8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen, within 90 days of the BIA’s final removal order.

Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2018-12-19(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the motion to reopen was time- and number-barred because Gonzalez filed the motion more than seven years after the BIA’s removal order became final and it was her second motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) excuses a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order from the time limit for lack of notice, but leaves the one-motion limit in place.

Coatl-Chiquito v. Blanche · filed 2026-04-30(c)(3)

A motion to reopen an in absentia removal order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) is excused from only the 90-day time limitation, while a mo- tion to reopen an in absentia deportation order is excused from both the 90-day time limitation and the numerical limi- tation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to remand based on new evidence to show that the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify errors of fact or law and be supported by pertinent authority.

Jimenez v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-10(c)(1), (b)(1)

A motion to remand to the IJ for consideration of new evidence presented on appeal is subject to the same standards as a motion to reopen. ... Such a motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... A motion for reconsideration must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits an alien to file one motion to reopen after each final order of removal, so a motion concerning a different final order does not trigger the numerical bar.

MELGAR · filed 2020-12-04(c)(2)

In its opposition, the DHS incorrectly states that the respondent’s motion is numerically barred. An alien is entitled to file one motion to reopen after each final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2020). The motion to rescind the respondent previously filed and had granted pertained to a different final order and does not bar the respondent from filing a motion to reopen within 90 days of our September 3, 2019, decision, despite the DHS’s assertion to the contrary.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s procedural requirements, including its limitations on motions to reopen, apply to motions to reopen CAT claims.

Chhun v. Rosen · filed 2020-12-28(c)(2)

We have consistently rejected the notion “that there cannot be any ‘regulatory limitation’ on motions to reopen under the CAT” and have held that the procedural requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) apply to motions to reopen CAT claims.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not support reopening to apply for new relief when the applicant had an opportunity to seek that relief during the original proceedings.

Marquez v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-24(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen to apply for new relief, where petitioners had the opportunity to apply during their proceedings before the IJ, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), and where petitioners failed to demonstrate the plausible grounds for relief necessary to establish prejudice from the alleged ineffective assistance of former counsel, see Martinez-Hernandez v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (ineffective assistance of counsel did not result in prejudice where cancellation of removal was not a plausible ground for relief due to lack of hardship evidence); Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to remand to apply for cancellation of removal where petitioner “did not tender any evidence showing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005) (requiring prejudice to state valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a 30-day deadline for motions to reconsider, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires new evidence supporting reopening to have been unavailable at the former hearing.

De La Rosa v. Garland · filed 2021-08-25(b)(2), (c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider as untimely where it was filed more than 30 days after the order of removal became final. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (motions to reconsider must be filed within thirty days of final administrative order); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2) (same). ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Flores De La Rosa’s motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal, where Flores De La Rosa failed to offer evidence that was not previously available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (new evidence in support of a motion to reopen must not have been able to be discovered or presented at the time of the former hearing); see also Carrillo-Gonzalez v. INS, 353 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (statements of counsel do not constitute evidence).

Section 1003.2 permits an alien to exceed the ordinary time and number limits for a motion to reopen when seeking reopening based on changed country conditions, and requires the motion to state the new facts to be proven and support them with affidavits or other evidence.

Hendaoui v. Garland · filed 2021-09-16(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien may exceed the normal time and number limitations for motions to reopen (one motion within ninety days) if he seeks to reopen based on changed country conditions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... In his motion to reopen, Hendaoui was required to “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing . . . if the motion is granted” and support the facts with “affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits a motion to reopen outside the normal time limit when country conditions materially change, while subsection (c)(1) requires the new evidence to be materially different from evidence at the prior hearing.

Trigueros v. Garland · filed 2022-03-14(c)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

Guevara Trigueros failed to demonstrate that country conditions in Honduras had materially changed from her 2013 hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ) to her 2016 motion to reopen. Although she presented new evidence that her family continues to receive extortion threats, such evidence was not “qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the previous hearing.” Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Therefore, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in holding that Guevara Trigueros failed to demonstrate a material change in country conditions sufficient to satisfy the timeliness exception for a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority; § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires a changed-country-conditions motion to reopen to present previously unavailable material evidence that, together with the original-hearing evidence, establishes prima facie eligibility for relief.

Zonova v. Garland · filed 2022-05-03(b)(1), (c)(3)(ii)

A motion to reconsider must “specify[] the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). Petitioner did not point to any legal errors in the prior BIA decision, nor did she identify previously submitted evidence that the BIA overlooked or misinterpreted. As such, the petition is denied as to reconsideration. ... To prevail on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, a movant must produce previously unavailable material evidence, which, “when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Petitioner argues that she is prima facie eligible for relief based on several theories of eligibility, all of which fail.

Section 1003.2 makes the Board's decision whether to grant a motion to reopen or reconsider discretionary, and provides that, if reconsideration is granted, the Board may affirm, modify, or reverse its original decision.

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland · filed 2023-05-11(a), (i)

Board reconsideration and reopening are discretionary. By regulation, today and at the time of §1252(d)(1)’s enactment, “[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board.” 8 CFR §1003.2(a) (2022); 8 CFR §3.2 (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 18904 (1996); see Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 12–13 (2008) (tracing history of discretion to reopen back to 1916). That means a noncitizen can request reconsideration. But only if “the motion to reconsider is granted” does the Board proceed to make the “decision upon such reconsideration” as to whether to “affirm, modify, or reverse the original decision.” 8 CFR §1003.2(i). And, again, whether to grant the motion to reconsider, and thus proceed to such review, is up to the Board in its discretion. §1003.2(a); In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA 2006) (“[W]e have authority to deny a motion to reconsider as a matter of discretion”); cf. §1003.2(a) (“The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief ”). Because Board reconsideration (like reopening) is a discretionary form of review, it is not available to the noncitizen “as of right.” Section 1252(d)(1) therefore does not require a noncitizen to pursue it.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires reopening evidence to be material and previously unavailable, while § 1003.2(b)(1) permits reconsideration to correct a change or misapplication of law or an overlooked aspect of the case.

Velasquez-Castillo v. Garland · filed 2024-01-17(c)(1), (b)(1)

The BIA cannot grant motions to reopen unless “the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Similarly, a motion for reconsideration of a prior BIA decision may be made to obtain a re-evaluation of record evidence in light of “a change in the law, a misapplication of the law, or an aspect of the case that the BIA overlooked.” Zhao, 404 F.3d at 301; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Upon remand, the BIA will address whether the TVPRA applies in this case. In doing so, it should consider whether the evidence submitted by Velasquez-Castillo—in his motion to reopen, his motion for reconsideration, and his motion for an urgent ruling—meets the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen within 90 days, permits an untimely motion based on materially changed and previously unavailable country conditions only when the movant also shows prima facie eligibility, and requires supporting affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Idrees v. Garland · filed 2023-11-20(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Motions to reopen removal proceedings must be filed within ninety days after a final order of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Untimeliness may be excused only where a petitioner demonstrates changed circumstances arising in his country of nationality or removal that materially affect his eligibility for relief which were not available or able to be discovered or presented at his last hearing. Id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). A petitioner must also establish prima facie eligibility for such relief. ... The Board was entitled to afford the unsworn statements little evidentiary weight because they were not affidavits. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); see also INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 143 (1981).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error in the BIA’s prior decision, and § 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify new and material evidence.

Socolov v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-23(b)(1), (c)(1)

In 21-75, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider where Socolov failed to identify any error in the BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s order denying adjustment of status and cancellation of removal under the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A petitioner’s motion to reconsider must identify a legal or factual error in the BIA’s prior decision.”) ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen where Socolov did not identify new and material evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Fonseca-Fonseca, 76 F.4th at 1180.

Section 1003.2 gives the BIA authority over motions to reopen or reconsider filed after the BIA has issued a final administrative decision.

Guillen v. Garland · filed 2022-08-09

If the BIA dismisses the appeal, any further administrative review may be pursued through a motion ... to reopen or reconsider submitted only to the BIA, where jurisdiction has vested.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires changed-conditions evidence to have been unavailable at the original merits hearing, and makes its availability when a prior motion to reopen was filed immaterial.

Tulung v. Garland · filed 2024-05-21(c)(3)(ii)

We require motions to reopen, including successive motions to reopen, to contain evidence that was unavailable at the time of the merits hearing. ... The relevant regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), requires petitioners to show that their changed-conditions evidence was unavailable at their "hearing," and the regulation consistently refers to merits proceedings as "hearings." ... Changed-conditions evidence must have been unavailable at the time of the merits hearing, but its availability at the time of a prior motion to reopen is immaterial.

Subsection (g)(5) permits the Board to accept paper filings in all cases at its discretion.

ARCINIEGAS-PATINO · filed 2025-01-17(g)(5)

The regulations provide that “[t]he Board retains discretion to accept paper filings in all cases.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(g)(5), 1003.3(g)(2).

Section 1003.2(g)(4) requires parties in immigration proceedings to electronically file through the EOIR Case Portal.

Ortiz-Ordonez v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-07(g)(4)

Parties in immigration proceedings are required to electronically file through the Executive Office of Immigration Review Case Portal (“EOIR Case Portal”).

A motion to reconsider a Board decision must be filed within 30 days after the Board mails its decision.

Reyes-Noriega v. Bondi · filed 2025-12-10(b)(2)

“A motion to reconsider a decision [of the Board] must be filed with the Board within 30 days after the mailing of the Board decision[.]”

Section 1003.2(b)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reconsider before the BIA.

Diaz-Ramos v. Mukasey · filed 2008-04-21(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider as time-barred when the motion was filed more than ten months late. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, *591383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004) (BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

A motion to reconsider filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order is untimely under § 1003.2(b)(2).

Hiskia Billy v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-08-08(b)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ July 6, 2009, motion to reconsider as untimely because it was filed over three years after the BIA’s February 15, 2006, final order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be previously unavailable and not previously discoverable or presentable.

Ordonez v. Blanche · filed 2026-04-24(c)(1)

Yet, even if reopening were available in this type of circumstance, BIA appropriately determined that none of the evidence petitioner seeks to introduce is actually newly available—the report he provides in support of his hardship claim indicates that his wife has been experiencing the mental health challenges that are the basis of the claim since before the order of removal was entered. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(f) permits the Board to consider a discretionary stay request connected with a pending motion to reopen or reconsider, but the Board prospectively requires the alien to seek a stay from DHS first and submit proof of that request or explain why sufficient time was not given for DHS to respond.

Herrera-Nunez · filed 2026-06-12(f)

With these considerations in mind, as a general policy going forward, an alien subject to a final removal order should first request a stay from DHS prior to the Board considering a stay request filed in connection with a motion to reopen or reconsider a Board or Immigration Court order. Cf. Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that “procedural default rules are consistent with” the Board’s “authority to prescribe procedural rules that govern the proceedings before it”). Going forward, an alien should first request a stay from DHS and submit proof that he or she requested a stay from DHS. The stay request generally should be submitted to DHS with an adequate amount of time for DHS to respond, and the alien should file a copy of DHS’ decision with the Board as part of the stay request with the Board. If not, the alien should provide an explanation as to why the request was not filed with DHS with an adequate amount of time for DHS to respond.

Section 1003.2(b)(2) sets a 30-day deadline for filing a motion to reconsider a Board decision.

Codner v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-01-10(b)(2)

Moreover, as a motion for reconsideration, it was timely filed because it was filed within 30 days of the Board’s April 5, 2013 decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2).

A motion for reconsideration must identify an error of fact or law in the BIA's prior decision.

Rivera v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-23(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivera’s motion for reconsideration because Rivera failed to point to any error of fact or law in the BIA’s denial of his motion to reopen.

A motion for reconsideration must identify errors of fact or law in the BIA's decision and include pertinent authority; the BIA may deny a motion that merely repeats previously rejected arguments.

Misirbiev v. Barr · filed 2020-10-27(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority, and the BIA does not abuse its discretion by denying a motion to reconsider that merely repeats arguments that the BIA had previously rejected. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Jin Ming Liu v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2006); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001). Misirbiev’s motion largely reiterated prior arguments, and the remainder of the motion failed to specify errors of fact or law in the agency’s decision.

Section 1003.2 treats evidence submitted to the BIA during a pending appeal as a motion to remand and permits denial of reopening when the supporting evidence was previously available rather than new.

Tuslova v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-01-10(c)(4), (c)(1)

If an alien submits evidence to the BIA while an appeal is pending, the BIA generally treats it as a motion to remand for further proceedings before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(4), (d)(3)(iv). ... The BIA may deny a motion to reopen that fails to introduce previously unavailable and material evidence. Chacku v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires an applicant seeking reopening on changed-country-conditions grounds to establish materially changed conditions.

Hua Mo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-03(c)(3)(ii)

In addition, Mo failed to establish materially changed country conditions in China warranting reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (setting forth the requirements for demonstrating changed country conditions in support of a motion to reopen); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991 (self-induced changes in personal circumstances are not sufficient to demonstrate changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when materially changed conditions in the country are shown.

Manegeng v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Manegeng’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Manegeng did not demonstrate materially changed conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Subsection (c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order.

Li v. Holder · filed 2014-01-06(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Li’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed nearly eight months after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, and section 1003.2(c)(3) does not excuse an untimely motion based only on changed personal circumstances created by the applicant.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2014-01-13(c)(2) and (c)(3)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Yang contends, however, that her recent membership in the China Democracy Party (“CDP”), and the Chinese government’s awareness of her political activities in the United States, constitute materially changed conditions excusing her untimely motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA properly determined that Yang's political activities constituted changed personal circumstances, which are insufficient to excuse the untimely filing of her motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen removal proceedings untimely when filed more than nine years after the removal order became final, absent a basis for tolling.

Gulley v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-01-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gulley’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than nine years after her removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gulley failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing, and the evidence must be material.

Jocelyn Infante Waminal Digeno v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-01-10(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must be based on affidavits or other evidentiary material which were not “available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the prior hearing before the IJ. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). In Digenova’s case, the Board properly found that she did not explain why the evidence dated prior to her hearing on May 10, 2011 was not available or could not have been discovered or presented at that time. Furthermore, “[a] motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless” the “evidence sought to be offered is material.” Id.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Singh v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-03-17(c)(1)

With regard to the BIA’s denial of reopening, Singh acknowledged that his affidavits were available at the time of his hearing before the IJ and claimed only that he was subjectively unwilling to request them until after the IJ ruled against him. The BIA’s conclusion that those affidavits were available and could have been presented at Singh’s hearing thus cannot be characterized as arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(d) limits the BIA’s sua sponte jurisdiction by withdrawing a motion to reopen after the movant has been removed from the United States.

Zhang v. Holder · filed 2010-08-12(d)

Therefore, we hold that the BIA is not plainly erroneous in its position, expressed in In re Armendarez-Mendez, that the departure bar limits its sua sponte jurisdiction. Accordingly, because the Board is entitled to deference with respect to that view, it did not err in concluding that § 1003.2(d) deprived it of authority to consider petitioner’s motion to reopen after he was removed from the country.

Section 1003.2 allows the Board to reopen a case on its own motion, but that regulatory sua sponte authority is limited by the departure bar.

Ortega-Marroquin v. Holder · filed 2011-05-23(a), (d)

Applying the departure bar to preclude the Board’s sua sponte reopening authority does not clearly and unambiguously conflict with the text of the statute, as no statutory provision authorizes an alien to file a motion to reopen outside the time limits specified (except for the two exceptions inapplicable here). In short, only the regulations permit the Board to grant an untimely motion using its sua sponte authority, but that authority is itself limited by the departure bar.

Section 1003.2(a) permits the BIA to reopen a case sua sponte, but § 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar may still prevent a removed person from obtaining such reopening.

Desai v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2012-08-21(a), (d)

the BIA ―did not err in concluding that § 1003.2(d) deprived it of authority to consider [Zhang‘s] motion to reopen [sua sponte] after he was removed from the country.‖ ... We agree with, and adopt, the Second Circuit‘s analysis. For the reasons stated, we hold that the BIA did not err when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Desai‘s motion to reopen sua sponte. Therefore, we will deny his petition.

Section 1003.2(d) bars a person who has departed from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider and treats a later departure as withdrawal, including for sua sponte reopening motions.

Gaytan-Aragon v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-22(d)

However, under the departure bar, “[a] motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. Any departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(d). We have accorded substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation that the departure bar is a jurisdictional limitation, which applies to motions for sua sponte reopening.

Section 1003.2(a) permits immigration courts to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte, while § 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar applies to sua sponte motions but not timely statutory motions.

Valdovinos-Lopez v. Attorney General United States · filed 2015-10-16(a), (d)

After that time, the only basis for reopening is a regulation that gives the immigration courts the authority to reopen a removal proceeding sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Motions to reopen sua sponte are subject to what is known as the “post-departure bar,” which precludes a person already removed from the United States from filing such a motion. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d); Desai v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 695 F.3d 267, 268 (3d Cir. 2012). The post-departure bar does not, however, prohibit “statutory” motions to reopen (i.e., those filed within the 90-day window). See Desai, 695 F.3d at 268, 270.

Section 1003.2(d) does not allow the BIA to strip itself of jurisdiction over statutory motions to reopen merely because the noncitizen was removed or departed the United States.

Thompson v. Holder · filed 2011-03-03(d)

We hold that the BIA may not contract the jurisdiction that Congress gave it by applying the departure bar regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d), as suggested by the BIA in Armendarez-Mendez, to statutory motions to reopen.

The statutory right to file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider applies to every alien without a geographic limitation, so a post-departure bar conflicts with that right.

Espinal v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-08-03(d)

In summary, the post-departure bar regulation conflicts with Congress‘ clear intent for several reasons. First, the plain text of the statute provides each ―alien‖ with the right to file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider. ... Sixth, Congress specifically withdrew the statutory post-departure bar to judicial review in conformity with IIRIRA‘s purpose of speeding departure, but improving accuracy. The regulatory post-departure bar to BIA motions to reopen/reconsider, if permitted, would undermine those dual objectives and conflict with the clear intent of Congress.

The departure bar in § 1003.2(d) cannot prevent an alien who has departed the United States from filing a statutory motion to reopen.

Carias v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-09-27(d)

A substantially similar regulation limits an alien’s ability to file a motion to reopen before the Board. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). ... In sum, we hold that the Board’s application of the departure regulation to statutory motions to reopen is invalid under Chevron’s first step as the statute plainly does not impose a general physical presence requirement.

Section 1003.2(d)'s post-departure bar remains applicable to an untimely motion to reopen filed after removal when no statutory basis permits the motion, including a sua sponte motion.

Asan v. Attorney General United States · filed 2012-12-11(d)

In Desai, the BIA held that it lacked jurisdiction under the post-departure bar of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) to consider an untimely motion to reopen filed by the alien after he had been removed. We agreed with the BIA’s conclusion, clarifying that Prestol Espinal applies to invalidate the post-departure bar only when the alien’s motion to reopen falls within statutory specifications. See Desai, 2012 WL 3570718, at *2. Thus, we held in Desai that that the BIA did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the untimely motion to reopen sua sponte, where there is no statutory basis for the filing of a motion to reopen sua sponte. See id. at *2-3. Here, although Asan submitted his motion to reopen to the IJ under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), we agree with the Government’s position that Desai applies with equal force to Asan’s case, as the regulations governing motions to reopen before the BIA and the IJ are substantively identical. See Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 n.5 (2d Cir. 2010). As in Desai, we conclude that the holding of Prestol Espinal is unavailing to Asan, and the BIA did not err in applying the post-departure bar to Asan’s untimely motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(d)'s departure bar cannot prevent a noncitizen who has departed the United States from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider, because the bar conflicts with IIRIRA.

Toor v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-17(d)

The regulation pertaining to motions to reopen or to reconsider made before the BIA states: A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d). ... That Petitioner departed the United States voluntarily, rather than involuntarily, is immaterial. The regulatory departure bar is invalid irrespective of the manner in which the movant departed the United States, as it conflicts with clear and unambiguous statutory text.

Section 1003.2(d) bars a motion to reopen or reconsider by or for a person in removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings after that person has departed the United States.

Salgado v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2017-12-19(d)

In the regulatory context, an alien can invoke the power to sua sponte reopen proceedings under either 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b), which provides the Immigration Court’s authority, or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides the BIA’s. ... That said, the Attorney General has promulgated regulations that preclude motions to reopen by or before the Immigration Court, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), or by or before the BIA, id. § 1003.2(d), that are filed by any alien who is subject to removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings after the alien’s departure from the United States. ... It is undisputed that Salgado did not seek to reopen his prior removal proceedings until years after he had been removed from the United States. Thus, the departure bar operates to mandate the conclusion that, under the regulations, no jurisdiction exists to reopen his proceedings.

Section 1003.2(d) bars a removed alien from filing a motion to reopen after departing the United States.

Infanzon v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-24(d)

Regulations found in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) 1 prohibit the filing of motions to reopen by removed aliens who have departed the United States.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Dhillon v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-02-22(c)(2)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen proceedings, and that motion must be filed no later than ninety days after the date of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be opened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); see also Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, the BIA correctly determined that Dhillon’s motion was numerically barred because she had previously filed a motion to reopen on July 1, 2008. In addition, the BIA correctly concluded that Dhillon’s second motion to reopen was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen filed after a final order of removal to satisfy its timeliness requirements; the court held that Lin’s motion, filed more than five years after the final administrative decision, was untimely.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2011-02-02(c)(2)

Accordingly, Lin’s motion was required to conform to the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), which governs motions to reopen. See Yuen Jin, 538 F.3d at 156. Because Lin was filing a motion to reopen after a final order of removal, and that motion was filed more than five years after the final administrative decision was rendered in her case, there is no dispute that it was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order unless the regulatory exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii) applies, which requires materially changed circumstances.

Mukweya v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-03-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Mukweya’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mukweya failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Uganda to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (requiring circumstances to have changed sufficiently that petitioner now has a well-founded fear of persecution).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen; the changed-country-conditions exception applies only when the evidence satisfies its requirements, and adjustment of status is not itself an exception to the time limit.

Yang v. Holder · filed 2010-06-08(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(3)

Because Yang’s motion to reopen was filed nine years after the IJ’s May 28, 1996 final order granting him voluntary departure -- well after the applicable ninety-day time limit -- it was untimely. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent Yang relies on an exception to this time limit for motions to reopen based on material and previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), we have previously reviewed the agency’s consideration of evidence similar to that submitted by Yang and identified no error in its conclusion that such evidence is insufficient to establish either material changed country conditions or an alien’s prima facie eligibility for relief, see Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169-72 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2006). ... Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Yang’s motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status, because adjustment of status is not an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be denied”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA's final administrative decision untimely, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed circumstances in the country are established.

Jun Cheng Pan v. Holder · filed 2010-07-29(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Pan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over two years after the BIA’s final administrative decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Pan failed to establish changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Lin v. Holder, 588 F.3d 981, 988-89 (9th Cir. 2009) (record did not establish change in family planning laws or enforcement of such laws to show changed country conditions excusing untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) removes that time limit for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Wang v. Holder · filed 2010-09-08(c)(2) (c)(3)(ii)

There is no dispute that Wang’s motion to reopen and remand was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that an alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered). However, there are no time limitations when a motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not make eligibility for adjustment of status an exception to the time limit for a motion to reopen.

Bi Jian You v. Holder · filed 2010-09-30(c)(3)(ii)

You’s third motion sought reopening to apply for adjustment of status; however, eligibility for adjustment of status is not an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final order, while subsection (a) authorizes sua sponte reopening and the BIA's decision not to invoke that authority is not reviewable.

Kaur v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2), (a)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Burrows’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s April 19, 2005, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of the final order), and Burrows failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 894 (deadline can be equitable tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”). ... We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, subject to the changed-country-conditions exception in section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

De Jin Ye v. Holder · filed 2010-11-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is beyond dispute that Ye’s motion to reopen was untimely, as it was filed almost five years after the agency’s order of removal became final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, this time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen asylum proceedings that is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Here, Ye waives any challenge to the BIA’s finding that he failed to satisfy such exception, arguing instead that the BIA failed to adequately consider the evidence he submitted in support of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) waives those limits for material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions in the country of nationality.

Yu v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-05-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen and must file it with the BIA “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time and number requirements are waived for motions to reopen that rely on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

The exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen applies to asylum or withholding claims based on changed country circumstances only when the evidence is material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Singh v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2011-11-18(c)(3)(ii)

Singh’s evidence that an individual in Guyana has threatened to do him harm is not evidence material to a claim of asylum, and thus does not provide a basis for applying the exception to timeliness, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (time and number limits do not apply to motions to reopen “[t]o apply or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a party to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion based on materially changed, previously unavailable country conditions; the comparison point is the IJ hearing, even if the applicant previously filed a motion.

Wu v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-02-10(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

We have explained that the BIA’s point of reference when evaluating whether country conditions have changed, or whether the evidence proffered was previously unavailable, is the time of the hearing before the IJ. Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 252–54 (3d Cir. 2006). This holds true, as is evident from the regulation’s numerical limitation, even where the applicant has already filed a motion to reopen. Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on materially changed country conditions supported by previously unavailable evidence.

Mussa v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mussa’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mussa failed to present evidence of changed circumstances in Rwanda to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order unless an exception such as changed circumstances under § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies.

Sri v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the movant presents evidence of changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Nzeusseu v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-03-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nzeusseu’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over three years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Nzeusseu failed to present evidence of changed circumstances in Cameroon to qualify for an exception to the time limit, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996-97 (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while allowing an exception for materially changed country conditions and requiring the movant to support the motion with material evidence.

Zeng v. Holder · filed 2012-08-27(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

An alien seeking to reopen proceedings is required to file a motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Also, Zeng’s contention that the BIA erred in discounting his evidence of conditions for Chinese Christians outside of his home province of Fujian is misplaced, as Zeng bore the burden of supporting his motion with “material” evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B); Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 149 (stating that where enforcement of a policy varies, it is the applicant’s burden to show a well-founded fear of persecution in his locality in China); Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the weight accorded to the applicant’s evidence lies largely within the discretion of the agency). ... As the BIA did not err in concluding that Zeng’s conversion to Christianity in 2010 constituted a change in personal circumstances, rather than a change in circumstances in China that would except his motion from the time limitation, see Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir. 2008); Li Yong Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 129, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2005), and as substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Zeng failed to demonstrate a change in the treatment of Christians in China, the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion as untimely, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-10-12(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed almost four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (new evidence must be qualitatively different from the evidence presented at the prior proceeding to be material).

Section 1003.2(c) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen only when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances that was not previously available and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Satchithananthan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-02-14(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Satchithananthan’s second untimely motion to reopen because the information in the INS letter to the Sri Lankan government was not new and Satchithananthan otherwise failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Sri Lanka to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-89 (“in order for evidence to be ‘material,’ ‘not available,’ and not able to have ‘been discovered or presented at the previous hearing,’ it must be ‘qualitatively different’ from the evidence presented at the previous hearing”) (internal citation omitted).

The section generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final decision, subject to an exception when the motion is based on changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed nearly five years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989-90.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the usual time and number limits when it relies on material evidence of changed country conditions that was previously unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Amador v. Attorney General United States · filed 2014-01-13(c)(3)(ii)

The time and number requirements that govern motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), do not apply when the motion to reopen relies on evidence of “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen subject to a time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for materially changed country conditions; the exception does not apply without a material change.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2014-03-04(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Jiang’s motion to reopen as untimely as it was filed more than seven years after his final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although there are no time limitations for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Jiang has not established any error in the BIA’s conclusion that there was no material change.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after a final removal order and limits a party to one motion, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to those limits.

Gavrilova v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-04-11(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gavrilova’s motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the successive motion was filed more than 13 years after her removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gavrilova failed to establish that any exception to the filing deadline applied, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3), or to demonstrate the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, but removes that time limit for materially changed country conditions supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Deshati v. Holder · filed 2014-05-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

An alien may file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Although Deshati’s motion was indisputably untimely because it was filed more than three years after the agency’s final order of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), there is no time limitation for filing a motion to reopen if it is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). We find no error in the BIA’s determination that Deshati failed to demonstrate materially changed country conditions excusing the untimely filing of his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, subject to an exception for previously unavailable information showing materially changed circumstances and a prima facie claim for the underlying relief.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2014-05-14(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Xiu Lin's second motion to reopen is both number-barred and untimely. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). "[A]n exception to these bars exists if the . . . motion is based on 'previously unavailable information showing material changed circumstances' and the petitioner's proof makes out 'a prima facie case sufficient to ground a claim of eligibility for the underlying substantive relief.'"

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen when the movant presents material evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal.

Ayala-Alvarado v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-02-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ayala-Alvarado’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), because he failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990 (a petitioner’s evidence lacks the required materiality where it simply recounts generalized conditions that fail to demonstrate “that her predicament is appreciably different from the dangers faced by her fellow citizens”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception based on changed circumstances in the relevant country.

Chen v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and the BIA reasonably determined Chen failed to establish changed circumstances in China to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986.

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) exempts a motion to reopen from the time and number limits when it rests on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal.

Mulyadi v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2015-04-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The time and number limitations do not apply if the motion to reopen is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). ... Here, Mulyadi does not dispute that his second motion to reopen was untimely and numerically barred. Thus, Mulyadi’s motion would have to be denied unless he could show by previously unavailable evidence a material change in country conditions. See Jiang, 568 F.3d at 1257. ... Moreover, Mulyadi failed to establish that Chinese Christians in Indonesia are currently subjected to conditions materially different from those existing at the time of his original petition. ... Thus, we cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in holding that Mulyadi’s second motion to reopen his removal proceedings was both time and number barred.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed circumstances in the country of removal are established.

Juniwaty v. Lynch · filed 2015-12-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Juniwaty’s untimely motion to reopen where she filed it more than 90 days after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Indonesia to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 989–90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)'s time limit for motions to reopen is not excused by a petitioner's purported eligibility to adjust status.

Lu v. Lynch · filed 2016-01-28(c)

Finally, Lu’s purported eligibility to adjust status did not excuse the time limitation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); In re Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2009) (emphasizing “that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board”).

The regulation bars an untimely or numerically successive motion to reopen unless materially changed circumstances in the country of removal qualify for the regulatory exception.

Gonzalez v. Lynch · filed 2016-03-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gonzalez’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and numerically-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gonzalez failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen when the movant submits material evidence of changed country conditions.

Guardado-Rodriguez v. Lynch · filed 2016-04-26(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guardado Rodriguez’s motion to reopen because it was untimely and numerically-barred, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Guardado Rodriguez failed to submit material evidence of changes in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c) permits a motion to reopen to be denied as untimely when filed six years after the final decision and the movant does not establish an exception to the time limitation.

Cheema v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-03(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cheema’s motion to reopen as untimely, where Cheema filed it six years after the BIA’s final decision, and did not establish any exception to the statutory time limitation for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 993-97 (BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to reopen as untimely).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars an untimely and number-barred motion to reopen, unless the movant establishes that a regulatory exception such as § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) applies.

Avagyan v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-05(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avagyan’s motion to reopen as it was untimely and number-barred where he filed his motion more than ten years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Avagyan failed to establish his motion fell within a regulatory exception to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the BIA can deny a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time and number limits on motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to those limits that the movant must demonstrate eligibility for.

Shen v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-02-23(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shen’s motion as untimely and number-barred where Shen filed his third motion to reopen more than seven years after the final administrative order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Shen failed to demonstrate he qualified for a regulatory exception to the time and number limits for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 991 (concluding that evidence submitted with motion to reopen did not establish changed circumstances arising within the country of nationality); cf. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that an alien can satisfy 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) by presenting “evidence of changed country conditions that are relevant in light of the petitioner’s changed circumstances”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order and generally limits a party to one motion, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception to those limits that the movant must establish.

Benitez-Cruz v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-20(c)(2) and (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Benitez-Cruz’s second motion to reopen as time and number-barred where it was filed over seventeen years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Benitez-Cruz failed to establish that he qualified for the regulatory exception to the time and number limitations imposed on filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (this court “defer[s] to the BIA’s exercise of discretion unless it acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law”).

The regulation generally bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order, but permits a time-limit exception when the movant provides sufficient evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-08-16(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to provide sufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances in India to qualify for a regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish materially changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits motions to reopen to those filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when the motion is based on materially changed country conditions that could not have been discovered or presented at the prior proceeding.

Singh v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-04-13(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than twelve years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Singh failed to establish a material change in circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 990-91 (petitioner failed to show evidence was “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence immaterial in light of prior adverse credibility determination).

Sections 1003.2(c)(2) and (c)(3) bar a third motion to reopen filed more than three years after the BIA's final order unless the movant establishes a regulatory exception to the time and number limits.

Lopez-Navarro v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-06-18(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez-Navarro’s third motion to reopen as untimely and number-barred where the motion was filed more than three years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where he failed to establish any of the regulatory exceptions to the time and number limitations for filing a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) permits an exception to the time and number limits for a motion to reopen only when the movant demonstrates prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Avagyan v. Barr · filed 2019-02-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Avagyan’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen, where he failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010) (the BIA can deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Section (c)(3)(ii) permits relief from the time limits for a motion to reopen based on material evidence that was unavailable and could not previously have been discovered or presented.

Rivera-Guerrero v. Barr · filed 2019-06-20(c)(3)(ii)

In limited circumstances, the untimeliness of a motion to reopen may be excused if a petitioner shows changed country conditions based on evidence not previously available and if he makes a prima facie showing that, if reopened, his case would lead to relief.

Section 1003.2 generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final removal order, but permits a later motion when the movant presents material evidence of changed country conditions.

Markarian v. Barr · filed 2019-07-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Markarian’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over 14 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Markarian has not established changed country conditions in Armenia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

The filing deadline in subsection (c)(2) does not apply when the movant establishes changed country conditions under the regulatory exception in subsection (c)(3)(ii).

Baez v. Barr · filed 2019-07-19(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hernandez Baez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over 12 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Hernandez Baez has not established changed country conditions in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 987-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed).

The regulation's exception to the time and number limits on motions to reopen does not apply when the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Garcia-Castro v. Barr · filed 2019-10-22(c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Castro’s untimely and number-barred motion to reopen because Garcia-Castro failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture to qualify for an exception to the time and number limitations for motions to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 986 (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides limited exceptions to the time and number limits on motions to reopen, and eligibility to adjust status based on marriage does not implicate any exception.

Krasniqi v. Barr · filed 2019-10-28(c)(3)

While there are limited exceptions to the 90-day time limitation, Krasniqi does not assert that any of them apply. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2008); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). His eligibility to adjust status based on his marriage does not implicate any exception.

Section 1003.2(a) subjects a motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status to the ordinary regulatory time limits.

Rosales-Santos v. Garland · filed 2021-10-18(a)

However, Rosales-Santos cites no authority for the proposition that, to the extent that his motion sought reopening to adjust his status, it was no longer subject to the normal regulatory time limits set forth in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a) and 1003.23(b)(1). See In re Cruz-Garcia, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1155, 1160 (BIA 1999). It is undisputed that Rosales-Santos’s motion to reopen, filed over 21 years after September 30, 1996, was untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day limit on motions to reopen, subject to § 1003.2(c)(3)'s exceptions, including changed country conditions, and the movant must show prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Martinez v. Garland · filed 2021-10-19(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Martinez’s motion to reopen proceedings as to his application for cancellation of removal where it was filed more than three years after the order of removal became final and he did not establish a statutory or regulatory exception to the time limitation or that equitable tolling is warranted. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (providing an exception to the ninety-day deadline for asylum and withholding of removal claims); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (listing factors relevant to the inquiry of whether due diligence is demonstrated as required for equitable tolling). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Martinez’s motion to reopen to apply for asylum and related relief based on changed country conditions where he failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2016) (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c) allows only one motion to reopen and requires filing within 90 days of the final administrative decision unless an exception applies.

Diaz v. Garland · filed 2022-07-15(c)

A party may file only one motion to reopen deportation proceedings and it must do so within 90 days of the final administrative decision unless an exception applies. Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 582; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i). ... As a result, we conclude the Board’s decision to deny the petition on these grounds was not “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) creates an asylum-based exception when material changed-country-conditions evidence was previously unavailable.

Chen v. Garland · filed 2024-11-22(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

It is undisputed that Chen’s motion to reopen was untimely and number-barred because he filed multiple prior motions, and this motion was filed approximately twenty-three years after his removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (allowing one motion to reopen), (C)(i) (90-day deadline for motion to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). There is an exception to these time and number limits if the motion is filed to seek asylum “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Chen failed to establish a material change in conditions in China. ... As reflected in these and other sources in the record, the BIA did not err in concluding that Chen failed to establish a change in the persecution of Christians since 1998, given evidence of similar treatment such as the closing of churches and the detention of some church members and leaders. See, e.g., id. at 122, 127, 133, 178; see also In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 257 (“Change that is incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory requirements for late motions of this type.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) provides regulatory exceptions to the time and number limits for motions to reopen, and Zhang's motion did not qualify for one.

Zhang v. Bondi · filed 2026-01-29(c)(3)

A motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal does not fall into a statutory or regulatory exception to the time limitation. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (listing exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same).

Section 1003.2(c) sets a filing deadline for motions to reopen and provides exceptions to it.

Usea v. Gonzales · filed 2007-01-18(c)(2), (c)(3)

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion to reopen was filed over one year late, and did not meet any of the regulatory exceptions.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen filed more than a year after the BIA’s final removal order untimely unless equitable tolling applies.

Duan v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Duan’s February 14, 2008, motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Duan did not show he was entitled to equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (deadline for filing motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s filing deadline applies to a motion to reopen in absentia deportation proceedings to seek adjustment of status.

Alvarez-Enriquez v. Holder · filed 2011-01-10(c)(2)

However, under certain conditions, a motion to reopen in absentia deportation proceedings to apply for a form of relief that was not available at the time of an in absentia deportation–such as adjustment of status, which was what Alvarez sought–may be granted subject to the general regulatory requirements for a motion to reopen, which are codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)’s time limit for motions to reopen does not apply to deportation proceedings that began before 1992.

Rodriguez-Manzano v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-01-09(c)(2)

All motions to reopen post-1992 deportation proceedings must be timely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (requiring aliens to file motions to reopen “no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (setting forth a 180-day deadline for filing motions to reopen deportation orders entered in absentia). Those regulations did not apply when proceedings against Rodriguez-Manzano commenced in 1987, and the DOJ did not see fit to apply the current, more ... restrictive regulatory scheme retroactively to cases like Rodriguez-Manzano’s.

A motion to reopen filed after the time limit requires a showing of changed country circumstances to qualify for the exception.

Miranda v. Lynch · filed 2016-08-03(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion denying Villela Miranda’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than sixteen years after the agency’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Villela Miranda did not establish changed circumstances in Guatemala to overcome the time limitation for a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-91 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes the one-motion and 90-day limits for motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides an exception for asylum motions based on qualifying changed country conditions.

Singh v. Garland · filed 2023-11-28(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Singh’s 2019 and 2021 motions were untimely and number barred because they were his second and third motions to reopen filed years after his removal order became final in 2014. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (setting one-motion limit and 90-day deadline for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). However, the time and number limits do not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). Time and number limits may also be excused by a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2000). The BIA did not err in concluding that neither exception applied to Singh’s motions.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening based on changed country conditions when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the merits hearing, with materiality assessed by comparing conditions when the motion was filed with conditions at the merits hearing.

Abdulahad v. Garland · filed 2024-04-11(c)(1)

A petitioner seeking to reopen their immigration case based on changed country conditions can do so if the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). When considering whether evidence was not previously available, we define “at the former hearing,” id., as at the time of the merits hearing, as opposed to evidence submitted on appeal or with a motion to reopen, because this court and “the [Board] normally do[] not accept and consider new evidence on appeal,” Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2018) (assessing whether certain evidence submitted with the motion to reopen “could not have [been] discovered” before the merits hearing). Similarly, when considering whether the evidence is material in terms of changed country conditions, we compare the country conditions as they existed at the time that the motion to reopen was filed and the country conditions as they existed at the time of the merits hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) exempts a motion to reopen from time and number limits when it relies on material, previously unavailable evidence of changed country conditions.

Cortez-Vasquez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-09-01(c)(3)

The time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen do not apply if, inter alia, the motion is “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).

A motion to reopen must show changed country conditions to overcome the regulation’s time and number limits.

Gatamba v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-08-10(c)(2)

Gatamba was required to show changed country conditions in Rwanda to overcome the time and numeric limitations on his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) allows an untimely motion to reopen when the movant presents evidence of materially changed country conditions.

Masood v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-03-22(c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ third untimely motion to reopen where petitioners failed to present evidence of materially changed country conditions in Bangladesh to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(3) allows an untimely motion to reopen for asylum or withholding when previously unavailable evidence establishes a material change in country conditions.

Mitaj v. Garland · filed 2022-07-20(c)(3)

The normal ninety-day time limit does not apply, however, if reopening is sought to apply for asylum or withholding of removal, and the motion “is based on . . . evidence” that is “material” to establishing “changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country [of] removal” and “was not available . . . at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). ... The BIA therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion as untimely.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support those errors with pertinent authority.

Monyenye v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-11-30(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Monyenye did not cite to pertinent authority to support her assertion of legal error by the BIA in its prior decision, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), and has not done so in her petition for review.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; repeating previously rejected arguments does not satisfy that requirement.

Arteaga v. United States Attorney General · filed 2010-07-21(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2010); see also INA § 240(c)(6)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C) (2010). A motion to reconsider that merely restates the arguments that the BIA previously rejected provides no reason for the BIA to change its prior decision. See Calle, 504 F.3d at 1329-31. “Therefore, merely reiterating arguments previously presented to the BIA does not constitute ‘specifying . . . errors of fact or law’ as required for a successful motion to reconsider.” Id. at 1329 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

A motion to reconsider must identify an error of fact or law in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ prior decision.

Cruz v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-02(b)(1)

The BIA was within its discretion in denying Martinez Cruz’ motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision.

A motion to reconsider must specify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Sepang v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-06-16(b)(1)

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and include pertinent authority.

Castillo v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-16(b)(1)

Because a motion to reconsider asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, the motion must specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and must be supported by “pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Medina-Herrera v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-29(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Medina-Herrera’s motion to reconsider, where the motion failed to allege any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior order denying his earlier motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”), and was based solely on new legal arguments that could have been raised in his previous motion, see Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 792 n. 8 (“a motion to reconsider does not present new law or facts, but rather challenges determinations of law and fact made by the BIA”).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the factual or legal error in the prior Board decision.

Arcega v. Mukasey · filed 2008-12-05(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2008); Matter of Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the BIA's prior decision.

Aggrey v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2005-12-27(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision.

Section 1003.2(b) requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors in the BIA’s decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Wang v. Gonzales · filed 2005-12-28(b)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported by pertinent authority. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to set forth new facts and present new or previously unavailable evidence, while subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior decision.

Cuevas v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-23(c)(1), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because it failed to set forth any new facts or present any new or previously unavailable evidence to demonstrate the requisite hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The motion also failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision affirming the hardship determination. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA order and be supported by pertinent authority.

Y. Corredor v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-05-17(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by “specify[ing] the errors of fact or law in the previous [BIA] order, and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). In this case, Corredor’s motion to reconsider did not specify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s final order adopting the IJ’s decision.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and be supported by pertinent authority.

Lopez-Ramirez v. Holder · filed 2011-01-04(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Isse v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-08(b)(1)

The applicable regulation provides that a motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... After careful review of the administrative record, we conclude that it fully supports the BIA’s rational explanation of why this contention failed to specify an error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.

A motion for reconsideration must identify the errors of law or fact in the Board of Immigration Appeals’ prior decision.

Barrera v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-08-06(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration must specify the errors of law or fact in the BIA’s prior decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and include pertinent supporting authority.

Diego Armando Munoz Gutierrez v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2008-09-03(b)(1)

Additionally, “[a] motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). ... Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. In his motion, Gutierrez did not have any binding legal authority to support his argument that the date of the postmark was the triggering date for computing his 30-day window to file the appeal.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify an error of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Diallo v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-26(b)(1)

A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS, 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2008); Matter of Cerna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (B.I.A. 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law).

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reconsider to identify factual or legal errors and supporting authority, and requires a motion to reopen to include material evidence supporting the allegations for a new hearing.

Chao Fang Zhang v. Holder · filed 2009-08-28(b)(1) (c)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reconsider must specify errors of fact or law in the BIA’s decision and be supported with pertinent authority. ... However, under agency regulations, an applicant filing a motion to reopen must submit material evidence supporting the allegations to be presented at a new hearing in the event the motion is granted.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of law or fact in the prior Board decision warranting relief.

Mazariegos-Diaz v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(b)(1)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mazariegos-Diaz’s motion to reconsider because the motion failed to identify any error of law or fact in the BIA’s August 9, 2007 order that would justify granting relief.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision.

Huang v. Holder · filed 2010-08-31(b)(1)

Furthermore, in its initial consideration of petitioners’ motion, the BIA clearly construed their motion as seeking reconsideration in part and reasonably found that petitioners’ conclusory assertion of error failed to specify any errors of fact or law in its prior decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao, 265 F.3d at 90.

A motion to reconsider must specify an error of fact or law in the prior decision.

de Perguachi v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2012-03-22(b)(1)

As the BIA noted, Petitioners failed to specify any error of fact or law in its prior decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), and instead simply declared—without any elaboration—that the delay in filing the motion to reopen “cannot be fairly ascribed to them.” (AR000003.)

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion for reconsideration to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior decision and to be supported by pertinent authority; it must do more than repeat facts and arguments already considered.

Hasan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-06-13(b)(1)

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), a motion for reconsideration of a decision by the BIA must “state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law” in the prior decision, and must be “supported by pertinent authority.” Such a motion requires more than a presentation of the same facts and arguments already considered.

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of law or fact in the challenged decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2012-08-21(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must “specify the errors of law or fact” in the challenged BIA decision and “be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2001).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and supporting documentation, while subsection (b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law.

Nyuwa v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-03-21(c)(1), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Nyuwa’s motion to reopen for failure to show prima facie eligibility for asylum. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (even assuming changed country conditions, petitioner must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief in order to reopen proceedings); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation). ... The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Nyuwa’s motion to reconsider where the motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision denying the motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the factual or legal errors in the prior Board decision and support them with pertinent authority.

Yeremin v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-04-16(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider “shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision and support them with pertinent authority; merely repeating earlier arguments is insufficient.

Gerson Noel Albornoz Solano v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2014-09-30(b)(1)

A motion to reconsider must specify the errors of law or fact in the prior BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority. See INA § 240(c)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). A motion to reconsider that merely reiterates arguments previously presented to the BIA does not specify errors of fact or law “as required for a successful motion to reconsider.”

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to specify the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and to be supported by pertinent authority.

Medellin-Loyola v. Lynch · filed 2016-02-29(b)(1)

Construed as a motion to reconsider, the motion failed to specify any error of fact or law in the prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.”).

Section 1003.2(a) makes BIA reconsideration decisions subject to abuse-of-discretion review, while § 1003.2(b)(1) requires a reconsideration motion to specify errors of fact or law and cite pertinent authority.

Garcia-Flores v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2020-03-18(a), (b)(1)

We review the denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, which is limited to the determination of whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and capricious manner. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); ... A motion to reconsider must state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior BIA decision and must be supported by pertinent authority. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law in the prior order.

Meza v. Barr · filed 2020-04-14(b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Obregon Meza’s motion to reconsider where his motion failed to identify any error of fact or law in the prior order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).

Section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to state its reasons by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision.

Calderon-Jordan v. Bondi · filed 2025-05-08(b)(1)

To the contrary, the regulations state that the “motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision,” and that “[t]he moving party may file a brief if it is included with the motion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (g)(3) (emphasis added).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.

Akhtar v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-23(c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion to reopen invoking 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4), however, where the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988) (finding that the movant’s failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief sought provides “independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the new evidence is immaterial or the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Meje v. Gonzales · filed 2006-01-23(c)(1)

The BIA may properly deny a motion to reopen where the evidence the alien seeks to offer is not material, or where the alien fails to establish prima facie eligibility for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2005); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). Here, the BIA correctly determined that Zhuo failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum with her evidence of her newborn son and claim that she would face persecution as an unwed mother in China.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present evidence of changed conditions or other material evidence supporting the claim.

Balla v. Gonzales · filed 2006-04-25(c)

The BIA reasonably found that the Balias had submitted no evidence with their motion that demonstrated changed conditions in Albania or that was material to their claim that they would face persecution if returned to Albania. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant lacks material, previously unavailable evidence or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Ying Ping Xu v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · filed 2007-07-13(c)(1)

The BIA may deny a motion when the movant fails to present material, previously unavailable evidence, or fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires the BIA to deny a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered appears material.

Mann v. Holder · filed 2010-06-03(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mann’s first motion to reopen because it considered the new evidence presented regarding her daughter’s medical condition and acted within its broad discretion in determining that it was not material because her condition was not severe or that she could not receive treatment in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material”); Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (The BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law.”)

Section 1003.2(c) permits the BIA to deny a motion to remand when the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Keovanna v. Holder · filed 2010-06-08(c)

Finally, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to remand, because petitioner failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under CAT based on the birth of his United States citizen daughter. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see also Mendez-Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2006) (prima facie eligibility is established “where the evidence reveals a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied”).

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts establishing prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Valencia v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-05-10(c)

Moreover, to the extent that he is asserting that the IJ and BIA should have considered, in spite of Valencia’s inadmissibility, the availability of cancellation of removal, he presents no new facts establishing prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status or cancellation of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material before the Board may grant the motion.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-08-11(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because Singh’s psychological evaluation did not explain the material inconsistencies underlying the immigration judge’s prior adverse credibility determination. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material . . . .”); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order as untimely, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) does not save a motion where the applicant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Ostapenko v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-10-02(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ostapenko’s third motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Ostapenko failed to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (the BIA may deny a motion to reopen for failure to establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought).

Subsection (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that was not previously available and establishes prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Pacheco v. Garland · filed 2021-11-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen removal proceedings to pursue claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, where Perez Pacheco’s evidence of phone threats was not previously unavailable and did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, including documentation supporting the requested relief.

Medina v. Bondi · filed 2025-04-15(c)(1)

However, the BIA reasonably denied the motion because Aguilar failed to submit documents showing that he was in fact eligible. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the Board to evaluate evidence offered with a motion to reopen to determine prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.

Cruzaldovinos v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-09-12(c)(1)

But the regulation governing motions to reopen plainly states that whether to grant such relief is a matter reserved to the Board’s discretion, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and further authorizes the Board to assess the alien’s prima facie eligibility for the relief he plans to seek. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (discussing process for adjudicating motions to reopen and explaining that the Board should evaluate the proffered evidence to determine prima facie eligibility for the relief ultimately sought).

Section 1003.2 gives the BIA discretion to reopen proceedings sua sponte, while a motion based on changed country conditions must be timely or satisfy an exception with new, material evidence establishing a reasonable likelihood of eligibility for the requested relief.

Vakeesan v. Eric H. Holder, Jr. · filed 2009-08-21(a), (c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Section 1003.2(a) “allows the BIA to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it does not require the BIA to do so.” ... Evidence of changed country conditions does not in itself warrant the reopening of an alien’s removal proceedings. The evidence must be material to the alien’s case, i.e., it must be sufficient, if proved, to change the outcome. ... The alien must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that, if removal proceedings are reopened, the alien will satisfy the statutory requirements for asylum.

The court rejected a separation-of-powers challenge to this provision.

Llamas-Valdez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-27(3)(c)(iii)

Llamas-Valdez’s contention that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(3)(c)(iii) violates the separation of powers doctrine is not persuasive.