Statute Annotations › Georgia › Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-38

Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-38

Time for filing notice of appeal: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Georgia
Case notes
1,649
Cited in passing
263
Citing cases indexed
1,978
Case dates
1982–2026
Screened through
2026-06-25
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-19
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

1,912 citing cases reviewed of 1,978 in the citation index: 1,649 interpreted the section (annotated below), 263 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-25 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ga. Code Ann. § 5-6-38?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1984-01-31 Steele v. Cincinnati Insurance Company reversed dismissal of an appeal whose notice mislabeled a directed-verdict order when final judgment had been entered and the opponent was not misled or prejudiced. Source
  • 1996-05-29 Livingston v. State held that a notice filed before entry of an order denying a motion for new trial can become effective when the order is entered, displacing Staton's dismissal rule. Source
  • 2001-09-17 Heard v. State held that withdrawal of a motion for new trial alone does not extend the appeal period; a trial court order disposing of the motion is required. Source
  • 2022-03-15 Cook v. State overruled Rowland's trial-court motion procedure for an out-of-time criminal appeal; a defendant claiming unconstitutional loss of an appeal of right must seek habeas relief. Source

Notice and appealable judgment

Law changed since The Georgia Supreme Court reversed this dismissal on January 31, 1984, holding that the notice was sufficient when a final judgment existed and the opposing party was not misled or prejudiced (Steele v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, cluster 1346168).

Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to specify an appealable judgment; an appeal identifying only an order granting a directed verdict motion must be dismissed.

Steele v. Cincinnati Insurance Company · filed 1983-07-07(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (Code Ann. § 6-803) provides that a "notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of . . ." "The notice of appeal must specify an appealable judgment from which the appeal is entered [cits.], absent which the appeal must be dismissed." Parish v. Ga. R. Bank &c. Co., 115 Ga. App. 540 (154 SE2d 750); Ruth v. Kennedy, 117 Ga. App. 632 (161 SE2d 410). Unfortunately for appellant, an order granting a motion for a directed verdict is not an appealable judgment. Smith v. Sorrough, 226 Ga. 744 (177 SE2d 246). Therefore the appeal must be dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38 requires entry of the judgment before an appeal may be taken; a judgment is not appealable until it is entered.

Crimminger v. Habif · filed 1985-04-01

The Appellate Practice Act in OCGA § 5-6-38 “specifically provides the judgment appealed from must have been entered before the appeal is taken . . . [and means] the judgment can not be considered appealable until it is actually entered.
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Section 5-6-38's notice-of-appeal time requirement is liberally construed, and substantial compliance in the notification process is sufficient.

Oller v. State · filed 1988-07-13(a)

However, the statutory time requirement of OCGA § 5-6-38 is to be liberally construed so as to bring about a decision on the merits of every case appealed and to avoid dismissal of any case or refusal to consider any points raised therein, except as specifically referred to and authorized by applicable statute. OCGA § 5-6-30. Further, it is sufficient if the provisions of OCGA § 5-6-38 are substantially complied with in the notification of appeal process.
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Section 5-6-38 does not require each party seeking review of a single judgment against multiple litigants to file a separate notice of appeal.

Marsden v. Southeastern Sash & Door Co. · filed 1989-11-20

Contrary to Southeastern's assertions, we do not believe that OCGA § 5-6-38 requires a different result. That section merely provides that "[a] notice of appeal shall be filed ...." It does not provide, nor do we construe it to require, that in cases in which one judgment is entered against multiple litigants each party seeking appellate review must file a separate notice of appeal in order to be heard by this court.
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A notice of appeal must identify an appealable decision or judgment that the appellant has standing to challenge.

Studdard v. Satcher, Chick, Kapfer, Inc. · filed 1995-03-13

A notice of appeal must be filed from an “appealable decision or judgment” (emphasis supplied) OCGA § 5-6-38, and must be brought by one with standing to pursue the appeal.
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Section 5-6-38 allows 30 days to file a notice of appeal; a document filed within that period can serve as its functional equivalent when it gives sufficient notice of the intent to appeal.

Cain v. State · filed 2002-11-25

Cain's May 10 document was filed with the Fulton County Superior Court Clerk's Office within the 30-day period set forth in OCGA § 5-6-38 for the filing of a notice of appeal. ... Accordingly, we hold that Cain's motion for out of time appeal should be deemed the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal from the April 10, 1999 denial of his motion for a new trial.
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Section 5-6-38 requires a notice of appeal from an appealable decision or judgment; a plaintiff cannot use a voluntary dismissal to obtain review of earlier orders after the notice deadline.

Waye v. Continental Special Risks, Inc. · filed 2007-12-07

“A notice of appeal must be filed from an appealable decision or judgment, OCGA § 5-6-38, and must be brought by one with standing to pursue the appeal.” ... A voluntary dismissal is not a decision or judgment that may be appealed by a plaintiff.
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Transcript and record costs

A motion to divide the costs of preparing the transcript and record for appeal should be addressed to the trial court, subject to review on appeal.

Van Geter v. Housing Authority of Atlanta · filed 1983-07-12(b)

Plaintiff has filed with this court a motion to have the costs of preparing the transcript and record for appeal divided equally between him and defendants. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (b) (Code Ann. § 6-803). Since this motion deals with costs incurred in the trial court, it should be addressed to that court subject to review on appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(b) permits a cross-appellant to be ordered to pay half the cost of preparing the record on appeal.

Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Hicks · filed 1995-02-17(b)

Hicks’ complaint that the trial court improperly ordered him ... to pay half of the cost of preparing the record on appeal is without merit. OCGA § 5-6-38 (b).
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Effect of postjudgment motions

A motion that functions as a motion for new trial tolls the time to appeal under § 5-6-38, even if titled a motion for reconsideration.

Homeland Group, LLC v. Lawson (In re Credo-Lawson) · filed 2016-02-26

This Court concludes Credolawson’s “Motion for Reconsideration” was a motion for new trial which tolled the time to appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s order; an amended order adding findings does not restart that period.

Sydorowitz v. Fulton Dekalb Hospital Authority D/B/A Grady Health System D/B/A Grady Memorial Hospital · filed 2014-08-15(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the trial court’s order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Although the trial court entered an amended order on August 28, that order was not a “new judgment” for purposes of filing an appeal. ... Accordingly, it did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
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Section 5-6-38 permits a joint tortfeasor to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after denial of a co-defendant’s motion for new trial when the appellant would have benefited from a grant of that motion.

Denson v. Kloack · filed 1986-01-09

However, under OCGA § 5-6-38, it is clear that appellant would have been relieved of the 30-day filing requirement had she herself previously filed a motion for a new trial. ... Since appellant would have benefitted from the grant of a new trial to her co-defendant, and since the law allows a party to elect to file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal at his option, we hold that appellant did not act improperly when she withdrew her initial notice of appeal and did not file another until after the disposition of her co-defendant’s motion for new trial. ... Appellant filed her notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of her co-defendant’s motion for new trial and it was therefore timely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) makes enumerations of trial errors premature while a motion for new trial remains pending and the notice of appeal seeks review only of an appeal-bond denial.

Henry v. State · filed 1985-05-01(a)

Despite the fact that his motion for new trial remains pending and the fact that his notice of appeal seeks review only of the denial of the appeal bond, appellant has enumerated eight errors, any one of which, he alleges, entitles him to a new trial. We must grant the State’s motion to dismiss those enumerated errors as prematurely filed and address only the appeal from the denial of bond. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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An untimely motion for new trial does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a conviction and sentence.

Knox v. State · filed 1986-09-03(a)

Because defendant’s motion for new trial was not timely made, it had to be considered an extraordinary motion for new trial. OCGA § 5-5-41; Dyal v. State, 121 Ga. App. 50 (1) (172 SE2d 326) (1970). As such it would not have extended the time for filing a notice of appeal from the convictions and sentences; therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the instant appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a)’s arrest-of-judgment exception to the notice-of-appeal deadline refers to criminal appeals; a civil motion to reinstate does not extend that deadline.

Daniels v. McRae · filed 1986-11-03(a)

Thus, even though OCGA § 5-6-38 lists “arrest of judgment” as one of the motions which extends the time for filing a notice of appeal, it apparently refers to criminal appeals (see OCGA §§ 17-9-60 through 17-9-63) because the repealer section of the CPA (Code Ann. § 81A-201 (jj)) repealed Code Ann. Ch. 110-7 dealing with motions in arrest of judgment.
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Section 5-6-38 does not allow a motion to strike to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.

Jones v. Robertson · filed 1989-05-11

A motion to strike is not one of the three statutory motions which extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-38.
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An untimely motion for new trial does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal from the conviction and sentence or require a second notice after the motion is decided.

Kindle v. State · filed 1986-11-07(a)

However, here we are not dealing with a premature notice of appeal and the failure to file a requisite notice of appeal after denial of the motion for new trial, as the state maintains, because the new trial motion was not timely made. Therefore it had to be considered an extraordinary motion for new trial. OCGA § 5-5-41; Dyal v. State, 121 Ga. App. 50 (1) (172 SE2d 326) (1970). As such it did not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal from the conviction and sentence, Knox v. State, 180 Ga. App. 564 (349 SE2d 753) (1986), so as to mandate another notice of appeal subsequent to a ruling on the motion.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after an order denying a motion for new trial; without an extension, a late filing requires dismissal.

Sikes v. State · filed 1986-12-05(a)

As indicated by our recital of the facts of the instant case, supra, appellant did not comply with the statutory requirements for timely filing of the notice of appeal. Although the certificate of service appended to the notice of appeal bears the date August 22, 1986, the actual date of filing with the Clerk, as attested by that official’s stamp, is August 26. The record contains no motion for extension of time or other authorization of an extension beyond thirty days. Therefore, pursuant to the authority cited supra, we must dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38 makes a case ripe for appeal when the trial court denies a motion for new trial.

Holiday v. State · filed 1988-06-23

When the trial court denied the motion for new trial, the case became ripe for appeal. OCGA § 5-6-38.
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Section 5-6-38(a) allows an appeal to be filed within 30 days after an order disposing of a motion for new trial.

Shirley v. State · filed 1988-09-09(a)

Because an appeal may be filed within 30 days of an order disposing of a motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), the necessity for an out-of-time appeal based upon constitutional deprivation existed in this case only if the motion for new trial was procedurally defective or had been abandoned.
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A written court order granting the unconditional withdrawal of a motion for new trial starts a new 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal.

Ailion v. Wade · filed 1989-02-02(a)

Hence, the unconditional withdrawal of the new trial motion, by filing of a written order of the court, states anew the running of. the statutory 30-day period of OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) in which appellant can timely file notice of appeal.
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A procedurally proper motion for new trial challenging factual findings after a bench trial extends the time to file a notice of appeal until 30 days after the motion is disposed of.

Gully v. Glover · filed 1989-02-09(a)

Accordingly, we find that the motion for new trial was procedurally proper, and that the period for filing notice of appeal had not expired.
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An appeal filed within 30 days after an order disposing of a prematurely filed motion for new trial is timely.

Jessup v. Newman · filed 1989-05-15

That judgment is erroneous because, under OCGA § 5-6-38, regardless of the validity of the motion for new trial, an appeal filed within 30 days after entry of the order finally disposing of the motion is timely filed.
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A motion for new trial after a bench trial extends the time to file a notice of appeal.

All Phase Electric Supply Company v. Foster & Cooper, Inc. · filed 1989-10-18(a)

A motion for new trial is a proper procedural vehicle to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal from a judgment rendered after a bench trial. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). Accordingly, appellees’ motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires the operative notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days after disposition of a motion for new trial.

Auld v. Weaver · filed 1990-09-04(a)

Inasmuch as the operative notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days of the disposition of appellant’s motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), the appeal must be dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) does not extend the time for appeal when a motion for new trial is filed more than 30 days after judgment.

Walker v. State · filed 1990-09-11(a)

Since the motion for new trial was not filed within 30 days of the judgment as required by OCGA § 5-5-40 (a), the time for appeal was not extended under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38 requires a notice of appeal or a specified motion within thirty days of judgment; a motion to amend findings does not extend the time to appeal in a civil case.

American Flat Glass Distributors, Inc. v. Michael · filed 1990-06-22

A judgment entered by a trial court becomes final thirty days after its entry unless, before thirty days, a notice of appeal, a motion for new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is filed. OCGA § 5-6-38. The only motion the appellants filed within the thirty-day period was a motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law. A motion to amend is not a motion which, under the Georgia Appellate Practice Act, extends the time for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case. Taylor v. City of Columbus, 228 Ga. 493 (186 SE2d 539) (1971).
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A motion under § 15-11-42 to modify or vacate a juvenile court order does not automatically extend the time to appeal the underlying judgment.

In the Interest of H. A. M. · filed 1991-09-03(a)

A motion under OCGA § 15-11-42, which appellant’s motion asserts to be in that it is bottomed on OCGA § 15-11-42 (a) (1) and (b), is not one of the three types of motions which will automatically extend the time for filing a notice of appeal on the underlying judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) does not delay the deadline for filing a notice of appeal when the post-trial motion was filed late.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Curry · filed 1992-11-05(a)

Therefore, as Wal-Mart failed to comply with OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), it was not entitled to the authorized delay in filing its notice of appeal until after the trail court acted upon its motion.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the appealable judgment or an order disposing of a motion for new trial.

Sayre v. State · filed 1983-01-27(a)

“A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the appealable judgment or within thirty days after the entry of an order disposing of a motion for new trial. Code Ann. § 6-803 (a) [OCGA § 5-6-38]. The time for filing such notice may be extended once by the court for an additional thirty days. Code Ann. § 6-804 [OCGA § 5-6-39].” ... In this case no extension was obtained; and consequently we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.
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Section 5-6-38 requires a timely notice of appeal after disposition of a motion for new trial; a notice filed 31 days later leaves the court without jurisdiction.

McNeese v. State · filed 1983-09-07

Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed as the notice of appeal was not timely filed. One day late is no less a deadline infraction than being one month late. This court is without jurisdiction where the notice of appeal is not timely filed in accordance with the statutory requirements of OCGA § 5-6-38 (Code Ann. § 6-803).
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Section 5-6-38 does not extend the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal when a motion for new trial is voluntarily abandoned without a court order disposing of it or granting an extension.

Taylor v. State · filed 1985-03-08

As defendant voluntarily abandoned his motion for new trial and there is no order of the court disposing of the motion nor any order granting an extension of time or a delayed appeal, there is no extension beyond the 30 days permitted after entry of the judgment. Therefore the appeal must be dismissed for failure to timely file notice of appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) does not require a notice of appeal to be filed until after the motion for new trial is disposed of.

Whitton v. State · filed 1985-04-04(a)

And, the notice of appeal is not required to be filed until after disposition of the motion for new trial.
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Section 5-6-38 makes an appeal premature when a motion for new trial remains pending, even if the notice of appeal was filed on the same day as the motion.

Bradshaw v. Woolford · filed 1985-10-11

It appearing that a motion for new trial was filed in this case on the same date as the notice of appeal and that the motion has not been ruled on by the trial court, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed as premature.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of an order denying a motion for new trial; an untimely notice requires dismissal.

Melton v. State · filed 1985-11-20(a)

This court’s jurisdiction to entertain an appeal being conditional upon the proper and timely filing of such notice, and the filing of such notice being required within 30 days after the entry of an order denying a motion for new trial, it follows that the appeal must be dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after an order disposing of a pending motion for new trial; a notice filed while the motion is pending is premature.

Boothe v. State · filed 1986-02-24(a)

The statute makes it mandatory that the notice of appeal under these circumstances must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the motion for a new trial.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days, and an improper motion for new trial does not extend that deadline.

Pillow v. Seymour · filed 1986-04-09(a)

Where a motion for new trial is not a proper vehicle for review of a trial court’s action, the motion has no validity and will not extend the time for filing the notice of appeal.
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An untimely motion for new trial does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under § 5-6-38.

Williamson v. State · filed 1987-03-06

Since the untimely filing of the motion for new trial did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal, this appeal is also dismissed as untimely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of an order denying a motion for new trial; timely filing is required for appellate jurisdiction.

Clark v. State · filed 1987-04-30(a)

Appellant was required to file his notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the order denying his motion for new trial. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). This court’s jurisdiction to entertain an appeal is conditional upon the proper and timely filing of such notice and, without it, we must dismiss the appeal.
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Law changed since On September 17, 2001, the Georgia Supreme Court held that withdrawal alone does not extend the filing period; a trial court order disposing of the motion is required (Heard v. State, cluster 1285978).

Withdrawal or dismissal of a motion for new trial starts the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal under § 5-6-38 (a).

Booker v. Amdur · filed 1988-03-08(a)

In such cases, the withdrawal or dismissal of the motion for new trial by the party who filed it is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), so as to commence the running of the 30-day period for filing an appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a)’s 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal does not begin when a motion for new trial is denied as to fewer than all parties against whom it was sought, unless the requirements of § 9-11-54(b) are met.

Crumbley v. Wyant · filed 1987-07-13(a)

Accordingly, the denial of a motion for new trial as to fewer than all the parties against whom a new trial has actually been sought is not an order “otherwise finally disposing of the motion” so as to trigger the 30-day period established by OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) for the filing of a notice of appeal, unless and until there has been compliance with OCGA § 9-11-54 (b).
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A notice of appeal filed more than thirty days after denial of a motion for new trial is untimely, and the appeal must be dismissed if no extension was requested.

Baker v. State · filed 1990-04-19(a)

Examination of the record indicates that the instant appeal was filed more than the statutorily permissible thirty days after the denial of the motion for new trial. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). Appellant filed no request for an extension of time. OCGA § 5-6-39. This court therefore has no jurisdiction over the appeal, and it must be dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) extends the time to file a notice of appeal after a motion for new trial even when the movant has not filed a trial transcript with the motion.

Moore v. Sinclair · filed 1990-07-13(a)

Although OCGA § 5-5-40 (c) gives trial courts discretion to delay consideration of such motions when the transcript is necessary to decide the motion, the trial court can decide the motion without a transcript. Therefore, we do not find that Moore’s motion for new trial was inherently insufficient to secure the extension of time in which to file her notice of appeal. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal filed within thirty days of sentence is timely; if a timely motion for new trial is pending, the notice ripens when that motion is denied.

O'KELLY v. State · filed 1990-09-12(a)

Since each was filed within thirty days of the sentence, both were timely. OCGA §§ 5-6-38 (a) and 5-5-40. The motion for new trial made the notice of appeal premature, but the latter ripened when the denial of the motion was entered.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of an appealable judgment unless the time is extended; a motion for new trial can extend that time.

Wright v. Rhodes · filed 1990-11-29(a)

To confer jurisdiction of an appeal on this court, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of an appealable judgment, unless an extension is granted. OCGA §§ 5-6-38 (a); 5-6-39. A motion for new trial will extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
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Absent a motion for new trial or an extension, a notice of appeal filed more than 30 days after judgment is untimely and leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Westbrook v. State · filed 1991-06-27(a)

Examination of the record fails to reflect that defendant filed a motion for new trial. The record indicates that the instant appeal was filed more than 30 days after the trial court’s judgment was filed. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The record before this Court fails to disclose any request for an extension of time. See OCGA § 5-6-39. Consequently, this Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal and it must be and is hereby dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealable judgment; a timely motion for new trial can extend that period.

Watson v. State · filed 1992-02-03(a)

Within 30 days thereafter, neither a motion for new trial nor a notice of appeal was filed. ... “A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of. . . .” OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... This court has no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the issues raised, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after an order finally disposes of a motion for new trial.

Gibson v. State · filed 1993-02-24(a)

“A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for new trial . . . has been filed, the notice shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion.” OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... In the absence of a timely filed notice of appeal, or the grant of an out-of-time appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case, and the appeal must be dismissed.
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A motion attacking the judgment rather than the determination of facts is not a valid motion for new trial and does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal under § 5-6-38(a).

BANK SOUTH MORTGAGE, INC. v. Starr · filed 1993-03-18(a)

Therefore, this motion was not a valid motion for new trial within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), and did not entitle Bank South to the automatic stay in filing its notice of appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) imposes a jurisdictional 30-day limit for filing a notice of appeal; an appellant cannot bypass it by appealing the denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial that raises issues available for a timely motion.

Bohannon v. State · filed 1992-03-13(a)

To hold, as the dissent suggests, would penalize neither civil nor criminal appellants for their own lack of diligence in pursuing their appellate rights and would effectively repeal the jurisdictional 30-day limitation established by OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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An untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under § 5-6-38.

Jarrard v. Copeland · filed 1992-07-14

Because the 30th day after February 19, 1991 was March 21, 1991, Jarrard’s motion was untimely and did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal under OCGA § 5-6-38.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 5-6-38(a) starts a 30-day period to file a notice of appeal when a pending motion for new trial is withdrawn, dismissed, or vacated.

Griffin v. Loper · filed 1993-06-24(a)

Rather, where a notice of appeal is filed while a previous new trial motion is pending, the subsequent withdrawal, dismissal or vacation of the motion for new trial by the party who filed it is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), so as to commence the running of the 30-day period for the proper filing of an appeal.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 5-6-38(a)’s 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal begins when a motion for new trial is withdrawn, rather than on the date of judgment.

Heard v. State · filed 1993-11-08(a)

The running of the 30-day period did not relate back to the date of the entry of the judgment as suggested by the State, but rather runs from the date of the withdrawal of the motion for new trial.
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A notice of appeal filed within 30 days after denial of a proper motion for new trial is timely; a motion challenging the factfinder’s determination of substantive facts qualifies.

Goodman v. Lake Buckhorn Estates Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1997-02-20(a)

Pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), Goodman filed his notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the trial court’s order denying his motion for new trial. ... We conclude that Goodman’s motion challenged the determination of substantive facts by the factfinder and thus constituted a proper motion for new trial.
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Section 5-6-38(a) starts the 30-day appeal period when a motion for new trial is denied or dismissed for failure to provide a transcript.

Evans v. State · filed 1998-02-02(a)

This does not, however, preclude our consideration of the merits of the appeal, since we have previously held that dismissal or denial of the motion for new trial due to failure to provide the transcript is, for purposes of OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), an order “finally disposing” of the motion, triggering the 30 days for filing of the appeal here.
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Section 5-6-38(a) extends the time to file a notice of appeal for a motion for new trial, and the motion’s substance rather than its title determines whether the extension applies.

Welborn v. State · filed 1998-06-10(a)

The matters addressed in the motion here, however, were properly the subject for a motion for new trial, which also will extend the filing time. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... The trial court correctly determined, and we agree, that the substance of the motion and not its nomenclature controls how the motion is to be viewed, making the appeal timely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after an order disposing of a motion for new trial; an untimely notice requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Hubbard v. State · filed 1993-05-25(a)

Inasmuch as the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within the 30-day time period as provided in OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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Vacating an order denying a motion for new trial can leave a later appeal timely even though the original denial made the case ripe for appeal.

Animashaun v. State · filed 1995-01-19

Although the case became ripe for appeal when the trial court denied the motion for new trial (see OCGA § 5-6-38), this appeal is timely because the trial court vacated its order denying the motion for new trial.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of judgment or the order finally disposing of a motion for new trial; an untimely notice subjects the appeal to dismissal.

Rowland v. State · filed 1995-01-24(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment complained of, or within 30 days after the entry of the order finally disposing of a motion for new trial. The failure to file timely a notice of appeal subjects the appeals at bar to dismissal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) governs whether an appeal following a motion for new trial is timely.

Tranakos v. Miller · filed 1996-06-14(a)

Also, we deny Miller’s motion to dismiss appeal, having found Tranakos’ appeal of this case was timely under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment, unless a specified postjudgment motion changes the deadline.

Carter v. Fayette County · filed 1997-08-07(a)

But the March 27, 1997 notice of appeal from an order dated February 3, 1997, is not timely under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A motion for new trial after an out-of-time appeal is granted extends the time for filing a notice of appeal.

Clay v. State · filed 1998-04-16(a)

He had an opportunity to assert other claims of ineffective assistance by motion for new trial after his appeal motions were granted, which post-conviction motion would have extended the time for filing the notice of appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the order finally disposing of a motion for new trial.

Veasley v. State · filed 2000-10-02(a)

In such a case, OCGA § 5-6-38(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order finally disposing of the motion for new trial.
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Section 5-6-38(a) starts the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal when a timely motion for new trial is dismissed.

Johnson v. State · filed 2000-10-03(a)

“[T]he . . . dismissal of the motion for new trial. . . is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), so as to commence the running of the 30-day period for filing an appeal.” ... Johnson filed a notice of appeal within 30 days after the dismissal of the motion for new trial; therefore, the appeal is properly before us and will be considered on its merits.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 5-6-38(a) treats withdrawal of a motion for new trial as disposal of the motion for purposes of filing a notice of appeal.

Richards v. State · filed 2000-11-21(a)

Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that a withdrawal of a motion for new trial constitutes a “disposal” of the motion under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal is timely when filed within the statutory period measured from the effective date of a nunc pro tunc order denying a motion for new trial.

Coleman v. Grimes · filed 2001-07-31(a)

Thus, Coleman’s notice of appeal, dated January 29, 2001, fell within the statutory period for timely filing from the denial of his motion for new trial pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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An untimely motion for new trial does not toll the 30-day deadline to file a notice of appeal from the judgment and sentence.

Keller v. State · filed 2001-08-06(a)

Although Keller filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of his motion for new trial, Keller’s void motion for new trial did not toll the 30-day limit within which he was required to file a notice of appeal from the underlying judgment and sentence.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a trial court order disposing of a motion for new trial to extend the notice-of-appeal deadline beyond 30 days after judgment; voluntary withdrawal alone does not suffice.

Heard v. State · filed 2001-09-17(a)

We now hold that OCGA § 5-6-38 requires a trial court order granting, denying, or otherwise finally disposing of a party’s motion for new trial in order to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of judgment. A party’s voluntary withdrawal of its motion for new trial, standing alone, is not the statutorily-required court order finally disposing of the motion for new trial.
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Section 5-6-38(a) extends the time to file a notice of appeal when a timely motion for new trial is disposed of by court order; withdrawing the motion alone does not extend that time.

Simmons v. State · filed 2003-04-29(a)

A timely-filed motion for new trial extends the time within which one may file a timely notice of appeal, so long as the trial court enters an order disposing of the motion for new trial. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). A defendant’s withdrawal of his motion for new trial, without more, does not extend the time within which a timely notice of appeal may be filed and, if a notice of appeal is not filed within 30 days of the judgment of conviction, results in the loss of the right to a direct appeal.
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A timely filed motion for new trial dismissed as void for failure to serve a rule nisi tolls the notice-of-appeal period; the dismissal starts the 30-day filing period.

Craig v. Holsey · filed 2003-11-25(a)

It appears, however, that in other cases, including failure to serve a rule nisi, a timely filed motion for new trial that is dismissed as void will toll the period for filing a notice of appeal. ... In these cases, an order dismissing the motion for new trial is considered a disposition of the motion pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-38(a), and it commences the running of the 30-day period for filing an appeal.
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An untimely motion for new trial does not toll the time to file a notice of appeal.

Peters v. State · filed 1999-04-12(a)

In the case sub judice, defendant Peters’ purported motion for new trial was not filed within 30 days as required by the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 30; Code Ann. § 70-301[, now OCGA § 5-5-40 (a)]), was thus void and of no effect, and therefore did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal under the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 21; Code Ann. § 6-803 [, now OCGA § 5-6-38 (a)]).
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Section 5-6-38(a) gives a party 30 days to file a notice of appeal after the denial of a timely motion for new trial.

Glass v. State · filed 2001-02-02(a)

The 30-day time period for filing a notice of appeal or for obtaining an extension of time ended on June 1, 1999.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of judgment and sentence, or within 30 days of the order disposing of a specified postjudgment motion, for an appeal to qualify as a direct appeal.

Orr v. State · filed 2003-01-13(a)

While a defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to a direct appeal when “the question on appeal is one which may be resolved by facts appearing in the record,” (Smith v. State, 253 Ga. 169 (316 SE2d 757) (1984)), a direct appeal is one in which a notice of appeal is filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment and sentence, or within 30 days of the entry of the order disposing of a motion for new trial, motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) gives a party 30 days after an order finally disposing of a motion for new trial to file a notice of appeal.

Jackson v. State · filed 2003-04-11(a)

At the outset, we reject the state’s contention that Jackson failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Generally, the notice must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for new trial . . . has been filed, the notice shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion.” ... The motion was denied on July 1, 2002, and a notice of appeal was timely filed on July 3, 2002.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or the order finally disposing of a motion for new trial.

Gulledge v. State · filed 2003-07-10(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment complained of, or within 30 days after the entry of the order finally disposing of a motion for new trial.
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An untimely motion in arrest of judgment does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a conviction.

Smith v. State · filed 2003-09-11(a)

However, although a motion in arrest of judgment normally extends the time for filing a direct appeal from a conviction, such is not the case where the motion in arrest of judgment itself was untimely filed.
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A notice of appeal is timely if filed within 30 days after denial of a motion for new trial.

Cook v. State · filed 2007-06-25(a)

Because Cook had not lost his opportunity to appeal his conviction at that time, see OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (notice of appeal timely when filed within 30 days of denial of motion for new trial), the trial court did not err by denying Cook’s motion for out of time appeal.
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Section 5-6-38 requires a trial court order disposing of a motion for new trial to extend the 30-day appeal deadline; voluntary withdrawal alone does not extend it.

Cooper v. Spotts · filed 2011-03-28

OCGA § 5-6-38 requires a trial court order granting, denying, or otherwise finally disposing of a party’s motion for new trial in order to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal more than 30 days after the entry of judgment. A party’s voluntary withdrawal of its motion for new trial, standing alone, is not the statutorily-required court order finally disposing of the motion for new trial. ... There is no order disposing of the motion in the record.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an order on a motion for new trial.

Davis v. State · filed 2006-03-27(a)

However, our review of the appeal establishes that although the trial court denied Davis’s amended motion for new trial in an order filed October 19, 2004, so that the notice of appeal to be timely had to be filed no later than November 18, 2004, see OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of order on motion for new trial), Davis’s notice of appeal was not received and filed until November 22, 2004, four days late.
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Section 5-6-38(a) gives a party 30 days from the filing of an order striking a motion for new trial to file a notice of appeal.

Hood v. State · filed 2006-11-09(a)

Under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), Hood had 30 days from the date this order was filed in which to file a notice of appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment, unless a specified postjudgment motion has been filed.

Register v. Elliott · filed 2007-06-07(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry ofthe appealable decision or judgment complained of, unless a motion for new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been filed.
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A notice of appeal filed within 30 days of judgment is timely even if a motion for new trial is pending and later withdrawn without a court order.

Hann v. State · filed 2008-07-15(a)

The case before us is different, because Hann had filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment, and therefore we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal.
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Filing a motion in arrest of judgment extends the time to file a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment.

Cameron v. State · filed 2012-01-09(a)

The filing of a motion in arrest of judgment extends the time within which a timely notice of appeal from the underlying judgment may be filed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order appealed from.

McCorkle v. State · filed 2012-04-25(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Touray v. Dabney · filed 2012-04-25(a)

To be timely, however, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Couch v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 224 Ga. App. 721 (482 SE2d 704) (1997). Here, the notice of appeal was filed 36 days after entry of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. We therefore lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, which is DISMISSED.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order appealed to be timely.

Robinson v. State · filed 2012-04-26(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Spivey v. State · filed 2012-05-01(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal.
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The 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal begins when an appealable final judgment is entered, not when an earlier interlocutory order is entered.

SOTTER v. Stephens · filed 2012-05-07(a)

It is clear from the discussion above that the orders entered on May 22, 2008 and July 20, 2010 were not final judgments within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and thus Appellants were not required to appeal from the rulings within 30 days after entry in order to preserve their right to pursue appellate review. ... Finally, the notices of appeal from the June 7, 2011 order were filed by Appellants on June 24 and 30,2011, and thus were timely and proper.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealed order; an untimely notice leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Freddie Brown v. State · filed 2012-05-09(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. ... Because Brown filed his notice of appeal 147 days after the trial court entered its order, the appeal is untimely. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment being appealed.

Jackson v. State · filed 2012-05-10(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment on appeal.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order.

Johnson v. State · filed 2012-05-11(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealable order; an untimely notice does not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Jenkins v. State · filed 2012-05-22(a)

We lack jurisdiction. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Jenkins did not file her notice of appeal until 44 days after entry of the judgment she seeks to appeal. Accordingly, her appeal is hereby DISMISSED as untimely.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Anderson v. State · filed 2012-05-30(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Crawford v. State · filed 2012-05-30(a)

Crawford’s judgment of conviction and original sentence were entered on December 9, 2008. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider any appeal of Crawford’s judgment of conviction and original sentence.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order appealed from.

Bryant v. State · filed 2012-05-30(a)

To be timely, however, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order being appealed; an appeal filed after that deadline is untimely.

In the Interest Of: D. B., a Child · filed 2012-05-30(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order sought to be appealed. ... Because D. B. filed his notice of appeal 33 days after entry of the commitment order, this appeal is untimely and is therefore DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order.

McCauley v. Suntrust Mortgage Inc. · filed 2012-06-06(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable judgment.

Merelien v. Panel Delcham · filed 2012-06-07(a)

Under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of an appealable judgment. Merilien’s notice of appeal, however, was filed 41 days after entry of the order in question.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Douglas Minor v. State · filed 2012-06-07(a)

Under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a timely notice of appeal; an untimely post-trial motion does not extend the filing deadline.

Augusta v. Hera Lighting L. P. · filed 2012-06-15(a)

Accordingly, Augusta’s notice of appeal, filed 183 days after entry of the judgment, is untimely. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the appealed order; an untimely filing deprives the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction.

Collins v. State · filed 2012-06-15(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. ... Collins’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of the order appealed from; an untimely notice leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Tillis v. State · filed 2012-06-15(a)

Under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the order sought to be appealed. Here, however, both notices of appeal were filed well after 30 days after entry of orders Tillis seeks to appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable judgment.

Weber v. State · filed 2012-06-22(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of an appealable judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable judgment.

Herndon v. State · filed 2012-06-28(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of an appealable judgment.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the order; an untimely notice does not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Major Fortson v. Render C. Freeman · filed 2012-06-29(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Couch v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 224 Ga. App. 721 (482 SE2d 704) (1997). Fortson’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Maddox v. State · filed 2012-07-03(a)

Maddox’s appeal from the order denying his motion to withdraw his plea is untimely. To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order.

Stewart v. State · filed 2012-07-03(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Stewart did not file his notice of appeal until 33 days after entry of the judgment he seeks to appeal. Accordingly, his appeal is hereby DISMISSED as untimely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment being appealed.

Clement v. National City Mortgage · filed 2012-07-09(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment on appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of the order being appealed.

Premier Capital, LLC v. Willis · filed 2012-07-11(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of the order sought to be appealed. Here, the plaintiff filed its notice of appeal 33 days after entry of the trial court’s order.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Johnson v. State of Georgia · filed 2012-07-19(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealable order.

McCullough v. State · filed 2012-07-20(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable order. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872 (1) (452 SE2d 756) (1995). McCullough did not file his notice of appeal until 36 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED as untimely.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Preston v. State · filed 2012-07-25(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order to be appealed. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days of an appealable judgment.

Tramaine Miller v. City Views at Rosa Burney Park Gp, LLC · filed 2012-08-03(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of an appealable judgment.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed; an untimely notice does not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Gregory v. State · filed 2012-08-08(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. See Couch v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 224 Ga. App. 721 (482 SE2d 704) (1997). Gregory’s notice of appeal was not filed timely from any of the orders entered in the case. Therefore, this appeal is DISMISSED as untimely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of an appealable order; a late notice requires dismissal.

Milton Harshaw, Jr. v. State · filed 2012-08-09(a)

First, to be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Because Harshaw filed his notice of appeal 33 days after the order was entered, his appeal is untimely and must be dismissed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order.

Gruner v. City of McDonough, Georgia · filed 2012-08-14(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order. Gruner filed her notice of appeal 89 days after the trial court entered the order that she seeks to appeal. Thus, this appeal is untimely and is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Jim Linzell Jackson, Sr. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. · filed 2012-08-15(a)

First, Jackson’s notices of appeal are untimely. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order on appeal. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A unilaterally withdrawn motion for new trial does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal unless the trial court enters an order resolving the motion.

Taylor v. State · filed 2013-01-09(a)

A unilaterally withdrawn motion for new trial, standing alone, does not toll the appeal time.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days; withdrawing a motion for new trial without a trial-court order does not extend that deadline.

Freeman v. State · filed 2013-02-22(a)

The trial court neither ruled on the motion nor granted Freeman permission to withdraw it. The time for filing his direct appeal, therefore, was not extended, and his notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after his conviction.
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A motion for new trial withdrawn without a court order does not extend the time to file a notice of appeal.

Timothy Lavon Duncan, Jr. v. State · filed 2013-04-16(a)

A unilaterally withdrawn motion for new trial, standing alone, does not toll the appeal time.
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Section 5-6-38(a) does not extend the time to appeal when a motion for new trial is withdrawn without a court order disposing of it.

Keithian Tiller v. State · filed 2013-05-09(a)

In this case, Tiller voluntarily withdrew his motion for new trial. The trial court neither ruled on the motion nor granted him permission to withdraw it. The time for filing his direct appeal, therefore, was not extended, and his notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after his conviction.
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A motion that could extend the time to appeal must be filed within the 30-day appeal period.

In the Interest of A. M. · filed 2013-11-06(a)

And even motions that extend the time of appeal must be filed before the 30-day limit has passed, and in this case the parents filed their motion long after the time to appeal had passed.
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A pending motion in arrest of judgment delays the ripening of a previously filed notice of appeal; if the motion is denied, the notice ripens.

Oladunni v. State · filed 2020-10-21(a)

Because Oladunni’s motion in arrest of judgment remains pending, we lack jurisdiction over his appeals. Oladunni’s “motion [in arrest of judgment] remains pending, the trial court has jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion, [Oladunni’s] notice[s] of appeal . . . [have] not ripened, and the attempted appeal in this [c]ourt must be dismissed.” Pounds v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (4) (846 SE2d 48) (2020) (addressing motion for new trial, which, like a motion in arrest of judgment, is a resetting post-judgment motion under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a)).
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Section 5-6-38(a) tolls the time to file a notice of appeal for specified motions, which do not apply to a request for relief from a fingerprint collection order.

Herrera v. State · filed 2022-04-20(a)

We note that the motions that toll the time for filing a notice of appeal under OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) – “a motion for new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict” – are not applicable to the relief Herrera seeks with regard to collection of his fingerprints.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order or judgment.

Rutledge v. State · filed 2022-04-25(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable order or judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Couch v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 224 Ga. App. 721, 721 (482 SE2d 704) (1997). Rutledge’s notice of appeal is untimely, as it was filed 62 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
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An appeal from an order denying a supersedeas bond must be initiated by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days after entry of the order.

Bunde v. State · filed 2022-04-27(a)

Second, Bunde has identified no authority providing for an appeal from a trial court order denying a supersedeas bond outside of the prescribed appellate procedures, which must be initiated by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or trial court order being appealed.

Belcher v. State · filed 2022-04-28(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or trial court order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable judgment.

Joe Neil Glenn, Jr. v. State · filed 2022-05-11(a)

But even if Glenn was entitled to a direct appeal from the denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial, his direct appeal is also untimely. A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of an appealable judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Glenn’s notice of appeal was filed on February 24, 2022, 35 days after entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of an appealable judgment.

Johnson v. State · filed 2022-05-23(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of an appealable judgment. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Johnson’s notice of appeal was filed on March 23, 2022, 43 days after entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order appealed; a notice filed after that deadline does not confer appellate jurisdiction.

Tomichealine West v. State · filed 2022-06-02(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. ... West filed his notice of appeal 35 days after entry of the trial court’s order dismissing his motion. Accordingly, this appeal is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

THOMAS v. BARNES LAND AND INVESTMENTS, LLC · filed 2022-06-03(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). “[A] timely-filed notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid appeal.” Henderson v. State, 265 Ga. 317, 317 (1) (454 SE2d 458) (1995). Here, Thomas’s notice of appeal was filed nearly three years after the February 2019 order and nearly two years after the December 2019 order.
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Section 5-6-38 (a) requires a notice of appeal from a summary judgment ruling within 30 days; an untimely notice cannot confer appellate jurisdiction.

Harmon v. Progressive Premier Insurance Company of Illinois · filed 2022-06-06(a)

In order to appeal the grant of summary judgment, Harmon was required to file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the summary judgment ruling. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). Because Harmon did not file her notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, that ruling cannot confer appellate jurisdiction upon us.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order being appealed; an untimely notice leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Phillips v. State · filed 2022-06-09(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or trial court order sought to be appealed. ... Phillips’s notice of appeal was filed 41 days after entry of the trial court’s order denying his motion. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this case.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Ward v. State · filed 2022-06-09(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Ward filed his notice of appeal 87 days after the December 20, 2021 order denying his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Thus, the notice is untimely as to that order.
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Section 5-6-38 requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of the ruling being appealed.

Baez v. State · filed 2022-06-10

Second, even if Baez’s motion to dismiss had been appropriate, it was untimely inasmuch as no notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the ruling on the motion to dismiss. See OCGA § 5-6-38.
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When a motion for new trial has been filed, Section 5-6-38(a) requires the notice of appeal within 30 days after the order finally disposing of that motion.

Scott v. State · filed 2022-06-13(a)

Although Scott and the trial court appear to characterize Scott’s first appeal as an out-of-time appeal, it was a timely appeal from the trial court’s July 30, 2019, order finalizing its ruling on Scott’s motion for new trial. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) (“A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for new trial . . . has been filed, the notice shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion”) (emphasis supplied).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of the order being appealed.

Williams v. State · filed 2022-06-16(a)

Second, even if the denial of a motion for reconsideration was directly appealable, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or trial court order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Redford v. State, 357 Ga. App. 247, 250 (850 SE2d 447) (2020). Williams, however, did not file this appeal until 37 days after entry of the trial court’s order, making this appeal untimely.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the order or judgment being appealed.

Rogers v. State · filed 2022-06-21(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order or judgment to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Rogers’s notice of appeal was untimely, as it was filed 41 days after entry of the order he seeks to appeal.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the trial court order being appealed.

Kennedy v. State · filed 2022-06-21(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the trial court order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38 (a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Tribble v. State · filed 2022-06-27(a)

To be timely, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order on appeal. See OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the appealable judgment; a motion for reconsideration does not extend that deadline.

JAMES v. WATERS EDGE CONSTRUCTION, LLC · filed 2022-06-27(a)

As a rule, “[a] notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of . . . .” OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). James did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the grant of summary judgment. Instead, she filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the motion did not extend the time to appeal from the underlying order, and the order resolving it is not subject to direct appeal.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order being appealed.

Ali v. State · filed 2022-07-14(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after the appealable judgment, and a motion for reconsideration does not extend that deadline.

SIMON DINKINS, JR. v. EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC. · filed 2022-07-19(a)

As a rule, “[a] notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of . . . .” OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). The Plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the grant of summary judgment. Instead, they filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the motion did not extend the time to appeal from the underlying order, and the order resolving it is not subject to direct appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Williams v. State · filed 2022-07-19(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed.
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the trial court order being appealed.

Wells v. State · filed 2022-07-25(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the trial court order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Pretermitting whether we would otherwise have jurisdiction, Wells’ notice of appeal was filed 41 days after entry of the trial court’s order. Accordingly, this appeal is untimely and is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment.

Sanchez-Olivio v. State · filed 2022-07-27(a)

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) provides that “[a] notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the appealable decision or judgment complained of.”
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry of the order appealed; filing it later leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Gates v. State · filed 2022-07-27(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Because Gates filed the notice of appeal 32 days after entry of the trial court’s order, we lack jurisdiction.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed.

Lauresia Woods v. State · filed 2022-08-01(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
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A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the judgment or order, and a motion for reconsideration does not extend that deadline.

RICHIE v. WILBURN · filed 2022-08-04(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or trial court order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Although Richie filed a motion for reconsideration within 30 days of the trial court’s ruling, motions for reconsideration do not extend the time to appeal from the underlying decision, and the order resolving the motion is not itself a judgment subject to direct appeal.
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Section 5-6-38(a) requires a notice of appeal within 30 days after entry of the order being appealed; filing after that deadline leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.

Gates v. State · filed 2022-08-08(a)

A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of the order sought to be appealed. OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). ... Because Gates filed the notice of appeal 32 days after entry of the trial court’s order, we lack jurisdiction.
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Notes 1–150 of 1,649, oldest cases first.

263 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Robinson v. Budd Residential Real Estate, LLC, the court applied the seven-day dispossessory appeal deadline in § 44-7-56; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general rule. opinion →
Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, the court reports that the mother brought a cross appeal; it makes no decision about § 5-6-38. opinion →
Scott v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, the court cites the section’s appeal period while deciding when a malicious-use-of-process claim accrued; it does not decide a disputed rule of this section. opinion →
Abney v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) to resolve whether this appeal may proceed, but does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Horton v. Allstate Insurance, the court uses § 5-6-38 only to establish that the appeal was timely; its decision about the defective notice rests on § 5-6-48. opinion →
Life for God's Stray Animals, Inc. v. New North Rockdale County Homeowners Ass'n, the court resolved the appeal-timing issue under § 5-6-34 (c), without deciding a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Barlow v. State, the court cites the section to explain why it cannot reach challenges to the conviction in this appeal; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the only reference to § 5-6-38 appears in the dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Pittman v. State, the citation appears in a special concurrence, not the court's decision. It describes filing chronology without deciding a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the court recites a rule from an earlier decision but does not decide how § 5-6-38(a) applies to this notice; it proceeds to the merits. opinion →
Conway v. State, the statement about this section appears in the dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
O'Quinn v. Bunkley, the court cites the section only to describe how the cross-appeal arose; it does not decide the section’s filing rules. opinion →
Typo-Repro Services, Inc. v. Bishop, the court mentions the filing deadline in its procedural history but does not decide a rule under this section. opinion →
McGuire v. State, the discussion of § 5-6-38(a) appears only in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Seaton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the special concurrence mentions § 5-6-38(a) to establish timely filing; the court decides whether the notice sufficiently identifies the judgment under § 5-6-48(f). opinion →
Hatfield v. Great American Management & Investment, Inc., this statement appears only in Judge Beasley's dissent. The majority decides the appeal under § 5-6-48(c). opinion →
Brantley v. State, the citation and statement about § 5-6-38(a) appear in a special concurrence, not the court's majority decision. opinion →
Odister v. State, the discussion of the notice-of-appeal deadline appears only in a dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
State v. Smith, the court cites a prior decision about § 5-6-38(a) while deciding whether it can hear the defendant’s cross-appeal; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Weems v. State, the discussion of § 5-6-38 (a) appears only in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Dollar v. Department of Human Resources, the court did not decide § 5-6-38(a)'s rules for the time to file a notice of appeal; it cited the section while declining to consider an issue raised without a cross-appeal. opinion →
Beamon v. Georgia Power Co., the court cites the section to identify the basis for the cross-appeal but decides no rule of the section. opinion →
Lawson v. Athens Auto Supply & Electric, Inc., the court decided finality under § 9-11-54 (b); it cited § 5-6-38 only in passing and did not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Bank South, N.A. v. Roswell Jeep Eagle, Inc., the court recites the filing deadline as background but decides whether a supersedeas can undo an earlier entry on the execution docket, not a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Hipple v. Brick, the court cites the section as background to the missed appeal and decides the malpractice claims, not a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
First Community Bank v. Bryan Starr & Associates, Inc., the citation appears only in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
St. Simons Island Save the Beach Ass'n v. Glynn County Board of Commissioners, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because no application for appeal was made; its discussion of § 5-6-38 is expressly conditional on treating the case as a direct appeal. opinion →
Queen v. State, this statement appears in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Vance v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc., the court decides when a lis pendens notice ceases to be effective. It cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the time to appeal but does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Wallace v. President Street, L.P., the court cites the section while dismissing a cross-appeal but does not decide its notice-of-appeal timing rules. opinion →
Johnson v. State, the discussion of § 5-6-38 is in a dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Jacobsen v. Haldi, the court said Jacobsen may be entitled to divided transcript costs but left her responsibility for costs for the trial court to determine. opinion →
Mayor of Savannah v. Norman J. Bass Construction Co., the court expressly excludes the notice-of-appeal deadline issue under § 5-6-38 from its decision. opinion →
Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, the court decides whether the cross-appeal required discretionary appeal procedures, not a rule about the time for filing a notice of appeal under § 5-6-38. opinion →
In the Interest of J. P., the section appears only in a special concurrence, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Elrod v. State, the court cites the section to establish that the first appeal was timely, but does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
National American Insurance v. Thornton, the statement appears in Judge Beasley's dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Planet Insurance v. Ferrell, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general appeal deadline, but dismisses the appeal because the order was interlocutory and no timely application was filed; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Mitcham v. Blalock, the footnote reports this court’s dismissal of an earlier appeal; the present opinion does not decide a § 5-6-38 issue. opinion →
Wilson v. State, the court notes that the notice of appeal was timely to explain why the appeal is before it; it does not decide a rule under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Johnson v. Pulaski County Board of Education, the citation to § 5-6-38 describes the superior court’s ruling; this court held the related cross-appeal issue moot. opinion →
Lops v. Lops, the discussion of the appeal deadline is in a dissent, not the court's own decision. opinion →
Lops v. Lops, the opinion uses the section’s 30-day deadline to calculate when a judgment became final for collateral-estoppel purposes; it decides a preclusion issue, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Adams v. State, the court cites this section for the general filing deadline, but decides whether a timely notice naming the wrong appellate court may be amended under other provisions. opinion →
Wimberly v. State, the statement about § 5-6-38(a) is conditional. The court dismissed the appeal for failure to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures of § 5-6-34(b). opinion →
In Re BSH, the court cites § 5-6-38 for the ordinary appeal period but decides the timeliness of a motion under § 15-11-42 and its jurisdiction over the appeal, not § 5-6-38’s own rules. opinion →
In the Interest of B. S. H., the court cites § 5-6-38 for the ordinary appeal period but decides the timeliness of a motion under § 15-11-42 and the availability of a direct appeal under § 5-6-34. opinion →
Fullwood v. Sivley, the court decides the deadline under OCGA § 9-14-52(b); it cites § 5-6-38(a) only as an example of another appeal deadline. opinion →
Hudson v. State, the footnote recounts a dismissal in an earlier appeal; this opinion does not decide an issue under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Merchant v. Mitchell, the court decides which claims are before it on appeal, without deciding § 5-6-38(a)'s filing deadline or another rule of that section. opinion →
Magnus Homes, LLC v. DeRosa, the court mentions § 5-6-38(a) only to identify an unused procedural option; it decides whether an objection was preserved, not a rule governing the time to file a notice of appeal. opinion →
Neisler v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) to explain its lack of jurisdiction over additional claims; it does not decide the section’s filing-time rule. opinion →
Mikell v. State, the court mentions the section only to establish that the appeal is timely; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Capricorn Systems, Inc. v. Godavarthy, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) only to establish that the time to appeal the underlying judgment had passed; it decides whether § 5-6-35 requires a discretionary application for the attorney-fee appeal. opinion →
Cross v. Stokes, the court decided that the probate court’s earlier ruling was void; it cited § 5-6-38 (a) only in resolving whether the appeal was timely. opinion →
Murray v. State, the court treated the 30-day deadline as undisputed background and decided whether Murray was entitled to an out-of-time appeal; it did not decide a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Threatt v. Rogers, the court cites the section in connection with the cross-appeal but does not decide any rule of the section. opinion →
Rodericus v. State, the opinion recounts an earlier dismissal under § 5-6-38; its present decision rests on the absence of an appealable order. opinion →
In Re Is, the court mentions this section's 30-day deadline as background, but decides whether the earlier order could be challenged under § 5-6-34(d) and whether the appeal was moot. opinion →
Interest of I. S., the court mentions this section’s 30-day deadline as background. Its ruling that the earlier order could be challenged rests on § 5-6-34(d), and it affirms on mootness grounds. opinion →
Elias v. State, the court cites the appeal deadline while explaining why a challenge to the guilty plea is unavailable, but decides no issue about filing a notice of appeal under this section. opinion →
Colbert v. Head, the court decides when the federal habeas limitations period began; it cites § 5-6-38 only to identify the time available for a direct appeal. opinion →
Rokowski v. Gilbert, the court decided the effect of an appeal under § 5-6-34. Section 5-6-38 appears only in a footnote to the opposing party’s rejected deadline argument. opinion →
SBP MANAGEMENT, LLC v. Price, the court decided whether the motion for new trial was timely; it cited § 5-6-38(a) only in discussing appeal timing. opinion →
Thompson v. Smith, the court cites the state appeal deadline to establish an undisputed finality date; it decides equitable tolling of the federal habeas deadline, not a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
In the Interest of S. P., the court rejects a timeliness objection by applying OCGA § 5-6-34 (d); it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Canas v. Al-Jabi, the opinion gives only a bare citation to § 5-6-38 and does not decide any rule of that section. opinion →
Jones v. Walker, the court cites the section as background to the appeal but does not decide its filing deadline or any other rule under it. opinion →
Thompson v. Salacoa Highland Property Owners' Ass'n, the court decided the trial court’s authority to dismiss under § 5-6-48 and its own jurisdiction under § 5-6-35, rather than a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Davis v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., the court decides whether Davis has standing to bring a direct appeal, not the filing time or another rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Weaver v. State, the court decided when the forfeiture action ended and applied the appeal deadline to establish jurisdiction; it did not decide a rule of § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →
Jackson v. State, the court decides whether to make an exception to its own certiorari deadline; it cites § 5-6-38(a) only for comparison. opinion →
Laosebikan v. Lakemont Community Ass'n, the court decides the effect of an unappealed judgment under res judicata; it cites § 5-6-38 only for the appeal deadline. opinion →
Newton's Crest Homeowners' Ass'n v. Camp, the court cites the section only to identify the basis for a cross-appeal; it does not decide a rule under the section. opinion →
Ross v. State, the citation supports the court’s account of a ruling in an earlier appeal, not a decision about § 5-6-38 in this appeal. opinion →
Stamey v. Policemen's Pension Fund Board of Trustees, the court used § 5-6-38(a) in addressing whether the appeal was timely, without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Daniels v. State, the court quotes the filing deadline in a procedural footnote but does not decide a disputed rule or issue under this section. opinion →
Strength v. Lovett, the court cites the section to explain the timing of a possible cross-appeal, but does not decide a rule under the section. opinion →
Jessup v. Ray, the court cites subsection (a) to explain why the Rays filed an independent appeal, but decides no rule under § 5-6-38. opinion →
GOMEZ-OLIVA v. State, the court uses the section to establish that the appeal is timely and reach the merits; it does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Gable v. State, the court mentions § 5-6-38 (a) as background but decides the rules for discretionary applications and extensions under other sections. opinion →
Hawkins v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc., the court cites § 5-6-38(a) as authority for bringing a cross-appeal, without deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
Mapp v. We Care Transportation Services, Inc., the citation describes what the trial court did; the appellate court does not decide a rule under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Board of Regents of the University System v. Ruff, the court cites § 5-6-38 for the appeal deadline while deciding whether it can hear this appeal; it does not decide a rule of the section itself. opinion →
Bowen v. State, the court decides whether the denial of reconsideration is directly appealable, but does not decide § 5-6-38’s rules for filing a notice of appeal. opinion →
Labrew v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) to explain the dismissal of the earlier direct appeal, but decides the request for an out-of-time appeal under other law. opinion →
Labrew v. State, the citation explains a prior dismissal that this court reports; this court decides the separate motion for an out-of-time appeal. opinion →
Torres v. Elkin, the court cited § 5-6-38(a) for the undisputed 30-day period while deciding whether the judgment was final and the appeal could proceed; it did not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Torres v. Elkin, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general filing period, but decides when the settlement order became a final, appealable judgment under other law. opinion →
State v. Sosa, the court uses the appeal deadline to establish when the conviction became final, but decides the habeas statute’s limitations period, not this section’s rules. opinion →
Allison v. Wilson, the reference to § 5-6-38 (a) states Wilson’s argument, which the court did not adopt; the court based its jurisdiction ruling on § 5-6-34. opinion →
Allison v. Wilson, the citation appears in Wilson’s argument, which the court did not adopt; the court resolved jurisdiction under § 5-6-34 (d). opinion →
Owens v. State, the citation explains an earlier dismissal; this opinion decides the motion for an out-of-time appeal, not a § 5-6-38 issue. opinion →
Owens v. State, the citation explains the untimeliness of an earlier appeal; the court decides the motion for an out-of-time appeal based on the absence of an ineffective-assistance allegation, not a rule of this section. opinion →
In the Interest Of: F. A. G. R., a Child, the court cited the section's deadline to assess appellate jurisdiction, then remanded to establish the filing date; it did not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Best v. CB Decatur Court, LLC, the court cites § 5-6-38 as background to whether it may review an attorney-fee notice ruling; it does not decide this section’s time-for-filing rules. opinion →
Jenkins v. Butts County School District, the court mentions the Georgia appellate rule but expressly says it has no bearing on its decision. opinion →
Gwinnett Community Bank v. Arlington Capital, LLC, the court cites the section in a background footnote about an earlier appeal; it does not decide an issue under the section in this opinion. opinion →
Gwinnett Community Bank v. Arlington Capital, LLC, the court decided the effect of the dismissed appeal under the law-of-the-case rule; it cited § 5-6-38 only generally in a footnote about cross-appeals. opinion →
Kier v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) as an appellate jurisdiction threshold, then remands to establish the filing date without deciding whether the notice was timely. opinion →
Ross v. State, the court recites § 5-6-38(a)’s deadline, but the notice was filed within 30 days. Dismissal turns on who filed it, rather than a decision about this section’s timing rule. opinion →
In the Interest of S. M., a Child, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) only to explain why it cannot review earlier judgments; it does not decide a rule of the section itself. opinion →
Schroder v. Westchester Wiltshire Condo. Assoc., the court mentions § 5-6-38’s deadline but does not decide whether any notice missed it; dismissal rests on failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. opinion →
Huskey v. Prime Funding Inc., the court mentions § 5-6-38(a)'s general deadline but decides timeliness under § 44-7-56's seven-day rule. opinion →
State v. Andrade, the court decides which provision of § 5-7-1 authorizes the appeal. It cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the resulting, undisputed filing period without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Townsend v. Mark Butler, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Labor, the discussion of § 5-6-38 is conditional on a right of direct appeal that the court held Townsend lacked. opinion →
PRESTON ELLIOTT D/B/A THE ELLIOTT GROUP v. FLORENCE SMITH, the court’s application of § 5-6-38 (a) is conditional on treating the motion as one for reconsideration. opinion →
ST. MARYS PROPERTY, LLC v. SAINT SMITTY, LLC, the court decides a request for an extension under § 5-6-39; it mentions § 5-6-38 (a) only as the underlying filing period. opinion →
Clark v. State, the timeliness statement is conditional; the court dismissed the appeal because the record contained no order to review. opinion →
In the Interest Of: B. R. F. F/K/A B. R. M., a Child (Mother), the court cites § 5-6-38(a) only to advise the mother about a possible future appeal; it does not decide an issue under that section. opinion →
In the Interest of B. R. F., this is guidance about a possible future juvenile court denial, not a ruling the court makes in this appeal. opinion →
Collins v. the State, the court cites the notice-of-appeal deadline to assess jurisdiction, but resolves the appeal under the rules for correcting a void sentence rather than deciding a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Paul Penn, Jr. v. Penny Mac Corporation, the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under § 44-7-56’s seven-day rule for dispossessory appeals. opinion →
Odolph Wright v. Gateway of East Point Lp, the court mentions § 5-6-38 (a) as the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
GORDON v. DORCHESTER MANAGEMENT, LLC D/B/A STERLING PLACE APARTMENTS, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Hotchkiss v. McGuire Floor Covering, Inc., the court mentions the notice-of-appeal deadline as an available route, but dismisses the appeal because the denial of a motion for reconsideration is not directly appealable; it does not decide a disputed rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
The State v. Rosas, the court mentions § 5-6-38 as the appeal deadline established by the Georgia Supreme Court, then decides the Miranda issue rather than this section’s rules. opinion →
Allen v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) only to determine whether a possible direct appeal invoked its jurisdiction. opinion →
Oklahoma Gaming Ventures, Inc. v. Pct Holdings, LLC, the court denies an untimeliness motion but states no rule or reasoning about § 5-6-38. opinion →
Boyd v. Vanderbilt Mortgage, the court mentions this section’s general deadline but decides timeliness under § 44-7-56’s seven-day rule for dispossessory appeals. opinion →
Yevette Freeman v. the Park at Hairston Apartments, the court mentions § 5-6-38(a)'s general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Murray v. State, this is conditional guidance about a possible cross-appeal, not the court’s decision on § 5-6-38. opinion →
White v. State, the court cited § 5-6-38 (a) for context while deciding whether the defendant remained represented by counsel; it did not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
White v. State, the court cites the section as background while deciding whether the defendant was represented by counsel; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Kell v. Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under § 44-7-56’s deadline for dispossessory appeals. opinion →
EDOKPOLOR v. GRADY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL CORPORATION, the court decided whether the judgment was final under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), rather than construing § 5-6-38. opinion →
Edokpolor v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corp., the court decided whether the judgment was final under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), not a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Caudell v. Hank York, the court mentions this section’s general deadline but dismisses the appeal under the seven-day rule in OCGA § 44-7-56. opinion →
Delevan v. State, the court decides counsel disqualification, not a rule of § 5-6-38. Its statement about the 30-day deadline is conditional guidance for a possible ruling on remand. opinion →
Delevan v. State, the statement sets a deadline only if a future out-of-time appeal is granted; the court did not decide that conditional issue. opinion →
CLIFTON v. the STATE., the court cites subsection (a)’s appeal period only to compare it with the deadline for withdrawing a guilty plea; it does not decide a rule of this section. opinion →
Abrams v. Laughlin, the court used § 5-6-38 (a) to identify when the conviction became final for the habeas filing deadline; it did not decide a rule of § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →
Monica Brown v. Greystar Management, the court mentions § 5-6-38(a) as the general deadline but decides timeliness under § 44-7-56’s seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals. opinion →
SALEM CROSSING TOWNHOMES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. WAGNER Et Al., the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) as an available route to challenge the earlier judgment, but decides collateral estoppel rather than the section’s notice-of-appeal rules. opinion →
In Re: Estate of Timothy S. Cook, the statement about § 5-6-38 reports the probate court’s ruling. This court decided whether it had jurisdiction over the emergency motion, not the section’s filing rules. opinion →
Wilson v. Sunnyland Community, LLC, the court applies the seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals under OCGA § 44-7-56; it mentions § 5-6-38 (a) only as the general rule. opinion →
Brown v. E. Howard Carson, Jr., the statement tied to § 5-6-38(a) reports the parties’ concession, not a decision by this court about the section. opinion →
HENRY COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. HOME DEPOT U. S. A., INC. Et Al., the court used § 5-6-38(a) to identify the expired appeal period, but decided whether intervention was timely under § 9-11-24. opinion →
Lamb v. Roy L. Nelms, Jr., the court cites this section for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule for dispossessory appeals in OCGA § 44-7-56. opinion →
Edins v. Patrick, the court applies the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56 to the dispossessory appeal; it cites § 5-6-38 (a) only for the general deadline. opinion →
Gale E. Chambers v. Royalty, LLC, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Perry v. Ysmr Equities, Inc., the court mentions § 5-6-38(a) as the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Ag Entertainment, Inc. v. Alliance Properties, LLC, the court decided the appeal under § 44-7-56’s seven-day dispossessory deadline; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general deadline. opinion →
McDaniel-ivey v. Ouda, the court decided the appeal under § 44-7-56’s seven-day dispossessory deadline; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general deadline. opinion →
SANDERS v. DOZIER, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, not a decision adopted by the district court. opinion →
Pittman v. Envision Property Management, the court applied the seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals under OCGA § 44-7-56; it mentioned § 5-6-38 (a) only as the general rule. opinion →
Duke v. State, the court decides the certificate requirement under § 5-6-34(b); it cites a prior decision about § 5-6-38(a) only as an analogy. opinion →
Duke v. State, the discussion of § 5-6-38 (a) reports Cody's holding in a string citation; this court decides an interlocutory appeal requirement under § 5-6-34. opinion →
Wright v. City of Greensboro, the court declines to review a ruling for lack of a cross-appeal but does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38(a), including its filing deadline. opinion →
Wilder v. Laughlin, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
Louis F. Reynaud, IV v. Five Oaks Development, Inc., the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Davis v. Green, the court applied the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56 to this dispossessory appeal; it cited § 5-6-38(a) only for the general deadline. opinion →
Hutchinson v. Wilson, the court mentions this section’s general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in OCGA § 44-7-56. opinion →
THOMAS v. STATE OF GEORGIA, the court cites § 5-6-38 while deciding whether state remedies remain available for habeas exhaustion; it does not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
Wright Sr v. City of Greensboro, Georgia, the section is cited only in a footnote explaining why an unappealed injunction ruling is outside the appeal; the court decides the municipal ante litem notice claim under § 36-33-5. opinion →
Dos Santos v. State, the court mentions the notice-of-appeal deadline to explain how long counsel must continue representing a client; it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Collier v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) as background to its decision about prejudicial delay in out-of-time appeal motions, rather than deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
Hodges v. Auction Credit Enterprises, LLC, the court cites this section for the initial appeal period but decides the disputed extension and Sunday deadline under other statutes. opinion →
State v. Henderson, the court dismissed the appeal because no notice was filed at all; it did not decide or apply § 5-6-38(a)’s filing deadline. opinion →
Masjid Warith Ud Deen Mohammad Non-Profit Trust 4525 v. Yousef, the court applied the seven-day deadline in OCGA § 44-7-56 to dismiss this dispossessory appeal; it cited § 5-6-38 (a) only for the ordinary deadline. opinion →
Romans v. Jackie Long, the court mentions § 5-6-38 (a) as the general deadline, but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
FORD v. TATE (And Vice Versa), the court cites subsection (b) to explain why Tate’s cross-appeal is before it; it does not decide a rule of that subsection. opinion →
GRIER v. DEAL, the court cites § 5-6-38 to establish when the conviction became final for the federal habeas deadline; it does not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
Jackson v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, the court applied the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56; § 5-6-38 (a) supplied only the general deadline. opinion →
Smith v. Wilmington Savings Fund Society, Fsb, the court applies § 44-7-56’s seven-day deadline; it mentions § 5-6-38(a) only as the general rule. opinion →
Jauntrica West v. Wri Property Management, LLC, the court applied § 44-7-56’s seven-day dispossessory deadline and § 5-6-35’s discretionary appeal procedure; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general thirty-day deadline. opinion →
Taylor v. Taylor, the statement about § 5-6-38 (a) concerns a possible future appeal, not the court’s decision dismissing this appeal. opinion →
Bryant v. State, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) to explain the dismissal of a prior appeal; it dismisses this appeal on res judicata grounds without deciding the section’s rules. opinion →
Walker v. State, the court used the section’s notice deadline to establish jurisdiction, but decided the validity of Walker’s pro se motion under other law. opinion →
Jones v. the Municipal Court of the City of Atlanta, the court’s application of § 5-6-38(a) is expressly conditional on a right of direct appeal; it decided that Jones had to seek a discretionary appeal. opinion →
Skipper v. Paul, the only discussion of this section appears in the dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Green v. Brooks, the court cites the state appeal deadline to establish when the judgment became final for federal habeas limitations; it decides equitable tolling, not a rule of this section. opinion →
Sanders v. Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections, the court used the state appeal deadline to assess federal habeas timeliness and expressly declined to decide the disputed finality date. opinion →
State v. Wheeler, the court describes § 5-6-38’s usual deadline as background while deciding the jurisdictional requirements of § 5-7-1 (a) (5). opinion →
Mike Jethro Azubike Redford v. State, the court cites the section to explain an earlier appeal’s dismissal; its decision here concerns the trial court’s jurisdiction over a later motion. opinion →
Jordan v. Adams, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation; the opinion does not show that the district judge adopted it. opinion →
Grimes v. Canopy Development Group, LLC, the court applied § 44-7-56’s seven-day dispossessory deadline; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general deadline. opinion →
Mannion & Mannion, Inc. v. Mendez, the cross-appeal discussion is a footnote to the negligence appeal. The court expressly says the spoliation issue is immaterial and does not address it. opinion →
Pounds v. State, the footnote reports the established no-tolling rule to explain past terminology; this court decides whether an untimely new-trial motion is a legal nullity, not the operation of § 5-6-38(a). opinion →
Ward v. U.S.bank National Association, the court applied § 44-7-56’s seven-day dispossessory deadline; § 5-6-38(a) supplied only the general deadline. opinion →
Harper v. State, the court cites the section only to describe the ordinary appeal deadline while establishing that this appeal was timely; it does not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Sdm Investments Group LLC v. Hbn Media Inc., the court mentions § 5-6-38(a) only to establish that the notice of appeal was timely; its decision concerns the delayed transcript under § 5-6-48(c). opinion →
State v. Langley, the court decides a sentencing issue under § 16-11-131 (b); § 5-6-38 (a) appears only in a footnote citing the basis for the State's appeal. opinion →
Ross v. Shipman Family Investment LLC, the court mentions § 5-6-38 (a)'s general deadline but decides jurisdiction under the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56. opinion →
FIRST MERIT CREDIT SERVICES v. FAIRWAY AVIATION, LLC, the court cited § 5-6-38(a) to establish that the appeal was filed within 30 days; it decided the disputed notice defect under other sections. opinion →
Crabtree v. Cranford Homes, Inc., the discussion of the notice-of-appeal deadline depends on the court’s stated assumption that the writ could be treated as a judgment; the court dismissed the appeal because no final judgment had been entered. opinion →
Hodges v. State, the discussion of the notice-of-appeal deadline reports the court’s decision in an earlier appeal; the present order does not decide § 5-6-38. opinion →
KAWANNA BROWN AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JERONTA BROWN v. QUIGGLEY, the court uses § 5-6-38 (a) only to establish jurisdiction over this appeal; its decision concerns the delayed transcript under other sections. opinion →
Head v. State, No. The court decides whether Head showed prejudice from counsel’s performance. It cites § 5-6-38(a) only for the ordinary 30-day appeal deadline. opinion →
Schoicket v. State, the citation to § 5-6-38(a) appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Bryant v. State, the citation refers to the court’s dismissal of an earlier appeal, rather than a decision in this appeal about § 5-6-38. opinion →
Rutledge v. State, the court mentions the 30-day filing period as background but decides whether the trial court could hear a motion for an out-of-time appeal, not a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
Owenby v. State, the court predicts what may happen in a future appeal; it does not decide an issue under § 5-6-38(a) in this order. opinion →
BREMNER v. GWINNETT COMMUNITY BANK, the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) only in concluding that the appeals from earlier orders were untimely; it does not decide a rule of the section itself. opinion →
Horton v. Preston Blake Pike, the court decides whether the discretionary application is timely under § 5-6-35 and cites § 5-6-38 (a) only in support of the appeal deadline. opinion →
In the Interest of S. W., a Child (Mother), the court cites this section for the general filing deadline, but decides whether earlier orders can be reviewed under OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). opinion →
Rouzan v. State, the court only predicts that a future appeal will likely be untimely; it does not decide an issue under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Polanco v. State, the court advises that a future appeal will likely be dismissed; it does not decide that appeal. opinion →
Garner v. State, the court gives a conditional warning about a possible future appeal; it does not decide an issue under § 5-6-38(a). opinion →
Polanco v. State, the court predicts that a future appeal will likely be dismissed; it does not decide that issue. opinion →
Oldham v. Judy Wilder, the court describes how a party may seek review after a future trial court order; it does not decide an issue under § 5-6-38 (a). opinion →
Sims v. State, the court predicts what may happen in a future appeal; it does not decide an issue under this section. opinion →
Glover v. State, the court gives an advisory prediction about a possible future appeal; it does not decide an issue under this section. opinion →
Burse v. State, the court only advises that a future appeal will likely be dismissed; it does not decide an issue under this section. opinion →
In Re: Estate of T. M. N., a Minor Child, the court mentions that the notice of appeal was timely but does not decide any rule under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Walters v. State, the court only advises that a possible future appeal will likely be untimely; it does not decide that appeal under this section. opinion →
Thomas v. Thomas, the footnote gives a conditional observation about timeliness; the court dismissed the appeal for failure to follow interlocutory appeal procedures. opinion →
Hammitt v. State, the court reports its earlier dismissal under the 30-day deadline; this order decides the effect of Cook on the out-of-time appeal. opinion →
State v. Burton, the court mentions the appeal deadline as procedural background but does not decide a rule under this section. opinion →
HARRIS v. CHAPMAN, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal, and the opinion does not show that the district judge adopted the recommendation. opinion →
Dougherty v. State, the court applies the law of the case to an earlier dismissal; it does not decide § 5-6-38’s filing rules in this opinion. opinion →
JONES v. KASPER, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the district judge has not yet adopted. opinion →
In the Interest of M. B., a Child, the court uses the notice-of-appeal deadline to decide whether it can review an earlier order; it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →
Kelly v. State, the court decided whether the State had a due process right and whether the trial court could reconsider its order after the term ended. Section 5-6-38(a) appears only in a passing reference to the appeal deadline; the court did not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Johnson v. State, No. The court cites § 5-6-38(a) as background while deciding whether courts may recognize pro se filings by counseled defendants; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
State v. Marquis Orlandis Carswell, the court decides the timing rule in OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (5); its reference to § 5-6-38 (a) supplies context but does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Malcolm Sidney Moore, Jr. v. Humble, the court cites the section in a footnote about how the cross-appeal reached it, without deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
Blau v. Stacia Horn Blau, the court described waiver as only arguable and resolved the issue on other grounds; it did not decide a rule under § 5-6-38. opinion →
Misty Michelle Garrison v. State, the court cites the section only to explain why the appeal was timely; it does not decide a disputed rule under the section. opinion →
BENTON v. CITY OF PORT WENTWORTH, the court expressly left the appeal’s timeliness undecided and dismissed it for failure to follow the discretionary appeal procedure. opinion →
In the Interest of N. K., a Child (Parents), the court dismissed an untimely application for discretionary appeal. Its reference to § 5-6-38(a) states the general notice-of-appeal deadline but does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Tanksley v. Fort, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, not an adopted district court decision. opinion →
Dalbert v. Pineiero, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
Vendrel v. State, the opinion reports an earlier dismissal as procedural history; this decision does not rule on § 5-6-38. opinion →
Hakeem v. Gilbert, the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the general deadline but decides the appeal under the seven-day rule for dispossessory actions. opinion →
Glenn v. Huntington Apartment Homes Xii LLC, the court applies the seven-day deadline in OCGA § 44-7-56; it cites § 5-6-38 (a) only for the general deadline. opinion →
Randolf Smith v. State, the court discusses the notice deadline only on the conditional premise that a direct appeal was available; it dismisses because discretionary review was required. opinion →
Cordarriel Green v. Hometown Communities Property Management, the court mentions § 5-6-38 (a) as the general deadline, but decides timeliness under the dispossessory appeal deadline in § 44-7-56. opinion →
Lockhart v. Mims, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
Myers v. Landing Square Multifamily, Lp, the court decided timeliness under § 44-7-56’s seven-day rule for dispossessory appeals, rather than deciding a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
DANNY AMEN VALENTINE SHABAZZ v. THE IRBY REIT D/B/A THE IRBY, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the seven-day rule in § 44-7-56. opinion →
JONES v. DILLS, the court cites the section to calculate when the conviction became final for the federal habeas limitations period; it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →
PENNINGTON v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GEORGIA MILITARY COLLEGE, the court decides relief under federal procedural rules and only cites § 5-6-38 in a footnote about the appeal window. opinion →
STATE OF GEORGIA v. DECATUR COUNTY-BAINBRIDGE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, the court dismissed the appeal because the State sought to appeal an order granting its own petition; it did not decide this section’s filing deadline or other rules. opinion →
MOORE v. OLIVER, this is a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown. opinion →
POPE v. SPRAYBERRY, this is an unadopted magistrate judge’s recommendation, and the citation recounts an earlier ruling. opinion →
JACKSON L. GATES v. ROSS, the court dismissed the appeal because there was no appealable judgment; it did not decide an issue under § 5-6-38’s filing deadline. opinion →
Glo Up, LLC v. 1800 Limited Partnership, LLC, the court cites § 5-6-38 (a) for the general deadline but decides timeliness under the separate seven-day deadline for dispossessory appeals. opinion →
MARK JULIAN KERLIN v. REAVES-PHAMS, the court’s discussion of the notice-of-appeal deadline is expressly conditional; it dismissed the appeal on other grounds. opinion →
MCDONALD v. JONES, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, and the opinion does not show that the district judge adopted it. opinion →
GREEN v. SALES, the magistrate judge recommends dismissal; the opinion does not show that the district judge adopted the recommendation. opinion →
WILLIAMS v. WALMART STORES EAST LP, the court cited the appeal deadline while deciding whether the action remained pending for removal; it did not decide a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
GOETZ v. JESTER, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation, with no district judge adoption shown in the opinion. opinion →
Cook v. Russell, the magistrate judge’s recommendation had not yet been adopted by the district judge. opinion →
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO WASHINGTON MUTUAL, N.A. v. WILLIAM E. WHITAKER AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE, the cited rule appears in a prior dismissal order that this opinion reports; the current appeal does not decide § 5-6-38. opinion →
Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, Respondent, vs. True Gravity Ventures, LLC, et al., Respondents, Astra Genstar ., the court decides Minnesota appellate procedure and lists § 5-6-38 only as an example of another state's law; it does not decide this section's rules. opinion →
Fountain v. Williams, the discussion of § 5-6-38 is in a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the district judge has not yet adopted. opinion →
LOLETHA DENISE HALE v. ASBM INVESTMENTS, LLC, the court cites the section while determining its jurisdiction over later orders, but does not decide the section’s filing deadline or another rule of the section. opinion →
PADGETT, this is a magistrate judge’s recommendation that the district judge has not yet adopted, so it is not the court’s final decision. opinion →
Loganville Pediatrics and Adolescent Care Associates Corporation v. Vmm, LLC, the court cited § 5-6-38(a) as the ordinary deadline but decided that the seven-day deadline in § 44-7-56 governed this appeal. opinion →
MUHAMMAD v. CLAYTON COUNTY, the court cites the section’s filing deadline to determine whether it has jurisdiction, but decides the appeal based on the effect of a pro se filing made while counsel remained of record. opinion →
Ledford, the court’s discussion of finality is tentative; it dismissed the petition for failure to pay the filing fee. opinion →
Rafael Santana, Jr. v. State, the statement about § 5-6-38(a) reports the trial court’s finding; the Court of Appeals decides whether § 5-6-39.1 permits out-of-time relief. opinion →
Thompson v. State, the court uses § 5-6-38(a) to identify when the ordinary appeal period expired, but decides the motion’s timeliness under § 5-6-39.1. opinion →
State v. Newberry, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) as an analogy while deciding whether a premature order granting a new trial is valid under § 5-5-40(h). opinion →
In Re: Estate of Jack Williams, the court mentions timeliness but dismisses the appeal because the represented party’s pro se notice was a nullity; it does not decide § 5-6-38’s timing rules. opinion →
CHARLIE BRIDGES v. GUPTA, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for the appeal deadline while deciding the trial court’s jurisdiction to award attorney fees under a different statute; it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →
Jordan v. May, the court cites § 5-6-38(a) for timeliness but dismisses the appeal because Jordan filed the notice pro se while represented by counsel; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
TABITHA MOCK v. CAR BLISS, LLC, the court recites § 5-6-38(a)’s deadlines but cannot determine whether they were met. It dismisses the appeal because the record is incomplete, without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Clemons v. State, the court used § 5-6-38(a) to establish appellate jurisdiction by checking the filing deadline; it did not decide a rule of the section. opinion →
Fremichael v. Doe, the footnote mentions the 30-day notice period, but the court decides whether the trial court could vacate and re-enter its order after notice was misdirected; it does not decide a rule of § 5-6-38. opinion →
State v. Petty, the court mentioned § 5-6-38’s deadline for the January order, which the State was not appealing; it dismissed the appeal from the June order under § 5-7-1. opinion →
JONES v. ODOM, the court uses the state appeal deadline to calculate finality under AEDPA; it does not decide an issue about § 5-6-38 itself. opinion →

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