8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

A motion to reconsider a BIA decision must be filed within 30 days after the Board mails its decision.

Bhoja v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-03-05(b)(2)

Since Bhoja’s motion to reconsider was untimely, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion. By regulation, a motion to reconsider a decision *352must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of a Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. The BIA issued its decision on July 26, 2002, affirming the IJ. Bhoja did not file his motion to reconsider until October 24, 2002. Thus, the BIA acted properly in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days after the underlying decision is mailed.

De Esquivel v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-04-06(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioners’ untimely motion for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring that reconsideration motion be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the underlying decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) makes a motion to reconsider filed nearly two months after the BIA’s final decision untimely.

Naja v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-17(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion was filed nearly two months after the BIA issued its final decision on April 27, 2009. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

A motion to reconsider a BIA decision must be filed within 30 days.

Lin v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2013-01-03(b)(2)

In any event, Lin’s request for reconsideration was indeed untimely, and we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in denying it for that reason.

Sections 1003.2(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii) bar an untimely, number-barred motion to reopen unless the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions qualifying for the regulatory exception.

Zou v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zou’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, because the motion was filed over eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zou failed to present material evidence of changed conditions in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-91; Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004) (regulatory exception does not extend to alleged changes in United States asylum law).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, while subsection (c)(3)'s exceptions do not include possible eligibility for a new form of relief.

Francisco v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-20(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Francisco’s motion as untimely and number-barred, where the successive motion was filed more than thirteen years after her removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and her possible eligibility for a new form of relief is not an exception to the filing requirements or time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (listing exceptions); see also Ocampo v. Holder, 629 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen subject to § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions exception.

Hussain v. Holder · filed 2012-04-24(b)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. ... Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... However, these time and number limitations do not apply if the motion is based on changed country conditions. ... Here, Hussain failed to offer material evidence of changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days, absent an applicable exception.

Sosa-Trujillo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner had previously filed two motions to reopen, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to the numerical limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as numerically barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance claims when the movant exercises due diligence.

Ke v. Holder · filed 2009-09-24(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the deadline may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, so long as the movant has exercised “due diligence” in vindicating his or her rights.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Ullah v. Holder · filed 2009-08-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien ... establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ullah and Titu Hassan’s motion to reopen, which was indisputably untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after entry of the final removal order.

Oviedo-Duarte v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

The section permits only one motion to reopen within 90 days, unless the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality; changes in the alien’s personal circumstances do not qualify.

Jiang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2009-07-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(3)(h)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than ten years after the agency’s final order of removal. ... To the extent that Jiang’s arguments can be construed as asserting that the Chinese government’s awareness of the birth of her U.S. citizen children constitutes changed circumstances excusing the untimely filing of her motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably viewed the motion as based on “circumstances entirely of [her] own making,” which did not exempt the motion from the applicable time and number bars.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality for the regulatory exception, and § 1003.2(b)(1) governs motions to reconsider, which may be construed as motions to reopen when appropriate.

Chirinkina v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-05-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chirinkina’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed nearly one-and-a-half years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Chirinkina failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in Uzbekistan to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2010); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence that conditions in country of nationality had changed). ... In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chirinkina’s motion to reconsider, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), or in construing the motion to reconsider as a motion to reopen and denying it as untimely and number barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days and requires material, previously unavailable evidence, but permits an exception when new evidence establishes changed country conditions; cumulative evidence showing that prior conditions persisted is insufficient.

Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-16(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Generally, an alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which the final administrative decision was entered based on evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (2); see Lin v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir.2006). The number and time limitations are excepted if, with the presentation of this new evidence, the alien can establish changed conditions in the country to which she was ordered removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see Zhao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir.2006). The alien cannot demonstrate changed conditions with “cumulative evidence that conditions asserted in the original application persisted.” Zhao, 440 F.3d at 407 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen for changed country conditions, and the birth of U.S. citizen children does not qualify as evidence under that exception.

Ming Fang Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-22(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Lin claimed that the birth of his two U.S. citizen children justified reopening his proceedings, such “ ‘evidence ... does not fit under the exception set forth in 8 C.F.R. § [100]3.2(c)(3)(ii).’ ” Cf. Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Jian Huan Guam, v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception based on changed country conditions.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as barred by time and number limitations. The BIA’s final order was issued in September 2002, but Chen did not file his motion to reopen until July 2006, See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Likewise, as Chen’s July 2006 motion was his second motion to reopen, there can be no dispute that the motion was number-barred. See id. As the BIA found, Chen’s motion did not qualify for an exception to the time or number limitation based on changed country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Chen submitted no country condition evidence; his motion to reopen simply provided additional evidence of his wife’s purportedly forced sterilization.1 Accordingly, as the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen *51failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, it did not err in denying his motion to reopen as barred by the time and number limitations. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006); see also Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Mendez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for qualifying changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Preciado v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than three years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in determining that petitioners failed to allege changed circumstances in Mexico that would exempt them from the time limits for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The provision generally allows only one motion to reopen within 90 days, but removes those limits when materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality are established.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-05(c)(2) and (c)(3)(h)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen because Li failed to establish changed country conditions in China or his prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought. See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (noting that failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought is an independent basis for the denial of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to applicable time limits, while allowing an exception when the motion demonstrates materially changed country conditions.

Weng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-13(c)(2)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Weng’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Weng’s motion to reopen did not demonstrate changed country conditions sufficient to meet an exception to the applicable limits on such motions. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits further consideration when materially changed country conditions support an additional motion.

Diaz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that “a party may file only one motion to reopen ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA properly found that the evidence submitted by petitioners, articles regarding random violence in Mexico, was not sufficient to establish changed circumstances to support further consideration of petitioners’ asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Hamoui, 389 F.3d at 826; Rostomian v. INS, 210 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as numerically and time-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and generally requires filing within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ortiz-Orjeda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because it was filed on July 30, 2007, more than 90 days after the August 10, 2006 final administrative decision was rendered, and petitioner had failed to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling of the filing requirements.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exceptions in § 1003.2(c)(3).

Lian v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-07-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(h), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the numerical limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... As to the former claim, the BIA properly found that a change in personal circumstances cannot establish changed country conditions excusing an applicant from the numerical limitation on motions to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances and not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). ... Because the BIA properly found that Lian’s evidence was thus insufficient to establish changed country conditions, it properly denied Lian’s motion to reopen as numerically barred and we need not reach its other findings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Dai v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed more than two years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarna v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA err in concluding that petitioner failed to show that reopening was warranted based on changed circumstances in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945-47 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-24(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed on August 10, 2007, more than 90 days after the November 6, 2006 final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Wang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of relief. See id. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien subject to a final removal order to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final order.

Kapoor v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Perez-Castaneda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

In addition, the regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and the motion to reopen must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred. Petitioners’ final administrative order of removal was entered on December 24, 2003. Petitioners’ second motion to reopen was filed on January 17, 2008, more than 90 days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(e)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Paxtor v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(e)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2). Because this is petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed well beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Yousefi-Talouri v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to applicable exceptions.

Arcos-Memije v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have failed to demonstrate that an exception to this time limit applies, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on materially supported changed country conditions from those limits.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-08(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations provide that an individual may file only one motion to reopen, and must do so within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations, however, do not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the individual’s country of nationality if he presents material evidence that was unavailable and undiscoverable at his previous hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of that order.

Osorio v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-27(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. ... Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and it was petitioner’s fifth motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days.

Sagastume v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-27(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final order.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred because petitioner previously filed a motion to reopen and the motion to reopen at issue here was filed almost eleven years after the BIA’s final decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (alien subject to final order of removal is limited to one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of date of entry of final order of removal).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of deportation to one motion to reopen, generally filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Salguero v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of deportation is limited to filing one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, absent an applicable exception.

Maldonado v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ final orders of removal were entered on March 6, 2006. Because petitioners’ second motion to reopen was filed on July 23,2008, beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to the time and numerical limitations apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as both untimely and number-barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chavarria v. Holder · filed 2009-02-19(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, absent an applicable exception.

Ramirez v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision.

Perasevic v. Holder · filed 2010-02-19(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen, generally filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Gunawan v. Holder · filed 2010-09-23(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Abualrob v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-09(c)(2)

The statute and regulations limit an alien to only one motion to reopen, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), and it must “be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Tapia-Martinez v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing it within 90 days after the BIA's final decision.

Zhao v. Barr · filed 2020-08-11(c)(2)

In general, a party may file only one motion to reopen a proceeding before the BIA, and that party must file such a petition within ninety days after the date on which the BIA rendered its final decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is thus undisputed that Zhao’s 2012 motion was untimely and number-barred because it was her fourth motion to reopen, filed more than seven years after her removal order became final.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Saldana-Salgado v. Garland · filed 2022-02-14(c)(2)

Petitioners “may file only one motion to reopen . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This is Salgado’s second motion to reopen and it was filed more than 90 days after the final decision.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to analyze whether newly alleged facts establish prima facie eligibility for asylum when deciding a motion to remand.

Zhao v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-30(a)

Regardless, Zhao’s only argument — that the BIA improperly engaged in de novo review when deciding her motion — is without merit when the BIA had the necessary authority to analyze whether she established pñma facie eligibility for asylum based on the newly alleged facts. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(1), (c)(4).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a petitioner seeking reopening based on changed circumstances to present material new facts, supported by affidavits or other evidence, that were unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Habchy v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-26(c)(1)

The Code of Federal Regulations dictates when the agency may grant a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. To qualify for a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances, the petitioner must “state . . . new facts . . . supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material,” and the facts must be material to the claim for relief and unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the former hearing. Id. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 treats a filing that does not specify errors of fact or law as a motion to reopen; such motions generally must be filed within 90 days, and the exception for previously unavailable material evidence applies only to claims of changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.

Patel v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-01-27(b)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(ii)

We conclude, as the BIA apparently did by its description of the motion filed in this case, that the motion was a motion to reopen, not a motion for reconsideration, because Patel did not specify errors of fact or law. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Most motions to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The general rule is subject to some exceptions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), but no exception applies in this case. Patel seemingly tried to invoke the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) in the agency proceedings, because he described the evidence relating to the visa petitions as material and unavailable. However, the exception that considers new material evidence that was previously unavailable is limited to claims of changed conditions in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the new evidence is material and previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(a) preserves the BIA’s discretion to deny reopening even after a prima facie case is shown.

Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-01-27(c)(1), (a)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless . . . [the] evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits an exception for qualifying changed country conditions; a successive asylum application after a final removal order must be filed with a motion to reopen and cannot rest solely on changed personal conditions.

Fa Ming Ye v. Filip · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (e)(3)(ii)

The regulations permit an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and require such a motion to be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to these time and number limitations when the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)(emphasis added). This Court has recently held that an alien who is subject to a final removal order and who wishes to file a successive asylum application must do so in conjunction with a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) and thus may not do so based solely on changed personal conditions. Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156 (2d Cir.2008).

Granting reconsideration does not automatically vacate the BIA’s prior removal order when the Board affirms it without materially changing its analysis.

Ayala v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-06(i)

But the grant of a motion to reconsider does not necessarily indicate that the underlying deportation order is similarly defective.

Section 1003.2 requires the Board to deny reopening unless the new evidence is material and unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior hearing, while preserving discretion to deny reopening even when a prima facie case for relief is shown.

Zhu v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-06-18(c)(1) and (a)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Furthermore, the BIA’s resolution of a motion to reopen is highly discretionary: “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Escalon-Padilla v. Garland · filed 2024-03-27(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .”

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days and requires a motion to reconsider within 30 days, but imposes no time or numerical limit on reopening when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-06-16(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reo2oen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. §. 1003.2(c)(2). Additionally, a motion to reconsider an agency decision must be filed within 30 days after the issuance of that decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... There is also no time or numerical limitation on a motion to reopen where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (3) (ii). Nevertheless, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioners .failed to establish such changed circumstances.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable, and generally requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Qing Long Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-06-24(c)(1), (c)(2)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must .file his motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a second motion to reopen when the petitioner shows material changed circumstances in the country of nationality, supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Kibe v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2018-06-29(c)(3)(ii)

As relevant here, such a motion may be granted if the petitioner is able to show “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because Kibe did not submit evidence sufficient to show “changed circumstances” in Kenya, we affirm the BIA’s denial of her second motion to reopen.

The exception in § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) requires a material change in circumstances in Indonesia since the last hearing; a personal change and evidence not showing deteriorated conditions do not satisfy it.

Keyrupan v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-20(e)(3)(ii)

As mentioned above, the BIA found that Keyrupan was unable to demonstrate that there had been a “material change in circumstances in Indonesia since the date of the last hearing,” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) in order to avoid application of the time and numerical limitations. ... We further agree with the BIA that Keyrupan did not demonstrate changed country conditions in Indonesia as required by the regulations governing motions to reopen. The sole document that Keyrupan produced with her motion in support of this argument — a 2007 Travel Warning — does not demonstrate that conditions for non-Muslims in Indonesia have significantly deteriorated since she was denied asylum. The 2007 Travel Warning warns of potential terrorist attacks directed against “American or other Western citizens and interests.” The warning does not extend to Indonesian citizens nor does it discuss the treatment of Chinese Christians living in Indonesia.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits reopening based on changed circumstances only when the movant submits sufficient supporting evidence.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-11-05(c)(3)(h)

The BIA also did not err in finding that Zheng failed to submit sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C) (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies only to late-filed motions to reopen seeking asylum and withholding of removal, not cancellation of removal.

Herrera v. Holder · filed 2009-07-24(c)(3)(ii)

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations only applies to late filed motions to reopen seeking asylum and withholding of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when materially changed country conditions support the claim.

Fierro v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-09-21(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) excuses the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions, but the court held that Chen had not shown such a change.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2013-10-17(c)(3)

Chen alleges that he has become a devout Christian, and that the Chinese government’s intensified crackdown on Chinese Christians constitutes a material change in country conditions excusing his motion from the applicable time and numerical limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate a material change of conditions in China.

The changed-country-conditions exception excuses the motion-to-reopen time limit only when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Basra v. Holder · filed 2010-09-29(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, these limitations do not apply if the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that the Petitioners did not establish changed country conditions excusing the time limitation on their motion to reopen. ... We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening after the 90-day deadline based on material evidence of changed country conditions; renewed awareness of the same activities does not qualify as such a change.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-05-25(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA also reasonably concluded that the Chinese government’s awareness of Lin’s pro-democracy activities in the United States, as established by his father’s letter and the Changle City Hang Cheng Jie Dao Yang Yu Village Committee Notice, does not constitute a material change in conditions in China because Lin’s original asylum claim was also based on the Chinese government’s awareness of his pro-democracy activities. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not treat changed personal circumstances, such as marriage or the birth of children, as changed country conditions that excuse the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen.

Fang Min Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-05(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent that Chen offers her marriage and the birth of her two children to support an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, we have found that such evidence of changed personal circumstances does not satisfy the exception. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the birth of the petitioner’s two U.S. citizen children was evidence of changed personal circumstances, rather than of changed conditions in China); Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam) (finding that a change in personal circumstances does not fit under the changed circumstances exception provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

For the changed-circumstances exception to the 90-day limit, the merits-hearing date—not the IJ’s decision date—is the critical date for determining whether evidence is new, and the Board must assess all potentially new, material evidence.

Chen v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)(ii)

The date of the merits hearing, and not the date of the IJ’s decision (if they are different as they were here), is the critical date in determining whether evidence is new. ... Therefore, on the record before us, any evidence dated after June 19, 2002 is new. ... Accordingly, the Board abused its discretion in concluding that only the Aird affidavit was new.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal, not changed personal circumstances.

Adebiyi v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-01-20(c)(3)(ii)

We therefore conclude that a change in United States law combined with a petitioner’s decision to raise a family in this country past the required date of his voluntary departure and a newly recognized subjective fear of persecution does not exempt petitioners from the evidentiary or filing period requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and numerical limits only when it seeks asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions, and the movant explains how those conditions affect the asylum claim.

Yue v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-24(c)(3)

However, this exception to the time and numerical limitations for filing motions to reopen only applies if the basis of the motion is to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed country circumstances. ... Yue cannot qualify for the exception merely by plainly pleading “changed country conditions,” without articulating how those conditions affect her asylum claim. Accordingly, the exception is not applicable here.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline only for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Balogun, Yetunde v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2006-03-23(c)(3)(ii)

Exceptions to the 90-day filing rule may be made only based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” and then only if “such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Selimi v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir. 2004). ... But Balogun’s marriage and the subsequent birth of her child are changes in personal circumstances, not conditions in Nigeria, and therefore do not trigger an exception to the 90-day filing deadline. See Selimi, 360 F.3d at 739.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the motion-to-reopen time limit for material, previously unavailable changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or country of deportation, not merely changed personal circumstances in the United States.

Lin v. Attorney General · filed 2006-04-06(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA is correct in its conclusion that the only applicable exception to Lin’s untimely filed reopen motion is that provided for by § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) for changed circumstances arising in the country of his nationality. ... Citing to Guan v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2003), wherein the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that changed personal circumstances arising in the United States are not within § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)’s exception, the BIA refused Lin’s invitation to sua sponte reopen his proceedings to hear his claim involving China’s coercive population control methods. ... However, as correctly noted by the BIA, Guo involved a timely filed reopen motion – a motion not limited by the “changed country conditions” exception of § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Unfortunately for Lin, that distinction is a determinative one.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion to reopen based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, but a change in an alien’s personal circumstances, such as the birth of children in the United States, does not qualify.

Li v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-04-13(c)(3)(ii)

One such exception, the only one applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2005); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005). ... In Li Yong Zheng v. Dep’t of Justice, we held that the birth of two children in the United States was essentially a changed personal circumstance that did not constitute a changed circumstance under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005).

The exception permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and numerical limits when the movant establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

de Zevallos v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

Accordingly, we conclude the BIA acted within its discretion in finding that Zevallos failed to establish changed circumstances in Peru, and thus that Zevallos’ second motion to reopen did not fall within the time and numerical limits exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for material, previously unavailable or undiscoverable changed-country-conditions evidence; previously available corroborating affidavits do not qualify as new evidence.

Zhuo v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-16(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(S)(ii)

A motion to reopen removal proceedings must normally be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (2). Because Zhou filed her motion to reopen approximately ten months after the BIA’s denial of her appeal, Zhou’s motion was untimely under this regulation. Id. ... The time limitation *15does not apply to a motion to reopen that is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if evidence of those circumstances is material and neither previously available nor discoverable at the prior hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). That exception does not apply here. With her motion, Zhou submitted three affidavits corroborating the events to which Zhou originally testified. This documentation was all previously available or discoverable at Zhou’s removal hearing. It cannot constitute new evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(S)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, but the applicant must show that the change materially affects the claims.

Ndocaj v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-29(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

A change in country conditions is an explicit exception to the 90-filing requirement, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Even though a change in country conditions could serve as an exception to the 90-day filing deadline, Ndocaj would have had to demonstrate that the country conditions in Albania changed such that they materially affected his claims. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the deadline for an untimely motion to reopen when the evidence establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Singh’s untimely motion to reopen was not subject to the “changed circumstances” exception to the filing deadline because the evidence Singh submitted did not establish changed circumstances in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

The exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an otherwise untimely or numerically barred motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions, but only when the supporting evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Cao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-04-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, this time and number requirement does not apply to aliens seeking to reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based upon changed circumstances arising in the country to which deportation has been ordered, so long as evidence supporting the motion is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows the time-limit exception for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the movant offers material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Rico v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-04-25(c)(3)(ii)

But this time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must offer material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id.

The exception permits a motion to reopen beyond the usual time and numerical limits when country conditions have changed in the movant’s country of nationality.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2007-05-11(c)(3)(ii)

The documents Chen submitted with her motion to reopen, if authentic, suggest that country conditions have changed in Chen’s country of nationality, such that her motion to reopen fell within the exceptions to the time and numerical limitations for these motions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) permits the agency to excuse the ordinary time and numerical limits on reopening when the alien convincingly demonstrates changed conditions in the home country.

Lemus v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-06(c)(3)

To be sure, these temporal and numerical limitations admit of an exception for motions to reopen that rest solidly upon changed circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Roberts, 422 F.3d at 36. "Under this rubric, the agency may waive numerical and temporal bars to reopening if an alien makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland." ... Evidence that merely contradicts the BIA's appraisal of country conditions without showing that, over time, those conditions have worsened is insufficient to vault a motion to reopen over the temporal and numerical hurdles erected by the regulations.

The changed-circumstances exception does not apply when the asserted change is in American law rather than in the country to which deportation was ordered.

Areta v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-06(c)(3)(ii)

A change in American law is not “changed circumstances ... in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) tolls the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality that were previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Quecano v. US Attorney General · filed 2007-06-29(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline is tolled for an alien that files a motion to reopen predicated upon “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Since Robles’ motion to reopen was not based upon changed circumstances in Colombia that could not have been presented at his previous hearing, the 90-day deadline was mandatory and jurisdictional.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an otherwise time- and number-barred motion to reopen only when the evidence is material, unavailable at the prior hearing, and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

S-Y-G · filed 2007-07-01(c)(3)(ii)

The applicant’s motion to reopen, otherwise barred by the 90-day deadline for filing motions to reopen, must meet the exception to the time and number limits when a motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding of removal is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.” Section 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2000). The evidence must be material and the applicant must also show that it was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2007); see also Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2012395 (2d Cir. July 12, 2007).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen only when the new evidence is material, genuinely new, and could not previously have been presented.

Estrada v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-08-23(c)(2)

However, under the “changed circumstances” exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen may be filed at anytime if it is based on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The material which postdated the merits hearing was essentially cumulative of the evidence presented to the IJ and merely reinforced Estrada’s original claims for relief. Because the newly proffered evidence was neither material nor novel, it failed to meet the requirements of the “changed circumstances” exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(ii) permits the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline to be waived for qualifying changed conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country of removal, but not for changed personal circumstances.

Hai Fan Huang v. Attorney General · filed 2007-09-28(c)(ii)

The BIA found the birth of two children in the United States did not constitute “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered” as required by INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(ii) to waive the ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen. We agree that Huang’s changed personal circumstances are distinct from changed circumstances arising in China. Thus we agree with the Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits, which have held that changed personal circumstances do not fall under this exception.

The exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen applies only when the motion relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Wirokesumo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-10-17(c)(3)(ii)

Wirokesumo’s reliance on such evidence is futile because only evidence “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing” maybe used in requesting an exception to the 90-day time requirement.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) removes the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable.

Singh v. Attorney General · filed 2008-04-25(c)(3)

“However, the ‘time and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply’ to motions to reopen that ‘apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.’” Shardar v. Attorney Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a movant seeking to overcome the procedural limits on a second motion to reopen based on new evidence to establish changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Kamal v. Attorney General · filed 2008-04-29(c)(3)(ii)

Before Kamal’s purported new evidence could be considered, however, he was required to establish changed circumstances in Bangladesh in order to overcome the procedural hurdles to his second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely absent an applicable exception, and changed-country-conditions evidence must be sufficient to excuse the deadline.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin failed to establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen requires evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Rahman v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-01(c)(3)(ii)

Furthermore, the BIA properly found that Rahman failed to establish changed circumstances in Bangladesh that qualified him for an exception to the applicable time and numerical limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The only evidence he submitted in support of his motion were certified translations of Bangladeshi court documents related to his murder conviction. Given that Rahman had already submitted these court documents with his October 2006 motion to reopen, albeit with uncertified translations, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by concluding that he failed to offer previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (providing that the time and numerical limitations shall not apply to a motion to reopen where the applicant establishes changed country conditions through evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at a previous hearing”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) makes a motion to reopen filed outside the 90-day period time-barred unless evidence of changed country circumstances is material and was not previously available or discoverable.

Along v. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-02(c)(3)(ii)

But while prima facie eligibility for the requested relief is certainly necessary for the grant of a motion to reopen, see Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004), it is not sufficient when the motion itself is untimely. The regulations are clear. When a motion to reopen based on evidence of changed country circumstances is filed outside the 90-day window prescribed by the regulations, the motion is time-barred unless “such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). As Along puts forth no argument that the evidence he presented to the BIA fits within the 90-day exception, we need proceed no further with this aspect of his appeal.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the movant satisfies the regulation's requirements.

Den Fung Cheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-05-09(c)(3)(ii)

An alien must file a motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to this limitation when an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal demonstrates that his or her claim is based on changed circumstances in the country of removal, if supporting evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. ... Cheng does not dispute that his motion to reopen was filed beyond the ninety-day filing period, but he does not address how his motion satisfied the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the procedural hurdle he must overcome before having an untimely motion to reopen considered. ... In sum, we conclude that Cheng did not sufficiently allege or establish changed country conditions in China to qualify for an exception to the ninety-day filing requirement.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the deadline for motions to reopen when there are materially changed country conditions, but the birth of additional children is only a change in personal circumstances and does not satisfy that exception.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-27(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, as we have previously noted, the birth of additional children constitutes a change of personal circumstances and does not establish changed country conditions required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). See Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows the time and number limits on motions to reopen to be excused for a material change in country conditions, but evidence showing only a continuation of previously alleged conditions does not satisfy that exception.

Kaur v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-12(c)(3)(ii)

Although the time and number limitations may be excused based on a material change in conditions “in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), as discussed below, Kaur’s evidence showed only a continuation of prior conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(2) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the movant presents sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2009-11-06(c)(3)(2)

We find that the agency did not err in denying Petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen because it reasonably found that they failed to submit sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an applicant filing a motion to reopen more than 90 days after a final decision to show materially changed conditions in the home country, by comparing current conditions with those at the time of the original case and making a prima facie asylum case.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-10-17(c)(2)

An asylum applicant who seeks to reopen his or her case more than 90 days after a final decision must demonstrate a material change in conditions in the applicant’s home country. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) — (8). This burden cannot be satisfied by evidence of current country conditions alone; conditions at the time of the original asylum case must be offered for comparison, and the applicant must demonstrate that the change in country conditions is material by presenting a pri-ma facie case for asylum.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen for asylum when it is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires supporting evidence establishing the new facts.

Lin-Guo v. Holder · filed 2012-07-25(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. ... although Lin-Guo’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than two years after the agency’s final order of removal, ... there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin-Guo failed to establish such circumstances based on his newly commenced practice of Christianity in the United States. ... Moreover, the BIA reasonably found that Lin-Guo failed to demonstrate an intensification of persecution of Christians in his native Fuzhou City since his 2006 hearing, as the country conditions evidence in the record did not describe any incidents of oppression of unregistered Christians occurring in Fuzhou City. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... Furthermore, the BIA reasonably determined that the letter written by Lin-Guo’s sister did not constitute material evidence, as it was vague and lacking in detail, and did not describe any change in the Chinese government’s treatment of Christians since 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ...

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires the BIA to address a motion-to-reopen claim that a threat of forced marriage in Pakistan constitutes a changed condition in Pakistan, rather than treating only the petitioner's U.S. marriage as the asserted changed circumstance.

Joseph, Roome v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2007-07-17(c)(3)(ii)

Joseph’s contention is that the threat of forced marriage in Pakistan, not her marriage in the United States, is the changed condition that the Board should have addressed. The BIA abused its discretion because it ignored this argument.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the submitted evidence shows a material change relevant to the applicant’s claims.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(3)(ii)

Rather, they reported generally about the excesses and impunity of the police in Punjab and did not address the particular claims of Singh and his family, who lived in Delhi.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening when the applicant submits material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Aster Worku Gebreeyesus v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-06(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA may reopen removal proceedings if the applicant submits material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at her prior hearing.

The changed-country-circumstances exception permits a motion to reopen only when country conditions, rather than merely the alien's personal circumstances, have changed.

Jiang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-04-05(e)(3)(ii)

One such exception, the only one alleged to be applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) (2005). This Court has already held that a change in an individual’s personal circumstances does not qualify under the above exception; an individual must demonstrate that the country conditions have changed in order for this exception to apply.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the movant adequately demonstrates materially changed circumstances in the country since the prior hearing.

Susanto v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-23(c)(1)

The BIA also reasonably found that Susanto had not “adequately demon*24strated meaningfully changed circumstances in Indonesia since the time of the hearing before the Immigration Judge to support reopening of [his] proceedings” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time limit when previously unavailable evidence shows changed conditions in the country of removal.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-14(c)(3)(ii)

In order for his untimely motion to reopen to be considered, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Chen was required to show, through evidence that was not available or obtainable at the previous hearing, a change in country circumstances arising in China, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, we hold that the 2003 documents, even without the Q & A Handbook, are sufficient to present to the BIA the same alleged policy discussed in Shou Yung Guo.

The exception to the time and numerical limits for reopening applies to material, previously unavailable changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country of removal, not changes in the applicant’s personal circumstances.

Dong v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-03(c)(3)(ii)

Contrary to Dong’s arguments, we have found that “changed circumstances” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) do not include changes in personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the ordinary filing limits based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality, but a self-induced change in the applicant’s personal circumstances in the United States does not qualify.

Hossain v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-07(c)(3)(ii)

Second, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Hossain’s argument that reopening was appropriate “due to his [pre-marital] relationship and fathering a child, against the teaching of his religion customs, traditions and culture.” ... This “evidence ... does not fit under the exception set forth in 8 C.F.R. § [100] 3.2(c)(3)(ii).” ... A self-induced change in personal circumstances cannot suffice.”

This provision permits an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, but changed personal circumstances do not qualify.

Ezarour v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-25(c)(3)(ii)

Ezarour’s second motion is not time barred because he claims changed country conditions. ... His claim of changed personal circumstances is not the same, however, as changed country conditions and therefore does not invoke the BIA’s regulatory authority to reopen removal proceedings.

The changed-country-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen only when circumstances changed in the country of nationality, not merely in the petitioner's personal circumstances.

Yang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-01(c)(3)(ii)

The exception to the 90-day period for filing a motion to reopen applies where the petitioner establishes “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and not changed personal circumstances, such as the ones relied on by Yang.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time limit for reopening only when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior proceeding.

Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-02(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, petitioner failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the material evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior proceeding.

Avila v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-02(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, petitioner failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the ninety-day deadline does not apply when the motion to reopen rests only on changed personal circumstances, without changed conditions in the country of removal.

Yi Lang Ye v. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-03(c)(3)(ii)

An alien must file a motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to this limitation when an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal demonstrates that his or her claim is based on changed circumstances in the country of removal, if supporting evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Rather, Ye’s evidence shows a change in personal circumstances that potentially alters the applicability of the family planning policy to her. In sum, we conclude that Ye did not sufficiently allege or establish changed country conditions in China to qualify for an exception to the ninety-day filing requirement.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening when the evidence establishes changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Angulo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(c)(3)(ii)

Mejia Angulo presented evidence in his motion indicating that the FARC guerillas have escalated their threats against him, having increased their efforts to discover his location and date of return to Colombia. This evidence is sufficient to establish changed circumstances in Colombia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when those conditions are material to the petitioners or their circumstances and support a prima facie CAT claim.

Diaz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-04(e)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioners’ motion was untimely filed and failed to meet an exception to the time limits on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ claim for protection under CAT failed to present changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners or their circumstances, and therefore, failed to meet their burden of presenting a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the motion is based on changed country conditions that could not previously have been presented.

Danfakha v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-26(c)(3)(ii)

It is beyond dispute that Danfakha’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding he failed to show changed circumstances in Senegal that would excuse the untimely filing of his motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from numerical and time limits when it relies on material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Lian v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-30(c)(3)(ii)

The numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen do not apply where the motion is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline for material, previously unavailable changes in country conditions, not changed personal circumstances.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-10-06(c)(3)(ii)

However, an individual “under a final removal order must file a successive asylum application in conjunction with a motion to reopen and in accordance with those procedural requirements.” Id. Therefore, Chen was required to comply with the ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen or establish an exception to that deadline as delineated in the Act and regulations. Id. at 152-53. The relevant provisions of the Act and regulations, in turn, require a showing of changed country conditions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

A motion to reopen may be supported by changed country conditions only when the evidence is material to the petitioners and their circumstances.

Davila v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners’ claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because petitioners have failed to meet their burden of establishing a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on material, previously unavailable changed-country-condition evidence, and the BIA must assess evidence bearing on the factual issues rather than simply adopt conclusions from an earlier decision.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-11-26(c)(3)(ii)

We note that in a situation like the present one, where the evidentiary record contains documents that were not at issue in an earlier decision, mere reference to that earlier decision is insufficient to warrant adopting its conclusions. Rather, the BIA must assess any evidence that bears on the questions of fact which it must decide.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material to the petitioners and their circumstances.

Salazar-Quintana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-11(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners’ claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) and for withholding of removal failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because petitioners have failed to meet their burden of establishing a prima facie CAT or withholding of removal claim to support reopening, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the evidence shows that country conditions have materially changed.

Hincapie-Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-12(c)(3)(ii)

The evidence that the petitioners submitted in support of their motion to reopen does not demonstrate that conditions in Colombia have changed for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen beyond the ordinary time limit when the petitioner presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Ming v. Attorney General · filed 2008-12-17(c)(3)(ii)

The time limit may also be suspended where the petitioner introduces evidence of changed country conditions that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits reopening when the applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions relevant to the applicant’s circumstances.

Santiago v. Holder · filed 2009-02-19(c)(3)(h)

Petitioner’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence shows a material change, and the court held that Chen’s 1999 indictment alone did not do so.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-02-05(c)(3)(ii)

This document alone does not indicate that country conditions related to the treatment of individuals who illegally depart China has materially changed since Chen’s 1997 hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-03-24(e)(3)(ii)

Although there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii), Lin did not assert before the BIA that conditions had changed in China or submit any such evidence in support of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening without the ordinary time and numerical limits when the alien presents sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Hai Fa Lin v. Attorney General · filed 2009-04-08(c)(3)(ii)

The primary document is from 1999, and the purported 2006 administrative opinions do not reflect any change in the policy since Lin’s application was last heard and denied in 2003. As such, these documents fail to demonstrate changed conditions in China sufficient to satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day limit when it is based on material, previously unavailable changes in country conditions.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-06-24(c)(3)(ii)

However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Such changes are regularly referred to as “changed country conditions” and distinguished from “changed personal circumstances.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the usual time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-18(c)(3)(ii)

However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order timely only when the applicant shows changed country conditions supporting newly available asylum eligibility.

Weng v. Holder · filed 2010-01-26(c)(2)

Because it is undisputed that Weng’s March 2008 motion to reopen was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s April 2004 decision, the BIA properly observed that her motion would be denied as untimely, unless she established that she was newly eligible for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a number-barred motion to reopen based on material changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal is ordered, not changed personal circumstances arising outside that country.

Averianova v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-01-28(c)(3)(ii)

The regulation unambiguously states that an applicant must show “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” id. (emphasis added), and we have previously held that motions to reopen based on § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) cannot be premised on changed personal circumstances arising from conditions outside the country of feared persecution, Zhong Qin Zheng, 523 F.3d at 895.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the ordinary time and number limits when it is based on changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Hajderlliu v. Holder · filed 2010-02-11(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... The BIA properly considered the record as a whole, reasonably finding that the evidence Petitioners presented was neither material nor previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to present evidence of changes in the country of removal that is material to the petitioner and the petitioner’s circumstances.

Aguilar-Huerta v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-02-22(c)(3)(ii)

Aguilar-Huerta’s claim for protection under CAT failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that CAT applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country).

The provision waives the motion-to-reopen time and number limits for material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Zhuo v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-02-03(c)(3)(h)

The time and number requirements are waived for motions that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, but not changes in an alien’s personal circumstances.

Li v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(3)(ii)

The argument is without merit, as changes in an alien’s personal circumstances, such as those alleged by Li, are not “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” as required under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on changed country conditions when the evidence concerns conditions particular to the movant and the circumstances supporting the claim.

Reyes v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-03-04(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners' claim for protection under CAT failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that were particular to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the 90-day filing deadline for a motion to reopen to be excused when the alien establishes changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-05-17(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day filing deadline may be excused if the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably concluded, however, that the evidence Zheng submitted, a notice purportedly sent to him by the Chinese government, “[did] not establish . . . that the government now is motivated to persecute [him] for a new reason.” See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008). Indeed, the notice did not reveal a change in country conditions, but merely supported the same claim that Zheng had asserted before the IJ.

The time limit for a motion to reopen does not apply when the asylum or withholding claim is based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal; a change in United States asylum law does not qualify as such a changed circumstance.

Orellana-Santos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-02-24(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, any alleged change in the asylum law of the United States does not constitute “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered” for purposes of a motion to reopen under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on changed country conditions only when those conditions are material to the petitioner and the circumstances of the case.

Felipe De La Cruz Galvan v. Mukasey · filed 2010-06-03(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioner’s claim for protection under CAT failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that CAT applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to his native country).

The changed-country-conditions exception allows a motion to reopen beyond the time limit only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been presented in the prior proceeding.

Kui Tong v. Holder · filed 2010-06-09(c)(3)(ii)

The exception to the time limit based on changed country conditions does not apply because Tong’s letter from his “Elder Brother” did not present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He, 501 F.3d at 1131.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the 90-day and one-motion limits applies only when the alien establishes materially changed conditions in the country of nationality, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-06-29(c)(3)(ii)

Although Zheng’s motion was indisputably untimely, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the birth of Zheng’s two U.S. citizen children, as well as her practice of Falun Gong in the United States, constituted a change in her personal circumstances rather than a change in country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence shows changed conditions that are material to the movant and the movant's circumstances.

Soria v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-07-01(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners’ renewed claim for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT, based on changed country conditions, failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and number limits only when changed country conditions are material and the evidence was previously unavailable, so a change in conditions alone is insufficient.

Khanal v. Holder · filed 2010-07-02(c)(3)(ii)

Further, we detect no error in the BIA’s determination that while conditions in Nepal had changed since Khanal’s hearing, the changes were not material to his claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Khanal does not dispute this materiality finding. Rather, he argues that the finding of changed country conditions alone required remand. The argument runs counter to the plain language of the INA, which requires a showing that any change is “material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an alien to file a motion to reopen without the usual time or numerical limitation upon establishing materially changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.

Li Hu He v. Holder · filed 2010-07-23(c)(3)(ii)

Nonetheless, there is no time or numerical limitation if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) (C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

For this motion-to-reopen exception, changed country conditions must be shown with evidence particular to the petitioners and their circumstances.

Angulo v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-30(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that were particular to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a movant seeking reopening based on changed country conditions to demonstrate changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Saleh v. Holder · filed 2010-08-02(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Saleh’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Lebanon to satisfy the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence could not have been presented at the prior proceeding.

Yang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-08-04(c)(3)(ii)

But only evidence that could not be presented at a previous proceeding justifies reopening, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Bao Hua Lin v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2006); Haile v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 493, 497 (7th Cir. 2005), and the only evidence here that is new does not compel that action.

The exception to the time limit for motions to reopen applies when the alien presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Zao v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-09-07(c)(3)(ii)

Nevertheless, the time limits are inapplicable if the alien can demonstrate changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. ... Here, however, Zao’s untimely motion to reopen was due to be denied because she could not show materially changed country conditions.

The time and numerical limits on motions to reopen do not apply to material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented; the court held that the petitioner failed to show such a change.

Abochoayra v. Holder · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2)

The time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen shall not apply to motions based on “changed circumstances in the country of nationality . . . to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing; [8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)] See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167-168 (2d Cir. 2007). However, we agree with the BIA that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate such a change had occurred in that country.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows reopening based on changed country conditions only when the conditions are material to the petitioners and their circumstances.

Ramirez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-10-22(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioners failed to establish changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioners and their circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an untimely or successive motion to reopen when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable or undiscoverable, and it can apply when changed personal circumstances are accompanied by changed country conditions.

Zheng v. Attorney General · filed 2011-04-19(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Although Zheng would have no claim for relief absent a change in his personal circumstances of having joined a church in the United States, we have recognized that an alien who has been ordered removed can file an untimely or successive asylum application based on changed personal conditions if he can also show changed country conditions in his motion to reopen. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2009).

Subsections (c)(2) and (3) require an alien seeking to overcome the time and numerical limits on a motion to reopen to show changed country conditions.

Yu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-25(c)(2), (3)

In order to overcome the time and numerical limitations on his motion to reopen, Yu was required to show changed country conditions in China. See § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits applies only when the changed conditions arise in the country of nationality; a change in the applicant’s personal circumstances does not qualify.

Xia v. Holder · filed 2011-09-01(c)(3)(ii)

However, as the BIA found, Xia's membership in the PFDC was a change in her personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. ... Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA's denial of Xia's motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Yuen Jin, 538 F.3d at 155. Because Xia did not establish an exception to the filing deadline, we do not reach her argument that she established her prima facie eligibility for asylum.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking to reopen asylum proceedings based on changed country conditions to show changed circumstances that materially affect eligibility for asylum.

Ramrup v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-10-13(c)(1)

We agree that Ramrup failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Guyana that materially affect her eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).