8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

The exception to the usual time and number limits for motions to reopen applies when the motion is based on changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier; the new evidence must be likely to change the result if proceedings are reopened.

Shala v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-05-29(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limits do not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Thus, the Shalas’ motion is time-barred and number-barred unless they can show changed country conditions and provide material evidence likely to change the result of their case if proceedings were reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256-57.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion when the petitioner presents previously unavailable material evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Jourbina v. Holder · filed 2013-05-30(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

Where, as here, a petitioner’s motion to reopen is filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the petitioner is required to present material evidence of changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable in order to excuse the untimely filing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening after the ordinary deadline when the applicant shows changed country conditions since the prior removal hearing, including worsened persecution; a later personal change alone is insufficient.

Liu v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-03(c)(3)(ii)

Because the petitioner moved to reopen her asylum proceeding after a final order of removal had been entered, her motion was untimely if based only on a change in her activities after coming to this country, such as her conversion. ... She had instead to show a change in conditions in China since 2002, the date of her last removal hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). She thus had to show that Chinese persecution of Christians (of her type) had worsened.

The exception to the motion-to-reopen time and numerical limits applies to changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

He Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

Changed personal circumstances do not constitute changed country conditions for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days after entry of a final order of removal.

Baagmil v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-09(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2013). ... We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that Baagmil did not show a change in country conditions that would excuse the ninety day period for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits denial of an untimely motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed circumstances in the country of nationality to be material to the claim.

Sugiarto v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sugiarto’s untimely motion to reopen where the motion was filed almost three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Sugiarto failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia material to her claim, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the filing deadline when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of ordered deportation.

Jansari v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

The filing period is not applicable if, inter alia, the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); accord § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Panjwani, 401 F.3d at 631.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of a final order of removal.

Dembele v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-18(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2013). ... In any event, we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding Dembele’s motion was untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the exception does not apply without proof of changed country conditions.

Kadria v. Holder · filed 2013-07-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kadria’s 2011 motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as he filed it more than eight years after the BIA’s order upholding an immigration judge’s underlying merits decision, and had previously filed a motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (providing that only one motion to reopen may be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Although these time and number restrictions do not apply to a motion to reopen seeking to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Kadria did not demonstrate a change in conditions in Albania.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-08-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the ordinary time and number limits when material evidence shows changed country conditions and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable.

Perera v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-09-12(c)(3)(ii)

Both the statute and the relevant regulations provide an exception for motions based on evidence of changed country conditions “arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” but only “if [the] evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “Therefore, if the [alien] presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if there has been a prior motion to reopen or the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from those time and numerical limits.

Lian v. Holder · filed 2013-09-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although their motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than six years after the agency’s final order of removal and it was their third such motion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in concluding that Lian’s newly commenced Falun Gong practice constituted a change in her personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the applicable limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Sherpa v. Holder · filed 2013-10-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Sherpa failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions that would excuse the untimely filing, as the record evidence did not indicate a change in conditions in Nepal, but rather reflected a continuation of instability caused by the Maoists, which existed at the time of Sherpa’s merits hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (noting that in evaluating evidence of changed country conditions, the BIA “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Lelcaj v. Holder · filed 2013-10-03(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered and is permitted to file only one such motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Petitioners’ third motion to reopen, filed in 2011, was untimely and number-barred because their orders of removal became final in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i).

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reopen within 90 days, but imposes no time limit on a motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2013-10-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Singh’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than six years after the agency’s final order of removal, there is no time limitation if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives the motion-to-reopen time and number limits for both asylum and withholding-of-removal claims when the applicant shows materially changed country conditions.

Mohamed v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-17(c)(3)(ii)

Sidi Mohamed claims that the BIA decision was an abuse of discretion because it failed to address his motion to reopen his withholding of removal claim under CAT. He is incorrect. The BIA did address his CAT claim when it stated that the motion to reopen included reopening the withholding of removal claim. Referring to the time limit and number-bar waiver for change of conditions with regard to asylum claims, the BIA cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, which provides that the waiver applies to both asylum claims and withholding of removal claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception.

Anandarajah v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-10-31(c)(2)

Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to time and numerical limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) does not remove those limits unless the motion is based on changed circumstances arising in the relevant country; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances in the United States is not a change in country conditions in China.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2013-11-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

There is no dispute that Zheng’s 2012 motion to reopen, filed almost ten years after the agency’s final order, was untimely. ... To the extent Zheng contends that the time and numerical limitations do not apply because his motion was “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h), his arguments are unpersuasive. ... The basis of Zheng’s motion to reopen — his renewed claim for asylum based on his newly commenced practice of Falun Gong in the United States — is a change in personal circumstances arising in the United States, not a change of conditions arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) subjects motions to reopen to time and numerical limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions supported by sufficient evidence.

Madhar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-11-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of materially changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to establish prima facie eligibility for relief and discussing consequences of lack of credibility).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen filed more than five years after the removal order became final when no applicable exception, such as equitable tolling, is established.

Magana v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huante Magana’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the successive motion was filed more than five years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when sufficient evidence shows changed country conditions.

Zhu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhu’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the successive motion was filed more than six years after her removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zhu failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), or the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision and generally limits an alien to one motion, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Li v. Holder · filed 2014-03-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations do not apply, however, to a motion “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that Li’s political activities in this country constituted changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed conditions are shown.

Thiara v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-03-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Thiara’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Thiara failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion based on material evidence of changed country conditions that could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Zhu v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-03-04(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

With limited exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the date of entry of a final administrative order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To obtain relief based on an untimely motion to reopen, Zhu had to provide material evidence of changed conditions in China that could not have been discovered or presented during the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it is based on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-03-21(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limits do not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Lin does not dispute that her second motion to reopen was untimely and numerically barred. Thus, Lin’s motion was due to be denied unless she could show by previously unavailable evidence a material change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen if it is untimely or exceeds the numerical limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material changed-country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2014-03-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred as it was his second motion and was filed more than six years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Zhang has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that there was no material change in country conditions here.

The exception permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable, requiring a showing that conditions intensified or deteriorated rather than merely continued.

Marsadu v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-04(c)(3)(ii)

However, these limitations do not apply to motions to reopen proceedings "based on changed circumstances arising . . . in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available . . . at the previous hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A petitioner's evidence of "changed circumstances" must demonstrate an "intensification or deterioration of [his] country['s] conditions, not their mere continuation." Tawadrous, 565 F.3d at 38.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Perera v. Holder · filed 2014-04-22(c)(2)

Ordinarily, a party may file only a single motion to reopen — and she must file it within 90 days of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Perera's motion is both number-barred and time-barred. On this, all agree.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Yang-Jiang v. Holder · filed 2014-04-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Yang-Jiang’s 2012 motion was untimely, because his final administrative order was issued in 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). But, as the BIA concluded, Yang-Jiang failed to establish changed circumstances for members of unregistered churches in China since his 2007 merits hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen without the usual time limit when based on material changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence; sporadic and localized violence, with no significant change in the type of attacks, is not a material change.

Gunawan v. Holder · filed 2014-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As the BIA concluded, the Petitioners’ evidence failed to establish changed conditions for ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. ... Given that attacks against Christians remained sporadic and concentrated in a few regions, and the Indonesian government both respected religious freedom and prosecuted perpetrators of religious violence, the BIA reasonably found that any change was not material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding agency’s rejection of pattern or practice claim when background materials noted only sporadic, localized religious violence in some of the 6,000 inhabited islands of Indonesia); Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that asylum applicant alleging persecution at the hands of non-state actors must demonstrate that government is unwilling or unable to control those actors).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2014-05-15(c)(3)(ii)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen and motion for reconsideration. An untimely motion to reopen may be filed only in the event of changed circumstances in the petitioner’s country and only “if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). To be “material,” the evidence must be of the type that, if the proceedings were reopened, “would likely change the result in the case.” See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004). Petitioners merely submitted evidence that a new military regime in Fiji has led to an increasingly unstable political climate. They did not provide new, previously unavailable evidence concerning persecution of Indo-Fijians, nor did they provide evidence that would undermine the IJ’s adverse credibility determination with regard to Rattan Singh’s alternate claims of persecution.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to time and number limits, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Caballero v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cardenas Caballero’s second and third motions to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motions were filed more than 13 and 14 years, respectively, after the final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Cardenas Caballero failed to establish changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed outside the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed conditions in the country of nationality are demonstrated.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 995-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions.

Yu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Yu’s second motion to reopen because the motion was filed nine years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(i), 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A) (an alien has 180 days to file a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia order if the alien can show that she failed to appear for the hearing due to exceptional circumstances), and Yu failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary for equitable tolling, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011), or establish materially changed country conditions so as to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence “must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception for material evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Li v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-04-30(c)(2) (c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions to reopen that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts qualifying asylum or withholding motions based on materially changed, previously unavailable country conditions.

Rexhaj v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2014-07-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen with the BIA and must do so within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)]; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations do not apply, however, to motions to reopen seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)]; Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2008). The “previous proceeding” refers to the hearing before the Immigration Judge. Filja, 447 F.3d at 253.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening removal proceedings when significant evidence shows materially changed country conditions, and the court found that standard met for Guatemala.

Gregorio v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-11(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA abused its discretion in denying Ramirez Gregorio’s motion to reopen. Ramirez Gregorio presented significant evidence of changed country conditions in Guatemala. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). This evidence showed that femicide in Guatemala has increased significantly in the years since Ramirez Gregorio’s removal proceedings. Thus, we grant Ramirez Gregorio’s petition for review with respect to her motion to reopen, based on changed country conditions in Guatemala.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the ordinary time limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality; qualitatively different evidence of changed country conditions can satisfy the exception, while a change only in personal circumstances cannot.

Bains v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-08-19(c)(3)(ii)

This time limit does not apply, however, where the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... A petitioner need not show unrelated evidence of persecution. Instead, he must present new evidence that was previously unavailable and is “qualitatively different from the evidence presented at his asylum hearing.” ... A change in personal circumstances does not qualify as a change in country circumstances. ... This new “qualitatively different” evidence established a change of country conditions.

Section 1003.2 generally imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, but the deadline does not apply to motions based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2014-10-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

In this case, it is undisputed that Zhang’s 2013 motion to reopen was untimely because the BIA issued his final order of removal in 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing a 90-day period for moving to reopen); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Hua en Ye v. Holder · filed 2014-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ye’s motion to reopen as untimely as it was filed more than seven years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although there are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Ye has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that there was no material change.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by time and number, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when qualifying changed conditions are shown.

Chahal v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed conditions that qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and number limits only when based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Shao v. Holder · filed 2014-10-17(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... Shao’s 2012 conversion to Catholicism reflects a self-induced change in personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions, and therefore does not exempt her motion from the applicable bars. ... Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Shao did not establish changed country conditions which would excuse the time limit for filing her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; self-induced personal changes and unchanged country conditions do not satisfy the exception.

Lai v. Holder · filed 2014-11-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An applicant may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day limitation period does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... As the BIA determined, Lai’s adoption of Christianity and church attendance in the United States constitute self-induced changes in personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimeliness of his motion. ... In addition, the BIA’s determination that Lai failed to establish a material change in conditions in China is supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169. The BIA reasonably found that the evidence showed conditions in China similar to those at the time of Lai’s merits hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen within ninety days, requires new facts supported by evidence, and exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from those limits.

Lin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-14(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(1). The time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, however, do not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (emphasis added).

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Zou v. Holder · filed 2015-03-02(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply when a motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen beyond the time limit only when the evidence is material and was unavailable in the prior proceeding; general violence and civil strife alone do not establish a material change.

Yousuf v. Holder · filed 2015-03-11(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not apply when a motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... However, as the BIA ruled, such evidence did not constitute a material change in country conditions because general violence and civil strife are, standing alone, insufficient to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution or a likelihood of torture. ... Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Yousuf failed to show a material change in country conditions, and therefore it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Faustov v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-05-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Thus, ordinarily a party may file only one motion to reopen a proceeding, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(2), and except in cases seeking to set aside in absentia removal orders, a motion to reopen “must be filed not later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These temporal and numerical limitations, however, admit of an exception for motions that rest on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which removal has been ordered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). The BIA may waive numerical and temporal bars to reopening if an alien makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland. Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313. Faustov relies on changed conditions in Ukraine to circumvent the procedural bars to his application.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day and one-motion limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on qualifying changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Kimca v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, there is no dispute that Kimca filed the motion to reopen after departing the United States, and that her motion was untimely as it was filed more than nine years after the BIA's final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kimca's motion to reopen because her evidence failed to establish changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen only when the petitioner presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable at the initial hearing.

Li v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

To overcome this procedural hurdle, she must “present[] material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ.” Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing that the “time and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply” if a petitioner presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available during the initial hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Ayanian v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-16(c)(3)(ii)

In order to merit reopening under the changed circumstances exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen, Ayanian bore the burden of showing that his evidence of changed country conditions “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) permits reopening based on materially changed country conditions when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Ping Dong v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-06(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dong’s untimely motion to reopen for failure to present material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions. Evidence that Dong was subjected to forced abortions in China in the 1980s was neither unavailable at the time of her March 2004 merits hearing nor indicative of changed circumstances in China since then. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a petitioner to seek reopening without the ordinary time bar based on changed country conditions for an asylum claim, but requires material new evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Liu v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-11(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, a petitioner must present new evidence of changed conditions that is material, and, moreover, it must have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Valencia v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Valencia’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where he filed it over three years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to establish materially changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal.

Ng v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed more than six years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they have not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c) allows reopening despite the usual one-motion and 90-day limits when material changed-country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier, including for CAT claims.

Agonafer v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-23(c)(3)(ii)

The changed country conditions exception likewise applies to motions to reopen to assert CAT claims. See Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e hold that the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims.”) The exception applies “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for asylum- or withholding-based motions supported by material evidence of changed country conditions or circumstances that was unavailable at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-07-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen typically must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion may fall within an exception to the time limit if asylum or withholding of deportation is sought “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet the exception, a petitioner must present evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing” of changed country conditions or circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The news articles and U.S. State Department country report Singh attached in support of his motion to reopen do not clearly demonstrate materially changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an asylum applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits a motion based on materially changed, previously unavailable country conditions.

Lin v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2017-08-08(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

An asylum applicant generally may only file one motion to reopen her case, and it must be effected within 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision that was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But this does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the ordinary time and number limits when it seeks relief based on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Wang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-08-22(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the time and number limitations applies if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section (c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, but the movant must show that such a change exists.

Farui Ye v. Sessions · filed 2017-10-17(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Ye failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) permits an exception for materially changed, previously unavailable country-conditions evidence supporting an asylum application.

Gonzales v. Sessions · filed 2017-11-16(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Those time and number limitations may be excused if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Gonzales’s 2016 motion to reopen ran afoul of the time and number limitations: it was her second motion, filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s October 2015 decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Gonzales, however, presses changed country conditions since her original merits hearing in 2008. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (the agency “compare[s] the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below”). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that conditions have not changed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limits for a motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Solis v. Sessions · filed 2017-11-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Solis’s untimely motion to reopen where Solis failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi, 597 F.3d 983, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA did not abuse its discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion to reopen when changed country conditions are relevant because of a change in the petitioner's personal circumstances.

Zheng v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-01-11(c)(3)(ii)

a petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen may qualify under the changed conditions exception in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), even if the changed country conditions are made relevant by a change in the petitioner's personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion seeking specified relief based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Gavrilova v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-01-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations do not apply, however, if the motion is for the purposes of seeking asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief “based on changed circumstances arising in . . . the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2017). “To prevail on a motion to reopen on the basis of changed country conditions,” a movant must, inter alia, “demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an otherwise untimely motion to reopen seeking asylum from the filing deadline when it is based on changed country conditions since the original hearing.

Ting Xu v. Sessions · filed 2018-01-19(c)(3)(ii)

Although this time limitation does not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions” since the time of the original hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i), as discussed below, the BIA’s conclusion that Xu failed to establish such a change is supported by substantial evidence, see Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

Subsection (c)(2) bars a motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred when it exceeds the applicable time and number limits, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Prayogo v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-04-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Prayogo’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically-barred where the motion was filed more than ten years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Prayogo failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely or successive motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when country conditions have materially changed.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-21(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where petitioners failed to establish a material change in country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); see also Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen that is untimely and number-barred, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions exception is unavailable without a prima facie showing of eligibility for asylum.

Ledesma-Conchas v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ledesma-Conchas’ second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Ledesma-Conchas failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum that would invoke the changed country conditions exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).

Section 1003.2 imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, but allows those limits to be excused for asylum claims based on materially changed country conditions that could not previously have been presented; the exception did not apply because the petitioner failed to show a material change in conditions for Christians in China.

Lin v. Sessions · filed 2018-06-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Shi Wu Lin’s 2016 motion to reopen was untimely and number barred because it was filed nearly nineteen years after his removal order became final and was his third motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations are excused if reopening is sought to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the BIA did not err in finding that Shi Wu Lin failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions for Christians in China.

A motion to reopen for asylum based on materially changed country conditions may be filed at any time and is exempt from the one-motion numerical limit.

Landin v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-15(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen to apply, or reapply, for asylum and related relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” may be filed at any time and is not subject to the one-motion numerical limit. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions seeking asylum based on materially changed country conditions since the original hearing.

Gao v. Sessions · filed 2018-07-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that both of Gao’s 2010 and 2016 motions to reopen were untimely, and that her second motion was number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although these limitations do not apply to motions to reopen in order to seek asylum “based on changed country conditions” since the time of the original hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA reasonably concluded that Gao did not establish any material change in conditions in China.

Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) impose time and number limits on motions to reopen and provide regulatory exceptions to those limits.

Suarez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-07-13(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bello Suarez’s tenth motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than nine years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to establish any of the regulatory exceptions to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it relies on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Hu v. Sessions · filed 2018-07-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Haiou Hu failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2 generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, but those time and number limits do not apply to an asylum motion supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Singh v. Sessions · filed 2018-08-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh’s fourth motion to reopen, filed eight years after his final order of removal, was untimely and number barred. However, the time and number limitations do not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely after 90 days, unless the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) applies; that exception requires a material change in country conditions.

Jiang v. Sessions · filed 2018-09-19(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Jiang’s 2015 motion to reopen was untimely because her removal order became final in 1997. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the 90-day filing limitation does not apply to motions to reopen to seek asylum “based on changed country conditions” since the time of the original hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the agency reasonably concluded that Jiang did not establish any material change in conditions in China.

The 90-day limit for motions to reopen does not apply when the request is based on material changed conditions in the country of nationality that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Yang v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA has the authority to reopen deportation proceedings beyond the 90-day limitation period if the request for relief is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To establish the requisite changed country conditions, Yang had to present evidence that compared, in a meaningful way, conditions in China in September 2006, when her removal hearing was held, with conditions in May 2017, when she filed her motion to reopen.

The regulation imposes a time limit on motions to reopen and provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Karim v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-10-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Karim’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Karim failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen despite the time and numerical limits only when the new evidence is material and demonstrates a material change in conditions.

Lin v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-14(c)(3)(ii)

These time and numerical limitations do not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For largely the same reasons set forth in Jian Hui Shao, we find no error in the agency’s determination that the isolated reports of force used to implement the family planning policy identified in Lin’s new evidence failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China as needed to excuse the time and number limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen to apply for asylum when material evidence shows changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Chen v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-14(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Chen’s evidence failed to demonstrate a material change related to the population control program as required to excuse her untimely filing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening despite time and numerical limits when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions, but isolated incidents and uncorroborated evidence did not establish a material change here.

Zou v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-23(c)(3)(ii)

These time and numerical limitations do not apply, however, if the motion is to reopen proceedings in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). For largely the same reasons set forth in Jian Hui Shao, we find no error in the agency’s determination that Zou’s new evidence of isolated incidents of persecution failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions related to the enforcement of China’s population control program as needed to excuse the untimely and number barred filing of his motion, much less as to his unsworn, uncorroborated evidence of a single instance of threatened application of China’s policies to children born in the United States.

The exception to the time limit for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions does not apply when the movant fails to establish materially changed country conditions.

Wu v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-18(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, because Wu did not establish a material change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limits for a motion to reopen when materially changed country conditions warrant reopening.

Gloria Villa De Carrillo v. Barr · filed 2019-02-21(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villa De Carrillo’s untimely motion to reopen where Villa De Carrillo failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening to seek asylum or withholding based on material, previously unavailable changed-country-conditions evidence; the evidence is material when it is likely to change the result of the underlying claim for relief.

Qorane v. William Barr, U. S. Atty · filed 2019-03-26(c)(3)(ii)

Second, the time and number limitations do not apply to motions to reopen to seek asylum or withholding “based on [evidence of ] changed country conditions” if that evidence “is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Today we reiterate that standard: An alien seeking to reopen must show the “evidence [of changed country conditions] is material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). That means the evidence must be likely to change the result of the alien’s underlying claim for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the filing deadline when it relies on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Singh v. Barr · filed 2019-04-30(c)(3)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Singh failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) permits a motion to reopen outside the 90-day window when country conditions materially changed and the supporting evidence was previously unavailable or undiscoverable; joining a disfavored group does not by itself defeat the exception if persecution materially intensified.

Lorenzo v. Barr · filed 2019-07-09(c)(3)

To satisfy the changed-country-conditions exception to the 90-day window for filing a motion to reopen, a petitioner "must show that conditions in the country to which [he] will be removed have materially changed, with evidence of such change being unavailable or unable to have been discovered at the previous proceeding." ... Therefore, the fact that an applicant voluntarily joins a disfavored group does not preclude a finding of changed country conditions if the applicant presents evidence that persecution of that group has materially intensified since the applicant's previous proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts asylum-based motions supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; under subsection (a), the BIA's sua sponte reopening authority is committed to agency discretion and is generally unreviewable.

Gebrenigus v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-04-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

Generally, an alien may only file one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final removal order. ... However, the time- and number-bars do not apply if a petitioner seeks reopening of his asylum proceedings based on changed country conditions in the removal country. ... Evidence of changed country conditions must be material and must have been unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of the previous hearing. ... The BIA may at any time reopen or reconsider sua sponte any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The decision to reopen sua sponte is committed to agency discretion, which is so wide and standardless that it is not reviewable. ... Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review legal claims related to the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Perez v. Barr · filed 2019-07-19(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bernal Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 11 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Bernal Perez has not established changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed); see also Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016) (“the changed country conditions exception is concerned with two points in time: the circumstances of the country at the time of the petitioner’s previous hearing, and those at the time of the motion to reopen.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a time- and number-barred motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and was unavailable at the original merits hearing.

Fernando v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-10-08(c)(3)(ii)

An alien can file an otherwise time- or number-barred motion if he demonstrates “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” from the time of his merits hearing to the time of his latest reopening hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Liem v. Att’y Gen., 921 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2019). The evidence of changed country conditions must be “material” and unavailable at the original merits hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to a regulatory exception for qualifying changed country conditions.

Morales-Jasso v. Barr · filed 2019-11-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Morales-Jasso’s untimely motion to reopen where Morales-Jasso failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (new evidence lacked materiality).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal.

Brown v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-11-27(c)(2)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although there is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions that seek to apply for asylum relying on evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), Brown has never sought asylum. His reopen motion filed nearly two decades after his removal order was issued was clearly untimely.

For the changed-country-conditions exception to the time limit on motions to reopen, the relevant prior hearing is the most recent hearing before the immigration judge, not a later BIA proceeding.

Johnson v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-12-04(c)(3)(ii)

If, instead, the BIA was referring to its own proceedings in 2017, the agency erred substantively by using the wrong point of reference to assess whether country conditions had changed. See Filja, 447 F.3d at 252-54 (determining that previous “proceeding” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), or “hearing” under implementing regulation 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), refers to most recent before IJ, not BIA).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) allows an asylum motion to reopen to escape the ordinary time and number limits in section 1003.2(c)(2) when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Yu v. Barr · filed 2020-01-08(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Yu’s 2017 motion was untimely and number barred because it was her second motion to reopen filed more than 12 years after her exclusion order became final in 2004. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Yu failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a changed-country-conditions exception for an asylum motion supported by material, previously unavailable evidence; Jiang's evidence did not satisfy that exception.

Jiang v. Barr · filed 2020-01-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Jiang’s motion to reopen filed in 2017 was untimely because it was filed more than four years after the 2012 final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limitation is excused if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Jiang’s evidence was insufficient to establish a material change in conditions in his home province of Fujian.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely, number-barred motion to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception only when the applicant demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Pirir-Chitay v. Barr · filed 2020-02-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pirir-Chitay’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the second motion to reopen was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Pirir-Chitay failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (BIA did not abuse its discretion where evidence of general country conditions was not material to petitioner’s claim).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the ninety-day deadline for a motion to reopen when the motion relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Meriyu v. Barr · filed 2020-02-26(c)(3)(ii)

The deadline does not apply if the motion is based on changed country conditions, as long as the supporting evidence is material, and was not previously available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen seeking asylum from the usual time and number limits when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Kacaj v. Barr · filed 2020-03-03(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Kacaj failed to demonstrate a material worsening of conditions for similarly situated people in Albania as needed to excuse the time and number bars to his motion, the BIA did not err in denying his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed outside the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Mendiola v. Barr · filed 2020-03-11(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mendiola’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed it more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions in the Philippines to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-91 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions with material evidence.

Quecholac v. Barr · filed 2020-04-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cotzomi Quecholac’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 21 months after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Cotzomi Quecholac has not established changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Barr · filed 2020-04-24(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Chen’s 2017 motion was untimely because it was filed approximately six years after her final removal order.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on evidence of changed country conditions made material by the petitioner's changed circumstances.

Ibrahim v. Barr · filed 2020-05-06(c)(3)(ii)

The agency, however, erred in denying Ibrahim’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A motion to reopen may be premised “on evidence of changed country conditions that” are made material “in light of the petitioner’s changed circumstances.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions shown by previously unavailable evidence, together with a prima facie showing that reopening would lead to relief.

Sharif v. Barr · filed 2020-07-07(c)(3)(ii)

“But the “untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be excused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not previously available and if he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, his case would lead to relief.” Rivera-Guerrero v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)); see also Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 607-09 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 are applicable to motions to reopen CAT claims).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to applicable exceptions, and Ramos's third motion did not comply with those time and number limits.

Ramos v. Barr · filed 2020-07-10(c)(2)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen and must file that motion within ninety days of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... First, Mr. Ramos fails to explain how his purported eligibility for cancellation of removal excuses the fact that his third motion to reopen did not comply with the time and number limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). As we have just explained, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Ramos’s untimely motion to reopen.

The time and numerical limits on motions to reopen do not apply when the motion is based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Urie v. Barr · filed 2020-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

We agree with Urie that the passage of the Same Sex Marriage Prohibition Act in 2014 constitutes a material change in country conditions for LGBTI individuals because it criminalizes a much broader range of conduct than Nigeria’s preexisting law criminalizing same-sex sexual activity. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen do not apply to motions “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . , if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking reopening based on changed country conditions to show changed conditions, material and previously unavailable evidence, and prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Silva v. Barr · filed 2020-07-10(c)(1)

Where, as here, the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country to which removal has been ordered, the movant must: (1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal, (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material, (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing, and (4) demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen when it is based on previously unavailable, material evidence of changed country conditions, and persistent violence without a material change does not satisfy that exception.

Sukirdjan v. Barr · filed 2020-07-22(c)(3)(ii)

Sukirdjan filed his motion after the ninety-day deadline but argued the time bar did not apply because the motion was based on previously unavailable and material evidence of changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA’s determination that Sukirdjan presented evidence demonstrating that violence against Chinese Christians persisted but did not materially change was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” ... Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2 generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after a final removal order, but permits an untimely motion seeking asylum when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Thaqi v. Barr · filed 2020-08-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Petitioners’ 2017 motion was untimely because it was filed 14 years after their removal order became final in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is, however, an exception to the time limits if the movant seeks asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Petitioners failed to establish a material change in conditions in Kosovo.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise barred motion when changed country conditions are shown.

Aliyev v. Barr · filed 2020-08-24(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner’s first motion to reopen, which he conceded was untimely and did not qualify for any exceptions to the filing requirements. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA abused its discretion by denying Petitioner’s second motion to reopen his asylum application. Petitioner established the changed country conditions necessary to avoid the time and number bars that otherwise would apply to his second motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts an asylum motion to reopen from the time limit when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable, but the exception does not apply without proof of such a change.

Huang v. Barr · filed 2020-09-09(c)(3)

However, the time limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that Huang failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order, but that time and number bar does not apply when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; the relevant previous hearing is the IJ proceeding.

Castro v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-09-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file the motion “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the final administrative order of removal was entered in December 2018. Therefore, Castro’s second motion to reopen, which was filed on December 20, 2019, was clearly time- and number-barred. The time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality … if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). The term “previous hearing” refers to the proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); a second motion based on an argument that could have been raised earlier may be denied when the delay lacks compelling justification.

Ethiopis v. Barr · filed 2020-10-14(c)(2)

A non-citizen “may file only one motion to reopen” his immigration proceedings, and “that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, these time and number restrictions do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Lin v. Holder, 771 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining the motion to reopen filing rules set out by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)). ... Accordingly, we conclude it is not an abuse of discretion, but rather a sound exercise of judgment, for the BIA to deny a second motion to reopen where it is based on an argument that could have been raised in the first motion to reopen and where there is no compelling justification for the delay. ... Here, because Petitioner’s Second Motion falls squarely within this category of disfavored motions, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s decision to deny it.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a movant seeking to reopen a time- and number-barred case under the changed-country-conditions exception to present material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or deportation.

Karamyan v. Rosen · filed 2021-01-06(c)(3)(ii)

Because Karamyan’s motion to reopen is time- and number-barred, he bears the burden of presenting material evidence of both “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or . . . deportation”1 and “a prima facie case for the relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the usual time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the motion relies on new, material evidence of changed country conditions.

Mukumov v. Rosen · filed 2021-01-11(c)(3)(ii)

But this time restriction does not apply “if the basis of the motion is to apply for [asylum or withholding-of-removal] relief . . . and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time and numerical limitations do not apply if there is new, material evidence of changed country conditions). Thus, to reopen his proceedings Mr. Mukumov was required to produce material evidence that was not available at the time of the previous proceeding and that demonstrated changed conditions in Uzbekistan at the time of his September 2019 motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts qualifying asylum motions based on materially changed country conditions from those limits.

Hassan v. Rosen · filed 2021-01-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limits do not apply if the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Motions to reopen are disfavored, and a movant bears the burden of demonstrating that the “new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions.

Theodore v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-01-26(c)(3)(ii)

Because Theodore’s motion is based on changed country conditions, there is no time limit within which he must have filed it. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 permits reopening more than 90 days after a removal order when the movant presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions sufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Singh v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-01-28(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

Three months later, Singh moved to reopen his proceedings based on new evidence and changed country circumstances in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (restricting proceedings to evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”). ... Because Singh moved to reopen proceedings more than 90 days after his removal order issued, he had to show changed conditions in India, the country to which he was ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Yahya v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2018). Such evidence must be material, previously unavailable, and sufficient to establish his prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see Yahya, 889 F.3d at 395; Joseph v. Holder, 579 F.3d 827, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a one-motion limit and a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen.

Lie Ye Xiao v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-02-03(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These mandatory numerical and time limitations do not apply, however, “when (1) the alien files a motion to reopen that seeks asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture; (2) the motion is predicated on changed country conditions; and (3) the changed conditions are material and could not have been discovered at the time of the removal proceedings.” Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). “An alien who attempts to show that the evidence is material bears a heavy burden and must present evidence that demonstrates that, if the proceedings were opened, the new evidence would likely change the result in the case.” Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256-57.

The changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and the procedural requirements of § 1003.2(c), apply to motions to reopen seeking CAT protection.

Vannak Hem v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-11(c)(3)(ii)

Similarly, the BIA properly determined that the “changed circumstances” requirement in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) also applies to Hem’s CAT claims. ... But in Go v. Holder, we held “that the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims” and rejected the argument “that there cannot be any ‘regulatory limitation’ on motions to reopen under the CAT.” ... Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by applying the same “changed country conditions” requirement to Hem’s CAT claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion, subject to the exceptions in § 1003.2(c)(3).

Diaby v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-17(c)(2), (c)(3)

With some exceptions provided by the INA and accompanying regulations, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered and can be filed only once. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (listing exceptions).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows an alien to move to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions when the new evidence is material, previously unavailable, and establishes prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Silva v. Garland · filed 2021-03-30(c)(1)

Where, as here, the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country to which removal has been ordered, the movant must: (1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal, (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material, (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing, and (4) demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. ... See 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-related motion to reopen from the 90-day filing limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Magassouba v. Garland · filed 2021-05-14(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final removal order and must be based on new evidence that was not previously available. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... Although the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Magassouba failed to establish any material change in Guinea because he did not submit any evidence of conditions in Guinea either at the time of his motion or at the time of his underlying removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a petitioner seeking reopening based on changed country conditions to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Jimenez v. Garland · filed 2021-05-25(c)(1)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Jimenez’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, where he did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (petitioner must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts motions to reopen based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from the usual time and number limits.

Ye v. Garland · filed 2021-05-28(c)(3)

These time and number limits, however, do not apply to a motion to reopen that “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Nevertheless, the BIA did not err here in finding that Ye failed to establish a material change in conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the motion relies on previously unavailable, material evidence of changed country conditions.

Suleiman v. Garland · filed 2021-06-11(c)(3)(ii)

But those limits do not apply if the noncitizen seeks to reopen his case based on previously unavailable and material evidence of “changed country conditions.” Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The Board did not exceed its discretion. Suleiman’s motion to reopen did not trigger the exception for late or successive motions because his evidence, mostly general news articles, does not show that conditions in Iraq have materially changed since Suleiman’s last motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the movant presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of removal and shows prima facie eligibility for relief.

Gallegos-Mendoza v. Garland · filed 2021-06-28(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gallegos’s untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).1 To show she was entitled to reopening on this basis, Gallegos had to: (1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearings; and (4) demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). The BIA reasonably concluded that Gallegos did not make this showing.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, permits an exception for changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence and a prima facie showing of relief, and commits sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion, which is not judicially reviewable.

Yusuf v. Merrik B. Garland · filed 2021-08-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Yusuf’s second motion, filed almost two years after the final order of removal, was therefore presumptively untimely. “But the untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be excused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not previously available and if [s]he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, h[er] case would lead to relief.” Sharif v. Barr, 965 F.3d 612, 618 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Rivera-Guerrero v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i). ... Having reviewed Yusuf’s proffered evidence, including her affidavit and several news articles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s assessment that the evidence unfortunately “shows that the poor conditions facing gays and Christians in Somalia have remained substantially similar since the time of [her] hearing” and that reopening was not warranted on the basis of changed country conditions. ... But whether to reopen proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is a decision “committed to agency discretion by law” that we lack jurisdiction to review.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but permits the deadline to be excused for an asylum-based motion when the petitioner shows qualifying changed country conditions.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2021-08-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Singh’s 2018 motion to reopen was untimely, as it was filed two years after his 2016 removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (90-day period to move to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Although the deadline is excused if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the petitioner demonstrates “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA did not err in finding that Singh failed to demonstrate such a change here.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions.

Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2021-11-15(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guzman Hernandez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number barred, where it was filed more than 6 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Guzman Hernandez has not established changed country conditions in Honduras to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2 limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, but those limits do not apply to an asylum motion based on changed country conditions unless the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Kandic v. Garland · filed 2022-02-14(c)(2), (c)(3)

The time and number limitations do not apply if reopening is sought to apply or reapply for asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.” ... This exception obtains, however, only if such evidence is “material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” Id.; accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that this exception did not apply because Kandic’s evidence was not material.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the filing deadline when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the relevant country.

Gorginyan v. Garland · filed 2022-02-15(c)(3)(ii)

However, this deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the applicant presents material, previously unavailable evidence that, together with the original record, establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2022-04-13(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s fourth motion to reopen, in which he alleged changed country conditions in India. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To show that he was entitled to reopening on that basis, Singh had to: (1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal; (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material; (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearings; and (4) “demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening despite the ordinary time and number limits when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Alles v. Garland · filed 2022-06-08(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ third motion to reopen, in which they alleged changed country conditions in Sri Lanka. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To be entitled to reopening on that basis, Petitioners needed to produce material evidence that country conditions have changed, demonstrate that the evidence was not available during the prior hearings, and show that the new evidence—together with the evidence presented at the original hearing—would establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the new evidence is material, previously unavailable, and establishes prima facie eligibility when considered with the earlier record.

Diaz v. Garland · filed 2022-07-08(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must ordinarily be filed within ninety days of the final order of removal, but an exception applies if the motion is based on changed country conditions and the “evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2017). To succeed based on changed country conditions, the movant must: “(1) produce evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal, (2) demonstrate that the evidence is material, (3) show that the evidence was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing, and (4) demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.”

A motion to reopen that adds new circumstances to a previously considered application need not include an application for relief, and changed circumstances outside the petitioner's control may qualify for the exception to the filing deadline when materially affecting the claim.

Reyes-Corado v. Garland · filed 2023-08-11(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

Consistent with the plain text of § 1003.2(c)(1) and various persuasive authorities, we hold that the first type of motion to reopen—one, like Reyes-Corado’s, that adds new circumstances to a previously considered application—need not be accompanied by an application for relief. ... Therefore, such events are properly understood as changed country conditions, not changed personal circumstances, for purposes of ruling on a motion to reopen. ... The BIA thus abused its discretion in determining that Reyes-Corado had not provided qualitatively different evidence.

Section 1003.2 imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, but those limits do not apply when an asylum motion is based on material changed country conditions and the supporting evidence was previously unavailable; the court applied these rules and upheld the finding that no material change was shown.

Dia v. Garland · filed 2024-05-07(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Dia’s 2021 motion was number-barred and untimely because it was his fourth motion to reopen and he filed it 19 years after his removal order became final in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (setting a 90-day deadline and one motion limit for reopening); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). The time and number limits do not apply, however, if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, [and] if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). In this case, the BIA did not err in finding that Dia failed to establish a material change in conditions in Guinea.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country of deportation.

Becerril-Sanchez v. James R. McHenry, III · filed 2025-02-06(c)(3)(ii)

The Board may grant an untimely motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions from the 90-day deadline and requires material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions supporting prima facie eligibility for relief.

Rivera-Trigueros v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Generally, a petitioner must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative removal order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). “However, the ninety-day deadline . . . do[es] not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions.” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)); see Go v. Holder, 744 F.3d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims”). To prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a petitioner must produce material, previously unavailable “evidence that conditions have changed in the country of removal” and “‘demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.’”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days of the final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Basra v. Bondi · filed 2025-10-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Basra’s 2012 motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because it was his third motion to reopen filed more than seven years after the agency’s 2004 final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (providing that one motion to reopen may be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). The time and number limits do not apply if the motion is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The limits also may be excused based on ineffective assistance of counsel and “due diligence in pursuing the case.” Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2000)). The BIA did not err in finding that neither changed conditions nor ineffective assistance excused the limits here.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) ordinarily limits motions to reopen to one filed within ninety days, but those limits do not apply to motions to reopen in absentia exclusion proceedings.

Bains v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-11(c)(2)

While motions to reopen exclusion proceedings ordinarily must be filed within ninety days of a final agency decision and usually are limited to one, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the agency has interpreted 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B) as providing that no time or number bars apply where, as here, an alien seeks to reopen in absentia exclusion proceedings. ... Accordingly, when the BIA construed the motion for reconsideration as one to reopen and denied the motion on the basis of time find number bars, it strayed inexplicably from its decision in In re N-B.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits the time and number of motions to reopen; subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions.

Harutyunyan v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-05-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

As to petitioners’ arguments regarding changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as time and number-barred, where it was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be ... “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c) limits the time and number of motions to reopen but allows an exception when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions.

Bal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bal’s second motion to reopen filed more than a year after the BIA’s decision as both untimely and numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), where Bal failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to remand for asylum relief may be denied when conditions have not materially changed and the applicant had an earlier opportunity to apply.

Chahoud v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-02(c)(1)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chahoud’s motion to remand to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. The record evidence supports the BIA’s finding that there had been no mateñal change in the conditions in Lebanon (i.e., relevant to the risk of harm faced by Christians) since the IJ’s October 2005 decision.2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). For this reason, and because Chahoud had an opportunity to file an asylum application during his initial appearance before the IJ, we will not disturb the BIA’s denial of his motion.3 See id.; Kaur; 413 F.3d at 233-34.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)’s time and number limits apply based on the date the BIA reasonably determines a motion to reopen was filed.

Makanast v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-05-29(c)(2)

If the BIA permissibly treated it as first filed on December 5, 2007 (the date of its purported “refiling”), then the BIA’s denial of the motion as untimely and number-barred was not an abuse of discretion and Makanast does not argue otherwise. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We conclude that the BIA did not err in treating the motion as first filed on December 5, 2007.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits how many motions to reopen a party may file with the BIA and when they may be filed.

Joshi v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Joshi’s third motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final administrative order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days of the final administrative removal order.

Shah v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-10-01(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “[t]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Shah’s second motion to reopen was time-and number-barred, and thus the Board did not abuse its discretion in dismissing it on that basis.

Section 1003.2(c) requires an application for relief with a motion to reopen and allows an exception to the filing deadline for sufficiently supported changed country conditions.

Lopez-Pelaez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-01-29(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Pelaez’s untimely motion to reopen, where he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, and he did not submit applications for relief.

A motion to reopen filed more than one year after the BIA’s final order is untimely unless the movant establishes materially changed country circumstances.

Miranda-Sanchez v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Miranda-Sanchez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than one year after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Miranda-Sanchez did not establish materially changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence did not establish materially changed country conditions since petitioner’s prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits when a motion to reopen may be filed and how many motions may be filed.

Robinson v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Robinson’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where he filed it over five years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to show prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining the BIA can deny a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions for failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (even under disfavored group analysis, petitioner must present some evidence of individualized risk).

Section 1003.2(c) limits the time and number of motions to reopen, with an exception for a material change in country conditions.

Ayala-Negrete v. Garland · filed 2021-10-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayala-Negrete’s fourth motion to reopen as untimely and number barred, where the motion was filed more than 9 years after the final order of removal, and where Ayala-Negrete failed to establish a material change in country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen.

Subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii) bar an untimely, numerically barred motion to reopen unless changed country conditions qualify for the regulatory exception; a discretionary sua sponte reopening decision under subsection (a) is not reviewable for lack of jurisdiction.

Satchithananthan v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Satchithananthan’s third motion to reopen as untimely and numerically-barred where the motion was filed more than nine years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Satchithananthan failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Sri Lanka to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c) does not necessarily govern a sua sponte motion to reopen, but the BIA may consider its timeliness, due-diligence, and relief-related factors when exercising sua sponte discretion.

Zelaya v. Barr · filed 2020-12-23(c)

The BIA listed three grounds for denying Zelaya’s MTR sua sponte, all of which ordinarily implicate 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c): (1) Zelaya’s lack of timeliness in waiting over 20 years before moving to reopen proceedings; (2) her lack of due diligence; and (3) the lack of any application for specific relief she would seek if the BIA were to reopen proceedings. While Zelaya is not necessarily required to meet section 1003.2(c) factors as part of her MTR, it is not legal error for the BIA to consider these factors pursuant to its “unfettered discretion” in deciding whether to exercise its sua sponte authority.

Section 1003.2(a) commits decisions on motions to reopen that do not satisfy subsection (c)'s requirements to the BIA's discretion, generally foreclosing judicial review of sua sponte denials.

Erazo-Caballero v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2022-12-07(a)

We generally lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions denying motions to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because such rulings are “committed to the [BIA’s] unfettered discretion.”