8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2)

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2002), we conclude that the BIA properly applied the 90-day deadline contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) to deny Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision.

Manalili v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2)

The agency acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Manalili’s motion to reopen filed more than eight years after the agency’s final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) and (b)(2) numerically bar a second motion to reopen or reconsider when the movant has already exhausted the applicable motion limit.

Tellez-Munguia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-11(c)(2) and (b)(2)

The certified administrative record indicates that Tellez-Munguia had exhausted the limits for both types of motions by previously submitting a Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider, which presented new evidence and raised legal arguments. The second motion substantially repeated the first motion,1 but also presented additional evidence and contained new legal arguments. Thus, the BIA properly concluded that the second motion was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening when the supporting evidence was available at the time of the prior hearing.

Zhang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-01-10(c)(1)

The BIA denied petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was based on evidence that was available at the time of the IJ hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Shou Yung Guo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir.2006) (“[T]he applicable test is not whether [the evidence is] new but whether [it was] previously available.”).

A motion to reconsider must identify specific errors of law or fact in the prior decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely rearguing previously rejected claims is insufficient.

Osorio v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-01-08(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C), INA § 240(c)(6)(c); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (same). ... Under these circumstances, we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the BIA already found in the petitioners’ favor with respect to their claim of legal error as to the IJ’s internal relocation finding and the petitioners otherwise merely reargued the merits of their already-rejected claims.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Rivera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a petitioner to move the BIA to reconsider an alleged error before seeking judicial review of that error.

Abusada v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-08(b)

Nevertheless, the petitioner’s failure to correct the mistake by moving the BIA to reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) deprives us of jurisdiction over his attempt to argue error by the Board.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel when the alien exercised due diligence.

Jiang v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2007-01-10(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed before the BIA no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled by a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the alien must show that he has exercised due diligence in pursing his claim.

Section 1003.2(a) requires a movant seeking reopening to show that the submitted evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Huang v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-09(a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion, to the extent that he requested reopening, because he failed to establish that the evidence he submitted was either material or previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c) requires evidence supporting reopening to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing; evidence obtained later is not necessarily unavailable when it concerns events known before the hearing.

Puentes-Oviedo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-01-12(c)

A motion to re-open “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... The letters referred to alleged threats and persecution that occurred before the removal hearing, and the fact that Oviedo did not obtain the letters until after the hearing does not make them “unavailable” earlier.

Section 1003.2(a) and (c)(1) permit the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the new evidence is immaterial or the movant failed to exercise due diligence.

Di Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-08(c)(1), (a)

The IJ and BIA were therefore reasonable in denying Chen’s motion to reopen based on new evidence, finding that Chen had failed to establish the materiality of his evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA also noted that Chen’s failure to exercise due diligence in pursuing his claims for relief was a ground for discretionary denial of his motion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... As a result, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen for failing to demonstrate due diligence.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Fuenmayor v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2007-01-05(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day time limit does not apply if the motions to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not err in denying Fuenmayor’s motion to reopen. The motion was untimely and did not fall within the “changed circumstances” exception to the 90-day rule.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen filed after a final BIA decision to be filed within 90 days, subject to specified exceptions, and the period may be equitably tolled when the petitioner shows sufficient diligence.

Chowdhury v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-12(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. A motion to reopen in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the BIA must be filed no later than ninety days after the date of the BIA’s decision, except in circumstances not relevant to petitioner. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2)-(e)(3). Yet petitioner’s motion was filed more than a year after the BIA decision that he sought to reopen, and petitioner failed to introduce evidence into the administrative record before the BIA that he exercised diligence sufficient to support equitable tolling of the ninety-day limitations period set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). See Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir.2000).

(c)(2) limits a person to one motion to reopen, subject to the exceptions in (c)(3), including changed circumstances in the country of nationality; the BIA must consider whether an exception applies before enforcing the numerical bar.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-01-08(c)(2), (c)(3)

The regulations state that individuals may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and there is no dispute that Singh had filed three motions to reopen with the BIA. The regulations provide for three exceptions to the numerical limitations, including: 1) certain motions filed from in absentia orders, 2) motions filed pursuant to “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” or 3) jointly filed motions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... In this case, the BIA abused its discretion in rejecting Singh’s motion to reopen as numerically barred without considering whether the motion fell within one of the exceptions. ... Moreover, the arrests of Singh’s parents occurred in India, and as a result, they could fall within the “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” exception. Since these affidavits were both previously unavailable and relevant to one of the exceptions to the numerical bar, the BIA erred in failing to consider them as part of its analysis.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Gashi v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-01-10(c)(1)

Gashi filed his motion to reopen based upon changed country conditions and pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), which states that such a motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (indicating that an alien may file a motion to reopen based upon changed country conditions in the alien’s country of nationality). ... Concerning Gashi’s claim regarding changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Gashi’s motion to reopen because the documentary evidence presented in support of his motion did not establish a material change in country conditions in Kosovo that would have made Gashi eligible for asylum relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order, unless an exception applies, including materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Khachatryan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the Khachatryans’ motion to reopen as untimely where they filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the evidence they submit, including documentation that lead petitioner’s brother was beaten by unidentified “thugs,” does not establish a sufficient change of conditions in Armenia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Sections 1003.2(c)(2) and 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) make a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final removal order unless the movant submits evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Pawal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pawal’s motion to reopen as untimely where Pawal filed the motion more than fifteen months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit any evidence of changed country conditions in India that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen when it exceeds the permitted number, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the error in the prior decision.

Ochirvaani v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-11(c)(2), (b)(1)

To the extent that petitioners’ motion sought to reopen removal proceedings, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying it, because it is number-barred under the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... To the extent that petitioners’ motion sought reconsideration, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying it, because petitioners failed to specify how the BIA erred in its denial of the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable deadline unless a regulatory exception applies.

Anand v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-17(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than eleven years after the BIA’s final order, because the motion to reopen was untimely and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions to the September 30, 1996 deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify a legal error in the BIA's prior decision.

Flores-Eustaquio v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-16(b)(1)

We therefore conclude that Petitioners’ motion to reconsider correctly specified a legal error in the BIA’s prior decision, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen filed within ninety days of the administrative decision, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Vichis-Chaves v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-17(c)(2)

The BLA acted within its discretion in denying Vichis-Chaves’ second motion to reopen, filed almost two years after the BIA’s final removal order, as both untimely and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting only one motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the administrative decision). Vichis-Chaves does not argue that one of the regulatory exceptions to the time and numerical limitations applies to his case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a second motion to reopen, subject to the regulation’s exceptions.

Perez-Ayala v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-18(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was numerically barred, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

The regulation limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits an exception for changed circumstances in the country of nationality or destination.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-25(e)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The regulations state that individuals may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2), and there is no dispute that Singh had filed two motions to reopen with the BIA. The regulations also state that motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of issuance of the “final *25administrative decision.” Id. The BIA’s denial of Singh’s first motion to reopen was issued in March 2004, yet Singh did not file his second motion to reopen until February 2006, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh’s second motion was untimely and numerically barred. The regulations provide an exception to these limitations if the movant can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Ni v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-01-24(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider requires an alien to show that “ ‘at the time of the Board’s previous decision an error was made.’ ” Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90 (quoting In re Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 402 (emphasis added)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” (emphasis added)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen before the BIA.

Vu v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-22(c)(2)

Vu filed the motion almost seven years after the IJ’s final administrative order, well after the 90-day deadline established by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although this court has stated that deadlines on motions to reopen may be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, ” Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (emphasis added), we have never equitably tolled a deadline where, as here, the alien alleges ineffective assistance of counsel without any hint of fraudulent activity.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits an alien to avoid the ordinary time and number limits on motions to reopen only by submitting material evidence of changed conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Dong, Xiu H. v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2007-01-24(c)(3)(ii)

In general an alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the normal restrictions do not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To support reopening on this ground, the alien must provide evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id.

Section 1003.2 permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to be filed at any time, but requires previously unavailable evidence showing an actual change in country conditions rather than merely cumulative support for the original claim.

Issakh, Abdallah A. v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2007-01-11(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Although a Motion to Reopen based on changed country conditions can be filed at any time, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Ajose v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2005), the movant must nevertheless show that the evidence supporting the motion was previously unavailable, see Krougliak, 289 F.3d at 460. ... But in seeking to reopen his asylum proceedings, Issakh must proffer evidence that shows an actual change in his home country, see Simtion, 393 F.3d at 736-37 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, 576 (7th Cir. 2003), and that does not merely offer cumulative support for his original asylum claim, see Betouche v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 147, 152 (1st Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening when the applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable at the prior hearing.

Kebe, Getu v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2007-01-19(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen may be granted if the applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable at the time of his previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Zhao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). In this case, the BIA’s denial of Kebe’s motion based on changed country conditions did not discuss or analyze any of Kebe’s evidence suggesting that both before and after the elections in 2005 the Ethiopian government launched increased repression of opposition groups compared to the situation in 2004. Although the BIA might have offered reasons for rejecting the evidence of changed conditions, or for denying relief despite changed conditions, the absence of any articulated reasons in the BIA’s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and requires a remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days and to specify the alleged errors of fact or law.

Nhora Constanza Gutierrez Jimenez v. U.S. Atty. · filed 2007-01-24(c)(2), (b)(1)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s final decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Similarly, a motion to reconsider must be filed within thirty days of the BIA’s decision and must specify the alleged errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)-(2). ... Guiterrez-Jimenez corrected motion was filed after the deadline for both motions to reopen and reconsider. ... It is not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny such a motion.

A motion to reopen may be granted only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Qui v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2007-01-25(e)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(1) (2005); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2006) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the record as the date before which the evidence must have been unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

A motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the appeal is denied must show changed circumstances in the country of nationality to avoid the timeliness bar.

Mehovic v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-19(c)(2)

Because petitioners filed their motion more than ninety days after the denial of their appeal, they were required to show changed circumstances in their country of nationality in order for their motion to be exempt from the timeliness bar. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) numerically bars a motion to reconsider when the regulatory limit on such motions has been reached.

Osorio v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-18(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ third motion to reconsider as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2 permits an alien to file a motion to reopen while a request for the government to join it is pending, and delaying the filing until the government responds does not justify equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

Valeriano v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2007-01-23(c)(1), (c)(3)(iii)

Because we see no unavoidable conflict between simultaneously filing a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and a request to file jointly under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii), we hold that the petitioner’s counsel did not act diligently by delaying filing until he had received the District Counsel’s response to his request, and thus the petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a timely motion to reopen based on material new facts that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; changed personal circumstances can satisfy that standard without a showing of changed country conditions.

Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-01-25(c)(1)

First, as to changed country conditions, the BIA erroneously treated Wang’s motion as having been untimely filed and, therefore, as though she were required to demonstrate a change in the relevant Chinese family-planning policies. The govern*22ing regulation and our case law, however, both indicate that a showing of changed personal circumstances — indisputably present here — may be sufficient when a motion to reopen is timely made.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal.

Torres v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-18(c)(2)

Motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-01-30(c)(2)

The regulations permit only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the instant motion was the second motion to reopen filed by Singh, exceeding the numerical limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable, and the applicant must explain why the evidence could not have been presented earlier.

Subekti v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-05(c)(2)

Subekti failed to explain adequately why he could not have presented evidence of his party membership or a letter from his father at the time of his hearing. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring an applicant to support a motion to reopen with material, previously unavailable evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable at the prior hearing, and evidence repeating facts already presented is not new evidence.

Ladino-Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-09(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The basis of Ladino-Lopez’s motion to reopen was two letters from friends or relatives in Colombia that stated the FARC continued to ask about the whereabouts of Ladino-Lopez and her family, but the letters do not constitute new evidence. Although the letters were not available to Ladino-Lopez at the time of her hearing, Ladino-Lopez stated in her asylum application and presented evidence at her hearing that the FARC was asking about her family in her neighborhood. The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ladino-Lopez’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify legal or factual errors and support them with pertinent authority, and forecloses reconsideration based on the claim that review should have been assigned to a three-member panel.

Durant v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-02-07(b)(1), (b)(3)

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... As to his argument that his appeal should have been assigned for review by a three-member panel, the regulations specifically foreclose motions to reconsider on that basis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law, and subsection (c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the merits hearing.

Dedewo v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-02-09(b)(1), (c)(1)

To the extent that Dedewo’s motion was a motion to reconsider, the BIA reasonably denied it because Dedewo failed to specify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s previous decision. ... Further, Dedewo submitted no new evidence or documentation with her motion, let alone any evidence that was material and that was unavailable and that could not be discovered or presented at her merits hearing.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the final order of removal.

Musaj v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-08(b)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reconsider a decision that the alien is removable from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The motion shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). For Petitioners’ motion to reconsider the BIA’s June 6, 2005 decision to be timely under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), the motion to reconsider must have been filed by July 6, 2005. The motion to reconsider was not filed until July 18, 2006. Therefore, the motion to reconsider was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on changed conditions to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Hendrik v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-05(c)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Hendrik failed to present material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing to demonstrate that conditions in Indonesia had worsened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include new evidence and affidavits or other evidentiary material that was unavailable at the former proceeding.

Jiang, Jin Xiu v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2007-02-12(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a motion to reopen must be accompanied by new evidence that will be proven if the motion is granted. See id.; Lin v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2006). The motion must also be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material that could not have been presented at the former proceeding. See Patel v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen, and the court applied that limit to uphold denial of the untimely motion.

Mekonen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-12(c)(2)

... the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on the ground that it was untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2006) (establishing a ninety-day time limitation for filing a motion to reopen); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992) (setting forth standard of review).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception to the numerical bar on motions to reopen for changed circumstances in the country of removal, but the exception requires evidence of those changed circumstances.

Johar v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-02-08(c)(3)(ii)

To the extent Johar is seeking to re-litigate his asylum and withholding of removal claims, he does not provide any evidence of changed circumstances in India, and thus does not satisfy the exception for a change in circumstances arising in the country to which deportation has been ordered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c) permits reopening for material new facts that were unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Gauwi v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-01-31(b), (c)

A motion to reconsider requires an applicant to “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). ... A motion to reopen allows an applicant to present new facts where “the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen or reconsider, subject to the regulation’s restrictions, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to appear material to the applicant’s claim.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-25(a), (c)(1)

According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA has discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen or reconsider, subject to the restrictions contained therein. One such restriction with respect to a motion to reopen mandates that the new evidence must appear to the Board to be material to the applicant’s claim.

Subsection (c) allows an alien to present an ineffective-assistance claim in a motion to reopen immigration proceedings, using the three-step Matter of Lozada process.

Sall v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-06(c)

It is; Sall may present his ineffective-assistance claim in a motion to reopen immigration proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) and its accompanying regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Specifically, Sall may present his ineffective-assistance claim according to the three-step process of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639, 1988 WL 235454 (B.I.A.), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen that submits an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Zheng v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Service · filed 2007-02-08(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion when it denied reopening for adjustment of status because Zheng failed to submit all the materials necessary for adjustment. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation”).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, and the Eighth Circuit reviews the BIA’s refusal to do so for abuse of discretion under its precedent.

Tamenut v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-15(a)

If we were writing on a clean slate, we, too, probably would conclude that we lack jurisdiction. However, we have previously reviewed challenges to a BIA's decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings under section 1003.2(a) for an abuse of discretion. ... Given this precedent, we review the BIA's decision for abuse of discretion and leave resolution of the jurisdictional issue to the court en banc at the appropriate time.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ragucci v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-22(c)(2)

Reviewing the BIA’s denial of Ragucci’s motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.2002), we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion as time-barred. The BIA dismissed Ragucci’s direct appeal on March 15, 2004. His expungement is dated April 2, 2004. The motion to reopen does not explain why it was not filed until March 28, 2005, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) ordinarily limits a party to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days, and a prior motion to rescind may count against that later motion even when the prior motion was exempt from those limits.

Leonides v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-14(c)(2)

The BIA also did not err when it denied Leonides’s motion to reopen as numerically barred. The federal regulations that govern motions to reopen or reconsider provide that ordinarily “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The regulations also provide that the time and numerical limitations of section 1003.2(c)(2) do not apply to a motion to reopen or rescind an order filed in absentia. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i). A motion to rescind an order of deportation filed in absentia may be filed “[a]t any time if the alien demonstrates that he or she did not receive notice or if the alien demonstrates that he or she was in federal or state custody and the failure to appear was through no fault of the alien.” Id. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2). An order entered in absentia in deportation proceedings may be rescinded only upon a motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3) (1995). Leonides argues that, because his first motion to rescind or reopen was filed under section 1003.23(b)(4), it was not subject to the time and numerical limitations of section 1003.2(c)(2) and cannot be counted as the one motion to reopen that he was permitted to file, but this argument fails. Although time and numerical limitations do not apply to motions to rescind an order of deportation filed in absentia, nothing in the regulation prevents the BIA from counting a motion to rescind against a later filed motion to reopen. Because Leonides’s “Motion to Vacate,” construed as a motion to reopen, was not filed under section 1003.23, the numerical limitations applied, and the BIA did not err when it determined that the motion was numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support the motion with pertinent authority.

Zheng v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2007-02-23(b)(1)

Inasmuch as the BIA considered Zheng’s motion to be a motion to reconsider, it did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Zheng simply reiterated her asylum claim and contested the BIA’s denial of her November 2003 motion to reopen in a one sentence conclusory manner. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to specify the errors of fact or law in the original decision.

Vaquero v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-23(b)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vaquero’s motion to reconsider because she did not identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s June 17, 2004 decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (requiring a motion to reconsider to specify error of fact or law in original decision).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the Board’s prior decision.

Zhu v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2007-02-21(b)

As an initial matter, because Zhu did not specify any errors of law or fact in the BIA’s previous decision denying her first motion as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b), the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion to reconsider, to the extent that the BIA construed it as such.

The changed-country-conditions exception allows a petitioner to overcome the motion-to-reopen time and numerical limits only by demonstrating changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Hong v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2007-02-20(c)(3)(ii)

We cannot ignore that before the BIA can consider the merits of Hong’s motion to reopen, Hong had to demonstrate changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 2006) (pointing out that the exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires the petitioner “show changed country conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement” applicable to a motion to reopen).

The exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen requires an alien to show changed conditions in the country of nationality before the BIA considers the motion's merits.

Hong v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2007-02-20(c)(3)(ii)

We cannot ignore that before the BIA can consider the merits of Hong’s motion to reopen, Hong had to demonstrate changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(8)(h); Wang v. BIA 437 F.3d 270, 274 (2d Cir.2006) (pointing out that the exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) requires the petitioner “show changed country conditions in order to exceed the 90-day filing requirement” applicable to a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to make a prima facie showing; subsection (c)(1) requires a completed application and all supporting documentation, and subsection (c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen.

Alizoti v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c), (c)(1), (c)(2)

A prima facie showing of eligibility for relief is required in motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Yousif v. I.N.S., 794 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[A] motion to reopen should not be granted unless the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the statutory requirements for the underlying relief have been met”). ... According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a petitioner filing a motion to reopen for adjudication of her adjustment of status application must submit a completed application and “all supporting documentation.” ... If the BIA were to consider new evidence as part of Petitioner’s motion to reconsider, Petitioner’s motion would be a second motion to reopen, which is barred by statute and regulation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229A(c)(7)(A) (“An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings under this section . . . .) (emphasis added); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new evidence that was unavailable at the former hearing, and the court applies those requirements to newly submitted evidence.

Aneyoue v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-23(c)(1)

Motions to reopen must state “new facts,” and an alien must show that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available . . . at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Even if the affidavit from the witness was previously unavailable, the Board’s denial of Aneyoue’s motion to reopen alternatively held that this new evidence would not be material to the adverse credibility finding within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), absent a stronger showing of the authenticity of the affidavit.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) makes a motion to reconsider untimely when filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s final decision, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts that will be proven if granted and supports declining to treat a reconsideration motion as a motion to reopen when it offers no new facts or evidence.

Jaswal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-23(b)(2) (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Jaswal’s motion to reconsider as untimely where it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Moreover, the BIA acted within its discretion in not construing the motion as a motion to reopen where it faded to offer new facts or evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (explaining that “a motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven ... if the motion is granted”).

Section 1003.2(d) bars a person who is the subject of deportation or exclusion proceedings from filing a motion to reopen after departing the United States.

Ablahad v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-15(d)

Ablahad’s motions to reopen were also barred by 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) and 1003.23(b)(1). Ablahad acknowledges that he traveled to Canada on multiple occasions after the entry of his removal order. As a consequence, the BIA was correct in holding that his motions to reopen were procedurally barred. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) & 1003.23(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when it is material and was previously unavailable, and inadequate proof of authenticity may defeat materiality.

Aneyoue v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States of America · filed 2007-02-23(c)(1)

Even if the affidavit from the witness was previously unavailable, the Board’s denial of Aney-oue’s motion to reopen alternatively held that this new evidence would not be material to the adverse credibility finding within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), absent a stronger showing of the authenticity of the affidavit. Considering the specific grounds for finding adverse credibility in her case, including her submission of a document despite compelling reasons to believe it was a forgery, we do not believe the Board abused its discretion in failing to find any legal or factual error in this ruling.

Section 1003.2(g)(3) deems a motion unopposed when the Government does not file a response.

Hussain v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-16(g)(3)

In addition, the Government did not oppose Hussain’s motion to remand. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3), if the Government does not file a response to a motion, it is deemed unopposed. An unopposed motion to remand for adjustment of status may be remanded.

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA's decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte entirely discretionary.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(a)

Moreover, to the extent that Liu challenges the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority to consider the merits of his claim, the present case is beyond the Court’s review, because the decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA's prior decision, absent an applicable exception.

Saini v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion to reopen was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the BIA's final order unless an exception applies.

Nunez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nunez’s motion to reopen as untimely because he did not file the motion within ninety days of the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not argue that an exception to the ninety-day deadline applied in his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Lombana v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ second motion to reopen as time- and number-barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners had already filed one motion to reopen and their second motion to reopen was filed on February 6, 2006, well beyond the 90-day jurisdictional time limit. In their second motion to reopen, Petitioners did not argue the applicability of the changed circumstances exception to the time and numerical limitations. Further, even if we construed Petitioners’ request to remand to introduce new evidence as an assertion of changed circumstances, Petitioners did not present any evidence of changed circumstances. The affidavit from Lombana’s sister merely repeats Lombana’s previous assertions before the IJ and does not constitute new material evidence of changed circumstances that was unavailable and could not have been discovered at a previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Samayoa v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c)(2)

Respondent’s motion to summarily deny this petition for review is granted because petitioner’s motion to reopen violated both the numerical and time limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the exceptions in paragraph (c)(3).

Tapia-Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2)

Furthermore, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) provides that “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (c)(3) of this section, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen when the movant satisfies the provision's requirements; the court held that Lian had not shown that an exception applied.

Lian v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c)(3)(ii)

Furthermore, Lian failed to demonstrate eligibility for any exceptions to the time limitations for motions to reopen, or show that the ninety-day deadline in his case should have been equitably tolled. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality.

Nates v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

As an initial matter, the BIA correctly found that Nates’s motion to reopen was untimely. Because the BIA issued its final administrative decision affirming the IJ’s denial of Nates’s application on October 21, 2005, Nates had to file his motion to reopen within ninety days of that date.5 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Nates did not file his motion to reopen until March 20, 2006, the motion was untimely. ... Nates contends that the exception to the filing requirement applies, however, because his proffered evidence was previously unavailable and established changed conditions in Colombia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). After review of the proffered evidence, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nates’s claim.

Section 1003.2 permits only one motion to reopen, but the numerical bar can be overcome by showing changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality; a change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Dong v. US Department of Justice · filed 2007-02-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as numerically barred. A petitioner may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Dong had previously filed one. A petitioner can overcome the numerical bar if he can demonstrate “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In his motion to reopen, Dong asserted that his case should be reopened because he now has two children who were born in the United States. A change in an individual’s personal cireum-*50stances, however, does not qualify under this exception; an individual must demonstrate that the country conditions have changed in order for this exception to apply.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Barcenas v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen.

A motion filed while an appeal is pending is properly classified as a motion to remand.

Hussain v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2007-02-16(c)(4)

Because Hussain’s motion was filed while the appeal was pending, it is properly classified as a motion to remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4)(2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits motions to reopen to 90 days after the final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when conditions in the country of removal have materially changed.

Manullang v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because they did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Indonesia, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider before the Board to satisfy the applicable filing deadline.

Gonzalez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(b)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not abuse its discretion in construing petitioner’s motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider and in denying it as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(1); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (motion to reopen must include new facts).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) numerically limits motions to reconsider, and a fourth motion may be denied as barred by that limit.

Aguilar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s fourth motion to reconsider as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (stating numerical limits on motions to reconsider); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts that will be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted.

Bangash v. Attorney General · filed 2007-02-27(c)(1)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a motion to reopen must present “new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.”

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision or by July 31, 1996, whichever is later.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than eleven years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (requiring that motions for reconsideration be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s final decision or by July 31, 1996, whichever is later).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, and a decision declining to do so is entirely discretionary and unreviewable.

Cyrus v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-19(a)

Cyrus also seeks review of the BIA’s decision declining to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is an “entirely discretionary” decision for which “we lack jurisdiction to review.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA's final administrative order of removal.

Rodas v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); ... The BIA’s final administrative order of removal was issued on May 7, 2004. Petitioners filed their motion to reopen on December 19, 2006, more than 90 days after the date on which the BIA rendered its final administrative order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) provides an exception for asylum proceedings when changed country conditions are demonstrated.

Singh v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the Board issued its original decision in August 2002 and Singh did not submit his second motion to reopen until November 2006, well beyond the ninety day deadline. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the motion to reopen was untimely and number barred, as it was Singh’s second motion and was filed outside the 90 day filing deadline. ... There is, however, an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen asylum proceedings where the moving party demonstrates changed conditions in his or her country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to demonstrate changed conditions in India that would excuse the late-filing of his second motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to equitable tolling when the alien demonstrates due diligence.

Fa Li Liu v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-11-02(c)(2)

Liu contends that the BIA abused its discretion in denying as untimely his motion to reopen, Abu Hasirah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 478 F.3d 474, 476-77 (2d Cir.2007) (per curiam), because it erred in refusing to equitably toll the ninety-day limitation period for filing such a motion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply equitable tolling after finding Liu failed to establish due diligence in pursuing his claim. ... Because Liu bears the burden of establishing due diligence, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the limitations period and denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling when deception, fraud, or error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts diligently.

Perez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The regulations provide that, absent certain exceptional circumstances, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This court, however, recognizes equitable tolling of deadlines on motions to reopen during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003). The BIA correctly found that petitioner had not established that his prior counsel’s ineffective assistance prevented him from filing a timely motion to reopen with the BIA, because petitioner was aware of the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal in April 2005, when he filed a pro se petition for review with this court. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that it could not excuse petitioner’s untimeliness and in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See also 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(2); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final order of removal.

Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen. The record indicates that petitioners’ final order of removal was entered on August 7, 2006. The record further indicates that petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed on February 20, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final order of removal.

Guardado-Ortega v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen. The record demonstrates that petitioner’s final order of removal was entered on April 25, 2006. The record further demonstrates that petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on March 12, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions, to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Tetelepta v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rueda v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but the deadline may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel when the movant shows a due process violation and due diligence during the tolled period.

Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-11-29(c)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. ... Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide a sufficient basis for equitable tolling of the 90-day period if the movant shows that his due process rights were violated by the conduct of counsel, and that the movant “exercised due diligence in pursuing the case during the period [he] seeks to toll.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but ineffective assistance of counsel can support equitable tolling when the movant shows a due process violation and due diligence.

Wang v. BIA · filed 2007-11-29(c)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. ... Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide a sufficient basis for equitable tolling of the 90-day period if the movant shows that his due process rights were violated by the conduct of counsel, and that the movant “exercised due diligence in pursuing the case during the period [he] seeks to toll.”

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days and permits an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Duarte v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Muñoz Duarte filed her motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, she failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final agency decision.

Leo v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Leo’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen must generally be filed within ninety days of the final agency decision).

Subsection (c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings that the court lacks jurisdiction to review.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than ninety days after the BIA’s April 28, 2004 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, so a second motion may be denied as numerically barred.

Chavez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2)

The BIA properly construed Chavez’s first motion as requesting reopening rather than reconsideration because she did not specify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision, but rather sought to offer new evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel and adjustment of status eligibility. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; see also Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir.2003). Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny Chavez’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (generally allowing for a party to file only one motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Tasci v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-10-30(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to deny a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material; appellate evidence that is insufficient to warrant remand does not satisfy that standard.

Rico v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-26(c)(1)

Contrary to Rico’s contention, the BIA acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence Rico submitted on appeal was not sufficient to warrant a remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the movant presents sufficient material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Wan Hai Zhong v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(1)

To the extent Zhong challenges the denial of his motion to reopen, there was no abuse of discretion in the Board’s conclusion that he failed to present sufficient material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Gosal v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-30(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must identify "the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reconsider each BIA decision that the alien is removable, rather than limiting the alien to one motion to reconsider throughout the proceedings; a motion to reconsider must also specify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Calle v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-10-23(b)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA’s interpretation of the regulation is broad and extends the language beyond its plain meaning. ... Under the language of the regulation, then, we conclude that Calle’s motion to reconsider the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen was not numerically barred because it was the first motion to reconsider that BIA decision. ... Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute “specifying . . errors of fact or law” as required for a successful motion to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision.

Ayurzana v. Attorney General · filed 2007-11-05(b)

A motion to reconsider should point out the errors of fact or law committed by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayurzana’s Motion to Reconsider. Ayurzana did not present new legal arguments, or point out errors of fact or law.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Solorio-Andrade v. Keisler · filed 2007-11-06(b)(1)

“In filing a motion to reconsider, the petitioner must ‘specify! ] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.’ ” Yeghiazaryan v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir.2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify its reasons by identifying errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Mojica-Sanchez v. U.S. Atty General · filed 2007-11-09(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration should specify the reason for the motion by pointing to such errors. See INA § 240(c)(6)©); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)©); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider and requires that it be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision, and such motion “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reconsider, filed more than three years after the BIA’s July 18, 2003 decision affirming the denial of his application for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(a) requires a request to reopen or reconsider a case decided by the Board to be filed as a written motion with the Board.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-07(a)

The agency’s regulations provide that “[a] request to reopen or reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, which request is made by the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, must be in the form of a written motion to the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Cisse v. Gonzales · filed 2007-11-21(b)(1)

BIA regulations authorize the filing of a motion for reconsideration and provide that a “motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)(emphasis added). As the BIA noted in its Order denying Cisse’s Motion for Reconsideration, Cisse did not identify any particular error of fact or law in the BIA’s April 10, 2006 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify the legal or factual errors in the prior order and include pertinent supporting authority.

Forde v. U.S. Atty. General · filed 2007-11-30(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration “shall specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days of the BIA's prior order.

Ortiz v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(b)(2)

A motion for reconsideration must be filed within 30 days of the BIA’s previously-issued order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within the applicable filing deadline, so a motion filed more than five years after the BIA's order is untimely.

Aguele v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(b)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguele’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than five years after the BIA’s order dismissing his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective-assistance claims only when the movant exercised due diligence.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-29(c)(2)

As a general matter, a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This 90-day deadline may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel only if the movant has exercised “due diligence” in vindicating his or her rights.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, but the movant must demonstrate that the conditions have changed since the prior hearing.

Zhan v. Attorney General · filed 2007-10-19(c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA’s decision denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen is not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. After careful review of Petitioner’s motion to reopen and exhibits in support thereof, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Petitioner’s motion to reopen provides information regarding the current country conditions for the People’s Republic of China, but fails to demonstrate how those conditions have materially changed since her hearing before the IJ in 2002. Because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, the BIA did not err by denying her motion to reopen.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the 90-day motion-to-reopen deadline does not cover a non-country-based desire to seek adjustment of status through marriage to a United States citizen.

Kapaj v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-31(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, the BIA properly found that Kapaj did not establish that he qualified for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen. The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was issued in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). This time limitation, however, does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA properly found that Kapaj’s desire to apply for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States citizen did not constitute an exception to the filing deadline.

The exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen applies to changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-11-20(c)(3)(ii)

Again, the exception to the 90-day period for filing a motion to reopen applies where the petitioner establishes “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and not changed personal circumstances, such as the ones relied on by Chen.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to rely on material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing, and the court applied that requirement to reject reliance on an uncle’s death that could have been raised during the pending appeal.

Parvez v. Keisler · filed 2007-11-02(c)

A motion to reopen the BIA’s proceedings must be based upon (1) new material evidence that was not available and which an alien could not have presented at the prior hearing and (2) a showing of a “prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.” ... We have jurisdiction to review Parvez’s claim that the BIA committed a legal error in determining that the death of Parvez’s uncle did not constitute new material evidence within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... Therefore, the BIA was justified in its position that the death of Parvez’s uncle cannot constitute "new evidence sufficient to merit reopening" because "the respondent has not explained why he did not file a motion to reopen on this basis during the pendency of his appeal."

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence qualifies as new and supports reopening; duplicative, previously available, or insufficiently changed-condition evidence does not justify reopening.

Nshanova v. Keisler · filed 2007-11-02(c)(1)

Furthermore, the BIA reasonably declined to reopen Nshanova’s proceedings to the extent that any such request was based on new evidence. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA accurately concluded that the affidavit Nshanova submitted in support of her motion was merely a “duplicate” of the allegations averred in her previous statement. The BIA also accurately observed that some of the evidence Nshanova submitted pre-dated the June 2005 decision of the IJ, and therefore was not new. While the 2005 State Department Report on International Religious Freedom for Uzbekistan was not available at the time of Nshanova’s hearing, the BIA accurately found that it does not demonstrate a worsening of conditions in Uzbekistan such that Nshanova had a well-founded fear of persecution.

Subsection (c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant lacks material, previously unavailable evidence or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-11-26(c)(1)

The BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence, or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while subsection (a) leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA's discretion.

Fernando v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Fernando’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen must generally be filed within ninety days of the agency decision). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to invoke its authority to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that “the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion”) (italics omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Morozov v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-06(c)(1)

These media reports—principally a transcript of a 60 Minutes broadcast—were released after the date of the IJ’s decision in Morozov’s case, meaning that they were “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Subsection (c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to equitable tolling when justified.

De La Cruz v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-10-29(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of the final administrative order, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), unless equitable tolling applies, see Borges, 402 F.3d at 406. Here, De La Cruz waited over six years before moving to reopen. Moreover, we find insufficient reason to toll the period between 2003 (when De La Cruz learned that, contrary to his prior attorney’s advice, he was likely not a U.S. citizen) and 2006 (when he moved to reopen).

A motion to reconsider a BIA decision must be filed within 30 days of the decision date.

Zheng v. Attorney General · filed 2007-11-08(b)(2)

In addition, motions to reconsider a decision of the BIA must be filed within 30 days of the date of the decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The BIA also correctly determined that treated as a motion to reconsider, Zheng’s motion was out of time.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA's final administrative order of removal.

Uyanga v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Petitioner filed his motion to reopen on November 2, 2006, more than 90 days after the date on which the BIA rendered its final administrative order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time bar applies to a motion to reopen when the petitioner does not establish an exception based on changed country conditions.

Alcala v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-26(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in concluding that petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). For the reasons stated by the BIA in its order denying the motion, we agree that petitioners failed to establish an exception to the bar, because petitioners failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Diallo v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-11(c)(2)

The BIA’s decision that Diallo’s motion was untimely, given that it was filed over four years after the BIA denied her appeal, is beyond objection. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered”).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen, subject to exceptions for qualifying changed country conditions and evidence that was previously unavailable.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-21(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly denied Zhang’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien may file only one motion to reopen). Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhang failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions in order to satisfy the exception to this numerical bar. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii). ... Additionally, the BIA appropriately found that Zhang’s husband’s letter does not support reopening where it stated only that the Chinese government still searches for *875Zhang, a fact she asserted in her prior motion to reopen. See id. Moreover, the BIA correctly noted that Zhang did not demonstrate why a letter from her husband was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the filing deadline for a motion to reopen only when the evidence of changed country conditions could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Novovic v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in ruling that because four of Novovic’s supporting documents pre-date his 2002 merits hearing, they “were thus previously available” to Novovic and could not demonstrate changed conditions. Additionally, the BIA accurately observed that the remaining documents, which were either undated or post-dated the merits hearing, primarily discussed events that took place before the IJ rendered her decision. As such, those documents did not present evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Zheng Zhong Chen v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 267, 269-70 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening to seek or renew withholding of deportation based on changed country conditions only when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Lakhavani v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-13(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen may be filed in order to apply or reapply for withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality if evidence of those changed circumstances is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Lakhavani asserts that he did not present evidence regarding Pakistan at his hearing because he did not believe he would be removed from the United States. He alleges that, after his adjustment of status application was denied, the possibility of his removal to Pakistan “became real” and constituted “a complete change of circumstances.” Because a change of circumstances in Lakhavani’s mindset does not meet the requirements set forth in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his argument that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen or remand on this basis is without merit.

(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material; an affidavit can suffice without additional documentation.

Chimil-Felipe v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-15(c)(1)

The BIA erred in holding petitioner was required to submit medical or other documentation showing hardship on his daughter on a motion to reopen. The BIA’s own regulation on motions to reopen requires only that the motion “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and ... be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception based on changed country conditions that the petitioner must demonstrate.

Chahal v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners did not demonstrate changed circumstances in India to excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1999) (upholding *210denial of motion to reopen where the evidence “was too general to demonstrate a well-founded fear that [petitioner] would personally be persecuted”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally makes a motion to reopen untimely, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an untimely motion when supported by previously unavailable or unobtainable evidence of changed country conditions.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

In order for his untimely motion to reopen to be considered, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Chen was required to show, through evidence that was not available or obtainable at the previous hearing, a change in country conditions arising in China, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The changed-country-conditions exception permits a motion to reopen after the 90-day deadline when country conditions, rather than merely the applicant's personal circumstances, have changed.

Tian Hao Lei v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-05(c)(3)(ii)

This court recently held that a change in personal circumstances does not meet the changed country conditions exception to the 90-day time limit for a motion to reopen. He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The petitioner’s change in religion and associated consequences he may face in China arise from a change in his personal circumstances, not a change in China or in Chinese policy toward members of any religious group.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars motions to reopen filed outside the 90-day time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Sanchez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The petitioners filed their motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, they failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.8d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, while subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law.

Delgado v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-27(c) and (b)(1)

In No. 04-74617, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mendoza Delgado failed to adequately comply with the requirements for a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, and “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”). Mendoza Delgado’s motion to reopen did not comply with the requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and did not include evidence to support counsel’s general statements regarding the children’s medical conditions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... In No. 05-71404, the BIA was within its discretion in denying Mendoza Delgado’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision and bars reconsideration of a decision denying a prior motion to reconsider.

Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(b)(2)

Upon review of the record and petitioners’ response to the court’s order to show cause, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the sixth motion to reconsider was numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and may not seek reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider.”); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004).

The exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen applies to changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, not merely changes in the applicant's personal circumstances.

Lin v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-19(c)(3)(ii)

As Lin argues, this time limitation does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Lin argues that the births of his two children are changed circumstances that qualify him for this exception. This argument is unavailing. As the BIA properly found, the births of Lin’s children in the United States constituted a change in Lin’s personal circumstances, not changed circumstances arising in his country of nationality.

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Vasquez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-27(c)

To the extent the BIA required that Petitioners failed to meet the regulatory requirements for motions to reopen to reapply for asylum, it did not abuse its discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Medina-Perez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Medina-Perez failed to provide evidence to support his claim that he was able to adjust status based on an *31employment-based visa. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”)

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Vazquez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not violate petitioners’ due process rights and was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Singh v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-23(c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Singh’s motion was untimely. However, section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) affords an exception to the filing deadline for those seeking to reopen their cases based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that this exception did not apply to Singh’s motion. Singh asserted that country conditions in India had changed because the Congress Party had returned to power, that the Congress Party had persecuted Sikhs, and that if returned, he would be “arrested and tortured.” Despite these assertions, the BIA properly found that Singh failed to establish “ ‘changed circumstances’ in India that affect his eligibility for asylum.” Indeed, Singh did not support his motion with any evidence of changed conditions in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. Accordingly, Singh failed to demonstrate how the Congress Party’s return to power would adversely affect him if he returned to India. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 234. In light of that failure, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Rodriguez-Avila v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-26(b)(2)

The regulations provide that motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider, filed on February 22, 2006, more than 30 days after the BIA’s March 21, 2005 decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits the BIA to deny an untimely motion to reopen.

Sanchez-Mendoza v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-19(c)(2)

Specifically, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that BIA denials of motions to reopen or reconsider are reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Keqaj v. Mukasey · filed 2007-11-29(c)(2)

The BIA appropriately noted that their motion was untimely where its prior decision had been issued in July 2002, and they did not submit their motion until June 2004, well beyond the ninety day deadline. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

(c) requires a motion to reopen to be pursued through the agency's prescribed reopening procedures rather than by a reviewing court ordering the BIA to reopen the record.

Xiu Fen Xia v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-07(c)

We cannot order the BIA to reopen the record for the taking of additional evidence where, as here, “the agency regulations set forth procedures to reopen.” ... The appropriate avenue for such relief would be to file a motion to reopen in the agency. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and generally requires the supporting evidence to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Vilma Gloria Ruano De Espinoza v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2007-12-07(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.” “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. . . .” Id. In addition, a motion to reopen “for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief [shall not] be granted if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her” and the alien was afforded an opportunity to apply for such relief. Id.

Section 1003.2 makes a motion to reopen filed with the BIA the proper vehicle for seeking adjustment of status that was not presented to the Immigration Judge, rather than a petition for review in the court of appeals.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-12-07

The proper vehicle for Singh’s application for adjustment of status is a motion to reopen filed with the BIA, rather than a petition to this Court. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed timely, subject to the regulatory exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Aldana v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was untimely and did not meet any of the regulatory *962exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings before the BIA to file the motion no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Taebenu v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Taebenu’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien seeking to reopen proceedings before the BIA must file the motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision.

Sanchez-Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, petitioner’s motion was filed more than two years after mailing of the BIA’s decision. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s untimely motion to reconsider.

The regulation generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, unless the movant provides evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Rosas v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

We conclude the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioner did not provide any evidence demonstrating changed circumstances in Mexico to excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 530 (9th Cir.1999).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Ocampo v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-21(c)(2)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) applies a ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after a final administrative order of removal, consistent with the INA.

Perez-Olano v. Gonzalez · filed 2008-01-08(c)(2)

Plaintiffs cannot show that the ninety day time limit in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2) and 1003.23(b)(1) is invalid, as the INA specifically provides for the ninety day limit. The regulations track that language. See 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (“Except as provided for in this subparagraph, the motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”).