8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen, measured from the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2024-03-08(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Singh’s 2018 motion was untimely filed more than 90 days after the 2016 final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline from “final administrative order of removal”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not create an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen filed to seek adjustment of status.

Sharipov v. Garland · filed 2024-04-22(c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, a motion to reopen to seek adjustment of status does not fall into a statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (same); Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“[U]ntimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen . . . and will ordinarily be denied.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions.

Saro v. Bondi · filed 2026-02-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Saro’s untimely second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (noting that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation's exceptions; the court upheld the denial of reopening because petitioners did not qualify for an exception.

Garcia v. Blanche · filed 2026-04-29(c)(2)

Ordinarily, a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days after the filing of a final administrative decision “in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limit does not apply if the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As discussed above, Petitioners have failed to establish a cognizable particular social group to support their claim for withholding of removal or asylum. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Petitioners had not “establish[ed] their eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal” and that their motion thus does not “fall[] within an exception to the time limitation.”

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final removal order unless an exception to the filing deadline applies.

Monterroso v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen to apply for asylum and related relief, where petitioners filed the motion more than two years after their final orders of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and failed to establish materially changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order.

Fang Rong Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2)

The motion was undisputably untimely as it was filed over seventeen months after the BIA denied Zheng’s appeal. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order).

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision unless an exception or equitable tolling applies.

Ordonez-Maldonado v. Barr · filed 2019-04-22(c)(2)-(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ordonez-Maldonado’s motion to reopen as untimely, where she filed the motion more than four years after her final administrative order of removal, and did not show equitable tolling of the filing deadline was warranted or that the motion was subject to any exceptions to the deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen; even assuming tolling until a person learns of the claim, a motion filed about a year later is untimely.

Atoyan v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-11-04(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Atoyan’s motion to reopen. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Atoyan became aware of the existence of her claim during November 1999, and she did not file the motion to reopen until approximately a year later, well after the 90-day limitations period had expired.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-02(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin filed his motion several months after the 90-day deadline, and therefore it was time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to seek adjustment of status to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order.

Acosta v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-07-25(c)(2)

Thus, the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner was required to file a motion to reopen to adjust status within 90 days of the final order of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2) and 1003.23(b)(3).

A motion to reopen before the BIA must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order; equitable tolling requires diligence.

Deo v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Deo’s motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (stating that motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order). The agency issued its final decision on August 20, 2003. Deo and his present counsel were aware of the alleged appeal waiver and supposed ineffective assistance of counsel in September 2003, if not earlier. Deo filed the motion to reopen on October 4, 2004. Considering these facts, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Deo’s claims were not equitably tolled. See Rodriguez-Lariz, 282 F.3d at 1225 (holding that petitioners must act with diligence to preserve their claims).

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen is mandatory and jurisdictional and is not subject to equitable tolling.

Sidhwani v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-08-01(c)(2)

In Abdi, however, this Circuit held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied a petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen, because the 90-day limit was “mandatory and jurisdictional, and . . . not subject to equitable tolling.” 430 F.3d at 1150. ... Given our holding in Abdi, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when, in the course of affirming the IJ’s denial of Sidhwani’s motion to reopen, and denying his motion to reconsider, the BIA did not toll the 90-day limit on a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after the Board’s final decision.

Sanchez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-12-08(c)(2)

The motion to reopen, filed more than 90 days after the Board’s final decision of May 18, 2005, was untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

A motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order is untimely when the petitioner does not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in the country of removal.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-12-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely, because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Mexico, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final removal order.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-12(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen proceedings based on his failure to abide by the time limitations for such motions. The BIA appropriately noted that it issued the final order of removal in these proceedings on June 28, 2004, and that Singh was required to file his motion to reopen within ninety days of that order, that is, on or before September 27, 2004. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). However, Singh did not file his motion until October 6, 2004. As such, Singh’s motion to reopen was untimely.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, unless the deadline is equitably tolled.

Benavides v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-24(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Benavides’s motion as untimely. Motions to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision.

Buenrostro v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-10(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ first motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final administrative decision), and the BIA clarified its earlier ruling in accor*936dance with Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir.2004), in any event.

A motion to reopen seeking protection under CAT is subject to a ninety-day filing deadline.

Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-28(c)(2)

Ballesteros Martinez contends that his motion to reopen was timely because there is no time limit for motions to reopen that seek relief under CAT and because he only recently became aware of “widespread torture” in Mexico. Ballesteros Martinez filed his motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Salazar-Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-01-09(c)(2)

Salazar-Garcia filed her motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, subject to a changed country conditions exception.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s first motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it 20 months after the BIA’s final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Singh also failed to demonstrate that he qualified for the changed country conditions exception to the 90-day time limit.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen, and the Board need not reach the merits of an untimely motion that does not qualify for the changed-country-conditions exception.

Tjan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-16(c)(2)

The BIA was not obligated to consider the merits of Tjan’s motion once it determined that it was untimely and that it did not qualify for an exception to the 90-day time limit based on changed country conditions.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Mercan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-20(c)(2)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mercan’s motion to reopen as untimely. The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which *405the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Aujla v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-25(e)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh Aujla’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order).

A motion to reopen before the BIA is subject to a 90-day filing deadline.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-03-24(c)(2)

As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in May 2002, but Lin did not file his motion to reopen until March 2008, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for motions to reopen before the BIA; a motion filed more than a year after the final removal order is untimely.

Hermosillo v. Holder · filed 2009-07-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for BIA motions to reopen; equitable tolling requires the petitioner to act with due diligence.

Mendoza-Valencia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed more than four years after the BIA’s May 28, 2004, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the removal order becomes administratively final, unless a basis to excuse the delay applies.

Valencia v. Holder · filed 2011-10-07(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the date the order of removal becomes administratively final. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen. Its decision was based on Valencia's failure to file the motion within the statutorily prescribed time limits.

A motion to reopen filed after the regulatory time limit requires a showing of materially changed country circumstances to qualify for the exception.

Nadir Ali v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-10-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ali’s motion to reopen as untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), where Ali failed to demonstrate that there had been a material change in circumstances in Pakistan with respect to violence between Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-91 (9th Cir. 2010).

An application for adjustment of status does not exempt a motion to reopen from the filing time limit.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2012-03-07(c)(3)

Insofar as Zheng sought reopening based on his application for adjustment of status, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely because an adjustment application is not an exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after the BIA dismisses an appeal.

Ukwu v. Holder · filed 2013-04-05(c)(2)

Ukwu’s motion to reopen was filed more than 90 days after the BIA dismissed his original appeal. As a result, his request to reopen his case based on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel was untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2).

A motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals must meet the filing deadline unless an exception applies.

Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jacinto Hernandez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed five years after proper notice of the final order of removal, and Jacinto Hernandez did not demonstrate grounds for any exception to the filing deadline.

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Osei v. Holder · filed 2014-01-13(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Osei-Wusu v. Holder · filed 2014-04-14(e)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2). There is no dispute that Osei-Wusu’s motion to reopen, filed in 2011, was untimely because his order of removal became final in 2006.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) gives an alien 90 days after a final removal order to file a motion to reopen, unless an exception applies.

Garcia-Mendoza v. Garland · filed 2023-01-17(c)(2)

Because Garcia cannot demonstrate that he qualifies for an exception to the time bar in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the BIA’s determination that Garcia’s motion to reopen was untimely was not in error.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision; equitable tolling requires due diligence.

Cargoso v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2023-11-29(c)(2)

Thus, by the plain language of the regulatory bar, Cargoso’s motion to reopen is untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider an immigration proceeding to be filed within the prescribed time limit after the final administrative decision.

Gonzalez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(b)(2)

There is no dispute that Gonzalez’s motion to reopen and reconsider was filed more than 90 days after the BIA dismissed the original appeal. As a result, his requests to reconsider his case based on Lopez and on his allegations of ineffective assistance were untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen immigration proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions.

Gurung v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gurung’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gurung did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision is entered and served, absent an applicable exception.

Mahamadou v. Holder · filed 2012-07-11(c)(2)

Aliens seeking to reopen proceedings may file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was entered and served on the appropriate party in person or by mail. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13; Ping Chen, 502 F.3d at 75. Here, the BIA reasonably found that it properly served Mahamadou by mailing a copy of its decision to both his and his attorney’s last known addresses on July 22, 2009, thus starting the 90-day filing period. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13; Ping Chen, 502 F.3d at 75. Because Mahamadou did not file his motion to reissue until March 2011, it was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to specified regulatory exceptions.

Sandhu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandhu’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Sandhu failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)'s exceptions do not include pursuing adjustment of status.

Lucero v. Holder · filed 2012-03-22(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lucero’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, Lucero’s final order of removal was entered in 2007, but Lucero did not file his motion to reopen until 2009, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA reasonably concluded that Lucero’s purported eligibility to adjust status did not excuse the time limitation for filing his motion to reopen. See Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Juarez-Contreras v. Holder · filed 2012-03-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Juarez-Contreras’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed over three years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Juarez-Contreras did not establish he acted with due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c) does not exempt a motion to reopen from the 90-day deadline merely because the applicant is eligible to adjust status.

Ahmed v. Garland · filed 2021-12-07(c)

His eligibility to adjust does not implicate an exception to the 90-day time limit for reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final decision, and the court applied that time limit to motions seeking CAT relief and a second asylum application.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because Chen filed the motion more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and his evidence did not demonstrate changed circumstances in China, see He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances in the country of origin within the regulatory exception to late-filed [motions to reopen].”). ... We reject Chen’s contention that there are no time limits for filing a motion to reopen to apply for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Finally, Chen’s due process claim fails because the BIA properly applied the time limitations for motions to reopen set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) to his untimely second application for asylum.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the Board’s final order unless an exception applies, and § 1003.2(a)’s sua sponte reopening decisions are not subject to judicial review.

Artega v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order of removal, and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they qualified for an exception to the 90-day time limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires motions to reopen to be filed within the applicable deadline and treats an untimely filing as barred unless tolling is warranted.

Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2010-08-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ramirez’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than three years after her final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ramirez failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the motions deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening to allow an application for discretionary relief when the right to seek that relief was fully explained and an opportunity to apply was provided at the prior hearing, unless circumstances arose afterward.

Silva v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-27(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted . . . for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief . . . if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Regardless of whether Silva was a strong candidate for 212(c) relief in 1994, she chose to withdraw her application, forgoing any possibility of 212(c) relief, after IJ Warren advised her of her rights and the consequences of her withdrawal.

Section 1003.2(c)’s time and number limits apply to motions to reopen seeking CAT protection, subject to the changed country conditions exception.

Bamaca-Cifuentes v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-08-29(c)

Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we will hold that the procedural requirements in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply with equal force to motions to reopen removal proceedings involving protection under the CAT.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board to reopen a case in which it rendered a decision and to consider ineffective-assistance claims based on counsel’s conduct after a final removal order.

Singh v. Napolitano · filed 2010-08-23(a)

The Attorney General’s interpretation of the Board’s jurisdictional statute, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2008), is reasonable, and we therefore defer to it. See Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that we review an agency’s interpretation of the regulations governing its jurisdiction for reasonableness). Under this authoritative interpretation, the Board had jurisdiction to hear Singh’s ineffective assistance claim, and Singh’s petition would fail for failure to exhaust this administrative remedy.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to proffer new facts supported by affidavits or other evidence, and permits reopening only when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable or could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Arulanantharasa v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-08-27(c)(1)

In a motion to reopen removal proceedings, the alien must proffer “new facts to be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,” and the motion “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted” unless it appears to the Board that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... Although the BIA may not have expressly stated the term “prima facie,” it appropriately based its decision on the requirements of § 1003.2(c)(1) and Doherty.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to proffer new facts supported by affidavits or other evidence, and bars reopening unless the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable.

Arulanantharasa v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-08-27(c)(1)

In a motion to reopen removal proceedings, the alien must proffer “new facts to be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,” and the motion “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted” unless it appears to the Board that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... We agree that the evidence that Arulanantharasa presented with her motion to reopen was not material nor did it establish a prima facie case for the relief sought. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c) provides the proper procedural avenue for an alien seeking to reopen immigration proceedings based on subsequent events that may affect the alien’s asylum claim.

Mbodj v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-08-31(c)

If Mbodj believes that subsequent events may impact his asylum claim, the proper course is for him to move the BIA to reopen proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and a failure to provide promised affidavits supports denial of the motion.

Buenrostro v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen where petitioners failed to present any of the promised affidavits to the BIA to support their contention of hardship to Maria Buenrostro’s parents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material establishing the asserted new facts.

Xu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-21(c)(1)

Moreover, although Xu stated in her motion to reopen that she had failed to receive the scheduling order which could have been “due to the change in [her] address,” Xu failed to submit any competent evidence in the form of affidavits or other evidentiary material to either show that her address had changed before July 2002, when the notice had been sent, or to support her assertion that the notice had not been delivered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2002); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (2000).

A motion to reopen must state material new facts to be proven at a hearing and include evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-07(c)(1)

Because Liu’s motion failed to meet the evidentiary requirements for a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA reasonably construed the motion as a motion to reconsider and denied it as untimely. ... Further, the BIA reasonably found that even if Liu’s motion were considered to be a motion to reopen, it would be denied pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), because it failed “to state any new facts that are material and that [would] be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion [were] granted[,] and [it was] ... unaccompanied by any evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented during pro*13ceedings before the Immigration Judge.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and inadequate evidence does not warrant reopening.

Lira v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lira’s motion to reopen because he failed to present evidence to support his contention that his newborn child has a medical condition and the evidence presented regarding his wife’s health was insufficient to warrant reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Bermudez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(1)

To the extent that Chavez’s pro se brief challenges the BIA’s April 30, 2007 decision, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the October 3, 2006 motion to reopen because Chavez failed to present evidence to support any of his contentions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the removal order, subject to exceptions including certain in absentia orders.

Wood v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-11-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(i)

As the BIA concluded, Wood’s motion was plainly untimely. A motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the removal order, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wood filed the motion at issue here more than a decade after the BIA entered the final order in his case. There are various exceptions to this deadline — including (1) in certain circumstances if the order was entered in absentia, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i); (2) if the motion is filed for the purpose of applying “for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed country conditions,” § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); (3) if the motion is jointly filed by the parties, § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii); or (4) if the Government files the motion, § 1003.2(c)(3)(iv) — but none of those exceptions applies here. Therefore, the BIA did not err in concluding that the motion was time-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a 90-day deadline, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a changed-circumstances exception when the supporting evidence shows materially changed conditions in the country of removal.

Rani v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-04-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA reasonably found that the motion, which was filed over nine months after the BIA issued its decision, was untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA also reasonably found that the evidence Rani submitted with her motion to reopen, which she claims proves “how Hindus were killed in India,” did not meet the changed-circumstances regulatory exception for untimely motions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant establishes a prima facie case; subsection (c)(2) imposes a 90-day filing deadline that is subject to equitable tolling.

Sotovando-Cifuentez v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2006-05-10(a), (c)(2)

We afford the BIA “broad deference” in these decisions, Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003), and, under the regulations, the Board “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. However, Sotovando-Cifuentez argues that the BIA should have equitably tolled the time period between the issuance of the Board’s July 1996 order and September 2004 when he filed his motion to reopen because his former counsel was ineffective. As the restrictions on when a person can file a motion to reopen are analogous to a statute of limitations, we have previously held that this time period is subject to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c) generally requires a motion to reopen a BIA case to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Smallhorne v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2006-05-10(c)

A motion to reopen a case in the BIA is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), which provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, that a “motion [to reopen] must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” Smallhorne filed his motion to reopen with the BIA at least four years too late. We therefore discern no error in the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision.

Ologe v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-21(c)(1), (c)(2)

Such a motion may not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... While certain omissions from the record may have been material to her claim, Ologe failed to raise this issue before the BIA in a timely manner. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005) (A motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed almost seven years after the underlying BIA decision untimely, and the changed-circumstances exception requires the movant to demonstrate changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Wang v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-08-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA reasonably found that Wang’s motion was untimely and that Wang failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China that would excuse the late-filing of his motion. In his motion, Wang did not dispute that the motion was untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), nor could he have succeeded on such a claim, inasmuch as the motion was filed in August 2005, almost seven years after the September 1998 BIA decision from which the motion was filed.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, unless the changed-circumstances exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) applies, and generalized evidence of police abuse was insufficient to satisfy that exception.

Vahniwal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely because Vahniwal filed the motion 20 months after the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal). The evidence submitted by Vahniwal, consisting primarily of articles about incidents of police abuse against Sikh individuals from 1994-2002, was insufficient to establish that the motion fell within the “changed circumstances” exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Konstantinova, 195 F.3d at 530 (concluding changed circumstances evidence was too general to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Rahmolla v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-06-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed before the BIA within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, an exception to this time requirement exists for aliens seeking to “reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir. 2002). ... Therefore, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that the Rahmollas do not meet the changed circumstances exception to the regulatory time limit for motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion based on changed country conditions only when those changes are material to the relief claim.

Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-06-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Lin’s motion was filed beyond the 90-day deadline; however, Lin argues that “changed circumstances” in China affected his eligibility for relief, excusing the untimeliness of his motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Lin failed to establish changed circumstances in China that were material to his claims for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances to present material evidence that was previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(c)(2) requires filing within 90 days unless an exception applies.

Jecrois v. Attorney General · filed 2007-07-23(c)(1), (c)(2)

The BIA is obliged not to grant a motion to reopen in immigration proceedings “unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Because the BIA issued its final administrative decision affirming the IJ’s denial of Jecrois’ application on January 9, 2003, he had to file his motion to reopen within 90 days of that date. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Accordingly, none of the proffered evidence established material changed circumstances in Haiti after Jecrois’ asylum hearing and therefore Jecrois failed to satisfy the exception to the timely filing requirement.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Zhen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-08-10(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, Zhen failed to timely file his motion to reopen. The BIA denied his appeal in March 2001, and Zhen filed his motion to reopen in August 2005.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts asylum or withholding motions based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances from the time limit.

Rodriguez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion *660“must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”), and petitioners did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Mexico, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time limitations do not apply to motions to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances, if the evidence is material and was not available at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions from that time limit.

Kaur v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-09-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Kaur did not file her motion until more than one year after the BIA’s denial of her appeal. However, the time limit does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to an exception for changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Liu v. Keisler · filed 2007-09-28(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

Based on the evidence presented, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen. A motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA issued its final order in November 1995; so it is undisputed that Liu’s September 2005 motion was untimely. However, Liu argued that the birth of her two children in the United States constituted “new circumstances” providing an exception to the timeliness requirement. Cf 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA reasonably rejected this argument. The 90 day filing deadline for motions to reopen does not apply where the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. Such changes are regularly referred to as “changed country conditions,” as distinguished from “changed personal circumstances.” See Jian Huan Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003). Changes in an individual’s personal circumstances do not constitute changed country conditions that might mitigate the time and number *220limitations set forth in the INA and applicable regulations. See id; Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005). Moreover, the evidence Liu presented in support of her motion-including documents prepared by John Shields Aird — did not, without more, show changed circumstances in China with respect to the family planning policy. See Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274-76 (2d Cir.2006) (finding that the Aird affidavit was insufficient to establish the existence of a policy of forced sterilization in China and noting that the State Department Country Report finds no official policy of forced sterilization). Accordingly, to the extent that the BIA denied Liu’s motion because it was based on a change in personal circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, adjustment-of-status eligibility is not an exception under subsection (c)(3), and jointly filed motions are exempt from the time and numerical limits under subsection (c)(3)(iii).

Keeswyk v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-25(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(3)(iii)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to reopen his case, but must generally do so within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. Here, there is no dispute that Keeswyk’s January 2007 motion was untimely because the BIA issued its decision dismissing his appeal in March 2002. Keeswyk argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion because it failed to consider his eligibility for adjustment of status based on his marriage to a United States citizen. This argument, however, is unavailing, as Keeswyk’s potential eligibility for adjustment of status does not constitute an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... We note that BIA regulations provide that if the petitioner and the government jointly file a motion to reopen, the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to specified exceptions, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable.

Martinez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Galindez Martinez filed his motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... In addition, he failed to present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1131-32 (9th Cir.2007).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but exempts motions supported by previously unavailable material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality or destination.

Zalla v. Attorney General · filed 2008-04-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time bar of § 1003.2(c)(2) does not apply, however, if the alien seeks to admit material evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” which “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The Zallas’ motions were filed almost three years late and they have not shown the changed circumstances necessary to exempt them from the ninety-day time limitation.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to deny reopening even after a prima facie showing, and subsection (c)(3)(ii) does not excuse the filing limits based solely on personal changes such as marriage and U.S.-born children rather than changed country conditions.

Chen v. Attorney General of United States. · filed 2008-04-18(a), (c)(3)(ii)

Under the regulations, the Board “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Here, as discussed above, the BIA found that the birth of Chen’s two children in the United States and his marriage do not constitute “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” as required by INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) in order to avoid appliea- ... tion of the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen. ... We agree that Chen’s changed personal circumstances are distinct from changed circumstances arising in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the BIA within 90 days after the BIA mails its decision.

Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-21(c)(2)

Specifically, the regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) requires materially changed circumstances to support reopening for Convention Against Torture protection.

Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-16(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The regulations state that a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Petitioner’s final administrative order of removal was entered on November 8, 2005. Petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed on September 20, 2007, more than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent petitioner challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen for protection under the Convention Against Torture, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. Petitioner has not met his burden of presenting a prima facie case for reopening because the motion to reopen does not present any changes that have occurred in Mexico that are material to him or his circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, unless it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions; the movant must show that the country conditions have materially worsened.

Juncaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the agency’s final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day filing deadline does not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... To prevail in his motion, Juncaj was required not only to submit previously unavailable evidence, but to show that such evidence demonstrated that conditions in Montenegro had grown worse. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when the motion is supported by materially changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances such as the birth of U.S.-citizen children do not satisfy that exception.

Su Ying Wen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-06-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA properly found that the motion was untimely as it was filed in February 2007, long after the 90-day deadline following the agency’s May 2004 final administrative order had passed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA also properly found that Wen’s motion did not qualify for the changed country conditions exception set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The only evidence that Wen submitted in support of her motion to reopen was a copy of her marriage certificate and copies of her children’s birth certificates. It is well-settled that the birth of U.S. citizen children is evidence of changed personal circumstances and is insufficient to show changed country conditions in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) provides an exception when changed circumstances arise in the country of nationality.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen. There is no dispute that Liu’s January 2007 motion was untimely where it was filed well after the 90-day deadline following the BIA’s final administrative decision in September 2002. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in finding that Liu failed to prove “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” that would excuse the untimeliness of his motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed nearly two years after the final order, unless the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-01(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost two years after the BIA issued its final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order, subject to the changed-country-circumstances exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) when the new evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-08-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The motion was indisputably untimely, as it was filed over three years after the BIA denied Chen’s motion for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (c)(2) (motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order). Chen did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), which permits reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of a final order, but reopening may be available for changed country conditions when the evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-08-12(c)(2), (e)(3)(ii)

The motion was indisputably untimely, as it was filed over three years after the BIA denied Chen’s motion for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order). Chen did not contest the tardiness of his motion; he did, however, assert that it fell within the exception of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii), which permits reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits reopening based on changed circumstances only when the petitioner establishes that the requirements for that exception are met.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-19(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed on December 18, 2007, more than 90 days after the March 23, 1998 final administrative decision. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioner failed to show that reopening was warranted based on changed circumstances in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945-47 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section (c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Long En Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-26(c)(2)

Even if Zheng had not waived these arguments, we would find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. It is undisputed that Zheng’s motion was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that his motion did not qualify for an exception to the time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2 limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits an exception for materially changed, previously unavailable country-conditions evidence; a change in personal circumstances does not qualify.

Dong v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-10-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within ninety days of the issuance of the final administrative order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... As to the former claim, the BIA properly found that a change in personal circumstances cannot establish changed country conditions excusing an applicant from the applicable time and numerical limitations. See Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that the birth of U.S. citizen children constitutes a change in personal circumstances and not a change in country conditions, and therefore does not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions; a change in personal circumstances and evidence not showing a change in policy enforcement do not satisfy that exception.

Lin v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-10-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen and such motion must be filed within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, those time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or *419presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA properly found that this change in personal circumstances could not establish changed country conditions excusing the untimeliness of Lin’s motion to reopen. ... Moreover, although Lin submitted letters from his father and neighbor stating that his parents were detained due to his family planning violation, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that he failed to present any evidence of changed country conditions where the letters did not reference past policy or any change in policy enforcement.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen when the movant fails to present evidence of materially changed circumstances.

Tooy v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tooy’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and Tooy failed to present evidence of material changed circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but provides no time limit for a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality or designated removal country.

Ting Long Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file his motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). There is no time limit, however, for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). Here, the agency properly found that Chen’s motion did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision and generally permits only one motion to reopen.

Torres-Refulio v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-26(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days after the date of the BIA’s final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Generally, a party may only file one motion to reopen. Id. The motion to reopen at issue in this petition was Torres’s third, and it was filed over seven years after his order of removal. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres’s motion on the ground that it was procedurally barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion seeking asylum or withholding based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Lian v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lian filed his motion more than four years after the BIA’s final decision. However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “to apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes those limits when materially changed circumstances arise in the country of nationality; the court applied these rules to reject Papa’s motion as untimely and unsupported by changed conditions.

Papa v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Additionally, the deadline may also be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, so long as the movant has exercised “due diligence” in vindicating his or her rights. See Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.2006). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion *36in denying Papa’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, Papa’s arguments as to changed country conditions and ineffective assistance of counsel are unavailing.

Section 1003.2 requires an alien seeking to reopen to submit supporting evidence, generally permits only one motion filed within 90 days, and removes those limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Jiang v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-23(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ’s denial of relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... It was Jiang’s burden to present evidence to support his motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen before the BIA, so a motion filed more than eighteen months after the BIA’s final order is untimely absent equitable tolling.

Pichardo-Cruz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-30(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely because it was filed more than eighteen months after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error,” as long as the petitioner acted with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file the motion within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ouyoung v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-08(c)(2)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, with an exception requiring evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Zeng v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zeng’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and Zeng failed to present evidence of changed circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

The changed-circumstances exception permits a motion to reopen after the 90-day deadline when material evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior merits hearing.

Chen v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)(ii)

Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Therefore, on the record before us, any evidence dated after June 19, 2002 is new. ... Accordingly, the Board abused its discretion in concluding that only the Aird affidavit was new.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but that limit does not apply to a motion seeking asylum or withholding based on qualifying changed circumstances in the movant’s country of nationality.

Di Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-02-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations provide that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. ... This limitation, however, does not apply when the movant seeks reopening to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in his country of nationality, if the evidence submitted is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of his hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides no time limit for motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; a change in personal circumstances does not qualify for the exception.

Be Song Zong v. Holder · filed 2009-09-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. ... However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” ... It is well-settled that a change in personal circumstances does not excuse the time limit for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions.

Shi Yong Fang v. Holder · filed 2009-10-02(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision is rendered in the proceedings that the applicant seeks to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(2) permits reopening an untimely motion only when the applicant submits sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Ain Gin Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-11-06(c)(3)(2)

We conclude that the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s untimely motion to reopen because it reasonably found that she failed to submit sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in China.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Wen Xiu Jiang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-11-16(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the 90-day limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions including the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Lima-Cortez v. Holder · filed 2009-12-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaman’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002) (motion to reopen based on pending I-130 petition may be granted if, inter alia, the motion is timely filed), and Zaman failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii), while subsection (a) preserves the Board's discretion to deny reopening even when a prima facie case is shown.

Shih v. Holder · filed 2010-02-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

The regulations provide that “[a] party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Indisputably, Shih’s May 2005 motion was untimely because he filed it more than twelve years after the IJ’s November 1992 in absentia order. However, the time limitation does not apply when the alien can establish materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... the BIA found that even if he had, it would deny his motion as a matter of discretion. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (finding that “in cases in which the ultimate grant of relief is discretionary,” the agency may jump ahead and determine that the movant would not be entitled to discretionary relief); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) ( “The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Shao v. Holder · filed 2010-03-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is indisputable that Shao’s motion to reopen was untimely. However, the time limitation does not apply if the alien establishes materially changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the changed-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s May 4, 2005, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty, 381 F.3d at 945 (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for motions supported by material evidence of changed country conditions.

Rantung v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-12-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

With respect to No. 09-73076, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rantung’s motion to reopen as untimely because Rantung filed it over five years after the BIA issued its final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Rantung and failed to submit material evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the 90-day filing deadline when it is based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of deportation.

Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-01-04(c)(3)(ii)

Likewise, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s second motion to reopen. The evidence she presented, though suggesting changes in Chinese policy abroad, did not represent a material change in conditions within China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (stating an exemption to the 90-day time limitation where the movant presents evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered . . . .”) (emphasis added). Instead, this evidence merely illustrates a continuation of China’s more than decade-long crackdown on Falun Gong.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed circumstances to excuse a late filing.

Belen v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Belen’s motion to reopen as untimely where Belen filed it nearly twelve years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Belen failed to submit material evidence of changed circumstances in the Philippines that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that petitioner now has a well-founded fear of persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) removes that deadline when the alien establishes materially changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Wen Xin Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-01-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no filing deadline, however, if the alien establishes materially “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion as untimely because it was filed more than two years after his May 24, 2006 final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limitation on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception based on changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Supit v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence submitted with motion to reopen must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the original hearing); see also Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004) (regulatory exception to time limitation does not extend to alleged changes in United States asylum law).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed almost four years after the BIA’s final administrative order untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception requiring changed circumstances in Morocco.

Bonjemaa v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bonjemaa’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed almost four years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Bonjemaa failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Morocco to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90.

Under § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen filed over seven years after the final order is untimely, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country to qualify for the regulatory exception.

Kaur v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over seven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (evidence of changed conditions must be material).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding.

Jobira v. Holder · filed 2012-10-30(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after “the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The changed-circumstances exception permits a motion to reopen beyond the time limit only when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-19(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the prior proceeding to be material).

Subsection (c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to that deadline.

Taslakhchyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-19(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Taslakhchyan’s motion to reopen as untimely, because her motion was filed nearly two years after the BIA’s January 30, 2008, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), did not establish an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), and did not establish grounds for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-80 (equitable tolling available where petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c) permits an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances, and that evidence must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at the prior hearing.

Mahindrath v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mahindrathan’s untimely motion to reopen because Mahindrathan failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Sri Lanka to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“the critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than nine years after a final exclusion order as untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception requiring a material change in circumstances in Guatemala.

Quinonez-Colop v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Quinonez-Colop’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than nine years after his exclusion order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Quinonez-Colop failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to meet the filing deadline unless the movant demonstrates materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Hang Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than six years after her final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Chen failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991; He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (a change in personal circumstances does not establish changed circumstances in the country of origin).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion based on materially changed country conditions only when the applicant establishes circumstances warranting reopening.

Butta v. Holder · filed 2013-09-18(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Butta contends, however, that he has established changed circumstances excusing his untimely motion to reopen, namely, materially worsened conditions in Pakistan for moderate Muslims who reject extremist ideology. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Because evidence of Butta’s religious beliefs was necessary to assess whether he established a material change in conditions that affected his eligibility for asylum, the BIA did not err in finding that Butta did not establish changed circumstances warranting reopening of his proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after a final administrative order of removal.

Lin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-02(c)(2)

Section 240(c)(7)(A) of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), permits an alien to file one motion to reopen removal proceedings, provided that the filing is “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Subsection (c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed over seven years after the BIA's final decision as untimely, while subsection (c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed circumstances in India are established.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over seven years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, but provides an exception for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Li v. Holder · filed 2014-05-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Li’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than seven years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than sixteen years after the final deportation order as untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception only when materially changed circumstances are established.

Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-12-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion over sixteen years after the IJ’s final order of deportation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Nicaragua in order to qualify for the regulatory exception, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of changed conditions must be qualitatively different than what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien to file a motion to reopen within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Nyabwari v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-20(c)(2)

An alien must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which the final administrative decision is entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly determined that Nyabwari’s motion to reopen was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision. See § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to satisfy the filing deadline unless a statutory or regulatory exception applies.

Li v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-03(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Li’s motion to reopen, where he filed the motion over five years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish that any statutory or regulatory exception applies, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (setting forth exceptions to the filing deadline for motions to reopen).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final removal order, unless the movant qualifies for an exception such as seeking asylum based on changed country conditions.

Martinez-Meza v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Meza’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than one year after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and failed to establish that he warranted an exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (90-day deadline does not apply when alien seeks to apply for asylum and related relief based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the final order as untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed circumstances to invoke the regulatory exception.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while changed personal circumstances do not excuse an untimely motion under the exception for changed conditions.

Li Ghuang You v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-31(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision. ... You’s political activities constituted changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of a final administrative removal order, subject to an exception for materially changed country conditions.

Lazo-Rodriguez v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lazo-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than six years after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final administrative order of removal). Lazo-Rodriguez failed to demonstrate changed conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) does not excuse an untimely motion to reopen when the movant fails to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Jimenez-Morataya v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jimenez-Morataya’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final order, and Jimenez-Morataya failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than 12 years after the final order of removal is untimely.

Galindo v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-04(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barillas Galindo’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than 12 years after his final order of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Barillas Galindo failed to exercise the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (due diligence requires petitioner to take reasonable steps to investigate any suspected fraud or error, or if he is ignorant of such circumstances, make reasonable efforts to pursue relief).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3) supplies regulatory exceptions to that deadline.

Cabrera v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-04(c)(2) (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez Cabrera’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 10 years past the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he does not qualify for any regulatory exception or equitable tolling of the deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

The filing deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled only when the petitioner exercises due diligence, and statutory or regulatory exceptions to the deadline may apply.

Meza-Noyola v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-19(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Meza-Noyola’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than six years after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Meza-Noyola failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline and has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline applies. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (setting forth exceptions to the filing limitations for motions to reopen); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for filing motions to reopen removal proceedings.

Oseguera-Salce v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Oseguera-Salce’s motion as untimely, where the motion was filed more than one year after the agency’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (setting a 90-day filing deadline for motions to reopen), and Oseguera-Salce failed to establish changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on materially changed country conditions when the new evidence was previously unavailable.

El-Abaidy v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-06-14(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Under the INA, an alien may file one motion to reopen removal proceedings and must do so within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal. INA § 240(c)(7)(A), (C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day time limit does not apply if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an untimely motion when material, previously unavailable evidence shows changed country conditions.

Yan Fang Chen v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-08-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final order of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A movant may be relieved of this time bar if he shows “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Chen filed his motion to reopen outside the ninety-day deadline. Therefore, to obtain relief on his untimely motion to reopen, Chen must provide the BIA with new, previously unavailable material evidence of changed conditions in China.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the material-change exception, and permits sua sponte reopening only in exceptional situations.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

A motion to reopen proceedings must be filed within ninety days after the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Under the Board’s regulations, the ninety-day deadline shall not apply where there is evidence that circumstances have materially changed in the country of removal, and such evidence was not previously available or could not have been previously presented. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But Singh has not argued that conditions in India have changed in any material way. ... The Board possesses “limited discretionary powers” to reopen proceedings sua sponte at any time. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). But that power is exercised only in “exceptional situations,” and the burden is on Singh to show that such a situation exists. ... The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion as untimely or in failing to waive the deadline sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s filing deadline barred consideration of the motion as untimely when it was filed more than two years after the final administrative order.

Calderon v. Sessions · filed 2017-11-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Calderon’s motion to reopen as untimely, where Calderon filed the motion more than two years after his final administrative order of removal, he failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, and he did not present sufficient evidence to qualify for any regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Subsection (c)(2) bars a motion to reopen as untimely when it is filed more than a year after the final order of removal.

Mora v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-01-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than a year after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish that equitable tolling of the filing deadline was warranted due to a lack of continuance or alleged notary fraud, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (The court recognizes equitable tolling “during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of a deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud or error.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Velasquez-Medina v. Barr · filed 2019-05-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Velasquez-Medina’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel and new eligibility for asylum and related relief, where he filed the motion more than three years after his final administrative order of removal, he did not show due diligence for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, and he did not show that the motion was subject to any exceptions to the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3) (subject to exceptions, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant submits sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Lemus-Sandoval v. Barr · filed 2019-06-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Lemus-Sandoval’s motion to reopen, because he filed the motion a year and a half after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to provide sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions to invoke the exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (setting forth requirements for prevailing on a motion to reopen on the basis of changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a noncitizen to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final administrative order of removal.

v. 19-1965P.01A · filed 2020-03-09(c)(2)

A noncitizen is generally limited to a single motion to reopen, which must ordinarily be filed within ninety days of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence of changed country conditions for an exception to the filing deadline for motions to reopen.

Perez v. Barr · filed 2020-03-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than two years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Perez Perez did not establish changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to his claim for relief, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (requiring material evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for exception to filing deadline for motions to reopen); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) imposes no filing-time limit on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.

Lindawati v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-01-26(c)(3)(ii)

Because Petitioners’ motion is based on changed country conditions, there is no time limit within which they must have filed it. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Buenrostro-Hernandez v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Buenrostro-Hernandez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than five months after the order of removal became final, and Buenrostro-Hernandez did not establish changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (movant required to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Subsection (c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and the court applied it to uphold denial of the petitioners’ untimely motion because they did not qualify for an exception.

Baena v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where they failed to qualify for any exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)–(3).

Section 1003.2(a) permits an alien to seek sua sponte reopening through the immigration court’s regulatory power, and a regulatory motion to reopen may be filed at any time.

Reyes-Amaya v. Garland · filed 2022-08-10(a)

“An alien seeking to reopen his removal proceedings has two options: (1) he can invoke the court’s regulatory power to sua sponte reopen proceedings under either 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); or (2) he can invoke his statutory right to reopen proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).” ... “While a regulatory motion to reopen may be filed “at any time,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), a statutory motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen in exceptional situations and generally prevents judicial review of that discretionary decision.

Maria Rosa Caguana Duchi v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2026-03-27(c)(2), (a)

A motion for the BIA to reopen immigration proceedings “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). After that window closes, the BIA has discretion to reopen a case in “exceptional situations.” Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976 (BIA 1997)); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Because the BIA retains “unfettered discretion” even in exceptional situations, we generally do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s exercise of that discretion. Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 129 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen before the BIA.

Phrasavath v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-16(c)(2)

The BIA therefore properly applied the filing deadline of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) to deny Phrasavath’s motion to reopen.

A motion to reopen filed after the 90-day deadline requires a demonstrated material change in country circumstances to qualify for the changed-circumstances exception.

Alonso v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(c)(3)(ii)

The Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely, because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2), and did not demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Mexico, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).