8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Subsection (a) grants the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its discretionary decision not to use that authority is not reviewable by the court.

De Arredondo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and a decision not to exercise that authority is not reviewable by the court.

Randhawa v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but its decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Olivares v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and courts lack jurisdiction to review its decision not to exercise that authority.

Izaguirre v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(a)

Further, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA unfettered discretion to decline sua sponte reopening or reconsideration, and a refusal to exercise that discretion is not subject to judicial review.

Bhoja v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-07-18(a)

As we have previously explained regarding the regulation at issue here, however, “[b]ecause the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision whether to invoke that authority is not reviewable.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-21(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the agency sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Martinez-Cornejo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-06(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

A decision by the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte under subsection (a) is entirely discretionary and beyond judicial review.

Pepushaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-19(a)

Finally, to the extent that Pepushaj requested the BIA exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen his proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that “a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review”).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte entirely discretionary, so courts lack jurisdiction to review it.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-08(a)

Additionally, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Lin’s case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte at any time, and its decision whether to do so is beyond judicial review.

Paul v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-04-11(a)

We also lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s determination that it would not exercise its discretion to reopen Paul’s removal proceedings sua sponte. See, e.g., Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that “a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review”).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte at any time, but a petitioner must first make a prima facie showing of an exceptional situation; even then, reopening remains within the BIA's discretion.

Wilks v. Attorney General · filed 2008-04-15(a)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA may sua sponte reopen a case at any time. A petitioner must show an exceptional situation to make a prima facie case for sua sponte reopening. Cruz v. Attorney General of U.S., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir.2006). However, the BIA has the discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if a prim,a facie case is made. Id.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations but does not require it, and the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Barry v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-17(a)

We previously have held that “[t]he decision whether to invoke sua sponte authority [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)] is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA” and therefore is not subject to judicial review. Harchenko v. I.N.S., 379 F.3d 405, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 C.F.R. § [100]3.2(a); Luis v. I.N.S., 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003); Ekimian v. I.N.S., 303 F.3d 1153, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002); Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999)). Section 1003.2(a) “allows the BIA to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it does not require the BIA to do so.” Harchenko, 379 F.3d at 411.

Section 1003.2(a) commits the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion to agency discretion, so a court lacks jurisdiction to review that decision.

Lenis v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-05(a)

For these reasons, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision in this case.

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to reopen, on its own motion, any case in which it has rendered a decision, but its decision whether to do so is discretionary and unreviewable.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-05(a)

The BIA may at any time reopen, on its own motion, any case in which it has rendered a decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, the BIA’s decision whether to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings *97pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is an entirely discretionary determination that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review. See Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006)(per curiam).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA complete discretion over whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, so that decision is not meaningfully reviewable and is outside the court's jurisdiction.

Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-21(a)

Because the BIA has complete discretion in deciding whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, see § 1003.2(a), there is no meaningful standard against which to review this decision, and this court lacks jurisdiction over it.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-03(a)

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the agency sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but courts lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to exercise that authority.

Olvera-Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-11(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision whether to sua sponte reopen proceedings under § 1003.2(a).

Kong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA regarding whether to sua sponte reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s sua sponte reopening decision entirely discretionary and places refusals to reopen on that basis beyond judicial review.

Zhao v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2008-11-07(a)

Finally, because the BIA’s decision to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary, any challenge to its refusal to do so in this case is beyond our review.

Section 1003.2(a) provides no guidelines governing the BIA’s sua sponte decision whether to reopen removal proceedings, making that discretionary decision unreviewable for lack of a meaningful standard.

Perdomo-Ulloa v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-10(a)

This court cannot undertake review of an agency’s discretionary determination where there is “no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). There are no guidelines directing the BIA’s decision whether to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny Perdomo-Ulloa’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(4) treats a motion for remand substantively the same as a motion to reopen.

Armendariz-Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-31(c)(4)

A motion for remand is substantively treated the same as a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4); In re L-V-K, 22 I. & N. Dec. 976, 978 (BIA 1999).

Section 1003.2(c) requires previously unavailable, material evidence for reopening, and a motion filed after a notice of appeal may be treated as a motion to remand for consideration by the BIA under subsection (c)(4).

Shiraz v. Holder · filed 2009-05-15(c), (c)(4)

As already noted, Shiraz failed to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... Nor has he asserted a basis for the IJ’s jurisdiction to rule on his motion after he filed his notice of appeal to the BIA. The motion may be deemed a motion to remand and be considered by the BIA in connection with the appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars a motion to remand for new evidence unless the evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Milat v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-19(c)(1)

“A motion to [remand for new evidence] shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Matter of Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 883 (BIA 1994). ... Here, the United Nations documents from 1967 and 1980 were available when Milat’s case was before the IJ and could have been presented then. Those documents could not serve as a basis for a remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2’s new-evidence standard for motions to reopen does not govern a motion to remand filed while an appeal is pending before the Board, because the two motions are meaningfully distinct.

Shojaeddini v. Jefferson B. Sessions III · filed 2018-01-11(c)(1), (a)

However, DHS did not file a motion to reopen the case; it filed a motion to remand while Petitioners’ appeal was pending before the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4) (“A motion to reopen a decision rendered by an Immigration Judge … that is filed while an appeal is pending before the Board, may be deemed a motion to remand for further proceedings before the Immigration Judge … .”). A motion to reopen implies that the case has been closed, or that the BIA has reached a final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (noting that a motion to reopen or reconsider can be made in “any case in which a decision has been made by the Board”). Because there is a meaningful distinction between the two motions, the BIA was correct in not treating DHS’ motion as a motion to reopen or holding it to the new evidence standard.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the BIA to deny a motion to remand, treated like a motion to reopen, when the movant fails to submit material, previously unavailable evidence likely to change the result.

Singh v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-06-04(c)(1)

The BIA may deny such motions if the movant fails to submit material, previously unavailable evidence that is likely to change the result in the case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Huang, 620 F.3d at 389-90.

Section 1003.2(c)(4) treats a motion to remand that seeks to introduce new evidence as a motion to reopen.

Joseph v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-11-22(c)(4)

When a motion to remand seeks to introduce new evidence, it is treated as a motion to reopen. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4).

A motion to remand that substantively seeks to reopen proceedings must satisfy the BIA’s requirements for a motion to reopen.

Flora Holmes v. Garland · filed 2022-06-17(c)(1)

Holmes’s use of § 1003.2(c)(1)’s language in her motion to remand and her I-589 application suggests that Holmes was actually asking the BIA to reopen the proceedings against her so that the IJ could consider her accompanying application for relief, in accordance with § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Having concluded that Holmes’s motion to remand in fact sought to reopen the removal proceedings, we note that “where a motion to remand is really . . . a motion to reopen . . . , it must comply with the substantive requirements for such motions.” Sharif v. Barr, 965 F.3d 612, 623 (8th Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (citation omitted)). Holmes does not argue that she has complied with such requirements, and the BIA found that she had not. Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA made no fundamental procedural error in denying her motion.

Section 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar is invalid because it cannot prevent a noncitizen from filing a qualifying motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).

CONTRERAS-BOCANEGRA v. Holder · filed 2012-01-30(d)

We hold that the subject regulation impermissibly interferes with Congress’ clear intent to afford each non-citizen a statutory right to pursue a motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).

Section 1003.2(d) bars a person who has departed from removal proceedings from filing a motion to reconsider and treats a motion filed before departure as withdrawn upon departure.

Moncaleano v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-08-13(d)

Although petitioners have 30 days after the mailing of the BIA decision to file a motion to reconsider, agency regulations provide that motions to reconsider cannot be filed by or on behalf of anyone' who is the subject of removal proceedings after they have departed from the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). If a person departs after filing a motion to reconsider, that motion is considered withdrawn. Id. Here, Gracia was removed 12 days after the BIA decision. Thus, had he filed a motion to reconsider before that time, it would have been withdrawn; after his removal, he was forbidden from filing it. In this Catch-22 context, a motion for reconsideration was not available as a remedy at all, much less “as of right.” Exhaustion, therefore, is not a barrier.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from entertaining a motion to reopen filed by an alien after departure and divests the BIA of jurisdiction over that motion.

Mendiola v. Holder · filed 2009-10-28(d)

Stare decisis thus dictates we conclude the BIA correctly determined 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar divests it of jurisdiction to review a motion to reopen filed by a removed alien, like Petitioner, even though relevant regulations allow an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from hearing motions to reopen or reconsider filed after an alien's departure, including after removal proceedings have ended, and overrides the BIA's sua sponte authority under § 1003.2(a).

Ovalles v. Holder · filed 2009-08-13(a), (d)

Therefore, because we find Contreras-Rodriguez distinguishable and are bound by our decision in Navarro-Miranda, we conclude that the BIA acted reasonably in determining that it lacked the sua sponte authority under section 1003.2(a) to reconsider or reopen Ovalles’s case due to the post-departure bar in section 1003.2(d). ... We conclude that the post-departure bar on motions to reconsider and to reopen applies and was intended to apply to aliens who depart the country following the termination of their removal proceedings. Therefore, the BIA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in applying section 1003.2(d) to Ovalles, despite the fact that the legal basis for his removal was later determined to be erroneous and his removal proceedings were concluded at the time he filed his motion.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from hearing a motion to reopen by an alien after the alien has departed, and the departure divests the BIA of jurisdiction even when the motion is timely under the statutory 90-day period.

CONTRERAS-BOCANEGRA v. Holder · filed 2010-12-23(d)

Ultimately, both Rosillo-Puga and Mendiola specifically upheld 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) in full recognition of IIRIRA, and once the departure bar rule applies, the substance of Mr. Contreras’s claim is irrelevant. ... We therefore remain bound by our prior conclusions that an alien’s removal from the United States divests the BIA of jurisdiction to hear a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d)'s automatic-withdrawal rule does not apply when the BIA has ruled on a motion to reopen or reconsider before the alien's removal.

Pizano-Zeferino v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-08(d)

The agency regulations provide that “[a]ny departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of . . . removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). We requested supplemental briefing on whether, if the motion for reopening and/or reconsideration was withdrawn from the BIA’s consideration by operation of law under § 1003.2(d) upon Mr. Pizano-Zeferino’s removal, such withdrawal would make it impossible for us to grant him the relief he seeks--a remand for further consideration of the motion by the BIA--thus effectively mooting his petition for review. The Attorney General responded with his view that, because the BIA ruled on the motion prior to Mr. Pizano-Zeferino’s removal, the withdrawal provision of § 1003.2(d) does not apply here. Thus, the petition for review would not be moot. We defer to the Attorney General’s interpretation of § 1003.2(d). See Wei v. Mukasey, 545 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar, which prevents the BIA from entertaining a motion to reopen by a person who has departed the United States, impermissibly conflicts with the statutory right to file one motion to reopen.

Le Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-05-23(d)

We are asked to decide whether the “departure bar” regulation—stating that the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) may not entertain a motion to reopen filed by or on behalf of a person who has departed the United States—impermissibly conflicts with the Immigration and Nationality Act’s provision permitting an alien to file one motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). We join the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in finding that it does.

Section 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar does not prevent a departed petitioner from filing a motion to reopen with the IJ and appealing to the BIA.

Ashish v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-01-07(d)

When Petitioners filed the No. 09-4650 petition challenging the IJ’s 2009 removal order, it was unclear if they had exhausted their administrative remedies (because the post-departure ban of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) prevented them from seeking further administrative review) and thus whether we had jurisdiction to hear the case. Pursuant to our recent holding in Prestol Espinal v. Attorney General, 653 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2011), the post-departure ban did not prevent Petitioners from filing a motion to reopen with the IJ and appealing to the BIA.

Section 1003.2(d) does not jurisdictionally bar the BIA from considering whether to reopen prior removal proceedings after an alien was involuntarily removed.

Medina v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-17(d)

That interpretation is inconsistent with this court’s precedent, which provides that the BIA is not jurisdictionally barred from determining whether to reopen prior proceedings if the alien was involuntarily removed from the United States.

The post-departure bar in § 1003.2(d) cannot abrogate a noncitizen's statutory right to file a motion to reopen.

Santana v. Holder · filed 2013-09-27(d)

Accordingly, Perez Santana's appeal may be resolved by our holding that the post-departure bar cannot be used to abrogate a noncitizen's statutory right to file a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar on motions to reopen or reconsider before the BIA is valid under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) and (7)(A).

Rosillo-Puga v. Holder · filed 2009-09-15(d)

We agree with the dissent’s position and conclude that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (like 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d)) is a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s Congressionally-delegated rulemaking authority, and does not contravene 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) or (7)(A).

Section 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar applies to motions to reopen filed by aliens who left the United States after their removal proceedings ended.

Al-Mousa v. Holder · filed 2010-03-18(d)

We concluded that the post-departure bar on motions to reconsider and reopen applied and was intended to apply to aliens who departed the country following the termination of their removal proceedings. Id. Accordingly, Al-Mousa’s arguments are without merit in light of our opinion in Ovalles, and his petition for review is DENIED.

Section 1003.2(d) does not strip the BIA of jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen because the alien has departed the United States.

Lisboa v. Holder · filed 2011-08-29(d)

It does mean, however, that the BIA cannot disclaim jurisdiction on the ground that the alien is outside the United States, which is the basis for the BIA’s decision here.

Section 1003.2(d)’s departure bar does not excuse an eight-year delay in filing a motion to reopen after a ruling that the restriction does not apply.

Carlos-Rivera v. Garland · filed 2022-06-27(d)

Nor did the BIA err in rejecting Carlos-Rivera’s argument that he could not have filed his motion to reopen earlier because of the “departure bar” in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). Rather, the BIA correctly noted that Carlos-Rivera did not file his motion until eight years after our 2011 ruling that no such restriction applies.

Section 1003.2(d) bars a motion to reopen filed after the person has been removed from the United States.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2005-11-15(d)

The record shows that following entry of a final order of removal, Liu was returned to China in May 2000. Accordingly, the Board did not err in concluding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) barred the subsequent motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the Board from reopening proceedings after an alien’s departure from the United States, including on its own motion.

ARMENDAREZ · filed 2008-07-01(d)

Because the completion of proceedings is a condition precedent to the filing of a motion to reopen with the Board, we cannot reasonably interpret 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as applying only to motions filed by aliens in ongoing proceedings.

The post-departure bar may be applied to a motion to reopen that exceeds the statutory limit on the number of motions.

Merino-Fernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-22(d)

However, there was no such error in the application of the bar in Merino-Fernandez’s case because he had no right under the statute to file a number-barred motion to reopen in the first place.

Section 1003.2(d)’s departure bar does not prevent a person from filing a motion to reopen after its invalidation.

Julce v. Nielsen · filed 2018-02-27(d)

He contends that he cannot file a motion to reopen his removal proceedings because he was removed in 2007 and two regulations bar him from filing such a motion. (Id. at 5) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)). That argument is without merit. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner’s 2007 removal was improper (and quickly remedied), the First Circuit invalidated the two regulations in question in Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2013). Therefore, since 2013, no statute or regulation prevented petitioner from filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d)’s post-departure bar may be applied to an untimely motion to reopen filed after removal, but it does not restrict the Board’s authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Cruz v. Barr · filed 2020-12-04(d)

But Cruz cannot benefit from our holding in Contreras-Bocanegra, because his motion to reopen was untimely. He therefore fails to show the BIA abused its discretion in applying the post-departure bar to his untimely motion to reopen. ... The Board also applied the departure bar to Cruz’s request for sua sponte reopening. This was error.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on an application for relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documentation.

Fonseca v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Fonseca’s motion to reopen because he did not submit an Application to Adjust Status (Form I — 485). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring that a motion to reopen based on an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application and supporting docu*635mentation); see also Malhi, 336 F.3d at 994 (upholding denial of motion to reopen to adjust status where movant failed to make out a prima facie case of a bona fide marriage).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion based on an application for relief to be accompanied by the appropriate application and supporting documentation.

Khan v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s motion to remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring a motion based on an application for relief to be accompanied by the appropriate application and supporting documentation); see also Malhi, 336 F.3d at 994 (upholding denial of motion to remand to adjust status where movant failed to make out a prima facie case of eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documentation, and requires the offered evidence to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Grant v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-09-29(c)(1)

When filing a motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief, an alien is required to attach “the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Grant’s motion to reopen his proceedings because Grant did not establish a prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. He neither attached his application for adjustment of status nor presented evidence that was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Rodriguez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-29(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion based on petitioners’ unsupported contention that Ms. Prado will be separated from her son. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (motion to reopen shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the application for the requested relief and supporting documentation.

Patel v. Holder · filed 2010-11-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be accompanied by the application for the requested relief with supporting documentation.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted.

Mu Fou Zhen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-12(c)(1)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reconsider, on the other hand, “is a request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.” In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 n. 2 (BIA 1991). Because Zhen’s motion did not assert any newly discovered facts or new factual developments, the BIA properly treated the change of law argument as a motion to reconsider. Motions to reconsider include claims based on changes in law. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include an affidavit or other evidentiary material.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen and reconsider because Singh failed to include an affidavit or other evidentiary material, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), or offer evidence of changed country conditions, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i), and failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Kaur v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-08-30(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Kaur’s motion failed to meet these requirements because it was not supported by any documentary evidence.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proven at the reopened hearing and to support those facts with affidavits or other documentary evidence.

Penaloza v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-24(c)(1)

Because Penaloza’s second motion to reopen did not include new facts to be proven at the reopened hearing and was not supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing the motion as one to reconsider and denying the motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen for the purpose of submitting an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Tanuja-Sahai v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-30(c)(1)

The regulations provide that an alien may seek to have a case reopened based on changed circumstances if the motion is accompanied by an application for relief and all supporting documentation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Waggoner’s motion was in fact a motion to reopen. § 1003.2(c)(1). The regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” Id. Waggoner did not submit such an application. In the absence of this application, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Waggoner leave to remand.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen submitted to apply for relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Kassim v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-28(c)

Kassim stated in his motion to remand that he was eligible to adjust his status with a waiver of inadmissibility, but failed to submit an application for the waiver, or provide evidence that his qualifying relative would suffer “extreme hardship” if he were denied admission. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (holding that BIA may deny an applicant’s motion to reopen if movant is not prima facie eligible for relief sought). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kassim’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking asylum relief to be accompanied by the appropriate asylum application.

Fen Guang Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(c)(1)

However, because a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief,” the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that he was required to submit an asylum application with his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to satisfy the regulation's standards, and inadequate or unexplained supporting documentation may be rejected.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-25(c)

In light of the fact that Liu failed to submit the original pregnancy verification, the document provided minimal information, and the “EDC” date, which was unexplained, had already passed by the time Liu filed her motion, the BIA properly found that this evidence did not meet the standards for reopening under the federal regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking new relief to include the proper application and supporting documentation, with material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-13(c)(1)

A petitioner may also move to reopen for the purpose of submitting a new application for relief, provided such motion is accompanied by the proper application for relief and all supporting documentation, and the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Almilaji v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-29(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen or remand to be supported by evidence establishing the relevant new facts, including a marriage and its bona fides.

Di Wu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-30(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wu’s motion to remand because she failed to submit evidence of her marriage and its bona fides.

Section 1003.2(c) requires evidence submitted with a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable at the former hearing.

Lyabakh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-01-18(c)

Finally, the agency was within its discretion in denying Lyabakh’s motion to remand because the BIA considered the evidence submitted and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence was insufficient to warrant remand. See Romero-Ruiz, 538 F.3d at 1063-64; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (evidence submitted with a motion to reopen must be material and previously unavailable at the former hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status to include the adjustment application; failure to do so procedurally defaults the motion.

Alatorre v. Holder · filed 2010-06-14(c)(1)

We find no error. Pulido-Alatorre failed to comply with the procedural requirements for filing a motion to reopen; the BIA determined that he failed to append an application for adjustment of status to his motion to reopen as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). His motion is procedurally defaulted.

A motion to reopen based on changed country conditions must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-12-02(c)(1)

Nevertheless, a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions must “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (1). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s untimely motion to reopen. As the BIA found, the attorney affirmation Singh submitted as the lone piece of evidence in support of his motion was inadequate because it was based solely upon “information and belief” and failed to reference any affidavits, reports, or other evidence to support the assertions therein.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Aji v. Holder · filed 2011-09-12(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aji’s motion to reopen his removal proceedings in order to permit him to apply for adjustment of status under Section 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), on the basis of an immigrant visa petition filed by his first wife on April 30, 2001. Aji’s submission of only a copy of the filing receipt for that immigrant visa petition (the so-called “grandfathering petition” for purposes of Section 245(i) eligibility) gave no indication of whether the petition was approvable when filed. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a person seeking reopening or remand to submit the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2011-12-01(c)(1)

He did not, however, file a motion to reopen or remand. He did not submit “the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the “formal requirements of a motion to remand and a motion to reopen are the same” and such motions must be “accompanied by the proper application for relief and all supporting documentation”). Given these circumstances, we decline Liu’s request for a remand.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen for submitting an application for relief to include all supporting documentation when filed.

Wane v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-04-17(c)

Motions to reopen for the purpose of submitting applications for relief must be “accompanied by . . . all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). When Wane filed his motion with almost no documentation, the BIA was free to act on the record as submitted.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen proceedings for submitting an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Vushaj-Cekoj v. Holder · filed 2013-04-01(c)(1)

The BIA may also properly deny reopening where the movant fails to comply with the regulatory requirements governing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Ramirez-Melgar v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-05-12(c)

Ramirez, however, bore the burden of showing in her moving papers that reopening was warranted. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(7)(B) (“The motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Lan v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-22(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall ... be supported by affidavits or other evidentia-ry material.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Sanic-Lopez v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-12-14(c)(1)

Sanic-Lopez is incorrect. A motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present evidence sufficient to warrant reopening, and the BIA may assess that sufficiency after accepting the motion's factual allegations as true.

Maldonado-Mendoza v. Barr · filed 2019-07-17(c)(1)

The BIA did not engage in impermissible factfinding, where the BIA properly accepted the facts in Maldonado-Mendoza’s affidavit regarding her asylum claim as true and determined that her evidence was insufficient to warrant reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 987.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved and support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Scarlett v. Barr · filed 2020-04-28(c)(1)

The BIA reasonably rejected this argument, noting the total lack of corroboration for the various domestic circumstances urged by Scarlett as extraordinary. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); Ajdin v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 437 F.3d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Supreme Court’s recognition that movant seeking to reopen immigration proceedings “bears a heavy burden” akin to that of a criminal defendant moving for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); see generally Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that “corroborating evidence may be required in certain circumstances” including where applicant “fails to put forth corroboration that should be readily available”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Ocampo v. Barr · filed 2020-07-10(c)(1)

Petitioners did not submit the required application for relief with their motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”). Petitioners do not contest that this was a valid reason to deny reopening here.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Illescas v. Garland · filed 2021-09-03(c)(1)

Motions to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... In light of the fact that the regulations governing reopening require the submission of the application and all supporting documentation, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand.

A motion to reopen filed to seek relief from removal must include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2023-05-25(c)(1)

Federal regulations require that a motion to reopen for the purpose of applying for relief from removal “be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation”. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Gonzalez-Martinez v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-14(c)(1)

The BIA’s regulations likewise specifically state that any motion to reopen “for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Cortes-Mendoza v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2026-02-10(c)(1)

She acknowledges, however, that the BIA determined that her motion was procedurally defective because she failed to submit the necessary application for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”). ... The BIA does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion to reopen for failure to comply with procedural requirements. ... We see no basis for creating the exception she seeks and conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in upholding the denial of her procedurally defective motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Melkonyan v. Bondi · filed 2025-05-28(c)(1)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”

Section 1003.2(c) does not require supporting evidence to be submitted with a motion to reopen; evidence filed within the 90-day period may be considered.

Y Teran v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-12(c)

The BIA abused its discretion in upholding the IJ’s order denying Mier Y Teran’s motion to reopen for lack of supporting evidence, because the motion identified the specific grounds for setting aside the in absentia removal order and stated that Mier Y Teran would file additional evidence, and the following week, Mier Y Teran filed that supporting evidence, well within the 90 day deadline for filing a motion to reopen. See Yeghiazaryan, 439 F.3d at 998-99 (holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) does not mandate concurrent submission oí a petitioner’s motion, briefs and supporting evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material; the BIA abuses its discretion when it treats an unsupported motion for reconsideration as a motion to reopen.

Sadighi v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-09(c)(1)

The BIA noted that Sadighi’s four-paragraph motion was not supported by “affidavits or other evidentiary material,” as required for a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Thus, the BIA abused its discretion because it misapplied its own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires supporting evidence to be provided with a motion to reopen; merely referring to it is insufficient.

Dhillon v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-07(c)(1)

The Board’s regulations require motions to reopen to be supported by “affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The evidence must be provided with the motion and not merely alluded to by the movant.

A motion to reopen before the Board must include the evidence offered in support.

Huang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-08-27(c)(1)

Furthermore, the Board addressed in its written decision the issues relevant to the Shou Yung Guo documents to the extent required, given that Huang did not comply with the regulation requiring him to submit the actual evidence with his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d) treats an alien's departure during the pendency of a motion to reopen as a withdrawal of the motion and thereby deprives the BIA of jurisdiction.

Estalita v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-06-11(d)

Accordingly, the BIA properly determined that Ms. Estalita’s departure from the United States during the pendency of her motion to reopen constituted a withdrawal of her motion and deprived it of jurisdiction.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from considering a motion to reopen filed after the person's departure only while removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings are pending.

Chaiban v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-05(d)

Though Chaiban’s motions to reopen were filed four years after entry of his final order of removal, both the IJ and the BIA concluded that 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1) and 1003.2(d), respectively, prevented them from asserting jurisdiction over Chaiban’s motions to reopen. After their rulings, however, we held that those regulations only prevent review while removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings are pending. Lin, 473 F.3d at 982; Reynoso-Cisneros, 491 F.3d at 1002. Neither the IJ nor the BIA ruled on the timeliness of Chaiban’s motions.

Section 1003.2(d) removes the BIA's jurisdiction to reopen removal proceedings once the alien has been deported.

Canchola-Velez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-23(d)

In Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672, 675-76 (5th Cir. 2003), we upheld as reasonable the BIA’s interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (formerly found in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d)) as removing its jurisdiction to reopen the removal proceedings of a deported alien.

Section 1003.2(d) does not bar a motion to reopen filed after departure once removal proceedings are completed, and the usual time and numerical limits do not apply when the motion is based on inadequate notice.

Kureghyan v. Holder · filed 2009-07-02(d), (c)(2), (c)(3)(i)

In this case, therefore, section 1003.2(d) did not preclude the BIA from considering a subsequent motion to reopen by Kure-ghyan brought after his removal proceedings were completed. ... But the time and numerical restrictions that generally apply to motions to reopen do not apply to those brought on the basis of inadequate notice.

Section 1003.2(d) does not cause a motion to reopen or reconsider to be withdrawn when the petitioner is involuntarily removed while the motion is pending.

Coyt v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(d)

Our conclusion that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) cannot apply to cause the withdrawal of an administrative petition filed by a petitioner who has been involuntarily removed from the United States is consistent with the approach taken by the only other circuit to address the question of involuntary removal specifically.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from considering post-departure motions to reconsider or reopen even when the alien departs after removal proceedings have ended.

Ovalles v. Holder · filed 2009-07-27(d)

We conclude that the post-departure bar on motions to reconsider and to reopen applies and was intended to apply to aliens who depart the country following the termination of their removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(d) treats a departure from the United States after filing a motion to reopen or reconsider as withdrawal of that motion, but the Fourth Circuit held the regulation invalid.

Sadhvani v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-12(d)

We recently found this regulation to be invalid in William v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2007 WL 2494763 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2007).

A departure from the United States after filing a motion to reopen constitutes withdrawal of that motion.

Grewal v. Attorney General · filed 2007-10-18(d)

With reference to his first argument, Grewal, unfortunately for him, left the United States in 1998, effectively withdrawing his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d) does not preclude BIA jurisdiction over motions to reopen filed by aliens after their deportation.

De Rubio v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-05(d)

On the merits, the BIA abused its discretion in granting DHS’s motion to reconsider on the ground that Esparza de Rubio *715had been deported. See Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1001, 1002 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) does not preclude BIA jurisdiction over motions to reopen filed by-aliens after their deportation).

Section 1003.2(d) bars an alien who has departed the United States from making a motion to reopen, which deprives the BIA of jurisdiction to exercise sua sponte reopening authority.

Bhela v. Holder · filed 2011-02-07(d)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen “shall not be made by . . . [an alien] subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). The BIA has interpreted this provision as depriving it of jurisdiction to exercise its sua sponte reopening authority after an alien has departed the United States, and we have deferred to that interpretation. See Xue Yong Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 660-61 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008).

Subsection (d) bars a motion to reopen by a person who departs while still subject to exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, but it does not apply once the original proceedings have ended.

Gonzalez-Rodriguez v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-03-04(d)

First, the BIA applied what is known as the “departure bar,” which states that “[a] motion to reopen . . . shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). But “[t]he regulation is phrased in the present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person who departs the United States while he or she ‘is the subject of removal . . . proceedings.’ Because petitioner’s original removal proceedings were completed when he was removed . . . , he did not remain the subject of removal proceedings after that time.” Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (emphasis and first ellipses in original)).

Section 1003.2(d) treats deportation after a motion to reopen is filed as withdrawal of that motion.

Ahmad v. Gonzales · filed 2006-11-07(d)

We need not reach this question, however, because far less ambiguous regulatory language states that Ahmad’s motion to reopen should have been deemed withdrawn. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (“Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.” (emphasis added)).

A departure while a motion to reopen is pending withdraws the motion; a timely motion tolls the voluntary departure period while the Board considers it.

Kanivets v. Gonzales · filed 2005-09-07(d)

On the other hand, if the alien leaves the country within the period allowed for voluntary departure, he forfeits his motion to reopen. ... That is a different situation from that presented here where we hold that tolling applies during the period of time that the BIA deliberates on a timely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a BIA decision and requires it to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider a BIA decision, and that the motion must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider because it was filed on February 29, 2008, more than 30 days after the BIA’s July 2, 2007 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA's final removal order.

Siahaan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-07(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Siahaan’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and because Siahaan does not contend that he is entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that deadline for motion to reconsider may be equitably tolled under certain circumstances).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Alves v. Garland · filed 2024-06-05(b)(2)

To the extent the BIA construed Alves’ latest motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration, Alves had 30 days to file it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (“The motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision[.]” (emphasis added)). ... Although Alves dated his motion November 15, 2021, the BIA did not receive his motion until November 18, 2021, which was 31 days after the BIA’s October 18, 2021 decision denying Alves’ prior motion to reopen. ... As the BIA correctly found, any arguments for reconsideration that Alves included in his latest motion to reopen were untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision.

Contreras v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed 45 days after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (requiring that motions for reconsideration be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration of a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days of the final decision.

Gutierrez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Arreola Gutierrez’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than ten months after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (requiring that motions for reconsideration be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be timely filed and permits the Board to deny an untimely motion.

Pierre v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-17(b)(2)

Based on our review of the record, we find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (2005).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed no later than 30 days after the final administrative decision.

Ortega v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-10(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed no later than 30 days after the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within thirty days.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-04-11(b)

To the degree that Singh’s motion was a motion to reconsider, the BIA properly found that it was filed out of time under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)—i.e., the motion, which challenged the BIA’s January 6, 2003 decision was filed on March 24, 2003, well beyond the regulatory, thirty-day filing deadline.

Subsection (b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the decision being challenged, while subsection (b)(1) requires the motion to identify errors of fact or law.

Lian v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2006-04-25(b)(2), (b)(1)

Motions to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision the movant is seeking to challenge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The motion to reconsider was filed in December 2003, and thus, was not timely with respect to the denial of her merits appeal in June 2002. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Lian’s motion to reconsider was timely only with respect to the denial of her motion to reopen. Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reconsider for failing to raise any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the BIA mails its previous decision.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-04-25(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s previous decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within thirty days of the BIA’s prior order.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-07-26(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed within thirty days of the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, the petitioners’ motion was filed in December 2004, three months after the BIA’s prior order in September 2004. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, the BIA committed no legal error in considering whether their motion might be treated as both a motion to reopen and to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board's decision is mailed.

Gutierrez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider as untimely because petitioner filed the motion nearly eighteen months after the BIA’s underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (stating that a motion to reconsider must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board’s decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Bejarano v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-08-16(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider a decision of the BIA must be filed with the BIA within 30 days of the mailing of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Padilla filed his motion 34 days after the BIA issued its decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. Accordingly, to the extent Padilla’s motion is a motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Garcia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De Anda Garcia’s motion to reconsider as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision”) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2 treats a motion based on overlooked legal arguments as a motion to reconsider, while a motion based on new evidence or changed circumstances is generally a motion to reopen, and requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days.

Urbina-Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(b)(1), (c)(1), (b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing the motion as a motion to reconsider where Urbina-Rodriguez alleged that the BIA overlooked her briefs in dismissing her appeal but did not introduce any new evidence or argue a change in factual circumstances. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that a motion to reconsider is a request that the BIA “reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of a case which was overlooked, while [a] motion to reopen is usually based upon new evidence or a change in factual circumstances.”) (internal quotations omitted); compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s March 14, 2005 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider before the BIA to be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision.

Mendez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (stating that motions to reconsider shall be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision). Petitioners’ motion was filed over a year after the BIA’s order dismissing petitioners’ appeal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the order.

Da Silva v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-04-24(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days of the Board of Immigration Appeals' final decision.

Teran v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pinedo Teran’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than two months after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (requiring that motions for reconsideration be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed, absent specified exceptional circumstances.

Calderon v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(b)(2)

The regulations provide that, absent certain exceptional circumstances that do not apply here, a motion to reconsider a decision “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.... ” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that it could not excuse petitioner’s untimeliness and in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reconsider. See id.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Palacios v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “a motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider, filed more than six months after the BIA’s March 2, 2006 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires motions to reconsider to be filed within 30 days, and the court recognized no exception to that deadline.

Ariwodo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-28(b)(2)

There is no exception to the 30-day time limit for filing motions to reconsider. See § 1003.2(b)(2). Ariwodo’s motion to reconsider was filed on September 17, 2004 -- more than 30 days after it was due. His claim that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider is therefore also without merit.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days of the challenged decision.

Arellano v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider a decision of the BIA must be filed within 30 days of the challenged decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider filed June 4, 2007, more than 30 days after the BIA’s March 30, 2007 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Morales v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file a motion to reconsider any given decision within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion, filed 58 days after the BIA’s decision, as late.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Rio-Meza v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision” and that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) & (c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely where it was filed more than three years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Moran v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-22(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider as barred by numerical limitations with respect to petitioner Francisco Alberto Gonzalez Moran because the motion for reconsideration was his second such motion. Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying the motion with respect to petitioner Margarita Gonzalez because it was filed more than 16 months after the BIA’s February 8, 2006 decision affirming the denial of her application for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Vasquez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-18(b)(2)

The applicable regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision____” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Ashraf v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion for reconsideration “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.... ” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration as untimely because petitioner filed the motion for reconsideration of the BIA’s March 3, 2005 decision on November 30, 2007. See id.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within the applicable deadline, and a motion filed one day late is untimely.

Basilio v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-07-26(b)(2)

By order entered on October 2, 2009, the BIA denied the motion for reconsideration as untimely because it was filed one day too late under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in correctly concluding that the motion was filed one day too late.

A motion to reconsider must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Segura-Barrientos v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(b)(2)

The applicable regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision____” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, the motion was filed 58 days after the mailing of the decision. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration as time barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied in part.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days of that decision.

Avila v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of BIA’s decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA decision is mailed, and the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority under § 1003.2(a) is not judicially reviewable.

Velazquez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-05(b)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pineda Velazquez’s motion to reconsider as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA denied Pineda Velazquez’s motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Soperanez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion, filed almost a year after the BIA’s February 28, 2007 order affirming the denial of her application for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits motions to reconsider and supports denying one that is barred under the regulation.

Serrato v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(2)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion as numerically-barred.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the final removal order is entered.

Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(b)(2)

A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the 30-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions apply to this time limit, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision.

Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-21(b)(2)

Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed well beyond the 30-day filing deadline for motions to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Subsection (b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days after the final administrative order.

Aguirre v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-21(b)(2)

The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s May 4, 2005 decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reconsider within 30 days of the underlying BIA decision.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-03-03(b)(2)

An alien seeking reconsideration must file a motion to reconsider within 30 days of the underlying BIA decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a person to one motion to reconsider and requires that it be filed within 30 days after the final order of removal.

Sandoval-Crespo v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(b)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider. A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal, and a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the entry of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). Because petitioner’s motions were petitioner’s third such motions, and because the motions were filed beyond the deadlines, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motions as untimely and numerically barred.

A motion to reopen or reconsider must be filed within 90 days of the date the final administrative decision is rendered.

Li v. Holder · filed 2009-05-26(b)

A motion to reopen or reconsider must be filed within 90 days of the date the final administrative decision is rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), (c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within thirty days after the BIA decision is mailed, subject to equitable tolling when the alien shows due diligence.

Bosquet v. Holder · filed 2009-09-18(b)(2)

Motions to reconsider must be filed •within thirty days of the date on which the BIA decision is mailed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). However, filing periods may be tolled based on equitable considerations if the alien shows due diligence during the period sought to be tolled.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the challenged BIA decision is mailed, and the filing deadline has no exception.

Yin Ting Lian v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA decision being challenged. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). There is no exception to the filing deadline for such motions. Matter of J-J-, 21 I.&N. Dec. 976, 978 (B.I.A. 1997).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the BIA's decision, and § 1003.2(b)(1) requires the motion to specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Ali v. Holder · filed 2010-01-27(b)(2), (b)(1)

There are no exceptions from the rule that a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). We identify no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of petitioners’ untimely motion to reconsider, or in its conclusion that, even if their motion had been timely filed, petitioners failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the Board’s decision.

Chmielewski v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-03-24(b)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the date of the Board’s decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the final administrative decision.

Martinez v. Holder · filed 2010-06-22(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The final motion to reconsider was filed over six months after the decision for which reconsideration was sought. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-08-30(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than a year after the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the decision).

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law, include pertinent authority, and be filed with the Board within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Sepang v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-06-16(b)(1), (b)(2)

A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). It “contests the correctness of the original decision based on the previous factual record….” See In re: O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2006). In addition, a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See id. at 1003.2(b)(2). The Board properly held that Sepang‟s motion for reconsideration was untimely, because it was not filed within 30 days of the Board‟s August 22, 2005 decision, see id. The Board thus did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The Board also properly held that Sepang did not demonstrate any factual or legal errors in its prior decision to warrant reconsideration, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) imposes a 30-day deadline for filing a motion to reconsider after the BIA's decision.

Ferry Liando v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-25(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely because petitioners filed it more than 30 days after the BIA’s decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the challenged decision and to specify an error of law or fact.

Zheng v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-21(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the challenged decision and must specify an error of law or fact in that decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because Zheng’s 2014 motion to reconsider was filed more than seven years after the 2006 decision she asked the BIA to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reconsider a given BIA decision, but requires filing within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Yusupov v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-08-10(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yusupov’s motion. First to the extent the motion could be construed as a motion to reconsider the Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) or BIA’s original decision (1) the motion was untimely; and (2) Yusupov did not sufficiently show that his asserted eligibility for CAT relief was based on facts and circumstances different than those that formed the basis of his original claim, which the IJ found was not credible. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (providing an alien may file one motion to reconsider any given BIA decision, and it must be filed within 30 days of the mailing of the decision); Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating a motion to reconsider that “merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind” (quotation omitted)).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Martinez-Avila v. Barr · filed 2019-04-12(b)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), “[a] motion to reconsider a decision must be filed . . . within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” ... The Board was not required to entertain a motion that Martinez-Avila filed late.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision, while § 1003.2(b)(2) limits such motions to one, filed within 30 days.

Rivera v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-03-05(b)(1), (b)(2)

The BIA determined that the motion to reconsider “d[id] not demonstrate that [Sacoto-Rivera] qualifies for any exception to the time and number filing requirements imposed on motions to reconsider.” JA 6; see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision. . . . A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision.”). ... Sacoto-Rivera has failed to demonstrate that the BIA’s timeliness determination is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” See Borges, 402 F.3d at 404. ... The BIA determined Sacoto-Rivera’s motion reiterated arguments that the BIA had rejected in its denial of reopening and did not establish errors of fact or law warranting reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.”). Sacoto-Rivera offers no basis to disturb this aspect of the BIA’s decision. Accordingly, the denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the final administrative order of removal.

Barrios Roblero v. Garland · filed 2023-04-17(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider “must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Barrios Roblero’s April 2021 motion for reconsideration was untimely filed almost three years after the BIA’s May 2018 decision affirming his removal order.