8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances.

Akopian v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed nearly two years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in declining to equitably toll the 90-day time limit where the BIA determined that petitioner failed to act with due diligence in pursuing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 889, 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts, and the new evidence must be material and previously unavailable.

Zavala v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(1)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen shall present new facts and shall not be granted unless the new evidence is material and could not have been presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires filing no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Clavijo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed more than three years after petitioner was ordered removed in absentia. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and previously unavailable, but it does not require reopening under any particular condition and leaves the Board discretion to decide when to reopen.

Astudillo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-12-21(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” In explaining 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), we have stated that: [t]he provision is framed negatively, by directing the Board not to reopen unless certain showings are made. It does not affirmatively require the Board to reopen the proceedings under any particular condition. Thus, the regulations may be construed to provide the Board with discretion in determining under what circumstances proceedings should be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day limit on motions to reopen, which may be equitably tolled when the movant diligently pursues an ineffective-assistance claim.

Punjwani v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-12(c)(2)

Punjwani contends that the BIA abused its discretion in denying as untimely his motion to reopen, Abu Hasirah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 478 F.3d 474, 476-77 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam), because it erred in refusing to equitably toll the ninety-day limitation period for filing such a motion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA’s finding that Punjwani should have discovered the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel “at least by 2003” was an abuse of discretion because the BIA’s explanation is not supported by the record. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005); see also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2006) (explaining that equitable tolling requires an alien to demonstrate due diligence in pursuing the claim that he seeks to toll from the point when ineffective assistance of counsel should have been, or was in fact, discovered).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, while § 1003.2(b)(2) bars a motion to reconsider filed more than 30 days after the order and a second motion to reconsider.

Soto-Galaviz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2), (b)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of removal was entered on June 3, 2004. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on July 19, 2006, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider as untimely and numerically barred. Petitioner’s July 19, 2006 motion to reconsider was barred by regulation in that it was filed over thirty days after the June 3, 2004 order, and was petitioner’s second motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (providing limitations on motions to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely or additional motion to reopen only when changed-country-circumstances evidence was unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-12-13(c)(3)(ii)

The “changed circumstances” exception only applies where evidence of the change was unavailable for the previous proceeding and could not have been discovered or presented at that hearing. ... Given that the regulation requires evidence that circumstances have changed, not merely that persecution existed in the past, the BIA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it determined that the evidence offered by Chen did not implicate § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Espinoza v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed almost two years after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Monroy-Gutierrez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-04(b)(1)

We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order affirming the IJ’s decision to deny cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Quintero v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-08(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Calderon Quintero’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the immigration judge’s order denying cancellation of removal for failure to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes numerical limits on motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to those limits.

Resendiz-Dominguez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2), (c)(3)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because the motion is barred by the numerical limitations governing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004). Furthermore, petitioner’s motion to reopen has not alleged that her motion is subject to any of the exceptions to the numerical limitations set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date *395on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the BIA issued its original decision in April 1995, and Zheng did not submit her first motion to reopen until July 29, 2005, nearly nine years after the filing deadline. Zheng’s second motion to reopen, submitted June 27, 2006, was both untimely and number-barred. See id. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. ... Zheng’s contention that the BIA should have granted her an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen because of changed conditions in her country of origin is without merit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). Zheng only alleges changes in her personal circumstances: her marriage to a United States citizen, her pending adjustment of status application, and her children’s change in immigration status to lawful permanent residence. These changes do not constitute “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), that would entitle Zheng to an exception to the regulatory filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts asylum or withholding motions based on changed country conditions; neither provision saved Singh's untimely motion because he showed no changed circumstances in India.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that *969a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s decision denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner does not contend that his motion was based on changed circumstances in India. Nor do the documents illustrate changed circumstances in India.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than seven months after final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Calderon v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen, filed more than one year after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's decision is mailed, while § 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days and limits a party to one such motion for a given decision.

Rivera v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2), (b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed almost a year and a half after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. ... The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within thirty days after the mailing of the BIA decision and that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, petitioners’ motion to reconsider was filed almost a year and a half after the mailing of the BIA’s decision and it was petitioners’ second motion to reconsider filed with the BIA.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reconsider.

Pelcaru v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(b)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that an alien may only file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). Here, a review of the record indicates that this was the third such motion filed by petitioner. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Omozee v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-03(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Omozee’s motion failed to specify any errors of fact or law in the decision denying reopening.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) bars a party from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.

Guardado-Santana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider ...” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fourth motion to reconsider. See id.; see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(e)(1) requires that evidence supporting a motion to reopen be material and unavailable, and not discoverable or presentable, at the original hearing.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-11(e)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at” the original hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(1). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Zheng failed to meet his burden and that therefore his motion to reopen should be denied.

Section 1003.2 permits the BIA to deny reopening even when prima facie eligibility is shown and requires new evidence supporting reopening to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Abeshi v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-08(a), (c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). That regulation further provides that a motion to reopen removal proceedings “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Sako v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 857, 863 (6th Cir. 2006). ... Petitioner did not meet these requirements in this case.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported with previously unavailable evidentiary material, and reopening may be denied when that support is lacking.

Erazo v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2007-12-17(c)(1)

Our review of the record indicates that Erazo failed to support his allegations with previously unavailable evidentiary material. As a result, the BIA did not exceed its allowable discretion in concluding that reopening was not warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Maghradze v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 150, 156 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen a case, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that authority or its failure to explain that refusal.

Lopez-Urenda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-03(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review claims that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte power to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Ordinarily, the BIA is not required to announce when and why it has chosen not to exercise its sua sponte power to reopen in the cases before it. The fact that Petitioner requested sua sponte reopening does not create an obligation where there was none before.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the BIA's decision is mailed.

Garcia-Alcaraz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen, which was filed 242 days after the BIA’s June 29, 2006 decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Henry v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final order of removal was entered on April 7, 2006. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on July 23, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen immigration proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Sagastume v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sagastume’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s December 19, 2005 order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (stating that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel when the alien acts diligently.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-28(c)(2)

The regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In a situation where ineffective assistance of counsel prevents an alien from presenting his claim, the filing deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled until the ineffective assistance “is, or should have been, discovered by a reasonable person in the situation.” Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In order to warrant further tolling beyond the time of discovery, an alien is required to demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing his claims. Id. (citations omitted).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions or equitable tolling.

Lin v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-01-29(c)

First, we note that the BIA correctly determined that Lin did not comply with the statutory ninety-day deadline, as she did not file her motion to reopen until January 2006, or nearly ten months after the challenged decision became final. Lin argues, however, that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period because she did not learn that there was a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), until October 1, 2005, or approximately six months after the challenged decision became final. Lin claims that she exercised due diligence during this six-month period because she consulted with several attorneys who advised her there was no basis for a third motion to reopen. We conclude that the BIA acted within its discretion in denying equitable tolling, as Lin has not provided any evidentiary support for her claim that she acted with due diligence during this six-month period and has not otherwise demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from learning of the Lozada claim prior to October 2005. See Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 250-53 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating requirements for equitable tolling). Moreover, Lin does not explain why she waited an additional three months after learning of the Lozada claim before filing her motion in the BIA. Because we uphold the BIA’s determination that the motion to reopen was untimely, we need not address the merits of the motion.

Section 1003.2(c) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-01-29(c)

First, we note that the BIA correctly determined that Lin did not comply with the statutory ninety-day deadline, as she did not file her motion to reopen until January 2006, or nearly ten months after the challenged decision became final. Lin argues, however, that she is entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period because she did not learn that there was a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), until October 1, 2005, or approximately six months after the challenged decision became final. Lin claims that she exercised due diligence during this six-month period because she consulted with several attorneys who advised her there was no basis for a third motion to reopen. We conclude that the BIA acted within its discretion in denying equitable tolling, as Lin has not provided any evidentiai'y support for her claim that she acted with due diligence during this six-month period and has not otherwise demonstrated that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from learning of the Lozada claim prior to October 2005.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final decision, subject to equitable tolling when ineffective assistance of counsel caused a due process violation and the movant acted with due diligence.

Bin Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-05(c)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide a sufficient basis for equitable tolling of the 90-day period if the movant shows that his due process rights were violated by the conduct of counsel and that he “exercised due diligence in pursuing the case during the period [he] seeks to toll.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal.

Mousavi v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mousavi’s first motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mousavi *977failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum, see Malty, 381 F.3d at 947; Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213-14 (9th Cir.1991) (where the petitioner has had a hearing, it is appropriate for the BIA to view and interpret the “new” evidence at face value). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mousavi’s second motion to reopen as both number and time barred because Mousavi had previously filed a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); the second motion was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see id.; and Mousavi failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum or CAT relief based on changed circumstances, see Malty, 381 F.3d at 947; Limsico, 951 F.2d at 213-14.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen and requires a motion to reopen to be timely.

Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was Benito Perez Lopez’s second motion to reopen, and was untimely as to Maria Remedios Rodriguez. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely, and that he did not qualify for an exception to the time and numerical limitations applicable to such motions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is beyond dispute that Chen’s second motion to reopen was untimely. Nor, contrary to Chen’s assertions, does the record reflect that the government agreed to join Chen’s second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii). Hence, none of the regulatory exceptions to the time and numerical limitations apply to Chen’s second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c) permits an applicant to file a motion to reopen with the BIA to present newly discovered, material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Huang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)

Moreover, agency regulations permit an applicant, like Huang, who purports to offer newly-discovered evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing” to file a motion to reopen with the BIA. ... Thus, the proper vehicle for Huang’s request for consideration of additional documentary evidence is a motion to reopen filed directly with the BIA, not a petition for review in this Court.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be supported by an affidavit and to show that submitted evidence was previously unavailable.

Resendiz-Arcos v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(a) and (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Resendiz-Arcos’s motion to reopen because he failed to support the motion with an affidavit or to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c) permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Askander v. Attorney General · filed 2008-01-30(c)

Moreover, pursuant to the BIA’s own regulations, a motion to reopen will not be granted “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Luna v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(b)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where petitioners failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s February 26, 2007 decision affirming the denial of cancellation of removal.

(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Santiago-Garson v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Santiago-Garson’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order.

Section 1003.2 treats motions to reopen filed with the BIA during a pending appeal as matters for the BIA, leaves reopening discretionary, and requires supporting new, material, previously unavailable evidence.

Ilic-Lee v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(a), (b)(1), (c)(1)

Petitioner admits that the “IJ is divested of jurisdiction over a motion filed after an appeal is filed with the BIA,” but argues that the “BIA treats a motion to reopen that is filed during a pending appeal as a motion to remand.” Petitioner’s Br. 06-3494 at 12-13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) and BIA Practice Manual 5.6(h)). These regulations do not support petitioner’s argument because they refer to a motion filed with the BIA in the first instance while an appeal is pending, not the appeal of an IJ’s decision on the merits in which she lacked jurisdiction. Accordingly, the BIA did not err when it found that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to render a decision on petitioner’s motion to reopen. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides that “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board . . . .” Accordingly, we review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under an abuse-of-discretion standard. ... A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2003). It “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” Id.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen.

Ahmad v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-28(a)

The decision to grant or deny a Motion to Reopen “is within the discretion of the [BIA].” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) places decisions to grant or deny motions to reopen or reconsider within the Board's discretion.

Salazar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-31(a)

A decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is “within the discretion of the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, we review the Board’s decision to deny a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Sosa-Trujillo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed more than four years after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and requires it to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Lopez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a final order of removal to be filed within 30 days.

Nwanko v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-28(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nwanko’s motion to reconsider as untimely when it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits the time limit to be bypassed only when qualifying evidence shows changed circumstances that were previously unavailable.

Gegaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gegaj’s motion as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The final order in these proceedings was entered by the BIA in February 2004, and Gegaj did not file his motion to reopen until April 2007, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). ... As the BIA found, much of the evidence Gegaj submitted in support of his motion to reopen addressed the persecution of his father and grandfather, which occurred years ago. As such, this evidence was previously available and failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances in Albania. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a filing-time limit, and the court applied that limit to uphold the denial of Kalu's untimely motion.

Kalu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-29(c)(2)

Based on our review of the record, we find that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been previously presented.

Ghotra v. Attorney General · filed 2008-01-15(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien may “reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” but only “if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (same, addressing timely motions to reopen). ... The Board thus correctly determined that these assertions cannot provide a basis for reopening removal proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies to aliens under final orders of removal who seek to apply or reapply for asylum.

He Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)(3)(ii)

Rather, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) expressly applies to aliens under final orders of removal seeking to apply or reapply for asylum.

A motion to reopen must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Mondragon v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-28(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Valencia’s motion to reopen because he failed to present evidence to support his contention that his son had a new medical condition. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) requires sufficient evidence of changed country conditions for the relevant exception.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)(2); (e)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s March 1, 2004 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that conditions in India have changed so that he now has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed nearly three years after the BIA's order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed circumstances that a change in personal religious commitment alone does not satisfy.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed nearly three years after the BIA’s September 29, 2003 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin’s deepening commitment to her Christian faith is not sufficient by itself to establish changed circumstances under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the regulatory exception to untimely motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2 sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, but the deadline does not apply to motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Islam v. United States Attorney General · filed 2008-01-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, there is no dispute *409that the Islams’ November 2006 motion was untimely where the BIA issued its final order in September 2002. The Islams argue, however, that the BIA erred in denying their motion to reopen because they satisfied the “changed circumstances” exception to the ninety-day filing deadline. The ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen does not apply where the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the Islams argue that Mohammed’s 2006 conviction “was politically motivated and that the conviction was a result of a change in circumstances occurring in Bangladesh, i.e., the assumption of power by the [BNP].” We find that the BIA reasonably determined that Mohammed’s conviction did not indicate a change of circumstances in Bangladesh. Indeed, as the alleged charges that ultimately resulted in Mohammed’s 2006 conviction had been brought in March 1995, his eventual conviction in the ongoing criminal proceedings did not constitute changed conditions in Bangladesh.2 Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Islams’ motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Bautista v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) allows only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Oviedo-Duarte v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in *580the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed more than ten months after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits a later motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions for asylum or withholding claims.

Li v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-01-23(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so based on new evidence within ninety days of the entry of the final order of removal. INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)-(2). The ninety-day limit is mandatory and jurisdictional and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2005). An exception to the ninety-day limit exists if the alien is reapplying for asylum and withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen, filed more than three years after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits a motion to reconsider a prior BIA decision based on an error of fact.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-28(b)(1)

The BIA abused its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider because the record reflects that, contrary to the BIA’s statement, Singh requested voluntary departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider can be based on an error of fact in a prior BIA decision).

(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-28(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s denial of petitioners’ application for cancellation of re*66moval. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Ambris v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-10(b)

Further, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in alternatively denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because petitioners had not demonstrated errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of fact or law; merely repeating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not satisfy that requirement.

DeSa v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2008-01-15(b)(1)

“Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(a) makes the Board’s decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen discretionary, even when the alien demonstrates entitlement to relief.

Zamora-Mallari v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-24(a)

Rather, the decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen is a discretionary decision, even if the alien demonstrates that he is entitled to relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, but its decision to do so is discretionary and unreviewable.

Jackson v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-06(a)

The time and numerical bars on motions to reopen do not prevent the BIA from reopening removal proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Such decisions, however, are entirely discretionary and we lack jurisdiction to review them.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen a removal case sua sponte, and its decision whether to do so is not subject to judicial review.

Royale v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-11(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review Royale’s argument that the BIA should have reopened his removal proceedings sua sponte because a “decision of the BIA [regarding] whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-06(c)(2)

The BIA appropriately noted that Zheng’s motion was untimely where its prior decision had been issued in December 2003, and Zheng did not submit her motion until November 2006, well beyond the ninety-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, subject to an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The applicable regulations provide that a party must file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative order of removal was issued. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the regulations also provide that the time and numerical limitations shall not apply if the motion is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which [removal] has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while subsections (c)(3)(ii) and (c)(1) address changed country conditions and evidentiary support.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to *163reopen his case, but must generally do so within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. ... While 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides that the untimely filing of a motion to reopen may be excused if it is based on “changed circumstances arising in the [movant’s] country of nationality,” Singh failed to submit any evidence of such changes with his motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring that a motion to reopen be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2008-02-11(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion. The BIA appropriately noted that its prior decision had been issued in December 2002, and Lin did not file her motion until January 2006, well beyond the ninety day deadline. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation's exceptions.

Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened____” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The administrative decision was final on December 15, 2005. Petitioners did not file the motion to reopen until June 25, 2007. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final order of removal.

Sosa v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that petitioner filed her motion to reopen on June 25, 2007, more than ninety days after March 13, 2006, the date on which the final order of removal was entered. Accordingly, respondent’s motion for summary disposition in part is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review as to the BIA’s denial of the motion as untimely are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to exceptions.

Rodelas-Ortega v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered, with certain exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that petitioners filed their motion to reopen on July 20, 2007, more than ninety days after March 30, 2007, the date on which their final orders of removal were entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to the regulatory exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Tobar-Serrano v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2), (c)(3)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was filed more than nine months after the final administrative order and did not meet a regulatory exception to the 90-day filing requirement. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we deny this petition for review in part.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen.

Jimenez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was filed more than three years after the final administrative order and did not meet a regulatory exception to the 90-day filing requirement. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cantu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Saiyed v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations state that *552a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(h).

Gjinaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien is limited to one motion to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). However, a motion that does not comply with this time limitation may be brought when the alien presents evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” which was undiscovered or unavailable at the time of the alien’s hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). In this casé, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gjinaj’s motion to reopen was untimely and that Gjinaj failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish changed country conditions in Albania.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes 90-day and numerical limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal.

Jin Wang Young v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion as untimely and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The final order in these proceedings was entered in December 2002, and Young did not file his motion to reopen until November 2006, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, to the extent that the BIA construed Young’s March 2003 motion as a motion to reopen, it properly denied his November 2006 motion to reopen as numerically barred. See id. Furthermore, the BIA properly found that Young failed to establish that he qualified for an exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. These limitations do not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, as the BIA found, Young did not demonstrate changed circumstances in China by asserting that a change in law in the United States rendered him eligible for asylum. The letter from his father that he submitted asserted only that local Chinese authorities continued to look for Young and to harass his family.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Huerta v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that “a party may file only one motion to reopen....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s eighth motion to reopen as numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rodionova v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2008-02-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rodionova’s motion exceeded the numerical limitations for motions to reopen because it was her second such motion, and that it was untimely, given that it was filed almost four years after the BIA denied her appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a party “may file only one motion to reopen” and such motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered”).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has established a prima facie case for relief.

Patel v. Attorney General · filed 2008-02-06(a)

Similarly, the decision to deny a motion to reopen is within the Board’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001). Under the regulations, the Board “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to deny a repetitive motion to reopen or reconsider without reaching its merits when circumstances have not materially changed.

Derezinski v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-20(c)(1)

But like any tribunal, the Board has discretion to turn down repeated requests to revisit a decision, and to do so without considering the merits of the request unless there has been a material change in circumstances, in order to avoid being flooded with redundant filings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 2(a).

Section 1003.2(b) governs motions to reconsider before the BIA; when the BIA grants one and issues a new decision addressing the case, the new decision vacates the prior order.

Mu Ju Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-13(b)

The purpose of a motion to reconsider is the correction of legal or factual errors that occurred in the BIA’s original decision. ... In our opinion, when the BIA grants a motion to reconsider and—after considering the issues afresh—renders a new decision addressing the arguments raised, the original order has been vacated and a new order entered in its place. ... In so holding, we provide those who practice before the BIA with a clear rule: Where a petition for review is filed with this court and a motion to reconsider is filed with the BIA, if the BIA grants the motion to reconsider and renders a new decision addressing the issues presented in the case, then the new decision effectively vacates the prior decision and a separate petition for review of the new decision must be filed with this court.

Section 1003.2(b) permits the BIA to reconsider a prior decision and, when it grants reconsideration and issues a new decision addressing the issues, the new decision replaces the prior order.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-13(b)

The purpose of a motion to reconsider is the correction of legal or factual errors that occurred in the BIA’s original decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... In our opinion, when the BIA grants a motion to reconsider and—after considering the issues afresh— renders a new decision addressing the arguments raised, the original order has been vacated and a new order entered in its place.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Gomez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2)

The regulations provide that motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion, filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s May 10, 2007 decision denying cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Moran v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits an exception only when material changed circumstances support reopening.

Soto v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. Petitioner’s final administrative order of removal was entered on September 29, 2006. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on June 8, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... To the extent petitioner asserts the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen for protection under the Convention Against Torture should be considered an exception to the time limits that pertain to motions to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. Petitioner has not met his burden of presenting a prima facie case for reopening because the motion to reopen does not present any changes that have occurred in Mexico that are material to him or his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, while subsection (c)(3) provides regulatory exceptions to that deadline.

Khoury v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2) (c)(3)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely when it was filed over three years after the deadline for filing motions to reopen. The final administrative decision in petitioners’ case was issued February 13, 2003. Petitioners have not demonstrated that one of the regulatory exceptions to the time requirement for motions to reopen applies here. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

The changed-circumstances exception permits a motion to reopen outside the ordinary time and numerical limits when conditions relevant to the claim have materially changed in the country of removal.

Babalola v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-13(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Babalola failed to establish that her motion to reopen to apply for asylum qualified for an *83exception to the time and numerical limitations based on “changed circumstances” in Nigeria. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA properly noted that, with respect to Babalola’s personal risk of suffering female genital mutilation (“FGM”), there was no evidence in the record that conditions in Nigeria had changed since her May 1999 hearing. Indeed, the most recent country report in the record, the U.S. State Department’s 2005 Report on Human Rights Practices in Nigeria, stated that the incidence of FGM has declined steadily in the past fifteen years. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Nigeria: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2005 (Mar. 8, 2006), http://www.state.gOv/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61586.htm. In addition, the BIA properly found that the birth of Babalola’s three daughters in the United States did not constitute “changed circumstances” in Nigeria. See Jian Huan Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003). Accordingly, the BIA’s denial of Babalola’s motion was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider a decided case on its own motion, while subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) govern the characterization and time and numerical limits of motions to reopen, and subsection (b)(1) requires errors of fact or law for a motion to reconsider.

Lupulescu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-19(a), (b)(1), (c)(1), and (c)(2)

The BIA’s construction of his motion as only a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1) (redesignated as 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), effective 2003) was not an abuse of discretion.2 Moreover, the BIA properly recognized that Lupulescu’s motion to reopen was in violation of the relevant time and numerical limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (noting that a party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered). ... Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA is granted authority to “reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” This power surely also allows the BIA to adjudicate, sua sponte, a preliminary question of whether it is prudent to consider an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen that Petitioner has not sought to equitably toll. It is perfectly appropriate for the BIA to apply the due diligence standard in this context. ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by declining to construe Lupulescu’s motion as a motion to reconsider where he failed to allege any errors of fact or law in its November 2001 decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(c) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, subject to limited exceptions, and bars reopening unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Liu v. Attorney General · filed 2008-02-12(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(iii)

A motion to reopen a proceeding must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the final decision was rendered on March 30, 2005, and the motion to reopen was filed in February 2006. Furthermore, none of the exceptions 1 apply. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA “shall not” grant a motion to reopen “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Liu’s affidavits state she was aware of her second pregnancy on March 14, 2004. Five days later, on March 19, 2004, Liu withdrew her application for asylum and the IJ granted her application for voluntary departure. Accordingly, even if Liu’s counsel had submitted a brief, the BIA could not have granted the motion because the evidence Liu sought to offer was known and available at the March 19 hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, but the petitioner was ineligible for that exception.

Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(e)(3)(ii)

Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner ineligible for an exception to the time limitation, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the BIA within 90 days after the BIA mails its decision.

Ocampo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a motion to *551reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the motion was filed 761 days after mailing of the BIA’s February 2, 2005 decision. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ untimely motion to reconsider.

The 90-day limit for motions to reopen does not apply to changed-country-conditions motions when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Vasilia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-06(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day time limitation for motions to reopen does not apply where the motion is based on changed country conditions, if the evidence of changed conditions “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, but a change in the applicant's personal circumstances, such as giving birth in the United States, does not qualify.

Fu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-11(c)(3)(ii)

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i). ... Rather than claim that the conditions in China had changed since the time of her December 1997 heai’ing, Fu claimed that her personal circumstances had changed because she had given birth to two children. We have found that the birth of children in the United States does not suffice to show changed country conditions to excuse the late filing of a motion to reopen. See Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d at 274. Because the alleged danger to Fu is the result of a “self-induced change in personal circumstances,” the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that those changes do not provide a basis upon which her case can be reopened.

Section 1003.2 limits a party to one motion to reconsider, requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days after the final administrative decision, and requires it to state the new facts to be proven and include supporting affidavits or other evidence.

Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(1)

The regulations state that motions to reconsider shall be limited to one motion to reconsider in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider for exceeding the numerical limitations because the BIA previously denied petitioners’ first motion to reconsider on April 29, 2005. ... To the extent the motion is construed as a motion to reopen, the regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. ... The regulations state a motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, which was based on the grounds of new circumstances due to new, unspecified changes in the law, because the motion to reopen did not have any documents attached to it to establish petitioners are prima facie eligible for any relief from removal.

Subsection (c) permits treating a motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration when it does not present material, previously unavailable evidence, and subsection (b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within thirty days after the final administrative order.

Flores-Pineda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c) and (b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in treating petitioners’ motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration because the motion did not seek to present material, previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration as untimely. The motion was filed on March 15, 2007, over thirty days after the BIA’s final administrative order of removal issued on February 9, 2007. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Guzman-Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a party may only file one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reconsider in a case previously subject to a final BIA decision.

Ayala v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2)

The regulations state that a party may file only one motion to reconsider in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider for exceeding the numerical limitations because this is petitioner’s fourth motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) allows a party to file only one motion to reconsider a given decision, so a third motion is numerically barred.

Orta-Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reconsider as numerically-barred.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider a proceeding sua sponte, and a decision declining to do so is not reviewable by the court.

Elhattab v. Attorney General · filed 2008-02-07(a)

However, as we made clear in Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003), “[b]ecause the BIA retains unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the case.” ... Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this part of Elhattab’s appeal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) when the evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-01-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day filing deadline does not apply to an alien who files a motion to reopen predicated upon “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline requires changed country conditions, and the birth of additional children is only a change in personal circumstances.

Chen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2008-02-06(c)(3)(ii)

As we have previously noted, the birth of additional children constitutes a change of personal circumstances and does not establish changed country conditions required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision unless a subsection (c)(3) exception applies, while subsection (a)'s sua sponte reopening power is discretionary and beyond judicial review.

Man Kwan Wong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-11(c)(2), (c)(3), (a)

The BIA’s decision was not an abuse of discretion because the motion to reopen was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and none of the regulatory exceptions listed in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) apply to this case. Additionally, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte powers in order to grant relief to petitioner. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (holding that “a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Diaz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-15(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2 permits an alien to file a motion to reconsider within 30 days, leaves granting or denying it to the BIA’s discretion, and requires a granted motion to affirm, modify, or reverse the original decision.

Plasencia-Ayala v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-07(b), (a), (i)

In addition, the alien may simultaneously file a motion for reconsideration within 30 days of the BIA’s issuance of the final order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). It is within the BIA’s discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). “If the motion to reconsider is granted, the decision upon such reconsideration shall affirm, modify or reverse the original decision made in the case.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(i).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, § 1003.2(c)(3)(i) creates a notice-based exception only for in absentia deportation orders, and § 1003.2(c)(1) permits support by affidavits or other evidentiary material without making affidavits indispensable.

Gaberov v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(i), (c)(1)

The parties agree that a motion to reopen must ordinarily be filed within 90 days of the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Gaberov did not file his motion to reopen until April 2006 — almost 4 years after the BIA’s June 2002 decision — it will be untimely unless an exception applies. See id. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The plain language of the provision indicates that it only applies to motions to reopen in absentia deportation orders. Thus, the BIA correctly determined that Gaberov’s motion to reopen was untimely. ... In fact, the regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Gaberov’s possession of the decision for an unrelated individual along with a cover letter addressed to his attorney is strong evidence that the BIA violated the notice regulations. Admittedly, his case would have been even stronger if he had also submitted affidavits, but his failure to do so was not fatal to his claim.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations but does not require it to do so.

Barry v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-25(a)

We previously have held that “[t]he decision whether to invoke sua sponte authority [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)] is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA” and therefore is not subject to judicial review. ... Section 1003.2(a) “allows the BIA to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it does not require the BIA to do so.”

The BIA's decision whether to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion is committed to agency discretion by law and is not judicially reviewable.

Tamenut v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-11(a)

Therefore, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings on its own motion, and that decision is committed to agency discretion by law and is not subject to judicial review.

Tamenut v. Gonzales · filed 2008-03-11(a)

We agree with other circuits, however, that there is no statutory, regulatory, or case-law definition of “exceptional situation” applicable to the BIA’s sua sponte power under § 1003.2(a), e.g., Ekimian, 303 F.3d at 1159, and that the use of the permissive term “may” in the regulation further implies that the BIA is under no obligation to reopen any particular case. ... Therefore, we hold that the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings on its own motion as a discretionary decision that the court lacks jurisdiction to review.

Hanan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-14(a)

Hanan also argues that the BIA erred by not reopening the proceedings on its own motion as permitted by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-25(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion as untimely. Motions to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh does not dispute that his motion for reconsideration was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final decision, although the deadline may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Obianwu v. Attorney General · filed 2008-02-26(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to reopen his case, but must generally do so within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. However, the 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled where the motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Zhao v. INS, 452 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006). An individual seeking to toll the filing of a motion to reopen is required to show that he exercised “due diligence in pursuing the case during the period he seeks to toll.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006); Iavorski v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 124, 134-35 (2d Cir.2000). Here, there is no dispute that Obianwu’s November 2006 motion to reopen was untimely as the BIA issued its decision dismissing his appeal in September 2005.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Rojas-Luengas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-11(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir.2007) (limitations period is tolled until a petitioner “definitively learns” of counsel’s defectiveness).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proven at a hearing, and the motion must be denied when it presents no new material facts.

Ramos v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-03-07(c)(1)

A motion to reopen a Board decision may “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Under federal regulations, such motions must be denied when no “new material facts” are presented. Id. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Blandon v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Blandon’s motion to reconsider its order upholding the immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, when the motion failed to raise an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen when changed circumstances in the country of removal are shown.

Piroli v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-26(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Piroli failed to establish that his untimely motion to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT qualified for an exception to the time and numerical limitations based on “changed circumstances” in Albania. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The provision creates an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.

Qi Lei Dong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-07(c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that Dong failed to show that his motion to reopen qualified for an exception to the time limitation *117based on changed country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The provision permits reopening after the filing deadline when changed country conditions, rather than merely changed personal circumstances, are shown.

Wu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-10(c)(3)(ii)

As we have previously noted, the birth of additional children constitutes a change of personal circumstances and does not establish changed country conditions required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, and a motion to reopen based on a new claim to explain why the claim could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Mohamed v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(b)(1), (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mohamed’s motion to reconsider, because the motion did not identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order dismissing Mohamed’s direct appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mohamed’s motion to remand for consideration of his new asylum application, based on his fear of persecution in Saudi Arabia, because Mohamed failed to explain why this claim could not have been presented at his previous hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Lainez-Ortiz v. I.N.S., 96 F.3d 393, 396 (9th Cir.1996).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires denial of a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sabitov v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-25(c)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen. As the BIA explained, Petitioners could have obtained and presented the information contained in Dr. Blum’s affidavit at their hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing ... ”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) measures whether evidence was previously unavailable by asking whether it could have been presented at the former hearing before the immigration judge, rather than during the appeal before the BIA.

Sherbakova v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-26(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be denied when the material was available “at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA stated that because the evidence underlying the Meyer affidavit was available “during the pendency of the respondent’s appeal,” it was not unavailable and therefore could not support a motion to reopen. But, in a decision rendered after the BIA’s denial of Sherbakova’s motion for reconsideration, we concluded that the language in § 1003.2(c)(1) means that “in reviewing the BIA’s determination of whether previously unavailable evidence support[s a] motion to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ,” not at the earlier hearing before the BIA. Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision, but the deadline may be equitably tolled when ineffective assistance of counsel prevents the alien from presenting a claim, subject to due diligence.

Tong Suan Ji v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-02-27(c)(2)

The regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In a situation where ineffective assistance of counsel prevents an alien from presenting his claim, the filing deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled until the ineffective assistance “is, or should have been, discovered by a reasonable person in the situation.” Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reconsider and provides no exceptions to that limit.

Monfort v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-03-10(b)(2)

Unlike a motion to reopen, there are no exceptions to the time limitation for motions to reconsider. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ekwueme v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ekwueme’s motion to reopen as untimely when the motion was filed almost two years after the BIA’s March 10, 2004 final order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not treat the birth of children outside the country of origin as changed country conditions; it is only a change in personal circumstances.

Dong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dong’s motion to reconsider because she failed to show an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying her second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Her second motion to reopen was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the birth of her two children in the United States was insufficient to establish changed circumstances in China, see He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than six years after the BIA’s order, and section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country to support reopening.

Lal v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lai’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s February 25, 1999 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, Lai failed to provide sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to establish that he now has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945.

Paragraph (c)(2) bars untimely and numerically successive motions to reopen, while paragraph (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Jin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Jin’s motion was untimely and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA also properly found that Jin failed to establish that he qualified for an exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen. ... Jin did not demonstrate changed circumstances in China where he claimed that a change in law in the United States rendered him eligible for asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Reframing his change in personal circumstances as though it were a change in country conditions in China does not make it a legitimate change in country conditions claim or otherwise bring Jin’s motion within the exceptions for the time limitations for motions to reopen.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen outside the usual time and numerical limits only when the evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Xian Gang Kong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-26(c)(3)(ii)

The relevant exception provides that the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen do not apply to motions filed ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Such a change, however, does not satisfy the requirements for the changed country conditions exception set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Indeed, to prevail on his motion, Kong was required to show not just that conditions for democracy activists in China had changed, but that such proof was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of his hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for material evidence of changed country conditions under subsection (c)(3)(ii).

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly denied Singh’s February and March 2007 motions to reopen as untimely and number barred where they were filed more than ninety days after the final order of removal was issued in his case and were his fifth and sixth motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien may only file one motion to reopen and it must be within ninety days of the final administrative decision). Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in order to satisfy the exception to this bar. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2 requires material, previously unavailable evidence for reopening, generally imposes a 90-day filing deadline, and provides an exception for changed country conditions when the movant establishes that change.

Siregar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-28(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Moreover, a motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. ... An exception to the time limit exists for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions arising in the country to which removal has been ordered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the BIA correctly determined that Siregar failed to establish changed country conditions in Indonesia that would warrant reopening his removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening based on evidence that could have been discovered before the hearing, while § 1003.2(b)(2) renders Dawit’s motion to reconsider untimely.

Dawit v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(1), (b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen Dawit’s proceedings on the grounds that the psychological and medical evidence Dawit attached to his motion could have been discovered prior to his hearing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that if evidence was capable of being discovered prior to the hearing, it cannot serve as the basis for a motion to reopen), and that, in light of the adverse credibility finding, the evidence of changed country conditions in Ethiopia was insufficient to establish a prima facie case for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 1059, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2007). ... To the extent Dawit was seeking reconsideration, his motion was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a request to consider new evidence to be made through a motion to reopen filed directly with the BIA, rather than through a petition for review.

Lucce v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-10(c)

Furthermore, we will not remand a case to the BIA for the specific purpose of considering additional documentary evidence if that evidence was not in the record before the BIA and agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen proceedings for the consideration of such evidence. ... Under these circumstances, the proper vehicle for a request to consider the new evidence is a motion to reopen filed directly with the BIA, not a petition for review in this Court. See id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits a party to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-13(c)(2)

In No. 05-70400, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Kaur’s motion to reopen exceeded the numerical limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed country conditions are sufficiently shown.

Hartono v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners’ second motion to reopen was numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting one motion to reopen to be filed), where Petitioners failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the applicant demonstrates materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality or, for certain cases, the country to which removal is ordered.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(3)(ii)

Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Kaur failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excepts a motion to reopen from the time and numerical limits when it is based on qualifying changed country conditions, while subsection (a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary and not judicially reviewable.

Gui He Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-29(c)(3)(ii), (a)

Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to show that his motion to reopen qualified for an exception to the time and numerical limitations based on “changed country conditions” in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Chen’s asylum claim was based on his alleged violation of China’s family planning policy and the evidence he submitted indicates that the coercive population control program “continues to be carried out.” Moreover, Chen’s complete lack of credibility before the IJ calls into question the relevance of any of the evidence he submitted. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234 (finding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen due, in part, to his failure to rebut the adverse credibility determination that provided the basis for the IJ’s denial of his underlying asylum claim). Consequently, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate changed country conditions. ... Finally, although Chen argues that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to reopen his proceedings sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision in that respect because it is “entirely discretionary.” See Cyrus v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (finding that the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is a discretionary decision that is not subject to judicial review); Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the formal filing requirements for a motion to reopen to be met, and the BIA may dismiss the motion for failing to meet them.

Gizaw v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-02-26(c)(1)

While the BIA could have properly dismissed Gizaw’s motion to reopen for failing to meet the formal requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), it did not clearly exercise its discretion to do so.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

De Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Galvez De Ramirez’s motion to reopen because she failed to state any new facts or present any new evidence to demonstrate the requisite physical presence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a reopening motion to state new facts and provide evidence showing prima facie eligibility; § 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion, filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Young Sun Shin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-04(c)(1), (c)(2)

A motion to reopen must, among other things, state the new facts to be considered at the reopened hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary materials demonstrating prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Further, aliens are entitled to file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed). Petitioner is now barred from filing a second motion to reopen.

A motion to reconsider must specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Wen Bo Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-02-28(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2007); Matter of Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law). ... We find the Board did not abuse its discretion. Lin merely repeated in his motion to reconsider his claim that his wife was forcibly sterilized. He failed to address the adverse credibility finding.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Molina v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-12(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) preserves the Board's discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a case in which it has rendered a decision, subject to the section's restrictions.

Mancia v. Garland · filed 2023-08-04(a)

Indeed, that inherent discretion is codified. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... We agree with Mancia. ... And nothing in NACARA requires those seeking relief under its provisions to do so by filing a section 203(c) motion. ... And we see no reason why NACARA should be read as implicitly divesting the Board of its discretion to sua sponte reopen a proceeding.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings only when it has rendered a prior decision in the case.

Galan v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-07(a)

Here, the only independent source of authority potentially available is the regulation that generally authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, by its plain terms, that regulation authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings only if it has rendered a prior decision in the case. Id.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board of Immigration Appeals discretion to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte, and it is not required to reopen under any particular circumstances.

Brice v. U.S. Atty. General · filed 2005-12-22(a)

We have observed that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) “gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion to dismiss [a petitioner’s] claim.” Id. ... The BIA is not required “to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances. Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit.” Id. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion when the BIA did not exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen Brice’s proceedings.

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte at any time, but gives it discretion to deny reopening even when the movant makes a prima facie showing; decisions based solely on that unstandardized discretion are unreviewable.

Cruz v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-06-21(a)

This regulation permits the Board “at any time [to] reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” ... However, “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Because there is no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we would lack jurisdiction to review BIA decisions not to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a decision not to exercise that authority is not reviewable by the court.

Jakir v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Anjelia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and a decision not to invoke that authority is not reviewable by the court.

Tanwar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-01(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Shen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Subsection (a) gives the Board sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-19(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and the BIA's decision not to use that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Quijano-Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-20(a)

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).