8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by new, previously unavailable evidence; evidence the applicant could have obtained earlier does not satisfy that requirement.

Rroku v. Holder · filed 2014-03-28(c)(1)

Rroku submitted a certificate validating the existence of a blood feud as a basis for reopening. The IJ did not err in rejecting it because Rroku could have obtained the certificate at the time the issuing organization first learned of the alleged feud, in May 2001. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen must be supported by new, previously unavailable evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be new and previously unavailable, and the court upheld treating evidence about a child born before the later hearing as failing that requirement.

Ortiz-Cervantes v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-01-22(c)(1)

However, the BIA found that it was “neither new nor previously unavailable” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). AR 3. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in this regard because it is undisputed that Ethan was born March 29, 2012, while Ortiz’s first appeal to the BIA was pending and thus prior to the second hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Romero-Escobar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-02-20(c)(1)

Also, the Board properly observed that Romero’s motion relied on legal arguments that he could have raised in his direct appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (explaining that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) covers new information that is material and could not have been discovered or presented to the IJ, requiring the agency to consider such information on remand.

Bringas-Rodriguez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-08(c)(1)

Upon remand, the agency should consider this new information, which is “material” and “could not have been discovered or presented” to the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Duran-Quintanilla v. Sessions · filed 2017-09-22(c)(1)

The relevant regulation provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). ... The BIA addressed petitioner’s purported “new evidence” and correctly concluded that his “ability to self-petition [for I-360 relief] was available at the time of his 2016 hearing[.]” Id. at 2.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Carabal-Santos v. Barr · filed 2019-05-15(c)(1)

In challenging the agency’s refusal to reopen his removal proceedings, Carabal-Santos bears a still heavier burden because the law states that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Tousi v. Barr · filed 2019-10-21(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new facts only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Lee v. Barr · filed 2020-09-22(c)(1)

"The BIA may only grant a motion to reopen based on new facts if the 'evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.'" ... As a result, the approval of the petition cannot have constituted a material change as required to warrant a remand. The BIA thus could not have abused its discretion in denying Lee's motion to remand on that basis.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Melgar-Melgar v. Rosen · filed 2021-01-12(c)(1)

Further, the BIA will not grant a motion to reopen proceedings “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to remand when new evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Solaka v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-01-27(c)(1)

The relevant established policy requires the BIA to remand if new evidence is material and was previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Ityonzughul v. Garland · filed 2021-06-24(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Because the evidence that Ityonzughul sought to introduce was part of the administrative record, it could have been discovered prior to the filing of his initial motion to reopen. Moreover, Ityonzughul has offered no explanation why he could not have presented his evidence in his initial motion to reopen. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2021-08-13(c)(1)

Consequently, the BIA’s regulation denies reopening “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion based on new evidence to show that the evidence is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Moreno-Molina v. Garland · filed 2022-06-09(c)(1)

In his motion, Moreno-Molina’s did not adduce “material” evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), nor did he adduce evidence sufficient to support prima facie eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Cruz-Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2022-12-02(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits remand or reopening only when the new evidence is material and was previously unavailable, with materiality requiring a likelihood of changing the proceeding's outcome.

Akrawi v. Garland · filed 2023-03-01(c)(1)

The Board typically subjects a motion to remand to the same standards that apply to a motion to reopen the removal proceedings. See Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 489 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)–(B). The Board may not grant this relief “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Yousif, 53 F.4th at 936. Evidence is not “material” unless it would likely change the outcome of the proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material, new, previously unavailable evidence.

Sanchez-Martinez v. Garland · filed 2023-10-23(c)(1)

The BIA denied the motion to reopen because it determined that Sanchez-Martinez had failed to present material, new, previously unavailable evidence regarding conditions in Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The failure to proffer material, new, previously unavailable evidence provides independent grounds for the BIA to deny a motion to reopen. Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening, and here a remand, to be material and previously unavailable.

DE JESUS PLATON · filed 2025-01-17(c)(1)

We consider the respondent’s new evidence of post-conviction relief in support of a remand under the standard for motions to reopen. See Matter of Coelho, 20 I&N Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992) (applying the standards for motions to reopen to motions to remand). We determine that the respondent’s new evidence is material and was previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2025). However, because the respondent’s new evidence did not establish the statutory subsection applicable to the vacatur in his case, we conclude that the respondent did not meet his burden for showing prima facie eligibility for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting reopening to be material and previously unavailable, meaning it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Castro-Castro v. Bondi · filed 2025-08-27(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. ... Under these circumstances, the BIA acted within its discretion in denying reopening because it was not required to view Petitioners’ new evidence as either previously unavailable or “material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; an article recounting previously presented facts does not qualify.

Campbell v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-09-20(c)(1)

Moreover, on appeal, Campbell concedes that the article chronicled the facts of his experiences in the Bahamas and throughout the asylum application process, and, therefore, the article does not qualify as material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered on a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable.

Nogales v. Garland · filed 2023-09-07(c)(1)

Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that he failed to show that this article was previously unavailable. Furthermore, the BIA did not err in finding that the article failed to significantly rehabilitate Lema Nogales’s credibility. Most of the discrepancies noted by the IJ in making the adverse credibility determination were unrelated to the father’s murder. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that reopening was not warranted based on the 1994 article.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been reasonably unavailable to the movant, not merely nonexistent; physical existence alone does not make evidence available.

Oyeniran v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-03-06(c)(1)

It is not sufficient that the evidence physically existed in the world at large; rather, the evidence must have been reasonably available to the petitioner.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to evaluate newly submitted evidence when deciding whether reopening is warranted.

Lotero-Diaz v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2023-05-25(c)(1)

The BIA did not err in reviewing the submitted evidence to determine whether to reopen Lotero-Diaz’s case, as the regulations require it to do so to determine whether reopening is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary and unreviewable, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a motion to reopen to include material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Krisna v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2007-04-04(a), (c)(3)(ii)

As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006). ... The regulations require a motion to reopen to be accompanied by affidavits or other evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Although the 2004 U.S. Department of State Report Krisna submitted with her motion became available only after her hearing before the Immigration Judge, the BIA found that “[t]he evidence submitted shows that religious and ethnic violence continues in Indonesia but does not show that the turmoil and violence which has occurred in Indonesia since the respondents’ July 12, 2004, hearing has worsened.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and imposes a 90-day filing deadline, subject to exceptions in § 1003.2(c)(3), while subsection (a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that this court cannot review.

Lin v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-01-23(c)(2), (c)(3), and (a)

The regulations state that an individual can file only one motion to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The only exception that could be relevant in this case is the “changed circumstances” exception. In his motion to reopen, Lin asserted that his case should be reopened because he now has two children born in the United States; he does not claim that the Chinese government has changed its enforcement of the coercive family planning policy. This Court has recently held that a change in an individual’s personal circumstances does not qualify under this exception; rather, an individual must demonstrate that conditions have changed in the country of nationality or to which deportation has been ordered. Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir.2005); Guan v. BIA, 345 F.3d 47, 49 (2d Cir.2003). Moreover, the approved visa petition is not new information that could be considered “changed” circumstances. ... Motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days after the final order of removal is entered, or by September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Lin still would have been able to file a motion to reopen if he fell into one of the exceptions provided for untimely filings at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). However, as previously discussed, the only exception that could have been applicable is the changed circumstances exception, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that this exception did not apply in this case. ... The BIA has limited authority to reopen an individual’s proceedings on its own. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also In Re J-J-, 21 I & N Dec. 976, 984, 1997 WL 434418 (BIA 1997). The decision of the BIA to reopen, or not reopen, a case sua sponte is completely discretionary, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a BIA decision regarding the use of its sua sponte authority. See Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir.1999); Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.1999); Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.2002); Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3rd Cir.2003); Pilch v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 585, 586 (7th Cir.2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, and subsection (a)'s sua sponte reopening decisions are not reviewable for lack of jurisdiction.

Santana v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Santana’s motion as untimely because he did not file it within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, while subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen sua sponte for exceptional circumstances, subject to the court’s lack of jurisdiction to review the refusal to exercise that authority.

Badreddine v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2007-06-11(c), (a)

Consequently, it was untimely as he filed it more than 90 days after November 15, 2005. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). While it is true that the BIA sua sponte could have reopened the November 15, 2005 decision and order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), it decided not to do so as it held that Badreddine did not establish exceptional circumstances to support such action. Our jurisdiction does not extend to a review of that decision.

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte entirely discretionary and beyond judicial review; § 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order, subject to possible equitable tolling.

Arias-Gomez v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(a), (c)(2)

As to the claim that the BLA abused its discretion in failing to sua sponte reopen the ease, we have “join[ed] our sister circuits in holding that a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond our review-in other words, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen ... immigration proceedings sua sponte.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). ... The contention that the BIA abused its discretion by declining to invoke principles of equitable tolling under § 1003.2(c) is equally unavailing here because Arias’s motion relates to a removal order that became final on July 21, 1997, meaning he was required to file his motion to reopen no later than October 19, 1997. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Under § 1003.2(c), the motion was untimely and the changed-country-conditions exception did not apply; a decision not to reopen sua sponte under § 1003.2(a) is discretionary and not judicially reviewable.

Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

It is undisputed that the motion was untimely where it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s May 2004 decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, the BIA properly found that Zheng failed to show that his motion to reopen met an exception to the time limitation based on “changed country conditions” in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Zheng’s proceedings sua sponte because such decision is “entirely discretionary.” See Cyrus v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is a discretionary decision that is not subject to judicial review); Azmond Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006) (same).

Section 1003.2 permits an exception to the motion-to-reopen limits for changed country conditions, does not treat changed personal circumstances in the United States as sufficient, and leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion.

Zheng v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2008-09-25(c)(3)(ii), (e)(3)(ii), (a)

Here, The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s June 2007 motion to reopen — his third such motion and the fifth motion he filed since his order of removal became final in 1997. ... In addition, the BIA properly determined that Zheng was not eligible for an exception to the time limitation for motions to reopen because he failed to submit any evidence establishing a change in country conditions in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA also properly found that reopening was not warranted to the extent Zheng’s motion was based on his participation in the CDP in the United States alone. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir.2006). It is well-established that such a change in. personal circumstances does not suffice to except a motion from the applicable time and numerical limitations. See id. Moreover, the BIA’s refusal to reopen Zheng’s case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) was entirely discretionary, and any challenge to that decision is beyond our review. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2 limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, provides an exception for materially changed country conditions, and gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority whose denial is not judicially reviewable.

Duarte-Acevedo v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2008-10-06(a), (c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and must do so no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (c)(2). This time limitation does not apply, however, to a motion to reopen proceedings to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order unless an exception applies; a labor certification alone does not establish an exception under subsection (c)(3), while subsection (a)'s sua sponte reopening authority is entirely discretionary.

Patel v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-24(c)(2), (c)(3), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Patel’s motion as untimely. As Patel concedes, she filed her motion to reopen after the ninety-day limitations period had elapsed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA properly found that her labor certification did not establish that she qualified for any of the excep*47tions to the ninety-day bar.1 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). To the extent that Patel challenges the BIA’s refusal to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), that argument is beyond our review because the BIA’s decision whether to exercise its authority to sua sponte reopen a case is entirely discretionary.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen sua sponte without meaningful standards for judicial review.

Mosere v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-12(c)(2), (a)

By regulation, a motion to reopen "must be filed no later than 90 days" after the date on which the administrative decision at issue becomes final. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (emphasis added). Given the clear language, it is impossible for us to say that the BIA abused its discretion in finding Mosere’s motion, filed more than eleven years after the order of voluntary departure, untimely. ... Section 1003.2(a) provides that the BIA "may" reopen on its own motion, but it "provides no guidance as to the BIA’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors . . ., places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and specifies no standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion." ... Because there are no meaningful standards by which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion, we find that we lack jurisdiction to review its refusal to sua sponte reopen Mosere’s case.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to the regulatory exceptions in § 1003.2(c)(3), while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte reopening authority that courts lack jurisdiction to review when the BIA declines to exercise it.

Neth v. Holder · filed 2009-09-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(i), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Neth’s motion as untimely because it was filed over 90 days after the BIA issued its final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Neth failed to demonstrate that he qualified for any of ... the regulatory exceptions to the time limit on filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(iv). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte; a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to exercise that authority.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-02-23(c)(3), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA's final order of removal and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they qualified for any exceptions to the ninety-day time limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of final administrative order of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on material, previously unavailable changed-country conditions from the time and number limits; subsection (a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary, so courts lack jurisdiction to review a refusal to reopen sua sponte.

Hodzic v. Holder · filed 2010-04-30(c)(3)(ii), (a)

However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate changed conditions in Montenegro. ... Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Petitioners’ argument that the BIA erred in refusing to reopen their proceeding sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2 makes motions to reopen subject to a 90-day filing period and specified exceptions, while giving the BIA complete discretion over sua sponte reopening.

Nezianya v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-01-13(c), (c)(3), (a)

The BIA has authority to reopen removal proceedings, subject to a 90-day filing period, upon a motion filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Failure to file within the 90-day filing period does not preclude reopening such proceedings, however, as long as one of four exceptions applies. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides the BIA with complete discretion in determining whether to reopen, our court lacks jurisdiction to review a challenge to the BIA’s refusal to exercise its authority under § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the final order, while § 1003.2(a) leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA's broad discretion.

Aldana v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-18(c)(2), (a)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Aldana’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than eight years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Aldana did not establish that she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the time limitation, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897. ... To the extent we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority, the BIA acted within its broad discretion in declining to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and generally requires filing within 90 days of the final order, while subsection (a) gives the BIA broad discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Roman-Anguiano v. Holder · filed 2011-03-15(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avetisian’s motion to reopen as time- and number-barred because the successive motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s December 24, 2003, order dismissing the underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (only one motion to reopen permitted and the motion generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order). ... To the extent we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority, the BIA acted within its broad discretion in declining to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1)-(3) makes a motion to reopen subject to filing limitations and exceptions, while subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Perez-Orellano v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-24(c)(1)-(3); (a)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez-Orellano’s motion to reopen as untimely where Perez-Orellano filed it more than 11 years after his deportation order became final, and Perez-Orellano has not met any of the exceptions to the filing limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)-(3). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and equitable tolling requires due diligence; § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte reopening authority that courts lack jurisdiction to review when the BIA declines to exercise it.

Ning v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-24(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Ning’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s October 20, 2005, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Ning failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897. ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

The BIA may deny an untimely motion to reopen when the applicant fails to show changed country conditions for the regulatory exception, and courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen sua sponte.

Mukweya v. Holder · filed 2011-03-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ali’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), Ali failed to demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and Ali did not show prima facie eligibility for the relief sought, see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying relief sought); see also Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, while subsection (a) provides sua sponte reopening authority that the court lacks jurisdiction to review when the BIA declines to exercise it.

Arenas-Celaya v. Holder · filed 2010-06-11(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Arenas-Celaya’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s May 19, 2005, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Arenas-Celaya failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not exempt eligibility for adjustment of status from the time limit for motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(a) makes sua sponte reopening discretionary.

Gashi v. Holder · filed 2010-06-22(c)(3)(ii), (a)

However, eligibility for adjustment of status is not an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”). ... The BIA’s determination as to whether it will exercise its sua sponte authority is entirely discretionary and thus beyond the scope of our jurisdiction.

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, does not treat adjustment-of-status eligibility as an exception, and leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-08-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (a)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, eligibility for adjustment of status is not an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); ... Thus, to the extent Chen sought reopening to pursue such relief, he was necessarily invoking the BIA’s authority to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. See Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Because Mahmood’s untimely motion to reopen was not excused by any regulatory exception, his motion to reopen could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua sponte authority.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s decision whether to exercise its sua sponte authority is entirely discretionary and thus beyond the scope of our jurisdiction.

The court applied § 1003.2(c)(2)'s time limit and held that § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)'s exception requires a showing of changed circumstances in India; it also held that decisions not to reopen sua sponte under § 1003.2(a) are unreviewable.

Bala v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90; see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings that is not reviewable by the court.

Im v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-18(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Im’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed nearly nine months after the BIA’s January 5, 2009, decision vacating the immigration judge’s decision to defer Im’s removal and ordering him removed, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order), and Im failed to allege grounds for equitable tolling, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678-80 (equitable tolling available where petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering such circumstances). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, while decisions under section 1003.2(a) not to reopen proceedings sua sponte are not reviewable for lack of jurisdiction.

Blanco v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-21(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Campuzano-Blanco’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over nine months after the BIA’s order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Campuzano-Blanco failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Asylum is not available to victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a protected ground.”) ... We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to exceptions, and § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority whose refusal to exercise it is unreviewable.

Castrejon-Telles v. Holder · filed 2013-01-16(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Castrejon-Telles’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than twenty-one years after the BIA’s July 5, 1989, order affirming the immigration judge’s order of deportation, and Castrejon-Telles did not establish that an exception to the filing deadline applied. ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen deportation proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the time limit for motions to reopen, and subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte reopening authority whose nonexercise is not reviewable here.

Ismail-Yusuf v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-11(c)(3) (a)

The BIA acted within its discretion by denying Ismail-Yusuf’s motion as untimely because it was filed more than five years after the agency’s administrative order of removal became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Ismail-Yusuf failed to establish that an exception to the filing deadline applied, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), and did not demonstrate the reasonable diligence necessary for equitable tolling of the deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011). ... We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the agency to consider an otherwise untimely motion to reopen or reconsider only through its sua sponte authority, whose exercise is entirely discretionary.

Pereyra-Martinez v. Holder · filed 2013-04-16(a)

Because the untimely filing of Pereyra-Martinez’s motion was not excused by any statutory exception, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv), his motion “could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua sponte authority.” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Such a decision is “entirely discretionary” and beyond the scope of our review. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to present new material evidence, generally limits an alien to one motion within 90 days, and removes those limits when the motion is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2014-04-10(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

the BIA did not abuse its discretion in this regard because Chen did not submit any new material evidence as required in a motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988). ... An alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... there are no time or numerical limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review.

Sihotang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-03(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Sihotang’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred, where Sihotang filed the motion six years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing). ... We lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1135 (BIA 1999) (BIA’s consideration of whether a fundamental change in the law warrants reopening involves an exercise of its sua sponte authority).

Section 1003.2(c) limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Tarango v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-12-05(c), (a)

The applicable regulations make clear that a party may file only one motion to reopen before the BIA, and that the motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Accordingly, Tarango’s second motion to reopen—filed years after his deportation—is both time and number-barred. Tarango therefore must rely on the BIA’s power to sua sponte reopen proceedings. See id. § 1003.2(a). ... However, we have repeatedly held that this court lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the BIA’s failure to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen, as “[t]he authority to sua sponte reopen deportation proceedings is entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, § 1003.2(c)(3) does not make eligibility to adjust status an exception to those limits, and § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that courts generally cannot review.

Cuka v. Lynch · filed 2016-07-07(c)(2), (c)(3), (a)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that the December 2014 motion was untimely because the BIA issued a final decision in February 2005, and number barred because it was the second motion to reopen. Nor do any exceptions apply to excuse the time and number limitations. An application for or eligibility to adjust status is not an exception to the time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009). Accordingly, the only basis for reopening is the BIA’s sua sponte authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that “entirely discretionary” authority. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.

Section 1003.2(a) places sua sponte authority to reopen immigration proceedings with the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Huang v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-08-14(a)

To the extent Huang asks this court to exercise sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, that authority rests with the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretionary authority to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time.

Tarango v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-09-05(a)

In addition to a statutory motion to reopen, an alien can file a regulatory motion to reopen, which invokes the BIA’s or immigration judge’s discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen the removal proceedings at any time. Lugo–Resendez, 831 F.3d at 340–42; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, leaves the decision entirely to the BIA’s discretion, and bars judicial review of its denial absent a meaningful standard for review.

Juan Jose Gushiken Ayala v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2022-05-12(a)

The BIA also has the authority to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Whether to grant or deny such a motion is entirely within the BIA’s discretion. ... Unlike the denial of statutory reopening, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen pursuant to its sua sponte authority because such a determination is committed to agency discretion by law and there is no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) does not make newfound eligibility for cancellation an exception; § 1003.2(a) permits sua sponte reopening only as a sparingly used extraordinary remedy.

Pineda-Aguilar v. Garland · filed 2025-01-10(a), (c)(2), (c)(3)

A petitioner seeking to reopen proceedings to apply for relief from removal may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... While there are statutory and regulatory exceptions to the deadline, newfound eligibility for cancellation of removal is not one of them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... Absent a statutory basis for rescission or reopening, Pineda-Aguilar could only have obtained reopening under the agency’s regulatory authority to reopen sua sponte despite the time limitation. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1000.23(b)(1). Such authority is to be invoked “sparingly, treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships created by enforcement of the time and number limits in the motions regulations, but as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.”

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides regulatory exceptions to the time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA’s discretionary sua sponte reopening authority.

Jiang v. Blanche · filed 2026-04-20(c)(3), (a)

And he moved to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal, so his motion did not fall into a statutory or regulatory exception to the time and number limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009). ... Finally, “we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s entirely discretionary refusal to reopen a case sua sponte” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretionary authority to reopen any case in which it has rendered a decision on its own motion, while section 1003.2(c)(2) gives a respondent only one motion to reopen within 90 days of an order.

Herrera-Nunez · filed 2026-06-12(a), (c)(2)

The phrase “sua sponte” is a Latin phrase meaning “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Board has the discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen on our own motion any case in which we have rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2026). “Sua sponte” does not refer to a right of a party to seek reopening. Rather, a respondent only has the right to file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry of an order, which is not applicable here. See INA § 240(c)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The one-motion limit in § 1003.2(c)(2) does not bar a motion to reconsider that asks the Board to correct a legal or factual error in its earlier decision.

Song Jin Wu v. Immigration and Naturalization Service · filed 2006-01-24(c)(2)

The Board compounded this error by then relying on In re M-S- in its March 9, 2000 decision to construe Wu’s subsequent motion to reconsider as a successive motion to reopen that was number-barred under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1998) (“Except as [otherwise] provided ... a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings.”) (now codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (Feb. 28, 2003)). This was double error because a motion to reconsider is proper when a petitioner alleges that the Board committed a legal or factual error in its previous disposition of his case based on the record as it existed at the time of the first decision. See Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90, 91 (citing In re Cerna, 20 I & N Dec. 399, 402 (BIA 1991)). Since Wu’s motion to reconsider asked the Board to reevaluate its August 31 ruling in light of its failure to address his properly presented change-in-law argument, that motion should not have been construed as a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, subject to specified exceptions such as changed country conditions.

Kaur v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-04-27(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, unless certain exceptions are demonstrated, such as changed circumstances in the country of the alien’s nationality. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA therefore properly denied Kaur’s second motion, because it clearly exceeded the numerical limitations and Kaur failed to present any evidence that her case fell within any exception to the regulations.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits a party to one motion to reconsider in a case previously decided finally by the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Martinez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-16(b)(2)

The regulations provide that motions to reconsider shall be limited to one motion to reconsider in any case previously the subject of a final decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals, allowing denial of a second motion on that basis.

Garcia-Paramo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Paramo’s second motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (permitting one motion to reopen before BIA).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

The regulations provide, with certain exceptions the BIA correctly found did not apply here, that a party “may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings ... and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen, filed more than one year after the BIA’s denial of petitioner’s appeal. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order.

Palacol v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(c)(2)

A party may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed not later than ninety days after the date on which the final order of removal was en*192tered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely when it was filed over five months after the deadline for filing motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an individual to file only one motion to reopen.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-10(c)(2)

The regulations state that individuals may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and there is no dispute that Singh has filed two motions to reopen with the BIA.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts or documentary evidence, while § 1003.2(b)(2) permits only one motion to reconsider a given decision.

Zendejas v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-27(c)(1), (b)(2)

Because petitioner’s motion did not submit any new facts or documentary evidence, the BIA properly construed the motion to reopen as a motion for reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004). The regulations provide that a party “may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision....” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen, filed nearly two years late. See id.; Larar-Torres, 383 F.3d at 972.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a party to one motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Herrera v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-17(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen.... ” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ third motion to reopen as numerically barred. See id,.; see also Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 894-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen removal proceedings to be filed with the BIA.

Heredia-Santana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2)

The regulations provide that only one motion to reopen removal proceedings may be filed with the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This was petitioner’s second motion to reopen removal proceedings. Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner’s second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order, absent a recognized exception.

Cedillo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-19(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioners have not contended that any recognized exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Cervantes v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-19(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-16(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because Chen’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90 day deadline, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien subject to a final deportation order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final order.

Ramos-Perez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-12(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of deportation is limited to filing one motion to reopen deportation proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

The regulations provide that “a party-may file only one motion to reopen,” and that the motion “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it was filed on October 19, 2007, more than 90 days after the November 15, 2005 final administrative decision was rendered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final order of removal to one motion to reopen, unless an applicable exception applies.

Omana v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioners’ motion to reopen was their second motion to reopen filed, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as number-barred. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, generally filed within 90 days of the final order.

Miranda v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-13(c)(2)

The regulations provide that an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s second motion to reopen was filed beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s untimely motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the final order.

Fuentes-Rojas v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-14(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The regulation limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but permits an untimely motion when the alien presents previously unavailable evidence establishing changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Sadiki v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien is limited to one motion to reopen removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This motion must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). However, a motion that does not comply with this time limitation may be brought when the alien presents evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” which was undiscovered or unavailable at the time of the alien’s hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143,151 (2d Cir.2008). In this case, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding (1) that the Sadikis’ motion to reopen was untimely — which is not disputed here — and (2) that they failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish changed country conditions in either Kosovo or Montenegro warranting an exception to the applicable time limitation. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final removal order, unless an exception to the time limit applies.

Avila v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-28(c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Because petitioner’s motion to reopen was filed well beyond the 90-day deadline, and petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an exception to the time limit applies, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the final decision in the underlying proceeding.

Liem v. Holder · filed 2009-07-23(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), applicants may file only one motion to reopen their proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the entry of the final decision in the underlying proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen, and requires that motion to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Dhillon v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-02-22(c)(2)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be opened.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a nearly eleven-year delay supports denial absent equitable tolling.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed nearly eleven years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh did not establish that he exercised due diligence during the entirety of this time period, as required to obtain equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit on motions to reopen, and the court applied it to a motion filed more than four years after the BIA’s final removal order.

Zhang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhang’s motion to reopen where he filed the motion more than four years after the BIA issued its final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), failed to demonstrate the due diligence required to obtain equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897, and failed to present any evidence of changed circumstances in China in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of a final order of removal.

Quintanilla v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-07(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We also note that insofar as Quintanilla sought reopening by submitting new evidence, substantial evidence supports the finding that he failed to show that his motion was timely and that the new evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at his hearing before the immigration judge.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed after the applicable deadline following the final removal order.

Zulqarnain v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Zulqarnain’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel because he filed the motion more than five years after issuance of his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (ascertaining due diligence based on “whether petitioner made reasonable efforts to pursue relief”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-20(c)(2)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The motion at issue is Singh’s third motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a second motion to reopen, including one based on eligibility for adjustment of status.

Ale v. Gonzales · filed 2006-11-02(c)(2)

We further conclude that the BIA did not exceed its discretion with respect to its order dated January 19, 2006. As the BIA concluded, that motion to reopen, which was Ale’s second, was number-barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen, and a motion to remand seeking reopening relief counts toward that limit.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-17(c)(2)

As a result, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Singh’s subsequent motion to reopen was number-barred under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-01-27(b)(1)

Accordingly, because Chen’s motion failed to specify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), he has not established that the BIA abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Morfin-Bernabe v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-21(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Virgen v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-01(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Virgen’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Aguilar-Lopez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-02-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar-Lopez’s motion to reconsider, because the motion did not identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order denying Aguilar-Lopez’s motion to reopen as untimely and concluding he was not entitled to equitable tolling. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.2003).

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Nieves v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-01-15(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Tiani v. Holder · filed 2010-01-04(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider asserts the Board made an error in its earlier decision. The movant must specify the error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Munoz v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-25(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Guzman v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-26(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Hernandez Guzman’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s pervious decision denying his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

Loza v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-27(b)(1)

Further, the BIA was within its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the IJ’s order denying cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) makes an alleged error of law or fact the proper basis for a motion to reconsider.

Krishna Bahadur Bhattarai Chhetry v. U.S. Department of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-20(b)(1)

The BIA was correct to consider Chhetry’s motion as one to reopen as opposed to recon sider because the motion presented no argument regarding an error of law or fact that would have been the proper basis for a mo-lion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Santoso v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Santoso’s motion to reconsider because he failed to specify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s April 2005 decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

de Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-26(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Torres’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order affirming the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir.2003) (upholding the BIA’s streamlining procedures).

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision; merely repeating arguments previously presented does not satisfy that requirement.

Elba Corina Mora Lancheros v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2008-04-08(b)(1)

After the BIA has affirmed an IJ’s order of removal, the alien may seek reconsideration on the ground that the BIA has made a legal or factual error. See INA § 240(c)(6); 8 U.S.C. §1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also INA § 240(c)(6)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify errors of law or fact in the prior order; merely reiterating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Catari v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-22(b)(1)

Finally, to the extent the petitioners in their motion to reconsider reiterated the arguments from the earlier appeal, they failed to specify “errors of fact or law” as required for a successful motion to reconsider. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) treats a motion to reconsider as one alleging legal or factual errors in the prior decision.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-08(b)(1)

The BIA properly construed Singh’s motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider because the motion only alleged legal and factual errors in the IJ’s decision. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir.2005); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(1) (a motion to reconsider specifies errors of fact or law in the prior decision while a motion to reopen presents new evidence).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Chavez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing their appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior order.

Cabrera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s June 8, 2006 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Membreno v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1227, 1230 n. 5 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify a material error of law or fact in the earlier decision; failure to do so justifies rejection.

Liu v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-12(b)(1)

Second, the record bears out the BIA's conclusion that the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was deficient because it failed to identify any material error of law or fact in the earlier decisions. This circumstance, in and of itself, justifies the rejection of the motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Zhao v. United States Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits a motion to reconsider when the movant seeks a new determination based on alleged errors of fact or law by the BIA.

Godinez v. Holder · filed 2009-02-13(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider seeks a new determination based on alleged errors of fact or law by the BIA.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2009-04-15(b)(1)

Here, the BIA properly denied Liu’s motion to reconsider where she failed to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Llanes v. Holder · filed 2009-06-30(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gutierrez Llanes’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s September 25, 2006 order denying his previous motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and provide supporting authority; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Viera-Soares v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-11(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact warranting relief.

Sidhu v. Holder · filed 2009-08-17(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s October 26, 2006 order that would justify granting relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision; merely repeating arguments previously presented does not satisfy that requirement.

Garcia-Florian v. U.S. Atty. General · filed 2009-09-28(b)(1)

“Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Islam v. Holder · filed 2009-12-08(b)(1)

To the extent Islam challenges the denial of his motion to reconsider, we find that the BIA reasonably denied that motion because he failed to specify errors of fact or law in its prior decision as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order.

Liu v. Holder · filed 2010-02-03(b)(1)

Liu fails to specify any errors of law or fact in the BIA’s August 20th Order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (requiring that a motion to reconsider to “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (same).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Alarcon v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(b)(1)

Construed as a motion to reconsider, the BIA was within its discretion in denying Alarcon’s motion where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the immigration judge’s order denying cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Espinel v. Mukasey · filed 2010-04-12(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Espinel’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying her application for asylum.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Salgado v. Holder · filed 2010-04-13(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying their motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior Board order.

Arteaga v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-25(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Arteaga’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's order.

Wiltron v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(b)(1)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Contreras Wiltron’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s July 25, 2008, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law alleged in the prior decision.

Lombana-Cano v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-10(b)(1)

By “merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the [Board],” Lombana-Cano failed to “‘specify[] . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior order.

Acevedo-Aguilar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Acevedo-Aguilar’s motion to reconsider where the motion did not establish any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the underlying decision.

Rojas v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-11-29(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because petitioners failed to identify any error of fact or law in the underlying decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (The BIA “does not have to write an exegesis on every contention.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to establish an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Maradiaga v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-11(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Maradiaga’s motion to reconsider where the motion did not establish any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Alcala-Urvina v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-23(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alcala-Urvina’s motion to reconsider, where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); see also Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the original decision; merely repeating earlier arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Cui v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-05-09(b)(1)

A motion asking the BIA to reconsider its decision must specify the errors of law or fact in the original decision. See id. at 1329 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). A motion that merely reiterates earlier arguments fails to specify those kinds of legal or factual errors. Id.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Lin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-27(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reconsider because Lin failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 791 (the court reverses the denial of a motion to reconsider only if the BIA acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider, where Singh did not identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior order rather than merely repeat earlier arguments.

Twum v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-10-26(b)(1)

Therefore, a motion to reconsider that merely reiterates arguments previously presented to the BIA does not specify errors of fact or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider. Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Lopez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-07-19(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (court “defer[s] to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-12-21(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider his claims because he failed to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Escobar v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-05-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Escobar’s motion to reconsider where Escobar failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating earlier arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Niang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-07-09(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “However, [a] motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind,” and “[t]herefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” ... “In any event, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration, because Niang merely reiterated the arguments from his earlier appeal to the BIA, which fails to provide a proper basis for reconsideration.”

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider where Singh failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the standard for a motion to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the agency’s prior decision.

Mijanul v. Sessions · filed 2018-11-05(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact” in the agency’s prior decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90. “A motion for reconsideration is a request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Hernandez-Hernandez v. Barr · filed 2019-07-23(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez-Hernandez’s motion to reconsider where he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the standard for a motion to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Gonzalez v. Barr · filed 2020-05-11(b)(1)

To the extent that Gonzalez is challenging the BIA’s denial of her motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion because her motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny a motion to reopen unless the newly offered evidence is material.

Montoya v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-31(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen because it considered the new evidence presented regarding their daughter’s educational and medical difficulties, and acted within its broad discretion in determining that it was not material because it did not indicate that her condition was severe or that she would be unable to obtain assistance or treatment in Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an alien seeking to reopen a case to provide new and material evidence.

Cetinkaya v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), an alien must provide new and material evidence to warrant reopening his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) gives the Board discretion to reopen proceedings when the movant presents new facts supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and the evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Ramirez v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-07-15(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA has discretion to reopen proceedings if the movant states new facts to be proved at a hearing that are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. That new evidence must be material and have been unavailable at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Silva-Jimenez v. Holder · filed 2010-12-01(c)(1)

The BIA shall grant a motion to reopen only if “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Although Silva and his wife were separated at the time of his hearing before the immigration judge, after reviewing the record, we agree with the BIA’s conclusion that petitioner did not establish that her testimony would provide information that could not have been presented at the prior hearing or that it would be new and material to his petition.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present newly available, material evidence supporting the claimed hardship.

Benavidez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Benavidez’s motion to reopen where Benavidez failed to submit any newly available, material evidence of hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the moving party presents material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered at the previous hearing.

Kaur v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-15(c)(1)

DHS further presented the IJ with material evidence that was not available and discoverable at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Manbru-Encarnacion v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-01-10(c)(1)

The second category of evidence Manbru-Encarnacion submitted with his motion to reopen—evidence that was identical or substantially similar to the evidence the IJ considered in denying his application for CAT relief in the first instance—also does not show the BIA abused its discretion. This evidence was not “new,” as is necessary to support a motion to reopen under BIA regulations. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); Verano-Velsaco, 456 F.3d at 1376-77 (explaining that evidence is “new” when it “was unavailable at the time of [the petitioner’s] previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Juarez v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2026-03-03(c)(1)

A movant seeking reopening of removal proceedings must identify material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Bonilla-Espinoza v. Blanche · filed 2026-06-01(c)(1)

Moreover, wasting time is not diligence. The motion needed to depend on previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); Maatougui, 738 F.3d at 1242 (evidence was “inappropriate for a motion to reopen” because it was previously available). The BIA concluded that the only information in Petitioner’s affidavit that could not have been previously presented was the “assertion regarding his partner’s capture in November 2024.”

A motion to reopen must be supported by new evidence; failure to provide it supports denial.

Zhen v. Gonzales · filed 2005-06-28(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhen’s motion to reopen to allow her to apply for asylum on the new ground that she fears China’s one-child policy. Zhen conceded that she did not support her motion with any new evidence, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and we are not persuaded that the IJ should have exercised more care in explaining that Zhen may have been eligible for asylum based on China’s population control policies.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Tran v. Attorney General United States · filed 2023-02-03(c)(1)

The BIA denied that motion because it was not supported by evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... The Board’s ... decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law, and therefore was not an abuse of discretion.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence connected to the applicant’s circumstances; a general study questioning interview reliability is insufficient without a connection to the applicant’s statements.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2007-11-27(c)(1)

The BIA found that it was not material because it did not relate to the specific facts of Petitioner’s case. As discussed above, this finding was not an abuse of discretion. There is nothing that connects the results of the study to Petitioner’s situation such that the study has any bearing on the reliability of Petitioner’s credible fear interview statements.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable at the former hearing; cumulative evidence does not warrant reopening.

Cira Elena Castellano Moran v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2008-05-02(c)(1)

The motion will be granted only if “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Her motion failed to state any new material facts that warranted reopening her case. The article that she submitted with her motion was not material because the information in it was cumulative of that she had already submitted.