8 C.F.R. § 1003.2

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final removal order, while § 1003.2(a) permits the agency to consider an untimely motion only through discretionary sua sponte reopening.

Villareal v. Garland · filed 2023-05-25(c)(2), (a)

A motion to reopen ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). ... Absent an exception to the filing deadline, an untimely motion can “only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua sponte authority” to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).

Subsection (a) permits the BIA to exercise sua sponte reopening discretion after considering whether the movant has made out a prima facie case for relief.

Alcantar v. Bondi · filed 2025-02-12(a)

The BIA did not err by noting that petitioners’ motion to reopen was “untimely and number-barred,” and the BIA correctly articulated the applicable standard governing its exercise of discretion. Consistent with the governing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), the BIA examined whether petitioners had “made out a prima facie case for relief,” id., and concluded that they had not.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of a final order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) exempts an agreed-upon, jointly filed motion from the time and numerical limitations.

Dervisevic v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-11-25(c)(2), (c)(3)(iii)

A motion to reopen must normally be filed within 90 days of a final order, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); but Dervisevic argued that his motion should be construed as a motion filed jointly with the Government, not subject to the 90-day limit, in light of his efforts to contact the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to obtain their consent. ... The BIA thus found the motion untimely and denied it. We agree with the BIA that the motion was not “jointly filed,” and we thus hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, and subsection (c)(3)(i) is one regulatory exception to that deadline.

Colin v. Holder · filed 2009-12-07(c)(2), (c)(3)(i)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely because it was filed over 90 days after the BIA’s February 8, 2006, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they qualified for any of the regulatory exceptions to the time limit on filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i)-(iv).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a time limit for motions to reopen, and a motion filed almost six years after the BIA’s order is untimely.

Kaseh v. Holder · filed 2009-12-07(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Kaseh’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed almost six years after the BIA’s January 25, 2001 order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaseh failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits an alien to one motion to reopen filed within 90 days after the Board's decision becomes final, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception for changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Djorov-Ivanov v. Holder · filed 2009-12-09(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Aliens are generally permitted to file one motion to reopen a deportation proceeding within 90 days of the Board’s decision on appeal, when the order becomes final. ... While the CAT regulations do not, as Djorov-Ivanov urges, create any special exception to timeliness regulations, a general exception for motions to reopen does exist for “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality.”

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order unless the deadline is equitably tolled, which requires due diligence.

Cruz-Herrera v. Holder · filed 2009-12-07(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Cruz-Herrera’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed the motion more than eighteen months after the BIA issued its final order, and she failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the motions deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after the Board's final decision, absent an applicable exception.

Alonso v. Holder · filed 2009-12-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez Alonso’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over six months after the BIA’s final decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supplies the filing deadline for motions to reopen, which the court applied to a motion filed more than ten years after the BIA’s final order.

Alvarenga-Velasquez v. Holder · filed 2010-01-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvargena-Velasquez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than 10 years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Alvargena-Velasquez failed to establish that she exercised due diligence required to warrant tolling of the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s deadline made Kaur's motion to reopen untimely because she filed it more than two years after the BIA's order; the court also recognized possible equitable tolling.

Kaur v. Holder · filed 2010-01-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely Kaur’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s April 29, 2004, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897-98 (deadline for filing a motion to reopen can be equitably tolled “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports treating a motion to reopen as untimely when it was filed more than four years after the BIA's final removal order.

Santos-Rivas v. Holder · filed 2010-01-21(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Perez’s motion to reopen because it was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Perez did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a timeliness limit on motions to reopen, which the court applied to a motion filed more than five months after the BIA’s order.

Majdoub v. Holder · filed 2010-02-22(c)(2)

the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Majdoub’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than five months after the BIA’s June 9, 2005 order dismissing his appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports denying as untimely a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA’s order.

Magallon-Cardenas v. Holder · filed 2010-02-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Magallon-Cardenas’ motion to reopen as untimely where it was filed more than two years after the BIA’s April 23, 2003, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supports treating a motion to reopen filed more than eight years after the BIA’s dismissal order as untimely.

Madatian v. Holder · filed 2010-03-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 8 years after the BIA’s May 23, 1997, order dismissing their appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed nine months after the BIA’s order.

Huerta v. Holder · filed 2010-04-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Perez Huerta’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed his motion to reopen nine months after the BIA’s July 17, 2006, order, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day filing limitation applies to motions to reopen, subject to an exception.

Escobar v. Holder · filed 2010-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motions to reopen because both motions were filed more than three years after the BIA’s February 26, 2004, order dismissing the underlying appeal, and failed to qualify for an exception to the 90-day filing limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3); see also Matter of Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (BIA 2002) (motion to reopen based on pending I-130 visa petition may be granted if, inter alia, the motion is timely filed); Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (pending petition for review does not toll the time limit for filing motion to reopen with the BIA).

Under § 1003.2(c)(2), a motion to reopen may be denied as untimely when filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order of removal.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-05-20(c)(2)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely because she filed it over five years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order as untimely.

Escamilla-Reyes v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-06-01(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Escamilla-Reyes’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Escamilla-Reyes failed to establish due diligence during the interval between the alleged ineffective assistance and the filing of the motion to reopen, see Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed nearly four years after the final BIA order as untimely.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2011-03-10(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Chen’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed nearly four years after the BIA’s December 19, 2002, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Chen failed to show changed circumstances in China in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin, 588 F.3d at 988-89 (record did not show material change in enforcement of family planning laws sufficient to establish changed country conditions and excuse an untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than five months after the BIA’s final administrative order as untimely.

Casteneda-Rivera v. Holder · filed 2011-03-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Casteneda-Rivera’s motion as untimely where the motion was filed more than five months after the BIA’s final administrative order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely unless the movant establishes an applicable exception, including changed circumstances in the country of nationality.

Lin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-04-01(c)(2)

To begin with, there is no question that Lin‟s motion to reopen was untimely filed. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). We also conclude that Lin has not shown “changed circumstances” in China, as an exception to § 1003.2(c)(2), for substantially the reasons given in the BIA‟s decision.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than one year after the Board's final decision is untimely absent an applicable exception.

Singh v. Holder · filed 2010-06-07(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over one year after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).

Section 1003.2 supports treating a motion to reopen filed almost ten months after the BIA’s order as untimely.

Gutierrez v. Holder · filed 2010-06-10

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed almost ten months after the BIA’s October 5, 2006, order dismissing the underlying appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; see also Dela Cruz v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“[T]he pendency of a petition for review of an order of removal does not toll the statutory time limit for the filing of a motion to reopen with the BIA.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen.

Katigbak v. Holder · filed 2010-07-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because Singh’s motion was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R.§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Subsection (c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost two years after the final order of removal, absent a valid basis for equitable tolling.

Martinez-Perez v. Holder · filed 2010-07-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Martinez-Perez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost two years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Martinez-Perez failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud or error, and exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances); see also Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed outside the applicable deadline.

Quiroz v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner Ana Elia Valdovinos Quiroz’s motion, because construed as either a motion to reopen or reconsider, it was untimely. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (b)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than 90 days after the final administrative order, absent an applicable exception.

Barco-Guerra v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Barco-Guerra’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed over ten years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Barco-Guerra failed to demonstrate eligibility for any of the regulatory exceptions to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost eight years after the BIA's order.

Lopez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-07-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez Lopez’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed the motion almost eight years after the BIA’s January 31, 2000, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Rodriguez Lopez failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897; cf. Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than two years after the BIA’s order as untimely.

Al Qasem Asaad v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Asaad’s motion to reopen as untimely because he filed the motion more than two years after the BIA’s March 25, 2005, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Asaad failed to establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897; see also Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than five years after the final order of removal.

Salinas-Lopez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Salinas-Lopez’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than five years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Salinas-Lopez failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, see Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (equitable tolling applies where “despite all due diligence, [the party invoking equitable tolling] is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the claim”) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen after a final administrative order.

Karapetyan v. Holder · filed 2010-09-30(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Lin’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than a year after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also He, 501 F.3d at 1132 (the birth of children outside the country of origin is a change in personal circumstances that is not sufficient to establish changed circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits the BIA to deny as untimely a motion to reopen filed almost ten years after the final removal order.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-25(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Singh’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed almost 10 years after the BIA’s final removal order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than six years after the BIA's order when the petitioner cannot show the due diligence required for equitable tolling.

Camacho-Contreras v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Camacho-Contreras’ motion to reopen because it was filed more than six years after the BIA’s March 25, 2002, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Camacho-Contreras failed to demonstrate that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally bars untimely and successive motions to reopen, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides a regulatory exception when changed country conditions are shown.

Weng v. Holder · filed 2011-04-11(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Weng’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred, where the motion was filed nearly eleven years after the immigration judge’s December 6, 1996, order denying her first motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Weng failed to show changed circumstances in China in order to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Lin, 588 F.3d at 988-89 (record did not show material change in enforcement of family planning laws sufficient to establish changed country conditions and excuse an untimely motion to reopen).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally limits a motion to reopen to one motion filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision.

Tchieng v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-06-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Tchieng’s third motion to reopen, filed over two years after the BIA’s final order, as untimely and number-barred. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and the court treated a motion filed more than 13 years after the deportation order as untimely under that provision.

MATA-FASARDO v. Holder · filed 2011-06-28(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mata-Fasardo’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than 13 years after his 1996 deportation order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Mata-Fasardo did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed eleven months after the BIA’s final decision as untimely.

Kumar v. Holder Jr. · filed 2011-07-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed eleven months after the BIA’s final decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order, subject to an applicable exemption.

Shah v. Holder · filed 2011-09-15(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Shah’s motion to reopen as untimely. Shah filed the motion more than 90 days after the agency issued its final administrative order, and he did not establish eligibility for an exemption from the 90-day deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than seven months after the BIA's order.

Ndoci v. Holder · filed 2012-04-05(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ndoci’s motion to reopen as untimely, as she filed it more than seven months after the BIA’s order upholding the immigration judge’s underlying merits decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c) treats a motion to reopen filed four years after the BIA’s final decision as untimely.

Kravchuk v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-04-25(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kravchuk’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed four years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Kravchuk did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) treats a motion to reopen as untimely when it is filed more than ten years after the final order of removal.

Montiel v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-05-23(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Montiel’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than ten years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Montiel did not establish grounds for equitable tolling where she failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), see Singh v. Holder, 658 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2011).

Section 1003.2(c) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed almost two years after the BIA’s final decision.

Pelaez v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-05-24(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia-Pelaez’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed almost two years after the BIA’s final decision, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), and Garcia-Pelaez did not establish prima facie eligibility for relief, see Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief warranting reopening based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a time limit on motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than six years after the final order of removal is untimely.

Zou v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Zou’s motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than six years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zou failed to show the due diligence necessary for equitable tolling, see Singh, 658 F.3d at 884.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) supplies the timeliness limit for a motion to reopen; the court applied it to a motion filed over five years after the BIA’s final order.

Ghayoor Khan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-09(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Khan failed to present sufficient material, previously unavailable evidence of changed circumstances in Pakistan to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (BIA did not abuse its discretion where evidence of changed country conditions was not material to petitioner’s claim, and petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The critical question is . . . whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) bars a motion to reopen filed more than 90 days after the final order of removal, subject to applicable exceptions.

Juarez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-12(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than two years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to establish that they filed their motion within 90 days of discovering the alleged ineffective assistance, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897-99 (limitation period may be equitably tolled until petitioner meets with attorney to discuss case and learns of previous ineffective assistance of counsel); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (90-day limitation period begins to run from the day the error is discovered).

Section 1003.2(c)(3) does not make an alien’s current prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status an exception to the deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-08-20(c)(3)

In the end, Zheng cannot show that he was prejudiced by former counsel‟s omissions because his third motion to reopen was time- and number-barred, and because his current prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status does not constitute an exception to the deadline for filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than eighteen months after the removal order became final is untimely.

Zaporozhets v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-06-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaporozhets’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than eighteen months after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Zaporozhets failed to demonstrate a material change in circumstances in Ukraine to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline, id. at (c)(3)(ii); Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).

Subsection (c)(2) treats a motion to reopen filed more than six years after the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision as untimely.

Habib Khan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-10-18(c)(2)

We find the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khan’s motion to reopen because the motion was untimely, having been filed more than six years after the BIA’s decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than three years after the removal order became final is untimely absent applicable equitable tolling.

Reddy v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-02-24(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Reddy’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed more than three years after Reddy’s removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Reddy failed to show the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud or error, and exercised due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen removal proceedings to be timely; the court applied that requirement and concluded Kumar's motion was untimely.

Kumar v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-19(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kumar’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kumar failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India so as to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (setting forth requirements for prevailing on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the regulatory time limit, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) provides an exception when materially changed conditions in the country of removal are demonstrated.

Endang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-21(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners did not demonstrate materially changed conditions in Indonesia to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limit for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” from the evidence presented at the previous hearing).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day deadline for motions to reopen, subject to equitable tolling when the petitioner demonstrates the required due diligence.

Munkhtumur v. Lynch · filed 2015-06-11(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen as untimely. The motion was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s order dismissing their appeal and petitioners failed to establish that they acted with the due diligence required to warrant tolling of the 90-day filing deadline with respect to any of the issues they raised in their motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from filing due to deception, fraud, or error only if the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when it is filed more than ten years after the final administrative order of removal.

Abelyan v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-04-20(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than ten years after the final administrative order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Abelyan failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, so a motion filed more than four years after the final order of removal is untimely absent an available basis for equitable tolling.

Vasquez-Trejo v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-11-03(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasquez-Trejo’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than four years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Vasquez-Trejo failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long the alien exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final removal order, subject to specified exceptions.

Wang v. Sessions · filed 2017-12-05(c)(2)

It is undisputed that Wang’s 2016 motion to reopen was untimely because his removal order became final in 2008. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)(setting 90-day filing period for motions to reopen); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)(same). Although this time limitation does not apply if the motion is “based on changed country conditions” since the time of the original hearing, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), as discussed below, the BIA’s conclusion that Wang failed to establish such a change is supported by substantial evidence, see Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 169.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and an untimely motion may be denied when the movant cannot establish due diligence to support equitable tolling.

Morales v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2017-12-21(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Alvarado Morales’ motion to reopen as untimely, where he did not timely file the motion and failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2011) (equitable tolling is available to a petitioner who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud or error, as long as the petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order, subject to applicable exceptions such as equitable tolling.

Leiva v. Jefferson Sessions, III · filed 2018-10-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Madrid Leiva’s motion to reopen as untimely, where he filed the motion more than four years after his final administrative order of removal, and did not show that equitable tolling of the filing deadline was warranted.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed eight months after the removal order becomes final, absent an applicable regulatory exception.

Orellana-Herrera v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-23(c)(2)

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Orellana-Herrera’s motion to reopen removal proceedings as untimely, where it was filed eight months after the order of removal became final, and Orellana-Herrera has not established materially changed country conditions in Guatemala to qualify for the regulatory exception to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3)(ii); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen before the Board of Immigration Appeals to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order.

Jose De Los Santos-Gordillo v. Garland · filed 2021-07-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying as untimely De Los Santos-Gordillo’s motion to reopen in order to consider new evidence relevant to his application for cancellation of removal, where he filed the motion more than nine months after his final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“no time limit on the filing of a motion to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for [asylum and withholding of removal] and is based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than 90 days after a final removal order, while § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) provides an exception for a motion agreed upon by all parties and jointly filed.

Sharabidze v. Garland · filed 2022-02-24(c)(2), (c)(3)(iii)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sharabidze’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed over 11 years after the order of removal became final, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and he has not established that any statutory or regulatory exception to the filing deadline applies, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii), (iv); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(iii) (exception to the filing deadline where the motion to reopen is “[a]greed upon by all parties and jointly filed”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets a time limit for motions to reopen, subject to specified exceptions.

Montoya-Hernandez v. Garland · filed 2022-05-26(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Montoya-Hernandez’s motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed more than nine months after the order of removal became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and where Montoya-Hernandez did not establish changed country conditions in Peru that are material to his claim for relief, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (material evidence of changed circumstances is required to qualify for an exception to the time and numerical limitations for motions to reopen); Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 987-90 (evidence must be “qualitatively different” to warrant reopening).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days, while § 1003.2(c)(3) provides limited exceptions to that deadline; eligibility to adjust status through a later marriage to a U.S. citizen does not qualify as an exception.

Egemba v. Garland · filed 2024-04-03(c)(2), (c)(3)

It is undisputed that Egemba’s 2022 motion was untimely because he filed it more than five years after his removal order became final in 2016. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (setting 90-day deadline for reopening); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Egemba did not invoke any statutory exception to the deadline, and his purported eligibility to adjust status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen does not fall within an exception to the time limit. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (identifying exceptions); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (same); see also Matter of Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be denied”). Accordingly, we deny the petition to the extent it challenges the denial of his motion to reopen as untimely.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one motion to reopen and requires it to be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision; the court applied that deadline and held the petitioner's motion untimely.

Acosta-Ochoa v. Garland · filed 2024-06-13(c)(2)

The BIA concluded that Petitioner’s removal proceedings should not be reopened because his motion was untimely. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) “a party may file only one motion to reopen deportation or exclusion proceedings … and that motion must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.” Petitioner filed his motion well after that deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel to be filed within 90 days, but the deadline may be equitably tolled when deception, fraud, or error prevents timely filing and the petitioner acts diligently.

Kumar v. Holder · filed 2009-12-10(c)(2)

Although a motion to reopen on IAC grounds generally must be filed no later than ninety days after a final administrative order, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), the BIA has the discretion to toll this deadline “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.” ... The BIA therefore abused its discretion by finding petitioners not diligent and thus ineligible for equitable tolling, and on remand should further consider petitioners’ IAC claim.

Section 1003.2(c)(2)'s 90-day deadline for motions to reopen may be equitably tolled only when an external force beyond the movant's control prevented timely filing, even if the movant exercised due diligence.

Wen Zheng Zheng v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-12-29(c)(2)

Even assuming that Zheng acted with the requisite diligence in pursuing his motion to reopen, he still must demonstrate that some external force prevented him from timely filing his motion. Based on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that Zheng failed to meet this standard.

The 90-day deadline for a BIA motion to reopen is not subject to equitable tolling for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Rodas v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2008-05-21(c)(2)

We concluded that the 90-day filing deadline is “mandatory and jurisdictional, and, therefore, it is not subject to equitable tolling.” Id. at 1150. Having reviewed the record in this case, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioners’ motion to reopen as time-barred; nor did the BIA deny Petitioners due process of law.

The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled for ineffective assistance of counsel only when that assistance affected the alien’s ability to file on time.

Junaidi v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2008-01-28(c)(2)

It is not any claim of ineffective assistance that will warrant equitable tolling; only those ineffective assistance claims that relate to the alien’s ability to meet a filing deadline can justify equitable tolling.

A motion to reopen generally must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision; ineffective assistance of counsel may equitably toll that deadline if the petitioner shows prejudice and due diligence.

Espinoza v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2011-09-23(c)(2)

But the deadline for filing a motion to reopen may be equitably tolled by an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. ... Therefore, because Espinoza has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by her former counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her untimely motion to reopen.

A motion to reopen before the BIA must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Li v. Holder · filed 2010-07-29(c)(2)

A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the relevant final administrative decision.

A late motion to reopen requires due diligence to qualify for equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

Nieto v. Lynch · filed 2016-11-04(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Nieto’s motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than one year after his final order of removal, and Nieto failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen before the BIA to state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing if the motion is granted.

Esteban v. Garland · filed 2023-08-07(c)(1)

Setting aside whether any of these PSGs are legally cognizable, Yoc Esteban did not present these potential PSGs to the BIA, see id. at 71 ("A motion to reopen proceedings before the BIA must state 'new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted.'") (emphasis added) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)), and he cannot rely on them now as the basis of his argument that the BIA abused its discretion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief from removal to include the relief application and supporting documents and to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

AMORES v. TSOUKARIS · filed 2023-02-09(c)(1)

Importantly, if an individual seeks reopening to apply for relief from removal, the motion must include the relief application and supporting documents and should demonstrate that the person is prima facie eligible for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1); 1003.23(b)(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an appropriate application for relief when seeking remand of removal proceedings, and the BIA may decline remand when the applicant fails to submit one.

Reyes v. Garland · filed 2023-05-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand Monzon Reyes’s removal proceedings where he failed to submit an appropriate application for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to reopen, in part, because motion was not accompanied by an application for the relief sought).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking relief to include the appropriate application and supporting documents, and § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) requires evidence offered on reopening to have been previously unavailable and undiscoverable.

Lin v. Attorney General United States · filed 2012-11-27(c)(3)(ii); (c)(1)

On a motion to reopen removal proceedings, that evidence must be shown to have been unavailable and undiscoverable during the previous proceeding. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Federal regulations require that “[a] motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... In light of the mandatory language in § 1003.2(c)(1), and in recognition of the BIA’s authority to enforce its procedural requirements, Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, we conclude that that failure alone is a sufficient basis to deny his petition.

A motion to reopen proceedings to submit an application for relief must include the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-12-11(c)(1)

As to petitioners’ motion to reopen, the BIA properly denied it in part because it was not accompanied by an application for cancellation of removal as required by the agency’s regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen filed to submit an application for relief to be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.

Lin v. Holder · filed 2009-12-15(c)(1)

The BIA also did not err in declining to reopen Chen’s proceedings based on her new practice of Christianity because she failed to submit an application for asylum regarding such a claim for relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered with a motion to reopen to have been unavailable and unable to have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-01-16(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen because Singh did not demonstrate that the evidence he submitted with his motion was new and previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (evidence offered with a motion to reopen must have been unavailable and unable to have been discovered or presented at the former hearing); see also Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen seeking asylum based on changed circumstances to be accompanied by a second asylum application.

Jamal Al-Jabre v. Holder Jr · filed 2013-03-26(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the first motion to reopen because Al-Jabre sought asylum based on changed circumstances, but failed to submit a second asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be based on new, previously unavailable evidence.

De Quan Ye v. Holder · filed 2014-07-02(c)(1)

The regulations provide that a motion to reopen must be based on new, previously unavailable evidence. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) allows the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the proposed evidence duplicates evidence available at the original hearing.

Hovanesyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-04(c)(1)

The evidence Petitioner sought to present on remand was duplicative of evidence available at the time of his original hearing. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2 requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions to be material and previously unavailable, and bars reliance on evidence that was available or could have been presented at the prior hearing.

Bulanov v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-01-22(c)(3)(ii), (c)(1)

Where, as here, a petitioner files a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, the petitioner must demonstrate that “circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim . . . now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” ... The evidence of changed country conditions must be material and must have been previously unavailable. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Finally, Bulanov’s reference to instances of discrimination and violence experienced by some non-Orthodox Christians in the decade prior to his original hearing is not newly available evidence, and so does not support his argument. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that the evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen—and, under the same formal requirements, a motion to remand—to state new facts and include supporting evidence.

Lopez v. Jefferson Sessions · filed 2018-04-13(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying Alvarez Lopez’s motion to remand, where he provided no new facts or evidence of his eligibility for the relief he sought. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen shall state new facts and be supported by evidence); Romero-Ruiz, 538 F.3d at 1063 (“The formal requirements of a motion to remand and a motion to reopen are the same.”); 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(e)(3) (2013) (requiring an approved immigrant visa in order to be granted a provisional unlawful presence waiver).

Section (c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Linares-Miranda v. Wilkinson · filed 2021-02-19(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Linares-Miranda’s untimely motion to reopen where Linares-Miranda failed to support her motion with an affidavit or other evidentiary material and otherwise failed to establish changed country conditions in El Salvador to qualify for an exception to the time limitations for filing a motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”)

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven, include affidavits or other evidentiary material, include the application for relief and supporting documentation when relief is sought, and present material evidence that was previously unavailable.

Aguilar-Rivera v. Attorney General United States · filed 2021-07-02(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). If the motion is submitted for the purpose of applying for relief, as in this case, it must include the “application for relief and all supporting documentation.” Id. The motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id.

Section 1003.2 bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material, was previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Mboba v. Garland · filed 2023-07-27

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. ... For example, Mboba’s contention is not that he developed PTSD after the hearing before the IJ, but that his PTSD was not yet diagnosed. 6 This evidence is not of the sort that “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. There was thus no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) bars reopening unless the offered evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Larin v. Garland · filed 2024-12-05(c)(1)

As the movant, Escobar bore the burden of showing that Dr. Nickels's opinion was unavailable in the month prior to the hearing. ... see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) ("A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing."). ... Accordingly, at least given the record before us and the arguments made to the BIA, Escobar has failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen insofar as the motion rests on Dr. Nickels's declaration.

A motion to reopen requires material evidence that was unavailable at the previous hearing; a claimed change in country conditions must be explained and shown to matter.

Channa v. Gonzales · filed 2006-10-26(c)(1)

Although the affidavit that Channa submitted with his motion stated that the “Congress party is back in power” and that the “Blue Star operation at Golden Temple, Amritsar, Punjab took place under the rule of this party,” he fails to offer an explanation of when this change occurred or how it is material to his claim of “changed circumstances” in India. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (a motion to reopen shall not be granted unless it appears that the evidence offered “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at the previous hearing).

A motion to reopen must be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material, even when filed without counsel.

Minasyan v. Garland · filed 2022-05-20(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, which was not supported as required by the governing regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen . . . shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.”); ... Petitioners offer no support for their contention that the BIA should have excused them from this requirement because they filed their motion to reopen pro se.

Section 1003.2 requires a motion to reopen to include a proposed application for relief, generally limits such motions to one filed within 90 days, and preserves an exception for material, previously unavailable changed-country-conditions evidence.

Sokoli v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2012-10-02(c)(1), (c)(2), (c)(3)(ii)

Moreover, Sokoli did not attach to her motion a proposed adjustment of status application, in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... We- first observe that motions to reopen must be filed within ninety days from the date “the final administrative decision was rendered,” and only one such motion is allowed under the applicable regulation. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). These time and number limitations do not apply, though, when the motion to reopen relies on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality ... if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3) (ii). ... Furthermore, and as the BIA properly noted, Sokoli failed to submit any new evidence in order to satisfy § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative order of removal, and § 1003.2(g)(2)(i) requires the motion to include the required fee payment or fee-waiver request.

Khokhar v. Holder · filed 2010-01-12(c)(2) (g)(2)(i)

Title 8, section 1229a(c)(7) of the United States Code provides that any motion to reopen must be filed “within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.” See also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). Furthermore, the governing regulations mandate that a motion to reopen “be accompanied by a check, money order, or fee waiver request in satisfaction of the fee requirements of [8 C.F.R.] § 1003.8.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(g)(2)(i). The BIA’s decision, therefore, does not constitute an inexplicable departure from established policies.

(c)(2) requires a general motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days after the final administrative decision, subject to the regulation’s stated later date.

Kawashima v. Holder · filed 2010-01-27(c)(2)

Section 1003.44 does not require mere notice, it imposes strict procedural requirements to qualify for relief, including the notation “special motion to seek section 212(c) relief.” Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not err in applying the 90-day filing deadlines for general motions to reopen pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) and in denying Mr. Kawashima’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed almost eight months late.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than eleven years after the BIA's order is untimely absent an applicable exception.

Villatoro v. Holder · filed 2010-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Villatoro’s motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than eleven years after the BIA’s January 3, 1996, order dismissing the underlying appeal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Villatoro failed to demonstrate either that a regulatory exception to the filing deadline applied, see id. § 1003.2(c)(3), or that she acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling available where “petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a 90-day filing limit on motions to reopen, subject to regulatory exceptions.

Ramos-Madrid v. Holder · filed 2010-06-02(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than 19 months after the BIA’s October 28, 2005, order dismissing the underlying appeal, and failed to qualify for an exception to the 90-day filing limitation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)-(3).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than six years after the final removal order is untimely absent equitable tolling.

Singh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-03-29(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed more than six years after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh failed to show he acted with the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) limits motions to reopen by a filing deadline, subject to applicable exceptions, and section 1003.2(b)(1) requires a motion to reconsider to identify an error of fact or law.

Gutierrez v. Holder · filed 2010-09-28(c)(2), (b)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reopen because the motion was filed more than four years after the BIA’s December 5, 2002, order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and petitioners failed to demonstrate that they acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”); see also Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2007). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion to reconsider because petitioners failed to identify any error of fact or law in the BIA’s June 1, 2007, order. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1180 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, and a motion filed one year after the BIA’s final order is time-barred.

Singh v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-10-25(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen as time-barred because it was filed one year after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Singh did not demonstrate that equitable tolling was warranted, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) sets the filing deadline for a motion to reopen, and eligibility to adjust status does not excuse an untimely motion.

Sidibe v. Holder · filed 2010-10-25(c)(2)

Given the untimely filing of Sidibe’s August 2008 motion to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that his eligibility to adjust status based on an approved I-130 petition did not excuse the untimely filing of his motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen to be filed within the applicable filing deadline, so a motion filed more than ten years after the removal order became final is untimely absent a valid exception.

Barraza v. Holder · filed 2010-11-02(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying as untimely Barraza’s motion to reopen and remand because the motion was filed more than ten years after his removal order became final, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Barraza did not show that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Singh, 491 F.3d at 1096-97.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing deadline for motions to reopen, which the court applied to deem a motion filed more than seven years after the final removal order untimely.

Penaloza v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-04-14(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners’ motion as untimely where they filed the motion more than seven years after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and they failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) requires a motion to reopen proceedings to be filed within 90 days after a final administrative order.

Hovhannisyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-22(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Hovhannisyan’s motion to reopen where the motion was filed seven months after the BIA’s final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative order), and Hovhannisyan did not establish grounds for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Iturribarria, 321 F.3d at 897 (equitable tolling is available “when a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error”).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed beyond the applicable deadline, while subsection (c)(3) provides exceptions to that deadline.

Sogoyan v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2011-07-25(c)(2), (c)(3)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sogoyan’s motion to reopen as untimely because it was filed more than six months after the final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Sogoyan did not establish that he acted with the due diligence required for equitable tolling, see Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling available where “a petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner acts with due diligence”). Sogoyan did not establish eligibility for any of the regulatory exceptions to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (evidence of changed circumstances in the country of removal lacks the requisite materiality where it simply recounts generalized conditions); cf. Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2004).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes a filing-time limit for motions to reopen, and a motion filed more than six years after the BIA's final order is untimely.

Da Wang v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-03-13(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Wang’s motion to reopen as untimely, where she filed the motion more than six years after the BIA’s final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wang failed to demonstrate that there has been a material change in circumstances in China with respect to the government’s mistreatment of political dissidents, see Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir. 2010); He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007) (a change in personal circumstances does not establish changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) makes a motion to reopen untimely when filed more than three years after the final removal order and no exception to the filing deadline applies.

Uzzhina v. Holder Jr. · filed 2012-03-13(c)(2)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Uzzhina’s motion to reopen as untimely because Uzzhina filed her motion more than three years after the BIA’s final order of removal, and she did not establish that her motion is subject to any exceptions to the filing deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally requires a motion to reopen to be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, while the regulation's changed-country-conditions exception applies only when the evidence shows a material change that was previously unavailable.

Zhang v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2012-07-26(c)(2)

Ordinarily, such motions “must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). However, the above time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen proceedings based on “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing.” § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). ... Zhang has not pointed to evidence of record that demonstrates a material change in country conditions since his merits hearing. He has therefore failed to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) generally permits only one motion to reopen filed within 90 days, while subsection (c)(3) does not exempt an adjustment-of-status claim from that time limit.

Jing Rong He v. Holder · filed 2012-08-17(c)(2), (c)(3)

An alien may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within 90 days of the agency’s final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). To the extent that the BIA construed He’s 2010 motion as a motion to reopen to apply for adjustment of status, the BIA properly found that the 2010 motion was untimely because it was filed more than ten years after the IJ’s in absentia removal order in 1999. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The BIA also properly found that He’s eligibility for adjustment of status did not constitute an exception to the applicable time limitation on motions to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also In re Yauri, 25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009).

When the Board has rendered a decision, subsection (a) requires a party seeking to reopen the case to file a written motion with the Board, but the place-of-filing rule is procedural rather than jurisdictional.

Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2013-12-24(a)

The agency’s interpretation of the statute is set out in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). That regulation provides that “[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision,” but “[a] request to reopen or reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the Board . . . must be in the form of a written motion to the Board.” (Emphasis added). Therefore, under the regulation, if the Board has rendered a “decision,” a party seeking to reopen must file a motion with the Board. ... Nevertheless, we conclude that Euceda Hernandez is correct that the Board’s place-of-filing rule is a procedural claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar to the Board’s authority to consider a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(2) imposes time limitations on motions to reopen, and an untimely motion may be denied.

Parvez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2014-05-16(c)(2)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Parvez’s motion to reopen because it was untimely, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Parvez failed to establish materially changed circumstances in Pakistan to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitations for motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3); see also He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2007) (The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying motion where petitioners “provided insufficient support to establish changed circumstances”); Toufighi, 538 F.3d at 996 (setting forth requirements for prevailing on a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions).

Section 1003.2(a) permits the Board to reopen a case in which it rendered a decision and requires a motion to reopen to be filed with the entity that adjudicated the decision being reopened.

Uzoegwu v. Garland · filed 2023-12-18(a)

The so-called “place-of-filing rule,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides that the Board may reopen any case in which it has rendered a decision. Longstanding Board precedent has understood this rule to require immigrants to file a motion to reopen with the entity that adjudicated the decision to be reopened. Matter of Mladineo, 14 I. & N. Dec. 591, 592 (B.I.A. 1974). Applying that rule, the Board declined to consider Petitioner’s motion to reopen because it had summarily dismissed his appeal as untimely and thus never rendered a decision on the merits. We find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s adherence to the place-of-filing rule.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires newly offered evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable or undiscoverable, and permits denial when those requirements are not met.

Liang v. Holder · filed 2012-04-17(c)(1)

“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits the BIA to consider new evidence on appeal only when it is material and was previously unavailable or undiscoverable.

Bin Wu v. Holder · filed 2012-06-18(c)(1)

The BIA noted that Mr. Wu had not shown that the new evidence was previously unavailable or undiscoverable, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... But in arguing this way, Mr. Wu effectively concedes that the evidence could not satisfy the other requirement for new evidence, i.e., that it be material. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... In sum, the BIA properly refused to consider the new evidence on appeal and did not abuse its discretion in declining to remand the matter to the IJ before whom Mr. Wu’s motion to reopen was pending.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable, meaning it could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zhou v. Holder · filed 2010-01-22(c)(1)

Moreover, as the BIA found, the article concerned events in a province other than Zhou’s own, making it of little probative value. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”). The BIA also did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the statement of Zhou’s friend because that statement was not previously unavailable. See id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires supplemental evidence supporting a motion to reopen to have been unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of the initial hearing.

Bankole v. Holder · filed 2010-02-11(c)(1)

Pursuant to the governing regulations, such supplemental evidence must have been unavailable or undiscoverable at the time of the initial hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2009); see Barry, 445 F.3d at 747.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be material, previously unavailable, and unable to have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Chen v. Holder · filed 2010-02-19(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Chen’s motion to reopen because the evidence she sought to introduce, her sister’s letter, was previously available and could have been presented at her merits hearing. Id.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts and include evidence showing prima facie eligibility, while § 1003.2(c)(2) permits only one such motion, filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision.

Shin v. Mukasey · filed 2008-10-22(c)(1), (c)(2)

A motion to reopen must, among other things, state the new facts to be considered at the reopened hearing and be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary materials demonstrating prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... Further, aliens are entitled to file only one motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (providing that a party may file only one motion to reopen proceedings and that motion must be filed within 90 days after the date on which a final administrative decision was filed).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening removal proceedings only upon material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing with due diligence.

Lin, Bao H. v. Gonzales, Alberto R. · filed 2006-01-23(c)(1)

The BIA may reopen removal proceedings if the alien presents new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Simtion v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2004). Further, a motion to reopen should not be granted unless the evidence presented “ ‘could not by the exercise of due diligence have been discovered earlier. . . .’ ” Krougliak v. INS, 289 F.3d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matter of Coelho, 20 I & N Dec. 464, 472 n.4 (BIA 1992)).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening removal proceedings only when the new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not reasonably have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Lin v. Alberto Gonzales, 1 · filed 2006-01-23(c)(1)

The BIA may reopen removal proceedings if the alien presents new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see Simtion v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir.2004). ... Most of the sources that Aird relied upon in his 2003 affidavit date back to the 1990s, so that information was available and reasonably discoverable at the time of the removal hearing, and certainly by the time that the BIA rendered its final decision in December 2003. ... Because Lin gave no reason for delaying so long to submit Aird’s affidavit, the Board acted within its discretion to deny the motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by evidence that is material, previously unavailable, and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Jiang v. Gonzales · filed 2006-05-08(c)(1)

A motion to reopen will not be granted unless the movant pi'oves that the evidence sought to be offered is material, was not available, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the supporting evidence is material and was previously unavailable.

Hu v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Services · filed 2006-05-10(c)(1)

Here, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Ye’s motion to reopen because it reasonably determined that her “new” evidence was not material and could have been obtained previously. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires motion-to-reopen evidence to have been unavailable at the former hearing, but does not require it to remain unavailable throughout later administrative proceedings.

Chen v. United States Department of Justice · filed 2006-07-28(c)(1)

The regulation at issue in this case, however, is not ambiguous. The regulation specifically states that the evidence sought to be offered must not have been previously available “at the former hearing”; it does not indicate that the information had to remain unavailable throughout the subsequent administrative proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); cf. Jian Yun Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 48 (2d Cir.2005) (reading the regulation to mean that an applicant can succeed on a motion to reopen if the new information was not available at the time of the hearing before the IJ). Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA erred in finding that because Chen’s alleged new evidence became available while his initial appeal remained under consideration by the BIA, the BIA was prohibited by regulation from considering the alleged evidence in support of a motion to reopen filed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven and include supporting evidence, and permits reopening only when the evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Esteban Fernando Antoni Parra v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2006-09-06(c)(1)

A petitioner may file a motion to reopen with the BIA which “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). “A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen. ... We agree with the BIA that this evidence did not constitute new facts sufficient to justify reopening the proceedings given that (1) the IJ already was aware that Esteban had been granted asylum, and (2) Esteban had testified regarding his asylum claims at the petitioners’ hearing.

Section 1003.2(c) permits the BIA to deny a motion to reopen when the movant presents no new evidence and does not reasonably explain why the claims were not pursued at the prior hearing.

Liang Wen v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-01(c)

Contrary to Wen’s contentions, the BIA acted within its discretion when it denied his motion for failing to present new evidence and for failing to reasonably explain why Wen did not pursue these claims during his previous hearing in 2004. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); Doherty, 502 U.S. at 325-328, 112 S.Ct. 719.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proved, include supporting affidavits or other evidence, and show that material new evidence could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Petrosyan v. Gonzales · filed 2007-03-06(c)(1)

A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 984. The evidence presented must be “material,” and the applicant must show that the evidence “could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 984. “The applicant must demonstrate that the new evidence, when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought.” Id. Because motions to reopen are decided without any factual hearing at which credibility determinations can be made, “facts presented in affidavits supporting a motion to reopen must be accepted as true unless inherently unbelievable.” Id. at 986-87.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present material new evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Zhang v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-03-14(c)(1)

In a motion to reopen, the petitioner must show (1) there is new evidence; and (2) that new evidence is material, was unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... First, Zhang failed to present material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. ... But Zhang filed an affidavit with the IJ on March 18, 2005 indicating that his wife was pregnant with their third child. Consequently, the evidence of the third child was before the IJ when he issued his August 5, 2005 order and does not constitute “new” evidence meriting reopening.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a motion to reopen to present new and material evidence supporting the underlying application.

Singh v. Gonzales · filed 2007-04-30(c)

The BIA acted within its discretion in denying Singh’s motion to reopen where Singh failed to present new and material evidence in support of his asylum application. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to be supported by material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Elba Corina Mora Lancheros v. U.S. Atty. Gen. · filed 2007-06-07(c)(1)

Furthermore, the BIA also did not abuse its discretion in denying Mora’s motion to reopen on the grounds that the evidence she sought to present upon reopening could not have previously been discovered or presented to the IJ. Mora explicitly indicates that the stabbing incident occurred on January 31, 2003. She filed her asylum application in January 2004 and her removal hearing was held on May 3, 2005. As such, Mora had more than ample time to obtain the letters and doctors’ evaluations that she submitted with her motion to reopen. Accordingly, Mora failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1)’s requirement that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c) permits an applicant to seek relief from removal based on new facts or evidence by filing a motion to reopen.

Jassi v. Gonzales · filed 2007-06-07(c)

An applicant may seek to present new facts or evidence that would entitle her to relief from removal by filing a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts, support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material, and show that the proposed evidence is material and was previously unavailable or could not have been discovered or presented earlier.

Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2007-10-03(c)(1)

In his motion to reopen, the alien “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The BIA may grant the alien’s motion if the proposed new evidence “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. ... Rodriguez failed to demonstrate that any of the evidence offered in support of his motion was material to his request for withholding of removal or for CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires an alien seeking reopening or remand based on later circumstances to demonstrate circumstances arising after the hearing that warrant the requested relief.

Diaz-Rodriguez v. Mukasey · filed 2008-05-22(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Diaz-Rodriguez’s motion to remand where he failed to present evidence to support his contentions or to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief following the purported change in case law. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (no motion to reopen shall be granted where the alien has failed to demonstrate “circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing” warranting remand).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proved at a hearing and to include affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Oliver v. Mukasey · filed 2008-06-30(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen because petitioners failed to set forth any new facts or present any new evidence to demonstrate the requisite hardship. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (providing that a motion to reopen “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new facts supported by evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Rranci v. Attorney General of United States · filed 2008-08-22(c)(1)

A pertinent BIA regulation states: A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.... A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.... 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Rranci’s March 2005 asylum application set out his concerns about the danger waiting for him in Albania as a result of his cooperation with the Government’s prosecution of the smuggler Muho. His subsequent October 2005 affidavit accompanying his motion to reopen added some detail, but made no allegation of new facts that arose between the August 2005 hearing before the IJ and the November motion. Thus, Rranci’s state-created danger claim did not satisfy the BIA regulation’s requirement of “new facts” for a motion to reopen.

A motion to reopen must identify material new facts that were unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the earlier hearing.

Rranci v. Atty Gen USA · filed 2008-08-22(c)(1)

A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. . . . A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing . . . . 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Rranci’s March 2005 asylum application set out his concerns about the danger waiting for him in Albania as a result of his cooperation with the Government’s prosecution of the smuggler Muho. His subsequent October 2005 affidavit accompanying his motion to reopen added some detail, but made no allegation of new facts that arose between the August 2005 hearing before the IJ and the November motion. Thus, Rranci’s state-created danger claim did not satisfy the BIA regulation’s requirement of “new facts” for a motion to reopen.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state new facts that would be proven at a hearing if reopening were granted.

Sunarno v. Mukasey · filed 2008-09-25(c)(1)

To succeed on a motion to reopen, petitioner must state "new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Kechichian v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 2008).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only for material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Khan v. Holder · filed 2009-01-29(c)(1)

The BIA has discretion to reopen a removal proceeding when an alien presents new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been dis-covered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when the movant submits new and material evidence that was unavailable at the prior hearing.

Iqbal v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-06-22(c)(1)

To warrant reopening, Iqbal was required to submit new, material evidence that was not available at the time of his hearing before the IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 253 (3d Cir. 2006). Several of the documents Iqbal submitted in support of his motion predated his 2006 hearing, and are therefore not “new.”

Section 1003.2(c) bars the Board from granting a motion to reopen unless the offered evidence is material, previously unavailable, and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Uddin v. Attorney General of the United States · filed 2009-07-29(c)

Also, under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c), the Board may not grant a motion to reopen unless the evidence offered is material and was not available and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) does not support reopening when the additional evidence was available during the original hearing.

Brito-delgado v. Holder · filed 2010-06-01(c)(1)

First, the additional evidence Brito-Delgado sought to present was available during her original hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits reopening only when new evidence is material and was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing.

Gjerkaj v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-02-02(c)(1)

Motions to reopen may be granted if there is new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); see also Abdi, 430 F.3d at 1149. To make such a showing, the alien “bears a ‘heavy burden,’ and must ‘present evidence of such a nature that the [BIA] is satisfied that if proceedings before the [IJ] were reopened, with all attendant delays, the new evidence offered would likely change the result in the case.’”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify the new facts to be proved, include supporting evidence, and show that the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have been presented at the former hearing.

Ewondo v. Holder · filed 2010-07-23(c)(1)

The motion “shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2010). Such motion “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” Id. Because Ewondo failed to show that the evidence submitted with his motion to reopen was not available and could not have been presented at the hearing, the Board did not abuse its discretion denying the motion.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence supporting a motion to reopen to be previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the prior hearing.

Sedeno-Arroyo v. Holder Jr. · filed 2010-09-30(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sedeno-Arroyo’s motion to reopen on the grounds that Sedeno-Arroyo failed to demonstrate that the evidence he submitted with his motion “was not available and could not have been discovered or presented” at his hearing.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to include the appropriate application for relief and supporting documents, and permits reopening only when the offered evidence is material and previously unavailable.

Hang Zheng v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-06-30(c)(1)

A motion to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting documentation” and “shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). ... First, we note that while Zheng did have an asylum application on file, this original application sought relief based solely on China’s family planning policy, and Zheng failed to accompany his motion to reopen with a new asylum application based on his changed circumstances. Even if this alone was not a reason to deny Zheng’s motion to reopen, the BIA did not clearly err in finding that none of the background evidence submitted by Zheng concerning China’s country conditions was “new,” as it was available at the time of his original hearing.

A motion to reopen based on new evidence requires proof that the evidence is material and was unavailable or could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Li v. U.S. Attorney General · filed 2011-11-04(c)(1)

When an applicant seeks to reopen his removal proceedings based on new evidence, he must show that the evidence is both material and was either unavailable or could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires evidence offered in a motion to reopen to be material and previously unavailable and undiscoverable or unpresentable at the former hearing.

Sun Kit Siong Ha v. Holder · filed 2012-08-21(c)(1)

The BIA’s denial of a motion to remand that “relies on newly available evidence is held to the substantive requirements of a motion to reopen,” Li Yong Cao, 421 F.3d at 156, and accordingly, Ha must show that the “evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Because the evidence Ha sought to submit related to terrorist bombings of hotels, it did not demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution against ethnic Chinese Christians in Indonesia.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) permits denial of a motion to reopen when the movant fails to submit new, material evidence that was previously unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the prior hearing.

Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Holder · filed 2012-09-17(c)(1)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodriguez-Ramirez’s motion to reopen because she did not submit any new, material evidence that was previously not available and could not have been discovered or presented at her prior hearing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to identify material evidence that was unavailable and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.

Salim v. Holder · filed 2013-08-28(c)(1)

To prevail on a motion to reopen, a petitioner must point to new evidence that “is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.”

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to present new and material evidence before the prima facie eligibility question is reached.

Rosales-Perez v. Holder · filed 2014-01-15(c)(1)

As to both arguments, Rosales had to show that his evidence was "new" and that it was "material" before reaching the issue of a prima facie case. See Ratnasingam v. Holder, 556 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). The problem for Rosales is that the new evidence was not material to the question of the nexus between his treatment and one of five protected grounds. The new evidence said nothing on this issue at all. This was a key gap in his original application, and the new evidence did not even purport to fill that gap.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to rely on new evidence material to the movant’s eligibility for asylum.

Jiang v. Holder · filed 2014-03-10(c)(1)

However, the BIA reasonably found that Jiang’s evidence of country conditions was not material as it pertained to individuals who were not similarly situated to her, including prominent activists who operated within China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (requiring that a motion to reopen be based on new evidence material to the movant’s eligibility for asylum); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A), 1208.16(b)(2)(i) (providing that evidence of a pattern or practice of persecution must involve a group of persons “similarly situated to the applicant”).

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a party seeking reopening or remand based on new evidence to explain why the evidence was previously unavailable and to show that it is material and would establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief.

Dauksh v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-04-14(c)(1)

Nor did the BIA abuse its discretion in denying Dauksh’s request to remand to the IJ. Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2005). Dauksh proffered to the BIA additional declarations in support of his application, but did not articulate why this evidence was unavailable earlier or could not have been discovered earlier. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Dauksh has not shown that the new evidence is “material,” or that when considered together with the evidence presented at the original hearing, it would establish prima facie eligibility for the relief he sought. See id.; Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005); Mendez–Gutierrez v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1168, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2006). Even accepting the new declarations, they are cumulative of the evidence Dauksh presented at the hearing. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen proceedings.

Section 1003.2(c)(1) requires a motion to reopen to state the new facts to be proven at a hearing and support them with affidavits or other evidentiary material; a motion lacking new facts and evidence is not a proper basis for reopening.

Zapata-Hernandez v. Eric Holder, Jr. · filed 2015-03-13(c)(1)

The BIA may reopen or reconsider any case in which it has previously rendered a decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)−(c). A motion to reopen must “state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” ... accord § 1003.2(c)(1). Zapata-Hernandez’s motion to reopen did not point to any new facts and was not supported by new evidence. ... Consequently, the BIA did not err in determining that the newly raised argument regarding the petty-offense exception was not a proper basis for reopening.

Section 1003.2(c) requires a movant to show that new evidence was previously unavailable and likely to change the result to obtain reopening.

Magnaye v. Lynch · filed 2015-10-22(c)

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Magnaye failed to establish the new evidence he submitted on appeal was previously unavailable or would likely change the result in his case. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see also Najmabadi, 597 F.3d at 988-90 (new evidence lacked materiality).