Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Section 16-5-21(a) defines aggravated assault to include assault with intent to rape or assault with a deadly weapon; an indictment tracking either statutory form sufficiently states the offense.

Watson v. State · filed 1986-04-07(a)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) a person commits aggravated assault when he assaults either (1) with the intent to murder, rape or rob; or (2) with a deadly weapon or any object which, used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury. In the instant case, count one of the indictment charged the appellant with aggravated assault by assaulting “Margerita Allen with a metal pipe, a deadly weapon when used in the manner in which it was used.” Count two charged him with aggravated assault by assaulting Margerita Allen with the intent to rape her. Both counts thus track the language of the statute and sufficiently contain and inform the defendant of the elements of the offenses charged.

An indictment alleging an aggravated assault by “shooting” sufficiently alleges the deadly weapon element.

Rushin v. State · filed 1986-09-12(a)(2)

The instant indictment alleged that appellant had committed an aggravated assault upon the person of the victim by commission of an act of “shooting.” The term “shooting” is not susceptible of an overly broad interpretation. It clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon.

An indictment charging aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) is sufficient against a demurrer when it tracks the applicable statutory language.

Day v. State · filed 1988-09-06(a)(2)

The indictment upon which appellant was tried sufficiently tracks the applicable language of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in overruling the demurrer.

An aggravated-assault indictment alleging an assault with a handgun adequately alleges an assault by the act of using the handgun.

Williams v. State · filed 1993-03-18(a)(2)

Pretermitting whether the indictment could be construed to include an averment of a simple assault by an attempt to commit violent injury is that the averment adequately includes the averment of an assault upon the victim by the act of using a handgun.

An indictment alleging an assault on a named victim with a handgun as a deadly weapon sufficiently informs the accused of an aggravated assault charge.

Wallace v. State · filed 1995-03-17

The instant indictment tracked the language of OCGA § 16-5-21 in alleging that Wallace made “an assault upon the person of Joe Jones, with a handgun, a deadly weapon.” This language is not too vague to inform the accused of the charges against him.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging that the accused used their hands as deadly weapons should state that the hands were used as deadly weapons and were likely to cause bodily injury.

Smith v. Hardrick · filed 1995-12-04

However, when the State believes that such circumstances exist, the indictment should allege that the accused’s hands were being used as deadly weapons and were likely to cause bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault indictment to allege that the defendant used an object likely to cause serious bodily injury without alleging use of a deadly weapon.

Jay v. State · filed 1998-05-26(a)(2)

Subsection 2 is a disjunctive clause. Because the indictment charged that Jay’s fists were likely to result in serious bodily injury, no reference to deadly weapons was required.

An aggravated assault indictment under subsection (a)(2) sufficiently informs the accused of the charge when it tracks the statutory language and alleges an assault with a handgun as a deadly weapon.

Griffin v. State · filed 1999-12-30(a)(2)

An indictment for aggravated assault that tracks the language of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) and alleges an accused made “an assault upon the person of [victim], with a handgun, a deadly weapon,” is not subject to demurrer for failure to inform the accused of the charges against him.

An aggravated assault indictment need not specify which manner of simple assault the State relies on when its language gives the accused reasonable notice of the charge.

Merneigh v. State · filed 2000-03-13

Merneigh contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the aggravated assault counts of the indictment because they do not indicate which of the two means of committing an assault is relied on by the state. We disagree. ... Merneigh’s right to reasonable notice of the charges against him was satisfied by this language in the indictment.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging that hands and fists were used offensively in a way likely to cause serious bodily injury need not also call them deadly weapons.

Moore v. State · filed 2000-09-27

Under OCGA § 16-5-21, a person is guilty of aggravated assault when he assaults another “with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” Thus, although the indictment does not specify that Moore’s hands were being used as “deadly weapons,” Moore could not admit the allegations contained therein and still be innocent of the crime charged.

An aggravated assault indictment under § 16-5-21(a)(2) need not allege that the object used was a deadly weapon.

Price v. State · filed 1999-06-03(a)(2)

The indictment did not charge the deadly weapons language of OCGA § 16-5-21, and such was not required.

An intentional assault with a deadly weapon is aggravated assault; an unloaded pistol pointed threateningly at someone can be a deadly weapon when it reasonably appears loaded to that person.

Stobbart v. State · filed 2000-07-10(a)(2)

Marchitelli testified that he did not know whether the pistol was loaded or unloaded, but even an unloaded pistol pointed at another in a threatening manner is a deadly weapon when it reasonably appears to the victim that the weapon might be loaded. Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 240 (6) (282 SE2d 305) (1981). Thus, the only evidence was that Stobbart committed an act intending to place Marchitelli “in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,” OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), and that he did so with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). If his act was justified, it was no crime; if not, it was the crime of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require an indictment alleging assault with hands and feet to also allege that they were deadly weapons.

Gafford v. State · filed 1999-10-05(a)(2)

Notwithstanding defendant’s argument to the contrary, it is unnecessary that the indictment further alleges that defendant used his hands and feet as deadly weapons in that subsection (a) (2) of the foregoing statute is expressed in the disjunctive.

When an aggravated assault indictment alleges two means of committing the assault, proof of either one is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Brown v. State · filed 2000-02-11(a)(1)

Moreover, when an indictment alleges that an aggravated assault was committed by two means, the State need prove only one of the two acts constituting the crime of aggravated assault to sustain the conviction.

An indictment under § 16-5-21(a)(2) must allege that the instrument used was a deadly weapon or, when used offensively, resulted in or was likely to result in serious bodily injury.

Youngblood v. State · filed 2002-01-16(a)(2)

The indictment failed to allege that the instruments used to assault the victim were either deadly weapons or that when used offensively resulted in or were likely to result in serious bodily injury as required by OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

An aggravated assault indictment under subsection (a)(2) sufficiently alleges the aggravating circumstance by stating that the bottle and hands used were likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively, without calling them deadly weapons.

Pye v. State · filed 2002-03-11(a)(2)

Since the aggravated assault count in the indictment in this case alleged that the bottle and hands with which Matthews was struck were “likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person,” the indictment sufficiently charged Pye with aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging use of a handgun can sufficiently inform the accused of the charge without specifying each way the gun was used.

Arthur v. State · filed 2002-11-25(a)(2)

Thus, by alleging Appellant’s general use of a gun, the State apprised him that he would have to defend against all of the possible ways of committing the assault that he himself had admitted in his statement.

An indictment under § 16-5-21(a)(2) can allege that the defendant used his hands as an offensive object causing serious bodily injury without calling them deadly weapons.

State v. English · filed 2003-03-24(a)(2)

But English's arguments overlook the fact that the counts allege that English used his hands as an offensive object, resulting in serious bodily injury to his son. See OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). ... While the indictment against English does not state that his hands were used as deadly weapons, this omission does not render the charge flawed.

Section 16-5-21(a) allows an aggravated assault indictment that sufficiently alleges and proves both statutory methods to support a conviction under either method.

Lopez v. State · filed 2003-04-03(a)

The wording of the indictment would have allowed the State to seek a conviction under either sub-paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of OCGA § 16-5-21, as both methods were sufficiently alleged and proven.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging that an object was likely to cause serious bodily injury need not allege that the object was a deadly weapon.

Kemp v. State · filed 2002-09-10(a)(2)

Because the aggravated assault indictment here charged that Kemp’s kicking feet were likely to cause serious bodily injury, no reference to a deadly weapon was required.

An indictment using the statutory language of aggravated assault need not also plead simple assault to withstand a demurrer.

State v. Tate · filed 2003-07-14(a)(2)

An indictment charging a defendant in the statutory language of aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), does not need to additionally charge in the language of simple assault, OCGA § 16-5-20, in order to withstand demurrer.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires only general criminal intent, so an indictment need not expressly allege that intent.

Bishop v. State · filed 2004-03-05(a)(2)

Because the indictment charged Bishop with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which requires only a showing of a general intent to injure, it was not void for failing to expressly allege the criminal intent.

An indictment alleging that the defendant assaulted the victim with a handgun during an exchange of gunfire that resulted in the victim being shot sufficiently charges aggravated assault.

Barber v. State · filed 2005-04-07(a)(2)

Count 2 alleged that Barber assaulted the victim with a handgun, a deadly weapon, by engaging in an exchange of gunfire with Springer which resulted in the victim being shot. This language is sufficient to charge the elements of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

An aggravated assault indictment alleging a threat with hands must allege facts showing their use as deadly weapons, intent to inflict serious bodily injury, or reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury.

Fleming v. State · filed 2005-11-21(a)(2)

The altered indictment in this case failed to set forth the elements of aggravated assault because it did not state that Fleming threatened the victim with his hands in an attempt to use them as deadly weapons; that by threatening the victim with his hands, Fleming intended to inflict a serious bodily injury or that he placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a serious bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require an indictment alleging assault with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury to also allege that the objects were deadly weapons or that the defendant intended injury.

Hooker v. State · filed 2006-03-23(a)(2)

The indictment alleged that Hooker assaulted the victim “by striking him in the face with metal plates and fists, objects . . . likely to result in serious bodily injury.” It was unnecessary to further allege that defendant used the plates or his fist as deadly weapons or that there was an intent to injure.

An indictment charging aggravated assault under Section 16-5-21(a) disjunctively can withstand a general demurrer, but it limits the manner of assault the state may prove at trial.

State v. Daniels · filed 2006-08-22(a)

We recognize that OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) is worded disjunctively, and the indictment under consideration here charges disjunctively, contrary to the state’s contention. But this does not render the indictment fatally defective as to Daniels. It simply limits the state’s option of proving at trial the manner in which the aggravated assault was committed.

An indictment alleging assault with a deadly weapon in the language of subsection (a)(2) states the elements of aggravated assault and gives adequate notice of the charge.

Garza v. State · filed 2007-05-25(a)(2)

The foregoing charge of aggravated assault tracked the statutory language of the offense, contained the elements thereof, and gave Garza sufficient notice of the charge he needed to be prepared to defend.

An aggravated assault indictment may allege that hands and feet used offensively were likely to cause serious bodily injury without alleging that they were deadly weapons.

May v. State · filed 2007-09-04(a)(2)

When this indictment specified that May’s hands and feet “were likely to result in serious bodily injury,” it successfully charged him with aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault indictment can allege use of a vehicle as a deadly weapon by charging that the accused accelerated it toward a person at close range.

Adams v. State · filed 2008-08-22(a)(2)

The indictment in this case alleged a crime, the use of a vehicle as a deadly weapon by accelerating the vehicle in close proximity to and toward a person.

An aggravated assault indictment alleging that hands and teeth, used offensively, were likely to and did cause serious bodily injury need not also allege that they were deadly weapons.

Greene v. State · filed 2009-01-30(a)(2)

Thus, because the indictment [in this case] alleged that [Greene’s hands and teeth were] “object[s] which when used offensively against a person, [were] likely to and actually [did] result in serious bodily injury,” an allegation that [they were] deadly weapon[s] was not required.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires only a general intent to injure, so an indictment charging aggravated assault under it need not expressly allege criminal intent.

Powell v. State · filed 2009-05-13(a)(2)

The indictment thus alleged all essential elements of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). “Because the indictment charged [Powell] with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which requires only a showing of a general intent to injure, it was not void for failing to expressly allege the criminal intent.”

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require an indictment alleging that hands were objects likely to cause serious bodily injury to also allege that they were deadly weapons.

Walker v. State · filed 2009-06-09(a)(2)

Thus, it was unnecessary for the indictment to allege that Walker used his hands as a deadly weapon.

An aggravated assault indictment is not void when it uses the statute’s language, includes the offense’s essential elements, and gives definite notice of the charge.

Johnson v. State · filed 2010-02-01

Because the indictment used the language of the statute, included the essential elements of the offense, and was sufficiently definite to advise Johnson of what he must be prepared to confront, it was not void.

An indictment charging aggravated assault through specified use of hands and feet need not include the phrase “when used offensively” if its allegations adequately describe that use and the resulting injury.

LIZANA v. State · filed 2010-05-17(a)(2)

The indictment further alleged that, when Lizana’s hands and feet were used in that particular way, they were objects which were likely to and actually did result in serious bodily injury. Thus, Lizana “could not admit the [underlying] aggravated assault charge of the indictment and still be innocent of aggravated assault.”

The exact date of the offense is not an element of aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2).

Coats v. State · filed 2010-04-22(a)(2)

Here, the exact date of the crimes was not a material allegation of the indictment because the exact date was not an essential element with respect to any of the charged offenses. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (a) (2), 16-5-70 (d) (2), 16-11-37 (a).

An indictment alleging an assault with a knife as a deadly weapon sufficiently tracks subsection (a)(2) and informs the accused of the charge.

Belcher v. State · filed 2010-06-28(a)(2)

We discern, however, no defect in the aggravated assault counts of the indictment. Those counts alleged that Belcher “did make an assault upon the person of” the five-year-old boy and his mother “with a knife, a deadly weapon.” “[T]he language of the indictment tracks that of OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) and is not too vague to inform [Belcher] of the charges against him.”

An indictment can implicitly allege the weapon element of aggravated assault by describing a hatchet used in a way likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Reed v. State · filed 2012-04-24(a)(2)

The felony murder count here implicitly alleged the use of a hatchet as a weapon which, when used offensively, is likely to result in serious bodily injury.

An aggravated assault indictment sufficiently alleges the offense when it includes both an assault and an aggravating element.

Durden v. State · filed 2014-03-26(a)(2)

Here both aggravated assault counts included the assault element under OCGA § 16-5-20 and the aggravation element under OCGA § 16-5-21.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires proof of only one qualifying assaultive act; additional acts alleged in the indictment are surplusage and need not be proved.

Petro v. State · filed 2014-05-01(a)(2)

As we have explained, because the aggravated assault statute “requires proof of only one act, inclusion in the indictment of more than one such act is mere surplusage, which is unnecessary to constitute the offense, need not be proved, and may be disregarded.”

An aggravated assault indictment must allege a deadly weapon or dangerous object, but need not identify the exact weapon or object when the circumstances do not allow it.

State v. Wyatt · filed 2014-06-02(a)(2)

Furthermore, while an indictment under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) must allege that the assault was committed with a deadly weapon or an object that was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury, the indictment is not required to identify the exact weapon or object used if the circumstances of the case do not allow such specificity.

When aggravated assault with intent to rob is charged as pointing a gun at the victim, the State must prove that alleged manner of assault.

Ford-Calhoun v. State · filed 2014-07-03(a)(1)

Nevertheless, as explained above, “[n]o averment in an indictment can be rejected as surplusage which is descriptive either of the offense or of the manner in which it was committed.” ... The evidence at trial showed that Campbell did not see a weapon at all, and no testimony supported a finding that a gun was pointed at her. Based on this evidence and this Court’s previous holding in Calhoun, we reverse as to Count 5.

An aggravated assault indictment may sufficiently allege use of a deadly weapon or other object likely to cause serious bodily injury without expressly naming the object.

Smith v. the State · filed 2016-01-25(b)(2)

These allegations were sufficient to place Smith on notice that he was being charged with aggravated assault by assaulting the victim “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2).

Subsection (b)(4) covers assault by discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle toward a person without legal justification; an indictment charging that form of aggravated assault need not allege a deadly weapon.

Downey v. State · filed 2016-03-07(b)(4)

In the first place, there are different sorts of aggravated assault, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (1)-(4), and only one is described in statutory language that includes the term “deadly weapon.” See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2). The indictment in this case appears to have charged Downey with a different sort of aggravated assault, inasmuch as the allegations of the indictment closely track the words of OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (4), which provides that a person commits aggravated assault when he “assaults . . . [a] person or persons without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person or persons.”

An aggravated-assault indictment must allege the aggravating aspect of the offense but need not specify how the underlying simple assault was committed.

Issa v. the State · filed 2017-01-31(a)(2)

As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, “[i]t is not necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.”

Aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault on a public safety officer; an indictment alleging facts that establish aggravated assault survives a general demurrer.

Letron Bell v. State · filed 2021-03-16(c)(1)

Pretermitting whether the indictment sufficiently charged Bell with assaulting someone he knew was a public safety officer under OCGA § 16-5-21 (c) (1), Bell cannot admit to the allegations contained in the indictment and be innocent of committing the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Therefore, Count 4 of the indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer.

An indictment for aggravated assault must allege the aggravating element, but an allegation that the object actually caused serious bodily injury need not also allege that it was likely to do so.

Hinkson v. State · filed 2020-10-19(a)(2)

An indictment under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) must allege the “element that aggravates the crime above a simple assault.” Wyatt, 295 Ga. at 261. But that aggravating element may be that the assault was committed either “with a deadly weapon or an object that was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury.” Id. at 262 (emphasis supplied).

An aggravated assault indictment that alleges the statutory elements withstands a general demurrer even if it does not expressly state that the officer was inside the vehicle the defendant struck.

Holtzclaw v. State · filed 2023-05-19(a)(2)

The indictment was sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. First, the language in the indictment tracked the statutory language, and Holtzclaw concedes that the indictment pled the essential elements of the offense.

An indictment for aggravated assault need not specify how the simple assault was committed, but it must identify what made the assault aggravated.

Galvez v. State · filed 2025-02-24(a)(2)

Indeed, our Supreme Court has addressed this very argument and has explained that “[i]t is not necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.”

Section 16-5-21(b) permits an eight-year prison sentence for aggravated assault.

Hiers v. State · filed 1986-05-22(b)

In the case sub judice, the defendant’s sentence of 8 years to serve is within the statutory limits for aggravated assault. See § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault.

Thomas v. State · filed 1991-05-29(b)

Thomas entered a guilty plea to a charge of aggravated assault, for which the maximum sentence is 20 years imprisonment. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b). He was sentenced to 15 years, ten years of imprisonment and five years of probation.

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a maximum penalty of twenty years for one aggravated assault.

Wainwright v. State · filed 1993-05-06(b)

In Wainwright’s case, the maximum penalty for one aggravated assault was twenty years. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a ten-year prison sentence for aggravated assault.

Taylor v. State · filed 1998-05-21(b)

In his final enumeration of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to ten years imprisonment based upon the court’s allegedly inaccurate recollection that defendant pointed a gun at Green’s head. ... The sentence was within the statutory limits set by OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) classifies aggravated assault as a felony.

Johnson v. State · filed 1997-04-02(b)

As aggravated assault is a felony, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (b), there was evidence that Johnson committed aggravated assault with a handgun.

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a 20-year maximum sentence for aggravated assault.

Brown v. State · filed 2003-07-18(b)

Although neither the State nor the court used the word “void” to describe Brown’s original 25-year concurrent prison terms for his six counts of aggravated assault, it is clear from the entire record that the State asked for and the trial court entered a sentence modification based upon the fact that the “maximum time on an aggravated assault is 20 years.” See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a maximum confinement term of twenty years for aggravated assault.

King v. State · filed 2004-09-16(b)

Each part of this sentence was well within statutory limits: (1) maximum confinement for aggravated assault is twenty years (OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)); (2) maximum confinement for aggravated battery is twenty years (OCGA § 16-5-24 (b)); and (3) punishment for possession of firearm during certain crimes is five years confinement to run consecutively with the sentence for the underlying crime (OCGA § 16-11-106 (b)).

Section 16-5-21(b) permits imprisonment for one to twenty years for aggravated assault.

Price v. State · filed 2006-10-11(b)

All sentences given were within the statutory limit, with the exception of the sentence for the cruelty to children conviction. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b) (providing that a person convicted of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than twenty years); 16-7-1 (a) (providing that a person convicted of the offense of burglary shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than twenty years for the first such offense); 16-7-22 (b) (providing that a person convicted of criminal damage to property in the first degree shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one nor more than ten years).

Section 16-5-21(b) authorized a ten-year sentence for aggravated assault at the time of the offense.

Sanders v. State · filed 2006-12-11(b)

A ten-year sentence was authorized for aggravated assault.

Aggravated assaults under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are subject to equally serious punishment.

Brady v. State · filed 2008-03-31(b)

Both felony murder counts were predicated on the felony of aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21, differing only as to the subsection. See, as to Count 2, id. at (a) (1) (assault is aggravated when committed with “intent to murder, to rape, or to rob”); as to Count 3, id. at (a) (2) (assault is aggravated when committed with a deadly weapon or any object that “when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury”). Thus, both predicate felonies were subject to equally serious punishment. Id. at (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a maximum punishment of 20 years for aggravated assault.

Tatum v. State · filed 2009-04-17(b)

The maximum punishment for the offense of aggravated assault is 20 years, OCGA § 16-5-21 (b), and Tatum was only sentenced to 15 years with no provision for probation or suspension.

Section 16-5-21(b) prescribes one to twenty years of imprisonment for aggravated assault.

CUBIA v. State · filed 2009-07-07(b)

The possible sentence for the aggravated assault offense was between one and twenty years of imprisonment. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21(b) (2007) allowed a maximum sentence of 20 years for aggravated assault.

Shelton v. State · filed 2011-01-24(b)

The offenses of aggravated assault and kidnapping both carried maximum sentences of 20 years. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b) (2007); 16-5-40 (b) (1) (2007). Since Shelton’s sentence fell within the statutory range, it was not void.

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a sentence of up to 20 years for aggravated assault.

Gillespie v. State · filed 2011-08-17(b)

And given that the 20-year sentences imposed for the aggravated assaults were within the statutory range of punishment, ... we have no basis for disturbing them.

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Willis v. State · filed 2012-06-15(b)

Willis was sentenced as a recidivist, as follows: twenty years on each of the three counts of aggravated assault to run concurrently with each other; five years on each of the three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the sentence for aggravated assault; and fifteen years on each of the two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, to run concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentence for aggravated assault. ... Each of these sentences was within the statutory limits for the crimes charged, OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b), 16-11-106 (b), 16-11-133 (b),... and “a presumption arises when a defendant is sentenced within the statutory limits set by the legislature that such sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.”

Section 16-5-21(b) authorizes a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Andrews v. State · filed 2013-03-07(b)

Finally, the 20-year sentences imposed on the burglary, aggravated assault, and robbery counts were also authorized.

Section 16-5-21(b) authorizes a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Ellicott v. State · filed 2013-03-25(b)

Finally, Ellicott’s 20-year concurrent sentences on the remaining counts of aggravated battery and aggravated assault, as well as his 10-year concurrent sentence for false imprisonment were also authorized.

Section 16-5-21(j) makes living in the same household a factor that triggers a three-year mandatory minimum sentence, rather than an element of aggravated assault.

Durden v. State · filed 2013-06-03(j)

The “living in the same household” fact that triggers a three-year mandatory minimum sentence under OCGA § 16-5-21 (j) is therefore only a sentencing factor, not an essential element of the offense.

Section 16-5-21(b) allows a 15-year sentence for aggravated assault within its 20-year statutory range.

State v. King · filed 2013-11-14(b)

Indeed, the 15-year sentences imposed by the trial court were well within the 20-year statutory range of punishments for robbery and aggravated assault, see OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b) & 16-8-40 (b), and therefore the sentences are not void.

Subsection (b) permits a ten-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Reynaldo Garza, Jr. v. State · filed 2014-01-08(b)

Garza’s ten-year sentence fell within the range of permitted sentences for his convictions for violating the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act and for aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21 permits a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Wade v. State · filed 2014-04-01

Here, Wade does not contend that his sentence is greater than the law allows, and his 20-year sentence is within the statutory range. See OCGA § 16-5-21.

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Bruce Robbins, Sr. v. State · filed 2014-04-03(b)

Robbins’ ... remaining sentences are also within the maximums authorized by law. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (aggravated assault); OCGA § 16-5-24 (b) (aggravated battery); and OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime).

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a twenty-year prison sentence for aggravated assault.

Robbins v. State · filed 2014-04-03(b)

On January 5, 2007, the court imposed the following sentences: Count I, life imprisonment without parole; Count II, twenty years imprisonment, concurrent with Count I; Count III, twenty years imprisonment, concurrent with Counts I and II; and, Count V, five years imprisonment, consecutive to Count I. ... Robbins’ remaining sentences are also within the máximums authorized by law. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b) (aggravated assault); 16-5-24 (b) (aggravated battery); and 16-11-131 (b) (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime).

Section 16-5-21 permits a twenty-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Taylor v. the State · filed 2015-04-10

Taylor was sentenced to twenty years in confinement for the aggravated assault on Gary, followed by twenty years for the aggravated assault on Faulks (with five years in confinement and the remainder on probation), followed by an additional fifteen years of probation for the charge of participation in criminal street gang activity and another five years probation for the possession charge, to run consecutively to the other sentences. Each of these sentences was within the statutory range for the crimes of which Taylor was convicted. OCGA §§ 16-5-21; 16-15-4; and 16-11-106.

Former § 16-5-21(b) set a 20-year maximum prison sentence for aggravated assault.

Dorsey v. the State · filed 2015-04-10(b)

The maximum period of time for which Dorsey could have been sentenced if he had been convicted of the aggravated assault that was the underlying subject of one of the conspiracy counts is 20 years.

Section 16-5-21 permits a prison sentence of up to twenty years for aggravated assault.

Hickman v. State · filed 2018-08-27

However, each of Hickman’s sentences to do exceed the statutory maximum sentence. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a person convicted of aggravated assault may be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years); OCGA §§ 16-4-1 and 16-5-44.1 (a person convicted of attempt to commit hijacking of a motor vehicle may be punished by imprisonment of not more than twenty years).

Section 16-5-21 permits imprisonment for up to twenty years for aggravated assault.

Hickman v. State · filed 2018-09-26

However, none of Hickman’s sentences exceed the statutory maximum sentence. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a person convicted of aggravated assault may be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years); OCGA §§ 16-4-1 and 16-5-44.1 (a person convicted of attempt to commit hijacking of a motor vehicle may be punished by imprisonment of not more than twenty years).

Section 16-5-21(b) set a 20-year maximum sentence for aggravated assault.

Jarvis Barber v. State · filed 2019-05-08(b)

The maximum sentence for aggravated assault was 20 years.

Section 16-5-21 (b) set a 20-year maximum sentence for aggravated assault at the time of the offense.

BARBER v. the STATE. · filed 2019-05-08(b)

The maximum sentence for aggravated assault was 20 years. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21 sets the sentencing range for aggravated assault at one to 20 years.

Ford-Calhoun v. State · filed 2019-04-30

Here, Ford-Calhoun’s sentence for each conviction is within the statutory range. See OCGA § 16-8-41 (sentence for armed robbery is not less than ten nor more than twenty years); OCGA § 16-5-21 (sentence of aggravated assault is not less than one not more than 20 years); OCGA § 16-5-41 (sentence for false imprisonment is not less than one nor more than ten years).

Section 16-5-21(b) permits imprisonment for aggravated assault for one to 20 years.

Barkley v. State · filed 2019-04-30(b)

Here, Barkley’s 20-year sentence was within the statutory guidelines. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (imprisonment of not less than one nor more than 20 years); OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) (same).

A 20-year sentence for aggravated assault falls within the statutory limits of § 16-5-21(b).

Herndon v. State · filed 2019-08-21(b)

Additionally, 20-year terms on convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault fall within statutory limits. OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) (armed robbery); OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (aggravated assault).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a prison term of one to twenty years for aggravated assault.

Ferrell v. State · filed 2020-03-05(b)

Both counts allow for a minimum sentence of one year and up to a maximum sentence of twenty years confinement. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (“[A] person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.”). ... Because Ferrell’s sentence was within the statutory guidelines, this Court declines to review it.

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Mark Stephan Newsome, Jr. v. State · filed 2020-11-17(b)

Here, each sentence Newsome received is within the statutory limits: 20 years for aggravated assault, 15 years for armed robbery, 5 years for false imprisonment, 15 years for burglary, 10 years for theft by taking, and 5 years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

Section 16-5-21 permits a twenty-year sentence for family violence aggravated assault.

Maine v. State · filed 2021-07-23

Here, Maine was sentenced to twenty years for family violence aggravated assault and ten years for aggravated battery, and these sentences fall within the applicable statutory ranges. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21; 16-5-24.

Under the 2004 version of § 16-5-21(b), aggravated assault was punishable by one to 20 years’ imprisonment.

Jonah Sanders v. State · filed 2023-02-21(b)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2004) mandated a sentence of “imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years” for aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(b) permits a sentence of up to 20 years for aggravated assault.

Williams v. State · filed 2023-06-21(b)

A defendant convicted of aggravated assault may be sentenced to no more than 20 years. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b).

Section 16-5-21 permits a 20-year sentence for aggravated assault.

Reinert v. State · filed 2023-07-19

On November 5, 2010, the trial court entered final disposition in the case, sentencing Reinert to 20 years on the aggravated assault count, 20 years on the aggravated battery count, and 12 months on the battery count. ... The sentences imposed in this case are within the statutory ranges. See OCGA §§ 16-5-21; 16-5-24 (h); OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (f) (2).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a 20-year maximum prison term for aggravated assault under the circumstances addressed here, and a sentence modified to fall within that range is not void.

Clements v. State · filed 2025-03-04(b)

Because the trial court amended Appellant’s sentence for aggravated assault to 20 years, and Appellant’s sentence is now within the statutory range provided by OCGA § 16-5-21 (b), his sentence is not void.

Section 16-5-21(b) generally sets imprisonment for aggravated assault at one to 20 years.

Gaona v. State · filed 2025-11-14(b)

Here, Gaona’s sentences fell within the statutory range of punishment for each of the crimes at issue. See OCGA § 16-8-41 (b) (“A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 20 years.”); OCGA § 16-4-6 (a) (“ A person convicted of the offense of criminal attempt to commit a crime punishable by death or by life imprisonment shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than 30 years.”); OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (except under circumstances not present here, “a person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years”); OCGA § 16-11-106 (b) (possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony “shall be punished by confinement for a period of five years, such sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence which the person has received”).

Section 16-5-21(b) sets a prison term of one to 20 years for aggravated assault, and a 30-year sentence for two counts falls within the statutory range.

Bussey v. State · filed 2026-01-09(b)

Here, Bussey’s sentence fell within the statutory range of punishment for the two counts of aggravated assault of which he was convicted. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (“a person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years”).

Section 16-5-21(c) and (k) set a maximum prison term of 20 years for aggravated assault, including assaults between the family members and household members listed in subsection (k).

Davis v. State · filed 2016-04-25(c), (k)

Furthermore, the record shows that the sentences imposed did not exceed the statutory maximums. See OCGA § 16-5-40 (d) (4) (“A person convicted of the offense of kidnapping shall be punished by . . . [l]ife imprisonment or death if the person kidnapped received bodily injury.”); OCGA § 16-5-21 (c) (Except as otherwise provided, “a person convicted of the offense of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.”), (k) (“ If the offense of aggravated assault is committed between past or present spouses, persons who are parents of the same child, parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, foster parents and foster children, or other persons excluding siblings living or formerly living in the same household, the defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than three nor more than 20 years.”).

Intent to commit aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can transfer to a second person injured during the assault.

Fussell v. State · filed 1988-05-12

Construing the evidence in favor of the verdict, the jury was authorized to find that defendant intended to assault the first victim with a deadly weapon and that in the course of that assault the second victim was injured. Similarly, the jury was also authorized to find the original intent was transferred in law to the second victim as well.

For aggravated assault based on attempted violent injury, intent to harm an intended victim transfers to the actual victims.

Veal v. State · filed 2000-03-17

Construing the evidence most strongly for the State, Veal intentionally fired at Jones’ trailer, doing so without concern for the safety of its inhabitants and with the intent to kill a person or persons he believed to be in or near the trailer. His intent to harm his desired victims is transferred to the actual victims.

A person who intentionally shoots into a group to harm one person may be guilty of aggravated assault against each person in the group.

Robertson v. State · filed 2000-08-23(a)(2)

When a defendant intentionally shoots several times into a group of people intending to harm only one of them, a jury would be authorized to find him guilty of aggravated assault against each person in the group.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers intentionally firing a deadly weapon into an occupied home even when the shooter does not know a particular occupant is there and that occupant is unaware of the shooting.

Culler v. State · filed 2004-03-29(a)(2)

Accordingly, it is of no import that appellants were unaware that Hunter was in the home. It is obvious that by intentionally firing into the home, appellants were likely to seriously injure all the occupants, not just their primary target, Mills. Such harm was likely regardless of whether a particular occupant (such as Hunter), was aware of the shooting as it occurred. It follows that the trial court properly denied the motion for directed verdict on the charges of aggravated assault against Hunter.

Intent to assault one person transfers to an unintended victim harmed by the assault, even if the victim was unaware of the shooting.

In Re Ic · filed 2009-10-16(a)(2)

Accordingly, I.C.'s intent to assault any one of the family members is transferred to the victim who suffered the harm, regardless of whether he knew that the victim was in the line of fire or whether the victim was aware of the shooting as it occurred.

Intent to assault one person transfers to an unintended victim harmed by the assault, even if the assailant did not know the victim was in the line of fire.

In the Interest of I. C. · filed 2009-10-16(a)(2)

Accordingly, I. C.’s intent to assault any one of the family members is transferred to the victim who suffered the harm, regardless of whether he knew that the victim was in the line of fire or whether the victim was aware of the shooting as it occurred.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be proved when a defendant shoots at one person intending to injure him but strikes a nearby bystander instead.

Jordan v. State · filed 2013-06-13(a)(2)

Because a rational trier of fact could have found that Jordan shot at the bouncer intending to commit a violent injury against him and that the bullet struck the bystander instead, the evidence authorized Jordan’s conviction for aggravated assault against the bystander.

Aggravated assault does not merge with conspiracy to commit armed robbery when the conspiracy is complete upon an agreement and delivery of a gun, because proving aggravated assault requires different facts.

State v. McBride · filed 1991-02-18

Under the facts alleged in the indictment, the crime of conspiracy to commit armed robbery would be complete upon proof of an agreement and proof that Chris McBride gave the gun to Phillip to commit the crime. OCGA § 16-4-8. These are not the same facts necessary to prove the crime of aggravated assault, OCGA § 16-5-21, and therefore the crimes do not merge.

Aggravated assault does not merge with armed robbery when the robbery was complete before the assault occurred.

Glass v. State · filed 1991-04-09

Glass’ robberies were completed, both victims having been deprived of their property, when they were marched off for another criminal purpose. Then the aggravated assault on each victim occurred. The offenses did not merge as a matter of fact.

An aggravated-assault conviction does not merge with armed robbery when separate acts and facts establish the two offenses.

Rhodes v. State · filed 1996-04-30(a)(1), (2)

Whereas, the essential elements of aggravated assault are: an assault with intent to rape, by the use of a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1), (2). ... The evidence shows these were separate offenses and the same facts were not used to prove both. Consequently, the offenses did not merge.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into robbery when the same acts of force prove both offenses.

Johnson v. State · filed 2000-12-06(a)(1)

In the case sub judice, the evidence adduced to convict Johnson of aggravated assault with intent to rob — that he threw the victim on the floor, hit her, and strangled her with a bed sheet — is part and parcel of the evidence underlying his robbery conviction. The offenses merge as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge with armed robbery when the assault was complete before the weapon was used to rob.

Walker v. State · filed 2001-08-01(a)(2)

Accordingly, there are sufficient facts of record to support the aggravated assault/deadly weapon convictions independent of the armed robbery conviction. Since the aggravated assault/deadly weapon offenses were complete prior to the use of the gun to rob the store, one offense is not “used up” in proving the other.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into robbery by force when the same use of force proves both offenses.

Joncamlae v. State · filed 2002-09-18(a)(1)

As conceded by the State, the evidence of the force exerted by Zuniga so as to support the robbery by force conviction is the same evidence used to support the two aggravated assault with intent to rob convictions, and thus, they merge as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault is complete when a person points a gun at a victim and orders the victim to kneel; a later demand for property can support a separate armed robbery conviction.

Blocker v. State · filed 2004-02-25(a)(1), (2)

In this case, Lewis testified that Blocker used a very demanding and aggressive tone when he ordered Lewis to his knees and pointed the gun at his chest, which frightened Lewis. Thus, Blocker committed aggravated assault upon the completion of this act. ... The armed robbery followed when Blocker, continuing to point the gun at Lewis, demanded Lewis’s cell phone. ... As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by refusing to merge the offenses.

A conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can merge as a matter of fact into an armed robbery conviction, requiring the aggravated assault conviction and sentence to be vacated.

Doublette v. State · filed 2006-04-12(a)(2)

However, Doublette’s conviction and sentence on Count 4, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, merges as a matter of fact into his conviction and sentence on Count 3, armed robbery.

An aggravated assault count merges into an armed robbery count for sentencing when both are based on pointing a handgun at the victim to take money.

Fagan v. State · filed 2007-02-28

Count 1 of the indictment charged that Fagan committed armed robbery by taking cash from the manager by use of a handgun with the intent to commit a theft. Count 2 charged him with aggravated assault based upon allegations that he pointed a handgun, a deadly weapon, toward the manager and demanded money from her. We have reviewed the record and conclude that both counts were based upon the same conduct, i.e., pointing a handgun at the manager in order to commit a robbery. ... We find Count 2 merged into Count 1 as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault does not merge with armed robbery when separate facts prove the assault after the robbery is complete.

Garibay v. State · filed 2008-03-19

Garibay committed a separate aggravated assault when he struck the victim in the head with the gun. Id. As separate facts were used to prove each crime, the trial court did not err by failing to merge the offenses.

An aggravated assault conviction based on pointing a gun at a victim merges with an armed robbery conviction when both rest on the same conduct.

Reed v. State · filed 2008-09-03(a)(2)

Because the two convictions were based on the same conduct (pointing the gun at King with the intent to rob him), merger was required.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of at least one fact that robbery by intimidation does not.

Elamin v. State · filed 2008-09-18(a)(1)

Thus, a plain reading of the statutes shows that the offense of aggravated assault requires proof of at least one additional fact which the offense of robbery by intimidation does not.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge with a later armed robbery when separate acts complete the assault before the robbery begins.

Ransom v. State · filed 2009-06-16(a)(2)

Therefore, because the aggravated assault was completed before the armed robbery, the trial court did not err in failing to merge the two offenses.

An aggravated assault based on conduct after a completed armed robbery does not merge with the robbery for sentencing.

McKenzie v. State · filed 2010-03-01(a)(2)

Here, McKenzie’s convictions of armed robbery and aggravated assault did not merge because they did not involve the same conduct.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) merges with armed robbery when the same act of assault establishes both offenses.

Taylor v. State · filed 2010-06-11(a)(2)

Given that the State relied on the same act of assault to establish Taylor’s guilt of aggravated assault and armed robbery, the trial court should have merged those counts.

An aggravated assault conviction can rest on conduct with a knife when the indictment also alleges use of a shotgun; it need not merge with an armed robbery conviction based on separate shotgun conduct.

Johnson v. State · filed 2010-09-07(a)(2)

Johnson’s conviction on Count 1, armed robbery, can be sustained based upon his conduct with the shotgun. His conviction on Count 3, aggravated assault, on the other hand, can be sustained based upon his conduct with the knife.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when it requires proof of no fact beyond those required for armed robbery.

Long v. State · filed 2010-10-04(a)(2)

We therefore conclude that there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery and that Long’s aggravated assault convictions merged into his armed robbery convictions.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into armed robbery when the charged assault is part of the armed robbery.

Herrera v. State · filed 2010-10-13(a)(1)

The offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob, however, was included in the offense of armed robbery as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when the charged assault requires no fact beyond those needed to prove the armed robbery.

Murray v. State · filed 2011-01-26(a)(2)

Given these underlying facts, as described in the indictment and during the initial guilty plea hearing, the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charges do not require proof of a fact that the armed robbery charges do not likewise require, and Murray’s aggravated assault convictions unquestionably merged into his armed robbery convictions.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into armed robbery when it requires no fact beyond those needed to prove the armed robbery.

Daniels v. State · filed 2011-07-06(a)

Therefore, under Lucky, the aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when the assault requires no proof beyond the elements of the armed robbery charge.

Daniels v. State · filed 2011-07-06(a)(2)

Thus, there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, and Daniels’s aggravated assault conviction merges into his armed robbery conviction.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into robbery when the assault is established by facts contained within the robbery offense.

Washington v. State · filed 2011-07-13(a)(1)

But the offense of aggravated assault in this case was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the robbery. ... It follows that the offense of aggravated assault merged into the offense of robbery.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into attempted armed robbery when, as charged, it requires no fact beyond those needed to prove the attempted robbery.

Garland v. State · filed 2011-07-14(a)(2)

Applying this test, we find that the aggravated assault count should have been merged into the attempted armed robbery count.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when both convictions rest on using the same handgun to intimidate the victim during the robbery.

Hall v. State · filed 2011-10-27(a)(2)

Instead, what dictates merger is the fact that both crimes for which Hall was convicted were predicated upon the same conduct—namely, Hall’s use of the handgun to overpower and intimidate Paul for the purpose of robbing the victims of their belongings.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge with armed robbery when the robbery is complete before the assault occurs.

Brown v. State · filed 2012-02-17(a)(2)

This testimony shows that the armed robbery and aggravated assault were separate events, the armed robbery being complete before the commission of the aggravated assault. For this reason, the court below did not err when it refused to merge these convictions.

Aggravated assault by pointing a handgun does not merge with a later armed robbery when the assault was complete before the robbery began.

Thompson v. State · filed 2012-02-29(a)(2)

Thompson committed the aggravated assault against White as alleged in Count 3 when he first confronted him in the garage with his family and pointed a handgun at him. ... Because the aggravated assault was complete prior to the armed robbery, the trial court did not err by entering separate convictions and sentences on these two counts.

Aggravated assault with a deadly or offensive weapon merges into armed robbery for sentencing when both crimes are part of the same act or transaction.

Crowley v. State · filed 2012-05-02(a)(2)

We conclude, therefore, that Crowley’s convictions for armed robbery and aggravated assault should have been merged for sentencing.

An aggravated-assault conviction may merge into an armed-robbery conviction, requiring the assault conviction to be vacated.

Williams v. State · filed 2012-07-12

As we held in the case of Williams’s co-defendant, however, Williams’s conviction for aggravated assault against Paul should have merged into his armed-robbery conviction.

An aggravated assault based on pushing a victim during an attempted armed robbery merges with that attempt when both arise from the same act or transaction.

Mullis v. State · filed 2013-05-06(a)(1)

Under these circumstances, the aggravated assault arose out of the same “act or transaction” as the criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and therefore, the convictions ... merged.

Aggravated assault with a handgun merges into armed robbery when both offenses arise from the same uninterrupted transaction.

Haynes v. State · filed 2013-05-29(a)(2)

Similar to Hall, the aggravated assault and armed robbery in the present case were predicated on the same conduct – the gunman’s use of the handgun to overpower and intimidate the husband for the purpose of robbing the family of their belongings. Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, the aggravated assault conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction, Haynes’s conviction and sentence for aggravated assault must be vacated, and the case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when the charged assault requires no fact beyond those needed to prove the robbery.

Newsome v. State · filed 2013-11-13(a)(2)

Applying this test, we find that the aggravated assault should have been merged with the armed robbery count.

An aggravated assault arising from the same act or transaction as an armed robbery merges with the armed robbery as a matter of fact.

Broyard v. State · filed 2014-02-21(a)

Because the aggravated assault arose out of the same act or transaction as the armed robbery, it was included in and merged with the armed robbery as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when both offenses arise from the same act or transaction.

Dean v. State · filed 2014-02-27

Accordingly, the aggravated assault was included in the armed robbery, Dean’s conviction and sentence for aggravated assault are vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges with armed robbery when the offenses arise from the same act or continuous transaction against the same victims.

Polanco v. State · filed 2014-07-01(a)

Finally, these actions arose out of the same act or continuous transaction as the armed robbery against the same victims and therefore merged as a matter of fact.

Section 16-5-21 treats the victim’s age as a penalty enhancement, not a separate element that prevents aggravated assault from merging with attempted armed robbery based on the same act against the same victim.

Culbreath v. State · filed 2014-07-10

The age-related provisions of aggravated assault are penalty enhancements and they do not create a separate offense. ... Accordingly, the victim’s age is not a separate element of the crime, and the convictions must merge where, as here, the two crimes occurred against the same victim as part of the same act or transaction.

An aggravated assault conviction merges into an armed robbery conviction when the offenses are part of the same act or transaction.

Mathis v. the State · filed 2014-07-31(a)(2)

The crimes were part of the same act or transaction. Consequently, the aggravated assault conviction merged into the armed robbery conviction as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob merges into armed robbery when the same conduct proves both offenses and the assault requires no additional fact.

Curtis v. the State · filed 2015-03-03(b)(1)

Because the aggravated assault with intent to rob was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to prove armed robbery, the offenses merge.

Aggravated assault convictions for putting a gun in a victim’s mouth and pointing a gun while demanding money merge into the armed robbery conviction arising from the same acts.

Potts v. the State · filed 2015-04-10

We further find, however, that the trial court erred in failing to merge two of Potts’s aggravated assault convictions (Counts 5 and 11) with his conviction for armed robbery (Count 4).

A conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into an armed robbery conviction.

Mack v. the State · filed 2016-10-12(b)(2)

A conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into an armed robbery conviction.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges with attempted armed robbery when both convictions rest on the same use of the weapon to overpower and intimidate the victim.

Morris v. the State · filed 2017-02-21(b)(2)

In this case, Morris’s conviction for aggravated assault should have merged with his conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery because those acts were predicated upon the same act or transaction, i.e., Morris’s use of a handgun to overpower and intimidate Ball for the purpose of attempting to rob him of his belongings.

An aggravated assault that begins after an attempted armed robbery ends does not merge into the attempted armed robbery conviction.

CUYLER v. the STATE. · filed 2018-02-12(a)(2)

Under these particular circumstances, the final shots fired at Gilbert constituted an aggravated assault that began after the attempted armed robbery ended, and the trial court did not err in failing to merge those convictions.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when both charges arise from the same act or transaction.

Chambers v. Hall, Warden · filed 2019-03-04(a)(2)

Both of those charges arose from the same conduct — threatening Mantz at gunpoint to make him open the cash register so the assailants could take the cash and checks inside. Accordingly, the aggravated assault count as to Mantz merged into Chambers’s conviction for armed robbery of Mantz.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when the convictions arise from the same assault.

Irving v. State · filed 2019-09-23(b)(2)

So all of Irving’s convictions for aggravated assault should have merged with his conviction for armed robbery.

An aggravated assault conviction merges into a conviction for attempted armed robbery for sentencing under the facts of this case.

Rice v. State · filed 2021-04-05

It also charged the co-defendants, individually and as parties to a crime, with the offense of aggravated assault against Perry in violation of OCGA § 16-5-21. ... Because we agree that the convictions should have merged for sentencing, we vacate Rice’s conviction and sentence for aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with a firearm merges with armed robbery when both offenses are part of the same continuous transaction.

Tucker v. State · filed 2022-02-04(a)(2)

In contrast, the aggravated assault and armed robbery of K. A. were both part of the same continuous transaction that began when one intruder pointed a gun at her, ordered her downstairs, pulled a necklace from her neck, and demanded money, jewelry, and the location of a safe. The trial court therefore should have merged Jarvis’s convictions for Counts 7 and 14.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when both arise from the same act or transaction.

Davenport v. Ward, Comr · filed 2022-04-19(a)(2)

We have explained that “because there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, that form of aggravated assault will merge into armed robbery if the crimes are part of the same act or transaction.” ... Accordingly, Count 3 merged into Davenport’s conviction for armed robbery.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into armed robbery when the same assault supports both charges.

Torres-Toledo v. State · filed 2023-01-25(a)(2)

Because the same assault was used to support both charges, the trial court should have merged Torres-Toledo’s convictions.

Aggravated assault charges based on a deadly weapon and intent to rape do not merge when they arise from separate acts.

Brooks v. State · filed 1991-04-08(a)(1), (a)(2)

Appellant’s contention that the two aggravated assault charges merged as a matter of fact is also without merit. ... The subsequent aggravated assault with intent to rape occurred in the bedroom when appellant bound the victim and made threatening statements concerning rape while the knife was on the dresser near his hand.

Aggravated assault counts under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) merge for sentencing when the same facts prove both offenses.

Hill v. State · filed 2002-08-20(a)(1), (a)(2)

The state concedes that the two aggravated assault charges should have merged for sentencing, as ... the same facts proved the two offenses. We agree.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon do not merge when separate acts complete the offenses at different times.

Robinson v. State · filed 2005-02-23(a)(1), (a)(2)

Here, the jury could have determined that Robinson completed the crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob prior to the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on the fact that Robinson revealed to Rice that he intended to steal his car prior to revealing his gun and entering into a gunfight. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the two counts of aggravated assault did not merge.

Aggravated assault counts for pointing a gun at a victim and then shooting the victim merge when the acts occur in quick succession without an ensuing interval.

MacK v. State · filed 2007-01-04(a)(2)

Accordingly, the court erred in not merging the second aggravated assault count of pointing the gun at the girlfriend into the first count of shooting the girlfriend.

Aggravated assaults with a knife and a gun do not merge when the first assault is complete before the second occurs.

Jones v. State · filed 2007-04-16(a)

Jones first argues that the two aggravated assault counts (OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a)) should merge. This argument is without merit. One aggravated assault count was for aggravated assault with a knife (Count 4 of the indictment); the other was for aggravated assault with a gun (Count 5). The evidence shows that Jones first grabbed the victim and threatened her with a knife. At this point, the crime of aggravated assault with a knife was complete. Only after he had taken her upstairs to her bedroom did he threaten her with the gun. At that point, he committed aggravated assault with a gun.

Aggravated assault counts based on a single act merge for sentencing when they charge different ways of committing the offense under § 16-5-21.

Thomas v. State · filed 2011-07-01(a)(1), (a)(2)

Although Count 3 alleges that the assault was done with a deadly weapon and Count 7 alleges it was done with the intent to commit murder, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (a) (2), these counts were clearly based on a single act since the razor or knife used in that assault broke while it was pressed against Davis’s neck. Thus these counts merely charged the same act of aggravated assault being committed in two of the multiple ways set out in OCGA § 16-5-21.