8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a decision to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Y Teran v. Ashcroft · filed 2006-02-27(b)(2)

The regulations provide that “[a] motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision denying an appeal.

Castro v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-09(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision denying an appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). In his motion to reconsider, Castro did not identify any such errors in the May 11 order. The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to reconsider.

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-20(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within the applicable time limit, and permits denial when the motion is untimely.

Gomez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-12(b)(2)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion when it denied as untimely petitioner’s motion to reconsider. See Malhi v. INS, 336 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law and support the claim with relevant authority.

Kuyateh-Moses v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-05(b)(1)

To the extent that Kuyateh-Moses moved the BIA to reconsider, she was required to specify errors of fact or law and to support her claim with relevant authority.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(1) makes qualifying new evidence a possible ground for reopening but does not require the BIA to grant the motion.

Mazariegos-Diaz v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-13(c)(2), (c)(1)

Specifically, he points out that his motion was timely because it was filed on October 28, 2003, within the ninety-day window mandated by the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). While timeliness is a prerequisite of a motion to reopen, it does not guarantee the motion will be granted. Similarly, the new evidence of Mazariegos’s asylum application provides a ground on which to grant a motion to reopen, but does not require it. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA has discretion in the matter.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify new facts and include supporting evidence, and permits reopening only when the evidence is material and was unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-24(c)(1)

Here, we conclude that Chen’s “motion to reconsider or reopen” could reasonably have been deemed — at least in part — as a motion to reopen under the BIA’s regulations. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” In addition, a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant lacks material, previously unavailable evidence or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Lin v. Gonzales · filed 2006-02-21(c)(1)

The BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence, or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). In Lin’s case, establishing prima facie eligibility for asylum was dependent on establishing credibility. Her new evidence did nothing to challenge the IJ’s finding that her testimony regarding her arrest for practicing Falun Gong in China was incredible. The BIA correctly determined that the March 2000 Amnesty International report could have been presented at the March 2003 hearing. Moreover, the BIA was entitled to view with skepticism the letter from Lin’s father, claiming that the police had renewed their demands for Lin’s surrender after someone had seen her practicing Falun Gong in the United States and reported her to the Chinese authorities. By implying that Lin could not establish prima facie eligibility for asylum with this implausible claim, the BIA provided an adequate, reasoned basis for denying the motion, and therefore did not abuse its discretion. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 108, 108 S.Ct. 904; Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at at 93.

Section 1003.2(c) permits one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final order, while subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte at any time, but the court lacks jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision.

Sondh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-03-28(c), (a)

Federal regulations authorize the BIA to grant a single motion to reopen, filed by either party within ninety days of a final order. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). ... It is true that the BIA may reopen a case at any time on its own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, “because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” we have held that “we do not have jurisdiction to consider [a] claim that the BIA should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).” ... Accordingly, the BIA’s decision is not reviewable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Lin v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-04-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c) permits a motion to reopen to consider new or previously unavailable evidence bearing on eligibility for relief, and granting the motion does not vacate prior agency decisions denying relief unless the BIA or IJ specifies otherwise.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-21(c)

The purpose of a motion to reopen is to consider, in the first instance, new or previously unavailable evidence that might establish eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Accordingly, a granted motion to reopen does not vacate the agency’s previous decision or decisions that denied relief unless the BIA or IJ so specifies when granting the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an asylum applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that courts lack jurisdiction to review.

Cheng v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-05-09(c)(2), (a)

An asylum applicant is' limited to only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of a final1 administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We have held that the filing deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled. ... Next, we note that the BIA has limited authority to reopen an individual’s proceedings on its own. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also In Re J-J- 21 I & N Dec. 976, 984, 1997 WL 434418 (BIA 1997). The decision of the BIA to reopen, or not reopen, a case sua sponte is completely discretionary, and we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s sua sponte discretionary authority.

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Liu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-07-30(b)(1)

His motion was styled as such, but it did not sufficiently “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision” nor was it “supported by pertinent authority,” as required by the regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision.

Estrada-Herrera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-06(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to reconsider because they failed to show an error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision dismissing their appeal. See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Chen v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2007-10-05(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state the errors of fact or law alleged.

Araiza-Ramirez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-01(b)(1)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in construing petitioners’ motion as a mo*649tion to reconsider and denying it because the motion failed to state any errors of fact or law as required by the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision; a new claim not previously raised does not satisfy that requirement.

Xuan v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-19(b)(1)

Indeed, because Xuan never raised this claim before the IJ or on appeal to the BIA, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider because this new claim does not specify “any errors of fact or law” in the BIA’s March 2007 decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Nie v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-24(b)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and cite pertinent supporting authority.

Lin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-04(b)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state its reasons by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Mompoint v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-10-27(b)(1)

It must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Because Mompoint has alleged “errors of fact [and] law in the prior Board decision,” § 1003.2(b)(1), and has not presented new facts supported by evidentiary material, § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA did not abuse its discretion by treating Mompoint’s challenge to the IJ’s finding as an untimely motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Xue Fang Zhao v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-14(b)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be *680supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 173 (2d Cir.2008).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Chavez-Ochoa v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2009-01-28(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the Board’s prior order.

Mekterian v. Holder · filed 2009-04-27(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reconsider its order upholding an immigration judge’s decision to deny asylum, withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s prior order.

A motion to reconsider must identify specific factual or legal errors in the prior BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Jesus A. Oviedo Cala v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-08-26(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and [must] be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). We have held that “merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA” fails to satisfy this standard.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law.

Galstyan v. Holder · filed 2009-09-02(b)(1)

The motion failed to specify an error of fact or law with respect to the BIA’s dis-positive determination that petitioners’ motion to reopen was untimely and that they failed to establish they were entitled to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Wang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2009-09-14(b)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

A motion to reconsider must allege material or factual errors in the underlying decision.

Hernandez v. Holder · filed 2009-10-13(b)(1)

We agree that the BIA properly construed the motion as a motion for reconsideration, and we conclude that the BIA properly denied the motion due to petitioner’s failure to allege any material or factual errors in the underlying decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state its reasons by specifying the factual or legal errors claimed in the prior BIA decision.

Sharif v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-13(b)(1)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), “[a] motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision....” In his motion to reconsider, Petitioner argued that the BIA failed to adequately consider his evidence. Although the BIA admitted that it “fail[ed] to recognize the arrest of Nawaz Sharif supporters” — evidence relevant to Petitioner’s asylum claim — it nonetheless con-eluded that Petitioner did not show that it “improperly evaluated or disregarded the facts and evidence presented.” These seemingly contradictory statements give us pause and leave us uncertain as to the BIA’s precise holding.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision.

Hafeez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-27(b)(1)

The agency’s regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and provide pertinent authority; merely repeating arguments previously presented does not satisfy that requirement.

William Javier Garcia Shimizu v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2010-02-26(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). “However, a motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind.” Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute specifying errors of fact or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify dispositive errors of fact or law in the prior order.

Huang v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-06-01(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huang’s motion to reconsider because Huang failed to identify any dispositive errors of fact or law in the BIA’s August 20, 2008, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-15(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 826 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to file a brief with the BIA where there were no plausible grounds for relief at the time of his appeal to the BIA).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA order.

Du v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-27(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Du’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s October 20, 2009, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to assert that the Board made an error of law or fact in its earlier decision.

Lopez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-10(b)(1)

To be successful, a motion to reconsider must assert that the Board made an error of law or fact in its earlier decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Rodriguez-Lopez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-12-06(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); ... “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)) (alteration in original).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Tsetskhladze v. Holder · filed 2012-04-18(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Tsetskhladze did not argue any specific errors of law or fact which would warrant reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the challenged BIA decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Khatra v. Holder · filed 2012-06-01(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify errors of law or fact in the [challenged BIA decision] and [] be supported by pertinent authority.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA decision.

Heron Cabello-Hinojos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(b)(1)

The motion must identify some error of fact or law in the prior BIA decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-16(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to show an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Mutti v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mutti’s motion to reconsider because he failed to show any error of fact or law in the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider a BIA decision to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Wajda v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-23(b)(1)

BIA regulations authorize a motion for reconsideration of a BIA decision and provide that such a motion “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision.

Diaz v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-02(b)(1)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Chavez Diaz’s motion to reconsider where Chavez Diaz did not identify any error of law or fact in the IJ’s prior decision denying his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the BIA's decision and support them with pertinent authority; it is not the proper vehicle for introducing new evidence after reopening is denied.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2015-03-30(b)(1)

The motion must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and be supported with pertinent authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... To the extent that Zhang sought to introduce new evidence following the denial of reopening, a motion to reconsider was not the appropriate vehicle by which to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Masalmeh v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-10-07(b)(1)

A successful motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). “[A] motion that merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place gives the tribunal no reason to change its mind.”

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior order.

Cabanes v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-05(b)(1)

Construed as a motion to reconsider, the motion failed to specify any error of fact or law in the prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (it is the alien’s burden to establish eligibility for relief).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Ruiz-Menendez v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-01(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ruiz-Menendez’s motion to reconsider because she failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and support the motion with pertinent authority.

Paz v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-20(b)(1)

An alien seeking reconsideration must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order and [support the motion] with pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 173 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ prior order.

Vasquez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasquez’s motion to reconsider because he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the agency’s prior decision.

He Chen v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-03-16(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reconsider, where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the agency’s prior decision denying his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Betancourt-Guzman v. Barr · filed 2019-05-28(b)(1)

As to petition No. 19-70166, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Betancourt-Guzman’s motion to reconsider where he failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the standard for a motion to reconsider); see also Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1160-62; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior agency decision.

Kadria v. Barr · filed 2019-07-23(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the agency’s prior decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90. ... Given Kadria’s failure to establish any error in the BIA’s conclusion that he did not demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to be filed within 30 days after the decision.

Hassan v. Barr · filed 2020-07-13(b)(2)

Accordingly, because the motion was filed more than 30 days after the prior decision, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely as to these claims. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.

Raja Sarwar v. Barr · filed 2020-07-18(b)(1)

Even assuming that Petitioner did not forfeit any challenge to the BIA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, that denial was not an abuse of discretion. Petitioner failed to identify any "legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision." Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2022-06-10(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the prior decision.

Xu v. Garland · filed 2023-03-17(b)(1)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider because Xu failed to identify any error of fact or law in the IJ’s prior decision denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the prior decision); see also Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020) (this court will reverse only if agency’s decision is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law).

A BIA motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Torres v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-10-26(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Matanga v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-21(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts the Board made an error in its earlier decision and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days, with no exception to that deadline.

Dong v. Holder · filed 2009-03-16(b)(2)

Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion as untimely, where there is no exception to the 30-day deadline applicable to motions to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to reopen a removal proceeding as a matter of discretion, so it must consider whether discretionary reopening is warranted.

Balan-Barrera v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-22(a)

However, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Balan-Barrera’s motion to reopen because it appears not to have considered whether he was entitled to reopening as a matter of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Singh, 771 F.3d at 653 (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen on jurisdictional grounds was legal error, and thus an abuse of discretion, because it had authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA broad discretion over when to reopen a case, even when the alien establishes a prima facie case for relief.

Jin Wen Lin v. Executive Office of Immigration Review · filed 2006-01-13(a)

The BIA has wide latitude in deciding when to reopen a case, even when an alien establishes a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA wide discretion to decide whether to reopen a case, including when an applicant establishes a prima facie case.

Zheng v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-07-28(a)

The BIA has wide discretion in determining whether or not to reopen a case, even in cases where the applicant does establish a prima facie case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 108, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(a) places the BIA’s sua sponte reopening decision within its discretion and makes that decision unreviewable, while subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law.

Huang v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-09(a), (b)(1)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002) (noting that “the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion”). The BIA was within its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying petitioners’ motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n. 2 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings, so it must recognize and exercise that discretion rather than treat reopening as legally unavailable.

De Alfaro v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-16(a)

The BIA indicated that the law precluded reopening, which appears to be contrary to a regulation providing that the BIA always has discretion to reopen proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... In light of the Government’s concession that reopening is a matter of discretion, the BIA’s apparent failure to recognize its discretionary authority and then to consider whether to grant or deny reopening as a matter of discretion warrants remand.

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case discretionary, but a court may review an incorrect legal premise and remand for reconsideration under the correct legal framework.

Louis Evangelista, Sr. v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-10-14(a)

The BIA’s decision to reopen a “case in which it has rendered a decision,” is discretionary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We retain jurisdiction, however, to determine if “the BIA relie[d] on an incorrect legal premise” and, if so, to “remand to the BIA so that it may exercise its sua sponte authority under the correct legal framework.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.

Lin v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-18(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... The BIA did not decline to reopen sua sponte based on Lin’s failure to establish her eligibility for relief; it explained that its discretionary authority to reopen was not a means to avoid enforcement of the time and number limits on motions and that reopening was not required even if a movant established prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.”

Subsection (a) allows the BIA to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has established a prima facie case for relief.

Martinez v. Bondi · filed 2025-07-31(a)

However, “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, cases in which it has rendered a decision, subject to the section's restrictions.

Sosa-Valenzuela v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-31(a)

The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. ... The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulations allow DHS to seek de novo review and reconsideration in the BIA. And the rules also allow the BIA on its own motion to reconsider a decision, even one where a final administrative order has been entered.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling when due diligence is shown.

Gbogbo v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-02(c)(2)

“A motion to reopen ‘must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.’” ... “But the 90-day time period may be extended by equitable tolling.” ... “Because Gbogbo failed to prove due diligence, equitable tolling is not available to extend the ninety-day limitation.”

The ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen asylum proceedings is subject to equitable tolling.

Gong Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-19(c)(2)

The ninety-day time limit for filing a motion to reopen asylum proceedings provided in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) is subject to equitable tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(1)'s filing deadline barred Aslanis's motion to reopen because he failed to exercise the due diligence required for equitable tolling of his ineffective-assistance claim.

Aslanis v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-18(c)(1)

As to the second challenge, we find that the BIA properly denied the motion to reopen as untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). While motions to reopen premised on ineffective assistance may be subject to an equitable toll, Aslanis did not exercise the due diligence required for such tolling.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance only when the alien exercised due diligence, while subsection (a) gives the Board discretion to deny sua sponte reopening.

Zhi Wen Huang v. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-14(c)(2) and (a)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed before the BIA within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This deadline may be equitably tolled by a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel; however, the alien must show that he has exercised due diligence in pursuing his claim. See Mahmood, 427 F.3d at 252-53. As for motions to reopen proceedings sua sponte, the Board has discretion to deny such a motion, even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(e)(2)'s ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen is subject to equitable tolling when deception, fraud, or error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts diligently to discover it.

Ghahremani v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-17(e)(2)

In general, a motion to reopen must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(2). However, we “recognizef] equitable tolling of deadlines ... during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an asylum applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but the filing deadline may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel; due diligence is required only from when the ineffective assistance was or should have been discovered.

Sun Xi Wu v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2007-10-15(c)(2)

An asylum applicant may file only one motion to reopen, and must do so within 90 days of a final administrative decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA exceeded its discretion in imposing upon Wu the requirement that he prove he exercised due diligence for the entire period between the filing deadline and the time he filed his motion to reopen in 2006.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a deadline, but that deadline may be equitably tolled when the movant shows due diligence in pursuing the claim.

Hwang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2008-03-18(c)(2)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hwang’s motion to reopen as untimely under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although the deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled in appropriate circumstances, such tolling requires a showing that the movant has exercised due diligence in vindicating his or her rights.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel to be filed within 90 days of a final administrative decision, but the deadline is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled when due diligence did not allow timely discovery of essential claim information.

Koutcher v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-31(c)(2)

A motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel must be filed *507within 90 days of a final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This is not a jurisdictional limitation, so the BIA might have excused their tardiness if the Koutchers— despite exercising due diligence — could not have discovered within the filing deadline essential information for their claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, but equitable tolling based on ineffective assistance requires due diligence throughout the entire period sought to be tolled.

Rashid v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-16(c)(2)

With certain exceptions inapplicable here, an alien may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... We therefore conclude that in order to equitably toll the filing deadline for a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, an alien must demonstrate that he or she has exercised due diligence during the entire period he or she seeks to toll. This includes both the period of time before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should have been discovered and the period from that point until the motion to reopen is filed.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day filing deadline for motions to reopen, subject to equitable tolling when deception, fraud, or error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts with due diligence.

Kaur v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-07(c)(2)

The BIA abused its discretion in rejecting Kaur’s request for equitable tolling of the ninety-day filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (stating that equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing [a motion to reopen] because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to equitable tolling when the alien has exercised due diligence.

Hakhinyan v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-09-03(c)(2)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although this ninety-day period may be equitably tolled, see Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002), the alien must have exercised due diligence in pursuing his case, Galvez Piñeda, 427 F.3d at 838.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits its one-motion and 90-day deadline to be equitably tolled for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims when the movant exercises due diligence.

Manansang v. Holder · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Manansang’s third motion to reopen, filed nearly six years after the BIA issued a final order, is indisputably untimely. However, the time limitation may be equitably tolled to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, so long as the movant has exercised “due diligence” in vindicating his or her rights throughout the period sought to be tolled.

Section 1003.2(c)'s 90-day deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled when ineffective assistance of counsel is established.

Khan v. Holder · filed 2010-10-19(c)

The Board also did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s motion to reopen, which was untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). The 90-day deadline can be equitably tolled by a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days, although the deadline may be equitably tolled; equitable tolling was unavailable here because the petitioner did not establish the required basis.

Perez v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-12-09(c)(2)

In general, an alien may file only one motion to reopen, and he must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... However, Perez contends in his opening brief that § 1003.2(c) should be equitably tolled due to the ineffective assistance of immigration trial counsel, see Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 248, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2005)—a contention raised with, and rejected by, the BIA. After careful review, we conclude that the BIA did not act arbitrarily or contrary to law in rejecting Perez‟s claim that he was entitled to equitable tolling; Perez has not shown error in the BIA‟s determination that he suffered no prejudice from counsel‟s allegedly deficient representation during the merits hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s ninety-day and one-motion limits may be equitably tolled when ineffective assistance of counsel prevents an alien from timely or adequately filing, including until the alien obtains and reviews a complete record with competent counsel.

Mendoza-Ortiz v. Holder · filed 2011-12-29(c)(2)

An alien is generally limited to one motion to reopen, which must be filed within ninety days of a final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We have “long afforded equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limitations to aliens who are prevented from timely or adequately filing due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 682. Tolling will often continue until “the alien obtains a complete record of his immigration proceedings and is able to review that information with competent counsel.” Id. at 679. The time for Mendoza-Ortiz to file his motion to reopen was equitably tolled until November 9, 2007 and his second motion to reopen was timely filed within ninety days of that date. The BIA therefore abused its discretion in denying Mendoza-Ortiz’s second motion to reopen as time barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline for motions to reopen may be subject to equitable tolling when the applicable equitable conditions are met.

Lisboa v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-25(c)(2)

The dispositive issue is whether Lisboa may move to reopen removal proceedings outside the 90-day time limit prescribed by statute and regulation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Our circuit “applie[s] the doctrine of equitable tolling to otherwise time-barred motions to reopen” if certain equitable conditions are met. ... We believe this ruling constituted an abuse of discretion because the miscalculated date is not an adequate basis on which to deny Lisboa relief, particularly in light of our prior remand instruction to the contrary.

Subsection (c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed approximately eight years after the final order of removal, absent a basis for equitable tolling.

Hassan v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Hassan’s motion to reopen based on the alleged ineffective assistance of his prior counsel where he filed the motion approximately eight years after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen; equitable tolling of that deadline requires due diligence.

Morales v. Sessions · filed 2018-01-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarado Morales’ motion to reopen as untimely, where he did not timely file the motion and failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled when the movant shows due diligence.

Mwangi v. Barr · filed 2019-08-19(c)(2)

An IJ and the BIA have discretion to equitably toll the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen if the movant shows that he exercised due diligence. Equitable tolling “is not available to those who sleep on their rights.”

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled for deception, fraud, or error if the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering it.

Singh v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2007-06-25(c)(2)

In general, a motion to reopen must be filed "within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(I); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, equitable tolling of the time limit for a motion to reopen is available "when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error." Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897. ... We deny the petition for review because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that the motion to reopen was untimely and the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

A movant who fails to show due diligence cannot require the Board to accept an untimely motion to reopen.

Ahmed v. Gonzalez · filed 2005-02-23(c)(2)

We cannot see in the Ahmeds’ own conduct any evidence of due diligence, and, again, they have never contended here that their actions satisfy this prima facie requirement. Accordingly, we have no basis to conclude that the Board was required to accept the Ahmeds’ untimely motion to reopen.

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen is not equitably tolled on the ground that a notice to appear omitted the courtroom when it gave the immigration court’s correct address.

Koci v. Garland · filed 2023-11-03(c)(2)

Although the specific courtroom on the 16th Floor was not included in the NTA, this does not render the NTA defective within the meaning of Pereira or Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), which both discussed NTAs that failed to specify either a time or place of the proceedings. ... Petitioner accordingly is not entitled to relief under Pereira and has not established that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled when counsel’s deception delays filing and the petitioner acts with due diligence.

Singh v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General · filed 2004-05-18(c)(2)

We hold that Singh filed a motion to reopen rather than a motion to reconsider, and that the time limit for filing that motion was equitably tolled because of the ineffective assistance of his former counsel.

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen may be equitably tolled, but the movant must diligently pursue the motion.

Pineda v. Ashcroft · filed 2005-10-26(c)(2)

The 90-day period may be extended, however, by equitable tolling. ... Pursuit of the First Petition in this court does not establish the requisite diligence—diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen.

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled, but pursuing a separate petition does not establish diligence in pursuing the motion.

Galvez Pi v. Gonzales · filed 2005-10-26(c)(2)

The 90-day period may be extended, however, by equitable tolling. ... Pursuit of the First Petition in this court does not establish the requisite diligence—diligence in pursuing the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for BIA motions to reopen; ineffective assistance of counsel may toll that deadline if the petitioner acts with due diligence.

Olavides v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-11-10(c)(2)

The deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled by an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. ... A petitioner who seeks equitable tolling, however, must exercise due diligence in pursuing the case. ... In any event, it is unreasonable for an alien to wait nine months to file when he knows that he has already missed his filing deadline.

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision; equitable tolling for ineffective assistance requires reasonable diligence during the period sought to be tolled.

Edin Cekic and Samka Cekic v. Immigration and Naturalization Service · filed 2006-01-18(c)(2)

To be timely, a motion to reopen must be “filed not later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Thus, no matter how egregiously ineffective counsel’s assistance may have been, an alien will not be entitled to equitable tolling unless he can affirmatively demonstrate that he exercised reasonable due diligence during the time period sought to be tolled. ... Even though we disagree with the BIA regarding when the Cekics should have learned that they had received ineffective assistance, we do agree with the BIA’s ultimate decision that the Cekics were not reasonably diligent.

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen may be equitably tolled when the movant acts diligently after ineffective representation.

Almazan-Ramirez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-23(c)(2)

The BIA abused its discretion in concluding that the late filing of AlmazanRamirez’s second motion to reopen was not excused by equitable tolling. A motion to reopen is due “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days of the final order, but ineffective assistance of counsel may toll that deadline if the movant shows due diligence.

Wen Sheng Dong v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-23(c)(2)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an individual may move to reopen his case, but must generally do so within 90 days of the entry of the final order in the underlying proceeding. However, the 90-day filing deadline may be equitably tolled where the motion to reopen is based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ... Upon review of the record, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dong’s motion, as Dong failed to specify how he exercised due diligence during the nearly five-year period he sought to toll.

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen can be equitably tolled when deception, fraud, or error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts with due diligence; the reason for tolling need not support relief from deportation.

Gutierrez-Alcaraz v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-20(c)(2)

The only materiality required for equitable tolling of the 90-day deadline for motions to reopen is that the petitioner “is prevented from filing [the motion] because of deception, fraud, or error.” Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897. We have never required that the grounds for equitable tolling also constitute grounds for relief from deportation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen; equitable tolling requires diligence after the petitioner learns of counsel’s error.

Barrie v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-05-15(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must “be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... It cannot, therefore, be said that the BIA abused its discretion in declining to equitably toll the time period for the filing of a motion to reopen.

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled when the movant diligently pursues relief.

Torres v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-10-16(c)(2)

Under the circumstances presented in this case, and given Torres’ diligent efforts in pursuing adjustment of status, see Mah-mood, 427 F.3d at 252-53, we conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in not equitably tolling the limitations period for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a person to one motion to reopen within 90 days; equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel requires due diligence.

Xiang v. Holder · filed 2010-03-29(c)(2)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Under the doctrine of equitable tolling, however, these time and number restrictions may be relaxed to accommodate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, so long as the movant has exercised “due diligence” in seeking to vindicate his or her rights.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen that may be equitably tolled.

Matharo v. Holder · filed 2010-01-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Matharo’s motion because it was filed more than 6 years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Matharo failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring petitioner to act with due diligence to definitively learn of the ineffective assistance after he becomes suspicious of it).

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel if the movant shows due diligence throughout the period sought to be tolled.

Loja-Cajamarca v. Lynch · filed 2016-09-20(c)(2)

Using that hearing date as a starting point, the BIA was within its discretion to find that waiting nearly five years to raise the ineffective assistance claim does not amount to due diligence.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) permits consideration of a time-barred motion when the alien shows changed circumstances in the country of nationality after deportation proceedings began.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-03-31(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The BIA correctly determined that Singh’s motion to reopen was time-barred, as it was not filed within 90 days of the of the BIA’s July 2002 order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA may entertain a time-barred motion to reopen under certain circumstances, such as where the alien can show “a change in circumstances in the country of the alien’s nationality after the initiation of the deportation proceedings.” Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir.2000); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion *883in declining to apply a regulatory exception, because, as the BIA correctly explained, Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to time and number limits, § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on qualifying changed country conditions, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires material evidence establishing prima facie eligibility for relief.

Wan Ping Lin v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or number limitation for filing a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen because it reasonably found that he failed to proffer material evidence that would establish his prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within ninety days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) provides a changed-country-conditions exception to those limits.

Jian Hang Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-04-06(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

In this case, the BIA properly found that Lin’s motion to reopen was untimely filed under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and that Lin did not qualify for the exception to the time limitations permitted by Matter of X-G-W, 22 I & N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998), or the “changed country conditions” exception listed under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days, while subsection (a) leaves sua sponte reopening or reconsideration to the Board’s discretion.

Evangelista v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-04-19(c)(2), (a)

Petitioner does not dispute that his August 2004 motion was not filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. Thus, insofar as the Board was denying a motion filed under this section, we must affirm its order of October 14, 2004. Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) further provides that “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings,” Evangelista’s second motion to reopen was also properly rejected by the Board’s order of January 19, 2005. To the extent that Evangelista was requesting a sua sponte reopening or reconsideration of the case, the decision to grant or deny such a request is “within the discretion of the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). No abuse of discretion has been shown.

Sections 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2) impose filing-time limits, so a motion filed more than three years after the BIA’s order is untimely.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(b)(2) and (c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen and reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than three years after the BIA’s June 28, 2002 order. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2).

Section 1003.2 permits the Board to treat a motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider and applies numerical and timeliness limits to the motion.

Ramirez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-09(a), (b)(2), and (c)(2)

Respondent’s motion for summary disposition is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard). The Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion when it construed petitioners’ motion to reopen as a motion to reconsider and denied petitioners’ motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)-(c). Construed as a motion to reconsider, the motion was both numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Accordingly, this petition for review is denied.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and pertinent authority; §§ 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2) impose one-motion and 30- and 90-day filing limits, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed country conditions.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-29(b), (b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). A party may file only one motion to reconsider any given decision and this motion must be filed with the BIA within thirty days of the mailing of its decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... Because there are no exceptions to the time limitations for motions to reconsider, the BIA properly proceeded to evaluate Wang’s motion under the regulations applicable to motions to reopen. ... Construed as a motion to reopen, Wang’s motion was also untimely because it was not filed within ninety days of the deadline for the filing of such motions. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(2). Moreover, Wang did not demonstrate that he was entitled to any exception from the time limitations for motions to reopen, such as changed country conditions in China. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c) (7) (C) (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) subjects motions to reopen to time limits unless an exception applies, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires materially changed country conditions to support the relevant exception.

Elizondo-Montes v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-22(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioner’s motion was untimely filed and failed to meet an exception to the time limits on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioner’s claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) failed to present changed country conditions in Mexico that are material to petitioner or his circumstances and therefore, failed to meet his burden of presenting a prima facie CAT claim to support reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir.2001).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) limits an alien subject to a final removal order to one motion to reconsider filed within 30 days after mailing; § 1003.2(c)(2) limits such an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of the final removal order.

Garcia v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-24(b)(2), (c)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider a BIA decision, and that motion must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is also limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Petitioners’ final orders of removal were entered on January 5, 2007. Petitioners did not file their motion to reconsider and reopen until October 15, 2007. Because petitioners’ motion was filed almost 8 months after the deadline for a motion to reconsider, and almost six months after the deadline for a motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider and reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) bars untimely motions to reconsider without an exception to the time limit, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new or previously unavailable evidence.

Fui Ha Bong v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-31(b)(1), (c)(1)

Because there is no exception to the time limitation for motions to reconsider, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), the BIA’s proper finding that Petitioners’ motion to reconsider was untimely is dispositive of their motion to reconsider. ... Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to the extent it construed it as a motion to reopen. As the BIA noted, the Petitioners failed to present any new or previously unavailable evidence in support of their motion. In the absence of such evidentiary support, the BIA’s denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. See Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, excepts motions based on changed country conditions from that time limit, and authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Yiquang He v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (a)

A motion must generally be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. *63§ 1003.2(c)(2). ... The time limits on motions to reopen do not apply where the movant alleged changed country conditions, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), and may be tolled where the movant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, see Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2006). ... While the BIA had the authority to reopen He’s proceedings sua sponte on that basis, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to review its refusal to do so. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, but subsection (c)(3)(h) provides no time limit for a motion based on qualifying changed country circumstances.

Bin Zhu v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The BIA’s regulations require an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Zhu’s July 2007 motion was untimely where the agency issued its final order of removal in September 2002. However, there is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous *765hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, the BIA properly found that Zhu’s motion did not qualify for such an exception.

Sections 1003.2(c)(2) and 1003.2(b)(2) limit an alien with a final removal order to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days and one motion to reconsider filed within 30 days, subject to applicable exceptions.

Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(c)(2), (b)(2)

An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Similarly, an alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reconsider a prior decision that the alien is removable from the United States, and that motion must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Because petitioners’ second motion to reopen and to reconsider was filed beyond the deadlines, and petitioners have not contended that any exceptions to this time limit apply, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ untimely motion to reopen and to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after the BIA's decision is mailed, while § 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after entry of a final removal order.

Rodriguez-Alonso v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-29(b)(2), (c)(2)

A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the BIA within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... An alien who is subject to a final order of removal is limited to filing one motion to reopen removal proceedings, and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(h) creates an exception for an asylum or withholding motion based on material, previously unavailable changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Zhang v. Filip · filed 2009-01-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(h)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations provide that an individual must file a motion to reopen within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This limitation, however, does not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal based on changed circumstances arising in her country of nationality, if the evidence submitted is material and was unavailable and undis-coverable at the time of her hearing before the IJ. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(7)(C)(n); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h). Here, it is undisputed that Zhang’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was filed more than ten years after the IJ’s order granting Zhang voluntary departure. ... Because Zhang’s case is squarely controlled by Yuen Jin, her failure to establish an exception to the fifing deadline for motions to reopen is fatal to her petition for review.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a ninety-day time limit on motions to reopen and does not exclude CAT claims, while section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception only when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier.

Sanchez v. Holder · filed 2009-07-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The motion was untimely because petitioners filed it outside the ninety-day time limit set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), which does not specifically exclude CAT claims from the time limit. Moreover, the exception to the time limit based on changed country conditions does not apply because petitioners did not present material evidence of changed country conditions that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous proceeding.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when material evidence shows changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Hernandez v. Holder · filed 2009-07-30(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez Hernandez’s motion to reopen to apply for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) as untimely, because he did not file the motion within 90 days of the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he did not present material evidence of changed ... circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(e)(3)(ii) removes the usual time and number limits for a motion to reopen based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Hung Liang Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-09-17(e)(3)(ii)

However, there are no time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen where the motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a showing of materially changed country conditions to excuse an untimely motion to reopen.

Liang v. Holder · filed 2009-09-24(c)(3)(ii)

Because a showing of a material change in country conditions is required to excuse the untimely filing of a motion to reopen, we will not disturb the agency’s denial of his motion.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and bars reconsideration of a prior reconsideration decision; it limits reopening to one motion filed within 90 days, subject to a changed-country-conditions exception, and requires qualifying evidence to be material and previously unavailable.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2009-10-20(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3)(h), (c)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the challenged BIA decision and be supported by pertinent authority. ... To the extent that Zheng sought reconsideration of that portion of the BIA’s decision that denied her first motion to reconsider, the regulations prohibit an applicant from seeking reconsideration of a decision denying a previous motion to reconsider. ... An alien may file only one motion to reopen, and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... An applicant may be excused from compliance with the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen if she submits evidence establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality.” ... Such a motion shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered in support of the motion “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and imposes a 90-day deadline, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-11-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The regulations provide that “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Indisputably, Zheng’s October 2007 motion was untimely because she filed it more than twelve years after the IJ’s April 1995 in absentia order. However, the time limitation does not apply when the alien can establish materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed with the Board within 30 days after the Board decision is mailed.

Gonzalez-Polanco v. Holder · filed 2009-12-17(c)(2), (b)(2)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), an alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision. An alien may file one motion to reconsider a decision that the alien is removable from the United States but must do so within 30 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision . . ..”)

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen; § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are established; and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Volavola v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shergil’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Shergil failed to establish changed country conditions in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”). In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding Shergil failed to explain why the psychological report attached to his motion could not have been discovered prior to his immigration hearing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that if evidence was capable of being discovered prior to the hearing, it cannot serve as the basis for a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a 90-day time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when changed country conditions are established.

Prasad v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed nearly three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Prasad failed to establish changed country conditions in Fiji to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is … whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

This subsection removes the time and number limits on a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed circumstances in the country of nationality or the country of removal that could not previously have been presented.

Hossain v. Holder · filed 2010-04-07(c)(3)(ii)

However, there are no time and number limitations when a motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen and provides exceptions to that limit.

Garcia-Navichoque v. Holder · filed 2010-04-19(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Navichoque’s motion to reopen as untimely, and he failed to qualify for any exception to the time limitation.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes the time and numerical limits for a motion to reopen when it is based on material changed country conditions that were previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Wu v. Holder · filed 2010-05-11(c)(3)(ii)

There are no time and numerical limits for filing a motion to reopen, however, if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

The regulation requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days, generally limits motions to reopen by time and number, and provides an exception when changed circumstances are demonstrated.

Kojongian v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-21(b)(2), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kojongian’s motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s decisions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). Further, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, construed as a motion to reopen, as untimely and number-barred because Kojongian filed the second motion over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kojongian failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2 requires motions to reconsider to be filed within 30 days and motions to reopen within 90 days, subject to specified exceptions, while preserving the Board’s authority to reconsider on its own motion.

Bazuaye v. Holder · filed 2014-07-30(b)(2), (a), (c)(2), (c)(3)

See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (“A motion to reconsider a decision must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision.”); accord 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B). ... Although the BIA “may at any time . . . reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), Bazuaye fails to identify any authority in support of his contention that the filing deadline on motions to reconsider may be equitably tolled. ... An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... “untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen.” Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors, generally limits reopening motions to one filed within 90 days, exempts material changed-country-conditions evidence from that deadline, and preserves the Board’s discretion to deny reopening even when prima facie eligibility is shown.

Ganiu v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-07-12(b)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), and (a)

To prevail, an alien must specify errors of fact or law in the Board’s decision, supported by relevant authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Generally, an alien may file only one motion to reopen within 90 days from the final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). But this deadline does not apply to motions that rely on evidence of “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The “previous proceeding” refers to the proceeding before the immigration judge. ... A motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for relief, but even then, the Board still has discretion to deny it. Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Guo, 396 F.3d at 563); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires motions to reopen to be filed within 90 days, subject to exceptions in subsection (c)(3), and subsection (b)(2) requires motions to reconsider to be filed within 30 days after mailing of the BIA decision.

Duncan v. Barr · filed 2020-05-20(c)(2), (c)(3), (b)(2)

A “motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings (whether before the Board or the Immigration Judge) . . . must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.” ... It is undisputed that Duncan’s June 2018 motion to reopen, filed over two decades after the BIA’s 1992 dismissal of his appeal of the in absentia order, was untimely. ... Duncan’s purported eligibility for a waiver of deportation does not implicate any exception to the time limit for filing a motion to reopen. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (listing exceptions); ... Duncan’s challenges, however, are to the 1990 proceedings and with the BIA’s 1992 decision and thus were not timely raised in his motion to reconsider the 2018 denial of reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (a motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days after the mailing of the BIA decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify errors of law or fact and cite pertinent authority, while subsection (c)(2) generally limits motions to reopen to one filed within ninety days, absent an exception such as changed country conditions.

Gallegos v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-11-12(b)(1), (c)(2)

To the extent that Urvina Gallegos’s motion before the BIA was one for reconsideration, we agree that he failed to point out any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) for the proposition that a motion for reconsideration “must claim ‘errors of law or fact’ in the BIA's prior decision and be supported by pertinent authority”). ... To the extent that Urvina Gallegos’s motion sought reopening, the motion was time-barred and number-barred. See Liem v. Att’y Gen., 921 F.3d 388, 395 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that under 8 U.S.C. § 1992a(c)(7) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), absent an exception for changed country conditions, a movant must file a motion to reopen within ninety days, and the movant is limited to one such motion). Urvina Gallegos did seek re-opening in part to pursue his asylum application, but he did not show that he relied on changed conditions in Ecuador since the time of his merits hearing, which might have allowed him to overcome the time and number bars.

Sections 1003.2(b)(2) and (c)(2) impose time limits on motions to reconsider and reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(2) also imposes a number limit on motions to reopen.

Chi-Poot v. Garland · filed 2023-07-14(b)(2) (c)(2)

The Board did not, in any event, abuse its discretion in denying Chi-Poot’s motions. His motion to reconsider was untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and his motion to reopen was both untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and number-barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

The filing deadline for a motion to reconsider a BIA decision has no exceptions.

Hong v. Gonzales · filed 2007-10-12(b)(2)

Whether construed as a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, Hong’s September 2006 motion was untimely because a final order was issued in April 1997. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(2), (c)(2). There are no exceptions to the time limitation for motions to reconsider a BIA decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an applicant to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days of the order and provides no applicable exception for the untimely motion here.

Baldi v. Holder · filed 2012-08-01(c)(2), (b)(2)

An applicant may file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the date on which a final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and may file a motion to reconsider within 30 days of an order, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). There is no dispute that Baldi’s May 2011 motion was untimely because the agency issued the final administrative order in January 2011. Contrary to Baldi’s assertion, there are no exceptions for the time limitation imposed on motions to reconsider, and a motion based on additional evidence to support a request for discretionary grant of 212(c) does not fall within any exception provided for motions to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Sako v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-20(c)(1)

Under BIA regulations, a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... The motion to reopen in this case does not offer any evidence that was not available at the time of the hearing before the IJ. Nor does it present any new evidence.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Yun Fu Hung v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-27(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Hung’s motion for his failure to present any new evidence. Hung attempts to explain his submission of a doctor’s note — entirely in Spanish — in support of his motion to reopen. This note was apparently submitted to prove his forced sterilization. However, Hung fails to address the BIA’s conclusion that the evidence could have been discovered or presented during his prior proceedings before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”). Given that the alleged sterilization occurred in 1983, more than fourteen years before the in absentia order was entered, we do not disagree that the doctor’s note was not previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Vata v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-03(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... “Initially, we find that the majority of information contained within Fischer’s report was discoverable at the time of Petitioner’s initial merits hearing held on August 31, 2004. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), such evidence is ineffective in support of a motion to reopen.”

To reopen a case, the movant must present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Netsajeva v. Keisler · filed 2007-10-10(c)(1)

Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Netsajeva failed to present any material, previously unavailable evidence regarding her purported inability to obtain travel documents from Estonia or Russia. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). First, there is no evidence in the record indicating when Netsajeva initially requested assistance from the Estonian and Russian Embassies, nor are any copies of Netsajeva’s initial correspondence with the Embassies included in the record. Without this, it is unclear what questions she asked the Embassy and whether the information could have been obtained prior to the filing of her motion to reopen. Second, it appears that the information from the Estonian Embassy was not new information, since a similar response from the Embassy was submitted with her initial asylum application. Third, the responses from the Estonian Embassy indicate merely that Netsajeva has not formally filed an application for residence; the letters are not clear that her application would be denied. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in finding that Netsajeva failed to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, and not discoverable or presentable at the former hearing.

Xi Ying Zheng v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-04(c)(1)

The BIA appropriately noted that the 2003 administrative documents that Zheng submitted predated her August 2005 hearing before an immigration judge and, thus, were previously available. See id. (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be new and previously unavailable, and a motion may be denied when the submitted evidence fails that requirement.

Zhun v. Holder · filed 2009-08-21(c)(1)

The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhun’s motion to reopen where the only document she submitted in support of her motion — a letter from her husband — was neither new nor previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); see Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the alien presents new, material evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Velez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2010-01-08(c)(1)

A motion to reopen may be granted if the alien presents to the BIA new evidence that is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to remand to present material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Huerta-Villanueva v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-01-06(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Huerta-Villanueva’s motion to remand because he failed to present material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture, see Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To qualify for reopening under the Torture Convention, an alien must establish a prima facie case that ‘it is more likely than not that. . . she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.’”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2010-08-10(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... “Here, the BIA did not err in finding that the evidence Wang provided in support of her ineffective assistance of counsel claim was available before she filed her appeal.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-04(c)(1)

An alien pursuing a motion to reopen bears the burden to show that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA, therefore, did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law in concluding that the evidence Zheng submitted was not “material,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and it is clear that Zheng did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief from removal based on his Falun Gong practice.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an alien seeking to reopen proceedings to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Saidi v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-07-14(c)(1)

Furthermore, an alien seeking to reopen proceedings bears the burden to present evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Rexhaj v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-03-14(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board [of Immigration Appeals] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... In denying the motion to reopen, the BIA reasoned that Rexhaj’s evidence failed to satisfy these requirements. ... Our review of the administrative record does not lead to the conclusion that the BIA’s determination was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law in that regard.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable at the former hearing.

Zou v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-11(c)(1)

The BIA may not grant a motion to reopen unless the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As the BIA correctly pointed out, most of the documents submitted by Zou in support of his motion to reopen were neither new nor previously unavailable; the vast majority of the documents pre-date the August 2010 hearing.