Statute Annotations › Georgia › Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1

Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1

Professional malpractice affidavit: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Georgia
Case notes
367
Cited in passing
232
Citing cases indexed
668
Case dates
1988–2026
Screened through
2026-05-22
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

599 citing cases reviewed of 668 in the citation index: 367 interpreted the section (annotated below), 232 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-22 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1997-07-01 The 1997 amendment limited covered professionals to licensed occupations listed in the section and ended the former practice of adding an entirely omitted affidavit by ordinary amendment; Mug a Bug Pest Control v. Vester holds the amendment applies prospectively. source Source
  • 1997-07-01 The amendment also allowed a plaintiff who filed a defective expert affidavit to cure its defect within thirty days after service of a motion identifying the defect; Harris v. Murray identifies the amendment's effective date and Fisher v. Gala applies the cure rule. source Source
  • 2005-02-16 The 2005 tort-reform act removed the former 45-day grace period and good-cause extensions for late expert affidavits, and required medical-malpractice affiants to satisfy the expert-qualification standard in former § 24-9-67.1; Scott v. Martin identifies the filing change and Spacht v. Troyer applies the qualification requirement. source Source
  • 2006 SB 465 made editorial corrections to the Georgia Code, including this section; the legislature's summary identifies no substantive change to the affidavit rule. Source
  • 2007-07-01 HB 221 restored a 45-day grace period when limitations will expire or there is a good-faith basis to think so within ten days, but requires a contemporaneous attorney affidavit and bars the exception if counsel was retained more than 90 days before expiration; it does not restore good-cause extensions of that period. source Source
  • 2026-05-11 HB 185 expanded subsection (g)(8) from dietitians to licensed dietitians and licensed nutritionists; no earlier note states a contrary rule about nutritionists. Source

Expert affidavit: filing and amendment

Law changed since The 1997 amendment ended ordinary amendment to supply an entirely missing expert affidavit; the current section allows only its stated grace-period and renewal exceptions.

Section 9-11-9.1(a) generally requires a professional-malpractice complaint to be filed with a competent expert affidavit, but the affidavit may be supplied by amendment when the circumstances do not warrant treating the complaint as a nullity.

St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Nease · filed 1988-10-17(a)

While there is no question that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) contemplates that the required affidavit will normally be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, it does not expressly provide that a complaint filed without the affidavit will be considered a nullity; nor would the purpose of the Code section necessarily be defeated by allowing the affidavit to be supplied by amendment, since the complaint would remain subject to dismissal unless and until the affidavit were supplied. Certainly, the appellants in the present case cannot claim to have been prejudiced by the appellees' failure to file the affidavit contemporaneously with their complaint, since they (the appellants) had already been served with the affidavit in connection with a previous suit on the same cause of action. On the other hand, the appellees, like the plaintiffs in Glaser v. Meck , would be unable to pursue a renewal action in the event their present complaint were dismissed. See OCGA § 9-11-41 (a). Applying the policy expressed in OCGA § 9-11-8 (f) that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice," we consequently conclude that the trial court did not err either in allowing the affidavit to be provided by amendment or in denying the appellants' motion to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit to set forth at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for the claim.

Waldroup v. Greene County Hospital Authority · filed 1992-04-24(a)

We hold that statement is sufficient to meet the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) of setting forth at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for the claim.
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Section 9-11-9.1 is satisfied when a hospital-liability complaint is filed with affidavits describing the negligence of the professionals whose acts support the claim; subsection (e) applies only when no affidavit was filed contemporaneously and does not bar an amendment clarifying the hospital’s liability.

Thornton v. WARE COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY · filed 1992-05-05(e)

We conclude that appellants complied with the requirements of § 9-11-9.1 by filing with their complaint affidavits which set forth the negligence of the professionals whose acts form the basis for appellants’ claim against the hospital. The hospital, citing OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e), incorrectly characterizes appellants’ amendment to their complaint as an attempt to circumvent the filing requirements of § 9-11-9.1. We disagree. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) addresses only the attempt to amend a complaint when the plaintiff fails to file an affidavit contemporaneously with the complaint. Appellants’ complaint as originally filed included the requisite affidavits setting forth the negligent acts of Dr. Whigham and the anesthesia team. However, the complaint was unartfully drafted in that it alleged that the defendants, collectively, failed to exercise the required degree of care. The amendment merely clarified the specific basis for the hospital’s liability. We find no merit to the hospital’s argument and hold that the trial court erred in dismissing appellant’s complaint.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a malpractice plaintiff to file a valid expert affidavit identifying at least one specific negligent act or omission and its factual basis as to each professional defendant, but the affidavit need not attach the records supporting its factual synopsis.

HCA Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Hampshire · filed 1992-10-14(a)

We hold that the trial court misconstrued OCGA § 9-11-9.1. In accordance with the legislative purpose of reducing the number of frivolous malpractice suits, we construe OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as requiring a plaintiff in a malpractice suit to submit a valid affidavit by an expert competent to testify in court against each professional defendant named in the complaint, in which is set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist as to each professional defendant (jointly, where appropriate; otherwise, severally) and the factual basis for the claim against each defendant. ... Therefore, under the correct interpretation of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, the filing of an expert's affidavit that satisfies the statute's requirements as to one defendant does not necessarily mean that those requirements have been likewise satisfied as to other defendants.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit to specifically state at least one negligent act or omission, and it does not permit an amendment when the corrected affidavit was not prepared and in the plaintiff's possession before the original affidavit was filed.

Edwards v. Vanstrom · filed 1992-10-28(a), (e)

An affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 which does not state specifically at least one negligent act or omission is fatally defective. ... Consequently, it did not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), and the trial court did not err by so finding. ... Moreover, Edwards’ attempt to amend the affidavit to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was not authorized as it is apparent from the date of this second affidavit that it was not prepared and in Edwards’ possession prior to the date the first affidavit was filed. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e); ... Accordingly, the failure to file this affidavit was not a mistake, and no amendment was authorized.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional-malpractice expert affidavit to specifically identify at least one claimed negligent act or omission and the factual basis for that claim.

Druckman v. Ethridge · filed 1991-01-10(a)

“What OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires is that the expert affidavit set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission ‘claimed to exist’ and the factual basis for each such claim.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 is satisfied when an expert affidavit identifies a specified alternative design and states that failing to use it or another appropriate alternative constituted malpractice, thereby setting forth a negligent act or omission.

Samuelson v. Lord, Aeck & Sergeant, Inc. · filed 1992-09-08

Likewise, in this case the opinion that another specified design “might” have been used and that the failure to use such a design or another appropriate alternative constituted malpractice is sufficient to set forth a negligent act or omission as required by the affidavit statute.
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Law changed since The 2007 amendment permits the 45-day grace period on a good-faith belief that limitations will expire within ten days, but requires a timely attorney affidavit and counsel-retention within 90 days of expiration.

The 45-day filing delay in subsection (b) is unavailable when the applicable limitations period will not expire within ten days after the complaint is filed.

Legum v. Crouch · filed 1993-03-08(b)

In view of the above, we conclude that appellants are correct in their claim that appellees were not entitled to invoke the 45-day delay provisions of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), as the applicable statute of limitation would not expire as to any of appellees’ averred claims, within ten days of the date of filing of the complaint.
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Law changed since The 2005 amendment ended good-cause extensions of the expert-affidavit filing period; the 2007 amendment restored a limited 45-day grace period without restoring those extensions.

Section 9-11-9.1(b) permits a good-cause extension of the 45-day period to file the expert affidavit only when the extension is requested before that period expires.

Dixon v. Barnes · filed 1994-07-14(b)

Accordingly, we conclude the language of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) authorizing the trial court to apply a single “for good cause” standard to “extend” the applicable 45-day period refers to requests for extensions prior to the expiration of the applicable period.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit to identify at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; for an alleged omission, the failure to find affirmative evidence that notice was provided can supply factual support.

Allen v. Belinfante · filed 1995-06-26

The affidavit of dentist Sommercorn stated that Dr. Belinfante failed to exercise the minimum degree of care and skill by failing in a timely manner to provide Mrs. Allen with notice of the serious health risks and known problems associated with the interpositional implants. This was based on Sommercorn’s examination of Mrs. Allen’s medical records and her finding no indication that Dr. Belinfante had ever provided Allen with such notice, including an FDA public health alert. Since the gist of the alleged tort was omission, the failure to find affirmative evidence of notice provided sufficient factual support for the alleged negligent act.
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Subsection (b) permits a trial court, when justice so requires, to consider a facsimile of an expert affidavit filed during the statutory grace period; the original need not already be in the plaintiff's physical possession, and no showing of mistake is required.

Roberts v. Faust · filed 1995-07-11(b)

Although OCGA § 9-11-9.1 contemplates that an original expert's affidavit should be filed, when justice so requires, trial courts may consider facsimiles of affidavits that are available during the statutory grace period found in OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b). Waldroup v. Greene County Hosp. Auth., 204 Ga.App. 256, 258(2), 419 S.E.2d 36 (1992); see Reid v. Brazil, 193 Ga.App. 1, 2(2), 387 S.E.2d 1 (1989). Contrary to defendant's assertion otherwise, an original affidavit does not have to be in a plaintiff's physical possession in order for it to be considered "available" under our holding in Waldroup. Nor do we find in Waldroup or OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b) any requirement that a plaintiff be able to demonstrate that the failure to file an original affidavit during the statutory grace period resulted from some mistake.
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Section 9-11-9.1 is satisfied when the supporting expert affidavit establishes relevant expertise overlapping the defendant physician’s expertise in the procedure and post-operative care at issue.

Stubbs v. Ray · filed 1995-08-28

Bussey’s affidavit establishes that he is a board-certified general surgeon who, from his training, experience and practice, is familiar with the standard of care, skill and diligence exercised by physicians and surgeons in the post angiography and angioplasty management of patients, particularly with the symptoms of clotting and blockage of arteries. Because, as noted above, these qualifications overlap with those of a radiologist performing that same surgical procedure, and because the affidavit in all other ways satisfies the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, we find that summary judgment based on the insufficiency of the affidavit was improperly granted.
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Law changed since The 2007 amendment permits the 45-day grace period on a good-faith belief that limitations will expire within ten days, but requires a timely attorney affidavit and counsel-retention within 90 days of expiration.

Subsection (b) gives an automatic 45-day extension to file the required expert affidavit when the limitations period will expire within ten days of filing and the plaintiff alleges that time constraints prevented preparing the affidavit.

Works v. Aupont · filed 1995-12-05(a), (b)

We reverse because OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b) unambiguously provides for an automatic 45-day extension for filing the requisite affidavit "to any case in which the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared." OCGA § 9-11-9.1(b). ... If these two conditions are met, it does not matter whether the trial court believes or disbelieves a plaintiff's allegation that "time constraints" prevented compliance with the contemporaneous filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a).
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice affidavit from an expert competent to testify that specifically identifies at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, and the affidavit is construed liberally in the plaintiff's favor.

Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Associates · filed 1997-03-07

And given the above interpretation, it is clear that the affidavit meets the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 because it was provided by “an expert competent to testify” and “set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis [therefor].”
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Section 9-11-9.1 allows a plaintiff to amend an expert affidavit filed with a malpractice complaint to cure an alleged defect, including insufficient factual allegations of negligent acts, subject to the statute's timing rules.

Porquez v. Washington · filed 1997-11-17(d)

Regardless of the need for amendment to withstand the motions to dismiss, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that Washington's § 9-11-9.1 affidavit could be amended to present additional evidence of deviation from the standard of care. As this Court determined in Hewett, when the expert affidavit is initially filed with the complaint, a plaintiff is allowed to supplement the affidavit if its sufficiency is disputed. Even though Hewett dealt with a challenge to the expert's competency, its analysis is not limited to a contest over competency; the reasoning is extant when the challenge is to the sufficiency of the expert's statements regarding negligent acts.
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For a medical-malpractice pleading, subsection (a) requires the supporting professional expert affidavit to come from someone knowledgeable about the allegedly breached standard of care.

Sinkfield v. Oh · filed 1997-12-05(a)

If Dr. Proctor, as a toxicologist and pharmacologist, had been offered as an expert witness against the two medical doctors for purposes of satisfying the strictures of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a), Dr. Proctor would not have been a competent witness. ... It is well settled that a professional expert affidavit for pleading purposes under OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) in a medical malpractice case must be from a person knowledgeable about the applicable standard of care that has allegedly been breached.
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Section 9-11-9.1 is procedural, its 1997 amendments apply only prospectively, and under the 1989 version a plaintiff may amend to add an omitted expert affidavit only if the affidavit was available before the complaint was filed and the omission resulted from mistake.

Mug a Bug Pest Control v. Vester · filed 1999-01-11(e)

This Court has held that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is a procedural law. ... Based on the express language of the act, we agree with the Court of Appeals of Georgia that the 1997 amendments to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 apply only prospectively. ... Interpreting OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as originally enacted, we held that a plaintiff’s failure to attach the required affidavit to a complaint in a professional malpractice action is an amendable defect when the plaintiff had obtained the affidavit but merely neglected to file it with the complaint. ... The 1989 version of § 9-11-9.1, which applies in this action, allowed a plaintiff to file an expert affidavit by amendment if two conditions were met. A court must find that (1) the plaintiff had the affidavit prior to filing the complaint and (2) the plaintiff failed to file it as a result of mistake.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a professional-malpractice plaintiff to file the expert affidavit with the complaint and does not permit an amendment to cure its absence, except for the statutory 45-day supplementation.

Fales v. Jacobs · filed 2003-10-01(a), (b)

However, nothing in the current version of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 otherwise permits a party to add the necessary expert affidavit by amendment.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1(b) gives a plaintiff an automatic 45-day period to file the required expert affidavit when the limitations period will expire within ten days of filing and the plaintiff alleges that time constraints prevented preparing the affidavit.

Knutsen v. Atlanta Women's Specialists Obstetrics & Gynecology · filed 2003-10-24(b)

Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), an expert’s affidavit must be filed with any complaint alleging professional malpractice. This contemporaneous filing requirement is not applicable, and a plaintiff has an automatic right to file the affidavit within 45 days of filing the complaint, however, in the following circumstances: (1) when the limitation period will expire within ten days of the date of filing the complaint; and (2) when the plaintiff alleges that because of the time constraints an expert affidavit could not be prepared. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires a professional-negligence plaintiff to file an expert affidavit with the complaint; its 45-day extension applies only when the complaint is filed within ten days of the limitations period's expiration, and subsection (e) does not permit amendment to cure a failure to file the affidavit.

Fisher v. Coffee Regional Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2004-06-10(a), (b), and (e)

The trial court correctly concluded that the statutes of limitation had expired well in advance of the filing of the renewal action, and that therefore, the extension provided by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), which applies only when the complaint is filed within ten days of the expiration of the limitations period, was not available in this case. ... But the 1997 amendment to subsection (e) eliminated the language allowing an amendment to cure the failure to file an OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit. ... Thus, the cases that Fisher cites in his brief, which were decided under the prior version of the statute, are not controlling. ... Nothing in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 permits Fisher to amend his complaint to file the required affidavit, and as stated above, he was not entitled to the 45-day extension granted by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b).
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional negligence against a licensed medical doctor to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, and the affidavit cannot be added later by amendment; after a merits dismissal, the statute's renewal provision is unavailable.

Bardo v. Liss · filed 2005-04-06(a), (e), (f)

When a complaint is filed for damages alleging professional negligence against a licensed medical doctor, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requires that, contemporaneously with the complaint, an expert affidavit be filed setting forth at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for the claims. ... Where a party fails to file the required affidavit with the original complaint, the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 do not permit the party to add the affidavit by amendment. ... If a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required by this Code section and the defendant raises the failure to file such an affidavit by motion to dismiss filed contemporaneously with its initial responsive pleading, such complaint shall not be subject to the renewal provisions of Code Section 9-2-61 after the expiration of the applicable period of limitation, unless a court determines that the plaintiff had the requisite affidavit within the time required by this Code section and the failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake.
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Section 9-11-9.1's expert-affidavit pleading requirement is distinct from the evidentiary requirements for opposing summary judgment; satisfying the former does not necessarily satisfy the latter.

Rudd v. Paden · filed 2006-04-28

An affidavit which satisfies the pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 will not necessarily satisfy the evidentiary requirements for summary judgment set forth in OCGA § 9-11-56.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit to specifically identify at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for it.

Allen v. Family Medical Center, P.C. · filed 2007-09-12(a)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), an expert’s affidavit must set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for each such act or omission.
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Section 9-11-9.1(d) gives a plaintiff 30 days to cure a defective malpractice affidavit after the defendant moves to dismiss, with the trial court able to extend that period in its discretion.

Thomas v. Gastroenterology Associates of Gainesville, P.C. · filed 2005-05-20(d)

The defendants brought their motions to dismiss on this basis, and yet Thomas failed to cure the defect within the 30-day period allowed her by statute. Thus we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted the motions to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1 permits a plaintiff who timely files an initial expert affidavit to amend or substitute it to add further allegations of professional negligence; subsection (e) bars amendment only when the plaintiff filed no affidavit.

Bhansali v. Moncada · filed 2005-08-04(a), (b), and (e)

For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Dr. Bhansali’s motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit with a medical-malpractice complaint, but when the original complaint alleges only ordinary negligence, the requirement is satisfied by filing the affidavit contemporaneously with an amended complaint that adds a professional-negligence claim.

Jensen v. Engler · filed 2012-10-11(a)

Thus, the pleadings do not reflect that Engler’s amended complaint was an improper attempt to cure any original failure to file an expert affidavit or otherwise avoid the contemporaneous filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). And because Engler filed the required expert affidavit contemporaneously with the filing of her professional negligence claim, she satisfied the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit supporting a malpractice claim, but the affidavit need not establish the claim’s evidentiary merits to withstand dismissal.

Bowen v. Adams · filed 1992-02-05(a)

Appellant cannot be required to submit an expert affidavit which unequivocally demonstrates the evidentiary merits of her claim unless and until appellee moves for summary judgment and submits evidence demonstrating that appellant’s claim lacks merit. It follows that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1 permits a plaintiff who filed an expert affidavit with the complaint to amend it in response to challenges to its sufficiency.

Washington v. Georgia Baptist Medical Center · filed 1996-11-13(e)

Although the ruling in Hewett allowed additional evidence to be presented regarding the expert’s competency, we do not see the holding as being limited to that particular challenge to the affidavit’s sufficiency, and find that when an affidavit has been filed with the complaint, it can be amended to respond to challenges to its sufficiency.
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Law changed since The 2005 tort-reform act removed the former 45-day grace period and good-cause extensions for late expert affidavits.

An expert affidavit filed after the initial 45-day period is timely only if the trial court grants an extension; filing a motion to extend does not itself extend the deadline.

Lowery v. Atlanta Heart Associates, P.C. · filed 2004-03-19(b)

Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), an affidavit may be timely filed after expiration of the ... initial 45-day period only upon a ruling by the trial court extending the 45-day period “on motion, after hearing and for good cause.”
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An expert affidavit alleging disclosure of unspecified confidential information can satisfy § 9-11-9.1.

Cagle v. Davis · filed 1999-02-17

Her assertion that the amount is excessive because her complaint should have been dismissed earlier for insufficiency of the expert affidavit is not only disingenuous but incorrect. See Bala v. Powers Ferry Psychological Assoc., 225 Ga. App. 843, 845 (491 SE2d 380) (1997) (assertion that defendant disclosed unspecified confidential information meets requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1).
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Expert affidavit required in professional malpractice actions

Section 9-11-9.1 applies to professional malpractice claims brought as breach-of-contract actions for failure to meet the professional standard of care.

RICHMOND LEASING COMPANY, INC. v. Cooper, Cooper, Maioriello & Stalnaker · filed 1993-02-22

However, “ ‘OCGA § 9-11-9.1 “applies to any action for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance with the professional obligation of care.” ’ [Cit.] Therefore, the trial court did not err by applying the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to [appellant’s claim].”
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff in any professional-malpractice damages action to file with the complaint a competent expert affidavit identifying at least one specific negligent act or omission and its factual basis; the requirement is not limited to medical malpractice.

Padgett v. Crawford · filed 1988-12-05(a)

Held: OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) provides that "[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim." Padgett contends that this Code section applies only to medical malpractice actions, but this court has already decided that issue otherwise. Barr v. Johnson, 189 Ga. App. 136 (375 SE2d 51) (1988). In this case, following the appellee's motion to dismiss Padgett's complaint for having filed no affidavit, the trial court gave Padgett 10 days in which to file such. Padgett submitted an affidavit within that time, but the affidavit neither states the qualifications of the affiant nor provides the affiant's opinion as to the reasonableness or skill of the defendant attorney's conduct. The trial court properly found this affidavit to be inadequate and dismissed the action.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a malpractice plaintiff to file with the complaint a competent expert's affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, but does not require the affidavit to state the standard of care or explain the deviation.

0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore · filed 1989-02-13(a)

Nothing in the affidavit requirements in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 demands that the standard of care be set forth, that a plaintiff’s expert state he is familiar with the appropriate standard of'care, or that the affiant detail the manner in which the defendant deviated from that standard. Thus the plain language of the statute does not support appellees’ arguments. ... We construe OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as establishing an “exception to the general liberality of pleading permitted under [the Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-1 et seq.],” ... by requiring when a malpractice suit is instituted that along with the complaint an affidavit be filed by a competent expert witness setting forth a single negligent act allegedly committed by the defendant. The purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed, not to require a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case entitling him to recover and capable of withstanding a motion for summary judgment before the defendant need file his answer.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a legal-malpractice complaint to be accompanied by a supporting expert affidavit.

Frazier v. Merritt · filed 1989-03-08(a)

The appellant, acting pro se, sued the appellee attorney for alleged legal malpractice arising from his representation of the appellant on certain criminal charges. Contemporaneously with the filing of his answer, the appellee moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not accompanied by the supporting affidavit of an expert as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). ... 2. The trial court did not err in granting the appellee’s motion to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit in any professional-malpractice action based on negligent acts or omissions, whether sounding in tort or breach of contract for failure to meet professional care obligations.

Housing Authority of Savannah v. Gilpin+ bazemore/architects & Planners, Inc. · filed 1989-04-05

“[OCGA § 9-11-9.1] applies to any action for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance with the professional obligation of care.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an affidavit providing a substantial basis for a professional-malpractice action, but incorporating prior discovery can satisfy the statute's purpose and permit amendment when the affidavit was not filed with a renewed complaint.

HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF FULTON COUNTY v. McDaniel · filed 1989-07-06

By incorporating the discovery from the original action in the complaint for the renewed action, the McDaniels complied with the spirit, if not the letter, of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. The purpose of the Code requirement is to ensure a substantial basis for actions against professionals. Clearly, such a basis existed in the present case, and the trial court properly allowed the amendment.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff asserting a medical malpractice claim to attach an expert's affidavit to the complaint.

Freeman v. Van Dyke · filed 1989-09-25

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant’s complaint because of his failure to attach the expert’s affidavit mandated by OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit with a complaint alleging professional malpractice, including a third-party complaint seeking damages, and applies to architects and other professionals, not just medical-malpractice actions.

Housing Auth. of Savannah v. Greene · filed 1989-09-28(a)

Consequently, we hold that, under the plain language of the statute, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 applies to “any action for damages alleging professional malpractice” on the part of an architect or other professional. ... We hold that it does. We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in this case that the statute is applicable here, since the third-party complaint does allege professional malpractice, and asserts a claim for damages. ... Under the statute, where a third-party complaint asserts a damage claim and alleges professional malpractice, it is only necessary that there be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint the affidavit of an expert stating that, in his expert opinion, such facts, if true, would constitute professional malpractice.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to submit an expert affidavit with the complaint, and that requirement is procedural rather than substantive.

Precision Planning, Inc. v. Wall · filed 1989-10-31

In the instant case, the OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requirement of submitting an expert's affidavit along with the complaint did not affect the substantive right of action for professional malpractice; it alters neither the standard of care to be applied nor the measure of recovery. The statute merely prescribes a procedure for enforcing that right, evidently with the purpose of preventing frivolous or unsustainable actions. Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying the statute prospectively only, and in denying the appellant's motions to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a medical-malpractice complaint, but the requirement does not apply when the alleged liability turns on no medical question.

Brown v. Durden · filed 1990-03-13

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in concluding that her claim was predicated solely on medical malpractice and in therefore granting summary judgment to the appellees due to her failure to submit an expert’s affidavit with her complaint in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. We agree that this ruling was erroneous. ... In the present case, the appellees’ alleged liability does not turn on a “medical question,” and a jury would be capable of determining without the help of expert evidence whether Dr. Durden’s medical assistant exercised due care in leaving the decedent unattended and unrestrained on the examining table after he had been brought to the office suffering from dizziness and nausea following an apparent seizure. We accordingly hold that the trial court erred in granting the appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit when a litigant alleges harm from an architect’s negligent professional services, and subsection (e) makes dismissal appropriate when the affidavit was not attached and the omission was not a mistake.

McLendon & Cox v. Roberts · filed 1990-10-15(a), (e)

That clearly categorizes appellee’s action against appellant as one for “damages alleging professional malpractice” within the ambit of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) rather than one for the creation or maintenance of a nuisance under OCGA § 41-1-4. ... We thus find that the claims against appellant constituted an action for professional malpractice to which OCGA § 9-11-9.1 applies. ... OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) applies. Thus, appellee’s claim was subject to dismissal and his failure to comply with the statute was not an amendable defect.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional malpractice claims, but not for claims alleging only simple negligence.

Creel v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance · filed 1990-11-02

We now affirm the trial court's judgment, concluding that, even if Creel is a professional within the meaning of § 9-11-9.1, Cotton States was not required to file an affidavit under § 9-11-9.1 because Cotton States' action against Creel is not a professional malpractice action but a simple negligence action. ... This is an allegation of simple negligence. Accordingly, Cotton States was not required to file an expert affidavit pursuant to § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice plaintiff to file with the complaint an expert affidavit identifying at least one specific negligent act or omission.

Hill-Everett v. Jones · filed 1990-12-04

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requires the plaintiff to file with the complaint an expert affidavit setting forth at least one specific act of negligence or omission which constitutes the claim of alleged negligence amounting to malpractice. Plaintiff failed to submit such an affidavit in the case sub judice. We need look no further than the face of the documents submitted by plaintiff to reach this conclusion because neither document bears a jurat. In the absence of valid jurats, the documents cannot be deemed affidavits.
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Law changed since The 1997 amendment limits the affidavit requirement to listed Georgia-licensed professions; this earlier rule about an unlisted occupation no longer governs new actions.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit in any action alleging professional malpractice, including a claim against a radiological physicist for negligent professional services.

Gillis v. Goodgame · filed 1991-03-15

Yet the procedural rule applies "In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice...." Plaintiff's complaint against Goodgame, by its nature and its language, alleges such. Summary judgment to the radiological physicist was authorized.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit filed with a professional-malpractice complaint and permits amendment to cure its absence only when the plaintiff had the affidavit available before filing and omitted it by mistake.

Smith v. North Fulton Medical Center · filed 1991-06-28(a), (e)

"In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim." OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). ... "[I]f a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required by this Code section contemporaneously with a complaint alleging professional malpractice and the defendant raises the failure to file such an affidavit in its initial responsive pleading, such complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim and cannot be cured by amendment pursuant to Code Section 9-11-15 unless a court determines that the plaintiff had the requisite affidavit available prior to filing the complaint and the failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake." OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). ... Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing to sustain any claim of professional malpractice based on the untimely affidavit included with the amended complaint.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional-malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit from an expert competent to testify in the relevant field that specifically identifies at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; an affidavit from a surgeon that neither establishes competence in nursing nor states that the nursing staff breached the professional standard is insufficient.

Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Milton · filed 1988-12-05(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) provides that “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” ... Dr. Scaljon’s affidavit is insufficient to meet the requirements of this Code section in that it fails to show that the affiant is “an expert competent to testify” in the field of nursing. The affidavit is also deficient in that it does not indicate that defendant’s nursing staff breached the requisite degree of care and skill required of the nursing profession generally by deviating from the treating physician’s post operative instructions.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice by a licensed pharmacist to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, and noncompliance is a complete defense to claims against the pharmacist and the employer, even when the negligence is clear and palpable.

Sparks v. Kroger Co. · filed 1991-06-24(a)

Where a vendor of drugs or medicines is a licensed pharmacist and is sued on the basis of allegations that he negligently dispensed the wrong drug in filling a medical prescription, the claim against him clearly is for professional malpractice; and we find nothing in OCGA § 51-1-25 which would obviate the need for compliance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 in such a case. ... Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded that the appellant’s failure to comply with § 9-11-9.1 constituted a complete defense to the claim against the company as well as the claims against the pharmacists.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a defendant's professional-malpractice counterclaim to include an expert affidavit, and amendment to cure its omission is allowed only under subsection (e); OCGA § 9-11-13 (f) cannot circumvent that limit.

Hardman v. Knight · filed 1992-02-24(a), (e)

Although we have discovered no direct controlling precedent on this issue, our review of existing case law and the statutes persuades us to agree with appellant. We first conclude that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does apply to the assertion of a counterclaim by a defendant. ... Counterclaims, as well, are encompassed by the quoted definition of an "action" and are similarly subject to the affidavit requirement. ... OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e) provides the only method by which the failure to file an affidavit with a complaint can be cured by amendment. ... Having concluded that counterclaims are subject to the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, we determine that amendments to pleadings to assert counterclaims with respect to the filing of the expert affidavit should be subject to the limitations of paragraph (e) of the statute. ... However, the trial court erred in circumventing those limitations by relying on OCGA § 9-11-13 (f) to allow the amendment to the answer to assert the new counterclaim.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit in an action alleging professional malpractice against a covered professional, including a harbor pilot when the alleged negligence involves professional judgment or skill, and the requirement is constitutionally valid.

Lutz v. Foran · filed 1993-03-08(a)

We hold that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against the inclusion of more than one subject matter in a bill or a matter in the body different from the title. ... A harbor pilot is a member of a profession listed in § 14-7-2. Therefore, Lutz must file an affidavit with his complaint if the allegations involve professional malpractice.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a professional-malpractice complaint, makes omission of the affidavit a nonamendable defect except when caused by mistake, and prevents renewal after the limitations period unless the omission resulted from mistake.

Lyberger v. Robinson · filed 1993-03-16(e) and (f)

“Amended paragraphs (e) and (f) of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 provide that the failure to attach an expert affidavit in a professional malpractice case renders the complaint subject to dismissal and is a defect which cannot be amended except where the failure to attach the ... [affidavit] ‘was the result of a mistake,’ and unless such failure was ‘the result of a mistake,’ such complaint shall not be subject to the renewal provisions of OCGA § 9-2-61 after the applicable period of limitation.” ... “Therefore, appellants were not entitled to renew the complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitation.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit in professional malpractice actions, but it does not apply when negligence or breach can be proven without expert testimony about a customary professional procedure.

Flowers v. Memorial Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1991-02-21

“[T]he purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is to prevent ‘frivolous or unsuitable actions,’ i.e., professional malpractice actions in which the plaintiff cannot prove by expert opinion that a professional standard or practice has been violated. But where . . . the plaintiff can prove negligence or breach without proof of a customary procedure and violation of it, the case is not a professional malpractice case and OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not apply to require an ‘expert’s affidavit.’ It is not the intent of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to cause dismissal of a complaint alleging negligence or breach of a duty merely because the defendant asserts he is a ‘professional.’ ”
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In a professional-malpractice case, failure to attach an expert affidavit makes the complaint subject to dismissal and generally prevents renewal under § 9-2-61, unless the omission resulted from a mistake after obtaining the affidavit.

Foskey v. Foster · filed 1991-03-01(e), (f)

Amended paragraphs (e) and (f) of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 provide that the failure to attach an expert affidavit in a professional malpractice case renders the complaint subject to dismissal and is a defect which cannot be amended except where the failure to attach the complaint “was the result of a mistake,” and unless such failure was “the result of a mistake,” such complaint shall not be subject to the renewal provisions of OCGA § 9-2-61 after the applicable period of limitation.
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Section 9-11-9.1 does not require an expert affidavit when alleged negligence can be proved without expert evidence about a customary professional standard, including in clear and palpable cases.

Roebuck v. Smith · filed 1992-04-15

“[W]here . . . the plaintiff can prove negligence or breach without proof of a customary procedure and violation of it, the case is not a professional malpractice case and OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not apply to require an ‘expert’s affidavit.’ ”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice complaint’s supporting affidavit to identify at least one specific negligent act and its factual basis, and permits a later affidavit only under the statute’s limited time-constraint or mistake exceptions.

Wright v. Crawford Long Hospital of Emory University · filed 1992-09-08(a), (b), and (e)

Contrary to appellant’s contentions, the deposition did not meet the requirement of “set [ting] forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim,” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), as Dr. Benitez did not identify any negligent act committed by appellees and was unable even to speculate as to the source of the wire. ... The statute permits amendment of a complaint to add the required affidavit only in limited circumstances: (1) if the statute of limitation will expire within ten days and the plaintiff alleges that an expert affidavit could not be prepared because of time constraints (OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b)); or ... (2) if the court determines that the plaintiff had the requisite affidavit available before the complaint was filed and the failure to file “was the result of a mistake” (id. at (e)).
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a professional-malpractice complaint; its ten-day limitations exception applies to tort claims but not contract claims.

Coleman v. Hicks · filed 1993-06-17(a), (b), (e)

2. “[I]f a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required by [OCGA § 9-11-9.1] contemporaneously with a complaint alleging professional malpractice and the defendant raises the failure to file such an affidavit in its initial responsive pleading, such complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim and cannot be cured by amendment pursuant to Code Section 9-11-15 unless a court determines that the plaintiff had the requisite affidavit available prior to filing the complaint and the failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake.” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e). In the case sub judice, plaintiff failed to file an expert affidavit with her complaint, relying upon OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), which provides: “The contemporaneous filing requirement of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not apply to any case in which the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared.” Although the exception set forth in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) was applicable to plaintiff’s tort claims, it was not applicable to plaintiff’s contract claims. Thus, even though plaintiff’s contract claims were not time barred, they were dismissed properly for failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint; licensed physical therapists are professionals, and no affidavit is needed for negligence not involving professional judgment and skill.

Hodo v. General Hospitals of Humana, Inc. · filed 1993-11-03(a)

Physical therapists must be licensed pursuant to OCGA § 43-33-11, and thus are “professionals” within the intendment of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. ... Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), in any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff must file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert setting forth at least one negligent act and the factual basis for such. ... Where the alleged negligence does not involve the exercise of professional judgment and skill, the cause of action is in simple negligence, and no expert’s affidavit is necessary. ... As such, Hodo’s action against Humana alleged professional malpractice, and her failure to file an expert’s affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 required dismissal of her complaint.
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Section 9-11-9.1 does not require an expert affidavit for a negligence or breach claim that can be proved without establishing a customary professional procedure and its violation.

Razete v. Preferred Research, Inc. · filed 1990-09-25

But where, as in this case, the plaintiff can prove negligence or breach without proof of a customary procedure and violation of it, the case is not a professional malpractice case and OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not apply to require an “expert’s affidavit.”
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit when negligence and causation cannot be established without expert testimony, and the affidavit must identify at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis.

Candler General Hospital, Inc. v. Lamb · filed 1991-05-15(a)

The purpose of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) is to prevent “frivolous or unsuitable actions,” i.e., actions where plaintiff sets out to prove negligence but is unable to do so without expert evidence; if plaintiff cannot establish negligence and causation without expert testimony, the case is generally a professional malpractice action within the meaning of § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a legal-malpractice plaintiff to file with the complaint an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act constituting the alleged breach and the factual basis for each negligence claim.

Tante v. Herring · filed 1994-10-31(a)

Of course, in an action for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must file with the complaint an expert’s affidavit setting forth at least one negligent act constituting the alleged breach of duty and the factual basis for each claim of negligence. ... Although the Herrings did attach an expert’s affidavit to their complaint, the expert did not set forth a negligent act which would constitute the basis for a claim of legal malpractice.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging the negligent performance of professional services to file an expert affidavit specifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis.

Raley v. Terminix International Co. · filed 1994-11-22

“OCGA § 9-11-9.1 ‘applies to any action for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance with the professional obligation of care.’ [Cit.]”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims based on engineering services involved in building and designing roads.

Department of Transportation v. Taunton · filed 1995-03-31

... “The process of building and designing roads requires engineering services which have been described as the performance of professional services within the purview of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. [Cits.]” ... Under the circumstances, we cannot say that “it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would succeed despite any state of facts which could be proved in support of the defense.” ... The trial court erred in striking this defense.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, including when hospital liability rests on employees' exercise of professional skill and judgment.

Robinson v. Medical Center of Cent. Georgia · filed 1995-05-19(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) pertinently provides that "[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert." ... An expert's affidavit is not necessary where professional skill and judgment are not involved. ... However, such an affidavit is required in an action against a hospital where, as here, liability is predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior and "the averment of acts or omissions requiring the exercise of professional skill and judgment by agents or employees who themselves are recognized as `professionals' under OCGA § 14-7-2...." ... Inasmuch as Robinson's claim of negligence goes to the propriety of a professional decision rather than to the efficacy of conduct in the carrying out of a decision previously made, we conclude that his complaint sounded in professional malpractice alone. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Central Georgia based upon Robinson's failure to attach an expert's affidavit to his complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a).
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice by a licensed exterminator to file an expert affidavit with the complaint.

Fender v. Adams Exterminators, Inc. · filed 1995-06-29(f)

The complaint in this case alleging the negligent application of a pesticide by a corporation required to be licensed by the State Structural Pest Control Commission is a professional malpractice action which requires the contemporaneous filing of an expert affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1. ... OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requires that an expert affidavit be filed with a complaint stating an "action for damages alleging professional malpractice."
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a valid affidavit to be filed with a complaint asserting a professional malpractice claim.

Rogers v. Coronet Insurance · filed 1992-10-29(a)

Additionally, the trial court correctly concluded that as to the professional malpractice claims, a valid affidavit was required to be filed with the complaint in accordance with the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional-malpractice complaint to include an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; under subsection (e), failure to file the affidavit permits dismissal for failure to state a claim.

ABE Engineering, Inc. v. Griffin, Cochran & Marshall · filed 1994-01-19(a), (e)

A complaint alleging professional malpractice must include an expert affidavit setting forth at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for each such claim. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). ... In the instant case, plaintiff’s complaint set forth a cause of action for legal malpractice; however, it failed to file an expert affidavit with the complaint and, as such, its complaint was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims, but not claims unrelated to malpractice; at the initial pleading stage, a synopsis of the salient facts supporting the expert's opinion suffices and the affidavit must link the professional defendant to the alleged negligent act or omission.

Howard v. City of Columbus · filed 1995-12-05(a)

The affidavit requirement in this subsection does not apply to claims unrelated to malpractice. Parker v. Brinson, 209 Ga.App. 19, 432 S.E.2d 626. Nor is OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) applicable to all wrongful acts or omissions allegedly committed by professionals. "[T]he relevant inquiry is whether `a particular claim is grounded upon "professional malpractice," that is, an act or omission caused by a "professional" which constitutes malpractice.' [ Dozier v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 206 Ga.App. 62, 63(3), 64 (424 SE2d 632).]" Adams v. Coweta County, 208 Ga. App. 334, 335(2), 430 S.E.2d 599. ... These claims do not relate to the exercise of professional judgment and therefore do not require backing of an expert's affidavit. See Adams v. Coweta County, 208 Ga.App. 334, 335(2), 336, 430 S.E.2d 599, supra. ... All that was required to satisfy the initial pleading requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) was a synopsis of the salient facts upon which Dr. Bussey based his opinion. HCA Health Svcs. of Ga. v. Hampshire, 206 Ga.App. 108, 112(4)(b), 424 S.E.2d 293.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit to be attached to a professional-negligence complaint, and failure to do so supports summary judgment on that claim.

Moore v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1996-03-06

As Pope provided no expert testimony regarding professional negligence (and failed to attach an expert affidavit to his complaint as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1), the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for a counterclaim alleging professional negligence in legal services, including when setoff or recoupment is pleaded as a counterclaim rather than a defense.

French Quarter, Inc. v. Peterson Young Self & Asselin · filed 1996-03-12

The trial court’s order, which explains the role reversal and consequent burden reversal which attends counterclaims, is totally correct. The affidavit was clearly required. ... Defendants argue their counterclaim merely reincorporates their defenses of setoff and recoupment, and that as “defenses” rather than “claims” they are not subject to the statutory affidavit requirement. “Contrary to defendant’s contention, setoff and recoupment are counterclaims and not defenses.” ... In the instant case it is even more obvious, as the allegations and prayer for relief were presented by defendants in an express counterclaim and not merely in their answer.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a contemporaneous expert affidavit for a professional-negligence complaint, and the defense of a missing affidavit is waived unless raised in the initial responsive pleading.

Seely v. Loyd H. Johnson Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1996-03-15(e)

The third-party complaints against R & R Plumbing alleging that plumbing work was negligently done are professional negligence actions which required the contemporaneous filing of an expert affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1. ... Under Chapter 14 of OCGA Title 43, the plumbing services at issue in the third-party complaints may only be performed pursuant to a license issued by the Division of Master Plumbers and Journeyman Plumbers of the State Construction Industry Licensing Board. OCGA §§ 43-14-3; 43-14-8. This Board is a "state examining board" pursuant to OCGA § 43-1-1. Accordingly, it is clear under Gillis, supra, that the third-party complaints against R & R Plumbing are professional negligence actions within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. Subsection (e) of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 provides in pertinent part that "if a plaintiff fails to file an affidavit as required by this Code section contemporaneously with a complaint alleging professional malpractice and the defendant raises the failure to file such an affidavit in its initial responsive pleading, such complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim...." (Emphasis supplied.) Expert affidavits were not filed with the third-party complaints as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1. Rather than raising the lack of expert affidavits when it filed answers to the complaints as its initial responsive pleadings, R & R Plumbing first raised the failure to file expert affidavits in its subsequently filed motion for summary judgment. Since the plain language of the statute requires that the defense be raised in the initial responsive pleading, the failure to do so was a waiver of the defense.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff asserting medical malpractice to attach a professional affidavit to the complaint.

Van Alstine v. Merritt · filed 1996-09-12(a)

Merritt was entitled to summary judgment on Van Alstine’s medical malpractice claim because Van Alstine failed to attach a professional affidavit to his complaint as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a).
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for claims based on a professional's failure to meet the standards of the profession, but not for every claim involving a lawyer, including fraud or breach of contract claims that do not implicate professional standards of care.

Peacock v. Beall · filed 1996-11-05

The complaint in the case sub judice does not appear to call into question professional standards of care applicable to attorneys. On the contrary, the complaint raises questions relating to the existence of a legal services contract between Peacock and attorney Beall, whether attorney Beall breached the terms of any such contract, and whether attorney Beall duped Peacock into purchasing $1,000 worth of advice in exchange for a false promise to represent Peacock in a future action for $1,500. Accordingly, since the allegations in the complaint are subject to a construction which could support Peacock’s fraud and breach of contract claims, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for noncompliance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a malpractice complaint to be filed with an expert affidavit identifying at least one claimed negligent act or omission and its factual basis, but the expert may assume the complaint’s factual allegations are true and need not rely on personal knowledge.

St. Joseph Hospital, Augusta, Georgia, Inc. v. Black · filed 1997-02-04(a)

An expert affidavit filed with a complaint pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 need not be based upon the affiant’s actual personal knowledge. To the contrary, the affiant may base his expert opinion upon an assumption that the factual allegations of the complaint are true . . . just as he could base his expert opinion at trial upon an assumption of the truth of the evidence adduced to support those allegations.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Dozier v. Clayton County Hosp. Auth., 206 Ga. App. 62, 68 (4) (424 SE2d 632) (1992). “ ‘ “What OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires is that the expert affidavit set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission ‘claimed to exist’ and the factual basis for each such claim. ... It is unnecessary for the . . . plaintiff to . . . prove the alleged facts. . . . (W)here a . . .complaint asserts a damage claim and alleges professional malpractice, it is only necessary that there be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint the affidavit of an expert stating that, in his expert opinion, such facts, if true, would constitute professional malpractice. . . .” ’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Id.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff in any professional-malpractice action, whether sounding in tort or breach of contract, to file with the complaint an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, with no clear-and-pal­pable-negligence exception.

Barr v. Johnson · filed 1988-09-14

This statute applies to any action for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance with the professional obligation of care.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit for claims alleging professional malpractice based on a professional's negligent act or omission and requiring proof of professional standards; it does not require an affidavit for fraud claims based on ordinary standards of conduct.

Hodge v. Jennings Mill, Ltd. · filed 1994-11-02(a)

Not every claim which calls into question the conduct of one who happens to be a lawyer is a professional malpractice claim requiring expert testimony or an OCGA § 9-11-9.1 affidavit. It is only where the claim is based upon the failure of the professional to meet the requisite standards of the subject profession that the necessity to establish such standards and the violation thereof by expert testimony for the guidance of the jury arises.
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Section 9-11-9.1 imposes an initial pleading requirement in a malpractice action, and an affidavit is sufficient when it alleges the defendant’s negligent acts and supplies a substantial basis for the action, even if it would not satisfy summary-judgment evidentiary standards.

Vitner v. Miller · filed 1996-11-12

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on a plaintiff in a malpractice action. “Accordingly, an expert affidavit which would be insufficient to satisfy the evidentiary standards of OCGA § 9-11-56 may nevertheless be sufficient to satisfy the pleading standards of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. [Git.]”
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit for a professional-malpractice claim based on negligent professional services, including an attorney’s negligent legal advice or handling of an estate.

Crawford v. Johnson · filed 1997-07-11(a)

Accordingly, to the extent Crawford alleges that Johnson acted negligently, the trial court properly dismissed the claim for failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims, but not for claims alleging only ordinary negligence in repairing and maintaining a roadway.

Drawdy v. Department of Transportation · filed 1997-09-02

Therefore, since Drawdy is alleging claims only for ordinary negligence in repair and maintenance of the roadway, an affidavit of an expert pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is not necessary.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, and failure to do so requires dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Holloway v. Northside Hospital · filed 1998-01-28(a), (e)

“In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). Further, failure to file the required affidavit requires dismissal because of failure to state a claim. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e).
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Law changed since The 2007 amendment permits the 45-day grace period on a good-faith belief that limitations will expire within ten days, but requires a timely attorney affidavit and counsel-retention within 90 days of expiration.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file a competent expert affidavit with the complaint when proving the applicable professional standard and its breach requires expert knowledge; the only timing exception allows supplementation when the limitations period will expire within ten days and the plaintiff alleges an affidavit could not be prepared.

Epps v. Gwinnett County · filed 1998-03-06(a), (b)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) provides that “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” ... In order to prove that the medical care provided her husband was inadequate, plaintiff must rely on the knowledge of experts with regard to what the applicable standard of care is, and whether that standard was breached. ... Consequently, based on the authority set forth above, she was required to file an expert affidavit with her complaint.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff in a professional-malpractice action to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, and failure to do so requires dismissal with prejudice.

Mendoza v. Pennington · filed 1999-06-22(a)

In any action for professional malpractice, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires that the plaintiff file with the complaint an expert affidavit setting forth a negligent act or omission. Failure to do so results in a dismissal with prejudice. ... If the claim is not for professional malpractice but for simple negligence, then no affidavit is required, even though the action may be against a professional.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff bringing a professional malpractice claim to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, and dismissal is mandated when the defendant raises the missing-affidavit defense.

Denson v. Maloy · filed 1999-08-17

Denson’s claim of professional malpractice was properly dismissed for the additional reason that he failed to file an expert affidavit with the complaint. OCGA § 9-11-9.1. As Maloy raised this defense in its answer, dismissal of the claim was mandated.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims based on negligent acts or omissions, including contractual claims alleging failure to perform professional services with the required professional care.

Centrust Mortgage Corp. v. Smith & Jenkins, P. C. · filed 1996-02-28

Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that these claims were, in essence, claims of professional malpractice, and were subject to dismissal in light of CenTrust’s failure to file an expert affidavit as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit specifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; a tort claim that professional medical treatment was inadequate falls within that requirement.

Bradford v. Rossi · filed 2001-04-20(a)

Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” ... As such, the claim requires that the plaintiff file an expert affidavit.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff in a professional-malpractice damages action to file with the complaint an expert affidavit identifying at least one claimed negligent act or omission and its factual basis, and an unaccompanied complaint is subject to dismissal.

Merck v. Saint Joseph's Hospital of Atlanta, Inc. · filed 2001-09-21(a)

Furthermore, we find that the trial court correctly dismissed Merck’s malpractice claims based on her failure to file an expert affidavit with the complaint. OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) provides that “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” A complaint that is not accompanied by the required affidavit is subject to dismissal.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit for claims alleging professional negligence or malpractice, but not for claims based on a professional's intentional acts.

Johnson v. Rodier · filed 2000-02-10(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) provides that, in an action for damages alleging professional malpractice, the plaintiff must file with the complaint an expert’s affidavit setting out “specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.”
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit when a professional-malpractice claim challenges a medical professional’s exercise of professional judgment, even if the claim is pleaded as battery.

King v. Dodge County Hospital Authority · filed 2005-06-27(a)

In summary, even if King’s consent was withdrawn, the issue facing Kehayes, i.e., whether she should abandon her attempts at starting the IV line, was one that required her to apply her professional experience, expertise, and judgment to resolve. Lacking medical expertise, the factfinder could not resolve this issue without the assistance of expert medical opinion, as required by OCGA§ 9-11-9.1. ... Because King failed to file an expert affidavit, the trial court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit in a professional-malpractice action involving a medical question, including a claim that a medical provider’s judgment caused a patient’s death.

Hardwick v. Atkins · filed 2006-03-07(a)

This provision applies in any cause of action that involves a medical question. ... Since this case involves the questioning of medical judgment, the trial court properly dismissed it based upon Hardwick’s failure to attach an expert affidavit as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, while claims based on simple negligence do not require one; diagnosis and treatment decisions are professional malpractice.

James v. HOSPITAL AUTHORITY OF BAINBRIDGE · filed 2006-03-23(a)

Under OCGA§ 9-11-9.1 (a), “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice,... the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” ... By negative implication, an expert affidavit is not required for claims averred in a complaint that are based on acts or omissions constituting simple negligence rather than professional malpractice. ... Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that despite James’ argument that his complaint can be construed as setting forth claims of simple negligence, all of his claims are plainly for professional medical malpractice. ... In light of the specific factual assertions made in James’ complaint, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the expert affidavit requirement imposed by OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file a competent expert affidavit with the complaint, and failure to do so is fatal to the professional-negligence claims.

Gaddis v. Chatsworth Health Care Center, Inc. · filed 2006-11-29(a)

While appellants’ complaint sets forth unfortunate facts and circumstances, appellants’ failure to file an expert affidavit contemporaneously with their complaint as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 was fatal to their professional negligence claims.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for actions alleging professional negligence, but not for claims of intentional misconduct such as fraud or misrepresentation against a professional.

Murrah v. Fender · filed 2006-11-30

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 mandates that any action alleging professional malpractice be accompanied by an expert affidavit setting forth "at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim." Our Supreme Court has limited the application of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to actions for professional negligence. Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 334-336(3), 519 S.E.2d 672 (1999). Thus, we have repeatedly held that complaints asserting claims for intentional misconduct against a professional, including fraud and misrepresentation, do not require the inclusion of an expert affidavit. See Howell v. Shumans, 281 Ga.App. 459, 460, 636 S.E.2d 182 (2006); Shuler, 280 Ga.App. at 741(1)(b), 634 S.E.2d 786; Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., 264 Ga.App. 24, 26-27, 589 S.E.2d 840 (2003); Johnson v. Rodier, 242 Ga.App. 496, 497(1), 529 S.E.2d 442 (2000). See also Bowling v. Foster, 254 Ga.App. 374, 380-381(1)(b), 562 S.E.2d 776 (2002); Boggs v. Bosley Med. Institute, 228 Ga.App. 598, 600(1)(a), 492 S.E.2d 264 (1997). Fender clearly alleges intentional misconduct by Murrah. We are bound by the directive of the Supreme Court and our prior precedent to hold that his claims fall outside of the purview of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for claims involving a licensed professional’s compliance with professional standards, including a nurse’s professional medication administration, but not nonprofessional administrative documentation.

Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Center, Inc. · filed 2007-02-16(a)

Therefore, we view a nurse’s administration of medication as within the scope of nursing duties involving professional skill and judgment. For example, the timing and urgency of administering the medicine is necessarily at issue in this case, and resolving such questions necessarily involves professional judgment. Accordingly, because the administration of medication involves the professional skill and judgment of a nurse, and nurses are licensed professionals to whom OCGA § 9-11-9.1 explicitly applies, we hold that the children’s claim for failing to properly administer Stanford’s medication is a claim of professional negligence. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed this claim based on the children’s failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1. ... Likewise, here the children can maintain this claim to the extent that they can show Alvista failed to properly perform the nonprofessional, administrative aspects of documenting Stanford’s complaints, and to the extent that such failure resulted in a regulatory violation leading to Stanford’s injuries as alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing this claim at this stage.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice by a listed professional, including a professional engineer, to file an expert affidavit with the complaint.

Dockens v. Runkle Consulting, Inc. · filed 2007-05-25(a), (d)(21)

Subsection (d) (21) of the statute lists “Professional engineers” as a profession to which this pleading requirement applies. ... Accordingly, Dockens’ complaint shows on its face that it involves an allegation of professional negligence that required an expert affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) and (d) (21). ... Under the circumstances, we find the trial court properly granted Runkle summary judgment on Dockens’ professional negligence claim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a medical-malpractice affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission for each professional whose conduct is challenged.

Thomas v. Medical Center of Central Georgia · filed 2007-05-29(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires an affidavit setting forth at least one act of negligence as to each professional whose conduct is challenged as negligent.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit when a claim challenges compliance with a professional standard of conduct, but not when the alleged negligence involves nonprofessional administrative work without professional judgment or skill.

Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc. · filed 2006-05-03(a)

Thus, “[a] § 9-11-9.1 affidavit is required when the issue is a defendant’s compliance with a professional standard of conduct, but when professional judgment and skill are not involved, a § 9-11-9.1 affidavit is not required.” (Citation omitted.)
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for actions alleging professional malpractice, but not for claims whose resolution does not require determining compliance with professional standards, including simple negligence and intentional tort claims based on conduct outside the professional judgment at issue.

Burke v. Paul · filed 2008-02-29(a)

Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1, any action alleging professional malpractice must be accompanied by an expert affidavit setting forth “at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). ... Thus, the resolution of the Pauls’ claims requires a determination of whether Burke complied with the language of the stipulation, that is, whether he acted within the consent the Pauls granted for access to their automobile. Their claims do not demand a determination of whether Burke acted in compliance with the standard of conduct applicable to professional engineers. Accordingly, the Pauls do not allege a claim of professional malpractice. They assert claims of simple negligence and intentional tort, and the trial court properly denied Burke’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to attach an expert affidavit.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit in an action alleging professional malpractice when the alleged negligence involves professional judgment or skill, including inappropriate medication prescribing.

Liu v. Boyd · filed 2008-10-23(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires that any action alleging professional malpractice be accompanied by an expert affidavit setting forth “at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” “Thus, a § 9-11-9.1 affidavit is required when the issue is a defendant’s compliance with a professional standard of conduct, but when professional judgment and skill are not involved, a § 9-11-9.1 affidavit is not required.”
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional-malpractice complaint to include an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, and failure to file it subjects the complaint to dismissal for failure to state a claim under subsection (e).

Old Republic National Title Insurance Co. v. Attorney Title Services, Inc. · filed 2009-06-12(a), (e)

That statute requires any complaint alleging professional malpractice to be accompanied by an expert affidavit setting forth “at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a). Where a plaintiff fails to file the requisite expert affidavit, its complaint “shall be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.. . .” OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (e).
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff in a professional malpractice action to attach an expert affidavit setting out the act of negligence underlying the claim; if the affiant does not meet the applicable expert-witness requirements, the affidavit is insufficient and the complaint is subject to dismissal.

Craigo v. Azizi · filed 2009-11-19(a)

Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action is required to attach to the complaint the affidavit of an expert “setting out the act of negligence underlying [the] claim.” ... The expert providing the affidavit must meet the requirements for an expert witness set forth in OCGA § 24-9-67.1. ... Where the affiant fails to meet those requirements, the affidavit is insufficient; and the complaint is subject to dismissal.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice against a listed Georgia professional, including a professional engineer, to file a competent expert affidavit with the complaint identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis.

Odion v. Varon · filed 2011-09-29(a)

Professional engineers are listed under subsection (g). ... “An action alleges professional malpractice when it calls into question the conduct of a professional in his area of expertise.” ... Because the unrebutted evidence showed that Odion’s claims sounded in professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence, and Odion failed to file contemporaneously with his complaint the expert affidavit required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), there was no error in the trial court’s grant of CEC’s motion.
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Section 9-11-9.1's expert-affidavit requirement does not apply to claims alleging a professional's intentional conduct, including medical fraud.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2013-08-28(a)

Although OCGA § 9-11-9.1 does not apply and, as a result, Mr. Johnson was not required to attach an expert affidavit to his medical fraud complaint, this does not mean that expert testimony will not be necessary for a jury to find in his favor.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional engineering malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, and permits dismissal when the affidavit is absent.

Bray v. Department of Transportation · filed 2013-10-23(a), (b), and (g)

We conclude that, to the extent the “inverse condemnation” action sought compensation for damages to the property based on allegations of professional engineering negligence, Bray was required to file with the complaint the expert affidavit required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1. In the absence of the required affidavit, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint to the extent it sought compensation based on allegations of professional engineering negligence.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit with a complaint alleging professional malpractice, but not for ordinary negligence; claims involving professional skill, judgment, or medical treatment fall within the affidavit requirement.

CARTER v. VISTACARE, LLC (Two Cases) · filed 2016-02-18(a)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) provides that “[i]n any action for damages alleging professional malpractice . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” ... “Although complaints against professionals may state claims based on ordinary as well as professional negligence, where the allegations of negligence against a professional involve the exercise of professional skill and judgment within the professional’s area of expertise, the action states professional negligence.” ... Here, even assuming that the act of allegedly failing to follow Cantrell’s doctor’s orders by placing Cantrell in hospice care could be construed as ordinary negligence, no damage resulted from the mere placement of Cantrell into the hospice service. Rather, the damages alleged involve injuries to Cantrell’s health resulting from the medical treatment she received while in hospice care. Thus, Carter’s claims assert issues involving medical judgment and the professional duties involved in providing such care to Cantrell, including the propriety of administering morphine to her. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Carter was required to file an expert affidavit along with her complaint, and her failure to do so bars her claim for negligence.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit in an action for damages alleging professional malpractice, including a breach-of-contract claim based on failure to perform professional services according to the applicable standard of care.

Hobbs v. Great Expressions Dental Centers of Georgia, P.C. · filed 2016-05-27(a)

As our appellate courts have explained before, the expert affidavit requirement contained in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) applies to “any action for damages alleging professional malpractice,” based on the failure to perform professional services in accordance with the applicable standard of care, including breach of contract claims.
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Section 9-11-9.1 imposes a threshold expert-affidavit requirement for medical-malpractice claims against professions listed in the statute; an EMT is not among those professions.

McKuhen v. Transformhealthrx, Inc. · filed 2016-07-15

Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Kern’s affidavit was insufficient to satisfy OCGA § 24-7-702, the McKuhens have failed to meet the threshold requirement under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and their medical malpractice claims fail as a matter of law. ... EMT is not one of the professions listed under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 as requiring an expert affidavit.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff asserting medical malpractice against a hospital to file an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; claims based on conduct that does not require professional skill or medical judgment are ordinary-negligence claims and do not require that affidavit.

Byrom v. Douglas Hospital, Inc. · filed 2016-10-04

A plaintiff who asserts a claim for medical malpractice against a hospital is required to file an expert affidavit along with her complaint setting forth at least one negligent act or omission and the factual basis for the claim. OCGA § 9-11-9.1. ... Where the professional’s alleged negligence requires the exercise of professional skill and judgment to comply with a standard of conduct within the professional’s area of expertise, the action states professional negligence. But where the allegations of negligence do not involve professional skill and judgment, the action states ordinary negligence. ... Here, the record does not show that only a person with medical training could transport Byrom in the wheelchair or that transporting her involved the exercise of medical judgment. ... Thus, Byrom’s claims are not for medical malpractice. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Douglas Hospital based on a failure to file an expert affidavit.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional-negligence affidavit to identify at least one specific negligent act or omission and the factual basis for it.

Ziglar v. St. joseph’s/candler Health System, Inc. · filed 2017-05-12(a)

Here, the affidavit recites only generally that the nurses and staff at the Hospital failed to appropriately treat, assess, and advocate for Ziglar while he was a patient there, and does not contain any specific instances of any of those alleged failures. Moreover, even assuming the general assertions of “failure to assess or treat” were sufficient to state an act or omission of negligence, the affidavit also failed to set out a sufficient factual basis to support such a negligent act or omission. Cf. Crook v. Funk, 214 Ga. App. 213, 214 (1) (447 SE2d 60) (1994) (doctor’s affidavit sufficient under facts set out in the affidavit). In this regard, the affidavit referred to the medical records but did not attach them, and as to facts otherwise recited only that “[b]eginning in December of 2013, . . . Ziglar was an unconscious patient that was at high risk for the development of pressure ulcers” and “[d]espite the fact that the staff of [the Hospital] knew or should have known of the high risk of pressure ulcers, . . . Ziglar developed a Stage IV sacral ulcer.” These are not the type of underlying facts sufficient to support claims of professional negligence for purposes of the Section 9-11-9.1 affidavit. Accordingly, even construing the affidavit in Ziglar’s favor, we find that the affidavit here was insufficient on its face to satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; the requirement does not apply to ordinary-negligence claims.

ST. MARY'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, INC. v. ROACH Et Al. · filed 2018-03-02(a)

Thus, under OCGA § 9-11-9.1, a plaintiff must “attach to the complaint an expert’s affidavit supporting his malpractice claim, but the requirement of attaching a medical affidavit to the complaint does not apply to claims of ordinary negligence.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice plaintiff to support the complaint with an expert affidavit that identifies at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, as an initial pleading requirement rather than proof of the claim's evidentiary merits.

HOLMES Et Al. v. LYONS Et Al. · filed 2018-06-01(a)

Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, which imposes an evidentiary requirement in the context of summary judgment on the merits, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 merely imposes an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit setting out at least one negligent act or omission for each defendant in a complaint alleging professional malpractice.

BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT · filed 2022-07-13

Georgia law requires an expert affidavit to be filed with complaints in actions alleging professional malpractice. ... Because Plaintiff failed to file an affidavit of an expert that sets forth at least one negligent act or omission against each Defendant against whom Plaintiff wants to assert a medical malpractice claim, Plaintiff’s motion to join these claims is denied.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims, including EMTALA stabilization claims, but not EMTALA screening claims that turn on disparate treatment rather than professional negligence.

ESTATE OF MINNIE LEE TOMLINSON v. HOUSTON HEALTHCARE · filed 2024-08-13(a)

We conclude that the Estate’s EMTALA claim against the Hospital for failure to provide an appropriate medical screening examination does not sound in professional negligence and thus is not a claim for professional malpractice within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 so as to trigger the expert affidavit requirement imposed by that statute. ... In contrast to the Estate’s EMTALA screening claim, we conclude that its EMTALA stabilization claim constitutes a claim for professional malpractice within the meaning of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and thus triggers the expert affidavit requirement.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for professional-malpractice claims, including claims against a hospital based on professional acts, but it does not automatically apply to every claim against a hospital.

EDWARD F. STRINGER, IV v. SEAY · filed 2022-11-01(a), (g)

The plain language of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit to support only professional malpractice claims, see Carter v. VistaCare, LLC, 335 Ga. App. 616, 621 (3) (782 SE2d 678) (2016), and, as we have said before, “[n]ot every suit which calls into question the conduct of one who happens to be a medical professional is a medical malpractice action,” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Roberts v. Quick Rx Drugs, Inc., 343 Ga. App. 556, 558 (1) (807 SE2d 476) (2017). ... In short, we have no trouble concluding that the claim here against Dr. Stringer – whether understood as the negligent failure to consult with another physician concerning the pathology report or the negligent failure to inform Beauchamp or her subsequent treating physicians of those results – sounds in professional negligence and, thus, required an expert affidavit in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff alleging professional malpractice against a covered professional, including a veterinarian, to file an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; failure to comply can authorize dismissal.

MERRITTS v. NORTH GEORGIA VETERINARY REFERRAL PRACTICE, INC. · filed 2023-02-13(a), (g)(26)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes “an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action.” ... And OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (26) specifically imparts that, among other professions, the Code section applies to veterinarians. ... Consequently, Merritts was required to comply with the provisions of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, and her failure to do so authorized the dismissal of her complaint.
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In a medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff must file with the complaint an affidavit from a competent expert identifying at least one alleged negligent act or omission and its factual basis.

Doe v. Augusta University · filed 2025-09-12(a)

Plaintiff has failed to comply with provisions of Georgia law regarding the filing of a medical malpractice claim. “Georgia law also requires medical-malpractice plaintiffs to submit an affidavit from a competent expert, ‘set[ting] forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.’” ... Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s claims are construed as asserting medical malpractice claims under Georgia law, any such claims are subject to dismissal for failing to comply with the statutory pre-suit requirements.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit from a competent expert identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis; the requirement applies to chiropractor claims under subsection (g)(5), and an affidavit is sufficient when it supports the alleged breach at the pleading stage.

Coll v. Kelly · filed 2026-05-22(a), (e), (g), (g)(5)

In a medical malpractice case, OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a) requires that the plaintiff “file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” This requirement applies to malpractice claims against chiropractors. OCGA § 9-11-9.1(g)(5). If the affidavit submitted with the complaint is defective, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See OCGA § 9-11-9.1(e). ... On these allegations, and construing the affidavit in the light most favorable to Coll, Royal’s affidavit was sufficient to meet the requirements of OCGA §§ 9-11-9.1 and 24-7-702(c)(2) with respect to his opinion that Kelly breached the standard of care in taking and reading the X-ray.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a)(1) requires a plaintiff to file an expert affidavit in an action for damages alleging professional malpractice against a Georgia-licensed professional, but the requirement does not apply to claims based on intentional acts rather than professional negligence.

WISE BUSINESS FORMS INCORPORATED v. FORSYTH COUNTY, GEORGIA · filed 2022-03-15(a)(1)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) (1) requires plaintiffs to file an expert affidavit in “any action for damages alleging professional malpractice” against professionals licensed by the State of Georgia, including professional engineers.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires the expert affidavit supporting a professional-malpractice complaint to be from an expert competent to testify under § 24-9-67.1.

Aguilar v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc. · filed 2013-03-05(a)

“The standard for determining an expert’s competence to testify is governed by OCGA § 24-9-67.1,... and the statute applies to affiants under OCGA § 9-11-9.1.”
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In a professional malpractice action, the plaintiff must attach an expert affidavit identifying the act of negligence underlying the claim, and the affiant must satisfy the applicable expert-witness requirements.

Cagle v. EHIRIM · filed 2010-06-17(a)

Under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a), the plaintiff in a professional malpractice action is required to attach to the complaint the affidavit of an expert setting out the act of negligence underlying the claim.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a medical malpractice plaintiff's expert affidavit to be properly notarized, with the affiant personally appearing before the notary.

Sambor v. Kelley · filed 1999-05-03

Therefore, we reaffirm our prior holding that notarization occurs only when the affiant or person acknowledging execution personally appears before the notary.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff filing a professional negligence claim to file an expert affidavit with the complaint stating the case's factual basis.

DAVIS v. GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES LLC · filed 2019-08-26

O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 requires that a plaintiff who files a professional negligence claim must file an expert affidavit along with the complaint setting forth the factual basis of the case.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional negligence.

Georgia Department of Transportation v. Mixon · filed 2020-06-10

Consequently, the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to file an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional negligence is inapposite here.
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Section 9-11-9.1 does not require an expert affidavit for Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-permanent-nuisance claim.

WISE BUSINESS FORMS INCORPORATED v. FORSYTH COUNTY, GEORGIA · filed 2023-12-22

The Court noted that it “did not grant certiorari on [this Court’s] ruling that Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance did not require an expert affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 or on its ruling that Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-abatable-nuisance claim was properly dismissed by the trial court.” ... Because the Supreme Court did not address our other dispositive holdings — that Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance did not require an expert affidavit, that Wise did not allege sufficient facts to assert a claim of inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance, and that Wise abandoned his claim for per se taking on appeal — and because those holdings are consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, those holdings become binding upon the return of the remittitur.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires a professional negligence plaintiff to file an expert affidavit stating at least one specific negligent act or omission and its factual basis.

LEWIS v. EMORY HEALTHCARE, INC. · filed 2026-02-03(a)

Where, as here, a complaint seeks damages for professional negligence, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires the plaintiff “to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent to testify, which affidavit shall set forth specifically at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a professional malpractice complaint even when the alleged negligence would be apparent to a layperson.

Collins v. Newman · filed 1999-04-30(a)

Collins does not contest the fact that her action constituted an action for professional negligence. However, she contends that an expert affidavit was not required because it would be apparent to a layman that leaving an instrument inside a patient constitutes professional negligence. This argument is without merit.
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Application to renewal actions

Section 9-11-9.1(f) permits renewal of a malpractice complaint filed without the required affidavit only if the affidavit existed when the original suit was filed and was omitted by mistake.

Jones v. Bates · filed 1991-05-10(f)

Under St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Nease, 259 Ga. 153, 155 (377 SE2d 847) (1989), Jones could renew this malpractice count only if it were shown that the required affidavit existed at the time of the original suit but was omitted from it by mistake. Accord OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f).
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Law changed since The 2005 amendment ended good-cause extensions of the expert-affidavit filing period; the 2007 amendment restored a limited 45-day grace period without restoring those extensions.

Section 9-11-9.1 governs a renewal action when it is filed because a renewal action is de novo and governed by the procedural rules in effect at filing; subsection (b) allows the trial court to extend the affidavit deadline for good cause.

Archie v. Scott · filed 1989-02-01(b)

It follows that OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is the applicable procedure which governs the instant renewal action and that the trial court did not err in so holding.
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Subsection (f) limits the circumstances in which a professional-malpractice action may be renewed after the applicable limitation period has expired.

Floyd v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc. · filed 1994-07-01(f)

Aside from the need to disapprove countless precedents implying otherwise, Piedmont in effect asks this court to render meaningless the clear import of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f), which expressly limits the circumstances under which renewal is possible in professional malpractice cases after the applicable limitation period has expired.
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Expert affidavit—failure to file with complaint is amendable

Law changed since The 1997 amendment ended ordinary amendment to supply an entirely missing expert affidavit; the current section allows only its stated grace-period and renewal exceptions.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a professional-malpractice complaint, but failure to file an affidavit already obtained before suit is an amendable defect; subsection (b) separately gives extra time when the limitations period is about to expire.

St. Joseph's Hospital, Inc. v. Nease · filed 1989-04-06(a), (b)

Appellants argue that because subsection (b) is the exclusive exception to the filing requirement in subsection 9-11-9.1 (a), the Neases could not amend their complaint under the general amendment statute, OCGA § 9-11-15 (a). We disagree. ... OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) allows a plaintiff in a professional malpractice action to supplement the complaint with a supporting affidavit when “the period of limitation will expire within ten days of the date of filing and, because of such time constraints, the plaintiff has alleged that an affidavit of an expert could not be prepared.” The language of this subsection shows a clear legislative intent to give a plaintiff extra time to secure an affidavit when the statute of limitation is about to expire. ... (b) The filing requirement of subsection 9-11-9.1 (a) protects professionals from having to defend lawsuits unless they are supported by an expert competent to testify. The real issue in the present case is: If the plaintiff has the affidavit but fails to file it with the complaint, may the plaintiff later amend and file the affidavit under Rule 15? ... Under the statute, failure to obtain the affidavit might be a fatal defect. Failure to file it with the complaint is an amendable defect because “Is not the chief object of amendment the correction of mistakes?”
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1 permits a plaintiff who obtained the required expert affidavit before filing to cure failure to attach it to the complaint by filing the affidavit in response to a motion to dismiss when amendment without leave is available.

Bell v. Figueredo · filed 1989-07-07

We hold that under the circumstances of this case the Bells cured their defective complaint by filing an affidavit in response to the appellees' motion to dismiss and thereby complied with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1 requires a professional-malpractice plaintiff to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, but a mistaken failure to do so is amendable when the affidavit had already been obtained before filing.

Reid v. Brazil · filed 1989-09-05

Failure to file an expert’s affidavit with a complaint for professional malpractice, as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1, is an amendable defect, at least where the plaintiff has obtained the affidavit prior to filing the complaint and the failure to file the affidavit was the result of a mistake.
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Applicability in federal court

Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice plaintiff to attach an expert affidavit identifying at least one negligent act or omission and its factual basis, but those pleading requirements do not bind plaintiffs in federal court.

Boone v. Knight · filed 1990-02-06

As the above authorities indicate, the pleading requirements of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 are not binding on a plaintiff in federal court. Rather, the sufficiency of plaintiffs complaint must be judged solely by the standard set out in Federal Rule 8, according to which the pleading of evidence is not required.
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Section 9-11-9.1’s expert-affidavit requirement does not apply in federal diversity actions because Federal Rule 8(a) governs the sufficiency of the complaint.

Roberts v. Jones · filed 2005-05-09

This Court finds that it is well settled law that in a diversity action the Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1, requiring plaintiffs to file an affidavit of an expert is inapplicable. The sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint is judged by the standard set out in Federal Rule 8(a) which does not require the affidavit of an expert.
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Section 9-11-9.1 does not bind a federal court when it determines the pleading standard for a motion to dismiss; federal law governs that issue.

Hays v. Page Perry, LLC · filed 2014-06-10

The Plaintiffs response to the Motion to Dismiss begins with a blatant misstatement of the law: that in ruling on a motion to dismiss, this Court is bound by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1. No authority for this preposterous statement is given. Of course, federal law determines the pleading standard in ruling on a motion to dismiss in federal court.
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Section 9-11-9.1's expert-affidavit requirement does not apply to professional-malpractice actions in federal court.

Callaway v. O'Connell · filed 2014-08-29

The Court recognizes the requirement that a plaintiff attach an expert affidavit to his complaint in a professional malpractice action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 does not apply in federal court.
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Section 9-11-9.1 is an initial pleading requirement rather than an evidentiary requirement, and its expert-affidavit requirement does not apply in federal court.

Encompass Home & Auto Insurance Company v. Stevens Hale & Associates · filed 2022-08-11

As an initial matter, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 is not implicated in this case. First, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 sets out an “initial pleading requirement rather than an evidentiary requirement.” ... Thus, the statute is inapplicable at this stage in the litigation and does not impact or alter a plaintiff’s burden to produce expert testimony at trial in professional malpractice cases. ... Furthermore, the statute does not apply in federal court. ... Therefore, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 is inapplicable to this case.
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Exception to expert affidavit requirement

Law changed since The 2007 amendment permits the 45-day grace period on a good-faith belief that limitations will expire within ten days, but requires a timely attorney affidavit and counsel-retention within 90 days of expiration.

The expert-affidavit requirement applies when the case is not filed within ten days after the statute of limitations expires, and indigency or pending discovery does not excuse compliance.

Kalustian v. McDonald · filed 1990-02-07(b)

Contrary to appellant’s assertions, OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b), the statutory exception to the requirement that the affidavit accompany the complaint, is inapplicable since appellant’s case was not filed within ten days of the expiration of the statute of limitation. Furthermore, neither appellant’s indigency nor the pendency of discovery matters was a barrier to the trial court’s dismissal of the malpractice action for failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an expert affidavit with the complaint; the requirement is procedural and may apply retroactively to a cause of action arising before the statute's effective date.

Blackmon v. Thompson · filed 1990-05-11

“In the instant case, the OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requirement of submitting an expert’s affidavit along with the complaint did not affect the substantive right of action for professional malpractice; it alters neither the standard of care to be applied nor the measure of recovery. The statute merely prescribes a procedure for enforcing that right, evidently with the purpose of preventing frivolous or unsustainable actions. Accordingly, the trial court [did nor err] in applying the statute [retroactively], and in [granting appellees’ motion] to dismiss. [Cits.]”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit as a prerequisite to filing a renewal action when the statute became effective between dismissal of the original action and filing of the renewal action.

Bell v. Figueredo · filed 1989-01-23

The affidavit filing requirement must be complied with as a prerequisite to the filing of the case at bar because OCGA § 9-11-9.1 became effective after the first suit was dismissed and before this action was filed. ... Thus, we find the trial court properly concluded that the prerequisite of filing an affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 must be met for this renewal action.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit only in actions against professions recognized under Georgia law in OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2), 14-10-2 (2), and 43-1-24.

Gillis v. Goodgame · filed 1992-02-27(a)

We hold, therefore, that the affidavit requirements of § 9-11-9.1 apply only to those professions recognized under Georgia law in OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2), and 43-1-24.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit in malpractice actions against pharmacists, but subsection (f)'s renewal-action bar is not applied when the statute's coverage was unclear when the original suit was filed.

Harrell v. Lusk · filed 1994-02-07(a), (f)

Because a suit that calls into question the conduct of a professional pharmacist in his area of expertise is a suit brought against a defendant who provides a service which can be legally performed only pursuant to a license from a state examining board issued upon successful completion of specialized schooling and/or training, we hold that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 must be met. Accord Sparks v. Kroger Co., 200 Ga. App. 135 (407 SE2d 105) (1991). See also Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 674 F2d 856 (11th Cir. 1982). However, although ordinarily this Court would rule that Lusk's second complaint, filed with the affidavit of a licensed pharmacist, should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (f), that result would be unfair in this case.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice plaintiff to file an affidavit from an expert competent to testify, and treats that affidavit as an initial pleading requirement rather than a prima facie case.

Handson v. HCA Health Services of Georgia, Inc. · filed 1994-05-16

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff to file an affidavit of an expert “competent to testify” in actions alleging professional malpractice. This is merely an initial pleading requirement, and the complaint will not be subject to dismissal unless the affidavit “ ‘ “disclose [s] with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts.” ’ [Cit.]”
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Section 9-11-9.1 does not require a separate expert affidavit addressing negligence allegations against a hospital when the filed affidavit addresses the physician-related negligence allegations.

Jenkins County Hospital Authurority v. Landrum · filed 1992-09-08

Therefore, an affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is not necessary, and the trial court did not err in denying the hospital’s motion to dismiss.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a malpractice complaint to be accompanied by an affidavit from an expert competent to testify.

Raskin v. Wallace · filed 1994-11-22

Nonetheless, the statute imposes an initial pleading requirement that the affidavit filed with the complaint be that of an “expert competent to testify.”
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit for a professional-malpractice claim alleging negligent performance of professional services, but not for a fraud claim.

Hilton v. Callaghan · filed 1995-01-24

However, an expert affidavit was not required under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to support the Hiltons’ claim of fraud.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit when claims against an entity are based on professional treatment by an agent or employee, and failure to file the affidavit requires dismissal.

Georgia Physical Therapy, Inc. v. McCullough · filed 1995-12-06

We have held that a malpractice affidavit is required in suits against entities not required to be licensed by this state where liability is predicated on the doctrine of respondeat superior or when “the averment of acts or omissions requiring the exercise of professional skill and judgment by agents or employees who themselves are recognized as ‘professionals.’ ” ... Applying that principle to the facts of this case, it is clear that McCullough’s claims against GPT arise out of the treatment rendered by its agent, McKeever, in the exercise of his professional skill and judgment. McCullough’s failure to file an expert affidavit in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-9.1 mandates the dismissal of his claims against GPT.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a plaintiff in a professional-negligence action to file an expert affidavit as an initial pleading requirement, and an admission of negligence does not excuse that filing.

Johnson v. Brueckner · filed 1994-12-16

Dr. Brueckner’s admission of inadvertence in the attached medical records does not excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-9.1.
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Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 9-11-9.1 generally requires a medical-malpractice plaintiff to file an expert affidavit with the complaint; the 45-day grace period applies only when the complaint alleges that the limitations period will expire within ten days and that time constraints prevented preparing the affidavit, and an omitted affidavit ordinarily cannot be supplied by amendment after the defendant raises the defect unless the statutory mistake exception applies.

Anderson v. Navarro · filed 1997-06-19(a), (b), and (e)

OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to file an expert affidavit with the complaint.
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Section 9-11-9.1 makes the expert affidavit an initial pleading requirement, so its sufficiency is judged on a motion to dismiss from the affidavit's four corners rather than by later summary-judgment evidence.

Sawyer v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1998-08-20(f)

The validity of an affidavit for OCGA § 9-11-9.1 purposes is not a summary judgment question; it is a motion to dismiss question.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires a professional-malpractice plaintiff to file an expert affidavit with the complaint, but that requirement does not bind a plaintiff in federal diversity court because it conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

Baird v. Celis · filed 1999-03-05

The Court finds, therefore, that O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1, requiring an expert affidavit to be filed with a complaint for professional malpractice, is in direct conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) which requires only notice pleading.
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Section 9-11-9.1 requires an expert affidavit with a complaint alleging professional malpractice, including claims against pharmacists or nurses styled as contract or tort claims.

Presto v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. · filed 1997-05-13

Although the Prestos attached to their complaint an expert affidavit alleging the negligence of Dr. Warren, as required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1, that affidavit makes no reference to any negligent act or omission attributable to Caremark. ... The Prestos’ claims, however labeled, are allegations of professional malpractice on the part of pharmacists or nurses at Caremark. ... The failure to attach to the complaint the expert affidavit required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 required the dismissal of these claims.
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Section 9-11-9.1(a) requires an expert affidavit for a professional-negligence claim against a nurse only when the alleged act or omission requires professional nursing skill and judgment.

Bunn-Penn v. Southern Regional Medical Corp. · filed 1997-07-11(a)

Although Bunn-Penn filed an affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1(a), the expert affidavit of a nurse is necessary to support a claim for professional negligence by a nurse only where the alleged act or omission by the nurse requires the exercise of professional nursing skill and judgement.
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Notes 1–150 of 367, oldest cases first.

232 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Sparks v. Hoff, the court mentions the statute only to note that the malpractice claim arose before its effective date. The decision turns on the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s expert evidence and does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Calhoun v. Bone, the statute appears only in a footnote explaining the filing dates and effective date; the court did not decide the statute’s application or otherwise construe it. opinion →
Ridgeview Institute, Inc. v. Brunson, the statute appears only in the complaint's allegations describing the plaintiff's uncertainty about whether an affidavit would be required. The court did not interpret, apply, or rule on § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Johnson v. Hospital Corporation of America, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe the missing affidavit and the trial court's dismissal; the appellate court decided the appeal based on finality and harmlessness, without construing or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
McDaniel v. Hendrix, the statute is mentioned only to describe that plaintiffs filed an expert affidavit. The court did not construe or decide any issue about § 9-11-9.1; its ruling addressed the medical-malpractice standard of care and the insufficiency of the expert's local-standard evidence. opinion →
MacOn-bibb County Hospital Authority v. Continental Insurance, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural and factual history to identify that the earlier complaint included a physician’s affidavit. The court did not construe § 9-11-9.1 or decide any issue about its requirements; it decided insurance coverage and the insurer’s duty to defend. opinion →
Robinson v. Starr, the statute is discussed only while determining the basis of an earlier summary judgment and the viability of res judicata. The court's ruling rested on the evidentiary requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 and the merits, not on construing or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Harvey v. Harvey, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1(b) only as the basis for a malpractice-affidavit motion. Because the plaintiff disclaimed a malpractice claim, the court held that motion moot and did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Southern Engineering Co. v. Central Georgia Electric Membership Corp., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural remand direction allowing time to file the prescribed affidavit; the court does not construe or decide any requirement, coverage, or application of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Smith v. Law Office of Tony Center, P.C., the statute appears only in the procedural history to state that appellee did not file a motion under it; the court does not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Ansa Mufflers Corp. v. Worthington, the statute appears only in the procedural history as a ground asserted in appellees’ summary-judgment motion; the court does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Jarallah v. Schwartz, the statute appears only in the procedural history to describe the appellee’s motion and the trial court’s ruling; the appellate court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Glaser v. Meck, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to explain the procedural consequence of the appellee's failure to timely assert that defense under § 9-11-12(b); it does not interpret, apply, or decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires. opinion →
Razete v. Preferred Research, Inc., the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the defendant's first motion to dismiss; this opinion does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
Washington v. Rucker, the court expressly pretermitted the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and decided the appeal on the absence of actionable malpractice allegations, so it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Hutcheson Medical Center v. Scealf, the statute appears in the parties’ arguments, but the court resolved the appeal on res judicata and expressly declined to address the remaining issues; it therefore did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Holmes v. University Health Service, Inc., the opinion only reports that UHS moved to dismiss for failure to file the affidavit and that the trial court denied the motion; the appellate court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1, and the cross-appeal concerning that ruling was deemed moot. opinion →
Cain v. Moore, the statute is mentioned only in describing the plaintiff's argument about an expert affidavit. The court did not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction before reaching the legal merits. opinion →
Walker v. Jack Eckerd Corp., the court cited OCGA § 9-11-9.1 only parenthetically as an example of Georgia public policy favoring reduced frivolous malpractice claims. It did not construe, apply, or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Hailey v. Blalock, the court expressly limited its analysis to the affidavit's evidentiary sufficiency under § 9-11-56 and did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or whether the affidavit satisfied that statute; the § 9-11-9.1 references are contextual and incidental to the summary-judgment ruling. opinion →
Zechmann v. Thigpen, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report that the complaint was filed with an expert affidavit; the court does not interpret or apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Kirsch v. Meredith, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to describe the procedural use of Meredith's expert affidavit in the malpractice action. The holding construes the abusive-litigation statute, OCGA § 51-7-81, and does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
Krasaeath v. Parker, the opinion merely mentions that the plaintiff filed an expert affidavit under § 9-11-9.1; it does not interpret or decide what the statute requires or how it applies. opinion →
Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, the statute appears only as an alternative ground stated by the superior court. The appellate court expressly said it need not reach the arguments directed to the alternative grounds because it affirmed on judicial estoppel, so this opinion does not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Cahela v. Bernard, the court did not decide whether § 9-11-9.1 applies in federal court or whether the plaintiff’s affidavit satisfied it. It only held that the defense could not be stricken because the applicability issue was unsettled, and reserved the affidavit-competence issue for a merits motion. opinion →
Salmon v. Pearson & Associates, Inc., the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to describe Salmon's procedural filing of an expert affidavit; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide what the statute requires. opinion →
Deal v. Handson, the opinion only recounts the procedural history of an earlier decision and states that the Supreme Court found the affidavit adequate; it does not construe or independently apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Thornton v. Ware County Hospital Authority, the statute appears in the procedural history and in a footnote distinguishing Hodo; this appeal decided release, dismissal, and apparent-agency issues, and did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 itself. opinion →
Henry v. Medical Center, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in a special concurrence's discussion of an unproven procedural-history assumption; the court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1(f) requires or whether the prior suit complied with it. opinion →
Brown v. Who's Three, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote discussing an unaddressed argument that was not part of the decision and was not cross-appealed; the court did not decide the statute's applicability. opinion →
Winding River Village Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Barnett, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the prior Waldroup decision and the consequence of that party's failure to file expert affidavits. This court decides wrongful-death preclusion, collateral estoppel, and joinder issues, without construing § 9-11-9.1 or deciding what it requires or whom it covers. opinion →
Velez v. Bethune, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing the procedural history of a separate malpractice count. The court did not construe the statute or decide whether its expert-affidavit requirement applied; the opinion instead addressed the intentional-tort claims. opinion →
National Foundation Co. v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the expert affidavit filed in the malpractice action; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any requirement of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Harkleroad & Hermance, P.C. v. Stringer, the court mentioned § 9-11-9.1 only while describing conduct supporting sanctions under OCGA § 9-15-14; it did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or determine whether the affidavit complied with it. opinion →
Freeman v. Pittman, the statute appears only in a parenthetical summary of the holding in Williams v. Hajosy and is cited in addressing whether the expert affidavit could support the pleading; Freeman does not interpret or independently apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Frasure v. Calhoun, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for the underlying motion to dismiss; the court decided the appeal on default and responsive-pleading timing, without construing or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Pope v. Goodgame, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote reporting what an earlier Gillis decision concluded; this opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Goring v. Martinez, the court expressly declined to decide whether the affidavit satisfied § 9-11-9.1 and merely reported the trial court’s ruling on that issue. opinion →
Thompson v. Long, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the trial court’s dismissal of an earlier complaint and this court’s reversal of that decision. The opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 in the decision being annotated. opinion →
Abdul-Majeed v. Emory University Hospital, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to identify the statutory basis for the expert affidavit. It does not interpret the statute or decide whether the affidavit satisfied its requirements; the holding concerns the insufficiency of the expert’s causation testimony for summary judgment. opinion →
Lee v. State, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1(e) only by analogy to describe the strictness of a different statutory scheme; it does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Harkleroad v. Stringer, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only while recounting an expert affidavit as one fact supporting an earlier sanctions ruling under § 9-15-14; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Woelper v. Piedmont Cotton Mills, Inc., the statute appears only in a cf. parenthetical describing the holding in Waldroup, another case. This court did not construe or apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to decide Woelper. opinion →
Ford v. Saint Francis Hospital, Inc., the statute appears in the hospital's cross-appeal, but the court did not decide whether the complaint complied with it; affirmance of the judgment mooted that issue. opinion →
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only as an additional pleading defect while rejecting Travelers’ subrogation-based claims. It does not construe the statute or decide a disputed question about its meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Anthony v. Chambless, the statute is mentioned only to describe the affidavit attached to the complaint. The court did not decide any issue about § 9-11-9.1, and the related issue was not raised on appeal. opinion →
Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, P.C. v. Richardson, the statute appears only in the procedural history to report the trial court's basis for striking the clients' defenses. The Court of Appeals did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Estate of Patterson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority, the court mentioned § 9-11-9.1(a) only in passing to contrast possible pleading sufficiency with the affidavit's failure to satisfy the separate summary-judgment evidentiary rule in § 9-11-56(e). It did not construe or definitively decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires. opinion →
Davis v. First Healthcare Corp., the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the trial court’s ruling. The appellate court did not decide whether the affidavit was required or otherwise construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
White v. Cauthen, the statute is mentioned only while distinguishing a prior case and reporting the parties’ positions; the court does not interpret or apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
In Re Lawsuits of Carter, the statute appears only in a footnote as an analogy distinguishing the medical-affidavit requirement from the attorney-certification order at issue; the court did not construe or decide the statute's application. opinion →
Blackwell v. Goodwin, the statute is mentioned only while reporting the holding of Ga. Physical Therapy v. McCullough, which the court uses by analogy in deciding whether the claims were subject to the medical-malpractice statute of repose. This opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 itself. opinion →
Renfroe v. Arrington, the statute is mentioned only to identify an expert affidavit filed in the case; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Tuten v. Costrini, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to describe the procedural use of an expert affidavit and, in a quoted discussion, to distinguish the pleading standard from the summary-judgment evidentiary standard. It does not decide what the statute requires or otherwise construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Bennett v. Butlin, the statute is mentioned only in describing an earlier motion to dismiss and distinguishing pleading sufficiency from the separate evidentiary question of expert competency; the court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Carter v. Murphey, the statute is mentioned only as part of Murphey’s arguments about whether the counterclaim was properly before the trial court. The court expressly declined to consider those assertions because Murphey did not file a cross-appeal, so it did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Wilborn v. Blake, the statute is mentioned only to identify an affidavit in the court's discussion of whether the expert's deposition established familiarity with the applicable standard of care. The court did not construe or decide any requirement of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Hedquist v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the court cited § 9-11-9.1 only in a parenthetical summary of Hodo v. Basa as an example of a dismissal that may have res judicata effect. It did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 to the present case. opinion →
Keefe v. Northside Hospital, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the event underlying the Keefes' legal-malpractice claim and in the procedural history; the court does not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1's requirements. opinion →
Robinson v. Williamson, the court mentions OCGA § 9-11-9.1 only in a parenthetical identifying the subject of a cited Sparks decision; it does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Johnson v. Department of Transportation, the statute is mentioned only because the appellants argued about whether an affidavit was required, and the court notes that the trial court had ruled in their favor. The court expressly says the dispositive issue was the absence of evidence of causation and negligence, not the affidavit statute, so it does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Cannon v. Jeffries, the court merely identifies the expert affidavit as having been submitted pursuant to § 9-11-9.1 and then resolves the case on causation and breach of the standard of care. It does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Miller v. Kitchens, the statute is mentioned only in describing the expert affidavit and the plaintiff’s unpreserved argument; the court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Williamson v. Fain, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1(d) only as a comparison while deciding that the quiet-title petition was sufficient to survive dismissal. It does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 to the case. opinion →
Denton v. Browns Mill Development Co., the statute appears only as citation [21] in the dissent, identifying the expert-affidavit statute by analogy; the majority does not discuss or construe § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Satilla Community Service Board v. Satilla Health Services, Inc., the concurrence mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to identify the attached affidavit and characterize the pleading as medical malpractice; the court did not construe or decide the statute's application. opinion →
Bowers v. Lee, the statute is mentioned only to recount the plaintiffs’ pleading choice; the court did not interpret or apply the expert-affidavit requirement and decided the appeal on the battery claim and related issues. opinion →
Simon v. Gunby, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report why the trial court dismissed the first complaint. The appellate court did not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1; it decided the appeal on res judicata. opinion →
Schneider v. Susquehanna Radio Corp., the statute appears only in a footnote's string of examples of state-court constitutional challenges; this opinion neither interprets nor applies § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Patton v. Turnage, the court expressly pretermitted, or declined to decide, the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 and decided the counterclaim on other grounds concerning the court-approved attorney withdrawal and Patton’s acquiescence. opinion →
Smiley v. S & J INVESTMENTS, INC., the court mentioned the statute only to note that the plaintiffs' affidavit met its requirements; it resolved the professional-negligence claim on lack of privity and did not interpret or otherwise decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires. opinion →
Chatham Orthopaedic Surgery Center, LLC v. Georgia Alliance of Community Hospitals, Inc., the court mentioned § 9-11-9.1 only in a footnote summarizing and distinguishing other decisions. Its holding concerned the anti-SLAPP statute, OCGA § 9-11-11.1, and voluntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41(a); it did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Oakes v. Magat, the statute is mentioned in the procedural history and footnote only to report that the superior court granted the plaintiffs additional time to file an expert affidavit. The appellate court did not construe or independently decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Blier v. Greene, the statute is mentioned only to report that the original complaint was accompanied by an affidavit. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Lunsford v. Dekalb Medical Center, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to report the trial court’s disposition of Lunsford’s professional-negligence claims; this appellate opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Hopkinson v. Labovitz, the statute appears only in the procedural history describing the additional time available to Hopkinson below; the court did not construe or decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or how it applies. opinion →
Board of Regents v. Oglesby, the statute appears only in the procedural history as the basis for the Board's initial motion to dismiss; the court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or whether it applied. opinion →
Campbell v. McLarnon, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report that Campbell omitted the required expert affidavit and that the trial court dismissed the suit. The appellate court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1; it decided the appeal on the timeliness of the notice of appeal. opinion →
Gunby v. Simon, the statute appears in the procedural history and in a footnote expressly stating that the alleged insufficiency of the affidavit was not addressed; the court decided only the res judicata issue. opinion →
Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. Reddick, the statute appears only in the architectural firm's argument. The court expressly declined to reach the merits of that argument and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot, so it did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP v. Keller, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to explain that medical-negligence cases use the ordinary/professional-negligence distinction for the affidavit requirement; it decides the separate issue of an attorney’s duty to a nonclient and does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Harris v. Griffin, the statute is mentioned only to identify the expert affidavit filed with the malpractice complaint. The court does not construe § 9-11-9.1 or decide what it requires or how it applies. opinion →
Comanche Construction, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, the opinion only reports that Cushway involved summary judgment based on failure to file an expert affidavit under § 9-11-9.1; this court does not interpret or apply that statute. opinion →
Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1(a) only in a footnote citation. The court’s decision concerns the summary-judgment rule in § 9-11-56(e) and the need for certified medical records supporting an expert affidavit; it does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Willingham v. Hudson, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote to identify the procedural basis for the plaintiff’s expert affidavits; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Brown v. Coast Dental of Georgia, P.C., the statute is mentioned in a footnote recounting procedural filing facts and the resulting operative commencement date. The court did not construe or independently decide the meaning, requirements, or application of § 9-11-9.1; its holding addressed the medical-malpractice statute of limitation. opinion →
Burt v. James, the statute is mentioned only to describe the plaintiffs' filing of an expert affidavit; the court does not interpret or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
Camp v. Coweta County, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1(b) only as an example contrasting statutes with specific consequences for noncompliance; the holding concerns the mailing requirement under OCGA § 50-21-35, not § 9-11-9.1(b). opinion →
Villani v. Hughes, the statute is mentioned only in describing the trial court’s ruling; the appellate court expressly declined to reach the issue and affirmed on statute-of-limitations grounds. opinion →
Travick v. Lee, the statute is mentioned only while discussing the scope of the Prophecy rule and describing the affidavit involved in another case. Travick does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1; its holding concerns summary judgment under OCGA § 51-1-29.1. opinion →
Conley v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., the court recited the affidavit requirement in § 9-11-9.1 (a), but did not decide any issue about that statute. The affirmance rested on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) by omitting the medical records supporting their expert’s affidavit. opinion →
Abramson v. Williams, the court cites § 9-11-9.1 only to identify the procedural standard for the motion, relying on Hewett; its actual decision concerns the expert-affidavit requirements under OCGA § 24-9-67.1, not the meaning or application of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Canas v. Al-Jabi, the statute appears only in a footnote's “But see” discussion of other cases. The court did not adopt or decide those authorities' propositions about when hospital claims are subject to § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Chatham Orthopaedic Surgery Center, LLC v. White, the statute appears only in a footnote stating a procedural fact about the malpractice complaint; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Gorney v. Meaney Rincon Orthopedic Associates, P.C., the statute appears only in a footnote as one item in a string citation identifying other states with similar medical-malpractice legislation; the court neither interprets nor applies Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Davenport v. Cummins Alabama, Inc., the statute appears only in a footnote as a passing citation explaining a procedural fact; the court did not decide the statute's meaning, requirements, scope, or application. opinion →
Whitley v. Piedmont Hospital, Inc., the statute is mentioned only to identify the affidavit supporting the medical-malpractice claim; the court decided summary-judgment and expert-credibility issues without construing or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the procedural context of another case, Abramson, while this opinion addresses expert-testimony qualifications under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 and summary judgment. The court does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 in this case. opinion →
Renz v. Northside Hospital, Inc., the statute appears only as the basis of Northside’s alternative dismissal argument. The trial court had not ruled on that issue, and the appellate court expressly declined to consider it, so the opinion makes no holding about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only in a string citation to Baird as support for its separate holding concerning the procedural treatment of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1; this court does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
WILLIAM H. STOLL, LLC v. Scarber, the statute appears only in a footnote describing time included in Stoll’s fee request for reviewing the hospital’s answer and defense. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
UniFund Financial Corp. v. Donaghue, the statute is mentioned only in the court's procedural discussion of Keefe and the prior attorney's failure to file an affidavit. This opinion decides the scope of a settlement release, not what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Nathans v. Diamond, the court did not decide an issue concerning § 9-11-9.1; it cited earlier decisions about that statute as an analogy in deciding that § 24-9-67.1(c) is procedural and may be applied retroactively. opinion →
McLeod v. Blase, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 only in a footnote while citing Ga. Physical Therapy v. McCullough for background about whether certified athletic trainers may be sued for malpractice and whether an expert affidavit is required. The court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1; it decided the separate issue of workers’ compensation co-employee immunity. opinion →
Pottinger v. Smith, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to identify the statutory basis for the plaintiff's expert affidavit; it does not construe the statute or decide any issue about its requirements or application. opinion →
Smith v. Harris, the court’s operative ruling concerns expert qualifications under OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c). Section 9-11-9.1 is cited only as cross-reference and support for distinguishing medical doctors and pharmacists; the court does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 itself. opinion →
Patterson v. Bates, the opinion only reports that the plaintiffs attached an expert affidavit in compliance with the statute. It does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1; the holding concerns whether the trial court improperly disregarded the affidavit under the self-contradictory testimony rule and certified-records issue. opinion →
Cedartown North Partnership LLC v. Georgia Department of Transportation, the opinion mentions OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b) only in a parenthetical citation to Landau while discussing the meaning of “period of limitation” under OCGA § 9-3-96. The court did not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Simon v. GRADY HEALTH SYSTEM, the statute appears only in the appellate court’s account of the trial court’s procedural ruling; the Court of Appeals did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1 in its own holding. opinion →
Clay v. Rippy, the court merely notes that the expert affidavit contained inaccurate factual assumptions while deciding the medical-malpractice summary-judgment issues. It does not construe, explain, or determine the legal application of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Jordan Jones & Goulding, Inc. v. Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural and factual account to explain that Newell attached an expert affidavit. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or otherwise construe or apply it; the holding concerned the statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25. opinion →
ALVISTA HEALTHCARE CENTER, INC. v. Miller, the statute is mentioned only in a hypothetical description of the consequence of the dissent's analysis. The court did not construe, apply, or rule on any requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Krachman v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing the trial court’s ruling on Dr. Shipman’s motion; the appellate court expressly states that this portion of the order was not at issue on appeal and does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
GRAYROBINSON, PA v. Smith, the court expressly declined to decide whether the expert affidavit satisfied § 9-11-9.1, so the statute was mentioned only as an unaddressed issue. opinion →
Guerrero v. McDonald, the statute appears only in a footnote describing a filing made with the complaint. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning § 9-11-9.1; the case is decided on malpractice causation and professional-judgment grounds. opinion →
Naik v. Booker, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote identifying the affidavit filed with the complaint and describing which experts addressed negligence and causation. The court did not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1; its holding concerned whether the expert evidence created a genuine issue on medical-malpractice causation and summary judgment. opinion →
Barrett v. Georgia Department of Transportation, section 9-11-9.1 is cited in a footnote as support for the DOT's argument that an expert affidavit was required. The appellate court affirmed summary judgment on other grounds and expressly found it unnecessary to address the expert-affidavit issue, so it did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Hope v. Kranc, the court did not construe or explain OCGA § 9-11-9.1. Its substantive analysis concerned the expert-qualification requirements of OCGA § 24-9-67.1; § 9-11-9.1 was mentioned only as part of the procedural description of the dismissal. opinion →
Vaughan v. Wellstar Health System, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history and as the context for an expert affidavit. The court's analysis and holding concern the expert's qualifications under OCGA § 24-9-67.1, not the meaning or application of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Sharp Engineering v. Luis, the concurrence mentions § 9-11-9.1(g) only to compare the scope of Georgia's statute with Texas's statute; the court did not construe or apply the Georgia provision. opinion →
Sharp Engineering v. Luis, the statute appears only in a concurring opinion’s footnote as an example for comparing Texas’s statute and is not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
Sowerby v. Doyal, the opinion cites § 9-11-9.1(a) only in a footnote to identify the procedural basis for Sowerby's motion and report what occurred below; the court does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Bruscato v. O'BRIEN, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only as one policy reason for declining to apply the impact rule in a medical-malpractice case. It did not decide the statute's requirements, scope, or application to this action. opinion →
Epco Holdings, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the opinion discusses Georgia's statute only as a comparison to Texas's certificate-of-merit statute and does not construe or apply Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1(b). opinion →
Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report the trial court’s and an earlier appeal’s rulings; this opinion does not decide what the statute means or how it applies. opinion →
EPCO Holdings, Inc and Enterprise Products Operating LLC v. Chicago Bridge and Iron Company and Howe-Baker Engineers, LT, the court decided the meaning and application of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 150.002(c), not Georgia Code § 9-11-9.1(b). The Georgia statute appears only in a comparative footnote, and the opinion reports a Georgia case as persuasive analogy rather than construing or applying the Georgia statute. opinion →
Deen v. Pounds, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to report that the plaintiff filed an expert affidavit with her complaint. It does not construe the statute, address what it requires, or decide compliance with it. opinion →
Roberts v. Connell, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to identify the statutory basis for attaching the expert affidavit. The court does not interpret or decide any requirement under § 9-11-9.1; its holding concerns informed consent under OCGA § 31-9-6.1. opinion →
Hawkins v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc., the opinion reports the prior ruling in its procedural history and mentions § 9-11-9.1 to describe the earlier motion and decision; this appeal does not itself construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Ladner v. Northside Hospital, Inc., the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to identify the statutory basis for an affidavit relied on by Ladner; it neither interprets nor applies the statute's affidavit requirements and resolves the appeal on lack of causation evidence. opinion →
Peterson v. Reeves, the court cites § 9-11-9.1 only to note procedural compliance with the expert-affidavit requirement and in passing discussion of expert testimony; it does not construe or decide the statute’s meaning, scope, or application. opinion →
Botes v. Weintraub, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to distinguish its expert-testimony discussion from the statute’s pleading requirement, expressly stating that the statutory pleading requirement is not at issue. opinion →
Botes v. Weintraub, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to distinguish its complaint-attachment requirement from the expert-testimony requirement at summary judgment, expressly stating that the statutory pleading requirement is not at issue. opinion →
Mayor of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., the court cites § 9-11-9.1 only by analogy when explaining the de novo standard of review for recusal-related legal-sufficiency rulings; it does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Raoul Lynch v. Sheriff Theodore Jackson, the court mentioned § 9-11-9.1(a) only to describe the expert-affidavit requirement that would have applied in state court. The case was removed, and the negligence claim was decided under federal pleading standards, so the court did not construe or apply the Georgia statute. opinion →
Brewton v. Kriten Poss, the opinion cites § 9-11-9.1 only in a footnote as a comparison to an earlier decision while construing OCGA § 19-7-22. It does not decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Brewton v. Poss, the statute appears only in a footnote as part of a comparison to Opensided MRI while the court construes OCGA § 19-7-22. Brewton does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Postell v. Hankla, the court cited § 9-11-9.1 (g) (11) and (12) only in a footnote as supporting authority for the proposition that medical doctors and nurses are separate professions. The court did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 9-11-9.1; its holding concerned the expert-qualification requirements in § 24-9-67.1 (c) (2) (D). opinion →
Postell v. Hankla, the opinion cites § 9-11-9.1(g)(11) and (12) only in a footnote as support for the proposition that medical doctors and nurses are separate professions. The court’s holding concerns the expert-qualification requirements of OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c)(2)(D), not the meaning or application of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Major Fortson v. Render C. Freeman, the statute appears only in the procedural history to report what the court decided in an earlier appeal; this order does not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1 and instead dismisses the present appeals on jurisdictional and procedural grounds. opinion →
Major Fortson v. Render C. Freeman, the opinion merely reports the court’s disposition in an earlier appeal and cites § 9-11-9.1 (a) as the basis for that earlier dismissal; it does not interpret or apply the statute in the present order. opinion →
The Medical Center, Inc. v. Knight, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote supporting a general statement about nursing standards and qualifications. The court does not interpret § 9-11-9.1, determine its requirements or coverage, or apply it to decide the appeal. opinion →
Knight v. Roberts, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 (g) (12) only in a footnote quoting and citing Grady General Hospital v. King as background for the proposition that nursing is subject to professional standards and qualifications. The court does not construe or apply this statute to decide an issue in Knight v. Roberts. opinion →
Bacon County Hospital & Health System v. Whitley, the court recites § 9-11-9.1(a)'s affidavit requirement and mentions subsection (g) while addressing the case, but it does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. The actual holding concerns the expert-qualification requirements in OCGA § 24-9-67.1(c), particularly the same-profession requirement. opinion →
Aguilar v. Children's Healthcare of Atlanta, Inc., the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 in a footnote describing the affidavit requirement and states that the expert-competence standard applies to affiants under that statute, but the court's decision concerns the expert's qualifications under OCGA § 24-9-67.1 rather than construing or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Spivey v. Qore, Inc., the court merely mentions § 9-11-9.1 to describe affidavits attached to the complaints; it does not interpret or decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Coffee Iron Works v. Qore, Inc., the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only as part of describing the plaintiffs’ professional-negligence complaints and attached affidavits. It does not decide what the statute means, requires, or how it applies; the holding concerns res judicata and collateral estoppel. opinion →
Bonds v. Nesbitt, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history concerning the filing of a plaintiff’s affidavit; the court does not interpret, explain, or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Bonds v. Nesbitt, the opinion mentions the § 9-11-9.1 affidavit only in recounting the procedural history of discovery. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue concerning the statute. opinion →
Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. v. Kemp, the statute appears only in a passage quoting attorney Sapp's letter and describing the parties' conduct; the court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1, and its ruling concerned witness-tampering sanctions. opinion →
Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. v. Kemp, the statute is mentioned only in a quoted letter describing the expert affidavit; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, Inc., the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to report that the plaintiff had dismissed estate claims for failure to file a medical affidavit; the court did not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Johnson v. Jones, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural description of the complaint's asserted compliance with the professional-negligence affidavit requirement. The court did not construe or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Johnson v. Jones, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural description of the complaint's attached affidavit; the court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Cooksey v. Landry, the statute is cited only in recounting appellees’ argument that the records were needed to prepare the expert affidavit; the court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Cooksey v. Landry, the statute is cited only in describing appellees’ argument about the expert affidavit needed to initiate a medical-malpractice claim. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Cope v. Evans, the opinion merely reports that the plaintiff filed an affidavit under the statute and explains why that affidavit did not create a factual issue. The court does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1's requirements; it reverses on the absence of expert evidence establishing a breach of the medical standard of care and the plaintiff's disclaimer of reliance on the affidavit. opinion →
Melissa Dempsey F/K/A Melissa Watson v. Gwinnett Health System, Inc. D/B/A Gwinnett Medical Center, the court’s holding concerned expert-witness qualification under OCGA § 24-7-702. It mentioned § 9-11-9.1(g)(12) only as interpretive support in deciding whether a certified nurse midwife and registered nurse were members of the same profession, without construing or applying the affidavit statute itself. opinion →
DAVIS Et Al. v. OSINUGA Et Al., the statute is mentioned only in the procedural and factual background to describe the affidavit filed with the complaint; the court decides the case under the continuance statutes and does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Dubois v. Brantley, the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 to identify the affidavit requirement and report that the plaintiffs filed affidavits. The court does not interpret or apply that statute; its holding concerns expert qualification under OCGA § 24-7-702(c)(2)(A). opinion →
Dubois v. Brantley, the opinion mentions and reproduces § 9-11-9.1 only to describe the malpractice-affidavit filing in the procedural background. The court's decision construes OCGA § 24-7-702 regarding expert qualification, not § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Wong v. Chappell, the statute is mentioned only while distinguishing the Peterson precedent and recounting that case’s procedural history; this opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Brantley v. Dubois, the statute is mentioned only in describing the prior appeal and the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to satisfy an affidavit requirement; this opinion reports the Supreme Court’s reversal and affirms the resulting judgment without interpreting or applying § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Brantley v. Dubois, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to describe the basis for an earlier judgment that was later reversed by the Supreme Court; this opinion does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
SMITH Et Al. v. DANSON Et Al., section 9-11-9.1 appears only in the dissent’s footnotes while discussing the trial court’s observations about the expert affidavit; the appellate court did not decide whether the affidavit satisfied the statute or otherwise construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Snuggs v. Rose, the statute is mentioned only to report the apparent basis for the trial court’s dismissal; the Court of Appeals decided only that the application was untimely and did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Jasarevic v. Foster III, the statute appears in the defendants’ argument, a footnote quoting subsection (a), and the procedural history, but the Court expressly says it does not reach the issue; therefore the opinion makes no holding about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Jasarevic v. Foster, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 (a), and its footnote quotes the subsection, but expressly declines to decide whether the affidavit requirement applied because the issue was moot. opinion →
The Estate of Robert Hunter Nixon v. Barber, the statute appears only in a footnote describing the expert affidavit attached to the complaint; the court did not decide the statute’s meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Atlantic Geoscience, Inc. v. Phoenix Development & Land Investment, LLC, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only in passing to note that the professional-malpractice claim remains subject to the expert-affidavit requirement; it did not decide whether the requirement was satisfied, explain its scope, or otherwise construe the statute. opinion →
SOUTHEASTERN PAIN SPECIALISTS, P.C. v. BROWN (Three Cases), the court cited § 9-11-9.1 (a) only in a parenthetical summarizing an earlier decision; it did not interpret or apply the statute in deciding this appeal. opinion →
Se. Pain Specialists, P.C. v. Brown, the court cited § 9-11-9.1(a) only in a parenthetical summarizing Lamb's holding that no expert affidavit was required for simple negligence; this case decided the ordinary-negligence-versus-medical-malpractice jury-instruction issue and did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Meunier Carlin & Curfman, LLC v. Scidera, Inc., Incidental: § 9-11-9.1 appears only in a parenthetical description of a cited district-court decision, within a string cite supporting this court's holding that § 9-10-112 conflicts with Federal Rule 8(b). This court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Tenet Health System Gb, Inc. v. Thomas, the statute appears only in the hospital’s argument concerning an unadjudicated expert-affidavit defense. The trial court did not decide the issue, and the Supreme Court expressly declined to express an opinion on it. opinion →
Tenet HealthSystem GB, Inc. v. Thomas, the statute was mentioned only as part of an argument the hospital raised and the court expressly declined to decide whether it applied; the holding concerned relation back under OCGA § 9-11-15(c). opinion →
Lucky Capital Management, LLC v. Miller & Martin, PLLC, the statute is mentioned in a footnote and in the plaintiff’s quoted pleading only to explain the affidavit’s procedural treatment. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or how it applies; it decided the claim’s assignability under § 44-12-24. opinion →
Edokpolor v. Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation, the statute is mentioned to describe the affidavit attached to the malpractice complaint. The court did not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1; it decided that the expert's causation testimony was conclusory and that summary judgment was proper. opinion →
HUDDLE Et Al. v. HEINDEL., the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 only to report that the appellants attached an expert affidavit to their complaint. The court does not construe, explain, or decide any issue concerning the statute's requirements. opinion →
Glover v. Atkinson-Sneed, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history as the basis for the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The appellate court did not decide whether § 9-11-9.1 required an affidavit, whether the affidavit was valid, or whether the motion should have been granted; the court’s analysis addressed expert-witness disclosure under § 9-11-26. opinion →
Lucky Capital Management, LLC v. Miller & Martin, PLLC, the opinion only recounts the statute in describing the complaint and the plaintiff’s position about the affidavit requirement; the court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or whether it applies. opinion →
Warren Averett, LLC v. Landcastle Acquisition Corporation, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing a filing made below; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about the statute. opinion →
EDWARDS v. MOORE Et Al., the statute is mentioned only to describe the procedural filing of an expert affidavit. The court does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Leeper v. Safebuilt Georgia, Inc., the opinion mentions § 9-11-9.1 (b) only in a footnote summarizing the holding of Schofill v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or how it applies; it used the cited case only as an example of the specific-statute-over-general-statute principle in its analysis of §§ 9-11-6 and 9-11-55. opinion →
Dietzen v. Radiology Associates of Atlanta, P.C., the statute is mentioned only to identify the procedural history of Dietzen's amended complaint and accompanying affidavit; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Irving A. Harned, Jr. v. Piedmont Healthcare Foundation, Inc., the opinion only reports the trial court’s dismissal and Piedmont’s argument concerning the expert-affidavit requirement; the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
ATLANTA WOMEN'S SPECIALISTS, LLC v. TRABUE (Five Cases), the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as part of an additional argument that the court expressly declined to address because it was outside the questions presented on certiorari; the opinion does not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
KNAPIK v. UNITED STATES OF DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, the court mentioned the statute in a footnote while discussing Georgia malpractice affidavit requirements; it did not decide whether the plaintiffs complied with § 9-11-9.1, construe its operation, or base the judgment on it. The summary judgment ruling rested on the absence of expert evidence. opinion →
Smith v. Goldberg, the court mentions the statute’s affidavit requirement but expressly says it was not the basis of the ruling and was irrelevant to the summary-judgment determination; the court did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
JAMISON v. UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S SERVICE, the statute is mentioned only in the plaintiff’s motion requesting an affidavit. The court reports and denies that motion without deciding what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Smith v. United States, the court merely noted that the complaint alleged compliance with Georgia’s medical-malpractice pleading requirements and cited § 9-11-9.1. It did not construe the statute, decide what it requires, or resolve any issue under it. opinion →
Department of Transportation v. Mixon, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report the trial court's dismissal of professional-negligence claims; the Supreme Court did not construe or apply OCGA § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
CHYBICKI v. COFFEE REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., the statute is mentioned only in describing the plaintiffs' argument about an affidavit. The court rejects the causation evidence on the ground that the nurse was not qualified to give the opinion; it does not construe or decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
Amason v. Highland Park Homeowners' Association, Inc., the statute is mentioned only in a parenthetical describing why an earlier malpractice case was dismissed; this opinion does not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
HARDWICK v. CORRECTHEALTH BIBB LLC, the court cites § 9-11-9.1 in a string cite while stating the general rule that expert testimony is required to prove breach. It does not interpret the statute or decide anything about its affidavit requirement, scope, or application. opinion →
Roether v. State of Georgia, the court merely reports that SGMC sought dismissal under the statute; it does not analyze, interpret, or apply § 9-11-9.1, and the motions were denied at that stage while plaintiffs were given leave to replead. opinion →
ELLIS v. OLES, the court merely recounted Ellis's characterization of her claims and her failure to file an affidavit; it did not decide whether § 9-11-9.1 applied or otherwise construe the statute. opinion →
ARBOR MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC v. HENDRIX, the statute appears only in the procedural history as part of AMS’s argument about the need for an expert affidavit; the appellate court did not decide that issue or otherwise construe § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
WILLIAMS v. DEKALB COUNTY, the court did not construe or apply Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-9.1. It mentioned the statute in a footnote only to clarify that its holding about affidavits attached to answers did not alter the separate requirement for affidavits attached to professional-malpractice complaints. opinion →
Beatty v. Trace T. Palmer, the opinion only reports that the trial court granted a motion based on alleged noncompliance with § 9-11-9.1; the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Smith v. The United States of America, the statute is mentioned only to identify the affidavit attached to the amended complaint in the procedural background. The court does not construe, explain, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
HOWELL v. COCHRAN, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 (a) to describe the procedural requirement for filing a malpractice complaint and the origin of the expert affidavit; it does not decide any disputed issue about the statute, and the holding concerns the expert’s qualifications under OCGA § 24-7-702. opinion →
Roether v. State of Georgia, the statute appears only in the background as a ground on which SGMC sought dismissal. The court did not construe or apply § 9-11-9.1; it dismissed the complaint because it was a shotgun pleading. opinion →
In the Matter of Brian Walton Whiteside, the statute is mentioned only in the factual and procedural history to describe the attorney's failure to file the required expert affidavit and the special master's criticism of his handling of the malpractice case. The Court did not construe or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1; it decided the appropriate disciplinary sanction. opinion →
Myrick v. Fulton County, Georgia, the court merely mentioned § 9-11-9.1 while describing the affidavit attached to the complaint; it did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
BROWN v. COLUMBUS POLICE DEPARTMENT, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote describing an earlier ruling that the court expressly says was erroneous, followed by the correction of that ruling. This order does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or require. opinion →
Zephaniah v. Georgia Clinic, P.C., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote reporting the holding of the court’s earlier decision in this case. The present opinion does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires; it decides consent for the battery claim and expert testimony for causation in the negligence claim. opinion →
WISE BUSINESS FORMS INCORPORATED v. FORSYTH COUNTY, the opinion expressly says the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the Court of Appeals’ ruling concerning the expert-affidavit requirement under § 9-11-9.1. The statute is mentioned only in describing the lower-court proceedings and an issue outside the scope of review, so this court made no holding about the statute. opinion →
WISE BUSINESS FORMS INCORPORATED v. FORSYTH COUNTY, the statute is mentioned only to report the Court of Appeals’ ruling, and the Supreme Court expressly states that ruling was outside the scope of certiorari; this opinion does not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires. opinion →
PRIESTER v. C. ERIC TURNER, the statute is mentioned only while recounting the holding and procedural outcome in Holloway; this opinion does not interpret or apply § 9-11-9.1, and its decision concerns the separate nature of a loss-of-consortium claim. opinion →
COX-OTT v. BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history to report that Cynthia submitted an expert affidavit; the court did not construe or decide anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
McQueen v. Long, the statute appears only in the description of Long’s argument and the procedural history of the trial court’s dismissal. The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded because the trial court’s ruling did not explain its treatment of the motion after disqualifying Long’s counsel; it did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 requires or whether it applied. opinion →
ANDREANA WILLIAMS, CONSERVATOR v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC, the statute is mentioned only in the procedural history and in reporting the parties' arguments about objections to the expert affidavit. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires, and its disposition rested on the statute of limitations and the characterization of the claims as professional negligence. opinion →
PERRY v. EMORY HEALTHCARE SERVICES MANAGEMENT, LLC, the statute appears only as an unadjudicated alternative ground asserted by the defendants. The trial court did not rule on that ground, and the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address it, so the opinion does not hold anything about § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
COLEMAN v. GRENDA, the statute appears only in a footnote describing an argument the defendants made below; the trial court did not reach it, and the appellate court did not decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Kennestone Hospital, Inc. v. Turner, the statute is mentioned only in the dissent’s statement of a general motion-to-dismiss standard for expert affidavits, citing Graham. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means or requires; the judgment addressed immunity under the Georgia COVID-19 Pandemic Business Safety Act and the PREP Act. opinion →
Doe v. Augusta University, the court did not decide these questions. It listed them for the Magistrate Judge to address on remand when assessing whether Plaintiff had a meritorious claim for Rule 60 relief. opinion →
ALKAMEL v. PIEDMONT HOSPITAL, INC., the opinion only reports that the defendants and trial court relied on § 9-11-9.1 (a) in the underlying dismissal. The Court of Appeals decided the appeal on jurisdiction and timeliness, without construing or applying the statute. opinion →
Doe v. Augusta University, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1(a) only while recounting questions identified in an earlier remand order. Its own discussion refers only generally to unmet Georgia pre-suit requirements and does not construe or expressly decide the meaning, scope, or application of § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
METRO AMBULANCE SERVICES, INC. v. JORAY ANTHONY WRIGHT, the court expressly declined to decide whether subsection (g) applies to paramedics and upheld the jury charge on other grounds, so the statute’s citation and the discussion of Harrell were incidental. opinion →
Johnson v. Aprio, LLP, the statute is mentioned only in a footnote recounting the procedural history of an earlier voluntarily dismissed action. The court did not decide what § 9-11-9.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Teresa Marie Rarick and Richard Dee Rarick v. Wesley Smidt And Des Moines Orthopaedic Surgeons, Pc, the concurrence cites § 9-11-9.1(e) in a footnote as an example of another state's medical-malpractice affidavit cure provision while interpreting Iowa Code § 147.140. It does not decide what the Georgia statute means or how it applies. opinion →
Hunter Contracting Co. v. Superior Court, the court mentions § 9-11-9.1 only in a footnote as part of a citation to a Georgia case from another jurisdiction; it does not adopt or analyze that case's statement about the statute. opinion →
RTC Mortgage Trust 1994 N-1 v. Fidelity National Title Insurance, the court describes Georgia's affidavit requirement only to contrast it with New Jersey's statute in an Erie/Hanna analysis; it does not decide or apply a question of Georgia statutory law. opinion →
Hubbard v. Reed, the court describes § 9-11-9.1 only in a comparative-law footnote discussing similar affidavit-of-merit statutes; it does not construe, apply, or adopt a holding about the Georgia statute. opinion →
Gorney v. Meaney, the statute appears only in a footnote string citation listing Georgia among states with similar medical-malpractice legislation; the court neither interprets nor applies § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Ezor v. Thompson, the court decided the self-contradictory testimony rule, not § 9-11-9.1's own requirements or limits. opinion →
Brantley v. Dubois, the court decided the expert-qualification requirements of OCGA § 24-7-702 (c); § 9-11-9.1 only supplied the affidavit vehicle. opinion →
Acosta v. SMART Alabama, LLC, the Court did not decide § 9-11-9.1's rules; it only noted that the defendants had not explained why the plaintiff could not attach the required affidavit. opinion →
WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC, the court used § 9-11-9.1 only in deciding the rational-basis challenge to § 9-3-73(b) and did not decide § 9-11-9.1’s own meaning, requirements, procedure, or limits. opinion →
Baskette v. Atlanta Center for Reproductive Medicine, LLC, the court decides whether the claims fall under the medical malpractice statute of limitation, not the affidavit requirements or professional list in § 9-11-9.1. opinion →
Dempsey v. Gwinnett Hospital System, Inc., the court used § 9-11-9.1 as an aid in deciding expert-witness qualifications under § 24-7-702; it did not decide the affidavit section’s own rules. opinion →
ODUOK v. FULTON DeKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY Et Al., the selected quote distinguishes counts without showing that intentional misconduct supplies the statutory dividing line. opinion →

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