8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-28(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Because Zheng filed his motion to reopen almost a year after the deadline imposed by the regulations, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion as untimely.

A motion to reissue a BIA decision is treated as a motion to reopen and is subject to the 90-day filing deadline.

Jalloh v. Holder · filed 2012-05-08(c)(2)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

A motion to reopen before the BIA is untimely when filed more than two years after the final removal order unless a filing deadline exception applies.

Herrera-Castaneda v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Herrera-Castaneda’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Herrera-Castaneda did not demonstrate his motion came within any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the BIA to reopen a removal proceeding for new evidence only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-16(c)(1)

Under these rules, the BIA will only reopen a removal proceeding on the basis of new evidence if the evidence is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material facts that were neither available nor discoverable at the former hearing; previously considered evidence is not new facts justifying reopening.

Zeru v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-19(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA must state "new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The evidence sought to be offered must be material and neither available nor discoverable at the former hearing. Id. ... We cannot say the BIA erred in holding the additional evidence of Zeru's PTSD did not present "new facts" justifying a motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); cf. Lemus v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence or establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Yong Tan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-29(c)(1)

The BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence, or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was not capable of being discovered or presented at the initial hearing.

Modeba v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-23(c)(1)

To prevail on a motion to reopen, the movant must present evidence that is both material to his application and that was not capable of being discovered or presented at his initial hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking reopening to show that the offered evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Shah v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-28(c)(1)

Under the relevant regulations, a motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant proves that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. ... Although the circumstances upon which Shah relies in his motion to reopen did not arise until after he had conceded removal and accepted volun*612tary departure, the IJ did not abuse his discretion when he determined that Shah failed to prove that country conditions had changed in Pakistan so as to justify reopening his removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by new or previously unavailable evidence.

Jimenez-Garcia v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-28(c)

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because they failed to submit any new or previously unavailable evidence in support of the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

A motion to reopen must rely on material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Guo v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-09-06(c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen must be based on evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA dismissed the documents at issue as “new”; but the applicable test is not whether they were new but whether they were previously available. As the government concedes, the documents could not have been presented at the asylum hearing and obviously were “not available” because they were dated years later.

Section 1003.2(a) and (c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was previously unavailable or had not been considered by the immigration judge.

Lazaro v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(a) and (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tovar Lazaro’s motion to reopen because she failed to demonstrate that the psychiatric report she submitted was based on evidence that was previously unavailable or had not been considered by the immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-14(c)(1)

The regulations provide that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In its denial of Lin’s motion, the BIA properly found that Lin failed to present new and material evidence to warrant the reopening of her case.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to include supporting affidavits and other evidentiary material.

Camberos v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-28(c)

A motion to reopen in the BIA must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted” and should be supported by affidavits, along with “other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23(b)(3); cf. Sanchez v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 641, 648 (7th Cir. 2007) (granting petition for review of denial of motion to reopen where the motion provided “extensive evidence” of spousal abuse). Camberos’ motion contained only a passing mention of 42B relief and failed to provide evidentiary support for such a claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material to the requested relief.

De Leon v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-21(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen because the BIA considered the evidence submitted regarding their children and Hurricane Stan’s impact on Guatemala and acted within its broad discretion in concluding that the evidence was not material to demonstrating exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that the evidence sought to be offered is material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proved at a hearing and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing . . . and shall be supported by affidavits and other evidentiary material.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Marie Rose Chery v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-04-28(c)(1)

Because the evidence concerning her husband’s travel problems, and the testimony he would have provided, was previously available to Chery, the affidavit-declarations she presented in her motion to reopen did not constitute new or unavailable evidence.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Lu v. Holder · filed 2011-02-02(c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion to remand where: (1) a movant failed to present previously unavailable material evidence; (2) a movant failed to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought; or (3) the relief sought is discretionary and a movant failed to show that she warranted the relief sought as a matter of discretion. See Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156; Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 474 (B.I.A. 1992); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring motions to reopen to present evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”). ... Indeed, to the extent that the report discussed the psychological effect that Lu’s deportation could have on her children as they would be returned to China, the BIA reasonably determined that this information was available and could have been presented at Lu’s hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) . Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that even if this information had not been previously available, it was not material as Lu testified that she would take her children with her if she were removed.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

De Garcia v. Holder · filed 2010-09-01(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be based on evidence that is “material and [that] was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-04-11(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. . . .”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to rely in part on affidavits or other evidentiary material that was not available or discoverable before the prior hearing.

Campos v. Attorney General United States · filed 2012-11-05(c)(1)

A successful motion to reopen before the BIA requires, in part, a showing that the new “affidavits or other evidentiary material” were not available or discoverable prior to the original hearing or hearings before the immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2006) (construing language of sister provision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), to designate the previous “hearing” as the proceedings before the immigration judge).

A motion to reopen may be granted when the new evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Fernandez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-05-23(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); see also Abdi, 430 F.3d at 1149.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material; the movant must submit sufficient evidence to establish grounds for further fact-finding.

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Holder · filed 2014-06-30(c)(1)

Under the applicable regulation, a motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, it was Mr. Rodriguez-Reyes’s burden to submit sufficient evidence in support of his motion to reopen to establish grounds for further fact finding before an IJ. The BIA considered his new evidence and found it inadequate. He was not thereby deprived of due process.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be denied unless the offered evidence is material, was previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Fan Wu v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-18(c)(1)

Wu has not demonstrated that her Chinese passport was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

A motion to reopen requires material, previously unavailable evidence.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2009-07-27(c)(1)

Since Liu failed to proffer material, previously unavailable evidence in support of her first motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it.

Section 1003.2(c) generally bars a second motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the evidence shows materially changed country conditions.

Li v. United States Attorney General · filed 2006-02-27(c)(3)(ii); (c)

Thus, to the extent that Li’s September 2004 motion was a motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably found that it was barred by regulation as a second motion to reopen, given that she previously filed a motion to reopen in June 2004. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(2)(c); 1003.23(4)(b). ... The BIA also reasonably found that the evidence did not show changed country conditions sufficient to warrant an exception to the numerical limitations provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), given that the information provided was either already in the record or not sufficient to show changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an asylum-related motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, unless the applicant qualifies for the § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exception by showing changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Twan v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-02-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An applicant for asylum who seeks to reopen his immigration proceedings must file a motion to reopen “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The ninety-day limit does not apply where, inter alia, the applicant seeks to reopen his proceedings in order to apply or reapply for asylum and withholding “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In determining that the petitioner’s motion to reopen did not qualify for exemption from the time requirement of § 1003.2(c), this Court determined that the motion “alleged before the BIA no changed circumstances in China; rather [the petitioner] claimed that his personal circumstances in the United States had changed.” Id. at 130 (emphasis in original). Thus, according to this Court, the proffered evidence did not fit within the exception contained in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when the applicant establishes changed circumstances in the country of nationality with material evidence that was unavailable at the prior hearing.

Diallo, Aicha v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2006-04-06(c)(3)(ii)

An untimely motion may be brought, however, if the applicant can establish "changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . ." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Ajose v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir. 2005). Evidence of changed country conditions must be material and must have been unavailable at the time of the applicant's previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits reopening an immigration case based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions relevant to an asylum or withholding claim.

Paul v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-04-06(c)(3)(h)

Unlike all those decisions — i.e., the pre- and postRamsameachire withholding cases and the more recent CAT claim case, Xue Hong Yang — the withholding claim that petitioner seeks to reopen in this case does not rest on, or in any way require, the validity of his defeated allegations of past persecution. ... Under the circumstances, the BIA’s refusal even to consider such evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 78, 81 (2d Cir.2005) (“When an applicant moves to reopen his case based on worsened country conditions, and introduces previously unavailable reports that materially support his original application, the BIA has a duty to consider these reports and issue a reasoned decision based thereon, whether or not these reports are clearly determinative.” (emphasis omitted)).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) exempts a motion to reopen from the ordinary time and numerical limits only when changed country conditions are supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Gao v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-01(c)(3)(h)

A party may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days, or one motion to reconsider, which must be filed within 30 days, after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be re-evaluated. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). However, time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality,” and the evidence sought to be offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered at the previous proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, Gao’s statements concerning her sister-in-law’s sterilization and her mother’s warning that local officials were aggressively implementing the birth control policy are new facts, but they do not constitute material facts that would alter the underlying BIA denial of relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions to reopen for asylum or withholding based on changed country conditions from the usual 90-day deadline when the material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous IJ hearing.

Igli Filja, Luljeta Filja, Endrit Filja v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-05-12(c)(3)(ii)

If one traces the labyrinthine path of the applicable regulations, one can only conclude that “previous hearing,” as used in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), refers to the hearing before the IJ, which is totally consistent with the statutory and regulatory factfinding procedures. ... Thus it was unreasonable for the BIA, referring to the Filjas’ motion, to hold that the “changes ... occurred prior to our decision in March 2002, and as such, this evidence even if deemed material was available and could have been discovered or presented at that time.” The BIA’s interpretation of “previous hearing” to refer to the proceeding before it rather than to the proceeding before the IJ does violence to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) when it is construed in conjunction with the language of related statutory and regulatory provisions, and it is inconsistent with the regulatory structure for fact finding and appellate review established in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0, et seq. The BIA committed an error of law when it held that the Filjas’ motion to reopen and remand was time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally allows only one motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions establish new eligibility for relief.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-03-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An asylum applicant may file only one motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, an exception is available to applicants who demonstrate a change in conditions in the country to which removal has been ordered that establishes new eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, he failed to provide material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions that excuse his numerically barred motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions from the ordinary time and numerical limits when supported by qualifying evidence.

Roman Ashnurov v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-04-04(c)(3)(ii)

A petitioner is ordinarily permitted to file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of the final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), but the time and numerical limitations do not apply to the filing of a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions if supported by evidence that is “material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Kostina argues that the country conditions in Ukraine have changed and that there is increased persecution of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, but her evidence failed to prove materially changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions.

Avila-Perez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avila-Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely where Avila-Perez filed the motion more than four months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit any evidence of changed country conditions in Guatemala that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence of changed country conditions was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered and presented.

Arreola v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Garcia Arreola filed the motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In addition, he did not establish an exception to the time limit by presenting material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been discovered and presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i). We therefore deny the petition for review.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions from the 90-day filing deadline only when the movant presents material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Bermeo-Castro v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-06-14(c)(3)(ii)

The 90-day time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because they failed to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the motion-to-reopen deadline does not apply when the evidence shows only continuing conditions in China, even if their effect on a family member worsened.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-10(c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s untimely motion to reopen because he failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b) (4) (i). ... Moreover, even if he had established that the continued harassment resulted in his wife’s illness, the BIA reasonably found that the harassment Liu described was not a changed circumstance, but rather that the conditions in China had continued to be the same since Liu’s merits hearing although the effect on his wife may have worsened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, unless an exception applies, including materially changed circumstances in the country of removal under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Espinosa v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Espinosa’s motion to reopen as untimely, because she did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Mexico, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an asylum applicant to move to reopen at any time based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of deportation that were previously unavailable, and it does not bar an additional motion based on such changed circumstances.

Li v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-07-31(c)(3)(ii)

Li also failed to present any material evidence of changed country conditions to substantiate his claim that he would likely be sterilized upon return to China on account of his three children born in the United States. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (stating that an asylum applicant may, at any time, move to reopen his case “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”). ... Here, Li did not submit any of the Guo documents to the BIA in support of his motion, and Li could, under the agency regulations, file another motion to reopen the proceedings before the BIA for the taking of additional evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (stating that an additional motion to reopen is not barred if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country which deportation has been ordered”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the movant presents material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes the ordinary time and numerical limits for qualifying changed-country-conditions motions.

Restrepo-Velasquez v. U.S. Atty. · filed 2007-08-06(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the movant presents new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... if the motion is supported by evidence that is “material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a late motion based on changed country conditions only when supported by new and material evidence.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-30(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than six months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in India that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception based on new and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Simonyants v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where petitioners filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Armenia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(H) permits an otherwise time- or number-barred motion to reopen when the alien establishes changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Zong Hang Zou v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-09-18(c)(3)(H)

A motion that does not comply with the time and numerical limitations can only be brought where the alien can establish one of four limited exceptions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). One such exception, the only one applicable here, is where the alien can establish “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(H).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely or successive motion to reopen for asylum or withholding when supported by material changed-country-conditions evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the previous hearing.

Shardar v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-09-19(c)(3)(ii)

Under the governing regulations, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no.later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the “time and numerical limitations ... shall not apply” to motions to reopen that “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” § 1003.2(c)(3). Therefore, if the asylum applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if there has been a prior motion to reopen or the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but those limits do not apply to an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; such a motion may be considered even if it is a second motion or filed after 90 days.

Shardar v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2007-09-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

There are both procedural and substantive hurdles that must be overcome in a motion to reopen removal proceedings. Under the governing regulations, “an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the “time and numerical limitations . . . shall not apply” to motions to reopen that “apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” § 1003.2(c)(3). Therefore, if the asylum applicant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that could not have been presented during the hearing before the IJ, his motion can be considered, even if there has been a prior motion to reopen or the motion is beyond the 90-day time limit for filing.

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen, while an exception requires evidence establishing changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Zheng v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2007-09-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to reopen based on his failure to abide by the numerical limitations. The regulations permit only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the instant motion was Zheng’s second. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly determined that Zheng was not eligible for an exception to the numerical limitation requirement; he failed to submit any evidence establishing a change in country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Thus, the BIA properly denied Zheng’s motion and provided adequate reasoning for doing so.

The 90-day limit for motions to reopen does not apply when the motion is based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or the country to which deportation has been ordered.

Cai v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2007-09-24(c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was issued in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). This time limitation, however, does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and Cai argued that the births of his two children in the United States are changed circumstances that qualify him for this exception. But, as the agency found, the births of Cai’s children in the United States constituted a change in Cai’s personal circumstances not arising in his country of nationality. See Jian Huan Guan v. B.I.A., 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order and imposes a numerical limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits an exception when materially changed country conditions warrant reopening.

Vasilia v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasilia’s motion, which was both untimely and numerically barred. The BIA dismissed Vasilia’s appeal in March 2003, and Vasilia did not file the present motion to reopen until December 2006, well beyond the ninety day deadline. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, this is Vasilia’s second motion to reopen, the first having been filed in April 2004. ... Vasilia could overcome these time and numerical limitations only if he submitted evidence that conditions in Albania had worsened to such an extent that further proceedings were warranted. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, the BIA reasonably concluded that Vasilia failed to submit evidence establishing such changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2 generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, unless the movant presents evidence of materially changed country conditions that excuses the time limit.

Singh v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where Singh filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit evidence of new and material changed country conditions in India that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

The changed-country-conditions exception to § 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day limit does not apply without evidence of a material change in the treatment of the protected group.

Deo v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

However, the changed country conditions exception to the 90-day requirement for submitting motions to reopen is not applicable to petitioner because he failed to submit any evidence regarding a material change in the treatment of Hindu persons. See Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). Additionally, petitioner is prohibited from collaterally attacking the propriety of his state court domestic abuse convictions in immigration proceedings. See Urbina-Mauricio v. INS, 989 F.2d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir.1993). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the motion to reopen time and number limits still applied and that petitioner’s motion to reopen was barred under both. See Iturribama v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen or reconsider, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits exemption from the applicable time and numerical limits when changed country conditions in the country of nationality are established.

Widjaja v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Widjaja’s motion to reopen based on the numerical limitation on such motions. Widjaja was only allowed one motion to reopen or reconsider and he had already filed a prior motion to reopen in July 2004. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A motion to reopen may be exempted from the applicable time and numerical limitations where the alien can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). However, the materials Widjaja submitted in support of his motion did not establish that the circumstances of Christians in Indonesia have materially worsened since Widjaja’s hearing before an IJ in January 2003.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within thirty days after the BIA decision is mailed, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion under the changed-country-conditions exception only when it presents information material to the petitioners’ circumstances.

De La Cruz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-17(b)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within thirty days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, the motion was filed 110 days after mailing of the BIA’s decision. Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen pursuant to the changed country conditions exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) because the motion did not set forth any information material to petitioners’ circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence shows changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Guan Wen Zhuang v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-03-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhuang’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed almost six years after the IJ’s decision.2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision). The BIA properly found that Zhuang failed to present material evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” sufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception for changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation, not changed personal circumstances in the United States.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely. See id. The BIA properly noted that it previously issued the final removal order in February 2004, and Chen did not file her motion to reopen until March 2007, well beyond the 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). ... To the extent Chen argues that the family planning policy will now apply to her in a manner in which it did not apply before she gave birth to two children in the United States, and that such a difference amounts to a change in country conditions, her argument is without merit. Merely reframing her change in personal circumstances as a change in country conditions in China does not bring Chen’s motion within the exceptions to the time limitation on motions to reopen. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129,130-31 (2d Cir.2005)(holding that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies to changed country conditions in the country of origin or deportation and not changed personal circumstances in the United States).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on materially changed country conditions when the evidence could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Mohamed v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2008-04-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the ninety-day time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” if the evidence is material and could not have been presented at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material changed-country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the agency’s final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day filing deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen. It is undisputed that Li’s August 2007 motion to reopen was untimely where he filed it more than 90 days after the BIA’s October 2005 decision affirming the IJ’s denial of his applications for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Li failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions that would warrant an exception to the filing deadline. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

(c)(2) generally imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while (c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on changed country conditions.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely and that she did not qualify for equitable tolling of the 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Moreover, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lin failed to show that her motion to reopen qualified for an exception to the 90-day filing deadline based on “changed circumstances” in China. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, and the BIA must explain why the submitted evidence is insufficient to establish that change.

Bin Yang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(3)(ii)

Nevertheless, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Yang’s motion as timebarred because it failed to explain why his evidence was insufficient to demonstrate a change in country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on changed country conditions that must be identified or substantiated.

Darbelles-Castro v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a party may only file one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Furthermore, a review of the record reflects that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioner did not qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations, since petitioner did not identify or substantiate any country conditions which have changed since his original asylum application was adjudicated. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), amended by 404 F.3d 1105 (2005).

Section 1003.2 generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but those limits do not apply to an asylum motion based on qualifying changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Mehmedovic v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-25(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not exceed its allowable discretion in denying Mehmedovic’s motion to reopen. As a general rule, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, these time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely or number-barred motion to reopen based on changed circumstances in the country only when the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-29(c)(3)(ii)

Here, on the other hand, the only question is whether the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Zheng failed to make an adequate showing of “changed circumstances arising in [China]” with “evidence [that] is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... That is not material evidence of changed circumstances when there is no evidence of local policies and practices prior to October 2002.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely or number-barred motion to reopen only when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Zheng v. Keisler · filed 2008-04-29(c)(3)(ii)

Here, on the other hand, the only question is whether the record supports the BIA’s conclusion that Zheng failed to make an adequate showing of “changed circumstances arising in [China]” with “evidence [that] is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Given the absence of specific evidence of changed conditions that was both material and not available in October 2002, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that “the evidence reflects conditions substantially similar to those that existed at the time of [the October 2002] hearing,” a conclusion it has reached in a series of recent decisions addressing this same issue. ... Therefore, the denial of Zheng’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen must be upheld.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline on motions to reopen seeking CAT relief, and section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country conditions that was unavailable and could not have been presented in the prior proceeding.

Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Onofre Ramirez filed his motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), which does apply to CAT claims. In addition, he failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128,1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

With limited exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen removal (whether before the BIA or an IJ). 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). However, this numerical limitation does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for material evidence of changed country circumstances that was unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Kustianto v. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, such motions must be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). As noted, Kustianto did not file his motion to reopen until 114 days after the BIA’s decision, rendering it untimely. The time-bar of § 1003.2(c)(2) does not apply, however, if the alien seeks to admit material evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” which “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Kustianto’s argument fails for two reasons. First, contrary to the assertion in his brief to this Court, Kustianto testified at his November 24, 2004 hearing that he was in contact with his family in Indonesia, and discussed with them the conditions in that country. Therefore, he has not demonstrated that the material in the three letters he now seeks to admit was “not available” or “could not have been discovered or presented” at the November 24, 2004 hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Second, nothing in the letters evinces “changed circumstances” in Indonesia – rather, the letters demonstrate only a continuation of exactly the types of problems that Kustianto complained of in his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Accordingly, the letters are not sufficient grounds for considering an untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception for materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable; the court held that Cheng did not satisfy the exception.

Cheng v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-05-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien must file a motion to reopen no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is an exception to this limitation when an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal demonstrates that his or her claim is based on changed circumstances in the country of removal, if supporting evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Cheng does not dispute that his motion to reopen was filed beyond the ninety-day filing period, but he does not address how his motion satisfied the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the procedural hurdle he must overcome before having an untimely motion to reopen considered. See Shardar v. Attorney General, 503 F.3d 308, 313-14 (3d Cir. 2007). In sum, we conclude that Cheng did not sufficiently allege or establish changed country conditions in China to qualify for an exception to the ninety-day filing requirement. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while allowing a later motion when changed country conditions are shown; a change in personal circumstances, such as the birth of U.S. citizen children, does not qualify.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

With limited exceptions, a *39party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the Board issued its final order of removal in October 2002 and Lin did not submit her second motion to reopen until April 2007. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely and number barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233-34. ... The BIA also properly found that Lin’s motion did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). It is well-settled that the birth of U.S. citizen children is a changed personal circumstance and is insufficient to show changed conditions in China. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-131 (2d Cir.2005); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273-274 (2d Cir.2006). Thus, the BIA properly found that Lin did not demonstrate changed conditions in China that would excuse the untimely filing of her second motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen only when the applicant presents evidence establishing changed country conditions.

Chen v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-05-19(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, the BIA properly determined that Chen was not eligible for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen because he failed to submit any evidence establishing a change in country conditions in China. See id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, unless it is based on changed conditions in the movant’s country of nationality and supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Juan C. Chavarriaga Orozco v. U.S. Attorney Gen. · filed 2008-05-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But this time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must offer material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the filing deadline when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Zeqaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-22(c)(3)(ii)

An alien is not bound by the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if his request for asylum or withholding of deportation “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The evidence submitted by Zeqaj, however, did not show a significant change in conditions in Kosovo since the time of his asylum hearing. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by determining that Zeqaj had not established changed country conditions and that his motion to reopen was, therefore, untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely and time-barred unless the exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) is satisfied with material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the motion was time-barred unless she made a sufficient showing of changed country conditions in China with evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not warrant reopening based on generalized, conclusory evidence of changed country conditions that does not establish sufficient recent developments.

Husyev v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-16(c)(3)(ii)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that recent changes in Ukraine do not warrant reopening of the case. The only evidence of changed country conditions submitted by the Husyevs is an expert report by Dr. Jeffrey Burds, which is almost exclusively devoted to the analysis of long-term social and political trends in Ukraine. Its only mention of recent developments — i.e., the conclusionary statement that the presidential election of 2004 “pitted ethnic Russians against ethnic Ukrainians in a bitter and violent struggle for state power in Ukraine” which “heightened the atmosphere of persecution of ethnic minorities” — does not warrant reopening of the proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, unless an asylum motion is based on material changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable.

Zagorjani v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-17(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and must do so no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... There was no error in the BIA’s finding that the affidavits in support of her original claim were available at the time of her hearing before the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2006) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the record as the date before which the evidence must have been unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline may be inapplicable when a motion to reopen is based on changed country conditions rather than merely changed personal circumstances.

Diaby v. Attorney General · filed 2008-07-08(c)(2)

Even if the Board had correctly found that Diaby had made out a prima facie case, it would be justified in denying the motion as untimely unless the motion was found to be based on changed country conditions. ... However, the change in personal circumstances would have been of little significance absent a change in country conditions. ... Based on the evidence Diaby submitted with his motion to reopen, it appears that country conditions have changed to make involvement with the RDR much more dangerous.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception for qualifying changed country conditions, not merely a change in law.

Barry v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barry’s motion to reopen as untimely. Barry’s motion to reopen, filed more than 14 months after the BIA’s February 2006 decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief, was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring motion to reopen to be “filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered”). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Barry failed to show that his motion to reopen met an exception to the time limitations based on changed country conditions in Guinea. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... However, a change in law is not a changed country condition within the meaning of the regulations. ... Untimely motions to reopen must satisfy an exception provided in INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), which does not include a change in law.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed country conditions are shown.

Gonzalez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as time and number barred. See id. ... In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that petitioners did not demonstrate a material change in country conditions such as would except the motion from the time and number requirements of the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Our review of the record reflects that petitioners failed to argue or to establish that the conditions cited in their motion have resulted from a material change in country conditions since their prior removal proceedings. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for asylum or withholding claims based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, it is undisputed that Singh’s motion was untimely, as it was filed almost two years after the BIA issued its decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Singh failed to show an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, in light of the adverse credibility determination that remains unchallenged in his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for newly available asylum eligibility based on changed circumstances arising in the country of removal.

Diakite v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

With limited exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). In Diakite’s case, because it is undisputed that his May 2007 motion to reopen was filed five years after the BIA’s May 2002 decision, the BIA properly observed that his motion was untimely, unless he established that he was newly eligible for asylum based on changed circumstances arising in Cote d’Ivoire. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 gives the BIA broad, non-reviewable discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, generally limits a party to one motion filed within 90 days, and creates an exception for materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable.

Gashi v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-08-01(a), (c)(2), and (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may move the BIA to reopen a prior removal order based on new evidence. ... The alien may file only one such motion to reopen and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... An exception to the 1-motion limitation and 90-day deadline exists, however, if the motion to reopen is for the purpose of reapplying for relief “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... The instant motion is both time- and number-barred. ... Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA may reopen proceedings in a case in which it has rendered a decision at any time upon its own motion. ... The discretion accorded in this provision is so wide that even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief, the BIA can deny a motion to reopen a deportation order. No language in the provision requires the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances. Instead, the provision merely provides the BIA the discretion to reopen immigration proceedings as it sees fit. ... We ultimately held that “[i]n short, the provision gives the BIA non-reviewable discretion,” such that “[it] could find no abuse of discretion [in Anin].

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when supported by material evidence of those changed conditions.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-07(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion, because he failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions, and the general evidence attached to his motion did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.2005) (CAT applicant must establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured in the country of removal); Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir .2003) (motion to reopen must establish prima facie case demonstrating a reasonable likelihood that requirements of eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(H) creates an exception without a time limit for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(H)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its final order was issued in January 2003, but Lin did not file his motion to reopen until May 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time limit, however, for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(H).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within ninety days, subject to an exception for asylum or withholding claims based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Peng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The INA provides that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, it is undisputed that Peng’s motion was untimely, as it was filed more than seven years after he was ordered removed in absentia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, as the Government argues, the agency did not abuse its discretion in finding that Peng failed to show an exception to the ninety-day filing deadline based on changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when the alien shows materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing limit when it is based on changed country conditions.

Kaur v. Gonzales · filed 2008-09-05(c)(3)(ii)

She contends that pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the 90-day limit for filing a motion to reopen did not apply because she based her motion on changed country conditions. We disagree; Kaur’s motion stated that conditions in India have not changed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing deadline when it is based on changed circumstances in the movant’s country of nationality, but the movant must present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Yuan v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-09-11(c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant's nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id. ... Thus, Yuan has presented material information that was previously unavailable of changed conditions in her home village regarding an increase in forced sterilization for women with two children and a prima facie case that she would be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on materially changed country conditions.

Salazar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See id. Moreover, petitioner’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Because petitioner has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) for qualifying asylum or withholding claims.

Mu Jin Di Jiang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). It is undisputed that Jiang’s motion was untimely, as it was filed over four years after the BIA issued its decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We conclude, moreover, that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Jiang failed to meet an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen based on changed country conditions, in light of the adverse credibility determination that remains unchallenged in his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits motions to reopen to 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits a later motion based on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented timely.

Moctezuma v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Atrixco filed her motion to reopen on February 10, 2006, outside the 90-day limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... As stated by the Board, Atrixco did not present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented on a timely basis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He, 501 F.3d at 1131-32.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3) excepts motions based on changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the removal hearing.

Xiu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-09-26(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien may file a motion to reopen removal proceedings within 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The deadline does not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed circumstances in the country of the alien’s nationality that was not available and could not have been presented at the removal hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Xiu’s evidence established that circumstances regarding the enforcement of family planning policies had intensified since Xiu filed her original application for asylum in 2000. ... The Board abused its discretion when it refused to reopen Xiu’s removal proceedings after Xiu established that conditions have changed in her country of origin since her original removal hearing.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, but permits a late motion when supported by new and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Stevano v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Stevano’s motion to reopen as untimely where Stevano filed the motion more than a year after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and failed to submit new and material evidence of changed country conditions in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Sing Yu Lam v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lam’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in December 2004, but Lam did not file his motion to reopen until November 2006, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, we cannot say the BIA erred in finding that Lam’s motion did not qualify for such an exception. Indeed, it is well-settled that the birth of U.S. citizen children is not evidence of changed conditions in China. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen).

Section 1003.2 limits motions to reopen and permits an exception for material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; evidence predating the merits hearing and changes in personal circumstances do not qualify.

Huang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reopen as number-barred. Because Huang filed his first motion to reopen in March 2002, there is no dispute that his second motion to reopen filed in January 2005 was number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no numerical limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA properly found that Huang’s motion did not qualify for such an exception. Indeed, it is well-settled that the birth of U.S. citizen children is not evidence of changed conditions in China. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen). Furthermore, the BIA correctly found that the country condition evidence that Huang submitted was not new or previously unavailable as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), where all of said evidence pre-dated his August 2003 merits hearing. Thus, because the BIA did not err in finding that Huang failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in China, it did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... As for Chen’s motion to reopen, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that she failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.1 As with Huang’s motion to reopen, the BIA properly considered the evidence that Chen submitted, and correctly found that the documents pre-dated her August 2003 merits hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006).

The 90-day filing limit does not apply to a motion to reopen based on changed conditions in the country of nationality when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Hanna v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-27(c)(3)(ii)

However, regulations provide that the 90-day requirement does not apply to motions to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . ., if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions only when the evidence is material and was not previously available or discoverable.

Alvarado-Vallardes v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-21(c)(3)(ii)

These limitations do not apply, however, to motions to reopen based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... Contrary to Alvarado’s assertions, the BIA’s dismissal reflects that it considered the evidence submitted by Alvarado to show worsened conditions in El Salvador, and found that those materials do not show material worsening of gang-related conditions in El Salvador since January 2006.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits an otherwise untimely motion to reopen to seek asylum or withholding based on materially changed country conditions, but requires evidence showing sufficiently changed circumstances.

Joshico v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-31(c)(3)(h)

Yet Joshico does not point to any record evidence demonstrating that circumstances in Indonesia have changed sufficiently since her hearing before the IJ to warrant the reopening of her proceedings as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits reopening to one motion filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Li You Cao v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The regulations permit one motion to reopen and require that it be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, it is undisputed that Cao’s motion to reopen was untimely. However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2 imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen but permits an untimely motion based on changed country conditions when supported by material, previously unavailable evidence.

Niyibizi v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An applicant for asylum has ninety days from “the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal” in which to file a motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time limit to file a motion to reopen proceedings “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered....” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The motion must be accompanied by “such evidence [that] is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... Michel’s work as a translator for the United States government in a high-profile terrorism ease, coupled with the information about the Rwandan government torturing the defendants in that case, constitutes a changed country condition sufficient to support the motion to reopen proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final administrative order of removal, subject to the exception in subsection (c)(3)(h) for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c) requires motions to reopen to be filed within ninety days of a final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening after that deadline when there are changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Xu v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-11-19(c), (c)(3)(ii)

The motion was indisputably untimely, as it was filed over six years after the IJ denied the petitioner’s asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of a final order). The petitioner did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which permits reopening based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.”

Section 1003.2(c) requires motions to reopen to be filed within ninety days of a final order, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) permits an exception based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.

Zhang Fen Xu v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2008-11-19(c), (e)(3)(ii)

The motion was indisputably untimely, as it was filed over six years after the IJ denied the petitioner’s asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of a final order). The petitioner did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii), which permits reopening based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” The BIA properly rejected the petitioner’s argument and concluded that he did not demonstrate a material change of circumstances in China for purposes of meeting the exception to the statutory time limit.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts qualifying asylum or withholding motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Lin v. United States Attorney General · filed 2008-12-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations provide that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in his country of nationality, if the evidence submitted is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of his hearing before the IJ. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, *85Lin’s motion to reopen was undisputably untimely, as it was filed with the BIA almost 12 years after the IJ issued an in absentia order excluding Lin from the United States.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the numerical limit when the alien submits evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-08-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations permit only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the instant motion was the fourth motion to reopen filed by Singh, clearly exceeding the numerical bar. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, Singh is not eligible for an exception to the numerical limitations because he failed to submit any documents to evidence a change in country conditions in India in the October 2005 motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision, but subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on qualifying changed circumstances in the country of nationality or destination.

Bhatti v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2007-08-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Bhatti did not file his motion until over a year after the BIA’s denial of his appeal. However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is mate*59rial and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or designated country; the applicant bears the burden of proving those changed conditions.

Limani v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2007-10-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, it is clear that Limani did not file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision, as he did not file the motion until ten years later. However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Limani failed to meet his burden of proof in establishing changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but allows an exception when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions, which the applicant must establish.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (e)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Zhang failed to establish changed country conditions in China warranting an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen. ... However, we cannot say that the BIA acted arbitrarily in concluding that the record reflects no material change in the Chinese government’s handling of political dissidents or its policy on internet usage.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates a time-limit exception for materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Zhang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhang’s December 2007 motion was untimely where the BIA issued a final order in May 1997. However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material to the applicant and the circumstances.

Castillo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-16(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioner’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or intended deportation.

He Gui Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-17(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, the *56time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because none of these assertions describe changed country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Jian Huan Guan, 345 F.3d at 49.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual numerical and 90-day limits when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Zhou v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-01-06(c)(3)(ii)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and the alien must file that motion no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision denying relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nevertheless, the numerical and time limitations set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) do not apply if the petitioner can establish “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, for the BIA to grant her motion to reopen, Zhou was required to present material evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” that was not available during her earlier hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a motion to reopen filed more than ninety days after a final removal order to be based on changed country conditions.

Ai Fang Li v. Filip · filed 2009-01-28(c)(3)(ii)

If the application is filed more than ninety days after a final order of removal is entered, the motion to reopen must be based on changed country conditions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Matter of C-W-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 346, 353 (BIA 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed country conditions only when the evidence shows changes material to the applicant's circumstances.

Casillas v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(3)(ii)

Petitioner’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and her circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes one-motion and 90-day limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country conditions for the relevant exception.

Blanco v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, in making his claim for protection under the *69Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), petitioner failed to present evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner and his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and because petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s changed-country-conditions exception; a successive asylum application based only on changed personal circumstances must still be accompanied by a qualifying motion to reopen.

Liu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-02-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

But we are of the view that this provision must be applied in harmony with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and 1003.23(b). Accordingly, we conclude that 8 U.S.C § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows successive asylum applications only within the 90-day reopening period for orders denying asylum unless the alien can show changed country conditions on the required accompanying motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen filed after the 90-day deadline when it seeks asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-02-04(c)(3)(ii)

But we are of the view that this provision must be applied in harmony with 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) and the regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and 1003.23(b). Accordingly, we conclude that 8 U.S.C § 1158(a)(2)(D) allows successive asylum applications only within the 90-day reopening period for orders denying asylum unless the alien can show changed country conditions on the required accompanying motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but that limit does not apply when the motion is based on changed country conditions supported by material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Bimbona v. Mukasey · filed 2009-02-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Ordinarily, a petitioner must file a motion to reopen “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The 90-day time limitation does not apply where a petitioner bases a motion to reopen on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But evidence of these changed conditions is only relevant if it was “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. Moreover, allegations of changed country conditions cannot be based on “speculative conclusions or mere assertions of fear of possible persecution.” Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a petitioner “must offer reasonably specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution.” Id. We conclude that Bimbona failed to do so.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an untimely motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Xu v. Holder · filed 2009-02-24(c)(3)(ii)

All three, however, filed their petitions after the 90-day deadline, thus requiring them to show “material” evidence of worsening conditions in China that “was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires the supporting evidence to be material and previously unavailable.

Yan v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-02-26(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yan’s second motion to reopen. Yan has presented evidence of changed personal circumstances in having two children but, unlike the petitioner in Li, has not submitted any evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” required for a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Furthermore, the majority of Yan’s documentary evidence was available when he filed either his original application for relief or his first motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that a motion to reopen will not be granted “unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline and a one-motion limit for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for asylum or withholding claims based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Herrera v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... The time and number limitations for motions to reopen do not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion seeking asylum or withholding based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Mushibuka v. Holder · filed 2009-03-16(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to reopen his case, but must generally do so within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, if such evidence is material and was not available at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions, but not merely on changed personal circumstances such as the birth of a child.

Hu v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-03-19(c)(3)(ii)

Cindy’s birth constitutes “changed personal circumstances,” insufficient to support an untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses that deadline only when material changed country conditions were previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Cordeschi v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-12-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by affirming the IJ’s denial of Cordeschi’s motion to reopen. First, Cordeschi’s motion to reopen was untimely, as she waited nearly 5 years to file it, and such a motion is normally required within 90 days. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Second, no exception - such as changed country conditions - applied. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Third, she made no showing that the outcome would have been different if her motion to reopen was granted. See Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1256-57.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but excepts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or removal.

Shui Xiam Ye v. Holder · filed 2011-12-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, Ye failed to establish changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2 generally permits one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Hou v. Holder · filed 2012-02-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the BIA concluded, Hou’s practice of Falun Gong in the United States is not changed circumstances arising in China. ... The evidence Hou submitted was therefore insufficient to establish a change in country conditions. Her recent practice of Falun Gong amounts at most to a change in personal circumstances. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Wagiu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the original hearing); see also Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004) (regulatory exception to time limitation does not extend to alleged changes in United States asylum law).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order, subject to an exception for changed country conditions supported by material evidence unavailable at the prior hearing.

Turangan v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-08-17(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must normally be filed within ninety days of a final order, but an exception to the time limitation exists if the motion is based on a change in conditions in the country to which the movant has been ordered removed, and is supported by material evidence not available at the prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) & (c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on materially changed conditions in the country of removal, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-08-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Initially, there is no dispute that Chen’s 2010 motion to reopen was untimely because his administrative order of deportation became final in 1998. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... To the extent Chen contends that the time and number limitations do not apply to his motion to reopen because his motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in” China, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), his arguments were properly rejected. ... However, as the agency found, his recent membership in the CDP was a change in personal circumstances, not a change in country conditions. ... Moreover, as the agency found, Chen failed to demonstrate material changed conditions in China because his evidence did not discuss the Chinese government’s treatment of CDP members returning from the United States, much less a change in the treatment of such individuals. ... Accordingly, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires one motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Molic v. Holder · filed 2012-09-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). However, the BIA’s finding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate changed country conditions is supported by substantial evidence. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Wang v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-01-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Wang does not dispute that his motion to reopen was untimely filed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (setting 90-day period for a motion to reopen). Rather, he argued to the BIA that his motion fell within the exception to the time limit based on changed country conditions. The time limitation does not apply if the movant seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). In addition to submitting new evidence showing materially changed conditions, an applicant seeking to reopen proceedings must also make a prima facie showing that he is eligible for the desired relief. Guo, 386 F.3d at 563.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the exception requires proof of materially changed country conditions.

Huang v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-03-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Huang’s motion to reopen, filed almost 8 years after the BIA entered the final removal order, was clearly untimely. The time limitation does not apply to motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Thus, Huang would be eligible to file an untimely asylum application in reopened proceedings based on his Christian faith, if he is able to show changed country conditions since the time of his hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions that could not previously have been presented.

Guo v. Holder · filed 2013-06-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Although the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), as the BIA concluded, Guo failed to establish changed circumstances for pro-democracy activists arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when there has been a material change in country conditions.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Kowengian v. Holder · filed 2013-09-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Kowengian’s May 2009 motion was untimely, as his final administrative order was issued in April 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably concluded that Kowengian failed to establish changed circumstances for ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia. Contrary to Kowengian’s argument, his evidence, which included an expert affidavit and various articles, was cumulative of evidence presented at his merits hearing, which also addressed sporadic attacks on churches and the passage of shari’a laws. The BIA also reasonably found that this evidence did not demonstrate that there had been a material change in the treatment of Christians and ethnic Chinese in Indonesia because: (1) the expert affidavit asserted that a change was likely to occur but had not yet occurred; and (2) evidence of increased support of radical Islam and economic and political instability as the possible impetus for a future pogrom did not prove that Christians or ethnic Chinese currently were being harmed in Indonesia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir. 2008) (reviewing the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline when the movant presents new, credible, and material evidence of changed country conditions.

Yu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-15(c)(3)(ii)

Yu neither filed his motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative order, nor satisfied the regulatory exception to this deadline by presenting new, credible, and material evidence of changed conditions in China.

Section 1003.2 generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but the deadline does not apply when the motion is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; an untimely motion may still be denied for failure to make a prima facie case for the requested relief.

De Saa v. Holder · filed 2014-07-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Nonetheless, the BIA may deny an untimely motion to reopen based on the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

The changed-country-conditions exception permits reopening despite the 90-day deadline only when the movant presents materially changed, previously unavailable evidence that, together with the original record, establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-01(c)(3)(ii)

To qualify for that exception, Singh must show (1) evidence that conditions in India have changed since his 2008 hearing, (2) the evidence is material, (3) the evidence was not “available and would not have been discovered or presented” at his 2008 hearing, and (4) the evidence, “when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Lin v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the date on which the agency’s final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-country-conditions exception when the movant makes a prima facie asylum showing.

Carrasco v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ortiz Carrasco’s motion to reopen, where the motion was filed more than six years after her final order of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ortiz Carrasco failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for asylum that would invoke the changed country conditions exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 992, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (news articles did not provide a link to show that petitioner would be affected by any change in country conditions discussed in the articles); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order of removal, unless an exception such as materially changed country conditions under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies and is supported by sufficient evidence.

Barua v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barua’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than two years after his final administrative order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to provide sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions to invoke the exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (setting forth requirements for prevailing on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) excuses that limit for material changed-country-conditions evidence that was previously unavailable.

Sesay v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, that time limitation is excused if the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) creates an exception to the ninety-day motion-to-reopen deadline for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality, and a personal change alone does not establish materially changed country conditions.

Lie v. Sessions · filed 2017-06-30(c)(2)

The crux of the current petition is whether the Lie Family has produced evidence to satisfy an exception to the ninety-day filing deadline that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Nevertheless, despite their change in personal circumstances, the Lie Family’s 2011 motion to reopen fails to present evidence to demonstrate that country conditions for Indonesian Christians has materially changed since they filed their 2003 asylum application.

The changed-country-conditions exception removes the one-motion and 90-day limits for an asylum or withholding motion when the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented; the alien bears the burden of proving changed country conditions.

Sangi v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-21(c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2018). This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country conditions, . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The alien bears the burden of establishing changed country conditions.

Section 1003.2 imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to an exception for an asylum motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the exception did not apply because Radoncic's new evidence was not material.

Radoncic v. Barr · filed 2019-05-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Radoncic does not dispute that his motion to reopen filed in 2011 was untimely because the BIA affirmed his removal order in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (90-day deadline for filing motion to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Although the new articles submitted by Radoncic with his motion vaguely described human rights violations, discrimination, politically motivated violence, and organized crime in Montenegro, they did not pertain to the grounds he alleged as the basis for his fear, nor did they offer a basis for determining if circumstances had changed. Accordingly, Radoncic’s new evidence was not material. ... The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion as untimely because Radoncic failed to satisfy the only available exception to the limitations period. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen seeking asylum or withholding when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions; changed conditions require an intensification or deterioration, not merely a continuation.

Twum v. Barr · filed 2019-07-09(c)(3)(ii)

However, that limit does not apply to petitions seeking either asylum or withholding of removal if the applicant presents evidence of "changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). "To establish changed country conditions, the evidence must demonstrate the intensification or deterioration of country conditions, not their mere continuation," Xin Qiang Liu v. Lynch, 802 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and the petitioner bears the burden of making such showing through a "convincing demonstration," id.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise untimely or number-barred motion to reopen when an asylum claim is based on materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable.

Lin v. Barr · filed 2019-12-26(c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Lin’s 2017 motion was untimely and number-barred because it was her second motion and was filed more than 13 years after her removal order became final in 2004. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is, however, an exception to the time and numerical limits if the movant seeks asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not err in finding that Lin failed to establish a material change in conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless a regulatory exception applies, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed country conditions for the relevant exception.

Singh v. Barr · filed 2020-03-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh has not established changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows a regulatory exception when the movant establishes changed country conditions.

Abramian v. Barr · filed 2020-09-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Abramian’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 11 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Abramian has not established changed country conditions in Georgia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an otherwise time-barred motion to reopen for asylum based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions in the relevant country.

Long Dong v. Garland · filed 2021-07-08(c)(3)(ii)

The time limitation does not apply if the motion is to reopen proceedings to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, because Petitioner did not establish a material adverse change in conditions in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception based on changed country conditions.

Lima-Nunez v. Garland · filed 2021-10-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lima-Nunez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over three years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he has not established changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion to reopen when it is based on material changed-country-conditions evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Josefina Son Tecum v. Garland · filed 2022-07-26(c)(3)(ii)

To be timely, a motion to reopen must generally be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But, as relevant here, “[t]here is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen” if it “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the usual time and numerical limits when it is based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality and supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Zhuiko v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2023-01-17(c)(3)(ii)

Generally, a noncitizen may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the agency’s final order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and numerical limitations do not apply, however, to motions seeking reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” and supported by material evidence that was not available during the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). “This changed-circumstances regulation effectively creates a procedural hurdle that must be overcome before an untimely motion to reopen may be considered.” Bamaca-Cifuentes, 870 F.3d at 111.

The changed-country-conditions exception to the time and numerical limits on motions to reopen requires materially different current country conditions, and a reasoned BIA determination that the evidence does not meet that burden is upheld on abuse-of-discretion review.

Anagho v. Garland · filed 2023-05-16(c)(3)(ii)

While there is evidence from which the Board could have concluded the conditions have sufficiently changed, there was also evidence in the record indicating that Anagho failed to establish that country conditions in Cameroon “were materially different from those conditions at the time of [her] original removal proceedings.” See Wanrong Lin, 771 F.3d at 185 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). And when the BIA catalogues a petitioner’s submissions, evaluates the evidence and explains why the evidence fails to meet the heavy burden, its decision “falls far short of arbitrariness.”