Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-21

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes an assault aggravated when an object used offensively is likely to cause, or actually causes, serious bodily injury.

Oliver v. State · filed 2006-03-23(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with any object, which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.

An aggravated assault charged as an assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury does not require proof that serious bodily injury actually occurred.

Massey v. State · filed 2006-03-17(a)(2)

The indictment in this case alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury. Massey was not indicted for actually causing serious bodily injury, and “[sjince there is no allegation in the indictment that serious bodily injury in fact occurred, any argument premised on such an allegation is . . . misplaced.”

Intent to commit a violent injury for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon may be inferred from approaching the victim and shooting him.

Smith v. State · filed 2006-05-05(a)(2)

The jury was authorized to infer that Smith intended to commit a violent injury upon Cross in view of the evidence showing that when Smith returned to the scene, he demanded to know Cross’s location, and then walked directly up to Cross and shot him.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) requires intent to murder for aggravated assault under that provision; a jury may infer that intent from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances.

Moody v. State · filed 2006-05-17(a)(1)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1), “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith intent to murder.” ... Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to find that Moody intended to murder the victim.

Aggravated assault occurs when use of a deadly weapon places a victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

In Re Cdg · filed 2006-06-09(a)(2)

"When the use of a deadly weapon places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, the felony offense of aggravated assault has occurred" under OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers use of a deadly weapon that places a victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

In Re Jal · filed 2007-03-14(a)(2)

"When the use of a deadly weapon places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, the felony offense of aggravated assault has occurred. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2)." ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment of the juvenile court, we find the evidence presented here was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that J.A.L. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the offense of aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon occurs when its use places a victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

In the Interest of C. D. G. · filed 2006-06-09(a)(2)

When the use of a deadly weapon places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury, the felony offense of aggravated assault has occurred” under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Aggravated assault requires an assault aggravated by an intent to murder, rape, or rob, or by use of a deadly weapon.

Squires v. State · filed 2007-06-25

Aggravated assault has two essential elements: (1) that an assault was committed on the victim; and (2) that it was aggravated by (a) an intention to murder, to rape, or to rob, or (b) use of a deadly weapon.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires either an intent to injure or the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Louis v. State · filed 2008-03-07(a)(1)

Accordingly, each aggravated assault required the element of either an intent to injure or the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires an act placing another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury; that apprehension may be shown by indirect or circumstantial evidence.

Dukes v. State · filed 2007-04-26(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he uses a deadly weapon to commit an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. Whether a victim has been placed in reasonable apprehension of injury is a question of fact, which may be established by indirect or circumstantial evidence.

Aggravated assault by pointing a pistol requires the victim to reasonably perceive a danger of immediate violent injury; awareness that the pistol is pointed at the victim alone is insufficient.

Manzano v. State · filed 2007-09-24(a)(2)

What the assault statutes require in addition to an awareness by the victim that a pistol is pointed at her is a reasonable perception on her part of the danger of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with wire cutters when their use results in serious bodily injury, as shown by a deep laceration requiring sutures.

Bly v. State · filed 2007-06-20(a)(2)

Bly struck violently at Officer Hawk with a pair of steel wire cutters, which lacerated Officer Hawk deeply and caused him to bleed profusely. He required surgical care to suture the wound. This evidence supported a finding that the wire cutters resulted in serious bodily injury to Officer Hawk.

Section 16-5-21 allows a jury to consider the injury an object actually caused when deciding whether it was likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Gibson v. State · filed 2008-03-31

Here, the charge was taken from OCGA § 16-5-21, and, immediately after giving the charge, the court correctly instructed the jury to determine whether the flashlight was “likely to cause serious bodily injury,” using evidence of actual injury as part of this inquiry.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction based on an object likely to cause serious injury when used offensively, without proof that the object was a deadly weapon.

Vonhagel v. State · filed 2007-09-11(a)(2)

Because the indictment in the instant case charged that Vonhagel’s gun was an object which, when used offensively, is likely to result in serious injury, no evidence of a deadly weapon was required at trial.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) makes an assault aggravated when committed with an object, device, or instrument that is likely to cause or actually causes serious bodily injury.

White v. State · filed 2008-01-17(a)(2)

As charged, the assault becomes aggravated upon a showing that it was done “with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault committed with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury; holding a pot of boiling water can satisfy it when the conduct places another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

In Re Tyb · filed 2007-11-28(a)(2)

The evidence was sufficient for the juvenile court judge to find beyond a reasonable doubt that T.Y.B. committed the "designated felony act" of aggravated assault by committing an assault against his mother in the aggravated manner set forth in OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires reasonable apprehension of bodily injury and intent to rob; it merges with armed robbery when the same facts prove both offenses.

Mercer v. State · filed 2008-02-14(a)(1)

"Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires the reasonable apprehension of receiving bodily injury and proof of the intent to rob the victim." ... Thus, all of the facts used to prove the offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob were used up in proving the armed robbery. Merger was required.

Placing a gun to a victim’s head can support a conviction for aggravated assault under § 16-5-21.

Johnson v. State · filed 2008-08-28

Given this knowledge, as well as evidence that Johnson had recently been fired from the restaurant, his proximity to the restaurant that night, and the voice identification, the jury was authorized to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault by placing a gun to the victim’s head and kidnapping by moving the victim’s wheel chair toward the safe.

Section 16-5-21 makes an assault aggravated when committed with intent to rob or with a deadly weapon or another object likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively.

Wallace v. State · filed 2009-01-06(a)(1), (2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with intent to rob or uses a deadly weapon or any object, device or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.

Aggravated assault committed with the defendant’s hands requires their use in a way that causes or is likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Armstrong v. State · filed 2008-06-23(a)(2)

The jury’s finding of guilt on aggravated assault necessarily required a finding that Armstrong used his hands in a way that did or was likely to result in “serious bodily injury.”

A cinder block can qualify as an object likely to cause serious bodily injury when used offensively against a person.

Moran v. State · filed 2008-07-23(a)(2)

Contrary to Moran’s argument, there was evidence from which the jury could find that he attempted to hit the victim with a cinder block and that the cinder block was an object that when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury. Accordingly, his sufficiency challenge to his aggravated assault conviction fails.

Whether an injury is serious enough to support aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2) depends on the circumstances and is generally a question for the trier of fact.

Reynolds v. State · filed 2008-10-23(a)(2)

Contrary to Reynolds’ assertion, we have not defined serious bodily injury in our aggravated assault cases, given that the circumstances surrounding each aggravated assault differ on a case-by-case basis and require a consideration of degree. Rather, we have taken a more flexible approach, holding that whether the injury sustained by a victim is sufficient to support an aggravated assault conviction is a “question[ ] particularly within the province of the trier of fact.”

Choking a victim with one’s hands in a manner likely to cause serious bodily injury constitutes aggravated assault under § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Hall v. State · filed 2008-07-08(a)(2)

In this matter, Hall committed aggravated assault by choking J. V with his hands in a manner that was likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) provides two alternative ways to commit aggravated assault: assault with a deadly weapon or assault with an object, device, or instrument that is likely to or actually does cause serious bodily injury when used offensively.

Stevens v. State · filed 2008-10-06(a)(2)

A person commits an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) when he assaults another person in one of two alternative ways: either with a deadly weapon or “with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”

Shoe-clad feet can support an aggravated assault conviction if their offensive use is likely to cause serious bodily injury, even when no injury occurs.

Windham v. State · filed 2008-10-16(a)(2)

Even in the absence of injury, we must affirm Windham’s conviction on this charge. Windham was not indicted for actually causing serious bodily injury with his shoe-clad feet; rather, the indictment charged that his shoe-clad feet are objects which, when used offensively against a person, are likely to result in serious bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21 covers an assault with a deadly weapon when gunfire into an occupied home gives an occupant reasonable apprehension of violent injury.

Hollis v. State · filed 2009-01-13(a)(2)

A person commits an aggravated assault when he “[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury” (OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2)), while using a deadly weapon (OCGA § 16-5-21). ... Given Ms. Bridges’ presence in the residence, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that she reasonably feared suffering a violent injury during the shooting.

For aggravated assault charged as firing a gun at two victims, the State must prove that the defendant assaulted both victims by firing a gun at them.

Taylor v. State · filed 2009-02-17(a)(2)

To convict Taylor of aggravated assault as indicted here, the State was required to prove that he assaulted both Ryan and Andre by firing a gun at them.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits a deadly weapon aggravated assault charge based on an attempted violent injury or an act placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of one.

Trimm v. State · filed 2009-05-14(a)(2)

Thus, the October indictment, as charged, required proof that Trimm attempted to commit a violent injury. The superseding indictment added, in the second count, “pointing and brandishing a firearm,” which required proof of an act that placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury; swinging a metal rod at someone can satisfy it even if the victim later arms himself.

In Re JWB · filed 2009-02-16(a)(2)

The evidence supports the court's finding that after Cobb walked away from the round of punches, J.W.B. grabbed a metal rod and swung it toward Cobb, who retreated inside his home where he then grabbed the knife. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and judgment of the juvenile court, we find that the evidence presented here was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that J.W.B. committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the offense of aggravated assault.

When an aggravated assault charge alleges both intent to rob and use of a deadly weapon, and the jury is instructed that both are material elements, the State must prove both; the added intent-to-rob element can prevent merger into malice murder.

Wilson v. State · filed 2009-02-23(a)(1), (2)

The aggravated assault count charged Frazier with assault and listed two aggravating factors stated in the conjunctive — with intent to rob and with a deadly weapon. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1), (2). The trial court instructed the jury that both aggravating factors were material elements of the crime as pled and both had to be proven in order to convict the defendants of aggravated assault. As a result, in order to establish that Frazier committed aggravated assault as pled in the indictment, the State was required to show not only that Frazier shot the victim, but that he did so with the intent to rob him.

Aggravated assault with a deadly or offensive weapon requires a general intent to injure, not a specific intent to murder, rape, or rob.

Barnes v. State · filed 2009-03-05(a)(2)

The state was only required to prove a general intent to injure; aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon, unlike aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, does not require a specific criminal intent.

Aggravated assault with intent to murder may be supported by evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for human life.

MacKey v. State · filed 2009-03-17(a)(1)

We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mackey acted in reckless disregard for human life and affirm his conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (c) as charged in the indictment.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury does not require intent to injure.

Hudson v. State · filed 2009-03-17(a)(2)

Although Hudson cites her testimony that she did not intend to injure anyone, the state was not required to show that she intended any injury, because she was charged with committing aggravated assault by using a gun to commit an act which placed others in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) requires general intent rather than specific intent.

State v. Austin · filed 2009-04-13(a)(2)

Moreover, the offense defined by OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is a crime requiring general — rather than specific — intent.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when an assault with a deadly weapon causes the victim reasonably to fear injury; the assailant need not intend to injure the victim.

Crane v. State · filed 2009-05-14(a)(2)

Furthermore, “[i]t is the victim’s reasonable apprehension of injury from an assault by a deadly weapon that establishes the crime of aggravated assault, not the assailant’s intent to injure.”

An officer’s testimony that he feared violent injury when the defendant suddenly drove away can support a conviction for aggravated assault on a peace officer.

Little v. State · filed 2009-06-11(a), (c)

Here, Deputy Lutz testified that he was in fear of receiving a violent injury when Little suddenly pulled away from the traffic stop, which was sufficient for the jury to find that Little committed aggravated assault on a peace officer.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be proved by showing that the weapon placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of injury; proof of intent to harm is unnecessary.

Williams v. State · filed 2009-06-25(a)(2)

Evidence of intent to harm is not required to prove an aggravated assault. ... The State need only establish that Williams placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of injury by a deadly weapon.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires offensive use for an assault involving an object other than a deadly weapon, but a jury charge alleging assault with a deadly weapon need not include that language.

Finley v. State · filed 2009-10-05(a)(2)

The phrase “when used offensively” describes an alternative method of committing aggravated assault, i.e., by use of an object other than one considered a deadly weapon.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury, even if no injury is proved.

Watson v. State · filed 2009-12-30(a)(2)

But the State was only required to show that the thrown bowl was likely to result in serious bodily injury, not that it actually caused such injury.

A bottle thrown at a person can satisfy the aggravated assault statute when its use is likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Reese v. State · filed 2010-04-29(a)(2)

Given the circumstances underlying this case, the jury was authorized to conclude that Reese used a bottle offensively against the officer in a manner likely to have resulted in serious bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires a general intent to injure with the weapon, but does not require specific intent.

Guyse v. State · filed 2010-03-01(a)(2)

Unlike the first statutory aggravator — intent to rob, rape, or murder — the second statutory aggravator does not require proof of specific intent. The State need only prove that the defendant possessed a “general intent to injure” with the weapon.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof that the victim reasonably feared immediate bodily injury and that the assailant intended to rob.

In Re Db · filed 2010-07-21(a)(1)

The evidence adduced was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, when D.B. showed the brothers the pistol stuck in his pocket, he put them in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate bodily injury. ... Further, the brothers' testimony that D.B. or his companions demanded their money at the time of the assault proves that it was with the intent to rob and, therefore, supports the adjudication of delinquency for two counts of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily injury and intent to rob; displaying a pistol and demanding money during the assault can establish those elements.

In the Interest of D. B. · filed 2010-07-21(a)(1)

The evidence adduced was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, when D. B. showed the brothers the pistol stuck in his pocket, he put them in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate bodily injury. ... Further, the brothers’ testimony that D. B. or his companions demanded their money at the time of the assault proves that it was with the intent to rob and, therefore, supports the adjudication of delinquency for two counts of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon was complete when the assailant pointed a gun at the victim and grabbed her neck, before moving her.

Williams v. State · filed 2011-02-01(a)(2)

Thus, the aggravated assault was completed when Williams pointed the gun at Hailey and grabbed her around the neck.

Threatening a victim while holding a knife can establish the victim’s reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury for aggravated assault.

Wilson v. State · filed 2010-06-10(a)(2)

This was sufficient to support the aggravated assault by knife conviction, because a jury could reasonably conclude that when Wilson threatened Russell’s life while holding a knife and she reached up with her hand, she was in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires proof of criminal intent for aggravated assault; a claimed accidental discharge does not defeat a conviction when the evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

House v. State · filed 2010-09-17(a)(2)

Arguing that the evidence established the affirmative defenses of accident and self-defense, House asserts that his conviction of aggravated assault cannot be sustained for lack of evidence showing that he acted with the required criminal intent. We disagree. ... Under these circumstances, we conclude the evidence was sufficient for any trier of fact to find House guilty of aggravated assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires an assault on the victim; fear of losing property alone does not establish apprehension of violent injury.

In Re Dm · filed 2011-03-21(a)(1)

Under Georgia law, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault with the intent to rob when he assaults with the intent to rob. ... Here, D.B.'s fear was based on a concern that D.M. would take his personal property, not an apprehension of injury. ... It thus follows that the evidence was insufficient to show that D.M. committed acts, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted aggravated assault with the intent to rob.

Aggravated assault with intent to rob requires proof of an underlying assault.

In the Interest of D. M. · filed 2011-03-21(a)(1)

Under Georgia law, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault with the intent to rob when he assaults with the intent to rob.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of an assault using that weapon, an element that distinguishes it from aggravated battery.

Reynolds v. State · filed 2011-06-24(a)(2)

With respect to the aggravated assault and aggravated battery count, whereas the aggravated assault required proof that Reynolds assaulted the victim using a deadly weapon, aggravated battery required proof that he maliciously caused bodily harm to the victim by rendering a member of her body useless.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with an object that, when used offensively, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.

Gross v. State · filed 2011-11-02(a)(2)

The trial court agreed and the charge that was given indeed tracks the definition of aggravated assault set forth in OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith . . . any object . . . which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”

Under subsection (a)(2), assault with a knife is aggravated assault when the knife, used offensively against a person, is likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Smith v. State · filed 2011-12-01(a)(2)

Aggravated assault, but not attempted rape, required proof that Smith assaulted the victim with a knife, an object when used offensively against a person is likely to result in serious bodily injury. OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2).

Aggravated assault does not require proof of intent to injure.

Brown v. State · filed 2012-02-03(a)(2)

Evidence of intent to injure is not required to prove an aggravated assault.

For aggravated assault based on reasonable apprehension, speculation that a victim could have seen a gun or heard threats is insufficient to prove the victim’s apprehension.

Santiago v. State · filed 2012-02-17(a)(2)

Because there is no affirmative evidence that the victim saw Santiago with the gun or heard his threats to shoot, the evidence is insufficient to support Santiago’s aggravated assault conviction.

Section 16-5-21 requires intent to injure for aggravated assault based on an attempted injury; a vehicle collision alone does not establish that intent.

KLICKA v. State · filed 2012-04-13

The evidence here did show that Klicka hit another vehicle in his attempt to elude the officer, but absent some evidence in addition to the mere collision, the State failed to prove the intent necessary to show that Klicka collided with the vehicle in an attempt to injure someone for purposes of an aggravated assault offense.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) defines aggravated assault as an assault with a deadly weapon or an object that, when used offensively, is likely to cause or actually causes serious bodily injury.

Simon v. State · filed 2013-02-27(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) pertinently provides that a person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults with a deadly weapon or with any object which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires an assault aggravated by the use of a deadly weapon.

Rebel Keith Lee v. State · filed 2013-03-20(a)(2)

A conviction for aggravated assault requires proof of two essential elements: (1) an assault, as defined in OCGA § 16-5-20, and (2) aggravation by use of a deadly weapon, see OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires intent to injure; criminal negligence alone is insufficient.

Sullivan v. Kemp · filed 2013-10-07(a)(2)

If the jury concluded from the evidence, as the prosecutor urged, that Sullivan had unintentionally harmed the victim, the jury would be authorized to find him criminally negligent, but that would not support a conviction for aggravated assault as charged in this case.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) covers an assault with a deadly weapon or an object that, when used offensively, is likely to cause or actually causes serious bodily injury.

Taylor v. State · filed 2014-05-07(a)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault “when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

When an aggravated assault charge alleges an attempted violent injury with a deadly weapon, the state need not prove that the victim apprehended an immediate violent injury.

In the Interest Of: O. L., a Child · filed 2014-03-27(a)(2)

Thus, given the allegations in this case, the state was not required to prove that O. L. had placed T. S. in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury (with a deadly weapon).

A victim’s reasonable apprehension for aggravated assault may be proved by circumstantial evidence of retreat, even if the victim does not testify.

Bostic v. State · filed 2014-03-28(a)

And, the evidence regarding the retreat of Mills and Meyers was sufficient circumstantial evidence as to their states of mind.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) provides distinct ways to commit aggravated assault, including assault with a deadly weapon and assault with an object likely to cause serious bodily injury; a jury charge cannot permit conviction by a method omitted from the indictment when the evidence supports that method.

Easter v. State · filed 2014-06-25(a)(2)

Given this evidence, and reading the jury charge as a whole, we must conclude that the charge allowed the jury to find that Easter had committed aggravated assault by a method not charged in the indictment, i.e., by using a deadly weapon rather than merely an object likely to result in serious bodily injury.

Aggravated assault based on reasonable apprehension of injury with an offensive object requires intentional use of the object, reasonable apprehension of injury, and an object likely to or actually resulting in serious bodily injury; it does not require intent to injure or cause apprehension.

Patterson v. the State · filed 2015-04-10(b)(2)

Accordingly, based on Count 4 as charged, the State was required to show that Patterson intended to drive his van in the direction of Silvers, that Silvers was placed in reasonable apprehension of injury, and that the van was an object that when used offensively against a person, was likely to or actually did result in serious bodily injury. The State was not required to show an intent to injure or that Patterson intended to place Silvers in reasonable apprehension of injury.

Section 16-5-21 treats assault with intent to murder, rape, or rob and assault with a deadly weapon as separate ways to commit aggravated assault.

Staley v. the State · filed 2014-12-25(b)(1), (b)(2)

Contrary to that incorrect suggestion, a person commits the offense of aggravated assault, among other methods, when he or she assaults “[w]ith intent to murder, to rape, or to rob,” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (1), or “[w]ith a deadly weapon[.]” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires intent to commit the act that causes injury or reasonable apprehension of injury, but does not require specific intent to cause either result.

Attaway v. the State · filed 2015-05-20(b)(2)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults another with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2). To prove the offense, the State must show that a defendant intended “to commit the act which in fact places another in reasonable apprehension of injury or actually results in injury, not a specific intent to cause such apprehension or injury.”

Aggravated assault with intent to murder requires deliberate intent to kill at the time of the assault; the jury may infer that intent from the instrument used, how it was used, and the wounds inflicted.

Gipson v. the State · filed 2015-05-20(a)(1)

To authorize a conviction for aggravated assault with intent to murder, the State must show that the defendant acted with the deliberate intent to kill at the time of the assault, which the jury may infer from the nature of the instrument used in making the assault, the manner of its use, and the nature of the wounds inflicted. ... In light of these combined circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable jury was entitled to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gipson acted with the intent to kill the victim and find him guilty of aggravated assault with intent to murder.

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) does not require proof of actual injury.

Horne v. the State · filed 2015-07-08(a)(2)

Contrary to Horne’s argument, former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) does not require that the State prove actual injuries.

Aggravated assault with an object requires its offensive use in a way likely to cause or actually causing serious bodily injury; the victim need not be a law enforcement officer.

Gordon v. the State · filed 2016-05-06(b)(2)

Having such a law enforcement victim is not an element of aggravated assault, which requires as an additional element the use of “any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.”

Section 16-5-21(b) permits an aggravated assault conviction based on any one of its alternative methods of assault, including intent to murder or use of a deadly weapon.

Cash v. State · filed 2015-10-19(b)

The aggravated assault statute authorizes conviction upon proof of one or more alternative methods of assault — such as “[w]ith intent to murder,” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (1), or “[w]ith a deadly weapon,” OCGA § 16-5-21 (b) (2) — and those methods are expressed in the disjunctive in the statute.

Section 16-5-21(a) provides alternative methods of committing aggravated assault.

King v. the State · filed 2016-03-30(a)

The record shows that the indictment alleged one of three alternative methods of committing aggravated assault. See former OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2001).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on placing someone in reasonable apprehension of injury requires intent to commit the act; negligence or recklessness does not suffice.

United States v. Alvarez-Jimenez · filed 2015-11-23(a)(2)

This Court concludes that the Atiáben does not demonstrate that negligent or reckless conduct will support a conviction under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2) for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. ... The Court concludes that Defendant’s conviction ' in SU13CR1097 for aggravated assault pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-21(a)(2) corresponds to the Guidelines definition of aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault based on an attempt to commit a violent injury does not require the victim to be aware of the attack.

Hayes v. State · filed 2016-01-19

Where, as in this case, “the assault at issue consists of an attempt to commit a violent injury to the person of another, awareness on the part of the victim is not an essential element of the crime.” Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 423, 423 (614 SE2d 65) (2005) (citations and punctuation omitted).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or qualifying object does not require proof that the victim feared harm when the underlying assault is an attempt to commit violent injury.

Robinson v. the State · filed 2016-04-05(b)(2)

But even assuming this is true, fear on the victim’s part is not a necessary element of the crimes of which Robinson was convicted.

Aggravated assault can be complete without actual injury, but an indictment alleging that the assault resulted in serious bodily injury requires proof of that injury.

Bledson v. State · filed 2016-06-16(b)(2)

As an initial matter, we note that although the crime of aggravated assault may be completed without proof of actual injury, the language used in the indictment in this case did require such proof.

Aggravated assault under subsection (b) requires an assault and an aggravating circumstance.

In THE INTEREST OF L. J., a Child · filed 2016-06-29(b)

Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-21 (b), aggravated assault is shown by proof of certain aggravating circumstances and an assault.

Aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon does not require proof that the defendant intended to injure the victim.

Brown v. the State · filed 2016-11-10(b)(2)

In such cases, where the State alleges that a defendant committed aggravated assault by use of a deadly weapon, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant intended to injure the victim.

Aggravated assault charged through the offensive use of hands or another object likely to cause serious bodily injury is a general intent crime requiring intent to injure with that weapon.

Booth v. State · filed 2017-08-14(a)(2)

Although aggravated assault can be charged in other ways that make the offense a specific intent crime, the manner in which it was charged here is a general intent crime, requiring proof only that Booth had the intent to (1) injure Vason (2) with a weapon, that weapon being Booth’s hands (or an unknown object) when used in a manner likely to result in serious bodily harm.

An intentional aggravated assault can support a conviction even when the defendant did not maliciously intend to cause the resulting bodily harm required for aggravated battery.

WILKERSON v. the STATE. · filed 2018-04-25(a)(2)

If the jury had found that Wilkerson had intended to commit the assault, but that he did not maliciously cause the bodily harm that resulted, that is, with intent to cause the harm, it could have found him guilty of the aggravated assault and found him not guilty of the aggravated battery.

A victim’s reasonable apprehension of injury in an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon may be proved by circumstantial evidence, even when the victim does not testify.

State v. Wilkerson · filed 2018-07-30(a)(2)

In this case, there is some circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer a perception of danger by the children sufficient to support Wilkerson’s convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against the children even though, like the youngest child in Veasey, the children did not testify.

A victim need not be aware of the weapon when the aggravated assault rests on an attempted violent injury.

The State v. Wilkerson. · filed 2018-07-30(a)(2)

Accordingly, the children’s awareness is immaterial; it is enough that Wilkerson’s sister confirmed that Wilkerson intentionally pointed the shotgun at the vehicle in which the children were riding in an effort to get the boyfriend and sister to stop the vehicle.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) does not require a deadly weapon to be pointed directly at a victim if its use places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Green v. State · filed 2018-08-20(a)(2)

Moreover, the statute under which Green was charged, OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), does not require the deadly weapon to have been pointed directly at each victim, but merely that the defendant use the deadly weapon in such manner as to “place[ ] another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.”

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon may be supported by a victim’s testimony of fear even when the victim gives conflicting testimony about apprehension of injury.

Martin v. State · filed 2019-01-09(a)(2)

The jury was authorized to credit Conner's statement that he felt "panic[ked and] scared" and infer from that statement that Conner had the necessary reasonable apprehension to support a guilty verdict on the aggravated assault charge, even though other statements of Conner suggested that he did not have the necessary apprehension.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires proof of a general intent to assault.

Fleming v. State · filed 2019-06-24(a)(2)

Both of the aggravated assault charges, as well as the underlying aggravated assault for the felony murder charge, required proof that Fleming had the general intent to assault Corbin and Skrine. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not require pulling the trigger of a gun aimed at the victim.

Gonzalez v. State · filed 2019-10-04(a)

Under the indictment and the statutory definitions, Gonzalez could commit attempted murder only if he performed an act which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of murder; that substantial step was pulling the trigger of the handgun aimed at the victim’s head. Such an additional step is not required for the commission of aggravated assault.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime requiring no proof of knowledge.

Green v. State · filed 2019-10-25(a)(2)

In this case, the State charged Green with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a general intent crime requiring no proof of knowledge.

Section 16-5-21(a) covers an assault committed with intent to rob and with a deadly weapon.

Cooke v. State · filed 2020-09-18(a)

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he assaults another person, with the intent to rob and with a deadly weapon.

Aggravated assault with a knife is complete when the assailant brandishes it and threatens to cut and kill the victim.

Bettis v. State · filed 2020-11-17

Thus, the aggravated assault was completed when Bettis brandished the knife and threatened to “cut and kill” Kates after she entered the restroom.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of an underlying assault, shown by an attempt to inflict violent injury or intent to place another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Bonner v. State · filed 2021-05-17(a)

This offense requires proof of an underlying assault, which can be shown by evidence of the defendant’s attempt to inflict a violent injury upon another or intent to do an act that places another in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

A defendant need not point a deadly weapon directly at the victim if its use places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Coates v. State · filed 2020-10-05(a)(2)

OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) does not require that Coates point a deadly weapon directly at Clements to be guilty of aggravated assault against him, “but merely that the defendant use the deadly weapon in such manner as to place another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.”

Aggravated assault based on pointing a deadly weapon requires the victim to reasonably apprehend immediate violent injury.

Bully v. State · filed 2020-11-17(a)(2)

As can be seen, neither the elements of the Oklahoma crime nor the “Information Sheet” showed that the Oklahoma crime required a showing that the victim had a reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be proved by an attempted violent injury without proving that the victim apprehended injury.

Atkins v. State · filed 2020-10-19(a)(2)

Thus, if the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Atkins attempted to inflict a violent injury upon Parks, the State was not required to also prove that Parks had any apprehension of receiving a violent injury.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be based on intentionally firing into an occupied home, including as to occupants who were not the primary target.

Shardow v. State · filed 2020-10-21(a)(2)

Stripling intentionally fired bullets into an apartment occupied by three people. “[B]y intentionally firing into the home, [Stripling and Shardow] were likely to seriously injure all the occupants, not just their primary target[.]”31 ... Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions of aggravated assault against Swanson’s son and Dixon.

Aggravated assault with a firearm can be proved through circumstantial evidence of a victim’s reasonable apprehension of injury, even when the victim does not testify.

Huerta-Ramirez v. State · filed 2020-10-21(a)(2)

Although the three- and six-year-old sisters did not testify at trial, testimony that they were forced to kneel with their mother while a man watched over them with a rifle, and that the mother was crying and did not feel like she could leave was sufficient to sustain Huerta-Ramirez’s convictions for Counts 5 and 6.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon may be based on either form of simple assault: attempted violent injury or an act causing reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Schmeelk v. State · filed 2021-02-16(a)(2)

The victim also testified that she knew Schmeelk was shooting at her, was afraid, and “r[a]n for [her] life.” We conclude that this was sufficient evidence to sustain Schmeelk’s aggravated assault conviction based upon either form of simple assault.

Section 16-5-21(b)(2) requires an assault committed with a deadly weapon.

United States v. Roosevelt Coats, III · filed 2021-08-12(b)(2)

That is, a defendant who is guilty of aggravated assault under Georgia law must commit not just the crime of assault but also, as pertinent here, must do so with a deadly weapon. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2).

Under the 2015 version of § 16-5-21(b), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires an assault aggravated by use of a deadly weapon.

United States v. Green · filed 2021-10-06(b)

In relevant part, the 2015 version of the Georgia aggravated assault statute (under which Glenn was convicted) required proof of two essential elements: (1) an assault, and (2) aggravation of the assault by the use of a deadly weapon.

Aggravated assault with intent to murder requires proof of a simple assault and a specific intent to kill.

Burley v. State · filed 2023-05-31(a)(1)

Aggravated assault with intent to murder requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a simple assault in one of the two ways defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) and that he acted with the “intent to murder.” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1).

Aggravated assault under subsection (a)(2) can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness.

Flores v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-09-23(a)(2)

Based on Borden and Moss, Flores’s Georgia aggravated assault conviction under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness, therefore, it is not an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

Aggravated assault with intent to rob does not require proof that property was taken.

COLLINS v. THE STATE (Three Cases) · filed 2021-10-05(a)(1)

An additional argument that Burdine makes — that the evidence does not prove that a robbery even occurred because the lead detective testified that there was no evidence that any items were stolen from Kelley’s house — is wholly without merit. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1); Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478, 482 (689 SE2d 825) (2010) (“[T]hat property be taken . . . is not a fact which must be proved in aggravated assault with intent to rob.”).

Section 16-5-21 is divisible because Georgia aggravated assault has alternative elements.

Flores v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2022-01-27(a)

Georgia’s aggravated assault and simple assault statutes are divisible, meaning that they set out one or more elements of an offense in the alternative.

Aggravated assault based on reasonable apprehension requires proof that the accused intentionally committed the act causing that apprehension.

Cruz v. State · filed 2022-06-02(a)(2)

Nevertheless, the State must still prove that the accused intentionally committed an act that caused another to be placed in reasonable apprehension of receiving immediate bodily injury. ... It follows that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Cruz’s conviction on aggravated assault on a peace officer as that crime was charged in the indictment.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) permits an aggravated assault conviction when turning on a curling iron during a violent attack places the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Freeman v. State · filed 2023-03-03(a)(2)

Under these circumstances, Freeman’s act of turning on the curling iron, by itself, constituted a substantial step toward committing a battery and a demonstration of violence against the victim, and showed a present ability to inflict injury which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Evidence that a person ran and hid from gunfire can establish reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury and support an aggravated assault conviction.

Williams v. State · filed 2023-03-07(a)(2)

This evidence was sufficient to establish that Clark was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, and thus supported the aggravated assault and firearm charges.

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) supports an aggravated assault conviction when gunfire places a victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, even if the victim does not testify.

Monroe v. State · filed 2023-03-07(a)(2)

This evidence was sufficient to establish that Clark was placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, and thus supported the aggravated assault and firearm charges.

Subsection (a)(2) requires proof of an assault with a deadly weapon or an object that, when used offensively, is likely to or actually does cause serious bodily injury.

Howard v. State · filed 2024-03-19(a)(2)

The relevant portion of Georgia’s aggravated assault statute requires the prosecution to show that a defendant committed assault “[w]ith a deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury[.]” OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2).

Section 16-5-21(a)(2) requires proof of an assault with an object that, when used offensively, is likely to cause serious bodily injury.

Owens v. State · filed 2025-01-08(a)(2)

Here, to prove aggravated assault, the State was required to show that Owens assaulted Williams with a knife, on object that when used offensively was likely to result in serious bodily injury (Count 1); ... and to prove battery, the State was required to prove that Williams suffered visible bodily harm (Count 5).

Section 16-5-21(a)(3) requires proof that the assault was likely to result in strangulation, but does not require proof that breathing or blood circulation was actually impeded.

Fuller v. State · filed 2025-02-21(a)(3)

However, “the State did not have to show that [Fuller] impeded [Scott’s] normal breathing or circulation of blood, only that [his] offensive use of his hands around her neck was likely to result in strangulation.” (Emphasis supplied; punctuation omitted.) Murphy v. State, 370 Ga. App. 738, 741 (1) (899 SE2d 307) (2024). Because the jury was authorized to find from the evidence presented that Fuller placed his hands around Scott’s throat and applied pressure, which could very likely impede her normal breathing or blood circulation, we reject this enumeration of error.

Aggravated assault charged as assault with a knife likely to cause serious bodily injury is a general intent crime requiring intent to assault with the knife.

Henderson v. State · filed 2024-04-16(a)(2)

Although aggravated assault can be charged in other ways that make the offense a specific intent crime, the way it was charged here is a general intent crime, requiring proof only that Henderson had the intent to (1) assault Kiara (2) with a knife, an object which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or does result in serious bodily injury.

Pointing a handgun at someone can support aggravated assault with a deadly weapon when the circumstances show reasonable apprehension of immediate violent injury.

Vincent Ivory Hall v. State · filed 2024-05-15(a)(2)

And, in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that Hall unexpectedly emerged from a storage closet pointing a handgun and yelling at Ashby and Hunt, thereby causing Ashby to flail her arms and attempt to get away. This evidence is sufficient to support Hall’s conviction.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be proved by evidence that the victim reasonably apprehended an immediate violent injury, even if the victim says she was not afraid.

Bass v. State · filed 2024-07-23(a)(2)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s verdict, we conclude that it was sufficient to find that Bass placed the aunt in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.

Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon can be established by a victim’s reasonable apprehension of violent injury even if the defendant does not point the gun directly at the victim.

Colvin v. State · filed 2025-12-15(a)(2)

However, there was direct testimony from Thompson that he repeatedly asked Colvin to put the gun down, that Colvin was threatening him and cursing at him, and that he was afraid that she would shoot him or someone else in the Bar. Thompson also testified that he positioned himself defensively when directing Colvin to put down her weapon. Thus, the fact that Colvin did not point the gun directly at Thompson is inapposite.

Section 16-5-21 makes knowledge an element of aggravated assault on a peace officer; a jury charge substantially using the statute’s language adequately conveys that element.

Miller v. State · filed 1983-02-23

The charge was substantially in the language of OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302) and properly advised the jury that knowledge was an element of the offense.

Section 16-5-21 covers an assault on a peace officer engaged in or targeted because of official duties when the assault is committed with intent to murder, rape, or rob, or with a deadly weapon.

Green v. State · filed 1984-03-14

Aggravated assault upon a peace officer occurs when a peace officer, engaged in or on account of the performance of his official duties, is assaulted by one with intent to murder, rape or rob or with a deadly weapon. OCGA § 16-5-21.

When an aggravated assault on a peace officer is charged as an assault with a deadly weapon, the weapon’s deadly character is an essential element.

Graham v. State · filed 1984-06-20(c)

Thus, assault with a deadly weapon was an essential element of the offense of aggravated assault upon the police officer (OCGA § 16-5-21 (c)), “and it was necessary to describe the injuries inflicted to establish that the gun used by [appellants] was capable of being a deadly weapon.”

Aggravated assault upon a peace officer requires the accused to know that the victim is a peace officer.

Hudson v. State · filed 1988-10-21(c)

The trial court did err, however, in failing to charge that knowledge by the accused that the victim is a peace officer is an essential element of the offense of aggravated assault upon a peace officer.

Section 16-5-21(c) requires knowledge that the victim is a police officer, and the jury must be instructed on that element.

Britt v. State · filed 1987-10-02(c)

Under OCGA § 16-5-21 (c), a person must knowingly commit the offense of aggravated assault upon a police officer. ... As the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on this issue, we must reverse and remand this case for retrial.

Subsection (c) does not require proof of a victim’s official peace officer certification, but it requires the accused to know the victim was a police officer, and a jury charge must convey that knowledge requirement.

Cornwell v. State · filed 1989-10-20(c)

Under the circumstances, we hold that the state was not required to prove the victim's certification in order to make a prima facie showing that he was acting as a peace officer within the contemplation of § 16-5-21 (c). ... We agree with the appellant that the use of language such as "knowingly commits" or "knowingly assaults" is insufficient to convey to the jury the requirement, as set forth in Bundren v. State, supra, that the accused must have acted with knowledge that the victim was a police officer; and to the extent that Carter v. State, supra, supports a contrary holding, it is hereby overruled.

Section 16-5-21(c) requires proof that the defendant knew the victim was a police officer; a jury charge on aggravated assault of a police officer is sufficient when, read as a whole, it conveys the relevant elements.

Tate v. State · filed 1991-01-07(c)

In Bundren, the Supreme Court held that knowledge that the victim was a police officer is an essential element of the crime of aggravated assault on a police officer (OCGA § 16-5-21 (c)). ... The charge given here, taken as a whole, clearly instructed the jury of the factors it was to consider in its deliberations, including the issue raised by appellant, and consequently we find no error.

Aggravated assault on a peace officer requires proof that the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer; omitting that element from the jury instructions ordinarily requires a new trial or sentencing for ordinary aggravated assault.

Chandler v. State · filed 1992-06-16(c)

The failure to instruct the jury that an essential element on both of these charges is that the defendant knew the victim was a police officer ordinarily requires either reversal and remand for a new trial, or resentencing on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault and aggravated battery.

Section 16-5-21(c) covers aggravated assault on law enforcement officers; evidence that the defendant fired at officers supported convictions under it.

Black v. State · filed 1991-12-04(c)

The evidence supports the defendant’s conviction on the counts charging aggravated assault on law enforcement officers and cruelty to children. OCGA §§ 16-5-21 (c) and 16-5-70 (b).

For aggravated assault on a police officer, firing the weapon and knowing the target was an officer may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

Nelson v. State · filed 1993-05-20

Nevertheless, appellant’s firing of the weapon and knowledge that the person at whom he fired was a police officer can be established by direct and/or circumstantial evidence.

Aggravated assault on a peace officer requires proof that the officer was performing official duties at the time of the assault.

Duitsman v. State · filed 1994-03-09(c)

Aggravated assault on a peace officer in violation of OCGA § 16-5-21 (c) requires proof that the officer was, at the time of the assault, engaged in the performance of his official duties. ... The contention that the officers were not in the lawful discharge of their official duties at the time defendant pointed a gun at each of them and violently resisted arrest is without merit.

Section 16-5-21(c) supports an aggravated assault conviction for pointing a gun at police officers while threatening to kill them.

Humphrey v. State · filed 1995-09-21(c)

The evidence also authorized the jury’s verdicts that defendant committed aggravated assault against Lieutenant Smith and Officer Taylor, in violation of OCGA § 16-5-21 (c).

Simple assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, and a separate instruction on simple assault does not give jurors another basis to convict of aggravated assault.

Marsh v. State · filed 2002-03-20

Contrary to Marsh’s contention, the “assault” charge did not present an improper basis on which jurors could convict him of aggravated assault. Rather, assault is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault.

When aggravated assault is charged as assault with a deadly weapon, a jury instructed on the uncharged intent-to-murder form must also be instructed to limit its consideration to the charged form.

Doomes v. State · filed 2003-06-02

Doomes was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He contends that the court erred by charging the jury that aggravated assault could occur both by an assault with intent to murder or by an assault with a deadly weapon. We agree. ... But here, the trial court did not give a limiting instruction after giving the improper charge. ... Accordingly, we conclude that Doomes’s due process rights were violated when he was tried on a charge of aggravated assault that was not alleged in the indictment, and therefore his conviction for aggravated assault must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Section 16-5-21 permits an aggravated assault conviction when a speeding driver uses a car offensively against a police officer during a high-speed chase.

Dyer v. State · filed 2003-05-15(a)(2), (c)

It is well established that a speeding driver who uses a car offensively against a police officer during a high-speed chase can be guilty of aggravated assault on a police officer. ... Here the evidence revealed that Dyer swerved his vehicle at the pursuing officers in an offensive manner, causing the officers’ vehicle to dangerously flip over several times, resulting in injuries to the officers. ... The evidence sufficed to sustain the conviction.

Section 16-5-21(c) treats aggravated assault upon a peace officer as a separate offense requiring the defendant to know the victim is a peace officer; the jury must be charged on that element.

Dupree v. State · filed 2004-05-24(c)

Aggravated assault upon a peace officer is a separate and distinct crime from aggravated assault. See Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 181(2), 274 S.E.2d 455 (1981); OCGA § 16-5-21(c). For the former, the defendant must know that the victim is a peace officer and the jury must be charged on this element.

Aggravated assault on a peace officer requires the accused to know that the victim was a peace officer, and the jury must be instructed on that element.

Elrod v. State · filed 2004-01-29

On retrial, when instructing the jury on the offense of aggravated assault on a peace officer, the court should instruct the jury that an essential element of the offense is that the accused knew that the alleged victim was a peace officer.

Aggravated assault on a peace officer requires the officer to be performing official duties; a lawful investigative stop and protective search satisfy that requirement.

Ramirez v. State · filed 2005-09-19(c)

His claim is premised on the assertion that the State failed to prove the underlying felony of aggravated assault on a peace officer because Officer Arango was not acting within the lawful exercise of his official duties when he stopped and questioned Ramirez and Alvaro. ... Thus, we conclude that Officer Arango was discharging a legitimate investigative function when he approached Ramirez and Alvaro to conduct a protective search for weapons.

Section 16-5-21(c) requires the defendant to know that the person assaulted is a police officer.

Milton v. State · filed 2005-04-19(c)

We note that the trial court’s charge and recharge mirrored the aggravated assault statute, including the requirement of subsection (c) that the person “knowingly’ commit the offense. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (c). There was no evidence at trial to contradict the inference that the uniformed person who got out of a police car to complete a traffic stop, and at whom Milton directed his curse and gunfire, was in fact a police officer. Thus the charge was proper as to the element of Milton’s knowledge.

Aggravated assault on a peace officer is complete when turning a vehicle toward the officer causes the officer reasonably to apprehend violent bodily injury.

Dryden v. State · filed 2008-06-05(a)(2), (c)

The evidence shows that the offense of aggravated assault upon a peace officer was complete when Dryden turned his vehicle toward the officer he injured, causing the officer, who reasonably apprehended receiving a violent bodily injury, to ready his weapon to fire at him. OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), (c).

Aggravated assault upon a police officer requires the defendant to know that the victim is a police officer, and the jury must be instructed on that element.

Fedd v. State · filed 2009-06-11(c)

The defendant’s knowledge that the victim was a police officer is an essential element of the aggravated assault upon a police officer offense and, thus, the trial court is required to instruct the jury as to this matter.

Evidence that a defendant wielded a knife against a police officer engaged in official duties can support a conviction for aggravated assault on a police officer.

Dobbs v. State · filed 2010-03-04(c)

Even if we were to consider the testimony provided by the police officers to be inconsistent, conflict in the testimony of witnesses is for resolution by the jury, and not this Court, and the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dobbs committed an assault upon the corporal with the knife while the corporal was engaged in his official duties.

When aggravated assault and aggravated assault on a peace officer involve the same act and victim, the aggravated-assault conviction merges because the peace-officer offense additionally requires proof that the defendant knew the victim was an officer.

Garrett v. State · filed 2010-10-13(a), (c)

Here, the physical act as charged, as well as the victim, were the same for both counts. The only required proof that differed in Count 4 was the proof that Garrett knew he was assaulting a police officer. Thus the conviction on Count 3 was “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts” that were required to establish the conviction on Count 4. The two crimes must be merged for sentencing.

Section 16-5-21(c) requires an assault on a peace officer to occur while the officer is performing official duties or because of those duties; it does not require lawful performance, so resisting an unlawful arrest or excessive force can be an affirmative defense.

Horton v. State · filed 2019-05-09(c)

Unlike the offense of obstruction, aggravated assault upon a peace officer is not defined to require that the officer be engaged in the "lawful discharge of his official duties," OCGA § 16-10-24 (b), but instead requires the State to prove that the assault occurred when the officer "is engaged in, or on account of the performance of, his or her official duties." OCGA § 16-5-21 (c). ... Accordingly, this charge can be subject to the affirmative defense that the defendant is resisting an unlawful arrest or excessive force.

An aggravated-assault instruction that permits conviction by a method not charged in the indictment is erroneous, but an instruction requiring proof of the charged method can cure the error.

State v. Thomas · filed 2019-06-24(a)(2)

Here, because the indictment specifically charged Thomas with aggravated assault by shooting, the trial court's instruction that the jury may find Thomas guilty based on placing the victim in reasonable fear of receiving a violent injury was erroneous, and the error was obvious. ... Under these circumstances, the trial court sufficiently cured any error in its charge on aggravated assault.

Section 16-5-21(i) covers aggravated assault between spouses, and a jury charge identifying the victim as the accused’s present spouse adequately instructs on the family violence relationship.

Lofland v. State · filed 2020-10-21(i)

The jury charges as given by the trial court met that requirement. See OCGA § 16-5-21 (i) (defining aggravated assault (family violence) as the “offense of aggravated assault . . . committed between past or present spouses . . .”).

Section 16-5-21 makes an assault with intent to commit rape an aggravated assault.

Terry v. State · filed 1983-05-13

Any assault with the intent to commit rape is an aggravated assault. OCGA § 16-5-21 (Code Ann. § 26-1302). ... Since the evidence does not show either rape or no offense, the trial court did not err in charging on aggravated assault with intent to commit rape.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) covers an assault committed with intent to rape whether or not all the elements of rape occurred.

Hartman v. State · filed 1984-03-09(a)(1)

Nevertheless, under the totality of the evidence, in which it is shown she was severely beaten, there was ample proof from which the jury could determine that the crime of aggravated assault occurred when she was assaulted by the defendant with the intent to rape her whether or not all the elements of rape occurred.

Section 16-5-21 requires a substantial step toward a battery, coupled with intent to rape; it does not require a substantial step toward rape itself.

Lester v. State · filed 1985-01-17

The ‘substantial step’ requirement thus relates to the first essential element of [OCGA § 16-5-21], the assault, and not to the second element, the intent to rape. The crime of aggravated assault with intent to rape is complete when there is a ‘substantial step’ toward a battery of the victim, i.e., an assault, coupled with an intent to rape. ... That evidence supplied the “substantial step” requirement.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape requires a substantial step toward battery and intent to rape; forcing a victim into another room, tying her up, and touching her genital area can support a finding of that intent.

Young v. State · filed 1987-01-21

The evidence shows that the “substantial step” requirement was satisfied by appellant’s actions toward the victim. As to the requirement that he had to formulate an intent to rape, we find that the jury was instructed as to intent and that appellant’s actions in forcing the victim into another room, tying her up, and touching her genital area was sufficient evidence for the jury to find intent to rape.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape may be proved by the assailant’s threats and restraint of the victim together with his rape of another victim restrained in the same manner.

Seagraves v. State · filed 1989-04-03(a)(1)

The evidence showed that Seagraves shoved the girl’s head down in a pillow, tied her hands behind her back, pulled a pillowcase over her head, put something “hard” against her head, and told her he would kill her if she was not quiet. The intent to rape was obviously present as he tied her younger sister up in the same manner and did rape her.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape does not require proof that the defendant had carnal knowledge of the victim.

Butler v. State · filed 1990-03-15

Notwithstanding our disagreement with appellant that the crime of rape is sexually motivated, the fact that appellant did not actually have carnal knowledge of the victim as defined by OCGA § 16-6-1 is immaterial to his conviction of aggravated assault with intent to commit rape.

Section 16-5-21(a)(1) does not require the victim to feel fear or the assailant to use a real gun when the assault is committed with intent to rob.

In the Interest of J. K. D. · filed 1994-01-31(a)(1)

Thus, the victim’s lack of fear does not eviscerate the offense. Secondly, appellant was not charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), so the fact that a toy gun was used is not fatal. The offense of aggravated assault with intent to rob under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) was complete when the perpetrator assaulted the victim and demanded his money.

Intent to rape is a necessary element of aggravated assault charged under subsection (a)(1).

Henderson v. State · filed 1992-07-10(a)(1)

The evidence was highly probative of appellant’s intent to rape, a necessary element of the charged offense.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape may be proved by evidence that the defendant used a pillow offensively with intent to seriously injure the victim.

Nelson v. State · filed 1996-08-07(a)(1)

These facts give rise to inferences that Nelson, with intent to rape, used the pillow in an offensive manner intended to injure the victim seriously and that he used the knife in his attack on her.

For aggravated assault with intent to rape, evidence of an attack involving restraint and attempts to remove the victim’s underwear can support a finding of intent to rape.

Huckeba v. State · filed 1995-05-02(a)(1)

Huckeba claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of aggravated assault with intent to rape. Although he concedes that there was evidence of an assault, he argues that there was no evidence of intent to rape. We disagree and find that a rational trier of fact could find from the evidence adduced at trial proof of appellant’s guilt of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape requires proof of intent to rape, which may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

Mangham v. State · filed 1998-09-29(a)(1)

Intent to rape, which is an essential element of both the burglary and aggravated assault charges against Mangham, ... may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

Aggravated assault with intent to rape does not require a deadly weapon; it is distinct from aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Brown v. State · filed 2000-03-17(a)(1)

Brown contends that the State failed to prove aggravated assault because he had no deadly weapon. This contention is without merit. The jury found Brown guilty of an assault aggravated by his intent to rape, which is entirely distinct from the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.

Intent to rape for aggravated assault may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including attempts to remove the victim’s clothing during the assault.

Whitehill v. State · filed 2000-12-11(a)(1)

In the instant case, the victim testified that Whitehill pulled up her shirt and bra, exposing her breasts, and that he tried to remove her pants as well. ... The evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find Whitehill guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary and aggravated assault with intent to rape.

Evidence that the accused removed the victim’s shirt and bra against her will can support aggravated assault with intent to rape.

In the Interest of J. C. · filed 2002-05-21

In this regard, the juvenile court was authorized to adjudicate J. C. a delinquent for aggravated assault with intent to rape upon the evidence as showing that he removed the victim’s t-shirt and brassiere against her will.