8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

The Board may reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time; courts lack jurisdiction to review its discretionary refusal to do so.

Pena-Lopez v. Garland · filed 2022-05-12(a)

But “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider a case.”58 ... We lack jurisdiction to review it.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen a case on its own motion, and a refusal to do so has no meaningful standard for judicial review.

Chen v. Garland · filed 2022-08-05(a)

We lack jurisdiction to consider Chen’s challenge to the IJ’s refusal to reopen his case sua sponte. Express authorization to reopen cases sua sponte is found only in regulations, and those regulations ... have only ever said that the BIA “may at any time reopen” a case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). There is “no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion,” Vela-Estrada, 817 F.3d at 71 (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830); we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it.

The BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte is generally unreviewable unless it relies on an incorrect legal premise or the BIA has meaningfully limited its discretion.

Castillo-Reyes v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2024-02-16(a)

With no exceptions to evade the rule against review, we lack jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision not to grant relief sua sponte.

Under § 1003.2(a), a refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte is reviewable only when the BIA may have mistakenly believed reopening would necessarily fail.

Umarov v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-24(a)

We have jurisdiction to review such a denial only “where the Agency may have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail.” Id. There was no misperception here.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte; a refusal is reviewable only for legal or constitutional error.

Flores v. Bondi · filed 2025-10-14(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(a) because Castaneda Flores has not properly identified any “legal or constitutional error” in the BIA’s order.

The BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening under § 1003.2(a) is discretionary and generally beyond judicial review.

Wang v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-05(a)

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an applicant seeking reopening to submit an adjustment of status application with the motion.

Valdovinos v. Holder · filed 2010-07-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres Valdovinos’ November 24, 2006, motion to reopen because he failed to submit an adjustment of status application with the motion as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and the government affirmatively opposed the motion, in part, because it did not comply with this regulatory requirement.

Section 1003.2(f) makes a stay of removal while a motion to reopen is pending discretionary rather than automatic.

Luna v. Holder Thompson v. Holder · filed 2010-09-03(f)

First, there is no automatic stay of removal while a motion to reopen is pending. The granting of a stay is discretionary, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f), and the motion to reopen is automatically terminated if the alien is removed while the motion is pending, id. § 1003.2(d); Xue Yong Zhang v. Holder, – F.3d –, No. 09-2628-ag, 2010 WL 3169292, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was not available and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2010-09-22(c)(1)

In denying Chen’s motion to reopen based on her claimed fear of persecution on account of her husband’s pro-democracy activities in the United States, the BIA reasonably noted that Chen’s husband had been active in the pro-democracy movement since December 2003, and that her claim, along with much of the evidence she submitted in support of that claim, could have been presented at her November 2005 hearing before an IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the movant presents evidence unavailable at the IJ hearing or undiscoverable earlier with due diligence.

Huang, Hui Zhen v. Gonzales, Alberto · filed 2005-12-27(c)(1)

A motion to reopen should be granted only if the movant presents evidence that was not available at the hearing before the IJ or could not have been discovered earlier by the exercise of due diligence.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, such that it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Caushi v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2006-01-23(c)(1)

We note, however, that Caushi certainly knew about the rape well in advance of his April 2002 hearing before the IJ. His elder sister, Andoneta Zherka, submitted an affidavit in support of his asylum application in December 2001 stating that Loreta had been raped by a police officer who came looking for Caushi, and Caushi himself mentioned in his testimony before the IJ that he heard “from my youngest sister who got raped . . . that a lot of things happened with my family.” The rape was therefore known to Caushi at the time of his hearing and the BIA correctly determined that the evidence “could . . . have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and was therefore not properly raised in a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, such that it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Caushi v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-01-23(c)(1)

The rape was therefore known to Caushi at the time of his hearing and the BIA correctly determined that the evidence “could ... have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and was therefore not properly raised in a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Zeng v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2006-01-27(c)(1)

Second, the motion must offer previously unavailable material evidence; that is, material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Even if both showings are made, the BIA still retains discretion to deny the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2006-03-31(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

You-Kai He v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-04-11(c)(1)

For the BIA to reopen proceedings, a petitioner must present evidence that is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Eziquio v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-17(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to reopen because Hernandez Eziquio failed to present evidence to support her contention that her stepson and husband would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if she were removed to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

A motion to reopen under § 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Bori v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-04-18(c)(1)

As to Bori’s motion to reopen the BIA proceedings, she failed to present evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the Board from granting a motion to reopen unless the proposed evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Huang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-04-27(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(e)(1) permits denial of a motion to reopen when the asserted new evidence was available, or could have been presented, at the prior hearing.

Balliu v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-10(e)(1)

The medical records, identification documents, and newspaper article all predated his hearing, and the new State Department reports did not offer background information materially different from that which was already in the record. Therefore, the BIA acted within its discretion in denying the motion for failure to present new, material evidence that was not available and could not have been presented at the previous hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing, while § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that courts cannot review.

Di Liu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2006-06-21(c)(1), (a)

The BIA reasonably found that Liu “offered no explanation [pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2] that would lead [the BIA] to conclude that the additional evidence presented with his motion was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the hearing below,” and Liu failed to state any grounds that would warrant a reopening sua sponte. ... Furthermore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that a decision of the BIA whether to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is entirely discretionary and, therefore, beyond the Court’s review — i.e., the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in support of a motion to reopen to have been unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the previous hearing.

Cheng v. Gonzales · filed 2006-06-21(c)(1)

Cheng was required, under the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), to submit documents that were “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2006-07-26(c)(1)

This evidence, which Chen still has not obtained, does not constitute evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Caushi, 436 F.3d at 232.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires that evidence supporting a motion to reopen be previously unavailable or undiscoverable, and the BIA may deny reopening when the evidence could have been submitted earlier.

Huang v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-08-07(c)(1)

Because the medical reports evidence a sterilization that allegedly took place in 1983, the BIA reasonably concluded that the results of the medical exam could have been submitted to the IJ at the hearing. Further, it is clear that the articles about the flood could have been submitted at that time. The BIA had a reasonable basis for concluding that there is no showing that the new evidence was not previously available or discoverable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2006).

Section 1003.2(c) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Jakaj v. Gonzales · filed 2006-08-16(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jakaj’s motion, finding that the evidence he submitted was not material. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”). Jakaj had presented evidence at the time of his hearing that numerous family members had previously been granted asylum because of the persecution they suffered under Communism; one of them testified at his hearing. Therefore, his additional evidence confirming family relationships, as well as his evidence that another uncle had been granted asylum after Jakaj’s own hearing, was merely cumulative of evidence the IJ and BIA had already considered.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to have been unavailable at the former hearing.

Becerra v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-12(c)(1)

Accordingly, the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the evidence they presented with their motion was unavailable at their former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 987 (noting that where the evidence became available during the pendancy of an appeal it was not “previously available” for purposes of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to remand to have been previously unavailable.

Jimenez-Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-15(c)(1)

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, Guzman v. INS, 318 F.3d 911, 912 n. 1 (9th Cir.2003) (per curiam), we conclude that the BIA acted within its discretion in denying Jimenez-Hernandez’s motion to remand because the evidence he sought to present was, according to his own declaration, not previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 874 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (“a motion to remand must meet all the requirements of a motion to reopen”).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that was previously unavailable.

Falkes-Rivera v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-20(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Falkes-Rivera’s motion to reopen because she failed to demonstrate the evidence she submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-24(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings when the movant presents supported new facts that are material and were unavailable at the former hearing.

Li v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2007-05-16(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA has discretion to reopen proceedings if the movant states new facts to be proved at a hearing that are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. That new evidence must be material and have been unavailable at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the material evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; evidence concerning pre-hearing events that could have been obtained earlier does not qualify.

Goel v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Varun Goel v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General · filed 2007-06-14(c)(1)

The key question, therefore, is whether the allegedly new information was unavailable at the time of the movant’s hearing. If it was available or capable of being discovered at that time, it cannot provide a basis for reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Makatengkeng v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-03(c)(1)

The Board properly treated Makateng-keng’s motion as a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless ... evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... We agree with the Board that Maka-tengkeng’s skin cancer diagnosis is not material to his application for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented, and the evidence must establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Naselkova v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-16(c)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen may not be granted “unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the for*65mer hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); see also Sukhraj Kaur v. B.I.A, 413 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.2005). ... Like the Kotler affidavit, the medical record was not material evidence establishing the petitioners’ prima facie eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); cf. Shou Yung Guo, 463 F.3d at 115.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that was previously unavailable.

Hernandez v. Gonzales · filed 2007-08-21(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ocampo Hernandez’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be previously unavailable and not discoverable or presentable at the prior hearing.

Ke v. Gonzales · filed 2007-09-04(c)(1)

To the extent that Ke’s motion could be construed as a motion to reopen, the BIA properly concluded that Ke failed to demonstrate that the evidence he submitted was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at his hearing before the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir.2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable for presentation in the underlying proceeding.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-03-19(c)(1)

To the extent Chen’s evidence could have been presented in the underlying proceeding, it was not “previously unavailable” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on evidence that was not previously available.

Wong v. United States Department of Homeland Security · filed 2008-03-27(c)(1)

In any event, the evidence submitted on appeal to the BIA was neither newly available, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), nor do its contents establish a prima facie claim for asylum based on United States-born children.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to show that the supporting evidence was previously unavailable or was not considered by the immigration judge.

Delgado v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-02(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion to reopen, because petitioners failed to demonstrate that the medical evidence they submitted was previously unavailable or was not considered by the immigration judge (“U”). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c); see also Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir .2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proven, provide supporting affidavits or other evidence, and show that the evidence was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Xhuti v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-19(c)(1)

The Board’s regulations require that a motion to reopen “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing” and, importantly, submit “affidavits or other evidentiary material” to support those factual statements. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). They were also required to show that the evidence “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” earlier. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Rivera v. Mukasey · filed 2008-07-23(c)(1)

With regard to the new claims brought in the motion to reopen, we conclude the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because petitioner failed to demonstrate the evidence submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was previously unavailable.

Bains v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-31(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh Bains’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and (c); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on new, previously unavailable evidence.

Santiago v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)(1)

The BIA abused its discretion in determining that the evidence contained in the witness affidavit Martinez Santiago submitted was not new evidence and could have been presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir.2005) (where the evidence becomes available during the pendency of an appeal to the BIA it was not “previously available” for purposes of a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Pllumbaj v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-04(c)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen. See Kaur, 413 F.3d at 233-34. The BIA accurately noted that the affidavit submitted by Petitioners relied substantially on information that was previously available and did not establish that significant changes had occurred in Albania that would have any bearing on their claim. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Further, the BIA properly found that the documents that Pllumbaj submitted in support of his motion to reopen were not material because they did not overcome the underlying determination that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between the harm he suffered and feared in Albania and a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to show that the new evidence is both material and previously unavailable.

Setianto v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-01(c)(1)

Setianto’s contention that the BIA may remand a case for consideration of new evidence even if the evidence was previously available is based upon a case that he does not sufficiently cite and that he admits is non-precedential. As the assertion is not sufficiently supported and is contrary to the plain language of the relevant regulation, Setianto has not shown the BIA abused its discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Setianto’s contention that the new evidence was material is insufficient, as Setianto was required to show the new evidence was both material and previously unavailable. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the motion presents new evidence that is material and was previously unavailable.

Da Cunha v. Gonzales · filed 2008-12-24(c)(1)

Motions to reopen are permitted only where they present new evidence that is material and was previously unavailable. Orehhova v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)(2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to present previously unavailable and material evidence.

Diaz-Gomez v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen because Petitioners failed to submit previously unavailable and material evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2009-03-13(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the BIA may deny a motion to reopen based on the alien’s “failure to introduce evidence that was material and previously unavailable”). ... Because the BIA found that Chen’s evidence was available and discoverable before his asylum hearing, it properly denied his petition to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to submit previously unavailable evidence.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2009-06-05(c)(1)

Because a failure to proffer previously unavailable evidence is a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, Jiang’s failure to challenge the BIA’s finding that she failed to submit such evidence is dispositive of this case.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires previously unavailable, material evidence to warrant a remand.

Simbolon v. Holder · filed 2009-08-31(c)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Simbolon’s motion to remand proceedings because he failed to present previously unavailable, material evidence to warrant a remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) treats evidence as previously unavailable when it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Amekoudji v. Holder · filed 2009-09-22(c)(1)

Although Amekoudji asserts that the evidence he submitted with the motion to remand was previously unavailable because it was not created until after the May 2007 merits hearing, the regulations define evidence as previously unavailable when it “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered before the hearing.

Garcia-Barreto v. Holder · filed 2009-10-26(c)

The BIA abused its discretion by determining that Garcia-Barreto failed to present previously unavailable evidence because the record shows that the evidence concerning his son’s conditions could not have been discovered prior to the hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Nela v. Holder · filed 2009-10-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nela’s motion to remand on the basis of new evidence, namely, an order granting his brother asylum and withholding of removal. ... Moreover, the BIA properly found that Nela’s brother’s statement was not previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As a result, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nela’s motion for a remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Cai v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-17(c)(1)

Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion in applying 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”) to deny the remand motion.

Section 1003.2(c) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Posada-Martinez v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-03-11(c)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), the BIA may not grant a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material and previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing, and the movant must have been statutorily eligible for the requested relief before the administratively final order.

Mbaye v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-03-15(c)(1)

In order to meet her burden, Mbaye must show that the evidence of changed circumstances are “material [] and not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Allabani, 402 F.3d at 675 (“[T]he [BIA] may determine, as a sufficient ground for denying a motion to reopen, whether the alien has produced previously unavailable, material evidence.” (citation omitted)). ... Even if Mbaye had presented previously unavailable, material evidence, she failed to establish that she was “statutorily eligible for [the] relief [sought] prior to the entry of the administratively final order.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Sako, 434 F.3d at 862.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to remand to have been previously unavailable.

Tuifagalele v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(c)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tuifagalele’s motion to remand proceedings because he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable.

A motion to reopen must be supported by evidence that was previously unavailable.

Contreras v. Holder · filed 2010-04-13(a) and (c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez Contreras’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate that the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by the evidence submitted with the motion and requires qualifying new evidence to have been previously unavailable.

Lenin Adali Rodas Alfaro v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2010-04-14(c)(1)

An alien may file one motion to reopen which “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B). ... Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider the addendum to his application when it denied the motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility, because Rodas-Alfaro failed to attach the addendum to his motion or to argue to the BIA that it established prima facie eligibility. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). As a result, the addendum was not part of the supporting evidence for the motion to reopen, and the BIA did not need to consider it. ... Furthermore, the addendum did not constitute evidence that was “not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to show that the additional evidence was unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of the initial removal hearing.

Lin v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2010-05-19(c)(1)

We disagree, as Lin plainly failed to satisfy the standard for reopening—i.e., she failed to demonstrate that the additional evidence was unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of her initial removal hearing.

Section 1003.2 requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable at the former hearing.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-12-08

As Petitioners conceded at oral argument, any distinction between the pre- IRRIRA standard and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 is of no consequence in this case, as both require that the evidence sought to be offered for a motion to reopen is material and was not available at the hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings when the movant presents new, material facts supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and the evidence was unavailable at the prior hearing.

Ramirez v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-07-15(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the BIA has discretion to reopen proceedings if the movant states new facts to be proved at a hearing that are supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. That new evidence must be material and have been unavailable at the former hearing.

For a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, the evidence must have been unavailable at the prior hearing and impossible to discover or present then.

He Chen v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-07-27(c)(3)(ii)

First, the BIA correctly noted that at least one of the documents offered by Chen pre-dated her administrative hearing and thus did not qualify as evidence that was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented in May 2000, 8 C.F.R. § 1003. 2(c)(3)(ii). (A.R. 2.) ... Based upon that analysis, we do not agree with Chen’s assertion that the BIA abused its discretion by concluding that she failed to identify previously unavailable evidence showing a material change in country conditions.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings when the movant presents material evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Neris v. Holder · filed 2010-08-13(c)(1)

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen where it presents material evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 98 n.2 (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Here, each of Petitioners’ three supporting pieces of evidence could have been discovered and presented at their initial removal hearing. ... We conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to grant a motion to reopen only when the supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Barsoum v. Holder · filed 2010-08-24(c)(1)

In addition, much of the material presented was obviously available earlier and not proper on a motion for remand. It was not an abuse of discretion for the BIA to refuse to remand to the IJ on the basis of such material. See Ratnasingam, 556 F.3d at 15; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (authorizing the BIA to grant a motion to reopen only if underlying evidence "was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing").

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Toure v. Holder · filed 2010-10-08(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA gave two reasons for its denial of Toure’s motion to reopen: (1) that Toure failed to establish that the affidavit from Dia was previously unavailable; ... We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in reaching either conclusion. As to the first finding, Toure’s motion to reopen was properly denied because she made no showing that the affidavit from Dia was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to remand to have been previously unavailable.

Lopez-Navarrete v. Holder · filed 2010-11-30(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pena-Gutierrez’s motion to remand proceedings because he failed to demonstrate the evidence he submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence submitted with a motion to reopen to have been unavailable at the time of the former hearing before the IJ.

Aguallo v. Holder · filed 2011-04-04(c)(1)

The BIA correctly determined that the standard in 8 C.F.R. y 1003.2(c)(1) applied to Petitioner's motion to reopen and that the motion to reopen failed to meet that standard. See Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that 8 C.F.R. y 1003.2(c)(1) requires that the evidence submitted with a motion to reopen must not have been available at the time of the former hearing before the IJ).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new or previously unavailable evidence.

Bracamonte-Romero v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-05-04(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Bracamonte-Romero’s motion to reopen because the motion failed to offer any new or previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Subsection (c) describes a motion to reopen as presenting new facts that would entitle the alien to relief, while subsection (c)(1) requires showing that supporting evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sheikh Haque v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-06-27(c), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing Haque’s motion to reconsider as a motion to reopen. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (a motion to reopen seeks to present new facts that would entitle the alien to relief from deportation). So construed, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because Haque failed to establish that his supporting evidence was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when an alien presents new, material evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Titova v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-30(c)(1)

A motion to reopen may be granted only if the alien presents to the BIA new evidence that is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence submitted with a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable for presentation at the former hearing.

Siahaan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-07-14(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen where petitioners failed to demonstrate their additional evidence was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (both statute and regulation require that evidence introduced through a motion to reopen “must not have been available to be presented at the former hearing”) (citation and internal quotation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Haghighatpour v. Holder · filed 2011-07-27(c)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Haghighatpour’s motion to reopen. Haghighatpour has not demonstrated that his affidavit and the letters from his friends could not have been submitted earlier. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Moreover, nothing in the State Department Report or the Amnesty International article suggest that the information contained therein was new or represented changed conditions in Germany. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Bin Bin Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-09-27(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented, at the former hearing.

Vargas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-10-21(c)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

A motion to reopen can be denied when the movant fails to show that the supporting affidavits were previously unavailable.

Claros v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-11-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guerrero Claros’s motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate the affidavits he submitted were previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007).

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Ahmed v. Holder · filed 2011-11-23(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” and Ahmed did not establish that the psychological report he submitted was unavailable at the time of his proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to remand to offer material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sherpa v. Holder · filed 2011-12-01(c)

Motions to remand are subject to the same substantive requirements as motions to reopen, including the requirement that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992).

Section 1003.2 allows a motion to reopen based on materially changed country conditions without a filing deadline when the evidence was previously unavailable, and otherwise requires reopening evidence to be material and unavailable or undiscoverable and unpresentable at the former hearing.

Thiersaint v. Holder · filed 2012-02-28(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Thiersaint’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than two years after the BIA issued its final order of removal, there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Contrary to Thiersaint’s argument that the BIA applied the wrong legal standard in concluding that his evidence was not material to his claim for CAT relief, a review of the record confirms that the BIA properly identified and applied the standard set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), which states that a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include material evidence that was previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Song Yieng Jin v. Holder · filed 2012-03-22(c)(1)

However, the certificate of graduation was not material because it was merely cumulative of the information he submitted indicating that he had been a member of the CDP since April 2008. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen must be accompanied by “material” evidence). ... Therefore, because Jin failed to demonstrate that evidence that the Chinese government was aware of his CDP activities and had threatened to arrest him should he return to China was not unavailable and undiscoverable prior to his August 2008 hearing, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to remand. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156-57; Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-04-20(c)

Because Hernandez’s ineffective assistance claim was not successful, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, construed as a motion based on new evidence, on the ground that Hernandez did not show that the psychological evaluation could not have been obtained and presented at the time of the merits hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

A motion to reopen must be denied unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Oyeniran v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-05-03(c)(1)

The BIA’s regulations state that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to state the new facts to be proven and include supporting evidence, and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Robles v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-07-17(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INA § 240(c)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). Further, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires evidence supporting a motion to remand to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Pun v. Holder · filed 2012-08-09(c)

Motions to remand are subject to the same substantive requirements as motions to reopen, including the requirement that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464 (BIA 1992). ... However, because none of these materials demonstrated that the Maoists would single Pun out for persecution on the basis of his political beliefs, the evidence was not material. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Pun also failed to demonstrate that these materials were unavailable to him when he first made his petition. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pun’s motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when supporting evidence was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the prior hearing.

Shanta v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-12-11(c)(1)

Shanta’s Asylee Relative Petition triggered the overseas investigation; the resulting report was unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of her asylum hearing, and reopening was proper. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the new evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Fa Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-12-05(c)(1)

“[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]” ... Here, the corrected translation of Chen’s mother’s letter was not material because it did not rehabilitate many of the other credibility problems the IJ found with Chen’s testimony (which he does not challenge), including other record inconsistencies, the lack of corroborating evidence, and his incomprehensible/unresponsive testimony regarding the source of his hospital records.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Cuchilla-Ventura v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-20(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cuchilla-Ventura’s untimely motion to reopen where Cuchilla-Ventura did not show that his newly submitted evidence was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c) bars granting a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Vizcarra-Ayala v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-01(c)

In granting the government’s motion, the BIA abused its discretion because the government’s motion was not based on new evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, and whether the evidence could have been discovered sooner is a factual determination.

Ehikhuemhen v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-08-23(c)(1)

Ehikhuemhen’s argument refers to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), which states that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” While we do not appear to have addressed, in a precedential opinion, whether the prior unavailability of evidence is a factual or legal determination, the BIA here simply determined, based on the totality of Ehikhuemhen’s submissions, that the letter (or its equivalent) could have been discovered sooner. We think that this is a factual determination falling beyond the boundaries of our present jurisdiction—indeed, Ehikhuemhen seems to implicitly concede this by urging a substantial-evidence standard of review, which is reserved for issues of fact. ... Accordingly, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to address this claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not permit remand based on evidence that was previously available; the evidence must also be material.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2013-10-02(c)(1)

Here, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to remand, as the medical document he submitted was previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). While Lin argues the medical document was previously unavailable because he did not ask family members to obtain it until after his hearing, this does not mean the document itself was unavailable. Id. Furthermore, even if the document constituted new evidence, it would not be “material,” as it does not address Lin’s credibility problems, which were fatal to his application. Li Hua Lin, 453 F.3d at 107.

A motion to reopen or remand requires evidence that is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Yaqoob v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-08-02(c)(1)

To the extent that some documents submitted with the motion to remand were previously available, we agree with the BIA that Yaqoob should have submitted these documents with the motion to reopen. ... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”). ... And to the extent that other documents submitted with the motion to remand were previously unavailable, we agree with the BIA that Yaqoob failed to demonstrate the documents’ materiality such that remand was warranted. ... Therefore, the BIA acted within its discretion in declining to consider Yaqoob’s new evidence.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires additional evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Hanick v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-11(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hanick’s motion to reopen where she failed to demonstrate her additional evidence was previously unavailable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the supporting evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented earlier, including for an ineffective-assistance claim.

Maatougui v. Holder · filed 2013-12-26(c)(1)

But while the BIA cited the wrong cases, it did not apply the wrong regulation. The BIA relied on 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), which directs the BIA not to grant motions to reopen unless the evidence presented was not available and could not have been presented earlier. And the BIA did not misapply that regulation. As outlined above, Maatougui knew of her IAC claim and the supporting evidence and could have presented the claim and evidence years earlier.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable at the former hearing and not discoverable or presentable then.

Hebtemariam v. Holder · filed 2014-06-19(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [Board of Immigration Appeals] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Fishaye v. Holder, 559 Fed.Appx. 296, 298 (5th Cir.2014) (same). ... We conclude that the Board of Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remand her removal proceeding, even in light of her pro se, incustody status and asserted ignorance of immigration law when she filed her application.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been previously unavailable.

Maakhuu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in its June 25, 2012, order denying Maakhuu’s motion to reopen because Maakhuu did not show the psychological report he submitted with the motion was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (evidence capable of being discovered at time of hearing cannot serve as basis for motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Teixeira v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-01-28(c)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Petitioners point to our decision in Oliva-Ramos and argue that “the facts outlined . . . were not available at the time of [their] proceedings before the IJ.” Pet’rs’ Br. at 6. The BIA was not persuaded that this satisfied § 1003.2(c); we agree.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered to support a motion to remand to be material and not previously available.

Morina v. Holder · filed 2015-04-10(c)(1)

To warrant remand, the evidence offered must be material and not previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2005).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen or remand to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Sharma v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-09(c)(1)

The BIA’s denial of a motion to remand that relies on new evidence is held to the substantive standard for motions to reopen, and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ... “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... Because even without the translation errors identified by the independent translator, the IJ would have found Sharma incredible, evidence of those errors was not material to Sharma’s claim, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Mohammed Emu Ademo v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-07-30(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must present new evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to remand to have been previously unavailable.

Brito-Barrientos v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-02(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Brito-Barrientos’ motion to remand with regard to cancellation of removal, where he failed to establish that the evidence submitted was previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010).

A motion to reopen may be granted only when the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Darinchuluun v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-08(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... Here, the BIA denied Mr. Darinchuluun’s motion because he had not met his burden of establishing that his supplemental materials “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA’s explanation is reasonable.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to remand to present previously unavailable, material evidence supporting the requested relief.

Millanes-Gonzalez v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Millanes-Gonzalez’s separately filed motion to remand, because he failed to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence that he was entitled to withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only on material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the prior hearing.

Zheng v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-26(c)(1)

We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Zheng’s sister’s affidavit was previously available and could have been presented at his hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the record as the date before which the evidence must have been unavailable). Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zheng’s motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to rely on new, previously unavailable evidence and does not permit relitigation of previously rejected arguments based on evidence that was already available.

Rasid v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-26(c)

A motion to reopen is not a vehicle to present previously rejected arguments on the basis of previously available evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (requiring that motion to reopen be based on new and previously unavailable evidence).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking remand based on new evidence to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Jin v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-22(c)(1)

“A motion to remand that relies on newly available evidence is held to the substantive requirements of a motion to reopen.” Id. at 156. A movant seeking remand for consideration of new evidence must “present material, previously unavailable evidence.” Id. at 158; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “[I]n reviewing the BIA’s determination of whether previously unavailable evidence supported [a] motion to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ.” Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on new evidence to show that the evidence could not have been filed by the applicable deadline.

Tobias v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-01(c)(1)

The agency also did not abuse its discretion in denying Tobias’s motion to reopen where he failed to show the new evidence submitted, namely his motion to suppress with supporting declaration, could not have been filed by the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir.2005) (evidence must not have been available to be presented at the hearing before the IJ).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the evidence offered is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Akramova v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-03(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Pandit v. Lynch · filed 2016-05-26(c)

In order for a motion to reopen to succeed, it must meet "two threshold requirements": it must "establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought," and it must "introduce previously unavailable, material evidence." ... The Pandits focus their argument primarily on the BIA's determination that the evidence they submitted was not "new or previously unavailable." See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (stating that "[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing").

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires showing that previously unavailable evidence could not have been discovered or presented at the hearing.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-22(c)(2), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(2), Singh failed to establish the evidence predating his July 2009 immigration hearing was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at his hearing, see 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(1), and Singh failed to establish his motion otherwise fell within the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

A motion to remand may be granted only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Rivas-Quilizapa v. Lynch · filed 2016-06-29(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to [remand] shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on previously unavailable, material evidence that would likely change the outcome; a claim available during the initial proceeding does not satisfy that standard.

Khemlall v. Sessions · filed 2017-06-21(c)(1)

Khemlall misunderstands the standard applicable to his motion to reopen. Absent ineffective assistance, his domestic violence claim did not meet the standard for reopening because the claim was available and could have been presented in the initial proceeding before the IJ. An applicant seeking to reopen his case bears a “heavy burden” of presenting “previously unavailable, material evidence” that “would likely change the result in the case.” Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472-73 (BIA 1992); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Mohamed v. Attorney General United State · filed 2017-08-24(c)(1)

A motion to reopen will only be granted if “it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), and we review a denial of such a motion under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, I.N.S. v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Gaffoordeen v. Sessions · filed 2018-01-17(c)(1)

Under 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... The new letter from his mother essentially amplified her earlier letter and was therefore not materially new information. ... And Gaffoordeen could have obtained the letter from his neighbor during the four-year hiatus between when Gaffoordeen filed his asylum application and his hearing. ... But he has not explained why he could not have asked his other Sri Lankan contacts to get these documents before his hearing in 2014. ... The Board therefore reasonably decided that this evidence could have been presented at his hearing before the IJ.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved and include supporting evidence, and it may be granted only when the evidence is material and was unavailable or undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Rahman v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2018-03-12(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... Since this evidence was not likely to alter the outcome, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rahman’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Moreta v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-14(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The Board determined that Fernandez failed to show that his proffered evidence––his substance-abuse counseling records and letters from his friends and family––could not have been discovered or presented earlier. Indeed, Fernandez’s counseling records predate his February 2017 merits hearing, and he offered no sufficient explanation for why he could not have submitted those records beforehand. And although the letters from his friends and family confirm their support for Fernandez, they are not new material evidence. Given the cumulative nature of this evidence, the refusal to reopen the case fell comfortably within the Board’s discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Mosharof v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-05-28(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Moreover, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hossain’s motion to reopen his application for asylum or withholding of removal, because the information he filed in support of his motion was available to him at the time of his merits hearing, and thus, the BIA did not mischaracterize the evidence or improperly give the affidavits Hossain submitted minimal weight.

Subsection (c)(1) sets a “previously unavailable” evidence standard for reopening, but satisfying it alone does not overcome the 90-day deadline.

Silais v. Barr · filed 2019-06-19(c)(1)

Silais also argues that the Board failed to analyze whether the “new” corroborating evidence was “previously unavailable” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). But that regulatory standard, if met, merely allows the Board to grant a motion to reopen if it was filed within 90 days of the underlying decision. Id. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking remand for consideration of new evidence to present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Socop-Castillo v. Barr · filed 2019-07-12(c)(1)

And we find no error in the BIA’s denial of Socop-Castillo’s motion to remand because his written statement was previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156 (providing that a movant seeking remand for consideration of new evidence must “present material, previously unavailable evidence.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen, and therefore a motion to remand held to reopening’s substantive requirements, to be material and previously unavailable at the time of the hearing.

Konoplyankin v. Barr · filed 2019-09-18(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in declining to remand because most of the evidence had either been submitted to the IJ or was previously available at that time and thus did not satisfy the requirement that the movant submit evidence that was not available at the time of his hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (4); Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156, 158 (providing that a motion to remand “is held to the substantive requirements of a motion to reopen” and that a movant must “present material, previously unavailable evidence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Lavrenov v. Barr · filed 2020-03-04(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... With respect to the prior availability of the new evidence Lavrenov submitted for the first time on appeal to the BIA, he argued to the BIA only that it “was beyond [his] capabilities to obtain while he was detained and unrepresented.” Admin. R. Vol. 1 at 20. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered on a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing; failure to offer such evidence is a proper ground for denial.

Hu v. Barr · filed 2020-05-12(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the BIA to reopen proceedings only when the petitioner presents material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Aquino-Mejico v. Barr · filed 2020-06-11(c)(1)

The BIA may reopen removal proceedings if the petitioner presents new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Alternatively, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that the new evidence could have been discovered and presented at a prior hearing. ... Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aquino’s motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c) bars reopening unless the petitioner presents material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Matadi v. William Barr, U. S. Atty Gen · filed 2020-07-13(c)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted” unless the petitioner seeks to introduce evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). Without addressing the materiality of the proffered evidence, we find that Matadi’s argument fails because the evidence was previously available or could have been discovered or presented before the BIA issued its first order.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and was previously unavailable or could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Maria Mercedes Lopez Garcia v. Barr · filed 2020-08-11(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. Here, the Petitioners argue that reopening is warranted based on what they perceived as new material evidence of the conditions in Guatemala. However, the additional information submitted offered no new material evidence.

A motion to reopen may be granted only when the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Galeano-Romero v. Barr · filed 2020-08-04(c)(1)

And “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]” ... In fact, the Board reached the only conclusion it could, because nowhere in Galeano-Romero’s submissions to the Board did he explain how he satisfies § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing; failure to provide such evidence is sufficient grounds for denial.

Ahmed v. Barr · filed 2020-09-04

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. Ahmed offers nothing, beyond conclusory statements, to support his claim that the newly-offered evidence was not available at the time of his hearing in 2018. Thus, we find nothing in the record to support Ahmed’s claim that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen. As noted above, failure to support a motion to reopen with evidence that was not available at the time of the agency hearing is sufficient reason for the Board to deny a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zou v. Barr · filed 2020-09-15(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... “The BIA did not err in finding that Zou’s psychological evaluation was previously available because, although the evaluation was conducted and prepared after the IJ’s and BIA’s initial decisions, the evaluation discussed only events and health issues that predated Zou’s 2016 hearing.”

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Regalado-Gomez v. Barr · filed 2020-10-19(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless the evidence sought to be offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Regalado-Gomez alleges that she had PTSD when she applied for asylum in 1994 and the immigration judge could consider that evidence in evaluating her claim. Nevertheless, she has not presented any convincing reason why her condition could not have been discovered prior to her September 2017 hearing. Because she has been represented by counsel since 2014, we cannot say that the Board acted “arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to the law,” de Jesus Melendez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2007), in denying her motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Rosales v. Barr · filed 2020-12-15(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless . . . evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988). ... Although the expert cites killings of security guards in 2017, the expert does not explain how this is a significant change from 2016 and noted that infiltration of gangs into the police and information sharing between gangs and the police “continued unabated in 2017.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Thus, the BIA reasonably determined that evidence of more killings of security guards in 2017 was not new or material evidence as required for remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; evidence concerning events that occurred while the appeal was pending was not previously available.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2021-05-18(c)(1)

As Singh argues and the Government concedes, the BIA erred in concluding that Singh’s evidence was previously available because the evidence addressed attacks on his father in India that allegedly occurred while his appeal was pending before the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (A motion to reopen requires evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” (emphasis added)); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]n reviewing the BIA’s determination of whether previously unavailable evidence supported the . . . motion to reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered on a motion to remand for consideration of additional evidence to have been previously unavailable, and that requirement is not met when the evidence could have been obtained before the immigration-judge hearing.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2022-03-14(c)(1)

As the BIA found, the evidence was not previously unavailable as required for remand for consideration of additional evidence because Singh could have obtained the evaluation prior to his hearing before the IJ. Id. at 156; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the proffered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Anja v. Garland · filed 2022-10-10(c)(1)

The BIA cannot grant motions to reopen unless “the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Each piece of new evidence was tangential to the IJ’s credibility finding. Thus, the new evidence does not disturb the previous adverse credibility determination and only tries to bolster the claim already found not credible. The BIA was thus rational to think that the new information was immaterial to Anja’s credibility determination.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) supports denying a motion to reopen when the proffered evidence or argument could have been presented in the earlier proceedings.

Nunez-Ramirez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2022-03-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider an argument that could have been made in previous proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the BIA from granting a motion to remand unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Petros v. Garland · filed 2023-04-21(c)(1)

Under the relevant regulations, the BIA “shall not [] grant[]” a motion to remand unless the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Marqus, 968 F.3d at 592 (applying 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the motion-to-reopen provision, to a motion to remand).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to reopen when the movant fails to show that the supporting evidence was previously unavailable or could not have been discovered at the time of the prior proceedings.

Ayala-Recarte v. Garland · filed 2024-08-19(c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen if it “hold[s] that the movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence.” ... But he obtained that same evidence while detained, and he does not explain why, “as a practical matter,” he could not have obtained the documents earlier, Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 895, or why the evidence “could not have been discovered,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Goel v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007). ... Therefore, the BIA acted within its broad discretion when it concluded that Ayala-Recarte failed to show that the evidence was not “available or capable of being discovered,” Goel, 490 F.3d at 738, at the time of his removal proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the material evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Mohamed v. Bondi · filed 2026-01-07(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless . . . [the] evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... The BIA did not err in finding that the evidence presented with the motion to reopen was previously available. The statements from relatives and acquaintances were prepared after Mohamed’s hearings, but they could have been obtained and presented earlier because they discussed events that took place prior to the hearings. ... That finding alone was dispositive of the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104–05.

Evidence offered in support of a motion to reopen must have been previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented during the earlier proceedings.

Thiam v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-11-13(c)(1)

Because the alleged instances of spousal abuse occurred between 2002 and 2004, at least six years before the initiation of Thiam’s removal proceedings in 2010, the BIA did not act capriciously, irrationally, or arbitrarily, or otherwise abuse its discretion, in denying Thiam’s motion.

Under § 1003.2(c), evidence of former counsel’s instructions may qualify as previously unavailable evidence for a motion to reopen.

Liu v. Gonzales · filed 2005-06-17(c)

The BIA also abused its discretion in finding that the newly presented evidence that Liu’s former counsel instructed her to remain at his office was previously available.

A proffered polygraph examination does not qualify as previously unavailable evidence for a motion to reopen under § 1003.2(c)(1).

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-06(c)(1)

We recently held in Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735 (9th Cir.2007) that polygraph evidence does not constitute evidence that was “not available” within the meaning of the regulation that governs motions to reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Thus, the BIA properly denied reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that could not have been presented earlier.

Kucana v. Holder · filed 2010-05-04(c)(1)

Only evidence that could not have been presented earlier supports a motion to reopen, see §1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) and 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(1), and then only to show that risk has increased because of changes in country condi- tions.

An applicant seeking to reopen proceedings based on new evidence must explain why the evidence was previously unavailable; conjecture does not satisfy that burden.

Ouadah v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-01-12(c)(1)

Offering conjectural explanations now is insufficient; Ouadah should have provided an explanation to the BIA. He did not.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Di Zhang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-12-26(c)(2)

A motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant offers evidence that was material and “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Even assuming that the documents submitted by Zhang in support of his motion were material, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that all them were either previously available or previously discoverable.

A motion to remand based on new evidence must meet the reopening requirement that the evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Barragan-Ojeda v. Sessions · filed 2017-04-05(c)(1)

The Board appropriately concluded that Mr. Barragan-Ojeda’s additional submissions on appeal did not meet the requirements' for a motion to remand. Specifically, it correctly ruled that his motion was not “accompanied by evidence which was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts the alien seeks to prove at a hearing if reopening is granted.

Vushaj v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-08-10(c)(1)

The motion to reopen must therefore state new facts that the alien seeks to prove at a hearing should the motion be granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the alien presents material new evidence that could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Chen v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-01-11(c)(1)

A motion to reopen may be granted if the alien presents new evidence that is material and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking to reopen proceedings based on new evidence to show that the evidence was unavailable at the time of the prior hearing.

Frausto v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-13(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Frausto’s motion to reopen, where Frausto did not demonstrate that his son’s birth certificate was unavailable at the time of his hearing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and the evidence he submitted regarding his father was insufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Garcia, 621 F.3d at 912-13.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on material new facts that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing; evidence the movant could have presented earlier does not qualify.

Jose Antonio Lazo Avelar v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-05-19(c)(1)

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the movant presents “new facts” that are “material and [were] not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... First, the BIA discussed the incident in which unknown men shot at Avelar a month after the gang arrests. As the BIA correctly observed, this is not a “new fact.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The incident happened in June 2013 when Avelar was still in Honduras. He could and should have mentioned it at the hearing before the Immigration Judge in September 2014. Not only did Avelar omit the incident from his testimony, he also affirmatively said there were no “problems or [] threats” after the initial threat in May 2013. The BIA was thus permitted to reject this evidence, as it was both not newly-discovered and “inconsistent with [Avelar’s] previous testimony.”

Under § 1003.2(c)(1), new evidence does not warrant remand when it could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ.

Wen Lin Chen v. Sessions · filed 2017-06-15(c)(1)

We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s denial of Chen’s motion to remand for consideration of new evidence. See Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 157. The relevant inquiry is “whether the evidence could have been presented at the hearing before the IJ.” Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Chen’s evidence consisted solely of affidavits and photographs purporting to show his attendance at a wedding in China in 2008, all of which could have presented to the IJ. See Norani, 451 F.3d at 294. Although Chen argues that he lacked notice that he would need to present evidence from as early as 2008, Chen had notice that the IJ was considering a frivolousness finding based on his entry date and did not produce additional evidence before the IJ or explain why he waited to submit evidence until six months after the final merits hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new facts that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Cardona-Franco v. Garland · filed 2022-05-24(c)(1)

His motion needed to present new facts that are “‘material’ and of the sort that ‘could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.’” Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new, material facts that were previously unavailable.

Morris v. Blanche · filed 2026-06-25(c)(1)

A regulatory motion to reopen by the DHS, like a statutory motion to reopen by an alien, must “state . . . new facts” that are material and were not previously available. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). DHS simply did not provide any new evidence in its motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits a party to file only one motion to reopen, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to that number bar.

Pertuz v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-13(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez Pertuz’s July 3, 2008, motion to reopen as number-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings), and Perez Pertuz has not met any of the exceptions to the number bar, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days, but that limit does not apply when reopening is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; the motion must state the new facts and be supported by evidence.

Phik Ha Lie v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-10-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (e)(1)

The regulation governing motions to reopen provides that: “A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.... A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing....” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(e)(1). Although a motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), this time limitation does not apply if the alien seeks reopening “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).