8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen deportation proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, or by September 30, 1996, whichever is later.

Pineda-Oreana v. Holder · filed 2009-11-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pineda-Oreana’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 16 years after the BIA’s April 23, 1990, order dismissing his appeal, and more than ten years after the September 30, 1996, statutory motions deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen deportation proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, or September 30, 1996, whichever is later).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, absent an applicable exception; the court applied that time limit to a motion filed more than three years after the BIA's order.

Guardado v. Holder · filed 2009-12-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Menjivar Guardado’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 3 years after the BIA’s June 30, 2003, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Menjivar Guardado failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Subsection (c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of deportation, subject to exceptions under subsection (c)(3).

Zuniga-Gutierrez v. Holder · filed 2009-12-30(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zuniga-Gutierrez’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion more than 16 years after the BIA issued the final order of deportation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order of deportation or by September 30, 1996), and failed to demonstrate that any exceptions applied to excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than one year after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.

Saurez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than one year after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than one year after the Board's final order of removal.

Suarez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than one year after the BIA’s final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Avakyants v. Holder · filed 2010-01-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avakyants’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Avakyants failed to establish that he acted with due diligence to warrant tolling of the ninety-day deadline for such motions, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 899.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than two years after the BIA’s order dismissing the appeal.

Cruz v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s June 23, 2004, order dismissing their appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud or error, and exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an applicant to file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision.

Agostin v. Holder · filed 2010-02-01(c)(2)

Here, the BIA properly denied Agostin’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed over a year after his 2006 final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an applicant must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, so a motion filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order is untimely absent an applicable basis for tolling.

Goharian v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Goharian’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Goharian failed to establish that he exercised due diligence to warrant tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes deception, fraud, or error in timely filing, and who exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than two years after the Board of Immigration Appeals' final order.

Juarez-Zamorano v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they warranted equitable tolling, see Valeriano, 474 F.3d at 674-75.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable regulatory time limit, subject to specified exceptions.

Cisneros v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed eleven months after the BIA’s February 14, 2006 order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that any of the regulatory exceptions apply, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after the BIA’s final removal order.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than 18 months after the BIA's final administrative order.

Hernandez-Beltran v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez-Beltran’s motion as untimely where the motion was filed more than 18 months after the BIA’s final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes timeliness a requirement for a motion to reopen, and a motion filed more than five years after the final order of removal is untimely.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2010-03-11(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed it over five years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rodriguez v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely because it was filed almost two years after the BIA’s final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than one year after the BIA’s order, absent grounds for equitable tolling supported by due diligence.

Gonzalez v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarez Gonzalez’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than one year after the BIA’s September 26, 2005, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Alvarez Gonzalez failed to establish that she acted with the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the 90-day filing deadline, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available to petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud or error, and exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars the motion to reopen here because it was filed more than two years after the BIA's order.

De Roldan v. Holder · filed 2010-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s June 3, 2005, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost six years after the BIA issued its final order of removal.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-04-21(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed it almost six years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports denying as untimely a motion to reopen filed more than ten years after the removal order became final.

Min Zhang Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-04-30(c)(2)

Here, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it over ten years after his order of removal became final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-05-17(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the date of the final administrative decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) makes a motion to reconsider untimely when filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s earlier decision.

Zhu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-02-11(b)(2)

We also conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners‟ motion to reconsider, remand, and reopen on June 17, 2010. The petitioners acknowledge that their motion to reconsider was untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA‟s earlier decision in their case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not provide an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen merely because the movant is eligible for adjustment of status.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2011-02-17(c)(3)

However, Chen failed to address the issue of the timeliness of his motion, and his eligibility for an adjustment of status does not constitute an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable exceptions.

Cruz v. Holder · filed 2011-02-25(c)(2)

Petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed late; the final administrative decision was rendered on February 11, 2005 and Petitioners filed their motion to reopen on November 3, 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring filing of a motion to reopen “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Eid v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Eid’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than five months after the BIA’s December 21, 2007, order dismissing his underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Eid failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than four years after the final order of removal is untimely absent equitable tolling.

Castro-Gomez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-22(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Castro-Gomez’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Castro-Gomez did not establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the time limitation, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897; see also Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n.8 (9th Cir. 2000) (statements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order of removal.

Delgado v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-22(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Delgado’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Delgado did not establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the time limitation, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

The court treated a motion to reopen filed nearly one year after the BIA’s order as untimely under § 1003.2(c)(2).

Vazquez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Castillo Vazquez’s motion to reopen because he filed the motion nearly one year after the BIA’s September 10, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Castillo Vazquez failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than a year after the final administrative order is untimely.

MacEdo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than a year after the final administrative order was entered in their case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable filing period after the final administrative order, subject to recognized exceptions.

Ramos-Madrid v. Holder · filed 2010-06-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 11 months after the BIA’s July 25, 2006, orders dismissing the underlying appeals, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s December 3, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order), and Singh failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897-98.

The regulation permits an exception to the 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen only when the movant demonstrates eligibility for a regulatory exception.

Balogun v. Holder · filed 2010-06-14(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Balogun’s motion to reopen to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture as untimely where the motion was not filed within 90 days of the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Balogun failed to demonstrate eligibility for any of the regulatory exceptions to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Orocio v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Orocio’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s October 18, 2005, order dismissing his appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Orocio failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than two years after the BIA’s final decision.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-07-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Patel v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-07-28(c)(2)

In general, motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not treat a BIA clerical error causing ineffective service of the transcript, briefing schedule, and decision as an exception to the time limit for motions to reopen.

Ren v. Holder · filed 2010-08-17(c)(3)(ii)

However, the BIA’s clerical error, which resulted in ineffective service of the transcript, briefing schedule, and BIA decision, does not constitute an exception to the statutory time limitation for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the BIA’s final decision, subject to limited regulatory exceptions.

Mishustina v Holder · filed 2010-08-18(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must ordinarily be filed within ninety days after the final decision of the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Mishustina’s was not. Mishustina seeks to avail herself of the exception to the timing requirement for cases in which there are “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). But to show changed circumstances, Mishustina points only to Russian laws that had already been enacted at the time of her hearing. These laws could have been discovered or presented at Mishustina’s original hearing. Her motion to reopen was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Stepanyan v. Holder · filed 2010-09-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Stepanyan’s motion to reopen filed more than five years after the agency’s final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, subject to equitable tolling where applicable.

Partida v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-27(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they were entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled where a petitioner acts with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the Board of Immigration Appeals' order dismissing the underlying appeal.

Prasad v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Prasad’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s May 12, 2005, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Prasad failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, making a motion filed more than three years after the BIA's order untimely.

De Vega v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s October 1, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limitation that makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost seven years after the BIA’s dismissal of the removal appeal.

Markovic v. Holder · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

It is beyond dispute that Petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely, as it was filed almost seven years after the BIA’s dismissal of Petitioners’ appeal of their removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, so a motion filed nearly two years after the final removal order is untimely.

Mejia v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez Mejia’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly two years after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Rodriguez Mejia did not show she was entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Zhen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhen’s third motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s March 12, 2003, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Zhen failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 894 (deadline can be equitable tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within ninety days of the final order of removal.

Bhagwani v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bhagwani’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly twelve years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and Bhagwani did not show she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (deadline for filing motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, but the deadline is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel when the party exercised due diligence.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(2)

Ordinarily, “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This is not a jurisdictional requirement, and the BIA may equitably toll this period in instances “where, despite all due diligence, [the party invoking the toll] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim” due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Del Muro v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final order of removal), and petitioners do not contend they are entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (deadline for filing motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the BIA's order, subject to any applicable equitable-tolling exception.

Wang v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-11-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Wang’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s December 1, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wang failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen; a motion filed more than six years after the BIA order was untimely.

Cornelia De Leon Diaz v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-05-04(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De Leon Diaz’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s November 6, 2002, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and De Leon Diaz failed to establish that she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (deadline can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Sihotang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Sihotang’s motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion nearly four years after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a 90-day period for filing a motion to reopen, and an untimely motion may be denied.

Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-24(c)

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and because it did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (setting forth 90-day period for filing motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order, subject to exceptions.

Godoy-Flores v. Holder · filed 2011-06-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where they filed the motion more than four years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to establish they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed 14 years after the deportation order, subject to any applicable equitable tolling.

Aguirre-Gomez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed 14 years after the September 8, 1995, deportation order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final order, absent an applicable exception.

Bakalov v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bakalov’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed five years after the final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Bakalov failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)’s filing time limit applies to motions to reopen seeking CAT relief.

Ramirez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-15(c)(2)

Contrary to Sandoval Ramirez’s contention that he may seek reopening at any time to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), the time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) applies to motions to reopen requesting CAT relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit that made Jin’s motion filed almost three years after the BIA’s final removal order untimely.

Jin v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jin’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed the motion almost three years after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to present sufficient evidence to qualify for the changed country conditions exception, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(g)(1) (“A motion and any submission made in conjunction with a motion must be in English or accompanied by a certified English translation.”); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (evidence of changed conditions must be “material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Ly v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-19(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The doctrine of equitable tolling may toll the 90-day limitations period for filing motions to reopen, Harchenko v. I.N.S., 379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004), and “may be applied to permit reopening when the alien demonstrates . . . ineffective assistance of counsel and [that he] was prejudiced thereby.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-09-09(c)(2)

There is no question that Zheng and Wu’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day time limitation for filing such a motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring that such a motion be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) allows only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Bakanovas v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-09-20(c)(2)

“[A]n alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Li v. Holder · filed 2011-11-17(c)(2)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)(2011). There is no dispute that Li’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2003. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Kadria v. Holder · filed 2011-12-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kadria’s motion to reopen as untimely, as he filed it more than seven years after the BIA’s order upholding an immigration judge’s underlying merits decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing that a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii).

Dedi v. Holder · filed 2012-04-06(c)(2)

It is beyond dispute that petitioners’ motions to reopen were untimely, as they were filed nearly six years after the agency’s order of removal became final in Mr. Dedi’s case and nearly two years after the agency’s order of removal became final in Mrs. Dedi’s case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Iqbal v. Holder · filed 2012-04-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen generally must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Iqbal’s 2010 motion was untimely, as the final administrative order was issued in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), or on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2008). However, Iqbal failed to demonstrate that his motion fell within either exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than four years after the BIA's final decision.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (requiring movant to produce material evidence that conditions in the country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order is untimely.

Gampu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (the new evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time limit barred Abrahamyan's motion to reopen filed over five years after the BIA's final order.

Abrahamyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Abrahamyan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Abrahamyan failed to present sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel to warrant equitable tolling of the deadline, see Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2004) (ineffective assistance of counsel may toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen if it amounts to a due process violation), and he also failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file the motion no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Zhu v. Holder · filed 2012-05-01(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhu’s motion to reopen, filed in October 2010, was untimely because the BIA issued a final order of removal in October 2005. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen unless a regulatory exception applies.

Osman Khan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-02(c)(2)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s untimely motion to reopen as, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), because Khan failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed almost three years after the BIA's final decision untimely.

Navasardyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Navasardyan’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed almost three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Navasardyan failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Almaraz v. Holder, 608 F.3d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2010).

Subsection (c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed beyond the applicable time limit, absent an applicable exception.

Rumualdo-Garcia v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Rumualdo-Garcia’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s June 26, 2007, order, and Rumualdo-Garcia failed to meet the requirements for the exception based on changed country conditions or demonstrate the due diligence necessary for equitable tolling. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (the deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not treat the petitioner's medical condition as a valid exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen.

Chan v. Holder · filed 2012-08-09(c)(3)

In Min Tong Zheng v. Holder, No. 11-2251-ag, the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner’s medical condition did not constitute a valid exception to the time limitation applicable to his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not treat the petitioner's medical condition as a valid exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2012-08-09(c)(3)

In Min Tong Zheng v. Holder, No. 11-2251-ag, the BIA did not err in finding that petitioner’s medical condition did not constitute a valid exception to the time limitation applicable to his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the exception for materially changed, previously unavailable country-condition evidence in an asylum-related case.

Zou v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-08-31(c)(2)

Motions to reopen immigration proceedings “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), in the case of an alien seeking asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under Convention Against Torture, there is no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if the motion is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable time limit after the BIA's final order.

Hong v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Vietnam to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance when due diligence is shown.

He Sheng Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-09-24(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the 90-day period may be equitably tolled when the motion is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in order to warrant equitable tolling, an alien must demonstrate “due diligence” in pursuing his claim during “both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.” Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006).

Subsection (c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires the motion to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Kaur v. Holder · filed 2012-09-10(c)(2)

Generally, an alien is limited to only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and it must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)-(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception described in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Pellumbi v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-11-30(c)(2)

Pellumbi’s motion was filed beyond the 90 days. However, as the BIA noted, there is an exception to the time requirements for motions to reopen if the movant shows “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA reasonably found that Pellumbi’s background materials on Albania show that human rights abuses in Albania persist, but have not materially changed since her 2007 hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, subject to equitable tolling when applicable.

Jimenez-Chirinos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jimenez-Chirinos’ motion to reopen as untimely where he filed the motion eleven years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time limit made petitioners' motion to reopen untimely because it was filed over three years after the BIA's final order.

Shvetsov v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Russia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Karapetian v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where they filed the motion seven years after their removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a deadline for motions to reopen, so a motion filed more than five years after the removal order became final is untimely.

Carrillo-Rivera v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Carrillo-Rivera’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Carrillo-Rivera failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678-80 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes he was prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order.

Nolasco-Villacre v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Nolasco-Villacre’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over ten years after her order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Nolasco-Villacre failed to establish that she qualified for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-80 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes that she was prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances); see also Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process claim).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, absent a regulatory exception.

Lopez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, and where an affidavit presented by Singh failed to overcome the immigration judge’s prior adverse credibility finding, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for relief in light of the immigration judge’s conclusive findings on his underlying claim).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order is untimely.

Lim v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-17(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989 (new evidence in a motion to reopen must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to specified exceptions such as materially changed country conditions.

Salazar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Cervantes Salazar’s motion as untimely, where he filed the motion over two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate changed conditions in Mexico material to his claims in order to warrant an exception to the deadline, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a petitioner cannot reopen based on changed country conditions by relying on evidence that simply recounts generalized country conditions without demonstrating that his or her predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by fellow citizens).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, subject to regulatory exceptions such as the changed-circumstances exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Guardado-Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guardado-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed five months after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and Guardado-Rodriguez failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 680-81 (petitioner “[a]pparently . . . took no affirmative steps to investigate” whether prior counsel adequately prepared claim); Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir 2007) (no evidence in record of any actions taken, after becoming suspicious of the fraud, until meeting with present counsel). Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Guardado-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where Guardado-Rodriguez failed to establish material evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception.

Lopez v. Holder · filed 2013-07-15(c)(2)

Motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This requirement may be relaxed "if a petitioner 'makes a convincing demonstration of changed conditions in his homeland.'"

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed eighteen months after the BIA’s final order untimely, absent a qualifying regulatory exception.

Guncoro v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed eighteen months after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (to prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, applicant must inter alia demonstrate that his evidence establishes prima facie eligibility for relief); Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009) (in the asylum context, “some evidence of individualized risk is necessary for the petitioner to succeed”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than five years after the BIA's final order.

Vardumyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vardumyan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Vardumyan failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to equitable tolling when the movant demonstrates due diligence.

Ramirez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Jasso Ramirez’s motion to reopen in order to reinstate voluntary departure, where the motion was filed after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of final order), and Jasso Ramirez failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679-80 (no diligence where petitioner “[a]pparently. . .took no affirmative steps to investigate” whether prior counsel adequately prepared claim after having reason to suspect deficient performance).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision and permits only one such motion.

Montesquieu v. Holder · filed 2013-10-24(c)(2)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered and is permitted to file only one such motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the entry of a final order of removal.

Zheng v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-17(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2013). This time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Zheng concedes that her motion was untimely. We conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that she failed to show a change in country conditions that would excuse a late motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Mbodji v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mbodji’s motions to reopen as untimely because both motions were filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and, in both motions, Mbodji failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Senegal to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) lists exceptions, and recent regulatory or administrative changes are not among them.

Patel v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-01(c)(2), (c)(3)

First, an alien seeking the relief of reopening generally must move to reopen within ninety days of the final administrative decision of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The Patels do not dispute that their motion was filed almost nine years too late. The statute provides exceptions to the ninety-day limit, such as a change in country conditions, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), but the Patels do not argue to us (nor did they argue to the Board) that any of these exceptions apply. Instead, they cite to the recent administrative changes. But regulatory or administrative changes like those on which the Patels rely are not included among the exceptions to the 90-day deadline. The Board thus acted properly in denying the motion as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a time limit for motions to reopen.

Sutheno v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sutheno’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Sutheno failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia so as to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the previous hearing” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the Board of Immigration Appeals' final order, absent a regulatory exception.

Marroquin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Marroquin’s untimely motion to reopen where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Marroquin failed to present sufficient evidence of changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the Board's final order.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Singh failed to show that some of the evidence was not previously available and could not have been presented at his previous hearing, see 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and Singh otherwise failed to demonstrate changed conditions that qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see id.; Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence was immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day filing deadline for a motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions; the court applied that framework because Mbugua did not establish changed country conditions qualifying for an exception.

Mbugua v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-21(c)(2)

Because Mbugua failed to show changed country conditions, his motion to reopen did not qualify for an exception from the ninety-day filing deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)–(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)’s time limit barred Singh’s motion to reopen, filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-12-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than seven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to demonstrate materially changed conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings to be filed within 90 days after a final order or by September 30, 1996, whichever is later.

Calumno v. Holder · filed 2015-01-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Calumno’s untimely motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status, where the motion was filed more than 10 years after the September 30, 1996, deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings must be filed no later than 90 days after a final order or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later); Matter of M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 356-57 (BIA 1998) (a motion to reopen an in absentia order in order to apply for adjustment of status is subject to requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal, subject to the regulatory exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Nunez-Sosa v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-04-14(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nunez-Sosa’s motion to reopen as untimely, where Nunez-Sosa filed the motion more than two years after his order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and he does not dispute that his motion was untimely or invoke any regulatory exception to the motions deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal unless a statutory or regulatory exception applies.

Kombaitan v. Lynch · filed 2015-04-30(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kombaitan’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed seven years after the order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal), and Kombaitan has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception applies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen within 90 days after entry of a final removal order.

Baltazar v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-08(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2014). ... A change in personal circumstances, such as the birth of a child who is a United States citizen, is not the same as a change in country conditions and does not excuse a petitioner’s failure to observe the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal, subject to equitable tolling when applicable.

Wang v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than one year after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal), and Wang has not established the due diligence necessary for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011) (the deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence” in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order as untimely.

Alvarez v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Moraga Alvarez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Moraga Alvarez failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990 (evidence must be material to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the agency’s final administrative decision to show materially changed country conditions to avoid the time limit.

Yang v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-25(c)(2)

Because Yang filed his motion more than 90 days after the agency’s final administrative decision, he was required to demonstrate a material change in conditions in China to excuse the applicable time limitation. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA’s final administrative order, absent an applicable exception.

Li Song v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Song’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Song failed to establish materially changed circumstances arising in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (documentation insufficient to establish changed circumstances); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (requiring that evidence of changed country conditions “be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”) (citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to specified exceptions.

Gapanovitch v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Gapanovitch’s motion to reopen based on the alleged ineffective assistance of her prior counsel, where she filed the motion approximately four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to demonstrate the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-80 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who establishes that she suffered from deception, fraud, or error and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final removal order, subject to the regulation's exceptions; the court applied that time limit to a motion filed more than 14 years late.

Morales v. Lynch · filed 2015-11-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Morales’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 14 years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Morales failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not provide an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen based on purported res judicata.

Chia v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-14(c)(3)

... But a motion to reopen based on purported res judicata does not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the timeliness requirements for motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Matter of Yauri, 15 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen”). Accordingly, the BIA and IJ did not err by concluding that Chia’s motion to reopen was barred as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than 10 years after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.

Villicana-Mendez v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Villicana-Mendez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 10 years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Villicana-Mendez failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports denying a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the BIA’s final decision.

Mounaddif v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-23(c)(2)

As to petition No. 11-72083, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mounaddif’s motion to reopen where he filed it more than three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Jiang v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-29(c)(2)

Jiang’s January 2014 motion was untimely, as he filed it over one year after the final order of removal was issued in July 2012. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day period for filing motion to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal.

Singh v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-05-05(c)(2)

In general, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s time limit barred Budiono's motion to reopen because he filed it more than six years after the BIA's final order.

Budiono v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Budiono’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Budiono failed to provide sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish materially changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision.

Valdez-Lopez v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-20(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Valdez-Lopez’s motion to reconsider as untimely because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of BIA’s decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Amin v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Amin’s second motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than ninety days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the BIA reasonably determined that he failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a motion to reopen to one filed within ninety days after the final administrative decision.

Mohammed Jewel v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-03(c)(2)

The BIA’s referring to the motion to reopen as “untimely” simply reflected the fact that the motion was filed more than ninety days “after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within thirty days after the relevant final administrative order.

Bonilla v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2016-10-19(b)(2)

It also correctly determined that Bonilla’s March 13, 2013 motion to reconsider was filed well beyond the thirty-day period that commenced when the Immigration Judge filed the removal order on December 12, 2012.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) generally requires a motion for reconsideration to be filed within 30 days after the final administrative decision.

Ahmadi v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-10-27(b)(2)

Also, the BIA did not err in ruling Ahmadi’s motion time- and number-barred. Most motions for reconsideration must be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the final administrative decision, and most motions to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) & (7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) & (c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed nearly five years after the final administrative order is untimely.

Espinosa-Lopez v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed nearly five years after the final administrative order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Espinosa-Lopez failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than twelve years after the final administrative order of removal, and the court upheld denial of the motion on that basis after the petitioner failed to establish equitable tolling.

Dominguez v. Boente · filed 2017-02-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dominguez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed it over twelve years after the final administrative order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as the alien exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than a year after the BIA's final order.

Hendy Ho v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where they filed it more than a year after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where petitioners failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(a) provides that the 90-day time limit for a statutory motion to reopen does not apply to a regulatory motion to reopen.

Diaz-Tineo v. Sessions · filed 2017-04-26(a)

The 90-day time limitation applicable to a statutory motion to reopen does not apply to a regulatory motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, making one filed over four years after the final removal order untimely.

De Fretes v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying De Fretes’ motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where De Fretes failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Salguero-Arellanos v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-08-14(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Salguero-Arellanos’ motion to reconsider its earlier August 7, 2012, order as untimely, where Salguero-Arellanos did not file the motion within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s 2012 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (a motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than fifteen years after the BIA’s final decision.

Cruz-Pineda v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-10-31(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cruz-Pineda’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than fifteen years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Cruz-Pineda failed to provide evidence of a material change in circumstances in El Salvador to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991-92 (BIA did not abuse its discretion where petitioner failed to introduce material evidence) ... PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen unless an applicable exception is claimed.

Yang v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-07-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen and reissue its prior February 16, 2016, order, where Yang concedes the motion was filed more than 90 days after her final order of removal, she did not claim any exception to the filing deadline, and the BIA properly sent the prior order to the last address she provided and to her attorney.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the time limit for motions to reopen before the Board.

Kui Ma v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-20(c)(3)

As to petition No. 15-71013, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ma’s motion to reopen as untimely where he failed to demonstrate that an exception to the time limitation applied. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the time limitation for a motion to reopen and possible exceptions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) ordinarily requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Garcia-Aguilar v. Sessions · filed 2019-01-16(c)(2)

Of particular pertinence for present purposes, motions to reopen are time-limited in immigration cases. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing that such a motion ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of the final order in the proceeding sought to be reopened); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, the final agency order was dated January 15, 2014, and the motion to reopen was filed more than three years later. Thus, the motion to reopen was well out of time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline applies to motions to reopen filed by aliens, but not to Board decisions made on its own volition; a Board response to a motion is not sua sponte and is covered by the deadline.

Umrani v. Barr · filed 2019-07-22(c)(2)

The 90-day deadline applies only to motions filed by aliens; it does not apply to decisions that the Board makes of its own volition. But a “request to reopen sua sponte” is an oxymoron; anything the Board does in response to a motion is not sua sponte and thus is covered by the 90-day deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports treating a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the removal order became final as untimely.

Garcia-Perez v. Barr · filed 2019-09-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than three years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Garcia-Perez failed to establish materially changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the prior decision.

Pratt v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-12-05(b)(2)

The BIA properly treated it as a motion to reconsideration to that extent and denied it because he did not file it within 30 days of its previous decision as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to the regulatory exception for changed country conditions.

Garcia-Gonzalez v. Barr · filed 2019-11-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen where petitioners failed to demonstrate changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final removal order, absent a regulatory exception.

Amaya-Mejia v. Barr · filed 2020-02-12(c)(2)

As to petition No. 17-71489, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Amaya-Mejia’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than 11 months after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Amaya-Mejia did not establish changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the exceptions listed in § 1003.2(c)(3).

Jenny Roman Roque v. Barr · filed 2020-04-20(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Roman Roque’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than eight years after the order of removal became final, and Roman Roque did not establish that any exception to the time limitation applied. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (listing exceptions to the time bar).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board of Immigration Appeals decision to be filed within 30 days.

Erazo-Caballero v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-04-29(b)(2)

The motion was filed outside the 30-day period applicable to motions to reconsider. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to equitable tolling when the alien shows diligent pursuit of rights and an extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing.

Gustavo Adolfo Ayala Avalo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-06-11(c)

An alien may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the date of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). The BIA can toll this 90-day deadline when an alien establishes that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2018).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Briseno-Barcenas v. Garland · filed 2021-03-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Briseno-Barcenas’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, and where Briseno-Barcenas failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to the regulatory exception for materially changed country conditions.

Khamraev v. Garland · filed 2021-03-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khamraev’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than three years after the order of removal became final, and where Khamraev failed to establish materially changed country conditions in Uzbekistan to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen removal proceedings, subject to applicable exceptions.

Flores-Flores v. Garland · filed 2021-04-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Flores-Flores’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than nine years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Flores-Flores did not argue an exception to the time limitation applied.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Zheng v. Garland · filed 2021-08-27(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Zheng’s 2018 motion to reopen was untimely because he filed it more than 20 years after his exclusion and deportation order became final in 1997. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and the court upheld denial as untimely where the motion was filed more than seven years after the final order of removal.

Sudiartate v. Garland · filed 2021-10-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sudiartate’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than seven years after the final order of removal, and where Sudiartate failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2010) (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reopen where petitioner failed to submit material evidence of qualitatively different country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and the court applied that time bar to a motion filed more than 17 years after the removal order became final.

Hamida v. Garland · filed 2021-11-09(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Hamida’s 2019 motion was time barred because he filed it more than 17 years after his removal order became final in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the time limit does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the BIA did not err in finding that Hamida failed to establish a material change in conditions in Niger.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day filing limit for motions to reopen, subject to the exception for motions based on material, previously unavailable changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Nababan v. Garland · filed 2021-11-23(c)(2)

Generally, a party wishing to file a motion to reopen must do so within ninety days. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the ninety-day time limit does not apply when the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)'s exceptions to the motion-to-reopen time limit do not cover an untimely motion seeking adjustment of status.

Ou v. Garland · filed 2022-02-11(c)(3)

Her request does not implicate any exceptions to the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)–(iv) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be denied”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen removal proceedings, subject to the regulatory exceptions.

Molina v. Garland · filed 2022-02-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Molina’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than one year after the order of removal became final, and where Molina failed to establish changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order unless an exception applies; the court applied that bar to Liu’s motion filed over five years later.

Liu v. Garland · filed 2022-04-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than five years after the order of removal became final, and where Liu failed to establish changed country conditions in China to qualify for an exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2007) (change in petitioners’ personal situation was insufficient to establish changed circumstances in China to support untimely motion to reopen but could be a basis for filing a new asylum application).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order.

Guerra-Leyva v. Garland · filed 2022-06-15(c)(2)

Motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days of a final removal order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit on motions to reopen, so a motion filed outside that limit is untimely.

J-L-L · filed 2023-02-10(c)(2)

The motion to reopen is untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).