 SE2d 333) (2003); see also OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Subsection (a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary appeal procedure when appealing a superior-court order arising from a de novo appeal of a magistrate-court ruling.

Veal v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2012-05-17(a)(1)

When a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court ruling, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires compliance with the discretionary-appeal procedure for an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a lower-court decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings.

Erkard v. City of Powder Springs · filed 2012-05-22(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from the decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings” require compliance with discretionary appeal procedure.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant challenging a superior court order involving a de novo appeal from magistrate court to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Sholar v. Coweta White Oak Associates · filed 2012-05-25(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal when the superior court reviews an auditor’s final report containing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Patel v. Epps · filed 2012-05-31(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) provides that an application for a discretionary appeal is required for appeals “from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of. . . auditors.” Construing this provision, our Supreme Court has held that “the judgment in a case in which the superior court has reviewed an auditor’s final report which contains findings of fact and conclusions of law [is] subject to the discretionary appeal procedure.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.)

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires appeals from state-court orders reviewing magistrate-court decisions to be pursued by application for discretionary review.

Green v. Keitt · filed 2012-06-26(a)(11)

Appeals from state court orders reviewing decisions of the magistrate court must be taken by application for discretionary review. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Salaam v. Nasheed, 220 Ga. App. 43 (469 SE2d 245) (1996). Because Green failed to follow the necessary appellate procedure, we lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior court order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Lyons v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2012-06-27(a)(1)

Because the superior court order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Lyons was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing administrative agencies, but not when the superior court did not review the merits of the agency decision.

Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County · filed 2012-07-11(a)(1)

[a]ppeals in zoning cases require an application because they are appeals from court decisions reviewing a decision of an administrative agency within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). [But w]here a zoning case does not involve superior court review of an administrative decision, the trial court’s order does not come within the purview of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) and no application for appeal need be filed. ... Here, the superior court did not review the merits of the zoning decision, and instead reviewed and ruled on the timeliness of the underlying lawsuit. Because the order appealed from does not involve the review of the merits of a zoning decision, no application for appeal was required and we therefore deny the motion to dismiss.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Malone v. Ordhan Corp. · filed 2012-07-20(a)(1)

Because the superior court order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Malone was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Her failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (a)(1) requires an appellant challenging a superior-court order on a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court ruling to use the discretionary-appeal procedure.

Legerme v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2012-07-25(a)(1)

When a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court ruling, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Legerne’s failure to adhere to the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior court decision reviewing a state agency ruling to use the discretionary appeal procedure.

Jackson v. Mark Butler, Commissioner of Georgia Department of Labor · filed 2012-07-25(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), however, a party seeking to appeal a superior court decision reviewing a state agency ruling must follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application for an appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a state or local administrative agency decision.

Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville · filed 2012-05-29(a)(1)

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1) says that “[a]ppeals from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of. .. state and local administrative agencies” must be brought by application for discretionary appeal under the procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when the order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Michel III v. Salesforce, Inc. · filed 2012-08-07(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Michel was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Subsection (a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary-appeal procedure when appealing a superior court order entered on a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Starks v. Georgia Housing & Finance Authority · filed 2012-08-10(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Accordingly, Starks’s notice of direct appeal does not give rise to a valid appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary-appeal procedure when appealing to the superior court de novo from a magistrate court decision.

Hans Price v. Consumer Solutions Reo, LLC · filed 2012-08-10(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Accordingly, Price’s notice of direct appeal does not give rise to a valid appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to use the discretionary appeal procedures.

Tawanna Dickey v. Federal National Mortgage Assoc. · filed 2012-08-16(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, the appellants were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Subsection (a)(1) requires an appellant to use the discretionary-appeal procedure when appealing a superior-court order entered on de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision.

Faloye v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2012-08-28(a)(1)

First, when a superior court order involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, an appellant is required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior court order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Henderson v. the Bank of New York Mellon · filed 2012-08-29(a)(1)

Because the superior court order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Henderson was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35 requires a discretionary appeal in appeals from magistrate-court decisions and certain damages judgments, and requires the application to be filed with the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals clerk.

Butts v. Williams · filed 2012-08-30(a)(11), (a)(6), (d)

Because the state court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Butts was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). In addition, a discretionary appeal is also required from a judgment of less than $10,000 in an action for damages. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6); Jennings v. Moss, 235 Ga. App. 357 (509 SE2d 655) (1998). ... But applications for discretionary appeal must be filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a de novo superior-court review of a magistrate-court decision to use the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Ingrid White v. Patterson Real Estate Group · filed 2012-08-30(a)(1)

Because the superior court order at issue involves a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, White was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35 (a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal from an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

David J. Urso A/K/A Rocket Ramone v. the Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company · filed 2012-09-12(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Urso was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Subsection (a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court decision reviewing a State Board of Workers’ Compensation decision to follow the discretionary-appeal procedures.

Raymond Salas, Jr. v. Big Lots Stores, Inc. F/K/A Consolidated Stores Corp. · filed 2012-09-14(a)(1)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), a party seeking to appeal “from decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation” must comply with the discretionary appeal procedures set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35.

Subsection (b) requires a party appealing a state-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Dike v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2012-11-07(b)

Because the state court’s order disposed of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Dike was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure set forth in OCGA § 5-6-35 (b). See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). Dike’s failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) makes a superior court decision reviewing a probate court decision directly appealable without a discretionary-appeal application.

In Re: Gary Crews, Ward · filed 2012-12-11(a)(1)

However, no application is required to appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of the probate court.

Appeals from superior-court decisions reviewing local administrative-agency decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings require an application for discretionary appeal, even when the superior court dismisses the certiorari petition.

Galardi v. City of Forest Park · filed 2013-01-08(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from the decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . local administrative agencies . . . by certiorari or de novo proceedings” must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal in this Court. See Consolidated Government of Columbus v. Barwick, 274 Ga. 176, 177 (1) (549 SE2d 73) (2001). This procedure must be followed even where the superior court dismisses the certiorari petition. See Brewer v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Atlanta, 170 Ga. App. 351 (317 SE2d 327) (1984).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal when a superior-court order disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

MacHulas v. MacHulas · filed 2013-01-11(a)(1)

We lack jurisdiction. Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Leonard Machulas was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35 (a)(1) requires a party to use discretionary appeal procedures when appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision.

Davidson v. J. W. Recoil LLC · filed 2013-01-24(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Davidson was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).1 His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Subsection (a)(1) requires a discretionary appeal application when appealing a superior court decision reviewing a lower court decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings, including a dismissal of the certiorari petition.

Ware v. George F. Hutchinson, III · filed 2013-02-13(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from the decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings” require compliance with the discretionary appeal procedure. ... Such compliance is required even where the superior court dismisses the certiorari petition.

Appeals from superior court decisions reviewing local administrative agency decisions by certiorari or de novo proceedings must be filed as applications for discretionary appeal.

Mangram v. City of Brunswick · filed 2013-01-08(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from the decisions of . . . local administrative agencies . . . by certiorari or de novo proceedings” must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal in this Court.

An appeal from a superior court decision reviewing a State Board of Workers’ Compensation decision must be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

Blackwell v. Fabritex · filed 2013-01-14(a)(1)

An appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation must be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to use discretionary appeal procedures.

Rauf v. Pnc Bank, National Association · filed 2013-02-20(a)(1)

We lack jurisdiction. Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Rauf was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an application for discretionary appeal when appealing a superior court decision reviewing a lower court decision by certiorari or de novo proceedings, including when the superior court dismisses the certiorari petition.

Curry v. Dekalb County, Georgia · filed 2013-03-06(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), “[a]ppeals from the decisions of the superior courts reviewing decisions of . . . lower courts by certiorari or de novo proceedings” must be made by filing an application for discretionary appeal in this Court. See Consolidated Government of Columbus v. Barwick, 274 Ga. 176, 177 (1) (549 SE2d 73) (2001); Brown v. City of Marietta, 214 Ga. App. 840, 840-842 (1) (449 SE2d 540) (1994). This procedure must be followed even where the superior court dismisses the certiorari petition.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior court decision reviewing a state agency ruling to use the discretionary appeal procedure.

Pugh v. the Olde Pink House Restaurant · filed 2013-03-13(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), however, a party seeking to appeal a superior court decision reviewing a state agency ruling must follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to use the discretionary appeal procedures.

Faulkner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company · filed 2013-04-03(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Faulkner was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court ruling on a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to use the discretionary appeal procedure.

David King, Jr. v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2013-04-09(a)(1)

Because King’s appeal involved a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, he was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure in order to appeal the ruling.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires a party appealing a superior-court order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate-court decision to follow discretionary-appeal procedures.

Edwin Ford, Sr. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2013-04-16(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Ford and Vision 21 Concepts were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995). Their failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from an order disposing of an appeal from a magistrate court decision to follow discretionary-appeal procedures.

Postell v. Five Star Ford Lincoln Mercury · filed 2013-05-01(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of an appeal from a magistrate court decision, Postell was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to follow the discretionary appeal procedure.

Jamice Turner v. Ib Property Holdings, LLC · filed 2013-05-02(a)(1)

The order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision. Accordingly, Turner was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35 (a)(1) requires a party appealing an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Mostofa v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation · filed 2013-05-16(a)(1)

Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Mostofa was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures.

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appeal from a superior-court decision reviewing a State Board of Workers’ Compensation decision to be brought by application for discretionary appeal.

Wise v. B & N Trucking, Inc. · filed 2013-05-17(a)(1)

An appeal from a decision of the superior court reviewing a decision of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation must be brought by application for discretionary appeal. OCGA § 5-6- 35 (a) (1); Adivari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 221 Ga. App. 279 (471 SE2d 59) (1996).

Section 5-6-35(a)(1) requires an appellant challenging an order that disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision to use the discretionary appeal procedure.

Mattox v. U. S. Bank National Association · filed 2013-05-17(a)(1)

We lack jurisdiction. Because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, the defendants were required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1); English v. Delbridge, 216 Ga. App. 366, 367 (454 SE2d 175) (1995).

Section 5-6-35(a)(11) requires a discretionary appeal for an order disposing of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Percell v. Federal National Mortgage Association · filed 2013-05-24(a)(11)

Moreover, because the order at issue disposes of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Percell was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995).

Subsection (a)(11) requires a discretionary appeal when the orders at issue dispose of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision.

Richard v. Perennial Properties Mgmt, Inc. · filed 2013-05-29(a)(11)

Because the orders at issue dispose of a de novo appeal from a magistrate court decision, Richard was required to follow the discretionary appeal procedures. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (11); Strachan v. Meritor Mortgage Corp. East, 216 Ga. App. 82 (453 SE2d 119) (1995). His failure to do so deprives us of jurisdiction over these appeals, which are hereby DISMISSED.