8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen does not apply to an asylum application based on materially changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Doda v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-11-22(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion relates to an application for asylum based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it relies on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions or circumstances in the country of nationality, and “previous hearing” means the proceedings before the immigration judge.

Yang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-01-11(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ. Filja, 447 F.3d at 252.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) places on the alien the burden of proving that country conditions have changed when seeking reopening on that basis.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-01-24(c)(1)

The alien bears the burden of proving that country conditions have changed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the deadline for a motion to reopen when new evidence shows materially changed country conditions, requiring the agency to compare the new evidence with the prior record and explain its determination.

Bodnaruk v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-01-30(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA cited the governing regulation regarding changed country conditions, and applied the appropriate standard for evaluating a changed country conditions claim. ... In the present case, the BIA acknowledged Bodna-ruk’s new evidence, accurately summarized its contents, compared it with Bodnaruk’s previous evidence, and explained why the new evidence did not show that conditions have changed since Bodnaruk’s hearing before the IJ. No more was required of it.

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits reopening for asylum or withholding based on material changed country conditions when the evidence was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Anandarajah v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-12-28(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen may be filed to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an otherwise untimely or number-barred motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, but a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2012-03-28(c)(3)(ii)

Although Wang’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than ten years after the agency’s final order of removal and because it was his third motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Wang’s conversion to Christianity constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely and number-barred filing of his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on materially changed country conditions, assessed by comparing the conditions shown with the conditions existing at the prior merits hearing.

Kamal v. Holder · filed 2012-04-03(c)(3)(ii)

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Kamal failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions in Bangladesh sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of his motion to reopen. ... In considering Kamal’s claim of changed country conditions, the BIA reasonably relied on the evidence in the record at the time of his underlying proceedings to determine that “mistreatment of Christians and other religious minorities in Bangladesh does not constitute a changed circumstance, but rather has been ongoing for many years and is substantial.” In re Joseph M. Kamal, No. A073 611 506, at *1; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the new evidence is material and was not previously available.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-04-13(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to establish a material change in country conditions as required to except his motion from the time limitation, as the record evidence reflected merely a continuation of conditions that existed prior to Chen’s 2005 hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (noting that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, and the evidence must establish that a change occurred.

Sembel v. Holder · filed 2012-05-11(c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sembel failed to establish changed conditions in Indonesia with respect to the treatment of homosexuals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) waives the motion-to-reopen time and number limits only when the motion relies on material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality; Kose's evidence did not establish a material change in Turkey.

Kose v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-07-06(c)(3)

The time and number requirements are waived for motions that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA concluded that Kose’s evidence did not show a material change in the conditions in Turkey.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the alien submits material, previously unavailable evidence establishing changed country conditions, and the evidence must be sufficient to excuse the time bar.

Long Da Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-07-27(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion or otherwise act arbitrarily in concluding that Lin did not meet his heavy burden to submit material, previously-unavailable evidence establishing changed country conditions in China that would excuse his time-barred motion to reopen. See Zhang, 572 F.3d at 1319; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for reopening when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions and the evidence was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Liu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-08-14(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the time and number limit applies if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... Liu’s motion relied on her political activities after the denial of her asylum petition and not on changes in China.

The changed-country-conditions exception requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to show that country conditions materially worsened since the prior hearing; changed personal circumstances alone do not excuse the 90-day filing limit.

Ouyang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-08-20(c)(3)(ii)

Ouyang was required to show that country conditions have worsened since the time of his hearing before the Immigration Judge in 2006. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Ouyang’s evidence does not show a material change in conditions in China since that date. ... Changed personal circumstances are insufficient to excuse an alien from the 90-day time limit on a motion to reopen.

The exception to the one-motion and 90-day limits applies only when the new evidence concerns changed country conditions; a change in the alien’s personal circumstances alone is insufficient.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-09-26(c)(3)(ii)

A change in personal circumstances alone does not entitle an alien to this exception.

(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions to reopen based on changed country conditions from the usual time and number limits, but requires a showing that conditions in the relevant country have changed.

Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-11-08(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limitations on motions to reopen, however, do not apply where the motion is based upon changed country conditions arising in the alien’s country of nationality or within the country to which removal is ordered. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The alien must demonstrate that conditions within the relevant country have changed, as a change in personal circumstances alone will not suffice to allow an otherwise untimely and successive motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable.

Pellumbi v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-11-30(c)(2)

However, as the BIA noted, there is an exception to the. time requirements for motions to reopen if the movant shows “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(h). ... The BIA reasonably found that Pellumbi’s background materials on Albania show that human rights abuses in Albania persist, but have not materially changed since her 2007 hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an applicant seeking reopening based on changed country conditions to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Ayele v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-13(c)(3)(ii)

To establish a change in country conditions, the applicant must present evidence that “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an otherwise untimely motion to reopen from the deadline when it is based on material changed conditions in the country of nationality that could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2013-07-09(c)(3)(ii)

The question is whether Chen qualifies for an exception to the time limit because his motion is "based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . [that are] material and . . . could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The first category of evidence cannot sustain a showing of changed country conditions; it only indicates a change in Chen's personal circumstances. ... The treatment of particular groups is certainly relevant to assessing country conditions. But when, as here, a new political group advances a cause that other groups have already advanced and receives the same harsh treatment as the prior advocacy groups, the group's formation alone does not constitute a changed country condition.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence was unavailable during the prior proceeding and is material to the underlying claim for relief.

Jutus v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

Evidence of changed country circumstances must, first, have been unavailable during the prior proceeding and, second, be material to the underlying substantive claim for relief. Raza, 484 F.3d at 127; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing and material; the change must show an intensification or deterioration of conditions, not merely their continuation.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2013-08-13(c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, motions to reopen must be submitted within ninety days of the final administrative decision. Raza, 484 F.3d at 127 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)). One exception is if "[the] alien makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland." Id. The motion must present new facts that will be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Additionally, the new evidence must have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the former hearing and it must be material. Le Bin Zhu, 622 F.3d at 92; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Particularly relevant here, the evidence "must demonstrate the intensification or deterioration of country conditions, not their mere continuation." Tawadrous v. Holder, 565 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the applicant provides evidence of a material change in circumstances in the country of removal.

Sacba v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-16(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sacba’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions where Sacba failed to supply any evidence of a material change in circumstances in Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions requires evidence showing materially changed conditions since the merits hearing.

Yong v. Holder · filed 2013-10-28(c)(3)(ii)

Indeed, we find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Yong failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions such that further consideration would have been warranted in reopened proceedings, as the record evidence did not indicate a change in conditions in Indonesia, but rather reflected a continuation of sporadic religious violence targeted towards ethnic Chinese Christians, which existed at the time of the Yong’s merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (noting that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies the same changed-country-conditions standard as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), requiring the evidence of changed conditions to be material.

Lin v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-11-14(c)(3)(ii)

Although the regulation cited by the BIA — 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) — does not track § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) verbatim, the two provisions reflect the same standard.

The changed-conditions exception does not excuse an untimely motion to reopen based only on the applicant’s changed personal circumstances.

Guo Man Wang v. Holder · filed 2013-11-25(c)(3)

Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that Wang’s membership in the DPC constituted changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

The changed-country-conditions exception requires evidence of a material change in circumstances in the country of removal.

Zheng v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-02(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions where Zheng failed to supply any evidence of a material change in circumstances in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions when the qualifying evidence was unavailable at the prior proceeding.

Alle v. Holder · filed 2014-01-15(c)(3)(ii)

Although Alle’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than nine years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Alle failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions excusing the untimely filing of her motion to reopen because the record evidence demonstrated continued systematic violence against women in Somalia since at least 1991, and did not indicate that conditions had materially worsened since Alle’s 1999 hearing.

This subsection permits a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions that were previously unavailable, despite the ordinary time and number limits.

Saleem v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-02-13(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen is not barred, however, if the alien’s request for relief “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding”. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To determine whether there has been a material change in country conditions, the evidence of such conditions submitted with the motion is compared to those existing at the time the deportation order was issued. See, e.g., Panjwani v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 626, 633 (5th Cir. 2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and number limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Gotora v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-06(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen is not subject to time and number limitations if the request for relief “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Although these reports evidence the continuation of political repression during the relevant time period, they do not show a material change. See, e.g., Zhang v. Holder, 487 F. App’x 949, 951-52 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Accordingly, Gotora did not meet her burden to prove an exception to the time and number limitations for her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and number limits when materially changed country conditions are supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Jacobo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-01-23(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions for women in Guatemala. The evidence Petitioner submitted with her most recent motion to reopen showed that the conditions described had existed for years in Guatemala and failed to introduce previously unavailable evidence showing a material change in conditions in Guatemala since the time of Petitioner’s 2002 hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Under § 1003.2(c), an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions may be denied when it fails to identify evidence showing that conditions have changed since the initial removal hearing.

Anton v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-02-24(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, where petitioners’ motion failed to specifically identify any evidence presented to show that conditions in Mexico had in fact changed from the time of their initial removal hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a late motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to show an intensification or deterioration of conditions in the relevant country, not merely a continuation of prior conditions.

Ang v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-19(c)(3)(ii)

The Board may properly deny a late motion to reopen if the petitioner's evidence of purportedly "changed conditions" shows only a "mere continuation" of prior conditions, Marsadu v. Holder, 748 F.3d 55, 58 (1st Cir. 2014), or what we have elsewhere described as a "persistence of negative conditions," Fen Tjong Lie v. Holder, 729 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 2013). Thus, a petitioner, to succeed in an untimely motion to reopen based on changed conditions, must show an "intensification or deterioration" of conditions in the relevant country. Marsadu, 748 F.3d at 58; see also Fen Tjong Lie, 729 F.3d at 30-31.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time- or number-barred motion to reopen when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-17(c)(3)(ii)

Although these limitations do not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Singh failed to make the required showing.

The 90-day deadline for reopening may be excused when a motion relies on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-25(c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limitation may be excused, however, if the motion to reopen is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Zheng’s 2014 motion was untimely, and the BIA was within its discretion to find no material change in conditions for Chinese Christians that would excuse the untimeliness.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) asks whether country conditions have changed, not merely whether conditions are poor, when evaluating a motion to reopen.

Nency v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-28(c)(3)(ii)

The question on a motion to reopen is not whether conditions are poor, but rather whether they have changed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (comparing “the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions basis for reopening was not established by evidence showing an ongoing problem without a meaningful comparison between conditions at the earlier hearing and the motion to reopen.

Escalante-Alvarez v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-10(c)(3)(ii)

Escalante-Alvarez asserts that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to reopen the removal proceedings on account of changed country conditions in Honduras. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). She argues that she presented evidence showing that violence against women in Honduras, particularly murder, has increased dramatically. However, the evidence presented reflects that violence against women has been, and remains, an ongoing problem in Honduras. In addition, Escalante-Alvarez failed to compare in any meaningful way the conditions in Honduras at the time of her 2002 removal hearing and her 2013 motion to reopen. Thus, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion because its decision was not capricious, without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so irrational that it is arbitrary.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum only when the movant proves a material change in country conditions, rather than merely a change in personal circumstances.

Zeah v. Lynch · filed 2016-07-08(c)(3)(ii)

To be excused from the 90-day filing deadline, the movant must prove changed country conditions, not a change in personal conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires evidence supporting reopening based on changed country conditions to be material and unavailable at the previous hearing.

Zacharia v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-19(c)(3)(ii)

However, Zacharia did have to show that the evidence of changed conditions was “material” and that it “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and numerical limits for reopening only when the evidence shows a material change in country conditions; section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence that is new or previously unavailable.

Chan v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-06-24(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Furthermore, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Chan failed to “show a material change in the family planning policy of the Fujian Province.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As the BIA properly noted, much of Chan’s evidence predated her October 2002 hearing. Thus, it was not new or previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Regardless, these documents did not show changed country conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions, but a change in personal circumstances such as the birth of U.S.-citizen children does not qualify.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-16(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 100S.2(c)(3)(ii). ... It is well-settled that the birth of U.S. citizen children is not evidence of changed conditions in China. ... Furthermore, the BIA correctly found that Chen failed to submit any evidence demonstrating changed country conditions in China. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening of a removal proceeding when changed country conditions support reopening.

Lin, Xiu Z. v. Mukasey, Michael B. · filed 2008-07-08(c)(3)(ii)

But unless the policy is enforced more stringently now than when the petitioner was ordered removed (“changed country conditions”), she cannot reopen the removal proceeding. ... The petitioner has carried her burden of showing changed country conditions that entitle her to reopen her removal proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies to aliens under final orders of removal seeking to apply or reapply for asylum.

Dong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-14(c)(3)(ii)

Section 1158(a)(2)(D) governs asylum applications only and is not applicable to the reopening of removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(3)(ii), on the other hand, expressly applies to aliens under final orders of removal seeking to apply or reapply for asylum.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding from the 90-day deadline when based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality; changed personal circumstances do not qualify.

Vunzi v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-08(c)(3)(ii)

Changed personal circumstances do not qualify as “changed circumstances” under section § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on asylum or withholding claims arising from changed country conditions from the ordinary time and numerical limits; a child's birth in the United States is only a changed personal circumstance and does not qualify.

Jiang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-15(c)(3)(ii)

Further, while the time and numerical limitations do not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal on the basis of changed country conditions, Jiang’s argument that the birth of her two children constitute such a changed circumstance unpersuasive. See 8 U.S.C. *828§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We have held that the birth of children in the United States “is essentially [evidence] of changed personal circumstances ... which does not fit under the exception” to the time and numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, unless it is supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; Liu’s evidence did not satisfy that exception.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the agency’s final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Liu’s July 2007 motion to reopen was untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day filing deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s finding that Liu failed to establish materially changed country conditions excusing the untimeliness of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the applicant demonstrates materially changed conditions in the country of removal.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding only when based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, not changed personal circumstances such as children born in the United States.

Jin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-15(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners requested reopening and asylum based on the birth of a second or third child in the United States. But it is well settled in this circuit that the birth of additional children in the United States is evidence of changed personal circumstances, not changed country conditions within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen for an asylum application based on changed country conditions, but changed personal circumstances alone do not satisfy the exception.

Jin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-15(c)(3)(ii)

an alien who is subject to a final removal order and who wishes to file a successive asylum application must do so in conjunction with a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) and thus may not do so based solely on changed personal circumstances.

The changed-circumstances exception to the ninety-day deadline applies only when the change arises in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered; asylum grants to relatives in the United States do not qualify.

Kishore v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-05(c)(3)(ii)

Grants of asylum to Kishore’s relatives in the United States do not constitute changed circumstances. See *4178 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (allowing an exception to the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen that are “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered”) (emphasis added); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128,1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an untimely or second motion to reopen only when the applicant presents material, previously unavailable evidence showing changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Ceni v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-10(c)(3)(ii)

These limitations, however, do not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hear-' ing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ceni’s motion to reopen, because Ceni failed to meet an exception to the applicable filing requirements. While Ceni asserts that the BIA failed to consider evidence of changed country conditions in the record, he does not specify what evidence he is referring to or how the evidence he submitted shows a change in circumstances as required by the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

The exception permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions despite the ordinary time limit.

Jiang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(c)(3)(h)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen.1 It is *369undisputed that the motion was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Jiang failed to show that his motion to reopen met an exception to the time limitation based on “changed country conditions” in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a late motion to reopen only when the movant submits new and material evidence showing changed conditions in the country of removal.

Laksono v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-29(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Laksono’s motion to reopen as untimely where Laksono filed the motion two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for asylum or withholding claims supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; the exception did not apply here because the evidence did not overcome the adverse credibility finding or establish an independent fear of future persecution.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed *404country conditions arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because the evidence that Singh submitted in support of his motion to reopen failed to rebut the adverse credibility finding, and because Singh offered no evidence establishing a fear of future persecution that is independent of the testimony and documentation he offered in the underlying proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh’s motion was untimely and did not qualify for an exception to the ninety-day filing deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception permits a motion to reopen without the usual numerical or time limits when it is based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of ordered removal that were previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Benabdi v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-17(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no numerical or time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not treat changes in an applicant’s personal circumstances as changed country conditions for the motion-to-reopen exception.

Xiao Chin Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-04(c)(3)(ii)

Not only did Zheng fail to produce corroborating evidence that her membership in the China Democracy Party would expose her to a risk of persecution, but the BIA accurately found that such a claim constitutes a change in personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that changes in an applicant’s personal circumstances do not fit under the changed circumstances exception provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the 90-day limit for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, but the exception must be demonstrated.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioner contends that the 90-day deadline for the motion to reopen does not apply because petitioner sought to reopen the proceedings on the basis of changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion, however, in denying the motion to reopen as untimely because petitioner did not demonstrate that the exception to the 90-day deadline applied. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a second motion to reopen based on changed circumstances only when the changed circumstances arise in the country of removal, not merely in the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Wang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-17(c)(3)(ii)

At any rate, she can prevail on a second motion to reopen only if she can show that it is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But Wang does not argue that conditions have changed in China; she argues only that her own conditions have changed because she has given birth to additional children. It is the rare individual for whom a change in individual circumstances will prompt a change in a country’s circumstances. See Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2006). The Board thus correctly observed that her petition, if construed (against her will) as a successive motion to reopen, still would be barred by her failure to show a change of circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum based on materially changed country conditions from the one-motion and 90-day limits when the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Nika v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-20(c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and must do so no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day limit when it seeks asylum or withholding based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-11-26(c)(3)(ii)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the 90-day limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal destination.

Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2007-08-17(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Here, Lin offered very similar evidence as that which we found to be inadequate in Guan. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the filing deadline when an asylum or withholding claim relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Janfeshan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(3)(ii)

An alien is not bound by the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if his request for asylum or withholding of deportation “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an applicant to avoid the 90-day deadline for reopening by presenting evidence of materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality, subject to the evidentiary requirements in subsection (c)(1).

Al Sayar v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-06(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered in the proceedings that the applicant seeks to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, an applicant may be excused from compliance with the 90-day time limit if he submits evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered in support of the motion “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). There is no dispute that the separate motions to reopen filed by the petitioners in this case were both untimely. Thus, in order to prevail on their motions, the petitioners were required to show that conditions in Kuwait had changed in a manner that was material to them claims for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the filing deadline when a withholding-of-removal request is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Iyoha v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-15(c)(3)(ii)

An alien is not bound by the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if her request for withholding of removal “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The evidence submitted by Iyoha, however, did not show that conditions had changed in Nigeria to her detriment following the BIA’s initial rejection of her request for withholding of removal under the CAT.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives the usual time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when material evidence shows changed country conditions that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing; the changed-circumstances requirement is a procedural hurdle that must be met before substantive relief is considered.

Thomas v. Attorney General · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)(ii)

The regulations, however, provide that the time and numerical limitations that typically apply to motions to reopen may be waived if the motions are “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Thus, with an otherwise time- and number-barred motion to reopen brought pursuant to § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA first considers whether the petitioner has proved, by material evidence not otherwise available at the time of the previous hearing, that circumstances in the country of deportation have sufficiently changed to warrant reopening.

The exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen applies to material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable, and Ni’s motion did not qualify for it.

Ni v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA properly found that Ni’s motion did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen to apply for asylum based on changed country conditions from the ordinary time limitation, but the applicant must establish changed country conditions.

Octavianus v. Holder · filed 2009-03-16(c)(3)(ii)

Although the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply for asylum based on changed country conditions, Oc-tavianus waives any challenge to the BIA’s finding that he did not establish changed country conditions.

The exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) lifts the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, which are distinct from changed personal circumstances.

Yan Long Hong v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2009-04-10(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and numerical limits do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such changes are regularly referred to as “changed country conditions” and distinguished from “changed personal circumstances.”

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts motions to reopen based on changed country conditions from the applicable time and numerical limitations.

Bary v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-06-08(c)(3)(ii)

The time and numerical limitations placed on motions to reopen do not apply to those based on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in the relevant country only when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-06-17(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the BIA reasonably concluded that Petitioner had not demonstrated that the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable.

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the time limit for a motion to reopen when the material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Brar v. Holder · filed 2009-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation for a motion to reopen does not apply to proceedings based on evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if the material evidence was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

The ninety-day deadline for a motion to reopen does not have a changed-country-circumstances exception when the alleged changes are only the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Ren v. Holder · filed 2009-06-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The BIA properly found that Ren’s conversion to Christianity and marriage to an asylee constitute changes in his personal circumstances, not changed circumstances in China warranting an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing limit when it is based on changed circumstances in the movant’s country of nationality, but the movant must present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-28(c)(3)(ii)

However, the 90-day limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the one-motion and 90-day limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Zhao v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-31(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the ninety day and one motion limits provides that they shall not apply if the motion to reopen “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available . . . at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... However, because Zhao failed to present sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in China with his second motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his late-filed motion to reopen.

The exception to the time and numerical limits applies when a motion to reopen is based on material changed country conditions supported by evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Xidi Sun v. Holder · filed 2009-09-02(c)(3)(ii)

There are no time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Sun’s proffered translation of the law did not demonstrate material changed country conditions excusing the time and numerical limitations applicable to Sun’s motion.

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen only when the movant presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country, rather than a self-induced change in personal circumstances.

Zeng v. Holder · filed 2009-09-15(c)(3)(ii)

These limits do not apply where the mov-ant produces material and previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, “[a] self-induced change in personal circumstances” does not suspend the bar. Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006).

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline does not apply when the asserted change is only in the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Cheng v. Holder · filed 2009-10-21(c)(3)(ii)

It is well-settled that such a change does not suffice to establish an exception to the timeliness requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen only when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of deportation.

Tak Man Lee v. Holder · filed 2009-10-23(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time or numerical limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In this case, the BIA reasonably found that Lee’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Muyingo v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Muyingo’s second motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Uganda to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (critical question is whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim now does).

The changed-circumstances exception removes the time limit for a motion to reopen when material country-condition evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Duka v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Duka’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows a motion to reopen without the usual time or numerical limit when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and undiscoverable; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2010-03-16(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no temporal or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... While Dong provided a notice from the Lao Feng Village Committee indicating that government officials were aware of his political activities and asylum application in the United States, such evidence is indicative of a change in personal circumstances, not changed country conditions that would warrant reopening his removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the 90-day deadline and numerical limit on motions to reopen to be excused when the alien establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-03-26(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline and numerical limitation may be excused if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . .” The BIA reasonably concluded, however, that Zheng had shown only that his personal circumstances had changed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing deadline when it is based on genuinely changed country conditions, not merely continuing conditions.

Solaque-Prieto v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-03-31(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision that is the subject of the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This deadline does not apply, however, if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We agree. The new statements Prieto submitted do not tend to show any changed country condition that would excuse the untimely motion. Moreover, the affidavits do not establish an increase in FARC’s intimidation tactics or harassment that did not exist at the time of Prieto’s removal hearing. On this record, Prieto has not demonstrated that the BIA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in ruling that she failed to produce evidence of changed country conditions sufficient to satisfy the limited exception to the 90-day deadline for the filing of a motion to reopen.

The 90-day deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen based on material changed country conditions that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Sikander v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-04-15(c)(3)(ii)

An alien must generally file a motion to reopen with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Sikander did not file the motion to reopen within the 90-day window; therefore, he must show changed country conditions in Bangladesh in order to excuse the untimeliness.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline for materially changed country conditions, but a change in the alien’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Weng v. Holder · filed 2010-04-15(c)(3)(ii)

This is fatal to her claim, as it is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances does not suffice to establish an exception to the timeliness requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day limit when it is based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality and supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Sepang v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-04-27(c)(3)(ii)

Because Sepang’s motion was untimely, his motion had to be based on changed country conditions in Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (90 day time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”) We conclude, however, that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his untimely motion to reopen because Sepang did not make the required showing.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a petitioner to avoid § 1003.2(c)(2)'s time and numerical limits by showing material country-condition changes that were unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior proceeding.

Beqiri v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-05-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), petitioners may escape the numerical and time limitations set forth in § 1003.2(c)(2) by establishing changed country conditions arising in the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from the usual time and numerical limits.

Kante v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-01-07(c)(3)(ii)

However, one exception to this ninety-day time limit is for motions “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (“The time and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings . . . [t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]”).

The time limit for motions to reopen does not apply to an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Weng v. Holder · filed 2011-02-07(c)(3)(ii)

Although this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA reasonably determined that Weng failed to demonstrate changed conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and numerical limits when it is based on changed country conditions and supported by material, previously unavailable evidence; the exception did not apply because Badiaga's evidence was insufficient.

Badiaga v. Holder · filed 2011-02-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is beyond dispute that Badiaga’s motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s dismissal of Badiaga’s appeal of his removal order, and because Badiaga previously filed a motion to reopen in December 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Badiaga contends, however, that the time and number limitations do not apply to his motion to reopen because it was “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” and the evidence he submitted “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In fact, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Badiaga failed to adduce material evidence of changed country conditions in the Congo sufficient to support a prima facie asylum claim.

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions.

Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez’s motion to reopen as untimely and successive because he filed his second motion to reopen over 20 months after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and because Hernandez failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 986, 986-989 (9th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time limit when it seeks asylum or withholding relief based on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Choudhury v. Holder · filed 2011-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

An alien is not bound by the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if his request for asylum or withholding of deportation “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a regulatory exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Galumashvili v. Holder · filed 2010-06-07(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galumashvili’s motion to reopen because Galumashvili failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Georgia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing motions to reopen.

The exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen does not apply when the alleged change is only in the alien's personal circumstances rather than country conditions.

Zhu v. Holder · filed 2010-07-02(c)(3)(ii)

It is well-settled that such a change in personal circumstances does not suffice to establish an exception to the timeliness requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely or numerically barred motion to reopen an asylum or withholding claim when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-08-06(c)(3)(ii)

However, the rules against untimeliness or multiplicity do not apply where the alien bases his motion to reopen an asylum or withholding of deportation claim upon “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the 90-day filing deadline and numerical limitation for motions to reopen to be excused when the alien establishes changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-09-23(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline and numerical limitation may be excused if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or ordered deportation.

Purba v. Holder · filed 2010-10-25(c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time or numerical limit, however, for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In this case, the BIA did not exceed its discretion in denying Purba’s untimely motion to reopen because Purba failed to offer material evidence of changed country conditions that would affect his eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen based on material changed country conditions or circumstances from the time and number limits when the supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Jalloh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-05-13(c)(3)

The time and number requirements do not apply, however to motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) ], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when an alien presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Yu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-30(c)(3)(ii)

There is an exception for the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, however, if the alien can demonstrate “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “An alien who attempts to show that the evidence is material bears a heavy burden and must present evidence that demonstrates that, if the proceedings were opened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case.” Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256–57. In examining the evidence, the BIA is entitled to discount documents that have not been authenticated. Kazemzadeh v. United States Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009). The BIA correctly determined that the evidence Yu submitted did not establish changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline and a number limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception for material, previously unavailable changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Cheng v. Holder · filed 2011-07-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Cheng’s 2010 motion was untimely and number-barred, as the final administrative decision was issued in 1995, and it was her second motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... As the BIA noted, Cheng’s political activities in the United States reflect a self-induced change in personal circumstances and, therefore, do not exempt her motion from the applicable bars. ... Because Cheng did not begin participating in PFD activities until 2009, well after she was ordered removed, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that she failed to meet an exception to the filing deadline and number bar for motions to re-open and in thus denying her motion to reopen.

The exception to § 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline requires changed circumstances in the country of nationality; changed personal circumstances alone do not suffice.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2011-07-15(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply where the applicant establishes both “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and prima facie eligibility for relief, see Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 78. ... Here, the BIA considered the evidence, provided citations to the record, and concluded that the material submitted by Zhang did not support a finding of changed conditions with regards to China’s policy affecting Christians. ... The BIA satisfied its duty, and declined to find the evidence persuasive of changed conditions. Accordingly, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. ... Having concluded that there was no change in country conditions, the BIA denied Zhang’s motion on the ground that a change in personal conditions is insufficient to excuse an untimely motion to reopen. ... Accordingly, where the petitioner has not submitted evidence of changed country conditions, no exception to the untimely motion to reopen can be found.

The exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen applies to changed conditions in the country of nationality, not merely to a change in the movant's personal circumstances.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-08-15(c)(3)(ii)

Although Lin contends that the time and number limitations do not apply to her motion to reopen as it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), her arguments are unavailing. ... However, as the BIA found, Lin's alleged conversion to Christianity was a change in her personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008). ... The record supports the BIA’s determination that, although China has engaged in discrimination and abuse against Christians, Lin failed to establish that conditions in China had changed fundamentally since her merits hearing, as required to warrant reopening. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007); Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and number limits when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions or circumstances that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Bin Li v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-08-31(c)(3)

The time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Under these circumstances, we conclude that evidence fails to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying reopening.

The exception to the 90-day deadline permits reopening based on changed conditions in the country of nationality only when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Zhao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen must be filed with the BIA no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be opened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). However, this limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Zhao‟s claim that the 90-day limit for filing a motion to reopen should be excused due to changed country conditions.

The regulation permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when the applicant establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Saran v. Holder · filed 2011-11-17(c)(3)(ii)

A person ordinarily may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. ... However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the individual establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Saran failed to establish material changed country conditions in Bangladesh sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

The exception permits an otherwise untimely or successive motion to reopen only when supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Le Zhang v. Holder · filed 2011-11-23(c)(3)(ii)

Although Zhang’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than seven years after the agency’s final order of deportation and it was her third motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions and exempts it from the ordinary time and number limits.

Anandarajah v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-12-28(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen may be filed to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The time and number limitations that usually apply to motions to reopen do not apply to a motion based on changed country conditions.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline requires material evidence, and evidence showing changed conditions without a connection to protected-ground persecution is insufficient.

Cabrera-Noriega v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-12-28(c)(2)(ii)

Next, even if Cabrera-Noriega had shown changed country conditions, he has not shown that they are material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)(ii). Both asylum and withholding of removal claims require the petitioner to show that any harm would occur on account of a statutorily protected factor, which is Cabrera-Noriega’s political opinion in this case. ... The articles and affidavits that he attached to his motion merely established that Pablito had escaped from custody, the ELN might be gradually declining or might be re-energized by Pablito’s escape, and the ELN had contacted Cabrera-Noriega’s brother to try to find him. Even assuming arguendo that this evidence was sufficient to show the persecution and harm elements of an asylum or withholding of removal claim, it did not establish that Pablito would seek to harm Cabrera-Noriega based on his political opinion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the time limit when it rests on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the relevant country.

Alvarez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-01-03(c)(3)(ii)

The federal regulations provide that the time limitation applicable to motions to reopen does not apply if a motion seeks “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum” and is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Alternatively, Alvarez failed to demonstrate that his motion to reopen was based on changed country conditions, rather than a change in personal circumstances, so as to qualify for an exception to the time restrictions applicable to motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-01-04(c)(3)(ii)

Although Lin’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin’s newly commenced practice of Christianity constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen when the petitioner seeks asylum or withholding of removal based on materially changed conditions in the country of removal.

Kalaj v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-01-26(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to this limit is made where a petitioner applies for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed conditions in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... However, their motion, while mentioning a change in conditions in the memorandum, was based on their eligibility for an adjustment of status, which is not an authorized exception. Moreover, even if this issue had been properly raised below, the Kalajs failed to demonstrate that conditions in Albania have changed for the worse since their original application for asylum or their first motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits avoiding that deadline based on materially changed country conditions not previously available.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-01-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s motion to reopen, filed in April 2010, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in August 2009. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... As the BIA reasonably noted, however, Chen failed to show changed country conditions with respect to the Chinese government’s treatment of democracy activists because the evidence submitted during Chen’s original hearing showed that China’s crackdown against its political opponents and persecution of CDP members was continuing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen beyond the usual time and number limits when it relies on material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Mei Fang Guo v. Attorney General · filed 2012-03-13(c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or destination.

Be Jing Ke v. Holder · filed 2012-04-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it is based on material changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal that were previously unavailable.

Lu v. Holder · filed 2012-04-12(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline does not apply when the alleged change is only the petitioner's self-induced personal change.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-04-27(c)(3)(ii)

As we have previously held, “The law is clear that a petitioner must show changed country conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement for seeking to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A self-induced change in personal circumstances cannot suffice.” Wei Guang Wang, 437 F.3d 274.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum despite the ordinary time and number limits when it is based on material changed country conditions supported by evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Khokhar v. Holder · filed 2012-05-23(c)(3)(ii)

there is no limitation on a motion filed to apply or reapply for asylum if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); ... Nevertheless, we note that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, as the evidence Khokhar submitted was available, could have been presented at his prior hearing, and did not establish a material change in country conditions since Khokhar’s May 2006 proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to § 1003.2(c)(2)'s filing deadline applies to material, previously unavailable changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, not to a self-induced change in the applicant's personal circumstances.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2012-05-31(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... As an initial matter, the BIA did not err in concluding that Huang’s practice of Falun Gong in the United States is not a changed circumstance arising in China. ... Huang argues that he is nonetheless entitled to reopen his case because he has demonstrated an increase in China’s persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. However, the BIA’s determination that the evidence failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China is supported by substantial evidence. ... Because the evidence Huang submitted was insufficient to establish a material change in country conditions, and because his recent dedication to Falun Gong constitutes only a change in personal circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that he failed to meet an exception to the filing deadline and, accordingly, in denying his untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Zhao v. Holder · filed 2012-07-20(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhao’s motion as untimely as he failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions from the ordinary time and number limits when the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Kaur v. Holder · filed 2012-08-09(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply to: ... (2) motions to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

The exception to the time and number limits for reopening applies only when materially changed country conditions are shown with evidence that was previously unavailable.

Salazar v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-07-30(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the time and number limit applies if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(3)(ii); see INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... These affidavits do not establish changed country conditions in Colombia, but instead show that he faced the same fear of persecution that he did at the time of his removal hearing. Likewise, the expert witness affidavit and the 2010 State Department Country Report are not material because they do not establish changed country conditions in Colombia.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the ordinary motion-to-reopen deadline when an asylum motion is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-08-22(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Lin’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than eight years after the agency’s final order of removal, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and number limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Zeng v. Holder · filed 2012-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Zeng’s motion to reopen as untimely. The background materials do not demonstrate a change in country conditions material to Zeng’s claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from those limits.

Jian Xi Hu v. Holder · filed 2012-09-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Hu’s March 23, 2011 motion to reopen was untimely because the BIA issued its final order of removal on October 24, 2002. However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material, and Li did not meet that standard.

Li v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-11-06(c)(3)(ii)

We need not address whether Li’s decision to embrace this religion demonstrates a change in her personal circumstances, rather than country conditions, because even if Li was a Jehovah’s Witness at her initial hearing, she did not present material evidence of changed country conditions so as to warrant relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to the 90-day deadline applies only when reopening is based on material changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal, not merely on changed personal circumstances.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-02-06(c)(3)(ii)

However, the 90-day time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Nonetheless, an alien cannot avoid the requirement of changed country conditions by showing only a change in personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the ordinary 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2013-02-11(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limit on filing a motion to reopen asylum proceedings if the motion "is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2012).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding of removal from the filing-time limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-03-05(c)(3)(ii)

This limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Lin’s motion to reopen, filed almost three years after the BIA entered the final removal order, was clearly untimely. In addition, we agree with the Board that the evidence Lin submitted with her motion to reopen was insufficient to demonstrate changed circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a one-motion and 90-day limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives those limits only for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Wang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-03-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA ―no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that rely on evidence of ―changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... This, along with other record evidence, amply supports the BIA’s determination that Wang failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances ―arising in‖ China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception permits an untimely motion to reopen when it relies on material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-04-25(c)(3)(ii)

These limitations do not apply, however, to motions that rely on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Chen had to provide evidence of changed country conditions in order for her untimely motion to proceed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the movant presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances.

Azatyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-10(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Azatyan’s motion to reopen on the ground that Azatyan failed to present material and previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

The changed-country-conditions exception allows the time limit for a motion to reopen to be avoided only when the motion is based on changed conditions in the country of removal, not changed personal circumstances in the United States.

Cui v. Holder · filed 2013-06-27(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Cui contends that the time limitation does not apply because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments are unpersuasive. Initially, the basis of Cui’s motion to reopen – his renewed claim for asylum based on his conversion to Christianity in the United States – was a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States, not a change of conditions arising in China. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (providing that the 90-day time limitation circumscribes eligibility for relief unless the motion is based on a change in the country of removal).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, not merely on changed personal circumstances in the United States.

Zhu v. Holder · filed 2013-07-25(c)(3)(ii)

Zhu concedes that his motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after his administrative removal order became final in 2005. It is therefore untimely unless it falls within an exception to the time limitation that generally governs motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Zhu contends that the limitation does not apply here because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). His arguments are unpersuasive. Zhu’s motion to reopen is premised on a renewed claim for asylum based on his alleged political activities with the Chinese Democratic Party in the United States, beginning after he was ordered removed in 2005. Zhu’s political activities constitute a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States, not a change of conditions arising in China, and are therefore insufficient to establish an exception to the 90-day time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen seeking relief based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or designated removal country.

Adolfo Jose Fernandez Gutierrez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-08-07(c)(3)(ii)

Regulations governing BIA practice provide that an exception to the time and number limits applies if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A change in personal circumstances, however, does not authorize the untimely filing of a motion to reopen.

The changed-circumstances exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen does not apply when the asserted change is a personal circumstance arising in the United States rather than changed country conditions in China.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2013-11-06(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Jiang contends that the time and numerical limitations do not apply because his motion was “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments are unpersuasive. Initially, the basis of Jiang’s motion to reopen – his renewed claim for asylum based on his conversion to Christianity in the United States – is a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States, not a change of conditions arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Randeniya v. Holder · filed 2014-03-13(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Randeniya’s decision to join the Sri Lankan Democratic National Alliance (“DNA”) while in the United States reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances, and therefore does not exempt his motion from the applicable bars. ... Because Randeniya did not join the DNA until 2009, well after he was ordered removed, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that his membership did not establish an exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Castellanos-Santiago v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

Second, Castellanos-Santiago failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for an exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence of change in the country of origin that would establish prima facie eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal; a self-induced personal change does not qualify as changed country conditions.

Fa Chang Zhang v. Holder · filed 2014-08-01(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... As the BIA noted, Zhang’s 2010 conversion to Christianity reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions, and therefore does not exempt his motion from the applicable bars.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Yan v. Holder · filed 2014-09-11(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. ... The BIA’s determination that Yan’s individualized documents were insufficient to show changed country conditions was not an abuse of discretion.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an untimely motion to reopen only when the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Rosales-Alvarado v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-07-07(c)(3)(ii)

Generally, an alien may file a motion to reopen with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). ... The time requirement is waived for motions to reopen that are “based upon changed country conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the Board acted within its discretion in denying Rosales-Alvarado’s motion to reopen as untimely filed because he failed to show changed country conditions in El Salvador sufficient to exempt him from the 90-day deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day reopening deadline for a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, but not a self-induced change in personal circumstances.

Chen v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-27(c)(3)(ii)

However, this time limitation does not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely; she filed it in 2013, nearly nine years after the agency rendered its final decision. The BIA determined that she failed to carry her heavy burden of demonstrating material changed country conditions that would excuse her delay. Specifically, the agency concluded that Chen’s motion was predicated on a change in her personal circumstances – converting to Christianity and participating in demonstrations – rather than a change in China. This was no abuse of discretion.

The exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen applies to asylum or withholding claims based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Kaur v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-08(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Kaur’s argument that changed circumstances warrant reopening her case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (stating that the “time and numerical limitations” on filing motions to reopen “shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings . . . [t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”). When considering a motion to reopen claiming changed circumstances, “[t]he critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004). Kaur has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion when it concluded that, although she has alleged a change in her personal circumstances (i.e., her 2004 marriage to Darshan Singh Sran, a permanent resident who was granted asylum), she has not alleged a change in circumstances in her home country.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions that could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-10(c)(3)(ii)

Singh does not, however, allege evidence of “changed country conditions” that “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions.

Martinez-Mena v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Mena’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Martinez-Mena failed to present material evidence of changed conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when material evidence of changed country conditions was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented.

Jiang v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-15(c)(3)(ii)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may move to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 § C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the changed circumstances arise in the applicant’s country of nationality; materially different country-conditions evidence is required to invoke it.

Lakha v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-25(c)(3)(ii)

With respect to petition No. 14-73690, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lakha’s third motion to reopen, where Lakha failed to establish materially changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (requiring “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality”); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989 (9th Cir. 2010) (no changed country conditions where country conditions evidence submitted with petitioner’s motion to reopen was not qualitatively different from that submitted at original hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality that overcome the time limitation.

Lin v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-24(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s untimely motion to reopen because Lin did not establish materially changed circumstances in China as to overcome the time limitation for motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions.

Munge v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Munge’s untimely motion to reopen because Munge failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Kenya to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish changed country conditions).

The changed-country-circumstances exception requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and not previously available.

Xiao He Chen v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-09(c)(3)(ii)

The first requirement necessitates a showing that the evidence offered in support of the alien's motion to reopen is material and was not previously available.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions.

Francisco v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Juan Francisco’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, and Juan Francisco failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Guatemala based on a disfavored group and imputed political opinion claim to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2 permits the 90-day reopening deadline to be avoided for changed circumstances only when the petitioner provides material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Abdullah Al-Fakih v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Although a petitioner typically must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final decision to be reopened, the time limit may not apply where the motion is “based on changed circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii). To prove changed circumstances, a petitioner must submit evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen does not apply when an alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the IJ hearing.

Morales v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-08-15(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day deadline does not apply where the alien “presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ.” Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).