8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits a motion to reopen to supplement the record with material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Sabov v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-03(c)(1)

A motion to reopen, on the other hand, requests the opportunity to supplement the record with evidence that is “material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not support reopening when the asserted evidence was already considered and no new evidence is presented.

Paryev v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-23(c)(1)

The Board properly evaluated and denied the motion to reopen by determining that Par-yev presented no new evidence; the significance of the birth of Paryev’s twins had already been considered in the Board’s April 2014 decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the new evidence is material and was unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Cui v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-16(c)(1)

Lastly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying reopening because Cui’s mother’s supplemental letter, which corroborated Petitioners’ arrest and detention, could have been provided at the time of Petitioners’ merits hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”); see also Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (looking to the date on which the IJ closed the hearing as the date before which the evidence must have been unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include supporting evidence, and it permits reopening only when the evidence is material and was previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable.

Lopez-Pineda v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2017-07-13(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must state the “new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present evidence unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Hyska v. Sessions · filed 2017-10-06(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must present evidence that “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). But Hyska’s documents related almost entirely to events that predated his March 2015 removal hearing, and his motion did not provide a ground for reopening the cancellation application absent ineffective assistance of counsel.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be based on new evidence that was not previously available; legal developments do not qualify as new evidence.

Fichera v. Sessions · filed 2017-10-17(c)(1)

The motion to reopen must be based on new evidence that was not previously available. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Even assuming timeliness, the BIA denied reopening for lack of new evidence. ... These legal developments are not new evidence and could have been raised in Fichera’s original proceedings or motion to reconsider.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant has not shown that the new evidence would likely change the outcome.

Rugama v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-03(a)

To the extent Rugama submitted non-cumulative evidence of rehabilitation in support of his motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where he did not establish that the evidence would likely have changed the outcome of his case.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a movant seeking reopening based on new evidence to present evidence that was previously unavailable and establishes prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Assad v. Sessions · filed 2018-08-28(c)(1)

To obtain reopening based on new evidence, a movant must present previously unavailable evidence that establishes his prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and unavailable, or undiscoverable or unpresentable, at the former hearing.

De Garcia v. William Barr, U. S · filed 2019-04-22(c)(1)

Under the relevant regulation, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and makes materiality and prior unavailability necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for reopening.

Gamero v. Barr · filed 2019-07-03(c)(1)

He points to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), which provides that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing.” The regulation goes on to say that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. Lopez Gamero reads this language to mean that the Board must reopen the proceedings if the new evidence is material and was previously unavailable. That’s a clear misinterpretation of the regulation, which establishes necessary—not sufficient—conditions for reopening.

A motion to reopen must be denied unless the offered evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Gonzalo-Oros v. Barr · filed 2020-03-06(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalo-Oros’s motion to reopen and remand because Gonzalo-Oros provided no explanation as to why the evidence presented was not available or could not have been discovered during his proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing[.]”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening when new evidence is material and was unavailable or could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Santa Adelayda Coto Castillo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-08-17(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3). Evidence is “new” if it was unavailable or could not have been presented before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, undiscoverable, or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Deleon v. Garland · filed 2023-01-31(c)(1)

The applicable regulation states that a “motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA considered the additional evidence that Santos submitted, finding that the threats made against him and the rest of his family occurred before his hearing and Santos did not sufficiently prove that the evidence could not have been discovered and presented at his previous hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening proceedings for new evidence only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2024-01-31(c)(1)

A motion to remand to the IJ for consideration of new evidence presented on appeal is subject to the same standards as a motion to reopen. See Li Yong Cao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 421 F.3d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 2005). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears . . . that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) treats evidence as new when it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing before the immigration judge; its availability during the appeal to the Board does not make it not new.

Lemus-Escobar v. Bondi · filed 2025-06-16(c)(1)

[B]oth the statute and the regulation indicate that the evidence must not have been available to be presented “at the former hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The proffered testimony concerns events that happened after the “former hearing” before the IJ. The government’s argument that the information was previously available because it became available during the pendency of the appeal to the Board does not comport with the statute and regulation. ... Bhasin controls here. The BIA erred as a matter of law by ruling that the evidence was not new because it became available after the hearing before the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires facts offered to reopen proceedings to be material and unavailable at the former hearing.

Mariscal-Romo v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-04-09(c)(1)

To justify reopening of removal proceedings based on newly-discovered evidence, the new facts must be “material” and “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Birke v. Ashcroft · filed 2003-08-05(c)(1)

“Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992) (quotations omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (2003). ... All of the evidence presented in these affidavits, however, could have reasonably been discovered or made available during her original immigration hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to offer material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Javed v. Board of Immigration Appeals · filed 2005-10-11(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is *60material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in this case because Javed’s motion failed to point to any errors in the BIA’s prior decision or to allege any new facts to support Javed’s claims.

A motion to reopen before the BIA must present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Hutahaean v. Gonzales · filed 2005-11-14(c)(1)

A motion to reopen seeks to present evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” ... But the IJ admitted over one thousand pages of such reports during the removal hearing, and Mr. Hutahaean failed to indicate in his motion how any reports issued after the hearing would have compelled the BIA to reverse the IJ.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing to reopen BIA proceedings.

Zunguza v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-09-05(c)(1)

Zunguza’s motion to reopen did not raise material, newly discovered facts that would warrant reopening his case. He submitted just one affidavit, in which he expanded on his own statements in his prior asylum application and testimony before the IJ. These facts “could ... have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application for relief; this requirement is mandatory, not permissive.

Da v. Holder · filed 2010-01-27(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.” Despite Da’s assertion to the contrary, the plain language of § 1003.2(c)(1) makes clear that submission of the appropriate application for relief is mandatory, not permissive. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)(utilizing “must” rather than “may”); see also Photopaint Techs., LLC v. Smartlens Corp., 335 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2003) (characterizing “must” as mandatory verb and “may” as permissive verb).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation; this requirement is mandatory.

Ali v. Holder · filed 2012-05-31(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis supplied). “[T]he plain language of § 1003.2(c)(1) makes clear that submission of the appropriate application for relief is mandatory, not permissive.”

A motion to reopen seeking CAT relief must include the appropriate application for relief.

Perez-Lopez v. Holder · filed 2010-02-24(c)(1)

Moreover, Petitioners failed to include the appropriate application along with their request to apply for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application for relief.

Salim v. Holder · filed 2010-03-01(c)(1)

Furthermore, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.”

A motion to reopen or remand for relief must include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation.

Rodriguez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-04-23(c)(1)

A motion to reopen or remand proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

A motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application and supporting documentation, and failure to do so procedurally defaults the motion.

Simwaka v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-01-25(c)(1)

The BIA also denied Simwaka’s motion because she failed to submit a written application (Form I-589) with the motion as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). This regulation provides, “A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The failure to “append an application for asylum to [a] motion to reopen” means the “motion to reopen is, at a minimum, procedurally defaulted.” Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485, 491 (6th Cir. 2009). Simwaka did not attach an application for relief and, as a result, did not comply with the procedural requirements for filing a motion to reopen. The BIA was therefore within its discretion to deny her procedurally defaulted motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an applicant to submit an application for relief together with a motion to reopen.

Jin Ming Sun v. Holder · filed 2010-11-02(c)(1)

In addition, Sun failed to submit an application for relief together with his motion, as required under the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen on this ground was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Tavarez v. Holder · filed 2011-05-17(c)

In his motion to reopen Tavarez did not establish his prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (providing that a motion to reopen must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation).

A motion to reopen seeking relief must include the appropriate relief application and all supporting documentation, and failure to meet that requirement is a ground for denial.

Pukri v. Holder · filed 2011-11-03(c)(1)

Moreover, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA’s position is that failure to comply with the requirement is a ground for denial of the motion. Since the plain language of the regulation supports that position, we defer to it.

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-10-18(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed with the BIA for relief to include the application and supporting documents, although noncompliance does not make denial mandatory.

Ferrari-Cock v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-04-20(c)(1)

A motion to reopen for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the application and supporting documents. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (motion filed with the BIA); ... Here, the BIA cited Yewondwosen’s language that the failure to submit the application typically results in denial. Thus, the BIA was aware that denial of the motion to reopen was not mandatory. ... Yewondwosen’s narrow exception does not apply here. Ferrari has not demonstrated that the BIA abused its discretion in affirming the denial of his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Majeed v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-10(c)(1)

Significantly, in this connection, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added). Majeed argues that § 1003.2(c)(1) did not require that he submit an asylum application because his “motion to reopen sought to amend his previously submitted asylum application.” He claims that his “motion [to reopen] relied on the same underlying basis as his prior application.” We disagree. Majeed’s first asylum application was premised solely on alleged political persecution. His motion to reopen was wholly based on changed country conditions in Pakistan potentially demonstrating an increased risk of persecution of Christians. Importantly, Majeed’s motion to reopen was not “accompanied by the appropriate application for relief,” as required by the plain language of § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Wang-Huang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-05-18(c)(1)

We also note that the pertinent portion of the regulation is phrased in mandatory language: “A motion to reopen . . . must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” (emphasis added). The BIA’s enforcement of the technical requirements for filing motions to reopen—where the alien’s noncompliance is admitted—surely does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application for relief.

Zhu v. Holder · filed 2013-08-07(c)(1)

Because the plain language of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) provides that a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (emphasis added), we do not conclude that the BIA erred by denying Zhu’s motion because he failed to file an asylum application based on his new religion claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) generally requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documentation, but the previously submitted application need not be attached when the movant seeks review of that application rather than a new form of relief.

Wang v. Whitaker · filed 2018-11-28(c)(1)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” ... However, failure to submit an application with a motion to reopen does not require denial of the motion. ... Where, as here, the petitioner does not seek a new form of relief but rather review of a previously submitted application available to the BIA, the original application need not be attached. ... Accordingly, the BIA should not have denied Wang’s motion to reopen for failure to attach his previously submitted asylum application.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen proceedings for submitting an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Takang v. Barr · filed 2020-01-03(c)(1)

The applicable regulations require that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Mu Lin v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-05-13(c)(1)

Rather, while a motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), Lin submitted no documentation related to her two children besides their birth certificates.

Subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to include the appropriate application and all supporting documentation.

Dominguez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-09-29(c)(1)

As the BIA correctly observed, Dominguez’s motion to reopen did not include the required application for cancellation of removal or supporting documentation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires a person seeking adjustment of status after a final order of removal to file a motion to reopen with the BIA, even while judicial review of the removal order is pending.

Tebyasa v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-02-01

If the BIA has issued a final order of removal, the petitioner wishing to obtain adjustment of status must file a motion to reopen with the BIA, whether or not a petition for judicial review of the removal order is pending. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2(d) does not bar a motion to reopen filed after the petitioner has been removed.

Estrada v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-04-22(d)

The BIA concluded that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to reopen proceedings without the benefit of our decision in Reyes-Torres v. Holder, Nos. 08-74452 & 09-70214, 2011 WL 1312570 (9th Cir. April 7, 2011) (mandate pending), in which we determined that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) did not apply to preclude a motion to reopen filed after the petitioner had been removed. ... We remand to the BIA in light of this intervening case law.

Section 1003.2(d) does not bar a motion to reopen filed after the petitioner has been removed.

Romero-Valenzuela v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-16(d)

In concluding that the agency lacked jurisdiction to reopen Romero- Valenzuela’s proceedings as a result of her prior deportation, the BIA did not have the benefit of Reyes-Torres v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2011), in which we held that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) did not preclude the filing of a motion to reopen after the petitioner had been removed. ... We remand to the BIA in light of this intervening caselaw.

Section 1003.2(a) provides that the statutory time limit for reopening applies to motions filed by aliens, but not to reopening actions initiated by the agency itself.

Kocev v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-03-08(a)

The statutory time limit applies to motions filed by aliens but not actions initiated by the agency itself. 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) authorized the BIA to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion, and refusals to exercise that discretion were reviewable only in narrow circumstances such as reliance on an incorrect legal premise.

Zhou v. Attorney General United States · filed 2022-01-25(a)

The BIA had jurisdiction to consider Zhou’s request to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2020). When “the BIA rejects the alien’s [statutory] motion to reopen because it comes too late or because it falls short in some other respect, the courts have jurisdiction to review that decision.” Mata, 576 U.S. at 148. “We [generally] review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and will not disturb the BIA’s determination unless it is arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Darby, 1 F.4th at 159. But when the BIA refuses to reopen proceedings on its own motion, our review is even more limited. We will review these refusals only when “the BIA relies on an incorrect legal premise” or “when the BIA has constrained itself through ‘settled practice to the point where an irrational departure from that practice might constitute abuse.’ ” Id. at 164 (quoting Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651–52 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings on its own motion, but the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Sequera v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and courts lack jurisdiction to review its exercise of that authority.

Trujillo v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-13(a)

Similarly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s exercise of its discretionary authority to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA unguided discretion to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion, so a denial of sua sponte reopening is not judicially reviewable.

Karim v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-31(a)

There are no guidelines directing the BIA’s decision whether to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to deny Karim’s motion for a sua sponte reopening of his removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Arana-Gonzales v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte reopening authority, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority.

Amezcua v. Mukasey · filed 2009-01-20(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002).

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte at any time, but leaves that decision to the BIA's discretion, and its failure to exercise that authority is not judicially reviewable.

Rene Alberto Ojeda Espanol v. U.S. Att'y Gen. · filed 2009-01-23(a)

The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The regulations provide that “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board,” and “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” Id. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to exercise its discretion to reopen based on its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA general authority to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to exercise that authority.

Triumph v. Holder · filed 2009-03-16(a)

Triumph argues that the BIA’s October 11, 2007 denial of his motion to reopen was an abuse of discretion because the BIA should have exercised its authority to reopen his case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal sua sponte to exercise its general authority to reopen or reconsider a case under § 1003.2(a). Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 219-20 (5th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(a) places sua sponte reopening of removal proceedings within the agency's discretion, making a decision to grant or deny such reopening unreviewable by the court.

Mahmood v. Holder · filed 2009-06-25(a)

We have no jurisdiction to consider this claim, because “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is [solely] within the discretion of the” Agency. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but it generally declines to do so when an untimely or number-barred motion seeks relief involving a matter outside its jurisdiction.

YAURI · filed 2009-07-01(a)

Finally, and separately from any question of jurisdiction, with regard to untimely or number-barred motions to reopen, we conclude that sua sponte reopening of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings pending a third party’s adjudication of an underlying application that is not itself within our jurisdiction ordinarily would not be warranted as a matter of discretion. ... Thus, we will generally decline to exercise our discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte under such circumstances.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is committed to unfettered discretion and is not subject to judicial review.

Talamantes-Rojo v. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-18(a)

Finally, in so far as petitioners claim the BIA abused its discretion by not exercising its sua sponte authority pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we are without jurisdiction to consider this claim as well. Belay-Gebru, 327 F.3d at 1000-01 (observing that the “decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion” and is therefore “not subject to judicial review” (quotation omitted)).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Lou v. Holder · filed 2009-08-17(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte, but a court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to do so.

Ghotra v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-19(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review either the BIA’s refusal to sua sponte reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), see Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1001, 1004-05 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (per curiam), or Ghotra’s assertions not first presented to the BIA, see Afolayan v. INS, 219 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 2000).

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to exercise that discretionary authority.

Stenaj v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-31(a)

Stenaj also argues that the BIA abused its discretion by not reopening her immigration proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides that the BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” ... Thus, we must dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it requests that this court review the BIA’s failure to exercise its sua sponte authority.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but its discretionary refusal to do so is not reviewable because no meaningful legal standard exists for judging that decision.

Jeon v. Holder · filed 2009-11-12(a)

This court has held, however, that a request for equitable tolling is essentially an argument that the BIA should have exercised its discretion to reopen sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority because no meaningful legal standard exists by which to judge such discretionary decisions.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and the Ninth Circuit lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise that authority.

Ortega-Camacho v. Holder · filed 2009-12-09(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a federal court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to invoke that authority.

Alvarez v. Holder · filed 2009-12-30(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the agency sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review the agency's decision not to exercise that authority.

Santos-Rivas v. Holder · filed 2010-01-08(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Subsection (a) makes sua sponte reopening entirely discretionary, so a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to reopen sua sponte.

Kurtaj v. Holder · filed 2010-01-15(a)

Finally, although Kurtaj argues that the BIA erred in refusing to reopen his case sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), because such a decision is “entirely discretionary.” Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings, and a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to invoke that authority.

Xu v. Holder · filed 2010-01-19(a)

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s failure to invoke its sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen Xu’s removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's refusal to do so.

Martinez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA wholly discretionary authority to reopen a case sua sponte, and courts lack jurisdiction to review that exercise.

Gordon v. Holder · filed 2010-03-05(a)

Gordon seeks in part to have this court review the BIA’s exercise of its authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen sua sponte a case in which it has rendered a decision. It is settled law that courts lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s wholly discretionary authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise that authority.

Bueno-Barajas v. Holder · filed 2010-03-24(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Garcia-Martinez v. Holder · filed 2010-03-25(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority is not reviewable.

Rodriguez v. Holder · filed 2010-04-13(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is beyond the court's jurisdiction to review.

Patel v. Holder · filed 2011-01-20(a)

Thus, Patel was necessarily invoking the BIA’s authority to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. See Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Because Mahmood’s untimely motion to reopen was not excused by any regulatory exception, her motion to reopen could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua sponte authority”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s determination as to whether it will exercise its sua sponte authority is entirely discretionary and thus beyond the scope of our jurisdiction.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but a decision not to exercise that authority is not subject to judicial review.

Meri v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-02(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board complete, unfettered discretion to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion.

Edemeka v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-11(a)

The relevant regulatory provisions vest the IJ 12 and the BIA 13 with complete, unfettered discretion when determining whether to reopen a case on their own motion.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a matter sua sponte at any time, but leaves that decision entirely to its discretion.

Muhammad Khan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2010-06-28(a)

The BIA may reopen a matter sua sponte at any time but the decision to do so is entirely within its discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen immigration proceedings, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise that authority.

Rivera v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-16(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte at any time, and its decision not to do so as an exercise of unfettered discretion is not reviewable.

Jahjaga v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2010-07-30(a)

Pursuant to § 1003.2(a), the BIA may sua sponte reopen a case at any time. ... We read the BIA’s decision declining to reopen proceedings as an exercise of its unfettered discretion. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review it. ... Accordingly, we will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Jahjaga’s petition for review of the Board’s denial of reopening pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, without a governing standard, so its exercise generally is not subject to judicial review unless the agency has established a reviewable general policy.

Kennedy v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2010-08-27(a)

We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decisions regarding reopening sua sponte because the regulation providing for that discretionary authority “offers no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). We have recognized an exception permitting review “if an agency ‘announces and follows—by rule or by settled course of adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be governed[.]’” Id. (citation omitted).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings, but the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke that authority.

Saribekyan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-28(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and its decision whether to exercise that authority is entirely discretionary and beyond judicial review.

Qu v. Holder · filed 2010-10-08(a)

Because petitioners’ motions were unquestionably untimely, and eligibility to adjust status is not a statutory basis for excusing the untimely filing of a motion to reopen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), those petitioners were necessarily invoking the BIA’s authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA’s determination as to whether it will exercise that authority is entirely discretionary and thus beyond the scope of our jurisdiction. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to reopen proceedings on its own motion, and its decision not to exercise that authority is not reviewable.

Marin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-09(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings, but the court treated the BIA’s refusal to exercise that authority as not subject to judicial review.

Arestov v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-24(a)

the BIA’s refusal to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen removal hearings—which derives from a regulatory provision, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)—is not subject to judicial review. ... Therefore, we are constrained to hold that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to reopen sua sponte. ... Although we express no opinion on whether Gor was correctly decided, we are bound to dismiss Arestov’s challenge for lack of jurisdiction.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen a case sua sponte at any time and gives it broad discretion to deny reopening, even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Wu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2013-12-12(a)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the Board may “at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” The regulation grants the Board broad discretion “to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board unfettered discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and its exercise of that discretion is not reviewable.

Movsesyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-06(a)

Movsesyan raised these issues for the first time in her motion to reopen under the Board’s sua sponte authority, and the Board denied that motion. That was entirely within the Board’s discretion. See Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)’s identical predecessor regulation). As a result, the Board’s exercise of its unfettered discretion is nonjusticiable.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board to reopen a case on its own motion, but provides no meaningful standards for reviewing how the Board exercises that discretion, so courts lack jurisdiction to review a refusal to reopen sua sponte.

Stanev v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-06-30(a)

We are without jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision to decline to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen the case. In Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400-01 (4th Cir. 2009), we noted that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) “provides that the [Board] ‘may’ reopen on its own motion, but it ‘provides no guidance as to the [Board]’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors . . ., places no constraints on the [Board]’s discretion, and specifies no standards for a court to use to cabin the [Board]’s discretion.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Because there are no meaningful standards by which to judge the [Board]’s exercise of discretion,” we concluded that we lack jurisdiction over the Board’s refusal to sua sponte reopen a case. Mosere, 552 F.3d at 401; see also Peralta v. Holder, 567 F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The [Board]’s discretion in this regard is unfettered[.]”). Accordingly, we dismiss that part of the petition for review from the Board’s order denying sua sponte reopening.

Subsection (a) gives the Board unfettered discretion to reopen a removal case sua sponte.

Barajas-Salinas v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-07-29(a)

The governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), still grants the Board unfettered discretion to reopen sua sponte as it sees fit.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board broad discretion to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion, including discretion to deny reopening even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Mendiola v. Holder · filed 2014-08-22(a)

The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. . . . The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (emphases added). As the text of regulation makes clear, the Board’s discretion in deciding whether to exercise its sua sponte authority is considerable, even to the extent that the Board may deny reopening despite a petitioner’s meritorious claim for relief.

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time but supplies no standard governing that discretion, so the denial is generally not subject to judicial review.

Thomas v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-09-03(a)

The BIA may, at any time, exercise its discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Sua sponte reopening is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999). Because the regulations governing sua sponte reopening “offers no standard governing the agency’s exercise of discretion,” we generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA complete discretion to decide whether to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-11-11(a)

Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides the BIA with complete discretion in determining whether to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, this court lacks jurisdiction to review Singh’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to do so.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA and immigration judges complete discretion to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, so a refusal to do so is not subject to judicial review.

Ramos-Hernandez v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-02(a)

Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides the BIA and the immigration judge with complete discretion in determining whether to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review Ramos-Hernandez’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to do so.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time and to deny reopening even when the movant has made a prima facie case; it requires reopening in no particular circumstances and sets no governing standard.

Dhanoa v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-06-05(a)

The BIA, however, has discretion to reopen a proceeding sua sponte “at any time” and may “deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Although the BIA has stated that its sua sponte authority is reserved for “exceptional situations,” In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A. 1997), the governing regulation does not “require[] the BIA to reopen a deportation proceeding under any set of particular circumstances” and provides no standard governing the agency’s exercise of its sua sponte authority, Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(a) makes the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings sua sponte discretionary and outside judicial review.

Singh v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-20(a)

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a final removal proceeding sua sponte at any time, but a federal court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s refusal to do so.

Y. Salinas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-10-23(a)

Absent compliance with the above exception to the statutory time limit, a tardy petitioner’s proceedings can be reopened only if the BIA chooses, sua sponte, to reopen the case on which it has already rendered a final decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). There is no time limit on the BIA’s ability to sua sponte reopen a proceeding. But while there is no time limit on the BIA’s power to initiate a reopening of the proceedings, there is also no jurisdiction by this Court to review the BIA’s refusal, sua sponte, to reopen those proceedings. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has made out a prima facie case for relief.

Dominguez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2016-03-04(a)

The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time but provides no standard governing that discretion.

Kap Sun Bukta v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2016-07-05(a)

The BIA has the authority to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... The Lenis Court then concluded that neither the INA nor 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provided any “standard to govern the BIA’s exercise of its discretion” to sua sponte reopen immigration proceedings. Id. Therefore, it did not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision. Id. ... We are compelled to reach the same conclusion here. As Butka has not raised any constitutional claims, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of her motion for sua sponte reopening.7 Thus, we must reject Butka’s arguments and grant the government’s motion to dismiss.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion, but leaves the grant-or-deny decision discretionary and supplies no standard for that discretion.

Bonilla v. Lynch · filed 2016-10-20(a)

Since the enactment of IIRIRA, where the timing and numerosity statutory requirements are not met and equitable tolling is unavailable, the only way an alien can reopen an adverse final order of removal is to ask the Board to exercise its sua sponte authority—that is, to reopen the case “on its own motion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984, Interim Decision 3323 (BIA 1997) (discussing the Board’s “limited discretionary powers under the regulations to reopen or reconsider cases on [its] own motion”). Neither the authorizing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), nor IIRIRA’s statutory provisions supply a standard for the Board to apply when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to reopen sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board of Immigration Appeals complete discretion to decide whether to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings.

Ramos-Hernandez v. Jeff Sessions · filed 2017-02-22(a)

Because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provides the BIA with complete discretion in determining whether to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, we lack jurisdiction to review Ramos-Hernandez’s challenge to the BIA’s refusal to do so.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte, including when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Sang Goo Park v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2017-01-17(a)

Section 1003.2(a) does not say what standard the BIA is to apply in deciding sua sponte requests to reopen. Rather, it says simply that decisions are “within the discretion of the Board,” which has the discretion to deny a motion “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte when a motion to reopen is untimely, but leaves that reopening to the BIA's discretion.

Afolabi v. Attorney General United States · filed 2017-05-18(a)

Where, as here, a motion to reopen is untimely, the BIA may exercise its discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte but supplies no meaningful standard constraining that discretion, so the BIA's decision is committed to agency discretion by law and is generally unreviewable.

Carrasco-Palos v. Jefferson B. Sessions, III · filed 2017-06-22(a)

We explained in Tamenut that the regulation establishing the BIA’s authority to reopen sua sponte, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “provides no guidance as to the BIA’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors for the BIA to consider in deciding whether to reopen sua sponte, places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and specifies no standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion.” 521 F.3d at 1004. ... Accordingly, we concluded that “the BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) [was] committed to agency discretion by law” and that we were without jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, a case in which it has rendered a decision.

Hernandez-Castillo v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-11-08(a)

Regarding decisions to reopen proceedings sua sponte, the regulations provide that the BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Thus, “[t]he regulations vest the decision of whether to sua sponte reopen entirely in the discretion of the immigration judge or the BIA.” Tarango, 697 F. App’x at 321.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA regulatory authority to reopen or reconsider removal proceedings sua sponte, but the agency has complete discretion to decline and its refusal is not subject to judicial review.

Nassiri v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-12-14(a)

“An alien seeking to reopen his removal proceedings has two options: (1) he can invoke the court’s regulatory power to sua sponte reopen proceedings under either 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); or (2) he can invoke his statutory right to reopen proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7).” ... “An IJ and the BIA have complete discretion to refuse to exercise their regulatory power to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a removal order. ... We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider the BIA’s refusal to exercise its regulatory power to reconsider or reopen Nassiri’s removal order sua sponte.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA and an Immigration Judge to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, but a refusal to exercise that discretionary power is generally unreviewable.

Lin v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-01-31(a)

To the extent Lin asks us to overturn the BIA’s decision declining to reopen Lin’s removal order sua sponte, we cannot engage in that inquiry, although we can consider the other stated reasons for the BIA’s decision denying the motion to reopen. ... In addition, an Immigration Judge or the BIA may reopen a removal decision sua sponte at any time. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(a) permits sua sponte reopening of removal proceedings at any time, but the agency's discretionary decision not to reopen is generally unreviewable because the regulation supplies no meaningful judicial standard.

Adeyinka Salami v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-05-10(a)

An IJ may reopen removal proceedings under her sua sponte authority at any time, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 827 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016), but the BIA has held that this authority is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” ... We generally lack jurisdiction to review any decision of an IJ or the BIA when declining to exercise their discretionary sua sponte authority to reopen removal proceedings. See Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he BIA’s decision whether to reopen proceedings on its own motion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion by law. We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision.”)

Section 1003.2(a) allows the Board to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, but the Board’s exercise of that sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review.

Cortina-Chavez v. Jefferson B. Sessions III · filed 2018-07-05(a)

Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the Board “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” But we have held that the Board's exercise of its sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review.

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion at any time, and its exercise of that discretionary authority is not reviewable by the courts.

Lemus v. Sessions · filed 2018-08-14(a)

The BIA's regulations provide that the BIA may reopen removal proceedings sua sponte (“on its own motion”) at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This circuit has long held that “sua sponte authority is committed to the unbridled discretion of the BIA, and the courts lack jurisdiction to review that judgment.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, but that authority cannot override the statutory bar on reopening a prior removal order after illegal reentry.

Rodriguez-Saragosa v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-09-14(a)

In addition, separate regulations authorize the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Under § 1231(a)(5), Rodriguez-Saragosa’s 2002 removal proceedings are “not subject to being reopened,” and the regulation giving the BIA’s sua sponte reopening authority cannot override that command.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but its discretionary refusal to do so is generally not reviewable.

Li v. Barr · filed 2019-05-15(a)

Accordingly, the only basis for reopening was the BIA’s authority to reopen sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Sua sponte reopening is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999). We generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “entirely discretionary” decision not to reopen sua sponte. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518. Although there is an exception if the agency “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009), the BIA did not misperceive the law in this case because it did not reach Li’s eligibility to adjust status; it simply concluded that Li’s case was not an “exceptional situation.” Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, and its refusal to do so is committed to agency discretion and is generally unreviewable.

Maria Claudia Diaz Vega v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2019-06-28(a)

Although decisions not to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, the decision not to reopen sua sponte is committed to agency discretion by law, and this discretion is so wide and lacking in a meaningful standard against which to judge it that it is non-reviewable.

Section 1003.2 lets the BIA reopen or reconsider cases on its own motion at any time, with the decision left to the Board’s discretion; the post-departure bar may inform that discretion but does not limit the BIA’s jurisdiction.

Ovalle v. Attorney General United States · filed 2019-11-19(a), (d)

According to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2, which is the source of the BIA’s sua sponte authority, the BIA “may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision” and the “decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section.” Id. (emphasis added). While the post-departure bar may be one basis for exercising that discretion, it is not absolute and it does not implicate the BIA’s jurisdiction, i.e., its competence to adjudicate a particular matter, see Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160 (2010).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen a case on its own motion, and judicial review of that sua sponte decision is limited at most to whether the Board misunderstood the basis for the request.

Garcia-Arce v. Barr · filed 2019-12-30(a)

Garcia‐Arce requested, in the alternative, that the Board exercise its sua sponte discretion to reopen immigration proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which allows the Board to reopen a case on its own motion. “To the extent that [Garcia‐Arce] made, and the Board considered, an oxymoronic request for the Board to exercise its discretion to reopen [her] removal proceedings sua sponte, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), our jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed to reviewing, at the very most, whether the Board misunderstood the basis for the request.” Villa Serrano v. Barr, 784 F. App’x 455, 456 (7th Cir. 2019). There is no reason to conclude that the Board misunderstood the basis for Garcia‐Arce’s claim of ineffective assistance. Indeed, the Board’s order discussed that claim at length.

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to reopen or reconsider cases sua sponte, but provides no governing standard and leaves that decision to the BIA’s discretion, so denials are generally unreviewable.

Chhoeun v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-03-04(a)

Additionally, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA had jurisdiction to consider Chhoeun’s request for sua sponte reopening. But because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) includes no standard governing the BIA’s discretion to reopen a case sua sponte, we generally lack jurisdiction to review a denial of a sua sponte reopening.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte when no timely motion to reopen is filed.

Chi v. Barr · filed 2020-09-18(a)

Absent a timely motion to reopen as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), the BIA has the authority to reopen sua sponte as a matter of discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s “entirely discretionary” decision declining to exercise that authority.

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider removal proceedings sua sponte at any time, but provides no meaningful standard for judicial review of its discretionary decision not to do so.

Anzardo v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-11-05(a)

The BIA has the authority to sua sponte reopen or reconsider removal proceedings at any time, including upon motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA have the discretion to deny a motion to reopen, even if the moving party has met its prima facie burden. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(3). The BIA may sua sponte reopen any case in which it has rendered a decision. Id. § 1003.2(a). ... In Lenis, we concluded we lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider a case under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because the regulation did not provide any “meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Id. at 1292-94.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte despite the time limit, but because that authority is entirely discretionary, courts lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision to exercise or decline it.

Diallo v. Barr · filed 2020-12-14(a)

Finally, although the BIA has the authority to reopen sua sponte despite the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to review that decision because that authority is “entirely discretionary.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to reopen proceedings on its own motion at any time, but that extraordinary power is reserved for truly exceptional situations rather than ordinary hardships caused by filing limits.

Hernandez-Alvarez v. Barr · filed 2020-12-16(a)

The Board has discretion to reopen a case on its motion at any time, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), but only invokes this power “sparingly, treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships created by enforcement of the time and number limits in the motions regulations, but as an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” Matter of G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen cases sua sponte in exceptional situations, but gives it unfettered discretion to decline and generally makes that refusal unreviewable absent an incorrect legal premise.

Castillo v. Attorney General United States · filed 2020-11-24(a)

Castillo urges that the BIA erred by refusing to reopen his removal order sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This argument is without merit. While the BIA may reopen a case sua sponte in “exceptional situations,” In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997), it retains “unfettered discretion” to decline to invoke its sua sponte authority, Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). Thus, as a general matter, a BIA decision refusing to reopen a case sua sponte is “functionally unreviewable,” leaving us without appellate jurisdiction. Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017). However, if the BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte is based on an “incorrect legal premise,” we may remand to the BIA “so it may exercise its authority against the correct ‘legal background.’” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 160 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009)).

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, any case in which it has rendered a decision, without prescribing standards for that discretionary choice.

Nunez-Orejuela v. Barr · filed 2021-01-11(a)

“The [BIA] may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). 2 The BIA has held that its sua sponte authority is “an extraordinary remedy reserved for truly exceptional situations.” In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999). But “[t]he regulation . . . provides no standards controlling or directing the BIA’s decision whether to reconsider on its own motion.” Belay-Gebru v. INS, 327 F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). We therefore have held that we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority “[b]ecause we have no meaningful standard against which to judge the BIA’s exercise of its discretion.” Id.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte despite the time and number limitations, and the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority is entirely discretionary and beyond judicial review.

Lin v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-25(a)

Accordingly, the only remaining basis for reopening was the BIA’s authority to reopen sua sponte despite the time and number limitations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Because Mahmood’s untimely motion to reopen was not excused by any regulatory exception, his motion to reopen could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua sponte authority”). However, the BIA’s decision not to exercise that authority is “entirely discretionary” and beyond the scope of our review.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA complete discretion to deny a motion to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings.

Jackson v. Garland · filed 2021-03-12(a)

Finally, the regulatory provision of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA complete discretion to deny a motion to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board of Immigration Appeals discretion to deny a motion to reopen even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief, and permits sua sponte reopening only in exceptional circumstances.

Mejia-Garcia v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2021-08-25(a)

By regulation, the BIA and the IJ may also reopen removal proceedings or earlier decisions pursuant to their sua sponte authority. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b). They have the “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (same). Sua sponte reopening is warranted only in exceptional circumstances, but it may occur at any time. Butka, 827 F.3d at 1283.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA unfettered discretion over sua sponte reopening.

Kassim v. Garland · filed 2021-10-25(a)

Accordingly, “the BIA’s decision . . . evince[d] no misunderstanding about its unfettered discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020).

Subsection (a) authorizes the BIA to reopen cases sua sponte at any time, but leaves that decision to the BIA’s discretion.

Greenwood v. Garland · filed 2022-06-16(a)

The BIA may at any time, in its discretion, reopen sua sponte any case. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). But this court lacks jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions by the BIA not to reopen a case sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen cases sua sponte, but that regulatory authority cannot override the statutory bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).

Bravo-Bravo v. Garland · filed 2022-07-18(a)

Although the then-applicable regulation cited by Bravo-Bravo gave the BIA and the IJ the authority to reopen cases sua sponte, that regulation did not expressly provide that such authority overrode the language of § 1231(a)(5) precluding the agency from reopening a reinstated prior removal order. Nor could it, given that “a regulation does not trump an otherwise applicable statute unless the regulation’s enabling statute so provides.”

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen or reconsider a removal order sua sponte at any time, but provides no standard governing the BIA’s exercise of that discretion.

Ledezma v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2022-07-19(a)

This Court concluded in Lenis, and reiterated in Butka, that “neither the INA nor 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) provide[s] any standard to govern the BIA’s exercise of its discretion to sua sponte reopen immigration proceedings.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA authority to reopen cases sua sponte, but that authority cannot override the statutory bar on reopening reinstated removal orders.

BRAVO-BRAVO V. MERRICK GARLAND · filed 2022-12-02(a)

An alien may also ask the IJ or BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1). ... Although the then-applicable regulation cited by Bravo-Bravo gave the BIA and the IJ the authority to reopen cases sua sponte, that regulation did not expressly provide that such authority overrode the language of § 1231(a)(5) precluding the agency from reopening a reinstated prior removal order. Nor could it, given that “a regulation does not trump an otherwise applicable statute unless the regulation’s enabling statute so provides.”

Subsection (a) leaves reopening on the BIA’s own initiative to the BIA’s discretion.

Aquino-Sanchez v. Garland · filed 2023-02-21(a)

The decision to reopen sua sponte is left to the BIA’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 585–86.

Section 1003.2(a) preserves the BIA's discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte even when the statutory prerequisites for reopening are unmet.

Rubinos v. Garland · filed 2023-07-17(a)

Even where the statutory prerequisites for reopening have not been met, the BIA retains discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)). We lack jurisdiction to review such discretionary denials of sua sponte reopening except “for the limited purpose of reviewing the reasoning behind the decisions for legal or constitutional error.” Id. at 588. We discern no such legal or constitutional error.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte, but does not require it to do so; because the decision is wholly discretionary, circuit courts generally lack jurisdiction to review a denial.

Garcia-Gonzalez v. Garland · filed 2023-08-07(a)

The Immigration and Nationality Act generally allows aliens to file one motion to reopen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). But the BIA’s regulations also allow the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). That decision is discretionary: Although the BIA “may” reopen proceedings, that is never required. Id.; see also Djie v. Garland, 39 F.4th 280, 288 (5th Cir. 2022). Given the entirely discretionary nature of sua sponte reopening, this court has repeatedly held that circuit courts lack jurisdiction over denials by the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte. The rationale is that the regulations provide federal courts with “no legal standard against which to judge” the BIA’s decision.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretion to deny sua sponte reopening, even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Hung Tran v. Garland · filed 2024-03-08(a)

The decision to sua sponte deny a motion to reopen “is within the discretion of the Board,” and the Board may deny reopening “even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.”

Subsection (a) places sua sponte reopening of proceedings within the BIA's sole discretion, so the BIA's refusal is generally not subject to judicial review.

Chen v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2024-05-24(a)

Because such a ruling is within the BIA’s sole discretion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), it is not generally subject to judicial review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that courts generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to sua sponte reopen proceedings because such decisions “are committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA”).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the Board discretionary authority to reopen a case sua sponte at any time, and its refusal to exercise that discretion is generally not subject to judicial review because the regulation provides no standards for reviewing the exercise of discretion.

Hernandez-Gamon v. Garland · filed 2024-07-23(a)

We generally lack jurisdiction to review such a decision because the operative regulation contains “no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” ... As the regulation states: “The Board may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. . . . The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen . . . is within the discretion of the Board . . . .” § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen a case sua sponte, and the court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s entirely discretionary refusal to do so.

Khan v. Garland · filed 2024-05-24(a)

To the extent Khan is arguing that the BIA erred in declining to exercise its authority to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) – an authority that has been circumscribed by amendments that took effect in 2021 – it is well settled that “we do not have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s entirely discretionary refusal to reopen a case sua sponte.”

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and the BIA's decision not to exercise that authority is generally not reviewable.

Bhojraj v. Garland · filed 2024-10-23(a)

Instead, Petitioners challenge only the BIA’s decision not to exercise its authority to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The BIA acknowledged its authority to reopen under Section 1003.2(a), but concluded that there was no “exceptional situation that warrant[ed] the exercise of [its] sua sponte reopening authority.” Cert. Admin. R. at 3–4. We lack jurisdiction to review that “entirely discretionary” determination. Ali, 448 F.3d at 518; see also Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 249 (2d Cir. 2022).

Section 1003.2(a) allows the BIA to reopen or reconsider a case on its own motion at any time, but that authority is discretionary and the BIA’s decision not to exercise it is generally not subject to judicial review.

Magana-Magana v. Garland · filed 2024-12-26(a)

We conclude, however, that the BIA’s decision of whether or not to reopen a removal proceeding sua sponte is a purely discretionary decision that we lack jurisdiction to review. ... The applicable regulation provides that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... We remain bound by it, and accordingly we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen proceedings sua sponte when the respondent's situation is truly exceptional.

Nedeva-Alaniz v. Garland · filed 2025-01-02(a)

For a person to obtain sua sponte relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “the Board must be persuaded that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional.” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte only when the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional, and it may deny reopening when the applicant lacks prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.

Rodriguez-Garcia v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-26(a)

In order for an individual to obtain sua sponte relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “the Board ‘must be persuaded that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional before [it] will intervene.’” Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1134 (BIA 1999)). More generally, the “BIA is entitled to deny a motion to reopen where the applicant fails to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.” Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2010)).

Subsection (a) requires the Board to be persuaded that a respondent’s situation is truly exceptional before granting sua sponte relief.

Nedeva-Alaniz v. Bondi · filed 2025-03-12(a)

For a person to obtain sua sponte relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), “the Board must be persuaded that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to deny a motion to reopen in its discretion even when the movant has established a prima facie case for relief.

Ochoa v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-22(a)

The Board’s decision thus evinces that it understood, and applied, its “unfettered discretion” to sua sponte deny Petitioners’ motion. Id. at 1233; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (granting the Board “discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief”).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA sua sponte authority, and the Ninth Circuit generally lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s exercise of that authority absent an apparent legal or constitutional error.

Ohumole v. Bondi · filed 2025-05-21(a)

“[W]e have no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s sua sponte authority under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2020). Nor is this a case where “legal or constitutional error . . . is apparent on the face of the BIA’s decision[.]” Id. at 1234. The BIA simply concluded that “the respondent has not established an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening,” and we would be speculating if we concluded that the BIA made a legal or constitutional error. We therefore dismiss the petition in this regard.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA entirely discretionary authority to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and a decision declining to do so is not subject to judicial review.

Liao v. Bondi · filed 2025-06-26(a)

And to the extent Liao challenges the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to review that “entirely discretionary” decision.

Subsection (a) gives the BIA wide discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte and permits it to deny a motion even when the moving party has made a prima facie case for relief.

Vargas-Rodriguez v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-19(a)

Notwithstanding these limitations, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) gives the BIA wide discretion to reopen a petitioner’s proceedings sua sponte. We generally “lack jurisdiction to review a BIA decision declining to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen a removal order.” Lopez, 990 F.3d at 1003 (quoting Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2020)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.”).

Subsection (a) gives the Board unfettered discretion over whether to reopen a removal case sua sponte, and its decision is not subject to judicial review.

Guzman-Torralva v. Bondi · filed 2025-09-17(a)

The Board possesses “unfettered discretion” to decide whether to exercise sua sponte authority. Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). And its decision is not subject to judicial review. Barry, 524 F.3d at 723; see also Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2020) (“It’s well settled that we lack jurisdiction to review a [Board] decision declining to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen a removal order.”). Thus, we dismiss this claim.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte despite the ordinary time limit, but that authority is discretionary and generally beyond the court of appeals' jurisdiction, subject to remand for a legal misperception.

Matthews v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-05(a)

Absent equitable tolling, the BIA may reopen proceedings sua sponte despite the time limitation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). However, that authority “is entirely discretionary and therefore beyond” our jurisdiction, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006), except we may remand if the BIA “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Li Chen v. Garland, 43 F.4th 244, 253–54 (2d Cir. 2022).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretionary authority to reopen sua sponte, and judicial review is limited to whether the BIA wrongly determined that reopening would be futile.

Jiang v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-10(a)

Finally, Jiang contends that the BIA erred in declining to exercise its discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen his removal proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). But we only have jurisdiction to review that decision insofar as the BIA declined sua sponte reopening based on an erroneous determination that reopening “would be futile.”

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen or reconsider, on its own motion and at any time, a case in which it has rendered a decision; the Board's refusal to exercise that authority is generally unreviewable, subject to a narrow exception for an incorrect legal premise or misapprehension of the legal background.

Carhuamaca-Vilcahuaman v. Bondi · filed 2025-11-26(a)

“The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). We generally lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision not to exercise this sua sponte authority “because there are no standards by which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Reyes-Vargas v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). But under a narrow exception, we may review whether the Board relied “on an incorrect legal premise” or “misperceived the legal background.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Subsection (a) authorizes the Board to reopen or reconsider any case on its own motion and gives it discretion to deny reopening even when the movant has made a prima facie case for relief.

Herrera v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-15(a)

These so-called “sua sponte” reopening motions do not stem from any statutory right—indeed, the Immigration and Nationality Act “does not specifically address” the concept of sua sponte reopening. Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Instead, the Board’s power to engage in sua sponte reopening derives exclusively from the Board’s regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The operative provision states that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.” Id. And it goes on to note that “[t]he Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.” Id. No other limits on the Board’s sua sponte authority appear.

Section 1003.2(a) authorizes the BIA to reopen proceedings sua sponte as a discretionary matter.

Morales v. Bondi · filed 2026-01-12(a)

The BIA articulated the correct standard for its exercise of discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), cited its own precedent, and demonstrated that it “clearly understood the discretionary nature of its decision.”

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen a case on its own motion at any time, but only in truly exceptional circumstances; a valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a removal order is not enough.

Yadav · filed 2026-02-05(a)

The Board has the authority at any time to reopen or reconsider on our own motion any case in which we have rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2025). ... A respondent’s valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a removal order does not constitute an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening of removal proceedings.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen proceedings sua sponte in exceptional situations, but that authority is entirely discretionary and generally unreviewable, subject to remand when the Board misperceives the legal background and believes reopening would necessarily fail.

Magassouba v. Bondi · filed 2026-03-19(a)

Thus, the only basis for reopening was an exercise of the BIA’s sua sponte authority. The BIA may reopen sua sponte despite time and number limitations in “exceptional situation[s].” Matter of J-L-L-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687 (B.I.A. 2023); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). But its authority to do so is “entirely discretionary” and we lack jurisdiction to review it, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006), except that we may remand if the BIA “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, that a reopening would necessarily fail,” Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). There was no such misperception here.

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen or reconsider a case sua sponte and to deny reopening even when the moving party has made a prima facie case for relief.

Hodzic v. Bondi · filed 2026-03-19(a)

The BIA has discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides: The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. . . . The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.

Section 1003.2(a) provides for sua sponte regulatory reopening, but a court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of such reopening.

Maldonado-Serrano v. Blanche · filed 2026-04-15(a)

Lastly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Maldonado-Serrano’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of sua sponte regulatory reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, and that decision is generally unreviewable unless it rests on an incorrect legal premise or departs from a settled practice.

Altamirano v. Attorney General United States of America · filed 2026-04-30(a)

Altamirano also challenges the BIA’s determination that his case did “not present any exceptional situation that would warrant . . . sua sponte reopening,” under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). ... Because the BIA has discretion whether to reopen sua sponte, we lack jurisdiction to review that decision unless it relied on an incorrect legal premise or departed from a settled practice. See Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651-52 (3d Cir. 2017).

Section 1003.2(a) gives the BIA discretion to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion at any time, and courts cannot review its refusal to exercise that discretion.

Cordoba-Quiroz v. Gonzales · filed 2007-05-25(a)

The BIA has the discretionary authority to reopen removal proceedings on its own motion at any time, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 (a), although it reserves that discretion for "exceptional situations." ... Thus, we have no jurisdiction to review the BIA's denial of Córdoba's request to reopen her removal proceedings sua sponte.