8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Shi v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-24(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Under these circumstances, the BIA did not err in finding no materially changed country conditions excusing Shi’s untimely motion. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Nababan v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-15(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners filed an untimely motion to reopen, because they filed it more than 90 days after the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioners failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-based motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it relies on changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country of deportation.

Enunwe v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-21(c)(3)(ii)

These time and numerical limitations do not apply, however, if the motion is filed for the purpose of seeking asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered. ” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen where he filed it more than three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

The changed-country-conditions exception excuses the motion-to-reopen filing restrictions when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Simonchyk v. Sessions · filed 2017-02-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, the filing restrictions may be excused if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but allows an untimely motion seeking asylum based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Zhang v. Sessions · filed 2017-03-31(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may move to reopen proceedings once, no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations may be excused if the motion to reopen is filed to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... None of the trends Zhang identifies would compel the BIA to find the material change necessary to excuse the untimeliness of her motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed country conditions in the country of removal.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen, where Singh filed it more than eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Singh failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the limitations imposed on filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the motion-to-reopen time limit when the evidence shows changed country conditions and was previously unavailable.

Zertuche-Moreno v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-05-22(c)(3)(ii)

Zertuche-Moreno argues that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard and failed to recognize that she presented sufficient evidence to qualify for the changed country conditions exception described in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We disagree, and conclude that the BIA properly denied Zertuche-Moreno’s motion because she failed to present sufficient evidence to show “changed country conditions” in Mexico and failed to show that the proffered evidence “was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a regulatory exception to the motion-to-reopen filing deadline when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions.

Zuchao He v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-02(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying He’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions as untimely, where he failed to establish materially changed conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Ji Xue He v. Sessions · filed 2017-07-13(c)(3)

As an initial matter, we note that He’s conversion to Christianity in the United States constitutes a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in China’s country conditions. Thus, the exception to the 90-day rule in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) does not apply.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but makes that deadline inapplicable when the motion relies on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Wei Fang v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2017-07-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day deadline does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen only when the supporting evidence concerns materially changed country conditions and was not previously available.

Enoh v. Sessions · filed 2017-08-16(c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA properly observed that the evidence linking SCNC with Boko Haram was not new or previously unavailable because this linkage began before Enoh’s merits hearing in September 2012. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA also reasonably determined that Enoh’s generalized country conditions evidence showed a continuation of the same or similar conditions for SCNC members that existed at the time of his merits hearing, rather than materially changed conditions or circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum or withholding motion to reopen from the filing deadline only when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Pang v. Sessions · filed 2017-11-29(c)(3)(ii)

Unfortunately for Pang, a change in personal circumstances is not sufficient to sustain a motion to reopen filed after the ninety-day deadline in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (“[T]he time limitation . . . shall not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings . . . [t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Instead, to obtain relief on an untimely motion to reopen, an alien must present, among other things, evidence of changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline when newly presented evidence establishes materially changed country conditions.

Vargas v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-12-13(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely because it was filed more than fifteen months after the final order of removal, and because petitioners’ newly presented evidence did not establish materially changed country conditions in Mexico, as required to qualify for the regulatory exception to the ninety-day time limit under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the new evidence of drug-related violence along the U.S.-Mexico border was not “qualitatively different” from the evidence previously presented.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen to seek asylum or withholding based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of ordered deportation, when the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Yahya v. Jefferson B. Sessions III · filed 2018-05-03(c)(3)(ii)

The deadline does not apply, however, where the alien seeks “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline when the alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the Immigration Judge.

Araujo-Trujillo v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-06-27(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, Araujo-Trujillo is not entitled to relief from the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions. The 90-day deadline to file such a motion does not apply where the alien “presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ.” ... An alien seeking to reopen his case on this basis must demonstrate both changed country conditions and prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the one-motion limit for motions to reopen based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Precetaj v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2018-10-24(c)(3)(ii)

Under the applicable statutory and regulatory schemes, motions to reopen are subject to temporal and numerical limits. See 8 U.S.C § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). An asylum applicant is limited to one motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to this numerical requirement for motions “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because this is Preçetaj’s second motion to reopen, it is subject to the “changed country conditions” exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when materially changed country conditions support the requested relief.

Ambrocio v. Barr · filed 2019-02-15(c)(3)(ii)

With respect to petitioner’s claim based on an increase in violence against women, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by finding that Maricela had not established materially changed country conditions in Mexico sufficient to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen when the movant establishes changed country conditions in the country of removal.

Rosales v. Barr · filed 2019-09-24(c)(3)(ii)

As to petition No. 17-72985, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carrillo Rosales’s second untimely motion to reopen because he failed to establish changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limitation, while the changed-country-conditions provision supplies a regulatory exception to that limitation.

Hernandez v. Barr · filed 2019-10-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Guzman Hernandez’s untimely motion to reopen where Guzman Hernandez failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Honduras to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (new evidence lacked materiality).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen when the movant establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Molina v. Barr · filed 2019-10-23(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carcamo Molina’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where it was filed over 10 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Carcamo Molina has not established changed country conditions in Nicaragua to qualify for an exception to the filing deadline, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

A prior claim-specific adverse-credibility finding about nationality or past enslavement does not by itself bar a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions and a different basis of persecution.

Ba v. Barr · filed 2020-06-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Put simply, the IJ’s suspicions that Ba was not Mauritanian and had not been enslaved need not be revisited on a motion to reopen in order to assess whether he will be persecuted if removed to Mauritania.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when it seeks asylum based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Markaj v. Barr · filed 2020-07-07(c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Markaj’s 2017 motion to reopen was untimely filed more than eight years after her removal order became final in 2009. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Markaj failed to demonstrate such conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the limits on motions to reopen for asylum or withholding claims based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable; evidence is not material when it cannot change the result because an adverse credibility finding independently defeats the claim.

Singh v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-12-29(c)(3)(ii)

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when an alien moving to reopen is applying or reapplying for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” To meet the exception, a petitioner must prove changed country conditions by providing evidence that “(1) is material and (2) was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... However, we agree with the BIA that no country conditions evidence Singh now submits is material—put differently, sufficient to change the result of Singh’s application for relief10—in light of the adverse credibility finding the IJ made against him after finding his testimony to be riddled with inconsistencies. ... Thus, we agree with the BIA that Singh cannot meet the changed country conditions exception and accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of his second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable, and a change in personal circumstances alone does not satisfy the exception.

Binderiya v. Garland · filed 2021-03-22(c)(3)(ii)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days from the entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But an exception to the time limit is available if the motion to reopen “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... However, her father’s removal is a change in personal circumstances that, while potentially rendering new country conditions relevant, does not by itself satisfy the timeliness exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception to the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen only when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances.

Mata-Garcilazo v. Garland · filed 2021-04-20(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mata-Garcilazo’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Mata-Garcilazo did not establish changed country conditions in Nicaragua or Honduras that are material to any of her claims for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (requiring material evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987–90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and number limits for a motion to reopen seeking asylum when the motion is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Rivera-Lopez v. Garland · filed 2021-04-22(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the time and number limitations do not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen based on these two exceptions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, but a change in personal circumstances alone is insufficient unless corresponding changed country conditions would lead to persecution.

Helal v. Garland · filed 2021-07-15(c)(3)(ii)

While a change in personal circumstances alone does not constitute changed country conditions for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Ba v. Barr, 819 F. App’x 295, 304 n.7 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 517 (6th Cir. 2006)), “if the petitioner can demonstrate that a change in country conditions would lead to his persecution based on a corresponding change in his own personal circumstances, this is permissible,” id. (citing Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 2017).

Subsection (c)(2) requires a timely motion to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions.

Menocal v. Garland · filed 2021-10-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Menocal’s motion to reopen removal proceedings as untimely, where it was filed over five years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Menocal has not established changed country conditions in Honduras to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception for asylum motions based on material changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Salhan v. Garland · filed 2022-03-10(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Salhan’s 2019 motion was untimely because he filed it more than two years after his removal order became final in 2017. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although this time limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” that are material to the applicant’s asylum claim, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), Salhan did not satisfy this exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed nearly two years after the final removal order untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3) removes that time limit for an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Doe v. Garland · filed 2022-04-21(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Petitioner’s 2018 motion was untimely because he filed it almost two years after his removal order became final in 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). However, the BIA did not err in finding that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a material change in conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3) exempts motions based on qualifying changed country conditions; the changed-conditions exception did not apply where the evidence neither rebutted the prior adverse credibility finding nor established changed conditions.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2022-12-16(c)(2) (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Singh’s 2020 motion to reopen was untimely because he filed it almost three years after his removal order became final in 2017. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (establishing a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). ... Although this limitation does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), the BIA did not err in finding that this exception did not apply because Singh’s evidence did not rebut the agency’s underlying adverse credibility determination or establish changed conditions in India.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline when the applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing; generalized worsening crime is insufficient without materiality to the applicant’s individualized claims.

Villalpando-Luna v. Garland · filed 2023-03-15(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the 90-day time limit applies where the petitioner presents material evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered . . . [that] was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2017). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villalpando-Luna’s motion to reopen. The motion was untimely because it was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order of removal. And the BIA correctly determined that the “changed country conditions” exception does not apply because Villalpando-Luna failed to show that the alleged “changed country conditions”—worsening conditions of crime in Mexico—are material to his claims that he will be targeted due to his family ties, his family’s land ownership, or his status as a recent returnee to Mexico.

Section 1003.2(c) creates an exception to the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline for asylum or withholding claims based on changed conditions in the country of nationality, requiring qualitatively different evidence from that presented previously.

Sanchez v. Garland · filed 2024-11-18(c)

Although generally motions to reopen deportation proceedings must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision being rendered, motions filed for the purpose of applying for asylum or withholding based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality constitute an exception to that time limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). To establish a country-conditions change sufficient to excuse an untimely motion to reopen, the evidence must be “‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The changed circumstances exception for a motion to reopen does not cover a change in personal circumstances, such as the birth of a child in the United States.

Feng v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-09-22(c)

Our court recently held that a change in “personal” circumstances, such as the birth of a child in the United States, does not fit under the “changed circumstances” exception to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... Accordingly, we are unable to say that the BIA abused its discretion in finding that it had not committed an error of law or fact in denying Feng’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen or remand based on additional evidence to be accompanied by material evidence that was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the hearing.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-07-30(c)(1)

Zheng was required to comply with the regulatory requirement that his motion be accompanied by evidence that is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of his hearing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and his failure to do so provided a proper basis to deny his motion, see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(e)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2009-08-17(e)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to remand because Singh did not submit previously unavailable evidence of identity.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Omer v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-16(c)(1)

The agency acted within its discretion in denying Omer’s motion to reopen because the documents Omer submitted with his motion did not qualify as previously undiscoverable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening to apply for asylum only when the applicant presents material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Diaz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-05(c)(3)(ii)

Because Diaz did not present any new, material evidence, the facts of which were not available to her at the time she decided to withdraw her application for asylum, the agency did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(3); Chang Hua He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-33 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing; the court upheld denial where petitioner failed to explain the evidence’s prior unavailability.

Espindola-Castena v. Holder · filed 2009-11-16(c)(1)

Under the regulations, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The IJ denied petitioner’s motion to reopen on two grounds. First, the IJ found that the evidence petitioner submitted with his motion to reopen should have been submitted at the merits hearing on his application for cancellation of removal and that petitioner had failed to explain why the evidence was “previously unavailable.” ... These conclusions were supported by the record and we find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s decision affirming the denial.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening based on documents that were previously available and could have been presented at the prior hearing.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(c)(1)

Additionally, the BIA found that the other documents Li submitted “were previously *99available and could have been presented for the March 1, 2006, hearing,” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). While Li argues that the BIA abused its discretion in failing to consider the evidence that she submitted with her appeal, she fails to demonstrate that the documents that the BIA did not specifically address were unavailable or undiseoverable at the time of her hearing. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to adjust status based on marriage to a United States citizen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and accompanied by the appropriate application for relief, while subsection (a)'s discretionary decision to reopen sua sponte is unreviewable.

Awe v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-11(c)(1), (a)

Like any other motion to reopen, a motion to reopen to adjust status based on marriage to a United States citizen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Finally, Awe challenges the Board’s refusal to sua sponte reopen his case, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), but the Board’s discretionary decision whether to sua sponte reopen proceedings is unreviewable, see Johnson v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 795, 799 (7th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Singh v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2009-09-08(b)(1)

Such motions “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final decision, while § 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary and beyond judicial review.

Ali v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-05-12(c)(2), (a)

A motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within ninety days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. ... We hereby join our sister circuits in holding that a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review — in other words, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Ali’s immigration proceedings sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen to one filed within 90 days, § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are shown, and § 1003.2(a)'s sua sponte reopening decision is entirely discretionary and unreviewable.

Su v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Su’s motion as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA accurately noted that, whereas a timely motion to reopen would have been due in October 2003, Su did not file his motion until October 2006, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. See Id. ... Further, the BIA properly determined that Su was not eligible for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen because he failed to submit any evidence establishing a change in country conditions in China. See Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Thus, in order to prevail, he needed to demonstrate changed country conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, because the BIA’s refusal to reopen Su’s proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) was entirely discretionary, we are without jurisdiction to review that decision. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) supplies an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, but the movant must submit evidence establishing a material change; subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte reopening authority, whose discretionary exercise is beyond judicial review.

Ji Hang Ni v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-07(c)(3)(ii), (a)

Further, the BIA properly determined that Ni failed to submit any evidence es*59tablishing a change in country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... To the extent Ni challenges the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen his proceedings, that discretionary decision is beyond the scope of our review. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, provides an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions, and makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary.

Xu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the agency’s final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day filing deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, insofar as Xu argues that the BIA abused its discretion in failing to reopen his proceedings sua sponte in light of the documents we addressed in Shou Yung Guo, we lack jurisdiction to review such a challenge because the agency’s decision in that respect was “entirely discretionary.” Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte entirely discretionary and therefore not subject to judicial review.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-18(a)

Additionally, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Singh’s case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” See Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte entirely discretionary and therefore outside judicial review.

Teoh v. Holder · filed 2010-01-08(a)

To the extent that Teoh argues that the BIA erred in failing to consider the equities in his case and declining to reopen his case sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to consider those arguments. See Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s decision not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than three years after the agency's final removal order, while subsection (a) places discretionary sua sponte reopening or reconsideration beyond the court's jurisdiction to review.

Felix-Fernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-25(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Felix-Fernandez’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Felix-Fernandez did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897. ... We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary decision not to sua sponte reopen or reconsider pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien’s motions to reconsider or reopen by time-and-number restrictions, while preserving the Board’s separate authority to act sua sponte.

Malukas v. Barr · filed 2019-10-15(b)(2), (c)(2), and (a)

The time-and-number limits apply to aliens’ motions and do not restrict the Board’s (or the Akorney General’s) authority to act independently of a motion. But the request that Malukas made—a motion to reopen sua sponte—is an oxymoron. Reopening in response to a motion is not sua sponte; it is a response to the motion and thus subject to the time-and-number limits.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen sua sponte despite that deadline; sua sponte reopening is an extraordinary remedy, and the BIA's discretionary refusal to reopen is not reviewable.

Bah v. Garland · filed 2022-01-20(c)(2), (a)

It is undisputed that Bah’s 2019 motion to reopen was time barred because he filed it 14 years after the agency issued his final order of removal in 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). ... The BIA may reopen sua sponte despite the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (version in effect until Jan. 15, 2021). But the BIA “invoke[s] [its] sua sponte authority sparingly, treating it . . . as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” ... And we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to reopen a case sua sponte under § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and courts generally lack jurisdiction to review its denial except to remand for a legal misperception.

Huang v. Bondi · filed 2025-08-13(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that decision, see Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2022), except that we may remand if the BIA misperceived the law and denied sua sponte reopening because it “thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, the BIA did not misperceive the law in concluding that Huang’s now-claimed eligibility for cancellation of removal, asserted years after she was ordered removed, was not an exceptional circumstance warranting sua sponte reopening.

Subsection (a) makes sua sponte regulatory reopening a discretionary decision with no legal standard for judicial review.

Yong v. Blanche · filed 2026-05-05(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte regulatory reopening because there is no legal standard by which to judge the BIA’s discretionary decision under § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides a changed-country-conditions exception, and reopening under that exception is distinct from a successive, untimely asylum application.

An Guoc Chun v. Holder · filed 2009-09-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(h), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Moreover, the BIA properly found that Chun’s motion did not qualify for the “changed country conditions” exception to the time and number limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... Chun never asked the BIA to consider a “new claim for asylum and withholding of deportation,” but only requested reopening of his initial immigration proceedings based on changed country circumstances, which is an independent form of relief separate and distinct from a successive, untimely asylum application based on changed circumstances. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after a final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) makes that limit inapplicable when the alien presents material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Huang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-10-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal and wishes to reopen the proceedings must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nevertheless, the time limit is inapplicable if the alien can demonstrate “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). An alien cannot circumvent the requirement of showing changed country conditions by demonstrating only a change in personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on materially changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-11-24(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, the time limitation does not apply when the alien can establish materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Wen Fang Wang v. Holder · filed 2009-12-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

We find that the BIA did not err in denying Wang’s untimely motion to reopen. An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... Additionally, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Wang failed to demonstrate changed country conditions excusing the untimely filing of . her motion.

The exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number bars applies to changed conditions in the country of nationality, not changed personal circumstances arising from actions taken in the United States.

Wang v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-12-29(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to this time and number bar permits an alien “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Haddad, 437 F.3d at 517; Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004). ... Similarly, Wang alleges an “individualized fear of persecution,” id., in that he claims that the Chinese authorities are aware of his pro-democracy activism in the United States and will arrest and harm him on his return. However, Wang’s fear of persecution is due to a change in personal circumstances rather than changed conditions within China. ... We conclude, therefore, that Wang has not demonstrated that had his motions to reopen and reconsider based on changed country conditions been timely they would have been granted.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed more than three years after the final decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when the applicant establishes changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2009-12-29(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred, where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (in order to prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, petitioner must demonstrate that evidence would establish prima facie eligibility for relief sought).

Subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2010-01-07(c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Zhang’s motion to reopen was both untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably found that Zhang’s motion to reopen did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless an exception applies, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires materially changed country conditions to support reopening for a prima facie CAT claim.

Preciado v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-01-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner’s motion was untimely filed and failed to meet an exception to the time limits on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner’s claim for protection under CAT failed to present changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner or his circumstances, and therefore petitioner failed to meet his burden of presenting a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2 generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, unless the movant shows materially changed country conditions qualifying for the regulatory exception.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in the country of nationality had changed).

Subsection (c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, generally filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes the time limitation when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-03-09(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Additionally, the time limitations do not apply if the alien can establish materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that the evidence Lin submitted was unauthenticated and thus insufficient to demonstrate changed country conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes that deadline for qualifying changed country conditions supported by material, previously unavailable evidence.

Ping Li v. Holder · filed 2010-03-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Li’s March 2008 motion was untimely. The BIA had issued its final order in July 2004. There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” if the petitioner provides “evidence [that] is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such changes are regularly referred to as “changed country conditions” and distinguished from “changed personal circumstances.” Jian Huan Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed nearly ten years after the final decision as untimely, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed country conditions for the regulatory exception to that time limit.

Shergil v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed nearly ten years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed country conditions in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is … whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed nearly two years after the prior BIA decision, unless the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies.

Hossain v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hossain’s second motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed nearly two years after the BIA’s prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hossain failed to establish changed country conditions in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision and limits a party to one motion, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to those limits when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are shown.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-04-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s third motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (in order to prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, petitioner must demonstrate that new evidence, together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, establishes prima facie eligibility for relief sought).

The 90-day and one-motion limits do not apply when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions, but a change in personal circumstances alone does not qualify.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2010-05-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

As the BIA found, Dong’s alleged membership in the Federation for Democracy in China was a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, and cannot therefore be the basis of a finding of changed circumstances so that the 90-day time limitation does not apply.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the time limit for an asylum or withholding application based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and was not previously available.

Awuy v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-06-01(c)(3)(ii)

However, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) carves out an exception to the time limitation to permit an applicant to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on evidence of changed country conditions if such evidence is material and was not previously available.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely or exceeds the limit on prior motions, subject to the regulation’s exception for material changed country conditions.

Wu v. Holder · filed 2010-12-16(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Wu’s motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred, because it was filed more than four years after the agency’s order of removal became final, and because Wu filed previous motions to reopen in June 2005 and October 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen outside the applicable time and number limits absent an exception, while subsection (a) gives the BIA broad discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Roa v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-06(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Roa’s second motion to reopen as time- and number-barred where the successive motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s August 8, 2005, order dismissing her underlying appeal, and Roa failed to demonstrate that she qualified for any exception to the time and number limits. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3). ... To the extent we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority, the BIA acted within its broad discretion in declining to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen filed outside the applicable 90-day period, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-08(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because it was Singh’s second motion, filed almost six years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed country circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2 requires most motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but suspends that time limit when materially changed country conditions are shown through evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Skendaj v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-06-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Most motions to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time limit is suspended in some cases by changed country circumstances, where the evidence of changed circumstances “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Johnson v. Aschcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality are established.

Lin Ying Ye v. Holder · filed 2010-07-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien can file a single motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or number limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (C) (ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-07-08(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened and only one such motion may be filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-07-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and numerically barred motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii); decisions declining sua sponte reopening under subsection (a) are not judicially reviewable.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Kaur’s sixth motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to establish changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2010-07-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen as untimely because Yang filed it over three years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Yang failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, including a change in laws or the enforcement of family planning laws, to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2009); He, 501 F.3d at 1132.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen when it is untimely and number-barred, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception based on materially changed country conditions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tan’s third motion to reopen as number-barred and untimely where the motion was filed nineteen years after the final order of deportation was entered in his case, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Tan failed to establish changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2009) (record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws that would establish changed country conditions excusing untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Chang Ju Ye v. Holder · filed 2010-07-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the birth of Ye’s two U.S. citizen children and his participation in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”) reflected changes in his personal circumstances and rather than changed country conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days and permits only one such motion, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses those limits for qualifying changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-07-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. ... A motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened and only one such motion may be filed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zheng’s second motion to reopen, filed in February 2009, was numerically barred and untimely. ... Moreover, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zheng’s political activities in the U.S. did not constitute “changed circumstances arising in [his] country of nationality” sufficient to excuse the time and number limitations barring his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to time and numerical limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Maksoudian v. Holder · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Maksoudian’s motion to reopen to apply for asylum and withholding because it was untimely and number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), and Maksoudian failed to establish changed country conditions in Lebanon to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Guo v. Holder · filed 2010-09-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Guo’s second motion to reopen as untimely because Guo filed it over five years after the agency issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Guo failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time or number limits for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-989 (9th Cir. 2009) (record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws that would establish changed country conditions excusing untimely motion to reopen); He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin excusing the untimely filing of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen without the usual time or numerical limits only when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality; changed personal circumstances are insufficient.

Ting Ting Fu v. Holder · filed 2010-09-27(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Fu’s motion was indisputably untimely, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the birth of Fu’s two U.S. citizen children, as well as her practice of Falun Gong in the United States, constituted a change in her personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a removed alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Yu Feng Pan v. Holder · filed 2010-09-29(c)(2)

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006). An alien who has been ordered removed may file one motion to reopen, but must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Here, the BIA properly denied Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, as it was his sixth motion to reopen and was filed more than six years after his June 2002 final order of removal. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are shown.

Karapetyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to reopen as untimely where the motions were filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings based on changed country conditions).

The exception to the time and number limits on motions to reopen applies only when supported by material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions arising in the country of nationality or removal destination, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Bao Mi Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-10-07(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limitations do not apply to a petitioner’s motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In denying Chen’s motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably concluded that his adoption of Christianity in the United States — well over a decade after an immigration judge originally denied Chen’s application for asylum — did not excuse the time or number limit barring his motion because it constituted a change in his personal circumstances rather than a change in circumstances “arising in the country of nationality.” See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Sarkar v. Holder · filed 2010-10-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarkar’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. In general, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened, and only one such motion may be filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Sarkar’s November 2008 motion to reopen was filed more than six years after the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of his asylum application. Because that motion was Sarkar’s third, the motion was both untimely and numerically barred. See id. In these circumstances, the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely or second motion to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changes in country conditions; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2011-04-05(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely, as he filed it more than seven years after the BIA upheld the immigration judge’s underlying merits decision, and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen seeking to apply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), as the BIA found, Wang’s political activities in the United States constituted a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, see Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions or changed circumstances that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the previous hearing.

Alpha Jalloh v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-05-13(c)(3)

The time and number requirements do not apply, however to motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). We find no merit in Jalloh‟s efforts to establish changed county conditions so as to excuse his time-barred motion to reopen. Indeed, as the Board properly found, the evidence submitted with Jalloh‟s motion to reopen “describe[d] a continuance of the on-going alleged threat from [Lieutenant] Barry and . . . the military that gave rise to [Jalloh‟s] first claim.” Notably, when Jalloh appeared before the IJ in June 2009, the military regime which allegedly seeks to persecute him had already seized power in a coup. See Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and typically bars more than one motion to reopen.

Clasford Green v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-05-25(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, petitioners are typically barred from filing more than one motion to reopen. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision and limits a party to one motion, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is supported by sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Thiara v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Thiara’s second motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the successive motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Thiara failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time and number limits, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a successive motion to reopen when it is untimely and exceeds the one-motion limit, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on changed circumstances in the country of removal that requires sufficient supporting evidence.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-07-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as time-barred and number-barred where the successive motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives those limits for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-07-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits an untimely and number-barred motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; a change in personal circumstances or nonmaterial, localized evidence does not qualify.

Man Tat Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-08-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Lin’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than nine years after the agency’s final order of removal and because it was his second motion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin’s newly commenced practice of Christianity constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely and number-barred filing of his motion to reopen. ... Furthermore, in light of evidence that the treatment of unregistered religious groups varied widely from region to region, the BIA reasonably found evidence that the Chinese government had intensified its repression of unregistered religious groups surrounding and following the 2008 Olympics immaterial to Lin’s motion because that intensification occurred in regions other than Lin’s home province. ... Accordingly, because the record does not compel the conclusion that the treatment of practitioners in unregistered Christian churches in Lin’s home province had changed materially since the time of Lin’s 2000 hearing, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the ordinary time and number limits when the applicant demonstrates materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2011-08-26(c)(3)(ii)

Although Zhang’s third motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred, such limitations do not apply if an applicant demonstrates materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In these circumstances, the BIA reasonably concluded that the notice was insufficient to establish materially changed country conditions. ... Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the usual time and number limits when it is based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2011-09-13(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” ... In this case, because Singh did not present any evidence of changed country conditions in India, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that he failed to demonstrate an exception to the time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires it to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Gao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-10-18(c)(2)

Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so ―no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.‖ 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-11-01(c)(2) (c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, Lin’s motion to remand, treated as a motion to reopen and filed more than ten years after the final administrative order, was time barred. However, the time bar does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. INA § 240(c)(7)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

An otherwise untimely motion to reopen may proceed under the changed-country-conditions exception only if the new evidence is material and previously unavailable, and the conditions have materially worsened.

Jin v. Holder · filed 2011-11-03(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limitation does not foreclose a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). ... Nor did the BIA err in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate changed country conditions for Christians in China. Based on the record evidence, the BIA reasonably concluded that the Chinese government restricted the practice of religion prior to Petitioners’ 2006 merits hearing, and has continued to do so, but that the evidence did not indicate that such repression had materially worsened so as to warrant reopening of Petitioners’ case.

The exception removes the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen when it relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Saini v. Holder · filed 2011-11-10(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limitations, however, do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The 90-day filing bar for a motion to reopen does not apply when the motion is based on changed country conditions in the alien's country of nationality, provided the alien submits material evidence of the change that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Abulashvili v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-11-15(c)(2)

Although Abulashvili‟s motion to reopen was untimely, the BIA may nonetheless consider the motion if it was “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(2). Under these circumstances, an alien must: (1) produce evidence demonstrating that conditions have changed in his country of nationality; (2) demonstrate that this evidence is material; and (3) establish that the evidence was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions to reopen from time and number limits when seeking asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions, but only if the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-11-18(c)(3)(ii)

Singh’s evidence that an individual in Guyana has threatened to do him harm is not evidence material to a claim of asylum, and thus does not provide a basis for applying the exception to timeliness, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time and number limits do not apply to motions to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time- and number-barred motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires the motion to rely on new and previously unavailable evidence.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2011-11-30(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Although Chen’s fourth motion before the BIA was indisputably untimely and number-barred, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Furthermore, the events the friend described occurred in 2003, several months before Chen filed his first motion to reopen with the BIA in May 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring motions to reopen to be based on new and previously unavailable evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the movant presents material evidence unavailable at the prior hearing and based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Hussain Khan v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-11-30(c)(3)(ii)

When a motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, the movant must present evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” which is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the movant presents material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier, arising from changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Khan v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-11-30(c)(3)(ii)

When a motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions, the movant must present evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” which is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits for materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Ren v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-01-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen, and he must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(2)). These time and number limitations are surmounted, however, when a motion to reopen removal proceedings relies on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). There is no question that the evidence submitted to the BIA by Ren was unavailable during his original removal proceedings. The BIA determined, however, that the evidence was not “material” to Ren‟s claim that he fears persecution on account of a prospective violation of China‟s coercive family planning policy.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days or by September 30, 1996, whichever is later; subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions; and subsection (a) leaves sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2012-01-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (a)

Singh’s motion to reopen was indisputably untimely and number-barred as it was his fourth motion to reopen and he filed it more than thirteen years after he was ordered deported and two years after the BIA’s last decision in his case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Contrary to Singh’s argument, the regulation accounts for cases that pre-date its enactment by requiring motions to reopen to be filed either within ninety days “or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Second, we reject Singh’s objection to the use of country conditions at the time of his 1995 hearing as a baseline, because without such a baseline it would be impossible to determine whether country conditions had in fact changed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (permitting motions to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” (emphasis added)). ... To the extent Singh challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen his case sua sponte to permit him to adjust his status, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision, as sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is “entirely discretionary.” Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a 90-day time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is based on changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Shankar v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). We reject petitioners’ contention that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in analyzing whether there was material evidence of a change in conditions in Fiji. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable, not merely self-induced changes in personal circumstances.

Shi v. Holder · filed 2012-01-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, the agency properly concluded that Shi’s conversion to Christianity in the United States constituted a self-induced change in personal circumstances that did not merit an exception to the time and number limitations applicable to motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the exception does not apply when the evidence fails to establish changed circumstances.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-02-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Chen’s 2010 motion was untimely and number-barred, as she previously filed two motions to reopen, and the final administrative order was issued in 2005. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), the BIA concluded that Chen failed to establish changed circumstances for Christians arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a person to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality are established.

Kuka v. Holder · filed 2012-02-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An individual ordinarily may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation if the individual establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and numerical limits when it relies on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable; section 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening discretionary and unreviewable.

Li v. Holder · filed 2012-02-06(c)(3)(ii), (a)

However, there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Li’s newly commenced practice of Christianity constituted a change in his personal circumstances, rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the applicable time and numerical limitations. ... Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Li’s proceedings sua sponte, as that decision is “entirely discretionary.” See Cyrus v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is a discretionary decision that is not subject to judicial review).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen that is untimely and numerically barred, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when sufficient evidence establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as numerically-barred and untimely where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Yan v. Holder · filed 2012-03-21(c)(2)

Yan’s second renewed motion to reopen was number barred and untimely because he filed it more than five years after his final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the BIA to consider an untimely motion to reopen when the applicant presents previously unavailable evidence of material changed country conditions, together with a prima facie showing of eligibility for the underlying relief.

Perera v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-27(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA may entertain an untimely motion to reopen if an alien makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his or her homeland. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Raza, 484 F.3d at 127. Those changes, however, must be material to the underlying substantive relief that the alien is seeking . . . and the evidence tendered in support thereof must have been unavailable during the prior proceedings. Raza, 484 F.3d at 127. In addition, the new evidence submitted, together with the evidence already in the record, must establish a prima facie showing of eligibility for the underlying substantive relief sought by the alien. See Smith, 627 F.3d at 438-39.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen when the movant establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Chowdhury v. Holder · filed 2012-04-13(c)(3)(ii)

Here, Chowdhury’s motion to reopen was indisputably untimely, as he filed it more than seven years after his final order of removal, and number-barred because it was his second motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C). Thus, Chowdhury was required to establish materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on qualifying changed country conditions from those limits.

Sarkar v. Holder · filed 2012-04-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Sarkar’s November 2010 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in 2002, and number-barred, because it is his third motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarkar’s motion to reopen as untimely and number barred because he failed to demonstrate changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it seeks asylum or withholding based on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence unavailable at the prior hearing.

Warouw v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2012-04-20(c)(3)(ii)

Under the governing regulations, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the “time and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply” to motions to reopen to “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). “A motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for [the relief sought].” Guo, 386 F.3d at 563.

The exception to § 1003.2's time and number limits requires material new evidence of changed country conditions, not merely continuation of the old threat.

Morales v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-04-30(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and number limits do not apply if the movant can show “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... To succeed on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, the movant must show that there is new evidence that was material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. ... These affidavits showed that the FARC continues to threaten Morales. The affidavits did not show that since Morales’s 2006 removal hearing the FARC has escalated its efforts to target Liberal Party members such as Morales. ... In short, Morales’s evidence showed only that he still faces the same threat he faced during his removal hearing, which is not a “change.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one filing within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses those limits only when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2012-05-03(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. ... Moreover, the BIA reasonably concluded that the evidence that Jiang submitted in support of her motion did not demonstrate a material change in conditions excusing the untimely and number-barred filing of her motion because the evidence showed only that, since Jiang’s 2002 removal proceedings, the Chinese government had continually repressed the practice of Christianity in certain areas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Haider v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-05-21(c)(3)(ii)

An alien, like Haider, may move to reopen his immigration proceedings “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and numerical limits when it is based on materially changed country conditions and the supporting evidence was previously unavailable.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2012-05-25(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. ... Although Liu’s motion was indisputably untimely and number-barred because it was filed more than eight years after the agency’s final order of deportation and it was his second motion to reopen, ... there is no time or numerical limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... Accordingly, because Liu failed to present material evidence that he would be affected by any change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuses its discretion in denying is motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for motions based on changed country conditions.

Gonzalez-Lora v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

By statute and by regulation, an alien may generally file only one motion to reopen proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the relevant order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(7)(A), (7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The rules allow for some exceptions to the time and number restrictions, such as when a motion is based on changed country conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We agree with the Government that Gonzalez-Lora has not shown that he falls into any such exception, and that his motion—his third—was filed well after the 90-day period expired.

Section 1003.2 limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, but permits an untimely or successive motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions, and requires new facts that would be proven at a hearing.

HANG CHEN v. Holder · filed 2012-03-30(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)

Also, the motion must be filed within ninety days after the last administrative decision's issuance. ... Provided a petitioner "makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland," however, the agency may forgive a petitioner's later and subsequent filing. ... To satisfy this standard, the motion to reopen must set forth new facts that will be proven at a hearing should the motion be granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) waives those limits for material evidence of changed country conditions.

Kose v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-07-06(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not permit the exception to the ordinary limits on motions to reopen when the movant fails to demonstrate changed country conditions.

Bhatti v. Holder · filed 2012-07-09(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bhatti’s motion to reopen, where Bhatti failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions in Pakistan. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin, 588 F.3d at 988-89 (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen where the evidence submitted was consistent with evidence presented to the IJ, and did not show any change in country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by imposing both a time limit and a numerical limit.

Nijjar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nijjar’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the successive motion was filed nearly six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Nijjar failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one filing within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) permits an untimely motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-07-17(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file the motion with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, Chen’s motion to reopen, filed more than seven years after the final administrative order, was untimely. However, the time bar does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150-52 (3d Cir. 2009) (successive asylum application, even when based on a change in personal circumstances, must be accompanied by a showing of changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when there has been a material change in country conditions.

Mirzoian v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mirzoian’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mirzoian failed to demonstrate that there has been a material change in Armenia with respect to the government’s treatment of opposition party supporters to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991; He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (a change in personal circumstances does not establish changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; Cao’s evidence did not qualify.

Cao v. Holder · filed 2012-08-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that Cao’s September 2010 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in 2004, and number-barred, because it was his second motion to reopen. However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In this case, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Cao’s motion to reopen as untimely as substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that the background materials do not demonstrate a change in country conditions material to Cao’s claim. ... Because the excerpts of the CECC report do not describe how the Chinese government’s repression of Falun Gong has increased or intensified since April 2003, the CECC report does not compel the conclusion that conditions for Falun Gong practitioners in China have changed such that Cao was entitled to reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed conditions in the country of removal, but evidence of repression outside the applicant’s home province did not establish that exception here.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-08-21(c)(3)(ii)

Lin contends, however, that he established changed circumstances on the basis of the Chinese government’s intensified repression of Catholics following his merits hearing in June 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (providing an exception to the 90-day deadline where a motion is based on a material change in circumstances in the country of removal); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007) (“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below.”). We conclude that the BIA’s denial of Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. ... Given this evidence of variation, the BIA reasonably determined that the China Aid Report’s anecdotal accounts of religious repression outside Lin’s home province of Fujian did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Tasik v. Holder · filed 2012-08-22(c)(2)

A petitioner may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date the final administrative decision was rendered, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), unless the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the [petitioner’s] country of nationality,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2 permits one motion to reopen within 90 days, but exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Diallo v. Holder · filed 2012-08-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Diallo’s June 2010 motion was untimely, as the BIA’s final administrative decision was issued in October 2007. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is true that the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, the BIA’s finding that Diallo failed to demonstrate changed country conditions is supported by substantial evidence. ... Contrary to Diallo’s contention, it was his burden to proffer new, previously unavailable evidence to demonstrate that he would be persecuted in Guinea under the current government. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits applies only when the motion relies on material evidence of changed circumstances in the alien's country of nationality.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-09-06(c)(3)

There is an exception to the time and number requirements for motions that rely on material evidence of changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA concluded that Lin had not shown that the situation for Falun Gong practitioners was more dire in 2011 than it had been in 2004 at the time of her hearing or that the increased abuses at the time of the Olympics had continued. A.R. at 3-4. ... Lin has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 limits motions to reopen by time and number, creates an exception for material previously unavailable changed-country-conditions evidence, and permits sua sponte reopening that the court said it lacked jurisdiction to review.

Ni v. Holder · filed 2012-09-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

It is undisputed that Ni’s August 2011 motion to reopen was untimely, because the BIA issued its final order of removal in November 2002, and number-barred, because it was his third motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen do not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Further, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Ni’s proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Prasad v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-18(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the successive motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for material evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality; the exception does not apply when the evidence fails to show materially changed conditions.

Macelara v. Holder · filed 2012-09-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date the final administrative decision was rendered, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), unless the motion is based on material evidence of changed country conditions arising in the petitioner’s country of nationality, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Here, there is no dispute that Macelara’s 2011 motion was untimely and number-barred because he previously filed a motion to reopen and his administrative order of removal became final in 1996. ... In addition, the evidence of changed conditions in Macedonia submitted with Macelara’s motion, an affidavit by Balkan history professor Dr. Bernd Fischer,1 was insufficient to establish materially changed conditions in Macedonia since his last hearing. ... accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) imposes no time limit for filing a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.

Yousif v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-09(c)(3)(ii)

There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires filing within 90 days of the BIA's final administrative removal order.

Drabek v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-10-10(c)(2)

However, an alien is generally limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings and must file it within 90 days of the date of the BIA’s final administrative removal order. INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day filing deadline is “mandatory and jurisdictional,” and, therefore, not subject to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost four years after the final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country conditions for the applicable exception.

Iqbal v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Iqbal’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed almost four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Iqbal failed to present evidence that constituted a material change in Pakistan, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Pooran v. Attorney General United States · filed 2012-10-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements do not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions,” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)], or “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, we see no basis for concluding that the Board abused its discretion in determining that Petitioners did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception under INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) [8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)].

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen when it is filed outside the applicable time limit and exceeds the applicable number limit.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where the motion was filed over six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limits for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of “generalized conditions” in Iran failed to demonstrate that petitioner’s situation was “appreciably different from the dangers faced by her fellow citizens”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen when changed country conditions are material and were previously unavailable.

Yue Mei Ding v. US Attorney General · filed 2013-02-08(c)(3)(ii)

An exception to the time and number limitations for a motion to reopen is available if the motion is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (same).

(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of nationality are demonstrated.

Kumar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kumar failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and numerical limits when it relies on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the movant's country of nationality.

Indriati v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2013-02-20(c)(3)(ii)

These limitations do not apply, however, to motions that rely on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA, however, did not hold that Indriati‟s evidence was not material; rather the import of the quoted language – and the BIA‟s decision as a whole – is that the evidence did not persuasively show a change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual numerical and 90-day limits when it relies on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence unavailable at the prior hearing.

Indriati v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-02-20(c)(3)(ii)

As a general rule, an alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within ninety days of the date of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations do not apply, however, to motions that rely on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days of the final order.

Catalan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Catalan’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where he filed the second motion almost four years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (party may file one motion to reopen and motion must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception based on materially changed country conditions when the movant establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-17(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where the motion was filed more than five years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture to qualify for an exception to the filing limitations based on changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996.