8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c) permits reopening when the petitioner presents qualifying new evidence, files within 90 days, and has not already filed a motion to reopen, but those limits do not apply when the motion is based on changed country conditions.

Ni v. Gonzales · filed 2007-07-12(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)

The motion may be granted if [i] the petitioner presents new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); [ii] the motion is filed within ninety days of the final administrative decision, id. § 1003.2(c)(2); and [iii] the petitioner has not already filed a motion to reopen, id. These “time and numerical limitations” do not bar a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen, subject to specified exceptions; the changed-circumstances exception requires changed country conditions rather than merely changed personal circumstances.

Drammeh v. Gonzales · filed 2006-07-28(c)(2), (c)(3)

The regulations state that individuals may file only one motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and there is no dispute that Drammeh filed two motions to reopen with the BIA. The regulations provide for three exceptions to the numerical limitations, including: 1) certain motions filed from in absentia orders, 2) motions filed pursuant to “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered,” or 3) jointly filed motions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Only the second exception is relevant here, and the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it did not apply. In order to succeed under the changed circumstances exception, Drammeh would *40have to prove that the country conditions in Gambia had deteriorated since the BIA issued his final order of removal. Drammeh asserts only that his personal circumstances, regarding his eligibility for cancellation of removal and the birth of his daughter, had changed. However, this Court has already held that a change in an individual’s personal circumstances does not qualify under the second exception; an individual must demonstrate that the country conditions have changed in order for the second exception to apply.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes numerical limitations on motions to reopen.

Khursheed v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in characterizing Khursheed’s motion to reconsider as a second motion to reopen where he sought to introduce additional evidence, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir.2003), and in concluding that the motion exceeded the numerical limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) allows a party to file only one motion to reopen proceedings after a final administrative decision.

Aleman v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-14(c)(2)

Respondent’s unopposed motion for summary disposition is granted because petitioner’s motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals violated the numerical limitations on motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings after a final administrative decision was filed).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) imposes numerical limits on motions to reopen, and the exception in § 1003.2(c)(3)(i) does not apply where the record shows that notice was sent by certified mail to the movant’s last known address and the movant does not contend otherwise.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-07(c)(3), (c)(3)(i)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s 2005 motion to reopen because it exceeded the numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), and Singh failed to show that his motion was excepted from the numerical limitations, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i), because the record reflects that notice of the March 24, 1995 hearing was sent through certified mail to Singh’s last known address, and Singh did not contend otherwise, see Arrieta v. INS, 117 F.3d 429, 431 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (“[NJotice by certified mail sent to an alien’s last known address can be sufficient under the Act, even if no one signed for it.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen, filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, although those limits may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Balane v. Gonzales · filed 2008-03-14(c)(2)

“[A]n alien may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings . . . and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen may, however, be equitably tolled on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002). ... Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that Mrs. Balane has failed to demonstrate that the BIA abused its discretion in rejecting her equitable tolling argument. We therefore affirm the denial of the untimely motion for reopening.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the numerical bar when it seeks asylum based on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions, not merely changed personal circumstances.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-10-07(c)(3)(ii)

This numerical limitation does not apply to a motion to apply or reapply for asylum “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Although the language of the regulatory numerical bar differs somewhat from the language of the statutory time bar, this Court has interpreted the time bar and numerical bar identically, to require changed country, not personal, conditions. ... Thus, for the same reasons Chen’s motion is time-barred, it is also numerically barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, subject to subsection (c)(3)(ii), which permits an exception when the movant shows material changed country conditions or circumstances.

Islam v. Mukasey · filed 2008-08-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Islam’s motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... The BIA also properly found that Islam did not meet an exception to the time and numerical limitations applicable to such motions because he “failed to show changed country conditions or circumstances in Bangladesh that are material to his claim.”2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2 exempts a motion to reopen from its time and numerical limits when the motion is based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions, and Chen’s evidence did not qualify for that exception.

Chen v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

However, the time and numerical limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” ... We find no abuse of discretion in the BIA’s conclusion that Chen failed to demonstrate a change in country conditions that would warrant an exception to the time and numerical limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) allows the time and numerical limits on reopening to be bypassed for an asylum or withholding application based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions; changed personal circumstances, such as having additional children in the United States, do not qualify.

Jin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-12(c)(3)(ii)

In light of the BIA’s recent published decision in In re C-W-L, to which we accord Chevron deference, we hold that an alien who is subject to a final removal order and who wishes to file a successive asylum application must do so in conjunction with a motion to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) and thus may not do so based solely on changed personal circumstances.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a person to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts motions based on material, previously unavailable changed country conditions.

Khadka v. U.S. Department of Justice · filed 2008-08-28(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) provides that an individual may file only one motion to reopen, and must do so within ninety days of the issuance of a final administrative order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These limitations, however, do not apply when the motion to reopen is filed in order to apply for asylum or withholding of removal “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, it is undisputed that Khadka’s motion was untimely and number-barred, as it was his second motion to reopen, and it was filed more than one year after the BIA issued its decision affirming the IJ’s denial of relief. ... We further conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Khadka’s claim that new reports of Maoist activity showed changed country conditions. ... Because Khadka had previously introduced similar evidence regarding Maoist activities in Nepal, the BIA reasonably required more than Khadka’s conclusory assertion that the Maoists are now “more powerful,” Petitioner’s Br. at 11, to support his claim that the situation in Nepal had changed materially.1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (3) (ii).

Section 1003.2 generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within ninety days, but removes the time and numerical limits when the alien establishes materially changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-17(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within ninety days of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, there is no time or numerical limitation where the alien establishes materially “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii). Here, the BIA properly denied Singh’s June 2007 motion to reopen as number barred because it was his third motion to reopen. See id. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the numerical bar on motions to reopen, but this motion did not qualify for any of them.

Diaz v. Holder · filed 2009-07-30(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding Camargo Diaz’s second motion to reopen was numerically barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and that it did not qualify for any of the exceptions provided at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and numerical limits on motions to reopen; the court applied those limits to deny a second motion filed more than three years after the BIA’s final decision.

Zhou v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zhou’s second motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred because the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zhou failed to establish materially changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (documentation insufficient to establish changed circumstances); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of a final removal order; the court upheld applying that deadline where changed country conditions were not shown.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-12-15(c)(2)

An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2011). The time limit does not apply if the basis for the motion is to seek asylum or withholding of removal based on changed country conditions, “if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion by finding that Chen did not show a change in country conditions that would allow for an untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than eighteen years after the BIA’s final deportation order as untimely.

Rodriguez-Parede v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-05-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez-Paredes’ motion to reopen as untimely because she filed the motion more than eighteen years after the BIA’s final order of deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day window for filing a motion to reopen removal proceedings.

Huerta v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-06-15(c)(2)

Second, Finn failed to move to reopen Huerta’s removal proceedings within the statutory 90-day window following the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the later September 30, 1996 date and exceptions in subsection (c)(3).

Castrejon-Telles v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Castrejon-Telles’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than twenty-one years after the BIA’s July 5, 1989, order affirming the immigration judge’s order of deportation, and Castrejon-Telles did not establish that an exception to the filing deadline applied. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2) (A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later.”), 1003.2(c)(3) (providing exceptions).

Under § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen filed more than eleven years after the BIA’s final order is untimely.

Guzman v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than eleven years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the BIA considered the record and acted within its broad discretion in determining that the evidence was insufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for relief from deportation.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a deadline for motions to reopen deportation proceedings, and applying that deadline to a person served with an Order to Show Cause after the regulation’s promulgation is not impermissibly retroactive.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-15(c)(2)

As the Board concluded, Mr. Singh is bound by the deadline for motions to reopen deportation proceedings found at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). That regulation, promulgated in April 1996, see Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900 (Apr. 29, 1996), is not impermissibly retroactive as to Mr. Singh, who entered the United States and was served with an Order to Show Cause in September 1996. The relevant law has not changed with respect to the filing deadline at any time during the pendency of his administrative proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after a final order of removal, subject to applicable tolling principles.

Pedroza-Molina v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where they filed the motion more than eight years after their removal orders became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), and petitioners failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the motions deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative order unless an exception applies.

Ochave v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-22(b)

A motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of “the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal, deportation, or exclusion.... ” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b). The critical date, by which the Ochaves were required to file their motions to reopen, was the BIA’s affirmance of the IJ’s denial of relief: May 26, 1999.

A motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings must be filed within 90 days of the final order or by September 30, 1996, whichever is later.

Fazul v. Lynch · filed 2015-08-04(c)(2)

... the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as untimely where it was filed more than eleven years after the September 30, 1996, deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (a motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings must be filed no later than 90 days after a final order or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever is later); Matter of M-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 349, 356-57 (BIA 1998) (a motion to reopen in absentia proceeding to apply for new relief is subject to requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)).

Section 1003.2(a)'s place-of-filing rule does not strip the BIA of jurisdiction to decide an ABC class member's request for administrative closure.

Hernandez v. Lynch · filed 2015-09-02(a)

Neither the 30-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal with the BIA under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(b) nor the BIA’s place-of-filing rule under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) strip the BIA of jurisdiction to decide an ABC class member’s request for administrative closure.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board authority to reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision, and subsection (f) permits a stay of removal while a motion to reopen is pending without limiting that reopening authority.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-13(a), (f)

Section 1003.2(a) plainly and unambiguously states that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphasis added). The Board therefore had authority to reopen Singh’s proceedings under § 1003.2(a). Section 1003.2(f), upon which the BIA relied in Yauri, is not to the contrary. By its plain language, that provision simply gives the Board authority to grant a stay of removal while a motion to reopen is pending – after the motion has been filed but before it has been acted on by the BIA. The provision does not restrict the BIA’s broad power to grant a motion to reopen in any case or suggest in any way that the BIA should refrain from reopening proceedings for the purpose of affording an alien the opportunity to pursue relief from removal before another agency.

Section 1003.2(c) permits an alien to move to reopen removal proceedings, requiring new facts and supporting evidence, and the movant must show that the new evidence would likely change the result.

Junior Alfredo Medina Acosta v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-03-12(c)

An alien may file a motion to reopen his removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). The motion should state the new facts to be proven if the removal proceedings were reopened and should be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The alien bears a heavy burden to establish that, if the proceedings were opened, the new evidence would likely change the result of his case.

Section 1003.2(c) permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen removal proceedings based on new facts.

Doe v. Sessions · filed 2018-10-01(c)

However, this is substantively an attempt to reopen Doe’s removal proceedings on the basis of “new facts.” The authority to reopen proceedings lies with the immigration courts and BIA. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(d) bars the BIA from reopening removal proceedings on a motion filed after the alien has departed the United States.

Castillo-Perales v. Mukasey · filed 2008-11-03(d)

The BIA views the restriction as jurisdictional, and Castillo does not deny that he departed the United States before filing his motion to reopen his deportation proceedings. This court has already held that the BIA’s interpretation of sections 1003.23(b)(1) and 1003.2(d) is reasonable, and thus, entitled to deference.

Section 1003.2(d) does not strip the Board of jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen merely because the alien has left the country.

Gordillo v. Holder · filed 2011-05-13(d)

There are no longer grounds for uncertainty. In Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011), the Board had denied Pruidze’s motion to reopen for the same reason it denied Gordillo’s motion for reconsideration here—namely, that the government had already deported him, thereby stripping the Board of jurisdiction over his motion per the Board’s interpretation of § 1003.2(d). We rejected that interpretation of § 1003.2(d) in Pruidze, holding that “no statute gives the Board purchase for disclaiming jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reopen filed by aliens who have left the country.” Id. at 237. The Seventh Circuit agrees. See Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 2010) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“As a rule about subject-matter jurisdiction, § 1003.2(d) is untenable”). Thus, the Board’s second reason for denying Gordillo relief—that it lacks jurisdiction to do so—is as invalid as the first.

Subsection (d) may function as a mandatory claim-processing rule concerning motions filed after departure, but it does not strip the Board of jurisdiction to consider those motions.

Pruidze v. Holder · filed 2011-02-03(d)

The Attorney General adds that, under Chevron, we must defer to its interpretation of § 1229a(c)(7) because the provision is silent—or at least ambiguous—on whether an alien abroad may file a motion to reopen. ... Whatever powers of interpretation Chevron gives agencies, it does not allow them to alchemize the authority to pass a mandatory rule into the authority to pass a jurisdictional one. We defer to an agency’s efforts to fill statutory gaps, not to create them, and in this instance Congress left no gap to fill when it empowered the agency to consider all motions to reopen filed by an alien, not just those filed by aliens who remain in the United States up to the time of decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A).

Section 1003.2(d) does not deprive the BIA of jurisdiction over a statutory motion to reopen when the noncitizen has been removed or otherwise departed; the court left other applications of the departure bar unresolved.

Luna v. Holder · filed 2011-03-03(d)

We hold that the BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress gave it by applying the departure bar regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), as suggested by the BIA in Armendarez-Mendez, to statutory motions to reopen. ... This same logic applies to someone like Thompson who has been removed before filing his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar does not prevent a petitioner who has been physically removed from pursuing a motion to reopen.

Reyes-Torres v. Holder · filed 2011-04-07(d)

Because such a result would “completely eviscerate the statutory right to reopen provided by Congress,” we reaffirm our holding in Coyt that “the physical removal of a petitioner by the United States does not preclude the petitioner from pursuing a motion to reopen.”

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar deprives the BIA of jurisdiction to reopen a removal case sua sponte after the alien has been removed.

Andrews v. Barr · filed 2020-01-22(d)

The BIA was correct that it did not have jurisdiction to reopen sua sponte because Andrews has already been removed. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d); Xue Yong Zhang, 617 F.3d at 655‐65 (upholding departure bar with respect to regulatory reopening).

Section 1003.2(d) does not strip the BIA of jurisdiction over a motion to reopen because the alien has been removed.

Sadhvani v. Holder · filed 2010-03-09(d)

In William I, we held that the regulation promulgated by the agency, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), was invalid because it directly contradicted the statutory language in the INA which permitted one motion to reopen with no restriction on the location from which it was filed. ... Although petitioner correctly asserts that the BIA has jurisdiction to enter- tain his motion, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying relief based on the statutory requirement that one ... must be present in the United States to be eligible for asylum.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) provides that reopening to apply for discretionary relief is unavailable when the right and opportunity to apply were fully explained at the prior hearing, unless circumstances arose afterward.

Liu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-23(c)(1)

Under the regulations, a motion to reopen will not be granted for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief . . . if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing.

Subsection (g)(3) deems a motion unopposed absent a timely response but permits the Board, in its discretion, to consider an untimely brief, and an unopposed motion is not automatically granted.

Khakhnelidze v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-08(g)(3)

Under the regulations, “[a] motion shall be deemed unopposed unless a timely response is made.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3). Under those same regulations, however, the “Board may, in its discretion, consider a brief filed out of time.” Id. The BIA thus had the discretion to consider the Attorney General’s responsive brief. Furthermore, deeming a motion to reopen as unopposed does not result in an automatic grant of the motion. Where, as here, Petitioners failed to establish grounds for relief, the BIA retains the discretion to deny relief even when no responsive brief is filed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) treats the alien’s prior hearing before the immigration judge as the relevant “previous hearing,” even when the alien failed to appear, and does not require reopening when the alien’s conduct prevented presenting evidence there.

Chehoud v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-05-22(c)(3)(ii)

Our decision in Filja did not require the BIA to remand for an evidentiary hearing before the IJ where the alien's own conduct prevented the discovery or presentation of evidence at the previous hearing. We decided in Filja only that the "previous hearing" referred to in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) was the alien's previous hearing before the IJ and not his subsequent appeal to the BIA. See Filja, 447 F.3d at 254. The BIA was not required to reopen and remand under these circumstances.

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar cannot be applied to a statutorily authorized motion to reconsider because the statutory right is not contingent on the alien's presence in the United States.

Lari v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-27(d)

The departure regulation therefore cannot serve as a basis for denying aliens who have departed the United States their statutorily authorized right to file one motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(d) cannot bar a statutorily authorized motion to reconsider solely because the alien has departed the United States.

Lari v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-09(d)

The departure regulation therefore cannot serve as a basis for denying aliens who have departed the United States their statutorily authorized right to file one motion to reconsider.

A motion to reopen must focus on new facts to be proven at a hearing if reopening is granted.

Agyei v. Holder · filed 2013-08-30(c)(1)

A motion to reopen focuses on "new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted," 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and may be denied if the movant fails to "establish[] a prima facie case of eligibility for the substantive relief sought," Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2013-11-08(c)(1)

Initially, we note that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in basing its decision on Jiang’s failure to file an asylum application to support his new religion-based asylum claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief” (emphasis added)); see also Joaquin-Porras v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 172, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (An agency’s interpretations of its own regulations are accorded “substantial deference”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the Board to deny reopening unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Guzman-Hernandez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); ... Guzman did not explain why the mental health evaluation and PTSD diagnosis “could not have been discovered or presented” at the IJ hearing. More importantly, Guzman did not establish that the mental health evaluation and PTSD diagnosis were material: Guzman, represented by counsel, participated in proceedings before the IJ without any apparent difficulty, with no indicia of incompetency.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when the motion presents material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Osorio-Zacarias v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-08-14(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) treats a request for further competency proceedings based on new evidence as a motion to reopen, and the BIA may deny reopening when the evidence does not warrant it.

Salinas-Medina v. Barr · filed 2019-12-09(c)(1)

Salinas’s motion is best viewed as a motion to reopen because it seeks further competency proceedings based on new evidence that Salinas was diagnosed with unspecified psychosis or psychotic disorder. Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 471 (BIA 1992); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (4). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding in the first instance that reopening proceedings was unnecessary. See Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr, 929 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he BIA [can] exercis[e] its discretion in the first instance.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (standard to reopen). ... The BIA reasonably concluded that Salinas’s new evidence did not indicate that he was incompetent, given that he was represented by counsel and able to participate in the proceedings without any apparent difficulty. Salgado v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 982, 987–89 (9th Cir. 2018); Matter of M-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011).

Section 1003.2 treats a motion to remand seeking previously unpresented evidence as a motion to reopen, and permits reopening for new material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Lenor v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-03-05(c)(1)

Where a motion to remand seeks to introduce evidence that has not previously been presented, it should be treated as a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) and subjected to the same substantive requirements. ... But they may be granted if there is new evidence that is material, was not previously available, and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits an alien subject to a final removal order to seek reopening based on new facts, and the court held that the BIA may require a prima facie showing for such relief even when the motion rests on a pending VAWA self-petition.

Franjul-Soto v. Barr · filed 2020-08-24(c)(1)

These provisions allow an alien subject to an otherwise final order of removal to seek administrative relief based on "new facts." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... In any event, we have held that the BIA may require that an alien's motion to reopen at least be supported by a prima facie case to be granted, see Carter v. INS, 90 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988)), and we see no basis for making an exception when the motion to reopen is based on a still-pending VAWA self-petition.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the movant presents new, material facts that could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Garcia-Gomez v. Garland · filed 2021-08-23(c)(1)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Gomez’s timely motion to reopen removal proceedings where Garcia-Gomez has not established new facts that are material to his claim and could not have been timely discovered or presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (BIA can deny a motion to reopen for “failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence”).

A motion to reopen based on changed circumstances must state new, material facts that could not have been discovered or presented during the earlier proceedings.

Konneh v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-10-01(c)(1)

Aliens may move to reopen their removal proceedings based on changed circumstances. But to do that, the motion must “state the new facts” amounting to “material” evidence that “could not have been discovered or presented” during earlier proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Konneh’s motion did not do that. Most of the evidence Konneh gave the Board rehashed his family’s long history of persecution and Liberia’s ethnic strife. Konneh knew this history long ago and could have presented it earlier. And although he mentioned receiving personal threats for the first time after the removal order, the Facebook message and voicemail transcript that he submitted could have predated that order: neither listed a year. ... So he failed to present evidence of new circumstances, and the Board reasonably denied his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proved and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material; unsupported assertions are insufficient.

Giron-Villatoro v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2022-08-02(c)(1)

Although Petitioner’s motion indicated that new potential evidence might exist, Petitioner provided no new facts and offered no affidavits or other evidentiary material in support of his motion. The broad assertions made by Petitioner’s lawyer that further details about the FBI investigation would become available at some unidentified future date and would be more fully developed at an evidentiary hearing fail to satisfy the evidentiary requirements governing motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening—and, as applied here, remand—to be material and previously unavailable.

Lafita v. Garland · filed 2024-06-07(c)(1)

“The relevant test for deciding a motion to remand for consideration of new evidence is whether the evidence is material and was previously unavailable. Marqus, 968 F.3d at 592 (applying 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), the motion-to-reopen provision, to a motion to remand).”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen for new evidence to show that the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Hoyos v. Garland · filed 2024-07-23(c)(1)

“A motion to remand for new evidence shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... “We treat Petitioners’ motion to remand for consideration of new evidence as a motion to reopen, using the standard articulated in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).”

Section 1003.2(c) directs requests to reopen proceedings based on new evidence to be made to the BIA in the first instance.

Moise v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2026-02-20(c)

But such a request should be made to the BIA in the first instance. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (governing motions to reopen filed with the BIA based on new evidence); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (providing that this Court shall decide a petition for review only on the administrative record).

Section 1003.2 treats a motion to remand based on changed circumstances and seeking an application for relief as a motion to reopen.

Sorcia v. Holder · filed 2011-07-01(c)(1)

In other words, citing changed circumstances, Sorcia sought a remand to allow for adjustment of his immigration status, a form of "relief." As such, Sorcia’s motion was one to remand for the reopening of his case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

A motion challenging the BIA’s dismissal of an untimely appeal is a motion to reopen when it relies on evidence the BIA did not previously have.

Corrales v. Blanche · filed 2026-06-24(c)(1)

In any event, such a position is flatly inconsistent with the BIA’s regulations and our case law, which make clear that a motion to reopen is the proper vehicle to challenge the dismissal of an untimely appeal when the challenge is premised on evidence not previously before the BIA.

Section 1003.2(d) does not prevent a petitioner outside the United States from filing a timely motion to reopen when the governing statute gives the Board jurisdiction to accept it.

Cordova-Soto v. Holder · filed 2013-10-15(d)

Although 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) might be thought to suggest that petitioners cannot reopen their removal orders from outside the United States, we have held that the Board cannot divest itself of the jurisdiction created by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) and (C), which allows petitioners the opportunity to file one motion to reopen within 90 days, regardless of the alien’s location.

Section 1003.2(c)'s procedural requirements, including its time and number limits on motions to reopen, apply to motions seeking protection under the Convention Against Torture.

Go v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-03-07(c)

Accordingly, we hold that the procedural requirements specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) apply to CAT claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a remand or reopening request to rely on evidence that was unavailable during the initial proceedings.

Yueqi Ye v. Holder · filed 2014-04-14(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA err in declining to remand the application to the IJ to consider the mental incompetency claim. As the BIA noted, the gravamen of Ye’s argument to the BIA – that her testimonial inconsistencies should be excused due to her poor memory – had already been thoroughly considered by the IJ, and Ye’s request for remand included no evidence that was unavailable to her during the initial proceedings before the IJ. See 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen may be denied when it repeats evidence and arguments the BIA already considered in an earlier motion.

Pankratov v. Holder · filed 2012-01-04(c)(1)

Here, because all of Pankratov’s evidence and arguments had previously been before the BIA in connection with his first motion to reopen, the BIA reasonably denied his motion as it repeated arguments that it had already rejected.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2014-05-09(c)(1)

The applicable regulation makes clear that an appropriate application for relief is mandatory, not permissive. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”); Lin Xing Jiang v. Holder, 639 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 2011).

A motion to reopen to seek relief must include the application for that relief; other evidence of eligibility cannot replace it.

Chhetri v. Garland · filed 2023-10-03(c)(1)

But the applicable law requires a petitioner to submit the actual application, and other evidence is no substitute for meeting that requirement.

Section 1003.2(c) permits the BIA to deny reopening or remand when the requested evidence or relief was previously available and the alien was fully informed of the right to apply and given an opportunity to do so at the prior hearing.

Balyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-27(c)

The BIA need not reopen or remand a case simply to permit presentation of evidence previously available or request relief that could have been sought during the initial proceedings “if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“The purpose of a motion to reopen is to present new facts or evidence that may entitle the alien to relief from deportation.”).

A motion to remand based on evidence may be denied when the applicant had an opportunity to present that evidence at the earlier hearing.

Rodriguez-Soriano v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-21(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Rodriguez-Soriano’s motion to remand, where he had the opportunity to present to the IJ evidence on any matter relevant to discretion.

A second motion to reopen cannot rely on newly created affidavits when the information in them could have been presented with the first motion.

Zou v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2009-03-03(c)(1)

The relevant inquiry is whether the information contained in the affidavits could have been presented with the first motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the earlier hearing.

Doughan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-24(c)(1)

However, there is nothing in the record to undermine the Board’s conclusion that the California application could have been discovered and presented earlier in the proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening to allow an alien to seek discretionary relief when the opportunity to apply was fully explained and afforded at the prior hearing, unless the request is based on circumstances arising afterward.

Avendano v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-27(c)(1)

One of those standards forbids reopening for the purpose of allowing the alien to apply for any form of discretionary relief, “if it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him . . . and an opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Asylum is a form of discretionary relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). The Board ruled that Avendano’s opportunity to seek asylum-related relief was addressed at the former hearing, and that he did not meet the standard for reopening based on new circumstances. Any challenge to this factual determination does not present a question of law, so we lack jurisdiction to consider Avendano’s claim relating to asylum.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen a case sua sponte, and its exercise is generally unreviewable absent a legal misperception.

Chen v. Bondi · filed 2025-07-09(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that decision, Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2022), except that we may remand if the BIA “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). There was no such misperception in the BIA’s determination that becoming potentially eligible for cancellation of removal after being ordered removed was not an exceptional circumstance warranting sua sponte reopening.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings, which it must consider when deciding a motion to reopen.

Bermudez-Barajas v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-22(a)

However, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Bermudez-Barajas’ motion to reopen because it appears not to have considered whether he was entitled to reopening as a matter of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Singh, 771 F.3d at 653 (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen on jurisdictional grounds was legal error, and thus an abuse of discretion, because it had authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)).

Section 1003.2(a) requires the BIA to consider whether to reopen proceedings as a matter of discretion.

Capuchino-Lopez v. Lynch · filed 2016-12-20(a)

However, the BIA abused its discretion in denying Capuchino-Lopez’ motion to reopen because it appears not to have considered whether he was entitled to reopening as a matter of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Singh, 771 F.3d at 653 (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen on jurisdictional grounds was legal error, and thus an abuse of discretion, because it had authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) exempts a jointly filed motion to reopen from the provision's time and numerical limitations.

Cuzco-Mora v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-12-02(c)(3)(iii)

The footnote merely informs the parties that the “time and numerical limitations” on motions to reopen do not apply if the motion is filed jointly. See id.

Government nonopposition alone does not qualify a motion to reopen for the jointly filed motion exception to the filing deadline.

Mejia v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-02(c)(3)(iii)

Contrary to Mejia’s contention, the government’s decision not to oppose his motion to reopen does not render the motion exempt from the statutory time limitations. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) (providing for an exception to the filing deadline where the motion to reopen is “[ajgreed upon by all parties and jointly filed”).

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proved at the hearing and support those facts with affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Beltran-Valles v. Holder · filed 2014-12-04(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and [the movant] must support those facts with affidavits or other evidentiary material.” Id. at 1239-40; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(d) does not bar a previously removed alien from filing a motion to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires material, previously unavailable evidence sufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Lopez-Vasquez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-12-10(d), (c)(1)

Thus, as in Reyes-Torres, petitioners’ prior removal from the United States does not preclude them from exercising their statutory right to file a motion to reopen. ... Because petitioners’ evidence in this case is material, was not previously available, and is sufficient to establish their prima facie eligibility for asylum, petitioners have cleared the necessary hurdles to prevail on their motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Saydur v. Holder · filed 2015-02-13(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”

Subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief.

Rahman v. Whitaker · filed 2019-02-11(c)(1)

First, the BIA did not err in denying the motion based on Rahman’s failure to file a new asylum application because a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Valencia v. Barr · filed 2020-06-09(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Leon-Mondragon v. Garland · filed 2021-04-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Leon-Mondragon’s motion to reopen for the purpose of seeking cancellation of removal. Leon-Mondragon did not file an application for cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an appropriate application and supporting documentation only when a motion to reopen is filed for the purpose of submitting an application for relief; a standard motion to reopen does not require a new application for relief already in the record.

Etemadi v. Garland · filed 2021-09-09(c)(1)

The text of § 1003.2(c)(1) makes a clear distinction between a motion to reopen proceedings and a motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief: A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added).

A motion to reopen for the purpose of seeking relief must include the application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Sunarto v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-15(c)(1)

According to the applicable regulation, if the motion to reopen proceedings is for the purpose of submitting an application for relief, the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation must be submitted.

A motion to reopen seeking relief must include the appropriate application and supporting documents; an earlier application in the record does not satisfy the filing requirement.

Portillo v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-03-09(c)(1)

The BIA found that Portillo’s motion to reopen was procedurally defective. ... Portillo failed to submit a Form I-589, the appropriate application for relief he sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen to be supported by evidentiary material without an accompanying sworn affidavit.

Singui v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-24(c)(1)

Third, the BIA improperly faulted Singui for failing to submit an affidavit in support of his motions to reopen, but the relevant regulation permits the submission of evidentiary material without an accompanying sworn statement.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify specific factual or legal errors in the Board's prior ruling; otherwise, the Board will deny it.

Shaohua He v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-27(b)(1)

The Board will deny a motion to reconsider that has not “identified specific factual or legal errors in [its] prior ruling.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); In re O–S–G, 24 I & N Dec. 56, 58 (BIA 2006).

Section 1003.2 limits reconsideration to errors of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision based on the existing administrative record, leaves grant or denial to the Board’s discretion, and directs challenges based on new evidence to reopening supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Alexander-Mendoza v. Attorney General United States · filed 2022-12-02(b)(1), (a), (c)(1)

Motions to reconsider BIA decisions contest “the correctness of the original decision based on the previous factual record.” Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA 2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (explaining that a motion to reconsider focuses on “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision”); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (same). Accordingly, motions to reconsider cannot raise arguments dependent on supplemental facts; rather they must be based on the preexisting administrative record. See In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 57 (“A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of the original decision based on the previous factual record . . . .”). Similarly, a motion to reconsider may generally dispute only the legal propositions previously before the BIA – either those raised in the alien’s initial appeal or those relied upon by the BIA sua sponte in resolving the appeal. ... Although a motion to reconsider does not allow a challenge to a removal order based on evidence not contained in the original administrative record, such a challenge may be brought through a motion to reopen, which Mendoza did not file. See In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 57–58; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); compare 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6) (setting forth procedural requirements for a motion to reconsider), with id. § 1229a(c)(7) (setting forth procedural requirements for a motion to reopen). ... A court reviews an order by the BIA denying a motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion. See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011)); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The decision to grant or deny a motion to . . . reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section.”). To constitute an abuse of discretion, a BIA order must be “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). The BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for reconsideration predicated on either new evidence or legal arguments that could have been raised earlier because both of those grounds exceed the permissible limits for such a motion. Also, in the absence of record evidence compelling a contrary conclusion, the BIA does not abuse its discretion in declining to revise its prior factual findings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Bujaj v. Lynch · filed 2015-05-01(c)(1)

The BIA also did not err in finding previously available a psychological report related to Kujtim’s purported memory issues. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Alternatively, the BIA reasonably concluded that the report was not material as it did not rebut the underlying adverse credibility determination.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be denied unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, and unpresentable at the former hearing.

Rivera v. Garland · filed 2023-03-30(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that, although the book may have been published after his removal hearing, Valenzuela had not demonstrated that the factual evidence referenced in the book was unavailable for his hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); see also Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that a motion to remand is treated as having the same requirements as a motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Mbonga v. Garland · filed 2023-10-13(c)(1)

A party to removal proceedings may move to reopen proceedings after the Board has rendered a decision in the matter. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The party must state “new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.” Id. § 1003.2(c)(1). Importantly, a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. The Board retains significant discretion to deny a motion to reopen “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” Id. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on evidence that is new, and previously available evidence does not satisfy that requirement.

Dwumaah v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-06-10(c)(1)

Thus, the BIA properly concluded that reopening was not warranted because Dwumaah’s evidence is not new. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking to reopen removal proceedings based on newly discovered evidence to show that the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Yuchin v. Jefferson Sessions III · filed 2018-06-29(c)(1)

To reopen removal proceedings based on newly discovered evidence, the movant bears a “heavy burden” of showing that the evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Krougliak v. I.N.S., 289 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence was previously unavailable or could not have been discovered at the former hearing.

Valle v. Barr · filed 2019-04-25(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez Valle’s motion to reopen based on new evidence because Gomez Valle failed to establish that the evidence was not previously available or could not have been discovered at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Goel v. Gonzalez, 490 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, if “the allegedly new information . . . was available or capable of being discovered at [the time of the hearing], it cannot provide a basis for reopening”).

A motion to remand for consideration of new evidence requires evidence that is material and was previously unavailable.

Marqus v. Barr · filed 2020-07-30(c)(1)

The relevant test for deciding a motion to remand for consideration of new evidence is whether the evidence is material and was previously unavailable. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Shakkuri, 780 F. App’x at 294.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on new evidence only when the evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Abakporo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-08-13(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material, was not available previously, and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3); Verano-Velasco, 456 F.3d at 1376–77.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless newly offered evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the original hearing.

Sothon Song v. Garland · filed 2022-12-01(c)(1)

That concession is well taken, as we see nothing unreasonable about the Board’s determination that the October 2012 document was available to Song while her removal proceedings were still pending in November 2018. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that reopening is unavailable unless the newly proffered evidence “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”).

Subsection (c)(1) permits reopening only for material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Mangroo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-03-14(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not err in concluding Mangroo’s I-130 petition and corresponding I-485 application did not constitute new evidence that was previously unavailable at the time of his removal hearing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time limits for a motion to reopen when the movant demonstrates changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Zhu-Hong v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-01(b)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

In construing Zhu-Hong’s motion as a motion to reconsider, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it because Zhu-Hong failed to specify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... In construing Zhu-Hong’s motion as a motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying it because Zhu-Hong filed her fourth motion over nine years after she was ordered removed in absentia, and she failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish materially changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Reyes-Villegas v. Lynch · filed 2015-07-02(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Reyes-Villegas’s motion for reconsideration, because it failed to identify errors of facts or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying her claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a 30-day deadline for motions to reconsider, while § 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to have been previously unavailable and to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Jones v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-06-02(b)(2), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s motion to reconsider as untimely, where he filed it more than 30 days after the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen, where the evidence, including evidence regarding Jones’s efforts to marry, was not previously unavailable and did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(C)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (new evidence in support of a motion to reopen must not have been available at the time of the hearing).

Subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

Tisnado v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-04-13(c)(1), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tisnado’s motion to reopen, because she failed to offer evidence that was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at Tisnado’s former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Goel v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 735, 738-39 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing the evidentiary requirements for a motion to reopen). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Tisnado’s motion to reconsider her claims, because she failed to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the standard for a motion to reconsider).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior BIA order.

Bereket Belay v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-10(b)(1)

As to petition No. 13-74341, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Belay’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision, rather than merely challenge the Board’s weighing of the evidence and resulting decision.

Zavala-Yanes v. Whitaker · filed 2018-11-14(b)(1)

In order to prevail, a movant must “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision,” rather than simply challenging the Board’s consideration of the evidence and the resulting decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2018).

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Urias-Vargas v. Barr · filed 2019-04-24(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior order. 8 CFR § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in a prior decision); see also Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1160-62.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the BIA’s decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Lumaj v. Garland · filed 2021-04-12(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision.

Reyes v. Garland · filed 2022-05-26(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Reyes’s motion to reconsider where she failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.

Mejia-Castillo v. Garland · filed 2023-03-20(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider where they failed to identify any error of law or fact in the prior decision. See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (same).

A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the underlying decision.

Kakliauskas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2024-02-09(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law” in the underlying decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C). ... Kakliauskas did not specify any errors of law or fact in the Board’s order denying his appeal; he repeated the same arguments he made below.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact and permits reopening only for material new evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the removal hearing.

Espinoza v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-06-02(b)(1), (c)(1)

Consequently, merely reiterating arguments previously made to the BIA “does not constitute specifying errors of fact or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” ... Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state its reasons by specifying errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision, which confines reconsideration to review of that prior decision.

Pigueiras v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2025-12-08(b)(1)

Second, while Pigueiras exhausted these legal claims in his motion to reconsider, the BIA did not reach these legal questions on the merits in its order, because in a motion to reconsider, the BIA should review its own prior decision for misapplications of law, and the BIA’s prior decision did not address these legal issues. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (stating a motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision”).

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s initial decision and support the claim with pertinent authority.

Chen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-20(b)

To secure *17reconsideration, an alien must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s initial decision, supporting that claim with pertinent authority.

A motion to reconsider must identify errors of law or fact in the BIA’s decision; repeating earlier claims does not suffice.

Zheng v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-30(b)

In his motion, Zheng merely reiterated claims already presented to the IJ, and to the BIA on appeal from the IJ’s decision, and attempted to explain inconsistencies in his testimony. Zheng failed to identify any errors of law or fact that would warrant reconsideration.

Section 1003.2(b)(3) bars a motion to reconsider based solely on a challenge to a summary affirmance or to adjudication without a three-member panel.

Djokic v. Jeff Sessions · filed 2017-03-21(b)(3)

Despite Djokic’s argument that the regulation applies only to summary affirmances by single-member panels, the Board’s precedent provides: “A motion to reconsider is also barred if it is filed solely to challenge a decision to affirm without opinion by a single Board Member, or to adjudicate the case without a panel of three Board Members.” Matter of O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA 2006). The preamble also suggests a similar reading of the regulation. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 63 FR 49043, 44 (“The proposed rule also amends the regulation regarding motions to reconsider to state that a motion to reconsider based solely on the argument that the case should have been heard by a three-Member panel, or otherwise should not have been summarily affirmed without a full opinion, is barred.”). As both parties agree, the purpose of this regulation is to streamline immigration appeals and filings, and the regulation bars motions to reconsider for challenges to both summary affirmances and single-member panels, two key ways in which the Board streamlines its docket.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars a motion to reopen seeking discretionary relief when the alien had an opportunity to apply for that relief at a former hearing.

Barua v. Sessions · filed 2017-08-11(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “for the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief” will not be granted if the alien had an opportunity to apply for that relief at a former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Assuming that Barua’s conviction is not a CIMT, he was eligible to petition for an immigrant visa and apply to adjustment of status when he married his wife in December 2009--four years before his initial hearing with the IJ in December 2013.

The time bar in § 1003.2(c) applies to motions to reopen based on a request for withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture.

Cotoc-Perez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2018-01-23(c)

We held that the time-bar under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) applies to motions to reopen based on a request for withholding of removal under the CAT.

Subsection (b)(1) permits a motion for reconsideration of a prior BIA decision to seek reevaluation of the record in light of a change in law, a misapplication of law, or an aspect the BIA overlooked.

Levy Samayoa-Montufar v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-05-30(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration of a prior BIA decision may be made to obtain a re-evaluation of record evidence in light of “a change in the law, a misapplication of the law, or an aspect of the case that the BIA overlooked.” Zhao, 404 F.3d at 301; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and provide pertinent supporting authority; the BIA may deny a motion that merely repeats arguments it previously rejected.

Xin He v. Bondi · filed 2025-05-05(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority, and the BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider that merely repeats arguments that the BIA had previously rejected. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) allows the Board to deny reconsideration when a motion repeats rejected arguments without raising new legal contentions, a change in law, or an overlooked issue.

Amaya v. Sessions · filed 2017-06-16(b)(1)

“Reconsideration,” we have said, “is not an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments,” ... and the Board therefore does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider that does not raise additional legal contentions, point to a change of law, or highlight arguments or aspects of the case overlooked by the Board.

A motion for reconsideration is confined to errors in the BIA’s prior decision and cannot raise issues that could have been raised earlier.

Omari v. Holder · filed 2009-03-04(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration is thus confined to the substance of the BIA’s original decision.

A motion for BIA reconsideration must identify errors of fact or law in the Board’s prior decision.

Lin v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-08-09(b)(1)

A motion to the BIA for reconsideration of one of its prior decisions must, in order to be granted, point out “errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.” ... Most of the arguments raised by Lin in support of her petition for review do not meet this standard.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material; the court upheld denial of equitable tolling where the petitioner provided none.

Gamez-Montoya v. Garland · filed 2024-10-29(c)(1)

Further, the BIA correctly declined to apply equitable tolling because Gamez-Montoya failed to show that he filed his motion with “due diligence,” Luna v. Holder, 659 F.3d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted), and did not present “affidavits or other evidentiary material,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), in support of his request for tolling.

A motion to reopen an in absentia exclusion order for reasonable cause must be supported by affidavits or other evidence.

Tan v. McElroy · filed 2003-11-06(c)(1)

An alien ordered excluded in absentia may move to reopen and rescind the order on a showing of “reasonable cause” for failure to appear, see Matter of Haim, 19 I. & N. Dec. 641, 642, 1988 WL 235452 (BIA 1988), supported by affidavits or other evidence, see 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1) (2000) (recodified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2003)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include evidence supporting its factual allegations.

Lora-Gonzalez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-12-02(c)(1)

The BIA did not rely on a false legal premise; it accurately summarized the standards for motions to reopen and reconsider, and correctly observed that, contrary to the regulations, Lora-Gonzalez had failed to present evidence in support of his allegations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) limits a motion to reconsider to identifying errors of law or fact in the prior order, ordinarily concerning issues already raised.

Ramirez v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-29(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must contest “errors of law or fact in the previous order,” and a motion to reopen for an additional hearing must state “new facts” and “be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)(C) & (7)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(b)(1) & (c)(1). ... However, several other Circuits have held “that the office of a motion to reconsider in an immigration case, under current law, is ordinarily limited to the consideration of factual or legal errors in the disposition of issues previously raised.” Martinez-Lopez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 169, 172-73 (1st Cir. 2013) (emphasis added) (collecting cases). We agree. ... Therefore, the Board was well within its discretion in denying her motion to reopen or reconsider.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the numerical limit when it makes the required showing of changed country conditions.

Abadi v. Sessions · filed 2018-09-11(c)(3)(ii)

And under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), the same showing of changed country conditions skirts the number bar.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the availability inquiry to focus on whether the evidence was available or could have been discovered at the former hearing, rather than before the BIA issued its decision.

Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker · filed 2018-12-14(c)(1)

Some of the Government’s arguments as to availability of evidence presume that the proper inquiry is whether the evidence was available before the Board issued its decision in July 2017. But the text of the regulation instead asks whether the evidence was available or could have been discovered “at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Bushati v. Holder, 458 F. App’x 457, 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2012) (reviewing whether newly presented evidence was available in 2006, the year the immigration judge denied relief, even though the BIA opinion was issued in 2008). Focusing on availability at the time of the hearing makes sense, as the BIA normally does not accept and consider new evidence on appeal.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subsection (c)(3) provides specified exceptions that do not include new I-130 evidence, and subsection (g)(3) does not prohibit consideration of a late-filed brief.

Gyamfi v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(i)-(iv), (g)(3)

As the government correctly points out, considering a late-filed brief is not proscribed, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3), and regardless, the BIA is duty-bound to use its independent judgment when facing these motions, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). ... Though Gyamfi tells us she can present new evidence, clearly the new evidence she offers, an I-130 visa, is not a statutory exception to the rule. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(iv). And absent an exception operating to prevent the ninety-day rule from applying (Gyamfi doesn't actually argue that one does), motions to reopen are subject to the ninety-day rule and Gyamfi missed it.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subsection (c)(3) lists exceptions to that deadline, and subsection (c)(1) does not create an exception.

Nava v. Barr · filed 2020-04-13(c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than 14 years after their final administrative decision, and petitioners did not show they qualify for any exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the date of the final administrative decision); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (listing exceptions to the filing deadline). Contrary to petitioners’ contention, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) does not list an exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the exceptions in § 1003.2(c)(3), including the exception addressed in (c)(3)(ii).

Abdelsalam v. Garland · filed 2021-07-15(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reopen “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Abdelsalam’s motion to reopen was untimely, and he concedes that “there was no change in the facts,” that would excuse his untimely filing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions, including for materially changed country conditions.

Sukul v. Garland · filed 2022-01-12(c)(2), (c)(3)

Motions to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within ninety days of the final administrative order of removal, unless equitable tolling or an exception applies. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3); see Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2011). Motions can be filed outside the ninety-day limit when there are changed country conditions, if the evidence is material and newly available. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Sukul’s final order of removal was entered on August 12, 2011, so any motion to reopen was due by November 10, 2011, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Sukul filed this motion to reopen and a motion to stay his removal on June 29, 2015, nearly four years after the BIA’s final order of removal, and way beyond the ninety-day deadline. He did not show that conditions in Fiji have materially changed since his removal hearing and so his motion is untimely. ... The BIA correctly denied the motion because it was both time-barred and number-barred, as only one such motion to reopen is allowed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Sukul does not argue there was any deception, fraud, or error, and we see none, and therefore no reason to allow equitable tolling. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a determination of changed country conditions to compare current conditions with those existing at the time of the prior merits hearing.

Barillas v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-04-11(c)(3)(ii)

A determination of whether country conditions have changed necessarily involves a comparison between current conditions and those existing at the time of the merits hearing before the Immigration Judge.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the BIA to deny a motion to reopen or remand when the movant lacks a prima facie claim, lacks previously unavailable material evidence, or would not receive discretionary relief even if the motion were granted.

Tilija v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-07-12(c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion to remand asylum proceedings if it determines that (1) the movant has not established a prima facie case for the relief sought, (2) the movant has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence, or (3) in the case of discretionary relief, such as asylum, the movant would not be entitled to relief even if the motion was granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the Board to deny a motion to reopen when the alien lacks a prima facie case, lacks previously unavailable material evidence, or would not be entitled to discretionary relief even if reopening were granted.

Xu v. DHS/ICE Office of Chief Counsel · filed 2024-05-15(c)(1)

The Board may deny a motion to reopen if it “determines that: (1) the alien has not established a prima facie case for the relief sought; (2) the alien has not introduced previously unavailable, material evidence; or (3) in the case of discretionary relief (such as asylum), the alien would not be entitled to relief even if the motion was granted.” Caushi v. Att’y Gen., 436 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

The BIA may deny reopening for lack of prima facie eligibility, but it must explain the denial and consider the arguments and evidence presented.

Anatoly Guts v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-03

Want of prima facie eligibility for relief is a legitimate basis for denial, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, but the BIA must provide analysis beyond “[c]ursory, summary, or conclusory statements.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen or remand to submit a new application for relief even when the immigration judge has not held a merits hearing on that claim.

Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland · filed 2023-12-28(c)(1)

Although the regulation references a “former hearing,” a noncitizen may move to reopen or to remand for the purpose of submitting an application for relief even if the IJ did not previously hold a merits hearing on that claim.

Subsection (g)(3) permits the BIA, in its discretion, to consider a brief filed out of time.

Sanchez-Miranda v. Barr · filed 2019-07-22(g)(3)

The BIA considers a motion to reopen unopposed if no timely response is made, but the Board “may, in its discretion, consider a brief filed out of time.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3). Sanchez points to no authority for the proposition that the BIA’s discretion to consider a late-filed brief is dependent on the Board’s expressly stating it is exercising that authority.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) supports denying reopening when evidence for new protection applications could have been presented in the prior proceedings.

Gomez-Beltran v. Barr · filed 2020-02-05(c)(1)

The BIA also reasonably concluded that the evidence in support of the applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection could have been presented at his prior proceedings before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.

Lapop-Herrera v. Barr · filed 2020-01-14(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration “must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.” Ma, 361 F.3d at 558; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

A motion to reconsider must identify a factual or legal error in the prior decision.

Linares v. Barr · filed 2020-02-10(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sanchez Linares’s motion to reconsider because his motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying Sanchez Linares’s motion to reopen as untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (requiring identification of factual or legal error in the prior decision).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a factual or legal error in the prior decision.

Martinez v. Garland · filed 2022-04-18(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Blanco Martinez’s motion to reconsider where his motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision summarily dismissing his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (a motion to reconsider requires identification of factual or legal error in the prior decision).

Subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider a Board decision to identify an error of law or fact in that decision.

Echeverria v. Garland · filed 2023-01-13(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Echeverria’s motion to reconsider where he failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”)

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify a legal or factual error in the BIA's prior decision.

Baltazar v. Garland · filed 2023-06-09(b)(1)

See Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (same).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to identify a legal or factual error in the prior Board decision.

Campos v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-14(b)(1)

The BIA correctly determined that Diaz Campos failed to identify any legal or factual error in the BIA’s decision denying his motion to reopen sua sponte, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Subsection (a) does not give the BIA jurisdiction to adjudicate a U visa petition.

Castillo v. Barr · filed 2020-04-15(a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand or administratively close, where neither the BIA nor the IJ has jurisdiction over a U visa petition. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Lee v. Holder, 599 F.3d 973, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2010).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to remand based on previously unavailable new relief, and the BIA abuses its discretion by ignoring prima facie evidence supporting that relief.

Paris-Mendez v. Barr · filed 2020-05-20(c)(1)

After the IJ rendered his decision, the petitioner married a then-lawful permanent resident of the United States and moved the BIA to remand his case on the ground that he was entitled to new relief previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), (4). ... In denying the motion for remand, the BIA abused its discretion in holding that the respondent “has not shown that the visa petition has actually been filed and is pending,” while ignoring the submitted copy of the visa application packet, which contained prima facie evidence supporting the availability of the relief sought. ... In addition, the BIA abused its discretion in holding that the petitioner had not demonstrated that his wife was eligible for naturalization, when he submitted evidence that his wife had a pending application for naturalization in front of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires previously unavailable, material evidence for a motion to remand.

Solorio v. Barr · filed 2020-09-25(c)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not err by denying Petitioner’s motion to remand because the record establishes that Petitioner did not present previously unavailable, material evidence, as the applicable regulation requires. See Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to remand based on evidence that was available at the merits hearing.

Gonzalez v. Garland · filed 2023-09-13(c)(1)

Thus, the BIA appropriately considered the request for notice as a motion to remand, see In re L-A-C-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 516, 526 (B.I.A. 2015), and reasonably denied remand because the report was available at the time of the merits hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 permits the BIA to apply the untimely-motion-to-reopen standard and does not require further proceedings before the immigration judge when the BIA denies reopening.

Prasad v. Barr · filed 2020-06-08(c)(3)(ii), (i)

Additionally, the BIA applied the proper legal standard to Petitioners’ motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (criteria for an untimely motion to reopen). ... On remand from this court, the BIA did not grant the motion to reopen and, thus, further proceedings were not necessary. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(i).

Section 1003.2(g)(3) does not require the Board to grant a motion to reopen merely because the opposing party did not file an opposition.

Gutierrez-Moreno v. Barr · filed 2020-11-04(g)(3)

The Board’s regulations do not require it to grant an unopposed motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(3).

Section 1003.2(g)(3) deems a motion unopposed unless a timely response is made, but it does not require the Board to use the word “unopposed” in its decision or grant the motion merely because it is unopposed.

Bastegian v. Garland · filed 2023-10-11(g)(3)

Sections 1003.2(g)(3) and 1003.23(b)(1)(iv) both provide that “[a] motion shall be deemed unopposed unless” a “timely response is made.” However, Petitioner cites no case law to support his argument that these regulations are to be read so strictly that the word “unopposed” must appear in the Board’s decision to avoid reversible error. ... While the Board did not use the term “unopposed,” it clearly took notice of the fact that DHS did not oppose Petitioner’s motion, as the BIA stated in the first paragraph of its decision that DHS “has not responded to the appeal.” Further, even if the BIA erred in this regard, it had no obligation to grant Petitioner’s motion just because it was unopposed.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances for withholding of deportation, which includes withholding or deferral of removal under the CAT, so the motion is exempt from the usual time and number limits.

Shabo v. Barr · filed 2020-11-16(c)(3)(ii)

That section, however, permits motions based on changed circumstances “for asylum or withholding of deportation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (emphasis added). ... There is no reason to think the availability of “withholding of deportation” under § 1003.2 excludes motions brought under the CAT.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides regulatory exceptions to the time and number limits for motions to reopen, and Dong’s motion did not qualify for one.

Dong v. Bondi · filed 2025-07-10(c)(3)

And her motion did not fall into a statutory or regulatory exception to the time and number limitations.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides no exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits solely because an invalid underlying conviction allegedly caused a gross miscarriage of justice.

Perez-Camacho v. Garland · filed 2022-08-01(c)(3)

The regulations provide seven exceptions to this number and time bar. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). There is no exception for claims that an alien’s removal order was based on an invalid conviction, and thus constitutes a gross miscarriage of justice.

Section 1003.2 sets time limits for motions to reconsider and reopen and limits a party to one motion to reopen.

Neta v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-02-28(b)(2), (c)(2)

We have reviewed the administrative record and the Board’s order and conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely and barred because the petitioner was limited to filing one motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and numerical limits for motions to reopen.

Wang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-26(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding Wang failed to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical limits for filing motions to reopen.