Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Section 16-5-21 permits separate aggravated assault convictions when different weapons cause multiple wounds to the same victim.

Morey v. State · filed 2011-11-03

But multiple wounds on the same victim resulting from different weapons will support convictions for more than one offense.

Under § 16-5-21(a)(2), two shots fired at the same victim in quick succession without a deliberate interval constitute one act of assault.

Benn v. State · filed 2011-04-19(a)(2)

Because Benn fired two shots at the peace officer in quick succession without any “deliberate interval” between the shots, this constituted only one act of assault, not two acts.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon do not merge because each requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Thomas v. State · filed 2013-02-18(a)(1), (a)(2)

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of a fact — the intent to rob — that aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of a fact — the use of a deadly weapon — that aggravated assault with intent to rob does not.

Aggravated assault with intent to murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon do not merge when each charge, as indicted, requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Howard v. State · filed 2015-10-23(a)(1), (a)(2)

Under the required evidence test, Howard’s two aggravated assault convictions (Counts 3 and 7) did not merge.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into aggravated assault by discharging a firearm from a moving vehicle when both charges arise from the same shooting.

Adkins v. State · filed 2017-05-15(b)(4)

Count 9 required proof of something Count 8 did not: that Adkins shot a gun from a moving vehicle, toward a person or persons, without legal justification. But the converse is not true; there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in aggravated assault by discharging a weapon from a moving vehicle.

Aggravated assault counts requiring the same elements merge when the injuries result from one act with no deliberate interval.

Huitron v. State · filed 2017-06-19(b)(2)

Both aggravated assault counts required proof of the same elements — an assault with a deadly object. And there was no evidence of a deliberate interval between Esmerelda’s eye and brain injuries and her skull injury; indeed, the evidence indicates that all of these injuries likely resulted from the same act — one or both of the Appellants hitting Esmerelda’s head against a hard surface. ... Accordingly, Count 11 merges into the felony murder count based on aggravated assault, just as Count 12 did, and we therefore vacate Appellants’ convictions and sentences on Count 11.

Aggravated assault counts under subsection (b)(2) merge when the charged injuries arise from a single act without a deliberate interval.

Gomez v. State · filed 2017-06-19(b)(2)

Both aggravated assault counts required proof of the same elements — an assault with a deadly object. ... Accordingly, Count 11 merges into the felony murder count based on aggravated assault, just as Count 12 did, and we therefore vacate Appellants’ convictions and sentences on Count 11.

Each distinct assault with a deadly weapon is a separate unit of prosecution; assaults separated by time and place do not merge.

State v. OWENS (And Vice Versa) · filed 2021-08-10(a)(2)

The unit of prosecution is thus the assault with the deadly weapon. It is clear here that there were two assaults separated by a significant period of time, in different locations, and with separate potential injuries to the victim.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape and aggravated assault by strangulation do not merge under the required evidence test because each requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Wilkins v. State · filed 2023-08-17(a)(1), (a)(3)

Here, aggravated assault with intent to rape requires proof of a fact - intent to rape - that aggravated assault based on strangulation does not. Likewise, aggravated assault based on strangulation requires proof that a defendant used “an object, device, or instrument,” in an offensive manner, which “likely or actually does result in strangulation,” whereas aggravated assault with intent to rape does not.

Aggravated assault with intent to murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon do not merge when each offense, as charged, requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Howard III v. State · filed 2015-10-23(a)(1), (a)(2)

Under the required evidence test, Howard’s two aggravated assault convictions (Counts 3 and 7) did not merge.

Aggravated assault with a knife does not require proof of specific intent; when the same stabbing proves attempted murder, the aggravated assault conviction merges into it.

Kelley v. State · filed 1991-09-03(a)(2)

Consequently, each crime was established by proof of the same facts, except that criminal attempt required proof that defendant intended to commit murder whereas assault with the knife, as charged, did not require proof of specific intent. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Therefore, the aggravated assault conviction merged into the criminal attempt to commit murder conviction.

Family violence is an element of aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(k), so a verdict alleging that element does not merge into a malice murder verdict involving the same victim.

Jeffrey v. State · filed 2015-03-16(k)

Accordingly, because the aggravated assault counts here all allege family violence as an essential element, these offenses require proof of a fact that the malice murder count does not, and the guilty verdicts on these counts do not merge into the malice murder verdict.

A family violence aggravated assault under subsection (k) does not merge into a murder conviction for the same victim.

Jeffrey v. State · filed 2015-03-16(k)

In addition, while ordinarily, in the case of a single victim in a single transaction, an aggravated assault verdict will merge into a verdict for murder, see Ortiz, 291 Ga. at 6, this is not so when the aggravated assault involves family violence as defined in OCGA § 16-5-21 (k).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of intent to rob; aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof that a deadly weapon was used. The distinct elements can prevent merger with a felony murder conviction.

Norris v. State · filed 2018-01-29(a)(1), (a)(2)

To prove the crime of aggravated assault with the intent to rob, the State was required to show that Norris had the intent to rob. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1). And to prove the felony murder charge as indicted, the State had to prove that Norris caused Patton’s death, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (c), and that he used a deadly weapon, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). Because the two crimes each required proof of one or more facts not required by the other and did not differ only in the degree of injury or culpability, these convictions did not merge, and the trial court did not err in sentencing Norris on both convictions.

Aggravated assault of one victim does not merge into a felony murder conviction involving a different victim.

Simmons v. State · filed 2022-10-25

Therefore, the trial court did not err in not merging the aggravated assault of Tongol (Count 5), a separate victim, into the conviction for the felony murder of Lee.

An aggravated assault proved by a second gunshot does not merge into an aggravated battery proved by the first gunshot when the evidence proving each crime is separate.

Grace v. State · filed 1993-02-18(a)(2)

The evidence used to prove the commission of the aggravated assault was not used at all in proving the commission of the aggravated battery and thus there is no merit to Grace's contention that the aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery.

Aggravated assault merges into aggravated battery when the same evidence supports both charges, so a separate sentence for aggravated assault is improper.

Riden v. State · filed 1997-04-23

The trial court erred in failing to merge Riden’s convictions for aggravated assault (OCGA § 16-5-21) and aggravated battery (OCGA § 16-5-24). ... Inasmuch as the same evidence was used to support the indictments for both offenses, the trial court erred in sentencing Riden on the aggravated assault count, the lesser included offense.

Aggravated assault merges as a matter of fact into aggravated battery when the same attack supports both offenses and the battery requires additional proof of serious bodily disfigurement.

Emberson v. State · filed 2005-02-24(a)(2)

Under the circumstances, however, the aggravated assault merged as a matter of fact into the aggravated battery, which required additional proof that striking the victim with the machete caused serious bodily disfigurement.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) does not require proof of every strike alleged in the indictment and merges into aggravated battery for sentencing when the same attack establishes both offenses.

Allen v. State · filed 2010-02-01(a)(2)

Notwithstanding these circumstances, however, the applicable aggravated assault provision did not require proof that, in addition to striking the victim’s head, Allen struck the victim’s chest. ... Because the aggravated assault was therefore a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery, the trial court erred by not merging them for sentencing purposes.

Aggravated assault is complete when the defendant strikes the victim with a hammer and disables her; a later, separate attack may support a separate aggravated battery conviction.

Brockington v. State · filed 2012-05-31(a)(2)

After he hit the victim in the leg with a hammer and rendered her disabled, he had completed the aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault committed by pointing a gun at a victim does not merge with aggravated batteries resulting from separate later acts.

Thomas v. State · filed 2014-02-06(a)(2)

It follows that Thomas’s initial act of pointing the gun at Lopez’s head, an aggravated assault, was a separate act from the ensuing acts of aggravated battery. ... Accordingly, the crimes do not merge.

Aggravated assault with intent to murder does not merge with aggravated battery when each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Busby v. the State · filed 2015-07-08(a)(1)

The trial court did not err in sentencing Busby separately for aggravated assault with intent to murder, as well as two counts of aggravated battery.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) does not merge with aggravated battery because the offenses require different elements of proof, even when they arise from the same act.

Regent v. the State · filed 2015-07-13(a)(2)

“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). ... Since aggravated assault and aggravated battery are two separate offenses with different elements of proof, the charges do not merge, and it is irrelevant that both crimes stemmed from a single act or series of continuous acts.2 ... Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to merge Regent’s convictions for sentencing purposes.

Aggravated assault merges into aggravated battery when both charges arise from one criminal act and differ only in the seriousness of the injury or risk of injury.

Regent v. State · filed 2016-06-06(b)(2)

Accordingly, as charged here, aggravated assault is included in aggravated battery, and the two offenses should have merged.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merges into aggravated battery when, as charged, it requires no fact beyond those needed to prove the battery.

EVANS v. the STATE. · filed 2018-01-22(a)(2)

Applying this test to the indictments in this case, we find that the aggravated assault conviction is a lesser included offense of the aggravated battery conviction.

Aggravated assault by pointing a firearm is complete before a later shooting when a deliberate interval separates the acts, allowing separate convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery.

Crider v. State · filed 2020-07-13(a)(2)

These facts show that the aggravated assault was completed before the battery took place. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (defining assault with a deadly weapon); OCGA § 16-5-21 (k) (2015) (defining family violence aggravated assault). Thus, there was a deliberate interval between Crider’s aggravated assault and her aggravated battery.

An aggravated assault conviction does not merge with an aggravated battery conviction when a deliberate interval separates the acts supporting the offenses.

Wilkey v. State · filed 2023-06-20(a)(2)

Thus, “the evidence shows a pause sufficient to constitute a deliberate interval,” and there is no merger.

Section 16-5-21 does not make aggravated assault a capital felony.

Hill v. State · filed 1993-03-15

In its initial explanatory comments, the court told the jury that aggravated assault is a capital felony. Of course, it is not. OCGA § 16-5-21.

Aggravated assault under § 16-5-21 does not include the elements of interference with government property, so the offenses do not merge on that basis.

Hyman v. State · filed 1996-07-22

Furthermore, the elements of interference with government property are not included in the elements required for aggravated assault. Compare OCGA §§ 16-5-21 and 16-7-24 (a).

Aggravated assault merges with kidnapping with bodily injury as a lesser included offense, so a separate aggravated assault sentence must be vacated.

Herring v. State · filed 1997-02-07

Aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of, and is accordingly merged with, the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury.

Aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) is complete when a simple assault is committed with a deadly weapon likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively; it does not merge with kidnapping when the crimes require different evidence.

Phanamixay v. State · filed 2003-03-11(a)(2)

And under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), “aggravated assault is complete when a simple assault is committed with a deadly weapon which, when used offensively' against a person, is likely to result in serious bodily injury.” ... The aggravated assaults occurred when deadly weapons were pointed at the victims. The evidence required to convict Phanamixay on the aggravated assault charges differed from that required to prove the kidnapping charges. Consequently, Phanamixay’s argument that those two crimes merged must fail.

Aggravated assault does not factually merge into kidnapping when separate conduct supports each offense.

Owens v. State · filed 2005-01-21(a)(2)

“Under those circumstances, the aggravated assault was supported by facts separate from the kidnapping . . . and would not, therefore, be included as a matter of fact in” the kidnapping offense.

Aggravated assault does not merge with kidnapping when the assault occurs first and is unnecessary to accomplish the kidnapping.

Williams v. State · filed 2008-11-26(a)(2)

The record shows that the assault occurred prior to the kidnapping. Further, assault was not necessary to accomplish the kidnapping. Consequently, the crimes do not merge as a matter of fact.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge as a matter of law with kidnapping because each offense requires proof of an element the other does not.

Verdree v. State · filed 2009-08-10(a)(2)

As shown in footnotes 9 and 10, supra, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon has at least one distinct required element which kidnapping does not, and vice versa. Therefore, because each offense requires proof of at least one fact which the other does not, neither crime is included in the other, and the crimes do not merge as a matter of law.

Aggravated assault charged as choking with hands does not merge with kidnapping with bodily injury when each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Mayberry v. State · filed 2009-11-23

Aggravated assault as charged in this case required proof that the victim used his hands, with either the intent to cause a violent injury or which placed the victim in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury. The kidnapping charge did not require such proof. Because each of the two crimes at issue requires proof of at least one fact which the other does not and the State provided such proof the crimes do not merge, and the trial court correctly sentenced Mayberry for both offenses.

A victim’s age of at least 65 enhances the penalty under § 16-5-21(d); it is not an element of aggravated assault.

Howard v. State · filed 1998-02-03(d)

The General Assembly enacted the age-related provisions of the aggravated assault statute “so as to change the penalty provisions relating to persons convicted of the crime[ ] of aggravated assault.” Ga. L. 1984, p. 900. Thus, proof that the victim was at least 65 years old was not necessary to establish a prima facie case of aggravated assault.

Subsection (d)'s victim-age requirement can be proved through the jury’s observation of the victim and unobjected testimony that she was 91.

Usher v. State · filed 2008-04-02(d)

In this case, in addition to the jury’s ability to deduce the victim’s approximate age from its observation of her appearance and demeanor, a detective testified, without objection, that the victim was 91 years old. This enumeration lacks merit.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) does not require corroborating evidence.

Maloy v. State · filed 1999-04-14(a)(2)

Nor is corroboration required to prove aggravated assault, proscribed by OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), as alleged in the indictment.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits separate aggravated assault convictions for each person victimized by shots fired into a group, regardless of the number of shots.

Pace v. State · filed 1999-08-03(a)(2)

Pace’s act of firing his weapon into the group made each individual in the group a separate victim. The seven aggravated assault convictions of which Pace was found guilty do not merge because the offenses were committed upon different victims.

Separate aggravated assault counts do not merge when firing into a group makes each person a separate victim.

Sanchez v. State · filed 2003-01-31

We find no merit to Sanchez’s argument. He was found guilty of firing a gun at a mobile home containing seven people. “[Sanchez’s] act of firing his weapon into the group made each individual in the group a separate victim. The seven aggravated assault [charges] of which [Sanchez] was found guilty do not merge because the offenses were committed upon different victims.”

Section 16-5-21(a)(3) permits a separate aggravated assault count for each person in a group fired upon from a motor vehicle; the counts do not merge merely because the shooting was one incident.

Scott v. State · filed 2010-01-25(a)(3)

The court did not err here in refusing to merge the six aggravated assault counts into one count nor in charging the jury that it could find Scott guilty on the six separate counts.

Firing a weapon into a group supports a separate aggravated-assault count for each person in the group.

MARTIN-ARGAW v. State · filed 2011-09-08(a)(2)

It is well settled that “the act of firing a weapon into a group [makes] each individual in the group a separate victim and [justifies] a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim.”

Firing a weapon into a group can support a separate aggravated-assault count for each person in the group.

Jones v. State · filed 2012-10-12(a)(2)

Furthermore, it is well settled that “the act of firing a weapon into a group makes each individual in the group a separate victim and justifies a separate count of aggravated assault for each victim.”

An aggravated assault conviction does not merge with an armed robbery conviction when the offenses were committed against different victims.

Buchanan v. State · filed 2020-12-14

“Because the armed robber[y] and aggravated assault[ counts that Buchanan challenges] were committed against different victims, the crimes do not merge as a matter of law or fact.”

An aggravated assault conviction for intentionally pointing a gun at one person can coexist with a reckless conduct conviction for endangering bystanders by firing the gun.

Robinson v. State · filed 2002-04-10(a)(2)

The jury’s conclusion that Robinson intended to assault Murdock by pointing a gun at him did not preclude it from also finding Robinson criminally negligent in firing that gun outside the club, endangering bystanders.

Deadly-weapon aggravated assault based on an attempted violent injury requires criminal intent; a guilty verdict for it conflicts with a reckless-conduct verdict involving the same act and victim.

Jackson v. State · filed 2003-02-24(a)(2)

Jackson was convicted of felony murder based on an assault, here aggravated into felony status by the use of a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2). ... A finding of guilt on the essential element of criminal intent for aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) thus excludes a finding of guilt based on the essential element of criminal negligence for reckless conduct. ... Looking to the facts in this case, we conclude that the jury's verdict finding Jackson guilty of felony murder predicated upon an OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(1) aggravated assault on Princess Thomas was mutually exclusive of a verdict finding Jackson guilty of involuntary manslaughter predicated upon reckless conduct in regard to the same act involving the same victim at the same instance of time.

An aggravated assault conviction must be reversed alongside a reckless conduct conviction involving the same victim and act when the jury may have based the assault verdict on an intent-to-injure theory.

Reddick v. State · filed 2003-11-18

The verdicts returned by the jury in this case with respect to Counts 4 and 12 are mutually exclusive in the same manner. The indictment asserted both “reckless conduct” in violation of OCGA § 16-5-60 (b) and aggravated assault in violation of OCGA § 16-5-21, without specifying whether the aggravated assault was made in an attempt to commit violent injury, OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), or by placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). ... Even though the trial court charged both parts of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a), under these circumstances, we cannot exclude the possibility that the jury found Reddick guilty of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), thus impermissibly finding that he acted both with criminal intent and with criminal negligence at the same time with respect to the same victim.

An aggravated assault verdict based on attempted violent injury is mutually exclusive with a serious injury by vehicle verdict based on reckless driving.

Dryden v. State · filed 2009-04-28(a)(2)

Accordingly, a verdict of guilt as to aggravated assault is mutually exclusive with a verdict of guilt as to serious injury by vehicle predicated on reckless driving, if the aggravated assault is based on “[a]ttempt[ing] to commit a violent injury to the person of another” under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1).

Displaying a gun to one person and yelling threatening statements at another can constitute aggravated assault under Georgia law.

United States v. Woodard · filed 2010-09-10(a)(2)

Aggravated assault occurs when a person assaults “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) (2010). ... Because Woodard did not object to the PSI’s narration of Woodard displaying a gun to Hill and yelling threatening statements at another person, the district court did not clearly err in finding that those facts constitute aggravated assault under Georgia law.

Firing a gun into the air can establish the intent required for aggravated assault when it places another person in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury; those facts do not warrant a reckless conduct instruction.

Craft v. State · filed 2011-05-31(a)(2)

This is because evidence that a defendant fired a gun into the air, and thereby placed another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, demonstrates the intent required for aggravated assault, not the criminal negligence required for reckless conduct.

Firing at least four shots at a car constitutes aggravated assault when the shooter does not reasonably believe the car poses an imminent threat.

United States v. Brown · filed 2025-08-07(a)(2)

That act qualifies as aggravated assault under Georgia law and meets the requirements for § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) to apply.

Firing weapons at people amounts to felony aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2), (b).

Miller v. State · filed 2026-06-02(a)(2), (b)

Here, the act of Miller and his companions of firing weapons at Williams and other individuals amounted to the felony of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(i) requires a family connection for a conviction under its family violence provision.

Eidson v. State · filed 2003-08-06(i)

The indictment did not charge, nor did the State attempt to prove, the family connection necessary to convict under OCGA § 16-5-21 (i).

Section 16-5-21(i) enhances the penalty for aggravated assault between parents of the same child and supports describing the charge as “family violence” in an indictment.

State v. Barnett · filed 2004-08-05(i)

Furthermore, in this case, the language of the statute supports the use of the term “family violence” in the description of the offense. OCGA § 16-5-21 (i) enhances the penalty for the commission of aggravated assault between persons who are the parents of the same child.

Section 16-5-21(i)’s family violence sentence enhancement requires proof that the defendant and victim are not siblings, which circumstantial evidence may establish.

Outz v. State · filed 2018-02-20(i)

He appeals the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence does not support his convictions because the state failed to prove that the victim was not his sibling, which it was required to do to invoke the family-violence sentence enhancement provisions of the aggravated assault and aggravated battery statutes. But the circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to draw this conclusion.

The family violence aggravated assault sentence enhancement excludes siblings, and circumstantial evidence can establish that the defendant and victim were not siblings.

Outz v. State · filed 2018-02-20(i)

The victim's testimony that she and Outz were romantically involved and had met 10 years before through mutual friends allowed the jury to conclude that they were not siblings.

Section 16-5-21 does not prohibit using prior convictions at sentencing after they were used during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.

Carswell v. State · filed 2003-10-29

There is no restriction in the aggravated assault statute that limits the use of prior convictions to the guilt-innocence phase of trial such that they cannot be used again at the sentencing phase of trial.

The aggravated assault statute does not prevent a defendant’s prior convictions from being used both for impeachment and for sentencing.

Newsome v. State · filed 2008-01-23

This enumeration of error is controlled adversely to Newsome by Carswell v. State ... in which we held that nothing in the aggravated assault statute prevented the use of the defendant’s prior convictions for both impeachment and sentencing.

A juvenile who helps an armed accomplice force a victim into a bedroom and commit sexual battery may be found to have committed aggravated assault, even if he was absent when the accomplice pointed the gun at the victim.

In the Interest of A. J. · filed 2005-04-19(a)(2)

Here, A. J. blocked the victim’s flight, assisted J. H. in pushing her into the bedroom, and committed sexual battery, all while J. H. remained armed with the gun he had pointed at the victim’s head. This evidence is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that A. J. committed aggravated assault.

A defendant may be convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the offense when the evidence supports that finding.

Artis v. State · filed 2009-07-21(a)(2)

Indeed, here, the evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Artis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a party to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Section 16-5-21 covers assault with intent to rob or with a deadly weapon, and a person may be convicted as a party to either form of aggravated assault.

Carter v. State · filed 2016-10-27(b)(1), (b)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he commits an assault with the intent to rob or with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (1), (2). ... Thus, Carter’s conduct before, during, and after the attack was sufficient to authorize the jury to convict him of armed robbery and aggravated assault as a party to the crimes.

Evidence that a defendant participated in an armed robbery and shooting can support an aggravated assault conviction as a party to the crime.

Boyd v. State · filed 2019-06-24(a)(2)

This evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Boyd was guilty, at least as a party of the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment...; that the predicate crime of aggravated assault against Murphy proximately caused Murphy's death, thus supporting Boyd's felony-murder conviction; and that Boyd was guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.

A defendant may be convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a party to the crime when the evidence supports an inference that he shared the shooter’s criminal intent.

Edouard v. State · filed 2025-06-11(a)(2)

Although Hardin shot Hall in the leg, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Edouard shared a common criminal intent with Hardin in this connection. ... Accordingly, the evidence authorized the factfinder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Edouard was a party to the crime of aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(a)(3) permits an aggravated assault conviction when shots fired from a motor vehicle toward bystanders place them in fear of imminent injury.

Adkins v. State · filed 2005-06-06(a)(3)

Adkins was charged with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (3) in that he “did assault persons in the area of 1113 East 37th Street without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward such persons.” ... Clearly, there were victims other than Givens who were placed in fear of receiving imminent injury. ... Applying Jackson v. Virginia, supra, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to authorize Adkins’ conviction for the aggravated assault of individuals other than Givens.

Section 16-5-21(a)(3) covers firing a gun from a motor vehicle toward a person when the gunfire frightens that person.

Hardeman v. State · filed 2006-01-09(a)(3)

Evidence that Hardeman fired a gun in Heard’s direction from within the vehicle in which he was speeding away, thereby frightening her, is sufficient to sustain Hardeman’s conviction for committing aggravated assault upon Heard as defined by OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (3).

Section 16-5-21(a)(3) covers an unjustified discharge of a firearm from a vehicle toward a person when it places that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Browder v. State · filed 2013-11-18(a)(3)

The definition of simple assault is “an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury,” and the evidence is ample to support a finding of assault which is a requisite element of the felony of which Browder was charged: assault “without legal justification by discharging a firearm from within a motor vehicle toward a person or persons.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (3).

Circumstantial evidence can establish that a person discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle toward another person under § 16-5-21(a)(4).

Sullins v. State · filed 2019-05-08(a)(4)

In addition, there was circumstantial evidence to support a finding that, when the Appellant shot a handgun out the window while riding in a car outside Mitchell's apartment, he shot "toward" Mitchell.

Section 16-5-21(a)(4) applies only when a firearm is discharged from within a motor vehicle or immediately after exiting one.

United States v. Jabarri Brown · filed 2025-03-26(a)(4)

That subsection applies only when a firearm is discharged “from within a motor vehicle or after immediately exiting a vehicle.”

An aggravated assault count based on threatening a child with a knife does not merge with a cruelty to children count based on the child witnessing an attack on someone else.

Nealey v. State · filed 2007-05-10(a)(2)

The offenses committed against B. S., however, involved different elements and required different evidence. The aggravated assault conviction arose from evidence that Nealey brandished a knife at B. S. in a threatening manner,... while the cruelty to children conviction arose from evidence that Nealey caused B. S. mental pain by attacking Cochran in her presence.... Thus, the trial court correctly declined to merge the two counts.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape merges into rape when the charged assault can be proved without a fact beyond those needed to prove the rape and the verdict does not establish a separate basis for assault.

Johnson v. State · filed 2009-07-01(a)(1)

Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the aggravated assault with intent to rape charge merged with the rape charge, and the trial court erred in sentencing Johnson separately for aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape does not merge into rape when the assault is completed through a separate act of force before the rape.

Andrews v. State · filed 2014-06-02(a)(1)

Contrary to Andrews’s contention, the aggravated assault did not merge with his rape conviction (Count 3) because the aggravated assault was complete before the rape and it involved a separate and distinct act of force outside of the force necessary to accomplish the rape.

An aggravated assault based on choking does not merge with rape when the choking is a separate act of force that causes injury outside the rape.

Bolden v. the State · filed 2016-02-18

The act of choking the victim was a “separate and distinct” act of “force and intimidation outside that necessary to accomplish the rape” and resulted in injury to the victim outside of the rape, as the victim had marks on her neck. ... Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to merge the convictions for aggravated assault and rape, and the jury was authorized to find Bolden guilty of both rape and aggravated assault under the circumstances.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge with rape for sentencing when the assault occurred before the rape as a separate act.

Mitchell v. State · filed 2016-06-16(b)(2)

We agree with the trial court, however, that the indictment did not allege in Count 3 that the assault with a deadly weapon occurred at the time of the rape, and the facts presented at trial show that Mitchell initially assaulted A. D. with the knife prior to falsely imprisoning A. D. and S. D. in A. D.’s bedroom, demanding to “talk” with her. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by separately sentencing Mitchell on Count 3.

An aggravated assault conviction does not merge with removal of a weapon from a public official when the offenses require proof of different facts.

Taylor v. State · filed 2014-07-07

And the aggravated assault count was not established by the ... same or less than all of the facts required to establish the count of removal of a weapon from an official. Therefore, these counts do not merge.

Aggravated assault with an offensive weapon does not merge with possession of a destructive device with intent to intimidate because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Mason v. State · filed 2011-11-18(a)(2)

Each of these statutory provisions requires proof of a fact that the other does not require: that the weapon function in a certain way and have certain dimensions (possession of a destructive device) versus that the victim was conscious of the risk of immediately receiving a violent injury by Mason’s use of an offensive weapon (aggravated assault).

Aggravated assault is a felony, so the rule of lenity does not apply when it is compared with another felony offense.

ROLLF v. State · filed 2012-03-05(j)

Pretermitting the issue of whether there is any ambiguity in either the statutes defining attempted murder or aggravated assault, both criminal attempt to commit murder and aggravated assault are felonies. ... “[T]he rule of lenity does not apply to convictions for two felony offenses.”

Aggravated assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury addresses different conduct from aggravated stalking, so the rule of lenity does not apply to the two offenses.

Myrick v. State · filed 2014-01-24(a)(2)

Clearly, the aggravated assault and aggravated stalking statutes do not define the same offense and do not address the same criminal conduct, the former offense addressing an assault with an object likely to result in serious bodily injury, and the latter offense addressing the harassment and intimidation of a victim in violation of a bond condition. Thus, no ambiguity exists regarding the statutory provisions at issue in this case, the rule of lenity does not apply, and the trial court committed no error in refusing to modify Myrick’s sentence.

Aggravated assault based on placing a victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury does not require a finding of specific criminal intent toward the victim, so a guilty verdict can coexist with involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct.

State v. Quentin A. Sawyer · filed 2014-03-26(a)(2)

Under the specific circumstances of this case, we find that the jury instructions only gave the jury the choice of finding Sawyer guilty of aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), which does not require a finding of specific criminal intent toward the victim. Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that the jury found that Sawyer acted with specific criminal intent in committing the aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault conviction cannot stand alongside a reckless-conduct involuntary manslaughter conviction when the record leaves open an intent-to-injure basis for the assault verdict.

Springer v. State · filed 2014-06-10(a)

Because we cannot conclusively state that the jury’s aggravated assault verdict “rested exclusively on either criminal negligence or criminal intent so as to eliminate the reasonable probability that the jury might have returned a mutually exclusive verdict by finding [Springer] acted with both criminal intent and criminal negligence at the same time as to the same victim,” we must reverse Springer’s involuntary manslaughter and aggravated assault convictions and remand for a new trial.

Aggravated assault based on placing a victim in reasonable fear of immediate violent injury does not require specific criminal intent toward the victim, so a guilty verdict on that basis can coexist with involuntary manslaughter.

State v. Sawyer · filed 2014-03-26(a)(2)

Under the specific circumstances of this case, we find that the jury instructions only gave the jury the choice of finding Sawyer guilty of aggravated assault based on OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), which does not require a finding of specific criminal intent toward the victim. ... Since the jury’s verdicts were not mutually exclusive, the trial court erred in setting aside Sawyer’s conviction for aggravated assault.

An aggravated assault verdict that does not identify whether the jury found an attempted injury or reasonable apprehension of injury may be mutually exclusive with an involuntary manslaughter verdict based on criminal negligence.

Springer v. the State · filed 2014-07-31(a)

Because an examination of the indictment, the evidence, the jury instructions and the verdict form shows that the jury could have found Springer guilty of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) or (a) (2), “then we must conclude that the jury based the verdict on (a) (1) in determining if the verdict was mutually exclusive.” (Citation omitted.) Sawyer, supra.

An indictment’s additional allegation of a threat to kill is unnecessary to prove aggravated assault with a knife and does not make terroristic threats a lesser included offense.

Petro v. State · filed 2014-05-01(a)(2)

As such, the State was not required to prove a “threat to kill” the girlfriend and ex-boyfriend to establish both the offenses of aggravated assault and terroristic threats, and so the crimes of terroristic threats were not mere lesser included offenses of the crimes of aggravated assault in this case.

Aggravated assault by stabbing with a knife does not merge with a terroristic threats conviction based on a separate threat to kill.

Batchelor v. State · filed 2021-03-16(a)(2)

Here, the offense of terroristic threats was proven by the evidence that Batchelor threatened to kill Martin, and the offense of aggravated assault was proven by the evidence that Batchelor assaulted Martin with a knife by stabbing him. “Accordingly, the two counts did not merge.”

Aggravated assault on a peace officer merges with felony obstruction of a peace officer when the obstruction is established by the same or fewer facts.

Reid v. the State · filed 2016-11-03(d)

The record clearly shows that the crime of obstruction was established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the crime of aggravated assault on a peace officer.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines; courts use Shepard documents to determine whether the conviction was under that subsection.

United States v. Ellis · filed 2018-06-13(a)(2)

Though Morales-Alonso concerned § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, its analysis extends to § 4B1.2. This is because both § 2L1.2 and § 4B1.2 define “crime of violence” by listing the generic offense of “aggravated assault.” Thus, our determination that Georgia aggravated assault qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2 means that it also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.

Aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) has elements equivalent to generic aggravated assault and qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ enumerated offenses clause.

United States v. Huling · filed 2018-07-10(a)(2)

In light of Morales-Alonso, Huling’s Georgia aggravated-assault conviction qualifies as a crime of violence because the elements of § 16-5-21(a)(2) are equivalent to the elements of generic aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with a deadly object under § 16-5-21(a)(2) qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines’ enumerated-offenses clause.

United States v. Patmon · filed 2018-10-05(a)(2)

Thus, our determination in Morales-Alonso that Georgia aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2 means that it also qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.

The 2012 and 2016 versions of § 16-5-21 treat aggravated assault with a deadly weapon identically in the respects relevant to its classification as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.

United States v. Dontavious M. Berry · filed 2020-04-03(a)(2) (2012); (b)(2) (2016)

Here, Mr. Berry’s argument is foreclosed by Morales-Alonso, as that case makes clear that a conviction under Georgia’s 2012 aggravated assault statute, with a deadly weapon, qualifiess as a crime of violence under the enumerated-offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. Furthermore, the 2016 aggravated assault statute is identical in all relevant respects to the 2012 aggravated assault statute.

The deadly weapon element of aggravated assault does not require a mental state greater than recklessness when the underlying simple assault involves apprehension of violent injury.

United States v. Carter · filed 2021-08-03(a)(2)

Nor does the deadly weapon aggravator element of a § 16-5-21(a)(2) aggravated assault conviction import a mens rea requirement greater than recklessness.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon charged by striking or shooting the victim rests on the attempted battery form of simple assault and qualifies as a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ elements clause.

United States v. Barlow · filed 2023-10-04(a)(2)

The charges against Barlow could only aver an attempted battery form of simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(1)—that is, that Barlow “attempt[ed] to commit a violent injury to the person of another.” ... We therefore hold that Barlow’s conviction for aggravated assault necessarily has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, and therefore qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.

A conviction for Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under § 16-5-21(a)(2) qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines’ enumerated offenses clause.

United States v. Morris · filed 2025-10-02(a)(2)

Given our binding precedent and Morris’s admission of crucial facts, we cannot say that the district court erred, plainly or otherwise, in considering Morris’s aggravated assault conviction as a “crime of violence” under 2K2.1(a).

When an aggravated assault charge alleges conduct likely to result in strangulation, the State need not prove that strangulation actually occurred.

Maxwell v. State · filed 2019-02-28(b)(3)

Thus, the State was only required to show that Maxwell had used his hands in a manner likely to result in strangulation.

Evidence satisfying the strangulation element can support an aggravated assault charge under subsection (a)(3).

Sutton v. State · filed 2020-03-13(a)(3)

Thus, there is some competent evidence to satisfy the strangulation element of the aggravated assault charge.

Aggravated assault based on strangulation requires offensive use of an object, device, or instrument likely to cause strangulation; proof that breathing or circulation was actually impeded is unnecessary.

Murphy v. State · filed 2024-02-29(a)(3)

First of all, the State did not have to show that Murphy impeded Gonzalez’s normal breathing or circulation of blood, only that Murphy’s offensive use of his hands around her neck was “likely to” result in strangulation.

Evidence that a defendant put his hands around the victim’s throat and that she reported choking can support an aggravated assault conviction based on strangulation.

Rutherford v. State · filed 2024-03-11(a)(3)

Here, the State introduced evidence that J. M. was pretty sure Rutherford put his hands around her throat during the attack and that she reported “strangulation or choking” to the SANE the day after the attack. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support Rutherford’s aggravated assault conviction.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not merge with false imprisonment because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not.

Jackson v. State · filed 2019-03-04(a)(2)

None of these elements must be satisfied in order to prove an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Moreover, neither an assault nor the use of a deadly weapon must be proven in order to prove a false imprisonment. Thus, because under Drinkard each offense requires proof of facts which the other does not, these offenses do not merge as a matter of law.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) can be committed recklessly when based on simple assault under § 16-5-20(a)(2), so it does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony.

United States v. Terin Moss · filed 2019-04-04(a)(2)

Georgia law holds that recklessness is a sufficient mens rea for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), when based upon simple assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-20(a)(2).

Section 16-5-21(a)(1)’s intent-to-rob aggravator can include intent to rob by sudden snatching, which does not necessarily require intentional violent force.

United States v. Smith · filed 2023-02-09(a)(1)

Both parties agree that “intent to rob” under § 16-5-21(a)(1) is the relevant aggravating factor. ... Therefore, the “intent to rob” element of aggravated assault—at least when that intent is based on robbery by sudden snatching—does not provide the intentional use of force requirement necessary to satisfy the ACCA’s elements clause.

A driver may commit aggravated assault on a public safety officer by intentionally ramming the officer’s patrol car during a chase when the act causes the officer to fear for his safety.

Collins v. State · filed 2021-04-20(a)(2), (c)(1)

In this case there was ample evidence from which a jury could find that Collins intended to ram his vehicle into the deputy’s patrol car in an effort to evade police. ... Additionally, the deputy testified that he feared for his safety when Collins rammed his vehicle. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on this count.

An unlawful detention does not excuse aggravated assault of an officer when the defendant uses disproportionate force to resist it.

Johnson v. State · filed 2022-02-08(c)(1)

Johnson contends that his aggravated assault conviction must also be reversed. We disagree. His “common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest or detention” extends only to a “proportionate use of force necessary to resist the force used to arrest or detain a person. . . .” Glenn, 310 Ga. at 23-24 (1) (b). Based on the particular facts and circumstances of this case, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Johnson’s use of a knife to resist arrest was a disproportionate use of force.

An accident instruction is required for aggravated assault when slight evidence negates the criminal intent required for the charged assault.

Schmitt v. State · filed 2024-04-30(a)(2)

Aggravated assault has two elements: (1) the commission of a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 and (2) the presence of a statutory aggravator. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). ... Because more than slight evidence negated that Schmitt acted with the requisite criminal intent, the trial court erred in declining the accident instruction as to Counts 2 and 4. ... Because at least slight evidence created such a question as to whether Schmitt acted with the requisite intent, the trial court erred in declining the accident instruction as to Counts 3 and 5.

Aggravated assault based on reasonable apprehension requires the victim to be aware of the threatened injury; pointing a gun at an unaware victim does not support a charge of attempted aggravated assault.

The State v. Harlacher · filed 2016-03-11(b)(2)

However, as the State concedes, the fact that the victim was unaware that Harlacher aimed a handgun at him precludes a conviction of a completed aggravated assault under OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (b) (2) and 16-5-20 (a) (2).