8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on material facts that were unavailable during the original proceedings.

HAJDARI v. Holder · filed 2011-12-05(c)(1)

Anyway, if he had any such ground and wanted to challenge his waiver, the time to do so was in the original proceedings and not by motion to reopen.

A motion to remand seeking to submit a new application for relief must include the application, and the proposed evidence must have been unavailable at the earlier hearing.

Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-13(c)(1)

The request for remand was not accompanied by an application for cancellation of removal. In addition, the evidence Romero-Ruiz sought to offer- — evidence that his drug paraphernalia conviction had been set aside — had been available as early as October 2003. Under the circumstances present here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Romero-Ruiz did not satisfy the procedural requirements for a remand motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to remand when the movant fails to comply with the regulation's requirements.

Rojankovski v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-24(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rojankovski’s motion to remand, because Rojankovski failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to remand to be previously unavailable and material.

Gudino-Barbosa v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gudino-Barbosa’s motion to remand, where he failed to establish the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable and material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to remand to include an appropriate application for relief and demonstrate prima facie eligibility for that relief.

Lopez-Nafate v. Garland · filed 2021-04-19(c)(1)

A motion to remand must include an appropriate application for relief and demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016).

Section 1003.2(c)(4) lets the Board treat a motion to reopen an immigration judge’s decision as a motion to remand, but leaves it discretion whether to do so or address the arguments immediately; it does not apply to sua sponte motions.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2022-09-16(c)(4)

But this paragraph allows the Board to treat a party’s motion to reopen an immigration judge’s decision as a motion to remand; it says nothing about a sua sponte motion. Besides, the text of § 1003.2(c)(4) left the Board with discretion either to construe Singh’s motion as a motion to remand or to address his arguments immediately.

A motion to remand that seeks to expand the evidentiary record must state the new facts to be proved and include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Pascual-Castro v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-16(c)(1)

but a motion for remand to expand the evidentiary record must “state the new facts that will be proven” and “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”

Motions to remand for new evidence are treated like motions to reopen and may be denied when the evidence could have been obtained before the hearing.

Garcia-Morales v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2017-11-15(c)(1)

Our precedents at any rate say that motions to remand should be treated like motions to reopen, which the regulations do address and which do suggest that the Board should deny motions like hers.

A motion to remand filed during a pending BIA appeal is treated as a motion to reopen for jurisdiction and standard-of-review purposes.

Korytnyuk v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2005-01-25(c)(4)

We thus find no reason to treat motions to remand differently from motions to reopen for purposes of determining whether we have jurisdiction, and determining the appropriate standard of review.

Section 1003.2(c)(4) allows a motion to reopen filed during an appeal to be treated as a motion to remand; the two motions are functionally equivalent when determining the standard of review.

Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-01-25(c)(4)

As noted above, we treat motions to remand as functionally equivalent to motions to reopen. It follows that in discussion of the appropriate standard of review of a motion to remand, we freely use cases discussing the standard of review of a motion to reopen.

A request to remand for an asylum application may be denied when the applicant did not seek asylum before the immigration judge and shows no circumstances arising after the hearing.

POCASANGRE v. Holder · filed 2011-06-29(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pocasangre’s request to remand to the IJ to apply for asylum where he had not applied for asylum before the IJ and failed to demonstrate that he sought relief based on circumstances that arose subsequent to his hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)’s requirements for a motion to reopen also apply, for practical purposes, to a motion to remand based on changed country conditions while an appeal is pending before the BIA.

Ghani Al-Awad v. Garland · filed 2023-10-10(c)

Al-Awad moved to remand based on changed country conditions while his appeal was pending before the BIA. When this happens, the requirements for a motion to remand and those of a motion to reopen are the same for all practical purposes. Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 526 (BIA 2015); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.1(b)(3).

Section 1003.2 permits reconsideration when the Board has committed an error of law or fact and permits reopening only when new evidence was previously unavailable and establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Tran v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-17(a), (b), and (c)

The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Tran’s motion to reconsider its earlier decision because Tran failed to demonstrate that the Board committed any errors of law or fact. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). The Board likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying Tran’s motion to reopen proceedings because he failed to demonstrate that the new evidence he submitted was previously unavailable, or that such evidence established prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority, while subsection (c)(1) requires material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing to support reopening.

Gui Wen Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-14(b)(1), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Wang did not allege any error of fact or law. Rather, she merely restated the same arguments that she initially raised on appeal to the BIA. Because we assume that the BIA had evaluated and rejected those arguments previously, it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny the motion on this ground. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111, (2d Cir.2006). A motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant proves that the evidence sought to be offered is material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that each of the grounds upon which Wang based her motion was insufficient to justify reopening her removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and pertinent authority, gives the BIA discretion over motions to reopen or reconsider, and requires reopening evidence to appear material to the applicant’s claim.

Dong v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-17(b)(1), (a), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA has discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen or reconsider, subject to the restrictions contained therein. One such restriction with respect to a motion to reopen mandates that the new evidence must appear to the BIA to be material to the applicant’s claim. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the motion presents new material evidence that could not have been presented at the former hearing, while subsection (b)(1) requires a reconsideration motion to specify errors of fact or law and provide pertinent supporting authority.

Nela v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-04-25(c)(1), (b)(1)

The evidence submitted with the motion was either published before Nela’s asylum hearing and could have been made available or the evidence pertains to events that were not relevant to Nela’s claim. Nela’s motion to reopen presented no new material evidence that could not have been presented at the former hearing; therefore, the BIA’s decision must be affirmed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2 gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen or reconsider, generally allows only one motion to reopen based on previously unavailable evidence, and requires a motion to reconsider within 30 days after mailing of the Board decision.

Sene v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-14(a), (b)(2), (c)(1), (c)(2)

“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board.... The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... First, with regard to the numerical limitation, “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There are four exceptions to this requirement, but Sene does not argue for, nor does she qualify for, any of them. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Moreover, this court has never held that equitable tolling applies to numerical limitations on motions to reopen.1 Second, evidence offered on a motion to reopen must have been unavailable at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Since this is undoubtedly Sene’s second motion to reopen and the proffered evidence was previously available, the BIA’s decision cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. ... Alternatively, Sene argues this should be considered a motion to reconsider the BIA’s denial of her first motion to reopen. Here, the BIA denied the motion to reconsider as untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Under § 1003.2(b)(2), a “motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the *556mailing of the Board decision.” In the case at bar, the denial of the first motion to reopen was mailed on May 18, 2004, and the motion to reconsider was filed on June 21, 2004. This is clearly outside of the time limitation. Accordingly, the BIA’s decision was rational and based upon established policies and, therefore, was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to offer new, material evidence that was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-09(b)(1), (c)(1)

Because Lin’s motion raised no errors of fact or law other than by offering additional evidence it was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny her motion to reconsider on this basis. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reopen must offer new, material evidence that was neither available nor discoverable at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify new evidence or new facts to be proven at a hearing, while subsection (b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the prior decision.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-26(c)(1), (b)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen proceedings. The BIA appropriately noted that Chen failed to submit any new evidence, or any new facts to be proven at a hearing if the motion were granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In addition, in declining to reconsider its prior decision, the BIA properly relied on Chen’s failure to identify any legal or factual error in its prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90. The BIA cannot be found to have abused its discretion when Chen’s motion contained only a vague, conclusory statement that the IJ did not consider the full context of her claim of future persecution. Therefore, the BIA properly denied Chen’s motion and provided adequate reasoning for doing so. See Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 93.

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority; subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Castillo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any legal or factual errors in the BIA’s underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioners failed to provide any new evidence to support their motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, and § 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision.

Vazquez-Galvan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(c)(2), (b)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and that “a party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s third motion to reopen, and, to the extent that petitioner’s motion could be construed as a motion to reconsider, second motion to reconsider.

(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to allege errors of fact or law; (c)(1) imposes a 90-day filing deadline for a motion to reopen; and (b)(2) imposes timing and numerical limits on motions to reconsider.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-17(b)(1), (c)(1), (b)(2)

Because Chen failed to allege any “errors of fact or law” in the BIA’s June 2006 merits decision, the BIA’s denial of the motion to reconsider was not an abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... It is well-settled that a motion to reopen is the appropriate vehicle for a claim of ineffective assistance and that such a motions has a 90-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Yi Long Yang, 478 F.3d at 142. ... Regarding Chen’s September 2006 motion (which was also styled as a motion to reconsider): because it was his second motion to reconsider and because it was filed more than 30 days after the date of the BIA’s last order, the BIA’s October 2006 denial of the motion based on time and numerical limitations was not an abuse of discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present previously unavailable or undiscoverable evidence, while section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Wang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-04-03(c)(1), (b)

In any event, the BIA properly construed Wang’s motion as a motion to reconsider where the motion did not present previously unavailable or undiscoverable evidence, as required in a motion to reopen. ... Moreover, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Wang’s motion where it largely reiterated arguments regarding her ineffective assistance of counsel claim which the BIA had previously rejected, and failed to allege any error in the BIA’s previous decision. See Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir.2006) (emphasizing that the BIA does not abuse its discretion in “denying a motion to reconsider where the motion repeats arguments that the BIA has previously rejected”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (stating that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority).

Section 1003.2 permits motions to reopen subject to a 90-day deadline and specified exceptions, while leaving sua sponte reopening to the agency's discretion, which is not judicially reviewable.

Dacaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to reopen his case, but must do so within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. However, the 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled where the motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ... Accordingly, Dacaj was ineligible for asylum and any evidence he submitted for the purpose of demonstrating that he warranted such relief was immaterial and thus insufficient to warrant an exception to the limitation on motions to reopen set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, Dacaj argues that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing to exercise its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen his proceedings based on “exceptional circumstances.” ... However, the BIA’s determination whether to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings is a purely discretionary one, which this Court has no authority to review.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and support them with affidavits or other evidence, while section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law.

Dompas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-09(c)(1), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dompas’ motion to reopen because Dompas failed to set forth new facts or present new evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Dompas’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision summarily affirming the IJ’s order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to show that supporting evidence was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Canales v. Holder · filed 2009-03-02(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA also acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because they did not demonstrate that the medical reports submitted were unavailable or incapable of being discovered at the time of their removal hearing, see Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir.2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and petitioners failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief under the Legal Immigrant Family Equity Act of 2000, see Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 245a.11.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law, while § 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2009-10-29(b)(1), (c)(2)

While a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), Chen’s argument that the BIA “ignored” material factual and legal errors that she described in her motion is without merit. ... The regulations permit an alien to file one motion to reopen and require that it be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, contrary to Chen’s argument, the BIA properly denied her motion to reopen because it was the second such motion she had filed and was filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered, and none of the exceptions to the time and number limitations apply.

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from sua sponte reopening or reconsidering a removed alien’s case after departure, even when the legal basis for removal is later shown to be erroneous.

Ramon-Sanchez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-06(d)

Here, Ramon similarly urges that the BIA erred in denying his motion to sua sponte reopen or reconsider his case based on the procedural bar of § 1003.2(d). However, Ramon’s situation is indistinguishable from the situation presented in Ovalles: Ramon departed the United States following the denial of his application for cancellation of removal and later filed an untimely petition to reopen or reconsider his case, arguing that Lopez v. Gonzales changed the legal basis for removal, and the BIA similarly denied Ramon’s motion to reopen or reconsider based on the § 1003.2(d) post-departure bar. As such, Ovalles controls our decision, and we accordingly conclude that the BIA did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to sua sponte reopen or reconsider Ramon’s case based on the § 1003.2(d) post-departure bar.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law and pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires material new evidence unavailable at the removal hearing for reopening.

Bin Xu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-06-09(b)(1), (c)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” ... A motion to reopen may be granted if the alien presents to the BIA new evidence that is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Because Xu failed to show that, if proceedings were reopened, the result would be different, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and cite pertinent authority, while § 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only for material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Augustine Victor v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-08-06(b)(1), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... The BIA has discretion to reopen a removal proceeding when the alien presents material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Subsection (c) generally treats a motion to remand based on new evidence as a motion to reopen, subject to the standards governing motions to reopen.

Weng vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-14(c)

A motion to remand a case based on new evidence is generally treated as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2 treats a request based on changed circumstances to submit an application for relief as a motion to reopen, and permits a qualifying motion filed while an appeal is pending to be deemed a motion to remand.

Sorcia v. Holder · filed 2011-07-21(c)(1)

In other words, citing changed circumstances, Sorcia sought a remand to allow for adjustment of his immigration status, a form of "relief." As such, Sorcia’s motion was one to remand for the reopening of his case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ("A motion to reopen a decision rendered by an Immigration Judge . . . that is filed while an appeal is pending before the Board, may be deemed a motion to remand for further proceedings before the Immigration Judge . . . from whose decision the appeal was taken. Such motion may be consolidated with, and considered by the Board in connection with, the appeal to the Board.").

Section 1003.2(b)(1) supports denying reconsideration when the movant identifies no factual or legal error, while § 1003.2(c)(1) supports denying reopening when the submitted evidence was previously available and could have been presented to the immigration judge.

Melendez v. Holder · filed 2012-04-23(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Melendez’s motion to reconsider where he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior determination that res judicata did not apply. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by construing Melendez’s motion as a motion to reopen to the extent it was based on new evidence, or by denying the motion where the evidence Melendez submitted was previously available and could have been presented to the immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to allege an error of law or fact and imposes a time limit on motions to reopen unless a regulatory exception applies.

Gutierrez-Gonzales v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-22(b)(1), (c)(2), (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez-Gonzales’s motion to reconsider where she failed to allege any error of law or fact in the BIA’s underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez-Gonzales’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gutierrez-Gonzales failed to present sufficient evidence to qualify for any of the regulatory exceptions to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by new, previously unavailable evidence.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-11(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider because Singh failed to specify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s previous decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Further, in construing Singh’s motion as a motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Singh failed to support it with new, previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Lainez-Ortiz v. INS, 96 F.3d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1996).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to meet the regulation’s requirements, and § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to establish an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-01(c)(1), (b)(1)

the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it found Singh’s polygraph evidence did not meet the requirements for a motion to reopen. ... the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion, construed as a motion to reconsider, where Singh’s motion did not establish any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) and (2) allows an alien to file one motion to reopen based on new facts, generally within 90 days after the final removal order. Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a case.

Abner Candido De Lima, Jr. v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-09-16(c)(1) and (2), (a)

An alien may file one motion to reopen based upon new facts, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) and (2). ... The BIA also has authority to sua sponte reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We, however, lack jurisdiction to review a challenge to the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a proceeding. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2 permits denial of reconsideration when no legal or factual error is identified, requires material evidence that was previously unavailable for reopening, and bars a renewed motion to reconsider a denial of reconsideration.

Silva-Toro v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-21(b)(1), (c)(1), (b)(2)

The BIA acts within its discretion when it denies a motion to reconsider that fails to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. ... “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Likewise, to the extent that Silva-Toro’s October 2012 motion in fact sought reconsideration of the denial of his January 2012 motion to reconsider, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) precluded him from seeking this relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires material evidence that was previously unavailable to support reopening, while § 1003.2(i) makes referral of a reconsideration or reopening motion to a three-member panel discretionary rather than mandatory.

Ali v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2017-08-07(c)(1), (i)

Reopening will not be granted unless it is supported by material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the merits hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA’s decision whether to refer such a motion to a three-member panel is governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(i) and § 1003.1(e)(6). ... We are not persuaded, however, that the different language alters the discretionary nature of the assignment decision. ... This court has said that assignment of an appeal to a three-member panel is not mandatory; the same should be true with respect to the assignment of a motion to reconsider or reopen to a three-member panel.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2) limit a petitioner to one motion to reconsider and one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Ali v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-10-10(b)(2), (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Petitioners are limited to just one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). It is abundantly clear from the record that Ali previously filed a motion to reopen and to reconsider. Therefore Ali could not file this second motion, and the BIA did not err in denying it.

Section 1003.2 permits denial of a motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, and denial of a motion to reconsider as untimely, when the applicant does not establish an applicable exception.

Olivares v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-23(c)(2), (b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Olivares’s sixth motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where he filed the motion more than 20 years after his final order of removal, and did not show the motion was subject to any exceptions to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3). ... Treated as a motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law, while § 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen, subject to the regulatory exception for changed country conditions.

Martinez-Hernandez v. Barr · filed 2019-05-23(b)(1), (c)(2)

In No. 17-70968, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Hernandez’s motion, construed as a motion to reconsider, for failure to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. ... In No. 17-70968, the BIA did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Hernandez’s motion, construed as a second motion to reopen, as untimely and number-barred, where he filed the motion nearly two years after the applicable filing deadline, and he failed to present sufficient evidence of changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law, while subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present previously unavailable new evidence likely to change the outcome.

De La O-Hernandez v. Barr · filed 2020-08-19(b)(1), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying De La O-Hernandez’s motion to reconsider because, as the agency noted, she did not identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision. ... To the extent that the motion to reconsider could be construed as a motion to reopen, the denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion because, as the agency also noted, De La O-Hernandez did not introduce new evidence that could not have been obtained earlier and that would likely have changed the outcome of her case.

Section 1003.2(c) bars reopening unless the material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Barry v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-19(c)

Turning to the BIA’s alternative basis for denying Barry’s motion to reopen—that her petition did not comport with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)—we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), a motion to reopen "shall not be granted unless it appears to the BIA that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing." Id. § 1003.2(c). Although it was undisputed that Barry had been subjected to FGM in Guinea many years before she came to the United States, and that Barry’s daughter would likely be subjected to FGM if she is returned to Guinea, the BIA correctly determined that the FGM evidence had been available and could have been discovered or presented during the initial deportation proceedings. Accordingly, the BIA correctly concluded that it had no authority to grant Barry’s motion under the regulation.

Section 1003.2(c) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Barry v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2006-04-19(c)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the BIA that evidence sought to be offered is mateiial and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Although it was undisputed that Barry had been subjected to FGM in Guinea many years before she came to the United States, and that Barry’s daughter would likely be subjected to FGM if she is returned to Guinea, the BIA correctly determined that the FGM evidence had been available and could have been discovered or presented during the initial deportation proceedings. Accordingly, the BIA correctly concluded that it had no authority to grant Barry’s motion under the regulation.

A motion to reopen may be granted only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Rojas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-04-02(c)(1)

As such, a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Here, although the affidavits Rojas submitted in support of her motion were dated approximately two years after her March 2004 hearing before the IJ, the affidavits merely rehash the general assertion that Rojas fled Colombia due to “political persecution” and contain no new information tending to dispute the IJ’s conclusion that Rojas failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a statutorily-protected ground such as, inter alia, religion, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Likewise, although the news articles Rojas submitted in support of her motion detail the FARC’s ongoing acts of violence, the articles provide nothing to connect that violence to Rojas’s politics or her membership in a protected group. Thus, we cannot say that the evidence Rojas submitted in support of her motion to reopen was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at her earlier hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable, meaning it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; evidence that could have been presented earlier does not satisfy the requirement.

Champuridze v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-18(c)(2)

The regulations governing BIA proceedings state that a motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant offers evidence that was material and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that some of Champuridze’s documents were previously available. Specifically, his wife’s affidavits and the information contained in his waiver application could have been presented earlier. Champuridze argues that he was not aware that he would have needed to submit these documents earlier, but this argument is misplaced. Although Cham*711puridze would not have been deemed inadmissible until after his proceedings before the IJ had concluded, the information regarding his wife’s hardship was directly relevant to whether his adjustment of status application should have been granted as a discretionary matter. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the claims made in the waiver application and affidavits were previously available and “could have been presented” at the prior proceedings.

A motion to reopen may be granted only when the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Shah v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-02-21(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-23(c)(1)

That finding — one which we do not have jurisdiction to review, as discussed above — is dispositive of Chen’s motion to reopen to file his asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (prohibiting the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); cf. Yuen Jin, 538 F.3d at 151-56.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a party seeking remand based on additional evidence to show that the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Valencia-Solis v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(1)

A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to remand because petitioners did not show that the additional evidence regarding hardship to their qualifying relatives “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an alien seeking reopening based on changed circumstances to prove that the material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Gao vs U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-01-13(c)(3)(ii)

Additionally, the alien must prove that the material evidence was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the earlier hearing.

Dakhlallah v. Holder · filed 2011-03-08(c)(1)

We agree with the Board that Dakhlallah failed to support the motion with evidence that was not available and could not have been presented at his earlier hearings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been unavailable for presentation at the former hearing before the IJ.

Rangel-Ledesma v. Holder · filed 2010-09-24(c)(1)

The BIA abused its discretion in determining that Rangel-Ledesma’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not new and could have been presented during the pendency of the appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (evidence must not have been available to be presented “at the former hearing”); see also Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) requires that the evidence must not have been available to be presented at the former hearing before the IJ).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to remand based on additional evidence to show that the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the hearing.

Arora v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ali’s motion to remand because Ali failed to demonstrate the additional evidence he submitted with his motion “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at his hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Rodriguez, 841 F.2d at 867.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a party seeking remand based on additional evidence to show that the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the hearing.

Ali v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ali’s motion to remand because Ali failed to demonstrate the additional evidence he submitted with his motion “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at his hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented, at the former hearing.

Soltero-Sanchez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-02(c)(1)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Soltero-Sanchez’s motion to reopen that was based on the newly presented psychological report. Soltero-Sanchez failed to show that the report was not previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

A motion to reopen cannot be granted unless the offered evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Freemantle v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-08-27(c)(1)

While he argues on appeal that he did not “learn of the current issues he would face” until after he was ordered removed, (Br. 8), he was obligated to discover and present that evidence at his hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zhang-Zhang v. Holder · filed 2013-11-18(c)(1)

The BIA reasonably declined to consider the letters from Zhang-Zhang’s sister and husband because they did not address the authorities’ recent interest in her Falun Gong activities, and could have been proffered at the time of her hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that reopening “shall not be granted unless. . . . evidence. . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. . . .”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former immigration hearing.

Armenta-Rodriguez v. Lynch · filed 2015-04-28(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Armenta-Rodriguez’s motion to reopen because Armenta-Rodriguez did not demonstrate that the evidence he submitted with the motion was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at his immigration hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]”); Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (evidence capable of being discovered at time of hearing cannot serve as basis for motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting reopening to be material and unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Doux-Bahi v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-20(c)(1)

However, several of the publicly available articles and reports that she attaches to her motion predate the evidentiary hearing and, thus, cannot constitute evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Maldonado v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Parra Maldonado’s motion to reopen based on new evidence because Parra Maldonado failed to establish the evidence was not previously available or could have been discovered at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars denying reopening based on a requirement that the movant have presented information that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Espinal-Lagos v. Garland · filed 2021-08-24(c)(1)

Under the governing regulations, the Board may not grant a motion to reopen “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988). ... The Board’s decision was also irrational because it required Espinal-Lagos to have presented information to the IJ that could not have been discovered or presented at that time. Id.

Subsection (c)(1) bars reopening based on evidence that was available or could have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Rodriguez-Fregoso v. Garland · filed 2022-05-20(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez-Fregoso’s motion to reopen where she failed to demonstrate that the evidence she sought to offer was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Guzman v. I.N.S., 318 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (no abuse of discretion where evidence was previously available and capable of discovery prior to former hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening based on evidence that was available or could have been discovered and presented at the prior hearing.

Braulio Roman Salgado v. Garland · filed 2023-05-17(c)(1)

We deny the petition in No. 20-73580 because the BIA did not err by denying reopening. Roman has not shown that his prior legal entry could not have been discovered earlier. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen or remand to have been unavailable and unable to have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Bazaldua v. Garland · filed 2024-11-20(c)(1)

Bazaldua did not establish that evidence of gang violence and corruption was not available at the time of his hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring that “evidence . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); Rodriguez v. INS, 841 F.2d 865, 867 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the requirements of a motion to reopen and a “redesignat[ed]” motion to remand “are for all practical purposes the same”).

For a motion to reopen before the BIA, evidence that becomes available only after the final hearing before the IJ satisfies § 1003.2(c)(1), even while the appeal is pending.

Suchite-Salguero v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2025-08-14(c)(1)

We therefore reject that interpretation and hold that, for the purposes of a motion to reopen before the BIA, evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing” refers to evidence that could not have been presented at the last hearing before the IJ. To put it another way, evidence that becomes available only after the final hearing before the IJ satisfies the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), irrespective of whether the petitioner’s appeal to the BIA is then pending.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the supporting evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Flores-Rueda v. Bondi · filed 2025-10-14(c)(1)

In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Flores Rueda’s motion to reopen proceedings because the evidence presented with the motion was available at the time of Flores-Rueda’s merits hearing. A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted” unless accompanied by evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006).

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Hariyanti v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-21(c)(1)

As an initial matter, the BIA did not err in refusing to consider documents that were undated or that pre-dated the IJ’s decision, as the record already contained documents describing conditions in Indonesia as they existed prior to the IJ’s decision, enabling the BIA to determine whether conditions in Indonesia had, in fact, woi’sened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(l)(“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days; an untimely motion may proceed only if equitable tolling is warranted, which requires due diligence.

Patel, Sunita v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2006-03-30(c)(2)

But this argument confuses the substantive criteria for succeeding on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim with the procedural rules that must be satisfied, including the rules governing the time for filing various motions. The Board would indeed turn immediately to the Lozada test if the motion to reopen were filed within the 90 days permitted by the regulations. With an untimely motion, in contrast, the alien must first show that her situation warrants equitable tolling of the time limits, and equitable tolling in turn requires a showing of due diligence.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Beltran-Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-10(c)(2)

Even if Beltran-Hernandez’s prior counsel was tardy in informing Beltran-Hernandez of the BIA’s December 18, 2003 decision to dismiss his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying cancellation, Beltran-Hernandez still had two months after learning of the decision to file a timely motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to that time limit.

Lama v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-04-19(c)(2), (c)(3)

Lama had 90 days to file a motion to reopen, yet did not file his motion until June 2005, more than two years later, clearly beyond the filing deadline. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2005). Further, Lama is not eligible for an exception to the time limitation requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceedings sought to be reopened.

Torres v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-21(c)(2)

This is a petition for review of the denial of petitioner’s motion to reopen immigration proceedings. Respondent’s motion for summary disposition of this petition for review is granted because a review of the record shows that Board of Immigration Appeals properly denied petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (stating that motions to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals must be filed within 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened); see also United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard for summary disposition). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order, absent an applicable exception.

Kaur v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur’s motion to reopen as untimely where Kaur filed the motion more than four months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to submit evidence of changed country conditions in India that would excuse the late filing, cf. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings before the BIA to file the motion no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Moreno v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Alvarez Moreno’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (an alien seeking to reopen proceedings before the BIA must file the motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to applicable tolling principles.

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Mejia Martinez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered); Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (filing deadline may be tolled where an alien, exercising due diligence, is prevented from timely filing by deception, fraud, or error).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to exceptions.

Karapetyan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16

The regulations state, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after the BIA's final decision.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-04-05(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen proceedings based on his failure to abide by the time limitations for such motions. Lin filed his motion in April 2006, more than one year after the BIA’s issuance of its final decision in March 2005, and long after the ninety-day deadline for the filing of motions to reopen had passed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Gonzalo De Jesus Saldarriaga v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2007-04-11(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The 90-day time limit does not apply, however, if the motion to reopen is filed on the basis of changed circumstances in the country of the movant’s nationality. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). To meet this exception, a movant must show material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final BIA order unless the movant qualifies for an exception to that time limit.

Shergill v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shergül’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it more than a year after the BIA’s June 29, 2004 order, and Shergill failed to demonstrate that he qualified for any exception to the ninety-day time limit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the BIA mails its decision, or by the specified later date, whichever is later.

Singh-Toor v. Ashcroft · filed 2007-05-04(b)(2)

A motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the *636BIA mails its decision or on or before July-31, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Toor filed his motion to reconsider over 100 days past the statutory deadline. We find the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Toor’s motion to reconsider as untimely because there is no legitimate reason for tolling the limitation period.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the BIA within thirty days after the BIA mails its decision.

De Perez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must be filed with the BIA within thirty days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Here, the motion was filed ninety-six days after mailing of the BIA’s decision. Therefore, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s untimely motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen, subject to the exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2), (c)(3)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an alien may file only one motion to reopen proceedings. We have reviewed petitioners’ response to this court’s order to show cause. Petitioners do not explain how their second motion to reopen met any of the exceptions to the numerical limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Petitioners’ second motion to reopen simply asserted facts which had already been considered and rejected by the Immigration Judge and the Board. Accordingly, we summarily deny this petition for review because petitioners’ second motion to reopen before the Board *744violated the numerical limitation on motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, subject to specified exceptions.

Lata v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because they filed it more than twenty months after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to show they were entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (equitable tolling applies “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering” the misconduct).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling only when the alien has exercised due diligence.

Yero v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-08(c)(2)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, Mr. Yero’s motion was filed 314 days after the BIA’s affirmance of his removal. Nevertheless, Ms. Healey asserts that the 90-day period was equitably tolled until Mr. Yero learned that she was ineffective, which purportedly occurred when this court dismissed the petition for review. Equitable tolling is available only if the alien has exercised due diligence in pursuing the case during the requested tolling period. ... We agree that Ms. Healey did not exercise due diligence. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to equitably toll the 90-day limitations period.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Baddredine v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2007-06-11(c)

Consequently, it was untimely as he filed it more than 90 days after November 15, 2005. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Barrientos v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed.

Section 1003.2(c) bars an untimely motion to reopen that does not satisfy a regulatory exception.

Flores v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was untimely and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed.

Romero-Alarcon v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

So construed, we conclude that this petition for review is appropriate for summary disposition in part because petitioners’ motion to reopen filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) violated the time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed. Id. The final order of removal was entered by the Board on March 10, 2004. Petitioners’ motion to reopen was not filed until August 11, 2006. Accordingly, this petition for review is denied in part.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(a) commits sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion, whose refusal to act courts lack jurisdiction to review.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-25(c)(2), (a)

With some exceptions not relevant here, a motion to reopen “shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” ’ 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(i). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Chen’s motion to reopen was therefore late—by approximately three years and eight months. ... As to Chen’s argument that the BIA should have reopened the case for humanitarian reasons notwithstanding the motion’s untimeliness, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise its discretionary power to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the stated alternative date.

Ping Xu v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2007-07-12(c)(2)

“[A] party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Xu’s motion was untimely under this general rule.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to stated exceptions.

Zheng v. Department of Homeland Security · filed 2007-07-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion as untime*663ly. The BIA previously dismissed Zheng’s appeal in August 2004, and Zheng did not file her motion to reopen until August 2006, well beyond the ninety day deadline. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Bahena-Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed more than eight months after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003).

Subsection (e)(2) provides regulatory exceptions to the numerical restriction on motions to reopen, and a motion that does not satisfy an exception remains numerically barred.

Montano v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(e)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s second motion to reopen as numerically barred, and in finding that the motion did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions to the number restrictions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2), (3); Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, absent an applicable exception.

Jimenez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the final administrative decision.

Gaspar-Correia v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA within ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the motion to reopen was filed over two years late. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Guardado-Aguilar v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not err in denying Guardado-Aguilar’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than three years after the BIA issued the final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal.

Diaz-Gutierrez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it found that Diaz-Gutierrez’s motion to reopen, filed over a year after the BIA’s final order of removal, was time-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (90-day limit).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the Board mails the decision.

Chimal v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-24(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “a motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The *379BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider filed on October 18, 2006, more than 30 days after the BIA’s August 18, 2006 decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the date of the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision.

Osorio v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(b)(2)

Regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the date of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) governs motions to reconsider, and section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to stated exceptions.

Flores v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(b)(1), (c)(2)

Nonetheless, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reconsider its February 16, 2007 denial of petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). The regulations provide, with certain exceptions that do not apply to this case, that a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Huertero v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(b)(2)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider “must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider as untimely where it was filed about two months late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal.

Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-18(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). The motion was filed on April 17, 2007, over ninety days after the BIA’s final administrative order of removal issued on July 20, 2006. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the Board's decision untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing to establish an exception.

Sanchez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-20(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The motion to reopen, filed more than 90 days after the Board issued its decision affirming the immigration judge’s denial of the petitioners’ application for cancellation of removal, was untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Cf Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d 1096, 1099 & n. 2 (9th Cir.2000) (discussing exception to time limit for CAT applicants ordered removed before March 22, 1999). In addition, the petitioners did not establish an exception to the time limit by presenting evidence that was material *562and was unavailable and could not have been considered or presented at the previous hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline on motions to reopen, subject to limited exceptions.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-25(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in January 2003, but Chen did not file his motion until January 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly found that Chen’s motion did not qualify for an exception to that time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, unless a specified exception to the time limit applies.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-02(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in August 2002, but Chen did not file her motion until April 2007, long after the 90-day deadline had passed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly found that Chen’s motion did not qualify for an exception to the time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days and permits only specified exceptions to that time limit.

Yang v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-05-28(c)(2)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in May 2003, but Yang did not file her motion until December 2006, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Yang’s motion did not qualify for an exception to the time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the prior BIA decision unless an applicable exception to the time limit is established.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-20(c)(2)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Liu’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in January 2003; Liu did not file her motion until April 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Liu’s motion did not qualify for an exception to the time limitation. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-28(c)(2)

As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in October 2003, but Chen did not file her motion until November 2006, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) provides the timeliness and exception framework for motions to reopen, and the court upheld denial where the motion was untimely and met none of the regulatory exceptions.

Jimenez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because the motion to reopen was untimely and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision.

Joya-Quintanilla v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider as untimely because Joya-Quintanilla filed the motion more than 30 days after the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to the stated alternative deadline of September 30, 1996.

Barberena-Hernandez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-10(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Barberena-Hernandez’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed at least seven years after the deadline for relief under NACARA, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.43(e)(1) (requiring motions to reopen to apply for NACARA relief be filed by September 11, 1998), and nine years after the deadline relevant for adjustment of status, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring motions to reopen be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision or by September 30, 1996).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, and an untimely CAT-based motion is not excused without qualifying changed country conditions material to the case.

Fierro v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-12(c)(2)

Petitioners filed their motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners contend that their motion to reopen was timely because there is no time limit for a motion to reopen that seeks relief under CAT. Petitioners, however, failed to establish that changed country conditions have occurred in Mexico that are material to their case, and the generalized evidence attached to their motion does not establish a prima facie case of eligibility for CAT relief. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir.2005). The BIA, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the relevant agency order.

Raygada v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-24(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Raygada’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it pertained to the BIA’s order dismissing Raygada’s direct appeal on December 21, 2005. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (motions to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the relevant agency order).

Section 1003.2(a) leaves sua sponte reopening entirely to the BIA's discretion, while subsections (c)(3)(ii) and (c)(3)(h) do not permit reopening based respectively on insufficient evidence of changed country conditions or changed personal circumstances.

Palaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(a), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(3)(h)

In addition, the BIA properly determined that Palaj failed to submit any evidence establishing a change in country conditions in Albania. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... To the extent Palaj moved to reopen based on her marriage to a lawful permanent resident and the birth of her U.S. citizen children, the BIA properly found that such changed personal circumstances did not suffice to except a motion from the applicable time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 2006). ... Finally, because the decision of the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary, any challenge to its refusal to do so in this case is beyond our review. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final order.

Aguilar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-15(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

The regulation generally imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, but removes that limit for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Li v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Li’s motion to reopen as untimely. As the BIA noted, its prior decision was issued in October 2002, but Li did not file his motion until December 2007, well beyond the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, however, the BIA properly found that Li’s motion did not qualify for such an exception.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final order.

Wamea v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Morales v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered *619in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). A review of the administrative record demonstrates that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed on December 26, 2007, more than 90 days after the August 21, 2001 final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to applicable exceptions.

Estrada v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, generally requiring it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Estrada v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not established that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after entry of the order, absent an applicable exception.

Al-Bassrei v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a petitioner to file a motion to reopen before the BIA within 90 days.

Tzafir v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-21(c)(2)

We reject Tzafir’s contention that the BIA erred in finding that her motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (establishing that a petitioner has ninety days to file a motion to reopen before the BIA).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Flores v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-28(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Calderon Flores’ motion as untimely because it was filed more than eighteen months after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision), and Calderon Flores failed to establish grounds for sufficient equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error,” as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the order.

Higareda-Cristerna v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen because it was filed on February 1, 2008, more than 90 days after the January 20, 2004 final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final decision, subject to equitable tolling when ineffective assistance of counsel caused a due process violation and the movant acted diligently.

Chen v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-08-15(c)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. This 90-day period is subject to equitable tolling if the movant shows that his due process rights were violated by ineffective assistance of counsel, and if the movant demonstrates “due diligence in pursuing the case during the period [he] seeks to toll.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien subject to a final removal order to file only one motion to reopen, and requires it to be filed within 90 days of the final order, absent an applicable exception.

Gaytan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ final order of removal was entered on August 26, 2006. Petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed on June 20, 2007. Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners do not contend that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Leon v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any recognized exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, generally within 90 days after the final order of removal.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-10(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and that motion must be filed no more than 90 days after the entry of a final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cifuentes v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-18(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen, filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-12(c)(2)

In general, a motion to reopen must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion to reopen at issue here was filed around thirteen years after entry of Lin’s deportation order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 30 months after the BIA's order dismissing the underlying appeal.

Arias v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 30 months after the BIA’s April 16, 2004 orders dismissing Petitioners’ underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit for filing a motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Arevalos-Alfaro v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than ten months after the BIA’s March 27, 2006 order dismissing Petitioner’s appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3), together with the related in absentia-order provision, requires a motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order based on exceptional circumstances to be filed within 180 days of the final administrative decision.

Ferra-Manzano v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-22(c)(3)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (motion to reopen and rescind an in absentia removal order based on exceptional circumstances must be filed within 180 days of the final administrative decision), and petitioners failed to establish that they acted with due diligence, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir.2007) (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Gorvokovic v. Filip · filed 2009-01-26(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gorvokovic’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reconsider, filed within 30 days of the order's entry.

Vazquez v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(b)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider, and that motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reconsider was filed beyond the 30-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Hernandez-Lievanos v. Holder · filed 2009-03-09(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA's final order.

Sharma v. Holder · filed 2009-03-31(b)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s May 31, 2006 order.

The ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen applies to motions seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Vilchiz v. Holder · filed 2009-03-27(c)(2)

Petitioners filed their motion to reopen outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), which does apply to CAT claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed almost ten years after the BIA’s final order.

Kone v. Holder · filed 2009-03-31(c)(2)

The BIA properly denied Kone’s November 2007 motion to reopen as time barred, where it was filed almost 10 years after the BIA’s final order in his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Le Zhou v. Holder · filed 2009-04-14(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(a) permits—but does not require—the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte in exceptional situations.

Uritsky v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-05-20(c)(2), (a)

A party must generally file a motion to reopen “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Uritsky filed his motion to reopen too late. ... Accordingly, the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. ... Uritsky further argues that the BIA abused its discretion by declining to reopen his immigration proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides that the BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” ... Even assuming he had demonstrated such circumstances, section 1003.2(a) merely “allows the BIA to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it does not require the BIA to do so.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final decision, but the deadline may be equitably tolled for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Narkaj v. Holder · filed 2009-05-29(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding. However, this time limitation may be equitably tolled where the motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports treating a motion to reopen filed almost two and a half years after the BIA's order as untimely.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2009-07-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed almost two and a half years after the BIA’s September 9, 2004, order.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision is mailed.

Zapata-Gomez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-07-27(b)(2)

“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the [BIA] within 30 days after the mailing of the [BIA] decision . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... Here, the BIA explained that it denied Zapata-Gomez’s motion because the motion was untimely. The BIA mailed its decision on May 21, 2008, but it did not receive Zapata-Gomez’s motion until three days after the June 20, 2008 deadline for filing a motion to reconsider. Because the motion was untimely, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than six years after the BIA's order.

Brar v. Holder · filed 2009-08-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s July 9, 1999 order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they aeted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(2) does not exempt a motion to reopen from the time bar merely because the movant has had children in the United States; that circumstance is insufficient by itself.

Lin v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2009-08-18(c)(3)(2)

However, we have repeatedly found that the birth of children in the United States are changed personal circumstances insufficient to establish an exception to the time-bar for motions to reopen required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time limit for a motion to reopen based on material changed country conditions evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2009-09-16(c)(3)(ii)

There are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Yang’s assertion of translation errors failed to demonstrate changed country conditions; she submitted no evidence in support of her claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than 19 months after the BIA’s order is untimely.

Tsadourian v. Holder · filed 2009-09-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tsadourian’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 19 months after the BIA’s October 20, 2004 order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Tsadourian failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available where “petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam) (pending petition for review does not toll time limit for filing motion to reopen with BIA).