8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

The BIA must identify its authority to remand for previously available evidence and, if relying on its sua sponte authority, explain the exceptional circumstances warranting its use.

Richards v. Sessions · filed 2017-10-16(a)

In Richards’ case, the BIA erred by failing to identify its authority to remand for consideration of previously available evidence. ... Moreover, if the BIA did intend to rely on its sua sponte authority, it did not either identify the exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of such authority or explain why those circumstances were, in light of BIA precedent, deemed exceptional. Accordingly, we remand for the BIA either to explain its authority to remand under the circumstances, or to terminate removal proceedings against Richards.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time; a motion invoking that authority creates no statutory right, and its denial is not judicially reviewable.

Alam v. Nielsen · filed 2018-05-09(a)

Regulations give Immigration Judges and the Board the authority to reopen or reconsider any case at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (Immigration Judges); id. § 1003.2(a) (Board). ... Consequently, amici's reasoning does not hold up when applied to regulatory motions to reopen. Though much is at stake, a statutory right is not. Moreover, a circuit court could not review a denial of the motion, so it is not the case that a gap exists between the Board's power and the circuit court's power to stay removal.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen any case sua sponte at any time.

Pereira v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-12-07(a)

Moreover, reading the statutory filing deadline as jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term would directly conflict with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which grants the BIA discretion to reopen any case at any time sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA unfettered discretion to deny a request to reopen proceedings sua sponte.

Carmona v. Ashcroft · filed 2004-12-13(a)

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA “unfettered discretion” to deny petitioner’s request to reopen her case sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to deny a motion to reopen sua sponte even if the motion states a prima facie case for relief; denial of that discretionary relief is unreviewable.

Zhang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-11-22(a)

Thus, the BIA and the IJ could deny the motion even if the Zhang motion to reopen stated a prima facie case for relief, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a); 1003.23(b)(3); see Luis, 196 F.3d at 41 (“There are no guidelines or standards which dictate how and when the BIA should invoke its sua sponte power under [section 1003.2(a)].”).

The Board's decision whether to reopen proceedings sua sponte is discretionary and unreviewable, but a court may remand if the Board may have declined to reopen because it misunderstood the law.

Mahmood v. Holder · filed 2009-04-01(a)

But we are without jurisdiction to review the BIA's failure to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... And where the BIA may have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail, remand to the BIA for reconsideration in view of the correct law is appropriate.

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Vargas v. Mukasey · filed 2009-05-20(a)

“The [BIA] has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... As such, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Vargas’s motion.

Section 1003.2(a) leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA's discretion and does not require reopening even in exceptional situations.

Charles v. Garland · filed 2024-08-15(a)

The Board has discretion to decide whether to grant or deny sua sponte reopening. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). No statute or regulation has provided any standard for the Board to apply in exercising its sua sponte powers.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings on its own motion; courts lack jurisdiction to review its refusal to do so.

Martinez-Rivera v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-02-03(a)

To the extent Martinez-Rivera argues his § 212(c) claim entitled him to reopening under the BIA’s sua sponte authority, we lack jurisdiction to review that argument.

Section 1003.2(a) leaves the BIA discretion to deny sua sponte reopening even when a fundamental change in law makes a noncitizen prima facie eligible for relief.

Artur v. Garland · filed 2024-04-25(a)

And in any event, the BIA retains discretion to deny reopening sua sponte even where it concludes that a change in the law is fundamental or that, as a result of such a change in the law, a noncitizen is prima facie eligible for relief.

Section 1003.2(a) does not require the BIA to grant sua sponte reopening whenever a conviction underlying removal is vacated.

Phimmady v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-10(a)

Phimmady has not demonstrated the settled course of adjudication he relies on: that the BIA grants sua sponte reopening ... whenever a conviction rendering a noncitizen removable is vacated.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to demonstrate that the earlier Board decision contained a material error of fact or law.

Arrobo v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-01-27(b)(1)

Motions to reconsider must demonstrate that the earlier Board decision suffered from a material error of fact or law. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) permits the BIA, when reviewing a motion to reconsider, to examine the underlying decision for an error of law or fact that affected the outcome.

Jaimes-Aguirre v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2010-03-12(b)(1)

The BIA properly continued its de novo review, and bound by the standard governing review of motions to reconsider, the BIA properly reviewed the underlying decision -- the denial of the motion to reopen -- to determine if an error of law or fact affected the outcome of the motion to reopen which would justify granting the motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) treats the proceedings before the immigration judge as the “previous hearing” for purposes of the exception to the motion-to-reopen time and number limits.

Li v. Attorney General · filed 2010-04-12(c)(3)(ii)

The term “previous hearing” in § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) refers to the proceedings before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars the BIA from granting a motion to reopen based on new evidence unless the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2012-08-09(c)(1)

The BIA may not grant a motion to reopen based on new evidence unless the evidence “offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to proffer new facts supported by affidavits or other evidence, and permits reopening only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Cakmakci v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-04-15(c)(1)

In a motion to reopen removal proceedings, the alien must proffer “new facts to be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted,” and the motion “shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A motion to reopen proceedings “shall not be granted” unless it appears to the Board that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id.

A motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2011-11-09(c)(1)

The BIA’s exercise of its discretion was proper in any case, because Yang also failed to submit a new asylum application with her motion to reopen, as required to do under the regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) requires a motion to reconsider to be filed within 30 days, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Patel v. Eric Holder, J · filed 2010-05-27(b)(2), (c)(1)

As Patel’s motion to reconsider was filed more than 30 days after the BIA’s decision, see id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), and Patel did not urge the BIA to equitably toll the deadline or present any other argument why his motion to reconsider was timely, we conclude it was properly dismissed. ... “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Patel cited no new facts and attached no new evidence to his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include sufficient evidentiary material showing prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Elisea v. Holder · filed 2010-06-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion because it was not supported by sufficient evidentiary material to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Urbina v. Holder · filed 2010-06-11(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bahena Urbina’s motion to remand because she failed to set forth any new facts or present any new evidence to warrant a remand. See Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The formal requirements of a motion to remand and a motion to reopen are the same.”); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proven, include affidavits or other evidentiary material, and may be granted only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Budiono v. Holder · filed 2010-08-20(c)(1)

The motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). It “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... We conclude the Board did not abuse its discretion. Budiono’s evidence did not show a material change in country conditions, but only a continuation of some of the same conduct that he claimed supported a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding Budiono’s evidence was cumulative.

A motion to reopen must state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Chand v. Holder · filed 2010-11-01(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chand’s motion to reopen because the BIA considered the evidence submitted, determined Chand failed to set forth any new facts or present any new evidence warranting reopening, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”), and acted within its broad discretion in determining the evidence was insufficient to warrant reopening, see Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to rely on new facts and establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.

Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-11-23(c)

A motion to reopen should be based on new facts and must establish a prima facie case of eligibility for the underlying relief sought in order to be granted.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and supporting evidence and bars reopening unless the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not previously have been presented.

Shan en Zhang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-15(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.... A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen or remand requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sinani v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-20(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that [(1)] evidence sought to be offered is material and [(2)] was not available and [(3)] could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, the Board must find that the evidence satisfies all three requirements before it may remand an asylum seeker’s case to the IJ. Id. ... her concession demonstrates that she did not fulfill the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), so the Board properly denied her motion to remand.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Salcedo-Guitierrez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-05-10(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Salcedo-Gutierrez’s motion to reopen because she failed to set forth any new facts or present new evidence to challenge the agency’s previous finding regarding her lack of good moral character. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) (stating that an alien who has served over 180 days in prison may not establish good moral character).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted and to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Angov v. Holder · filed 2013-12-04(c)(1)

The applicable regulation provides that a motion to reopen shall state “the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted” and be supported by affidavits or other “evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances to state new, material facts supported by affidavits or other evidence, and those facts must have been unavailable and undiscoverable at the prior hearing.

Lopez-Amador v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-15(c)(1)

To reopen a claim based on changed circumstances, the petitioner must "state . . . new facts . . . supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material," and the facts must be material to the claim for relief and unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts to be proved at a hearing and to include supporting evidentiary material.

Abdul-Majeed v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-10-10(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must state new facts to be proved at a hearing and must be supported by “evidentiary material.” 8 CFR § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and permits the BIA to discount unauthenticated documents.

Ding Hui Wang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-10-17(c)

In order to prevail on a motion to reopen, a petitioner must make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief. See Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). The motion must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, but the board is entitled to discount unauthenticated documents. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1353 (11th Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, state new facts, be supported by affidavits or other evidence, and rely on material evidence unavailable at the previous hearing.

Lin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-10-28(c)(1)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen, which must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The motion must state new facts that will be proven at a hearing if granted and must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Such evidence must be material and must not have been available at the previous hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2012-04-04(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); see also 8. U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2 allows the BIA to make factual findings when deciding a motion to reopen filed with it and requires the movant to present evidence that was previously unavailable.

Agbomah v. Holder · filed 2012-05-15(a), (c)(1)

However, because he filed his motion to reopen with the BIA and not the immigration judge (“IJ”), the BIA had the power to make findings of fact in order to determine whether Agbomah presented previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c); cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). ... Furthermore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion on the basis that the evidence he sought to offer was not previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2011); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-06-25(c)(1)

An alien’s motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240B(c)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioners’ motion to reopen. With respect to Petitioners’ coercive family planning claim, much of their evidence pre-dated the December 2009 removal hearing, and Petitioners have not explained why they could not have presented this material at the removal hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-07-24(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the hearing as the date before which the evidence must have been unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen applicant to show prima facie eligibility for relief and submit evidence that is material and was not previously available.

Wu v. Holder · filed 2013-08-21(a)

Wu was required to demonstrate to the BIA her prima facie eligibility for relief and that the evidence she submitted was material and not previously available. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(1); see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Reyes-Cornejo v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-28(c)(1)

Motions to reopen are governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, which provides in relevant part that “[a] motion to reopen proceed-ings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[] … .”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, and unsworn statements are not affidavits that the BIA must credit.

Hovhannisyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen requires a showing that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Under the governing regulations, the BIA was not required to give the unsworn statements any weight at all, because they were not affidavits. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 (1981) (holding that where allegations are “unsupported by affidavit” they cannot support a motion to reopen because this would constitute a circumvention of the affidavit requirement in the regulations).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Talipov v. Holder · filed 2014-11-19(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005). Failure to offer such evidence is, therefore, a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Mazariegos v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-06-24(c)(1)

On the contrary, the burden of providing evidence to support both a motion to reopen and a CAT claim lies squarely on the applicant. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) ("A motion to reopen proceedings . . . shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material."); id. § 1208.16(c)(2) ("The burden of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal under this paragraph to establish that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.").

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in support of a motion to reopen to be material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Di Xie v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-14(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2015). Failure to offer such evidence is therefore a proper ground on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen, as is the movant’s failure to establish “a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the offered evidence was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; previously available evidence without a reasonable explanation does not satisfy that requirement.

Kour v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-22(c)(1)

The BIA grants motions to reopen only if “evidence sought to be offered . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Kour did not explain to the BIA why he could not have presented his old passport during the previous proceedings, given that Kour’s new passport indicated that his prior passport had been returned and cancelled. ... Consequently, the BIA’s determination that Kour failed to meet the requirements of a motion to reopen was not arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. Additional evidence of Kour’s identity was previously available, and he did not provide the BIA with a reasonable explanation as to why this evidence was not provided as part of his original removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidentiary material.

Singh v. Whitaker · filed 2018-11-28(c)(1)

Finally, Singh did not submit an updated application statement or letters from his family members to clarify what portions of the statements were incorrect. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring motions to reopen to be supported by evidentiary material).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to show that the offered evidence is material, was previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the original hearing.

Based v. Barr · filed 2020-06-17(c)(1)

To obtain reopening, Based must establish that the evidence he offered was material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented at his original hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts an asylum-related motion to reopen based on qualifying changed country conditions from the usual time limit, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires the motion to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing.

Antipov v. Barr · filed 2020-08-19(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

However, the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions in the country of nationality . . . , if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Antipov argues that his case should be remanded to the IJ for a hearing on his personal economic circumstances, but he was required to provide such information in his motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.”); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 157–58 (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce evidence can itself constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the agency’s challenged decision.”); id. at 168 (explaining that movant carries a “heavy burden” on reopening (quoting Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on material facts that could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-02(c)(1)

The motion must be based on facts that are “material” and “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on new, previously unavailable evidence that establishes a prima facie case for the relief sought.

Feng v. Garland · filed 2021-04-09(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be based on new, previously unavailable evidence, and that evidence must make a prima facie case for the relief sought. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Chavez-Chilel v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-12-09(c)(1)

Accordingly, to seek voluntary departure, Chavez-Chilel must file a motion to reopen with the BIA, not a motion to remand in this Court. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include supporting affidavits or other evidentiary material; the new evidence must be material and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Qiu v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2023-02-01(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. INA § 240(c)(7)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The new evidence must be material, and the noncitizen must demonstrate that the evidence could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include affidavits or other evidentiary material; an application for relief must include the application and all supporting documentation.

Regalado v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-09(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jaramillo Regalado’s motion due to his failure to comply with procedural requirements for bringing a motion to reopen. Jaramillo Regalado’s motion to reopen was required to “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion [was] granted and [] be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... As for Jaramillo Regalado’s motion to apply for cancellation of removal, it “must [have been] accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).1 Jaramillo Regalado did neither.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(v) requires a material change in fact or law that vitiates all applicable grounds of removability; mere eligibility for adjustment of status does not satisfy that requirement.

Guo Ping Wu v. Garland · filed 2023-08-07(c)(3)(v)

We note as well that Wu has failed to show that he satisfies § 1003.2(c)(3)(v)’s prerequisites because he does not show “[a] material change in fact or law . . . that vitiates all grounds of removability applicable to [him].” The 1996 deportation order found Wu deportable under I.N.A. § 241(a)(1)(B), which is now § 237(a)(1)(B), and although the new I-140 petition appears to make Wu eligible for relief under I.N.A. § 245(i), that mere eligibility does not vitiate the prior finding of deportability. Nor has he adequately addressed § 1003.2(c)(3)(v)’s other prerequisites.

Section 1003.2 sets a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to an exception for asylum motions based on material changed country conditions and possible equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-05-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that the July 2019 motion was untimely filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal in June 2018. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (providing 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). We find no error in the BIA’s conclusion that Singh did not satisfy an exception to the deadline. The deadline does not apply if the noncitizen moves to reopen to apply for asylum based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality” if those conditions are material to the alien’s asylum claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). And the time to file may be equitably tolled based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2 limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, exempts motions based on qualifying changed country conditions, and requires a motion seeking relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documentation.

Shun Guan Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-04-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien may only file one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the time and number limitations do not apply to a motion to reopen that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In any event, as the BIA also found, Chen did not submit an application for adjustment of status with his motion, as he was required to do. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the applications for relief sought and supporting documents.

Ortiz-Puentes v. Holder · filed 2011-12-01(c)(1)

“The respondents have not included applications for the relief sought, with supporting documents, as required by the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).” This reasoning is consistent with the applicable statutes and regulations and with the BIA’s decision in Lozada.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits an alien to file only one motion to reopen and requires filing it no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Cai Hua Ye v. Holder · filed 2014-08-07(c)(2)

The BIA’s denial of Ye’s motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). An alien may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision has been rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Ye’s 2013 motion was untimely, as the final administrative decision was issued in 2004.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by time and number, subject to the regulatory exception for materially changed country conditions.

Amanuel v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-08-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Amanuel’s second untimely motion to reopen where Amanuel failed to present evidence of materially changed country conditions in Eritrea to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (in order for evidence to be material, it must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen based on changed-country-conditions asylum relief to include the required application and supporting evidence, and provides no time-limit exception for reopening to seek cancellation of removal.

Queiroz v. Barr · filed 2020-04-23(c)(1), (c)(3)(i)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen to the extent that De Souza sought to apply for asylum based on changed country conditions because he did not file the required application for relief and evidence demonstrating changed country conditions. Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Although De Souza also sought reopening to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), there are no exceptions to the time limitation for cancellation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(i)–(iv), 1003.23(b)(4)(i)–(iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides exceptions to the regulatory time and number bars on motions to reopen, but does not provide an exception solely for a claim that the removal order rests on an invalid conviction constituting a gross miscarriage of justice.

PEREZ-CAMACHO V. MERRICK GARLAND · filed 2022-12-02(c)(3)

The regulations provide several exceptions to this number and time bar. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (2020). There is no exception for claims that an alien’s removal order was based on an invalid conviction, and thus constitutes a gross miscarriage of justice.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening when the asserted new claim could have been presented at the original hearing.

Zeng v. Holder · filed 2010-08-31(c)(1)

Insofar as the petitioner in Wei Dong Zeng v. Holder, 08-0406-ag, argues that the new evidence he submitted in support of his motion demonstrated his eligibility for relief based on his claim that family planning officials attempted to forcibly sterilize him in 1990, we find that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that he could have presented that claim in his original asylum application and at his October 1996 hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, and the movant must show that it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Xiao v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-05-20(c)(1)

Turning to the denial of Xiao’s motion to reopen proceedings, such a motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In her motion before the BIA, Xiao offered no proof that her evidence was previously unavailable. Because Xiao failed to prove that the material she submitted to the BIA could not have been previously discovered, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion on that basis.

(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable at the former hearing.

Suryanto v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-01-06(c)(1)

The BIA denied Suryanto’s motion to reopen because he failed to “comply with the evidentiary requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) as to the conclusory claim of changed country conditions.” A.R. 3. This regulation holds that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Suryanto’s evidence did not comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) because it did not meet the requisite standard of materiality. Suryanto has failed to demonstrate otherwise.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable time limit, so a motion filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order is untimely.

Tuchez-Ordonez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-10(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying, as untimely, petitioner’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed almost ten years after the final order of removal.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-06-08(c)(2)

Here, the BIA properly denied Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed it almost ten years after his June 1995 final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed nearly seven years after the BIA's order.

Lopez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed the motion to reopen nearly seven years after the BIA’s March 26, 2002, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lopez failed to establish that she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (equitable tolling available where, despite due diligence, petitioner is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of a claim because of circumstances beyond petitioner’s control).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a timeliness limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed nearly five years after the final order of removal is untimely.

Parhar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Parhar’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed nearly five years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Parhar failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit for motions to reopen, which Danielyan failed to meet by filing more than three years after the BIA’s removal order.

Danielyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-14(c)(2)

Danielyan filed the motion over three years after the BIA’s March 28, 2006, order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he did not demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1095-96.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than two years after the Board of Immigration Appeals' final decision.

Lumentut v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-31(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lumentut’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Lumentut failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-89 (evidence of changed circumstances must be qualitatively different from what could have been presented at prior hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the final order as untimely when no exception is shown.

Oshilaja v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-08-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Oshilaja’s motion to reopen as untimely where Oshilaja filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to show materially changed country conditions in Nigeria that would excuse the late filing, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to “have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision as untimely.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s untimely second motion to reopen where Singh filed the motion over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets the filing deadline for a motion to reopen, which the court applied to a motion filed more than eight years after the final removal order.

Sarabjeet v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-17(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Sarabjeet’s motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel because he filed his motion to reopen more than eight years after issuance of his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, so a motion filed more than four years after the BIA's final decision is untimely.

Langie v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-02-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Langie’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Langie failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final removal order.

Lopez v. Sessions · filed 2019-01-18(c)(2)

Generally, a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA issued its final order of removal on April 12, 2017, and Ms. Lopez filed her motion to reopen 90 days later, on July 11, 2017. Consequently, the motion to reopen was timely, and the agency’s decision must be sustained, if at all, on some alternative ground proffered by the BIA.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports treating a motion to reopen filed more than 11 years after the BIA's order as untimely.

Garcia v. Barr · filed 2020-02-06(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Peralta Garcia’s motion to reopen as untimely where her motion was filed more than 11 years after the BIA’s December 28, 2005, order dismissing her appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Peralta Garcia failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s timeliness limit supports denying a motion to reopen filed more than three years after the removal order became final.

Bustamante v. Garland · filed 2021-09-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Varela Bustamante’s motion to reopen where it was filed more than three years after the order of removal became final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Perez-Rodriguez v. Bondi · filed 2025-03-26(c)(2)

Said motion must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision at issue. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a second motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order untimely and number-barred, while subsection (a)’s sua sponte reopening decisions are not reviewable by the court.

Roman-Anguiano v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-15(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Roman-Anguiano’s second motion to reopen, which was filed over 90 days after the BIA’s final order, as untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent that Roman-Anguiano challenges the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to review such a challenge. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 2002). If we had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision, we would find no abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen within 90 days and generally bars more than one motion, while subsection (a)’s sua sponte reopening discretion is unreviewable absent a general BIA policy governing its exercise.

Green v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-05-25(c)(2), (a)

A motion to reopen must be filed no later than ninety days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened. ... In addition, petitioners are typically barred from filing more than one motion to reopen. ... Finally, the BIA refused to sua sponte reopen the proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to consider a challenge to this decision unless the BIA “announces and follows— by rule or by settled course of adjudication — a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed.” ... Since those circumstances do not apply here, we lack jurisdiction to review this decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits an alien to one motion to reopen, while § 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reconsider a case on its own motion; a second motion therefore depends on that sua sponte authority, whose exercise is not reviewable.

Akinmulero v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-15(c)(2) and (a)

Akinmulero next argues his second motion to reopen was not number barred. With an exception inapplicable here, an alien is allowed to file only one motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Thus, an alien seeking to file a second motion to reopen must rely on the BIA’s authority to “reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphasis added). Akinmulero’s argument is, in essence, an effort to secure reversal of the BIA’s decision declining to reopen his case sua sponte. Because the decision to reopen sua sponte is committed to the sole discretion of the BIA, we have no jurisdiction to review it.

Subsection (c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, while subsection (a) leaves sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion, including when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Zou v. Holder · filed 2011-11-14(a), (c)(2)

As relevant here, a motion to reopen must be filed no later than 90 days after the proceeding has been closed. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). Zou’s original immigration proceeding concluded when the BIA dismissed his appeal on March 25, 2002. Zou did not move to reopen that proceeding until April 23, 2010, more than eight years later. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zou’s motion. ... Zou also argues that the BIA erred in not reopening his immigration proceeding under the BIA’s sua sponte authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (providing that the BIA “may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). This Court generally lacks jurisdiction to review a BIA decision declining to sua sponte reopen a removal or deportation proceeding. ... Such a decision is placed “‘[solely] within the discretion of the’” BIA. ... The BIA may decline to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen a proceeding “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits a petitioner to one motion to reopen within 90 days, while § 1003.2(a) permits but does not require the Board to reopen a case sua sponte at any time; the merits of that discretionary refusal are unreviewable.

Fuller v. Whitaker · filed 2019-01-23(c)(2), (a)

With exceptions not applicable here, a petitioner is limited to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days of the Board’s final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) & (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Fuller sought reopening long after the 90-day time limit had expired and, consequently, his only recourse was to ask the Board to exercise its authority to reopen the removal proceeding sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any time reopen on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”), a power the Board has said it will reserve for “exceptional situations,” ... Because the governing regulation permits but does not require the Board to exercise this power and there is no law defining what situations will qualify as “exceptional,” there is no meaningful standard by which to evaluate the exercise of the Board’s discretion, and consequently the merits of the Board’s decision to deny a motion to reopen sua sponte are unreviewable.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not exempt an untimely, number-barred motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status, while § 1003.2(a)'s sua sponte reopening authority is discretionary and generally beyond judicial review.

Mbagoyisahaha v. Garland · filed 2021-12-21(c)(3), (a)

All agree that Mbagoyisahaha’s 2019 motion to reopen – his third such motion, filed more than 15 years after his 2004 removal order – was untimely and number barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). Mbagoyisahaha requested reopening to pursue adjustment of status, which does not implicate any exceptions to the time and number limitations. Id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)–(iv) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); see Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be denied”). Thus, Mbagoyisahaha’s motion necessarily relied on the BIA’s authority to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. See Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). With one exception, however, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to reopen sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing to justify reopening, while subsection (a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte reopening authority that is generally not judicially reviewable except for constitutional or legal error.

Alvarez v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-12(c)(3)(ii), (a)

And we still do not find that Petitioner has presented “material” evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing” to justify reopening his deportation proceedings. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it refused to sua sponte reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This authority is discretionary and not subject to judicial review, Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1236–37 (9th Cir. 2022), except for constitutional or legal error, see, e.g., Cui v. Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2021).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening based on matters that could have been raised earlier before the BIA, and the BIA’s refusal to reopen sua sponte under § 1003.2(a) is not reviewable.

Nwosuocha v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-07-26(c)(1), (a)

Nwosuocha’s post-appeal motion to reopen to urge a claim of fundamental unfairness caused by procedural defects was properly rejected by the BIA because the motion addressed matters that occurred before the case went to the BIA, i.e., matters that could have been – but were not – raised before the BIA earlier. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Manzano-Garcia v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 2005). Additionally, we are without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

The changed-circumstances exception permits reopening despite the time and number limits when the record shows changed circumstances in the country warranting reopening.

Garcia v. Holder · filed 2010-06-03(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ second motion to reopen as time and number barred where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s December 2, 2004, final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the record failed to show there were changed circumstances in Mexico warranting reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen based on changed circumstances to show that the requested relief rests on circumstances arising after the prior hearing.

Campos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-13(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasquez Campos’ motion to reopen to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture where he previously withdrew these applications before the immigration judge (“IJ”) and failed to demonstrate that he sought relief based on circumstances that arose subsequent to his September 2009 hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(b) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reconsider proceedings, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Martinez-Velasco v. Holder · filed 2010-06-07(b)

We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reconsider proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Santa Cruz v. Holder · filed 2010-06-10(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Subsection (a) commits sua sponte reopening decisions to the BIA’s unfettered discretion, so federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to exercise or decline that authority.

Neves v. Holder · filed 2010-07-21(a)

Kucana does not affect the subsidiary holding in our earlier opinion that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to exercise or decline to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings. Such decisions are "committed to [the BIA's] unfettered discretion" by law, Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and "the very nature of the claim renders it not subject to judicial review," Luis, 196 F.3d at 40; see also Caldero-Guzman v. Holder, 577 F.3d 345, 348 (1st Cir. 2009).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Zheng v. Holder · filed 2010-07-28(a)

Lastly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Zheng’s challenge to the BIA’s decision not to exercise its authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” See Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Canales v. Mukasey · filed 2010-10-01(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and courts lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary decision not to do so.

Reyes v. Holder · filed 2011-05-05(a)

We lack jurisdiction to consider the Board’s discretionary decisions not to sua sponte reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority is not reviewable.

Cano v. Holder · filed 2011-05-05(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision whether to invoke that authority.

Ramos v. Mukasey · filed 2011-05-10(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but its decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Paiz v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-22(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but its decision not to invoke that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Marin v. Holder · filed 2011-08-09(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen a case sua sponte, and the BIA’s refusal to exercise that authority is not judicially reviewable.

Chai v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2011-08-10(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen Chai’s case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because that decision was “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, but provides no standard governing that discretion, so courts generally lack jurisdiction to review a denial of sua sponte reopening.

Patel v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-08-24(a)

The BIA may, at any time, exercise its discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Sua sponte reopening is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999). Because the regulation governing sua sponte reopening “offers no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion,” we generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte. See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Romero-Romero v. Holder · filed 2012-01-19(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision whether to exercise its sua sponte authority under § 1003.2(a). See, e.g., Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.2011); Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159-60 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, but provides no meaningful standard for judicial review of that discretion.

Ndreca v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2012-02-23(a)

This is because the source of that authority, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides no meaningful standard against which to evaluate the BIA’s exercise of its own discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte authority to reopen a case without regard to ordinary timeliness limits, and courts generally lack jurisdiction to review its refusal to do so.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2012-04-05(a)

Singh argues that the BIA should have exercised its sua sponte authority, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), to grant his motion without regard to its timeliness. However, such a decision is “entirely discretionary,” and we lack jurisdiction to consider it.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, but the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision whether to exercise that authority.

Coronel-Ortiz v. Holder · filed 2012-04-18(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision whether to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen under § 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) makes the BIA's sua sponte reopening authority entirely discretionary, so courts lack jurisdiction to review a decision declining to exercise that authority.

Tian He Chen v. Holder · filed 2012-08-23(a)

Finally, to the extent that Chen challenges the agency’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte reopening authority, we are without jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because such a decision is “entirely discretionary”).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and that discretionary decision lacks standards for judicial review.

Lopez v. Holder · filed 2012-08-23(a)

And “we do not have jurisdiction to consider [whether] the BIA should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise that authority.

Sanchez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-17(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but its decision not to exercise that authority is not reviewable by the court of appeals.

Vargas-Placarte v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-18(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and its refusal to exercise that discretion is not reviewable by the court.

Garcia-Rivera v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-05-16(a)

In this circuit, such an argument is construed as a challenge to the BIA’s refusal to exercise its discretion to sua sponte reopen the proceeding under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review this purely discretionary decision. Id.

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte discretionary and generally unreviewable, except when based on a misperception of law.

Leslie v. Holder · filed 2013-08-30(a)

In general, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” ... While we retain jurisdiction when the BIA declines to exercise its sua sponte authority based on a misperception of the law, see Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469-71 (2d Cir. 2009), in the present case, the BIA stated that it declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because Leslie did not demonstrate an exceptional situation warranting reopening. ... Because Leslie did not present any evidence supporting his claims of citizenship or eligibility for cancellation of removal, the BIA’s decision to decline to exercise its sua sponte authority was based on agency regulations and BIA precedent, and not a misperception of the law.

Subsection (a) gives the IJ and BIA unfettered discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and courts lack jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision.

Agrawal v. Attorney General United States · filed 2013-09-16(a)

We also lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s or Board’s unfettered discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006).

8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte as a discretionary matter, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to do so.

Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2013-12-09(a)

To the extent Zheng challenges the BIA’s refusal to sua sponte reopen her removal proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review this discretionary ruling under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Torres-Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-09-30(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA unfettered discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, and courts lack jurisdiction to review its decision not to do so.

Ortiz-Romero v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-10-10(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s unfettered § 1003.2(a) discretion not to reopen removal proceedings.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte without a meaningful standard for judicial review, so the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of such reopening.

Gonzalez-Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-03-11(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA unfettered discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and that discretionary decision is not subject to judicial review.

Silva v. Attorney General of the United States of America · filed 2015-04-08(a)

We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s unfettered discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) commits sua sponte reopening decisions to the BIA's discretion, which courts generally cannot review except on two narrow grounds.

Roman Moldavchuk v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-12-04(a)

Moldavchuk also argues that the BIA abused its discretion in declining to sua sponte reopen his proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, the BIA’s decision to decline sua sponte reopen proceedings is “committed to its unfettered discretion” and is virtually immune from judicial review. Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are only two grounds that allow us to review such a discretionary decision and neither applies here.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings or reconsider earlier decisions sua sponte at any time, but provides no meaningful standard for judicial review of that discretion.

Ramon Jesus Lantes Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-04-06(a)

We have held, however, that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority, because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, but provides no meaningful standard for reviewing its discretionary exercise.

Silva-Solis v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-08-02(a)

We have held, however, that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) commits the BIA’s decision whether to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte to its unfettered discretion, so that decision is not subject to judicial review.

Patel v. Barr · filed 2019-10-17(a)

This court has “held that ‘[t]he decision whether to invoke sua sponte authority [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)] is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA’ and therefore is not subject to judicial review.”

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations, but the exercise of that authority is committed to the BIA’s unfettered discretion and is not reviewable by the court.

Pereyra v. Barr · filed 2019-09-19(a)

The BIA may also reopen proceedings on its own authority in “exceptional situations.” ... We do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decisions based on its authority to grant motions to reopen sua sponte because “the exercise of this specific authority ‘is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA.’”

Subsection (a) gives the Board discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, and judicial review is limited at most to whether the Board misunderstood the basis for a sua sponte request.

Victor Villa Serrano v. Barr · filed 2019-11-12(a)

To the extent that Villa made, and the Board considered, an oxymoronic request for the Board to exercise its discretion to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), our jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed to reviewing, at the very most, whether the Board misunderstood the basis for the request.

Subsection (a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen a case sua sponte entirely discretionary and not subject to judicial review.

Chen v. Barr · filed 2019-12-23(a)

We dismiss the petition as to the only remaining basis for reopening because the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte is “entirely discretionary” and not subject to judicial review.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA and IJ to reopen or reconsider removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, but provides no meaningful standard for reviewing that discretion, so the denial is generally not judicially reviewable.

Sonia Maribel Vega Juarez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-03-05(a)

Both the BIA and the IJ have the authority to reopen removal proceedings or reconsider earlier decisions at any time pursuant to their sua sponte authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1292–93 (11th Cir. 2008). We have held, however, that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.

Section 1003.2 lets the Board reopen immigration proceedings on its own motion, but the Board's exercise of that discretion is generally unreviewable absent a colorable constitutional claim.

Vue v. Barr · filed 2020-03-27

The first is a regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, which gives the Board the discretion to reopen proceedings “on its own motion.” ... When it comes to how the Board exercises its power to reopen on “its own motion,” our review is exceedingly narrow. By law, the decision is “committed to agency discretion,” and without any “meaningful standard” to guide our review, all we can do is consider “colorable” constitutional claims.

Subsection (a) lets the Board reopen or reconsider a decided case on its own motion at any time, but makes that relief discretionary without a governing standard, so such decisions generally are not judicially reviewable.

Greene v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-12-28(a)

[t]he [board] may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This relief is entirely “within the discretion of the [b]oard.” Id. And “while the regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. [section] 1003.2(a), expressly gives the [board] discretion to sua sponte reopen [or reconsider] cases, it provides absolutely no standard to govern the [board]’s exercise of its discretion.” See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2008). With “absolutely no standard” to govern the board’s exercise of its discretion, we’ve held that we don’t have jurisdiction to review the board’s decision on a motion based on its sua sponte power under 8 C.F.R. section 1003.2(a). See id. (“[W]e hold that the [board]’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. [section] 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law” and “we lack jurisdiction to review” such decisions.).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA essentially unlimited discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, so a court of appeals generally lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial.

Gutierrez-Hernandez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-02-23(a)

Gutierrez-Hernandez also petitions for our review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, because the BIA’s discretion in this context is “essentially unlimited,” we do not have jurisdiction to review its denial order and thus dismiss the petition as to this issue. Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017).

Subsection (a) commits the BIA’s decision whether to reopen immigration proceedings sua sponte to its unfettered discretion, so that decision is not subject to judicial review.

Hermiz v. Garland · filed 2021-04-08(a)

In the case of denials of motions to reopen sua sponte, however, “‘[t]he decision whether to invoke sua sponte authority [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)] is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA’ and therefore is not subject to judicial review.”

Subsection (a) generally bars judicial review of the BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte, except for legal or constitutional error.

Solano v. Garland · filed 2021-05-13(a)

The BIA declined to reopen pursuant to its sua sponte authority. We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Singh v. Holder, 771 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, we review only for “legal or constitutional error.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 588 (9th Cir. 2016).

Section 1003.2(a) governs the BIA’s sua sponte reopening authority, and a purely discretionary denial under that provision is generally unreviewable when it rests on no legally erroneous premise.

Cho v. Garland · filed 2021-10-27(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review Cho’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), as the denial was purely discretionary and not based on a legally erroneous premise.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review its refusal to do so.

Diarrassouba v. Garland · filed 2022-07-07(a)

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA entirely discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is generally not subject to judicial review.

Khan v. Garland · filed 2022-07-07(a)

The agency’s decision whether to exercise its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is “entirely discretionary” and not subject to judicial review.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is committed to the BIA's unfettered discretion and is not subject to judicial review.

Niazi v. Garland · filed 2023-10-12(a)

The 90-day period is subject to narrow exceptions,1 including the BIA’s ability to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Under our precedent, the BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte authority “‘is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA’ and therefore is not subject to judicial review.” ... Therefore, we “lack jurisdiction to review a BIA decision declining to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen a removal order.”

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA's sua sponte reopening decision discretionary, so courts may review the denial only for legal or constitutional error.

Kong v. Garland · filed 2024-11-01(a)

In Bonilla, we held that the BIA’s decision to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is discretionary and reviewable only “for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decision for legal or constitutional error.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its denial is generally unreviewable.

Jiang v. Garland · filed 2024-12-13(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that “entirely discretionary” decision.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and courts generally lack jurisdiction to review that decision but may remand for a legal misperception.

Lin v. Bondi · filed 2025-03-04(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that decision, Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2022), except that we may remand if the BIA misperceived the law and denied sua sponte reopening based on an erroneous determination that a petitioner was not eligible for the relief sought, i.e., that relief on “reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). There was no such misperception in the BIA’s determination that becoming potentially eligible for cancellation of removal after being ordered removed was not an exceptional circumstance.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, a case in which it rendered a decision; its discretion to do so sua sponte is unfettered and generally not subject to judicial review.

Mendoza-Jovel v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-09(a)

The Board is authorized to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). ... We have repeatedly recognized that the Board’s discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is unfettered and not subject to judicial review.

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s sua sponte reopening decisions discretionary, with judicial review limited to legal or constitutional error.

Lozada-Moreno v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-14(a)

In Bonilla v. Lynch, we held that the BIA’s decision to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is discretionary and reviewable only “for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decision for legal or constitutional error.” 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016). Because no legal or constitutional error is evident on the record, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision declining to reopen Lozada-Moreno’s case sua sponte and dismiss in part Lozada-Moreno’s petition for lack of jurisdiction as to that issue.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but its decision is not reviewable when there is no legal standard for judging that discretion.

Avalos-Caseres v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-29(a)

Further, Avalos contends the BIA should have granted his request for sua sponte regulatory reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Our court lacks jurisdiction to review the issue, as there is “no legal standard [available] to judge the BIA’s decision” under § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) makes a wholly discretionary refusal to reopen sua sponte generally unreviewable, although remand remains available when the agency declined to exercise that authority because it misunderstood the legal background.

Jieng v. Bondi · filed 2025-10-31(a)

We otherwise lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary refusal” to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Li Chen, 43 F.4th at 249 (quotation marks omitted). Although we may remand if “the Agency may have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” id. at 253 (quoting Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009)), there was no such misperception here because, as set forth above, Jieng was not eligible to apply for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and the court generally lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s exercise of that authority, subject to remand if the agency misunderstood the governing legal background.

Chu v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-18(a)

The only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s discretionary authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review that decision. See Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2022). While we may remand when the agency “may have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” id. at 253 (quoting Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009)), there was no such misperception in the BIA’s determination that Chu could not establish exceptional circumstances by becoming potentially eligible for cancellation of removal.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte and discretion to deny reopening even when the movant makes a prima facie case; the Board's refusal to exercise that authority is not judicially reviewable.

Rayes v. Bondi · filed 2026-02-19(a)

The Board’s power to engage in sua sponte reopening derives from its own regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This same regulation grants the Board “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.” Id. Because the Board has “unfettered discretion” whether to invoke its sua sponte authority, its decision not to do so is “not subject to judicial review.” Herrera v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 617, 622 (6th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen a case on its own motion, and courts cannot review its refusal to do so.

Gonzalez-Cantu v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-08-01(a)

Thus, we cannot consider the BIA’s or the IJ’s refusal to reopen sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) provides no meaningful standards for judicial review of the BIA’s refusal to reopen a case on its own motion.

William v. Holder · filed 2009-12-30(a)

We therefore found that section 1003.2(a) lacked any meaningful standards by which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion, and so found that we lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen the petitioner’s case sua sponte. ... We are therefore compelled to conclude that the BIA’s decision in this case is also unreviewable.

A decision whether to reopen proceedings on the BIA’s own motion under § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion and is unreviewable on appeal.

Ochoa v. Holder · filed 2010-05-05(a)

Under these circumstances, we see no way around Tamenut's proscription given Ochoa's express reliance on § 1003.2(a) throughout her filings and argument. Even if the BIA addressed the merits of Ochoa's claim under a § 1003.2(c) analysis, it does not circumvent the posture of the motion and the petition now before us.

Under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings on its own motion under subsection (a).

Gor v. Holder · filed 2010-06-04(a)

Therefore, we are constrained to hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen a case on its own motion, and courts lack jurisdiction to review its decision not to do so.

Lushaj v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2006-09-29(a)

In the instant case, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to grant Lushaj’s motion to reopen because that decision is committed to the discretion of the BIA.

The Board may reopen removal proceedings on its own motion despite an untimely filing, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review its discretionary refusal to do so.

Rasi v. Mukasey · filed 2007-12-03(a)

Despite the untimeliness of Rasi’s motion, the BIA retained discretion to reopen the removal proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Yet the BIA chose not to exercise that discretion—concluding that the kinds of exceptional circumstances needed to grant such relief did not exist here. See JA 6. Regrettably for Rasi, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to exercise this authority.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA complete discretion to deny an untimely motion to reopen sua sponte, leaving courts without a standard to review that decision.

Khan v. Holder · filed 2009-06-22(a)

Because the regulation governing sua sponte reopening vests the BIA with complete discretion to deny untimely motions to reopen, our court “has no legal standard by which to judge the . . . ruling, and therefore . . . lacks jurisdiction”.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings on its own motion; in the Sixth Circuit, courts cannot review its refusal to do so.

Rais v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-09-16(a)

Consequently, the BIA’s sua sponte authority to grant his motion was the only means by which he could have obtained relief. Binding circuit precedent, unimpaired by recent Supreme Court case law, establishes that this court does not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to refrain from exercising that authority.

Section 1003.2(a) commits sua sponte reopening to the BIA’s discretion, leaving courts no legal standard for reviewing its refusal to reopen.

Dominguez v. Sessions · filed 2017-09-22(a)

The sections of the Code of Federal Regulations governing regulatoiy motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b), commit the decision to reopen to the IJ’s or BIA’s discretion.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen a case on its own motion at any time, and courts lack jurisdiction to review a denial under that authority.

Velasquez-Aguilar v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-12-07(a)

The BIA “may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision,” but the decision to reopen “is within the discretion” of the BIA, “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen pursuant to its sua sponte authority.

Section 1003.2(a) subjects motions to reopen and motions to reconsider to the same procedural requirements, including the BIA’s sua sponte authority.

Duarte-Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-07-27(a)

This jurisdictional limitation also applies to our review of the BIA’s denial of a petitioner’s motion for sua sponte reconsideration. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (addressing motions to reopen and motions to reconsider together and subjecting them to the same procedural requirements).