42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(b) permits Title VII liability for an individual only if the individual qualifies as an agent of the employer.

Russell v. City of Overland Police Dept. · filed 1993-12-03(b)

With the exception of the conspiracy allegations, which the Court will address subsequently, it is the opinion of the Court that the allegations concerning defendant Hermann should be dismissed because he is not an "employer" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Individual defendants may be liable under Title VII only if they qualify as statutory "agents" of plaintiff's employer.

A county that merely issues deputy sheriffs’ paychecks, without control over their employment, is not their employer under Title VII.

Ryals v. Mobile County Sheriff's Department · filed 1993-12-13(b)

There exists no evidence, however, that Mobile County does anything other than cut the checks for the deputies from the funds annually budgeted for the Sheriffs Department. ... Consequently, Mobile County is not plaintiff’s employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer can encompass a hospital under a joint employer theory when evidence of its control over a worker's employment creates a genuine factual dispute.

Acot v. New York Medical College · filed 1993-12-27(b)

Because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Hospital may be considered an employer of Plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), summary judgment is inappropriate at this time.

Section 2000e(b) excludes employers with only thirteen employees from Title VII coverage.

Hamilton v. New York City Commission On Human Rights · filed 1993-12-30(b)

Although title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e [b]) is inapplicable because appellants employed only thirteen employees at all relevant times, the record reveals no error of law on the part of the Commission.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees and excludes independent contractors from that count.

Sierra v. Periodico La Perla Del Sur · filed 1994-01-24(b)

In determining who qualifies as an employee for purposes of meeting the aforementioned quota, the courts have examined the degree of control over the alleged employees and the economic reality of the particular working relationships to exclude independent contractors from the tally. ... We are satisfied that, given the nature of the relationship of the pertinent persons with the defendant newspaper as described by its administrator, we have no jurisdiction to entertain this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes college employees who significantly influence promotion and tenure decisions within the definition of the college’s agents.

Dutt v. Delaware State College · filed 1994-01-28(b)

The Court holds college employees below the administration level are “agents” of the college as defined in § 2000e(b) of Title VII, so long as they participate in the promotion and tenure process to such an extent they significantly control or influence the decisions which govern some aspect of the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, but municipal officers cannot be sued in their individual capacities under Title VII.

Dirksen v. City of Springfield · filed 1994-02-09(b)

Section 2000e(b) defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person.” (Emphasis Ours). ... Thus, individual capacity suits under Title VII are inappropriate in this case—Plaintiff must plead “official capacity” suits.

Section 2000e(b) makes employers responsible for their agents’ acts but does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Johnson v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. · filed 1994-02-11(b)

Although this issue remains deeply divided in the circuit, this Court believes that the better position is that supervisors cannot be held individually liable under Title VII. While the plain wording of the statute deceptively suggests that “agents” are employers within the meaning of Title VII, a closer analysis of the language in the statute indicates that the more reasoned reading of the statute is that the “and any agent of such a person” language was meant to incorporate respondeat superior into the statute.

Section 2000e(b)’s inclusion of an employer’s agents makes employers responsible for their agents’ conduct but does not make individual employees personally liable under Title VII.

Lowry v. Clark · filed 1994-02-11(b)

This Court finds that the analysis of Miller is quite sound and adopts its holding that the “agent” provision in the statutory definition of “employer” only ensures that employers cannot escape respondeat superior liability.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make supervisory employees individually liable under Title VII.

Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co. · filed 1994-02-28(b)

Thus, passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 really suggests that Congress did not intend to include individual supervisory personnel within the meaning of “employer.”

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer; allegations that a supervisor with hiring and firing authority harassed an employee within the scope of employment can establish that agency relationship.

Johnson v. Indopco, Inc. · filed 1994-03-08(b)

In the case sub judice, Wilkes alleged enough facts to establish that Chambers was a supervisory agent of Unichema and that his conduct forming the basis for sexual harassment occurred within the scope of his employment. Chambers had the authority to hire and fire employees. Chambers also had the supervisory power to grant or eliminate economic privileges of the employees.

Section 2000e(b) defines who is an employer under Title VII; an agency that did not employ the plaintiff is not liable on her Title VII claim.

Kammefa v. Maryland Department of Personnel · filed 1994-03-07(b)

We also note that because neither of these agencies were Kammefa's employer, the district court's dismissal of Kammefa's Title VII claims against them was proper.

Section 2000e(b) counts an employee toward the employer coverage threshold only for weeks in which the employee worked every day of the work week.

Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I Associates · filed 1994-03-16(b)

A plain reading of the language of section 2000e(b) can yield only the conclusion that an employee is counted only in the weeks in which he worked every day of the work week.

Section 2000e(b) limits liability to employers, excluding individual co-workers.

Smith v. St. Bernards Regional Medical Center Fran Bower Dianne Moss Mary Lou Wilson Pat Overman · filed 1994-03-25(b)

We conclude that the claims against the individual defendants were properly dismissed because liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) can attach only to employers.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within Title VII’s definition of employer, but does not make them personally liable for discrimination.

Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems · filed 1994-03-31(b)

Under both Title VII and the ADEA, only employers and their agents can be held liable for discrimination. § 2000e(b) of Title VII; § 630(b) of the ADEA. ... Therefore, the court holds that under Title VII and the ADEA, Musci cannot be individually liable.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers a car dealership with thirty to thirty-five employees.

Powell v. Bob Downes Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. · filed 1994-04-15(b)

Defendant is an employer for purposes of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of “employer,” and a supervisor may be such an agent.

Dreisbach v. Cummins Diesel Engines, Inc. · filed 1994-04-05(b)

It is well established that a supervisor may be an agent of an employer for purposes of this provision. ... Plaintiffs Title VII claim against Gorban is thus sufficient to withstand his motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make individual employees personally liable under Title VII, even after the 1991 amendments.

Smith v. Capitol City Club of Montgomery · filed 1994-04-12(b)

Moreover, the law in the Eleventh Circuit has been settled that there is no individual liability under Title VII; the fact that Congress made available compensatory and punitive damages — without changing the definition of employer and without discontinuing the exemption for small employers — does not provide this court with a reason to believe that Title VII now imposes individual liability.

Section 2000e(b) excludes individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers from personal liability under Title VII.

Grant v. Lone Star Co. · filed 1994-05-27(b)

The definition of the term "employer" in § 2000e(b) does not include individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers under the statute.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer, making them individually liable under Title VII.

Douglas v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Northern New England, Inc. · filed 1994-05-31(b)

The Court finds that §§ 2000e(b) and 2000e-2(a)(1) impose individual liability on any agent of an employer.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer but does not make those agents individually liable under Title VII.

Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Authority · filed 1994-05-12(b)

The import of Busby is that, even though Congress defined “employer” to include “any agent,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b), this provision does not impose individual liability but only holds the employer accountable for the acts of its individual agents.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer permits Title VII suits against employees as agents of the employer only in their official capacities, not their individual capacities.

Stefanski v. R.A. Zehetner & Associates, Inc. · filed 1994-06-17(b)

The court therefore concludes that the individual defendants may be sued under Title VII only in their official capacities as agents of Bell.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a business engaged in an industry affecting commerce that has at least 15 employees.

Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp. · filed 1994-06-30(b)

At all relevant times, Westvaeo was an employer as defined by Title VII in that it employed more than 15 people and was engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees; individual employees are not personally liable under Title VII.

Breen v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A. · filed 1994-07-22(b)

First, with respect to the individual defendants, Title VII does not impose individual liability on employees. ... Rather, Title VII governs only employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Because Breen does not dispute the status of Sophie Bell Kelley, Jim Gossen, Mike Casey and Diane Johnson as employees within the meaning of the statute, the individual defendants will be dismissed under Count III.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not include a supervisor solely because the person supervises employees; the supervisor must have authority over the plaintiff's employment.

Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America · filed 1994-07-22(b)

To accept this argument would require this Court to further liberalize our construction of the term employer to include all supervisory personnel, not just those with the ability to hire or fire. We decline to do so.

Section 2000e(b) excludes employers with fewer than 15 employees from Title VII.

Beardsley v. Webb · filed 1994-07-26(b)

For example, Title VII does not apply to employers with less than 15 employees.

Section 2000e(b) treats a supervisor as an employer’s agent only when acting in an official capacity; the supervisor cannot be held individually liable under Title VII.

Ajaz v. Continental Airlines · filed 1994-07-05(b)

Only when the supervisor is acting in an official capacity, however, can he be deemed an “agent” of the employer. ... Therefore, any recovery against the agent must be in his official, not individual, capacity.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of “employer,” allowing personal liability for employees responsible for discriminatory decisions made on the employer’s behalf.

Cassano v. DeSoto, Inc. · filed 1994-07-19(b)

Like its other colleague Honorable James Moran, and in part for the reasons that he has set out in Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 824 F.Supp. 769, 785-86 (N.D.Ill.1993), this Court opts to uphold the prospect of individual personal liability stemming from a discriminatory decision made by a responsible decisionmaker on behalf of an employer corporation.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, allowing individual employees to be held personally liable under Title VII.

Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. · filed 1994-07-22(b)

The plain language of both the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), define an employer to include a person acting as the agent of the employer. The statute does not limit the liability of the agent to only his official capacity.

A Title VII claim fails if the plaintiff does not prove that the defendant is an employer covered by the statute.

Sabry v. Gilbert Security Service, Incorporated Herbert Brown John Owen · filed 1994-07-11(b)

Sabry does not challenge the finding that he failed to prove that Gilbert Security is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e(b). That unchallenged finding is in itself adequate to support the district court's judgment.

Separate business entities may be treated as one employer under Title VII based on their operations, labor relations, management, and ownership or financial control.

Gilmore v. List & Clark Construction Co. · filed 1994-08-03(b)

Under the integrated enterprise test, the following four factors are considered: (1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common management; and (4) common ownership or financial control.

Title VII permits individual liability for employees acting as agents of an employer.

Gregory v. Southern New England Telephone Co. · filed 1994-08-19(b)

In the absence of guidance from the Second Circuit, and in the interests of consistency, the court will follow the existing authority in this circuit which recognizes individual liability under Title VII. Therefore, because Gregory alleges that the individual defendants were acting as agents of SNET, the individual defendants may be subject to liability under Title VII, and Gregory's claims will not be dismissed on these grounds.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make individual supervisors personally liable under Title VII.

Accordino v. Langman Construction, Inc. · filed 1994-08-23(b)

The term “employer” must be interpreted in the context of this structure. It is implausible that this structure, which purposefully excludes or limits the liability exposure of small businesses, would simultaneously allow recovery against individuals who are employed by a covered employer, such as supervisors.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer makes employers liable for their agents’ conduct but does not make supervisors or co-employees personally liable under Title VII.

Barb v. Miles, Inc. · filed 1994-08-25(b)

When Congress included within the definition of employer the “agent of any such person,” it intended only to ensure that, unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, employers sued pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Congress did not intend, however, to create a class of persons liable under the Act who do not fit within the conventional meaning of “employers.”

Under § 2000e(b), a supervisor with scheduling authority but no hiring or firing authority is not an employer for a Title VII claim.

Thomson v. Olson · filed 1994-09-19(b)

He may not bring a claim against Mike Olson because, although Mr. Olson apparently oversaw employee scheduling, he did not have the authority to hire and fire Thomson. Therefore, neither he nor the other named individuals are “employers” within the purview of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes an employment agency sued as an employer from Title VII coverage if it has fewer than fifteen employees.

Greenlees v. Eidenmuller Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-09-19(b)

Since Eidenmuller employs fewer than fifteen employees, it does not fall within the statutory definition of employer under title VII because title VII excludes employers with fewer than fifteen employees from coverage.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII; a supervisor who does not qualify cannot be held individually liable.

Yeager v. Norwest Multifamily, Inc. · filed 1994-09-27(b)

Because McSween is not an employer within the definition of Title VII, he cannot be held individually liable under the Title VII claim.

For the fifteen-employee threshold, hourly and part-time workers count only on days when they are at work or on paid leave.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1994-08-30(b)

It held that hourly and part-time workers are considered employees under the ADEA only on days when they are either physically present at work or on paid leave. ... We will therefore apply the employee counting method first set forth in Zimmerman and later applied in the Title VII context by this court in Norman v. Levy, 767 F.Supp. 1441, 1449 (N.D.Ill.1991).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make a supervising employee personally liable under Title VII.

Williams v. Rothman Furniture Stores, Inc. · filed 1994-08-31(b)

Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... This Court will not, at this time, extend liability under Title VII to a supervising employee in his/her individual capacity.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” does not make supervisors individually liable for Title VII violations.

Engle v. Barton County Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-09-22(b)

The mere fact that new remedies were added does not in itself expand the pool of those subject to liability under the term “employer.” ... Absent any directive from the Eighth Circuit, this Court adopts the sound reasoning and conclusions of the Ninth Circuit, as set forth in the Miller decision, by holding that a supervisor may not be held individually liable for violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer,” but does not make supervisory employees individually liable under Title VII.

Haltek v. Village of Park Forest · filed 1994-09-27(b)

Consequently, this Court concludes that the statutory limitation on Title VII’s and the ADA’s definition of “employer” supports the determination that supervisory employees are not individually liable under Title VII or the ADA.

Section 2000e(b) requires fifteen employees for an entity to qualify as a Title VII employer; employees of affiliated counties are not counted when the counties do not control the entity’s employment decisions or operations.

Chester v. Northwest Iowa Youth Emergency Services Center · filed 1994-10-04(b)

The court concludes that the counties do not fall within the range of affiliated entities whose employees could be counted to meet Title VII numerosity requirements. Only the YES Center’s direct employees may be counted to meet those requirements. Because the YES Center does not have sufficient employees to fall within the definition of an employer under Title VII, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Counts I and II of Chester’s suit.

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII discrimination plaintiff to establish that the defendant is an employer within the statute’s definition.

Thomason v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America · filed 1994-10-28(b)

As a necessary predicate to prevailing on a Title VII or the KAAD claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of the respective statutes.

Section 2000e(b)’s reference to an employer’s agents makes employers liable for their employees’ discriminatory acts but does not make those agents personally liable.

Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp. · filed 1994-09-30(b)

And our reading does not render meaningless the phrase “and any agent of such a person” in the statute’s definition of “employer.” Rather, the Court believes that Congress included that language to ensure, unlike sections 1981 and 1983, that employers sued pursuant to Title VII would face derivative liability for the discriminatory acts of their employees.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, but company officials need not be individual defendants when full relief is available against the employer.

Straka v. Francis · filed 1994-10-14(b)

The Individual Defendants in this case are not necessary parties to the Title VII or ADEA actions because the full measure of available relief is generally obtainable against the remaining corporate Defendant.

Title VII’s definition of employer permits individual liability for agents who engage in unlawful employment discrimination.

Jendusa v. Cancer Treatment Centers of America, Inc. · filed 1994-11-02(b)

Because such a result is wholly incompatible with the remedial and deterrence objectives of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes, the court concludes that the statutes must be interpreted to authorize individual liability.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of “employer,” supporting employer liability for harassment by a supervisor with significant control over an employee’s work.

Henry v. Gehl Corp. · filed 1994-10-19(b)

“Employer” is defined to include an “agent” of any person who has fifteen or more employees and conducts a business that affects commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Duryea had the ultimate authority to hire and fire the plaintiff. He exercised significant control over the plaintiffs conditions of employment. There is a factual and legal basis for imposing liability on Gehl for Duryea’s harassment.

Section 2000e(b) allows employees of separate entities to be counted together when the entities are sufficiently integrated to constitute a single employer.

Bielawski v. AMI, INC. · filed 1994-10-27(b)

The facts and circumstances as a whole, then, do not indicate that AMI and any of the managed properties were interrelated to such an extent that it is appropriate to treat them as a single employer within the meaning of § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) counts shareholder-employees of a professional corporation toward the 15-employee threshold for an employer.

Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, P.A. · filed 1994-11-04(b)

Shareholder-employees of professional associations are, in law, “employees” not only for purposes of bringing their own Title VII claims, as in Hyland, but also for purposes of determining whether the requisite number of people have been employed to bring the employer within Title VII’s remedial reach.

Section 2000e(b) includes supervisory agents in its definition of “employer,” allowing individual liability for supervisors who sexually harass employees.

Domm v. Jersey Printing Co., Inc. · filed 1994-11-16(b)

Applying agency law to hostile environment sexual harassment, this Court must conclude that supervisors who fall within the Title VII definition of “employer” and have sexually harassed an employee may be held individually liable for the sexual harassment.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make a supervisor personally liable under Title VII.

Webb v. Hyman · filed 1994-11-05(b)

Because the parties’ counsel had failed to bring to the Court’s attention that the Plaintiff had no cognizable claim on Title VII against the individual Defendant Edward Paylor, the Court issued its Vacatur Order in light of the fact that Title VII only imposes liability upon “employers.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in its definition of employer, allowing a co-employee supervisor to be personally liable for the supervisor’s own independent acts of intentional discrimination.

Johnson v. University Surgical Group Associates · filed 1994-11-22(b)

Having reviewed the law in the Sixth Circuit, we find that a co-employee supervisor may be personally liable for acts of intentional discrimination under Title VII, provided that their individual liability is based on their own independent acts and not merely for acts in compliance with policies set forth by their superiors.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, allowing liability for a store manager’s discriminatory conduct when he has authority to hire and fire employees.

Preston v. Income Producing Management, Inc. · filed 1994-12-13(b)

The court also had at hand Sauers v. Salt Lake County, supra, which suggests that conduct such as was manifested by Poland, as the company’s alter ego, satisfies the issue of liability running to the defendant company. ... The evidence is clear that at pertinent times Poland had authority to hire and fire store employees. ... To say now that IPM somehow is immune from punitive damages for the acts of Poland while co-manager is nonsense.

Section 2000e(b) requires at least fifteen employees for Title VII coverage; unsupported claims of an integrated enterprise or agency do not establish that threshold.

Allen v. McEntee · filed 1994-12-08(b)

Similarly, for an action to stand under Title VII, the defendant must employ at least fifteen persons. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). ... We reject both assertions. Appellant has supplied not a strand of evidence supporting his position on either count.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII defendants to employers and their agents.

Hamilton v. New York State Department of Mental Hygiene · filed 1994-12-05(b)

A Title VII action may only be maintained against an “employer” or his “agent.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) makes employers responsible for their agents’ conduct under Title VII but does not make supervisors or coemployees personally liable.

Randolph v. Cooper Industries · filed 1994-12-07(b)

Although this argument has some merit, we are persuaded that the better view is that supervisors and coemployees cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. ... We concur with Judge Lancaster that by including the agency provision in the statute, Congress only intended to insure that employers sued under Title VII would be subject to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Section 2000e(b) permits a county board to qualify as an employer under Title VII; whether it employed a particular worker may require facts beyond the pleadings.

Malone v. Chambers County Board of Commissioners · filed 1994-12-21(b)

The court cannot say that Malone has failed to allege that the Board was his employer within the meaning of Title VII. Nor can the court determine that the Board was not Malone’s employer within the meaning of Title VII on the basis of the authority to which the Board points without more factual information than is presently before the court.

Section 2000e(b) permits Title VII suits against individual supervisory employees, including supervisors of government agencies.

Weeks v. State of Me. · filed 1994-12-20(b)

The Court is persuaded that individual supervisory employees are subject to suit under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs claim under Title VII against the individual Defendants.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make individual public employees personally liable under Title VII.

Marshall v. Miller · filed 1995-01-04(b)

An employer is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such person.” ... Because Title VII does not authorize individual capacity suits against individual public employees, the court dismisses Marshall’s Title VII claims against all defendants in their individual capacities.

Section 2000e(b) does not make supervisors liable in their individual capacities under Title VII.

Hudson v. Soft Sheen Products, Inc. · filed 1995-01-10(b)

Because there is no individual liability under Title VII, the Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts upon which relief may be granted, and therefore, we grant Allen’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Section 2000e(b) makes an employer liable under Title VII for the improper acts of its agents.

Splunge v. Shoney's, Inc. · filed 1994-12-22(b)

Title VII imposes liability on an employer for the improper acts of its agents. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer” does not make individual supervisors personally liable for employment discrimination under Title VII.

McCray v. DPC Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-02-02(b)

Grant makes clear that individual supervisors cannot be held liable for employment discrimination because they do not meet the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer; an official-capacity claim against that agent is redundant when the employer is already a defendant.

Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance · filed 1995-02-08(b)

As a district manager, Meeks is an employer/agent under Title VII. In this case, though, Independent Life, the employer, has been properly named as a defendant. Accordingly, to proceed against Meeks in his official capacity would be redundant.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII liability to employers with at least fifteen employees and does not permit individual capacity suits against employees.

Rumbel v. Suggs · filed 1995-01-26(b)

First, Title VII has always limited liability to employers with fifteen (15) or more employees, 42 U.S.S. § 2000e(b), indicating an intent by the Legislature to protect small entities, including individuals, from the cost of litigation. ... As such this Court is inclined to follow the Eleventh Circuit precedent. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III is granted.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of “employer” used in § 2000e-2(a).

Blong v. Secretary of the Army · filed 1995-02-28(b)

However, section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of "employer” as used in § 2000e-2(a).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer subject to Title VII.

Steinle v. Boeing Co. · filed 1995-03-30(b)

Boeing is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and is subject to Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) does not make an employee individually liable under Title VII merely because the employee supervised the plaintiff.

Nelson-Cole v. Borg-Warner Security Corp. · filed 1995-04-06(b)

In interpreting this statute, federal courts have routinely held that although an employee may be sued in their “official capacities” as an agent of an employer, there is no liability for an employee in his or her individual capacity. ... Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Title VII claim against Captain Godette shall be dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) counts part-time and full-time employees on the payroll when determining whether an employer meets Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Agnes VERA-LOZANO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1995-03-22(b)

For the purposes of that statute “employer” is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ... Counting both part-time and full-time employees on the payroll during 1991, there is sufficient evidence on the record in the form of testimony of Vera and Román to support finding that IBC was an employer as defined by Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for each working day in at least twenty weeks of the current or preceding calendar year.

Lightner v. CITY OF ARITON, ALABAMA · filed 1995-03-27(b)

Under this statute, “employer” means “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calender weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ...” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Defendant, City of Ariton, has not employed 15 or more persons in either of the last four calender years. Thus, Title VII is inapplicable in this matter and Plaintiff may not maintain an action thereunder.

Section 2000e(b) can treat a controlling shareholder as an employer when he is alleged to be the corporation’s alter ego and main decisionmaker.

Curcio v. Chinn Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1995-06-05(b)

Taking plaintiffs’ allegations as true for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Chinn can be viewed under such circumstances as plaintiffs’ employer for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII liability to employers and excludes individual employees.

Najera v. State of California-Prison Industry Authority David King Linda Clifford Rick Reyes · filed 1995-05-22(b)

As an initial matter, we note that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the individual employees of the PIA.

Title VII’s definition of employer does not make an individual supervisor personally liable unless the supervisor independently meets that definition.

Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Centers, PC · filed 1995-05-25(b)

Because the ADA and Title VII define “employer” in a materially identical manner, that holding compels the same result in a suit brought under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make supervisory employees personally liable for Title VII violations.

Schaffer v. Ames Department Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-05-26(b)

As a result of its own review of the statute and the plethora of cases, the court finds that supervisory employees cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for Title VII coverage.

Astrowsky v. First Portland Mortg. Corp., Inc. · filed 1995-06-02(b)

Because the record does not contain any evidence that Atlantic Staff Management employs at least fifteen persons, it is not an “employer” for purposes of Title VII, ADEA, the federal Family Medical Leave Act or the Maine Family Medical Leave Act.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer; claims against corporate officers under Title VII proceed in their official capacities and effectively operate as claims against the employer.

Rivera v. Telefonica De Puerto Rico · filed 1995-06-23(b)

We conclude, therefore, that the suit against co-defendants Arce and De Jesús can only proceed against them in their official capacity; consequently, the suit against the individual corporate officers effectively operates as a suit against co-defendant Telefónica.

Section 2000e(b) does not make a supervisor an employer solely because the supervisor has control over employees.

Parsons v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 1995-06-23(b)

Based on the complaint, this Court finds that Walker was not functioning as an employer of Plaintiffs when he allegedly harassed and retaliated against them. It has only been plead that Walker maintained some form of supervisory control over Plaintiffs, a fact which in and of itself does not lead to the conclusion that Walker was an “employer” under the guidelines of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in Title VII’s definition of employer.

Stewart v. Weis Markets, Inc. · filed 1995-06-30(b)

9. Dean Meyer was an agent of Weis Markets within the meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but supervisors cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd. · filed 1995-06-30(b)

Individual employees, however, even those functioning in a management capacity, cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) makes the District of Columbia itself the proper defendant in a Title VII suit against the District, rather than its departments or agencies.

Raney v. District of Columbia · filed 1995-07-05(b)

In a Title VII suit against the District of Columbia, only the District itself, and not its departments or agencies, may be the proper defendant. Zervas v. District of Columbia, 817 F.Supp. 148 (D.D.C.1993) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). Accordingly, the Court shall dismiss the Title VII claims against Director Malone.

Section 2000e(b) treats a supervisor as an employer’s agent but does not make the supervisor personally liable under Title VII.

Gary v. Long · filed 1995-07-28(b)

Thus, while a supervisory employee may be joined as a party defendant in a Title VII action, that employee must be viewed as being sued in his capacity as the agent of the employer, who is alone liable for a violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer to establish employer liability, but does not make those agents individually liable under Title VII.

McIlwain v. Korbean Intern. Inv. Corp. · filed 1995-08-18(b)

The better reading of Title VII is that the "and any agent" provision was intended to incorporate respondeat superior into the statute. The Court therefore holds that McIlwain could not state an actionable Title VII claim against Milstein in his individual capacity even if she were to allege that Milstein was an "agent" of Korbean.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII claims to the plaintiff’s employer, excluding individual defendants who are not the employer.

Simon v. Morehouse School of Medicine · filed 1995-09-06(b)

Both Title VII claims lie only against More-house, and not the individual defendants, because only Morehouse was the plaintiff’s employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) does not make a supervisor individually liable under Title VII for delegable personnel decisions such as hiring or firing.

Mitchell v. RJK of Gloucester, Inc. · filed 1995-09-18(b)

By its terms, Title VII applies only to “employers.” ... This court interprets the footnote to mean that decisions that any employee in a supervisory position might make, i.e., hiring, firing, or discipline, may be delegated within the corporation and thus shield an individual from liability under employment discrimination laws.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents so the employer can be liable for their acts, but it does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Thanning v. Gulotta · filed 1995-09-19(b)

Interpreting the agent provision to establish a cause of action against a high-ranking, supervisory employee in his individual capacity comports with neither the logic nor the intent underlying Title VIL. ... The purpose of the agent provision is to provide a mechanism for imposing respondeat superior liability on employers for the acts of their employees.

Related entities’ employees may be counted together to meet the fifteen-employee threshold for an employer under § 2000e(b).

Kinosh v. Stephen Chevrolet, No. Cv92-0506307s (Sep. 12, 1995) · filed 1995-09-12(b)

Clearly, Stephen Chevrolet and Center Subaru were related entities during the relevant time period (exhs. 19, 20, 26, 10, 12, 22). Thus it would appear that there were more than 15 employees in the two related entities.

An individual defendant must be alleged to qualify as an employer under Title VII to face a claim in that capacity.

Booth v. NC DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENT, HLTH. & NAT. RES. · filed 1995-09-19(b)

Even had they been so named, plaintiff has pled neither facts nor legal conclusions to the effect that any of the individual defendants were her "employers" for purposes of Title VII.

An individual defendant must qualify as the plaintiff’s employer to face a Title VII claim.

Booth v. North Carolina Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources · filed 1995-09-19(b)

Even had they been so named, plaintiff has pled neither facts nor legal conclusions to the effect that any of the individual defendants were her “employers” for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make a supervisor individually liable under Title VII unless the supervisor independently meets that definition.

Zorn v. Helene Curtis, Inc. · filed 1995-09-29(b)

Decker moved for summary judgment as to Counts I and II, arguing that under Title VII he may not be held individually liable for Title VII violations. Decker is correct as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, and the definition is construed liberally.

Dortz v. City of New York · filed 1995-10-05(b)

Title VII defines an ‘employer’ as “a person engaged in any industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The definition of an “employer” is construed liberally.

Section 2000e(b)’s inclusion of agents in the definition of “employer” makes employers responsible for their supervisors’ acts but does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Winston v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. · filed 1995-09-25(b)

Therefore this court adopts the holding in Lowry and finds that the “agent” provision within the employer definition of Title VII only ensures that employers cannot escape liability and does not attach individual liability to the employee supervisors themselves.

Section 2000e(b) does not make a supervisor individually liable under Title VII unless the supervisor independently meets the statutory definition of an employer.

Patterson Ex Rel. Patterson v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1995-09-26(b)

Both Title VII and the ADA define an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person ...” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 12111(5)(A). ... Because Ms. Kaelin is not alleged to satisfy the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII or the ADA, she is dismissed from Counts I and II of this lawsuit.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Grissom v. Waterloo Industries, Inc. · filed 1995-09-26(b)

In the absence of any contrary precedent from the Eighth Circuit (and in light of the rationale underlying that court’s decision in Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., supra), the Court elects to follow the majority view, and concludes that supervisors may not be held individually hable as “employers” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make an employer’s agents personally liable under Title VII.

Tomka v. The Seiler Corporation, Daniel Lucey, David Polonsky and Timothy Conroy · filed 1995-09-27(b)

We now hold that individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within its definition of employer; a supervisor who participated in a discriminatory decision may be sued in an official capacity, but not an individual capacity.

Kounitz v. Slaatten · filed 1995-09-28(b)

On this issue, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning in Coraggio v. Time, Inc., 1995 WL 242047 at *7-*9, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5399 (S.D.N.Y.*22-*27), and finds that Van Scoyoc cannot be held hable in her individual capacity under Title VII, but can be named as a defendant in her representative or official capacity because the complaint alleges that she participated in the decision making process that formed the basis of the discrimination against Kounitz, making Van Scoyoc an “agent” of her employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) makes an employer accountable for its agents’ acts without imposing individual liability on those agents.

Rickman v. Precisionaire, Inc. · filed 1995-10-17(b)

And although Congress defined “employer” to include any “agent,” this does not impose individual liability but only holds the employer accountable for the acts of its individual agents.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Carson Barnes, Jr. v. City of Kent Suzanne Moon · filed 1995-09-25(b)

There is no colorable argument that Moon is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of employer requires control over employment; paying an employee’s salary alone does not establish employer status.

Lee v. Mobile County Commission · filed 1995-10-10(b)

The mere duty to pay Lee’s salary through the budgeting of funds for the Circuit Court does not mean that Lee is deemed an employee of the Mobile County Commission for liability purposes under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) counts part-time employees toward the 15-employee threshold only on days they actually work.

Goudeau v. Dental Health Services, Inc. · filed 1995-10-10(b)

Nor can the part time employees be counted as employees on those days when they did not actually work.

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII employer to have at least fifteen employees for each working day in at least twenty calendar weeks of the current or preceding year.

Hulsey v. Gunn · filed 1995-10-24(b)

The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on Richardson v. Bedford Place Housing Phase I Assocs., 855 F.Supp. 366 (N.D.Ga.1994), as well as the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings that the record demonstrates that Defendants did not employ fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. · filed 1995-11-17(b)

3. Defendant Domino’s Pizza, Inc. (Domino’s) employed Papa and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make individual employee agents personally liable under Title VII.

Ascolese v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · filed 1995-11-02(b)

Or is it not more probable that Congress did not contemplate that employee-agents would be called on to respond in damages? In my view, the latter is the better reading of Congress’s delphic silence.

Section 2000e(b)'s reference to an employer's agents does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Bartholomew v. Delahaye · filed 1995-11-08(b)

The courts of appeal for every other circuit have explicitly held that the "any agent" language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) was merely Congress' way of reminding courts of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and does not make supervisors liable as individuals. ... In this instance, I am persuaded that the majority rule is correct. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) does not make a supervisor individually liable under Title VII unless the supervisor independently qualifies as an employer.

Ripberger v. Western Ohio Pizza, Inc. · filed 1995-11-16(b)

The Seventh Circuit has recently resolved a split in the Circuit and found that individuals are not liable pursuant to this statutory language unless they independently meet the definition of “employer.” ... However he is not individually hable under Title VII because he was a supervisor, not Plaintiffs employer.

A coworker who is not the plaintiff’s supervisor does not qualify as an employer for Title VII liability.

Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd. · filed 1995-11-07(b)

Blake was not the plaintiffs supervisor, and therefore she does not qualify as an “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) does not make a supervisor personally liable for a decision to terminate employment merely because the supervisor acted as the employer’s agent.

Stephens v. Kay Management Co., Inc. · filed 1995-12-07(b)

After Birkbeck, there is no personal liability under either the ADEA or Title VII for individuals making a decision to terminate employment.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer permits individual liability for supervisors under the Fourth Circuit rule applied by this court.

Turner v. Randolph County, NC · filed 1995-12-11(b)

Applying the law as established by Paroline, the individual defendants can be held individually and personally ... liable for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents to establish employer liability, but does not make supervisors personally liable under Title VII.

Patton v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1995-12-21(b)

The purpose of the inclusion of the “agent” provision in § 2000e(b) was to incorporate respondeat superior principles into Title VII, not to impose individual liability on supervisory employees.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Williams v. Banning · filed 1995-12-21(b)

Because a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII’s definition of employer, Williams can state no set of facts which would enable her to recover under the statute.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make an employer’s officers, employees, or agents personally liable under Title VII.

Foster v. Shore Club Lodge, Inc. · filed 1995-12-19(b)

As used in the statute, the word “employer,” means the entity, and does not include officers or agents. We hold that individual officers, employees, and agents of an employer are not subject to personal HabiHty under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Under Title VII’s definition of “employer,” a supervisor who exercises significant control over an employee’s hiring, firing, or conditions of employment can be individually liable.

Pardasani v. Rack Room Shoes Inc. · filed 1996-01-22(b)

However, the Paroline decision does not make this limitation and until the Fourth Circuit decides en banc to limit Paroline, this Court must interpret the term “employer” under an Title VII action as established in the Paroline opinion. Accordingly, individual defendants can be held individually and personally liable for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Therefore, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Title VII claims against defendants Snider and Borden is denied.

Section 2000e(b) permits individual liability for a supervisor who wields significant control over an employee and engages in conduct that is not a plainly delegable duty.

Shoemaker v. Metro Information Services · filed 1996-01-08(b)

This court holds that supervisors may be individually liable in Title VII cases where they wield significant control over plaintiffs and their conduct cannot be categorized as a plainly delegable duty.

Section 2000e(b)’s inclusion of agents in the definition of “employer” does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Vernon v. Medical Management Associates of Margate, Inc. · filed 1996-01-16(b)

Under Busby and Cross, therefore, a Title VII plaintiff cannot seek relief against a supervisor in his or her individual capacity. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit has, in essence, assumed that the statute’s reference to “any agent” as part of the definition of “employer” merely confirms that employers can be held liable for acts of discrimination by their agents.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but supervisors of private employers cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Dandridge v. Chromcraft Corp. · filed 1996-01-24(b)

The Fifth Circuit law is clear— supervisors cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make public officials personally liable under Title VII merely because they are an employer’s agents.

Hughes v. Arveson · filed 1996-01-25(b)

Because Title VII does not provide for the personal liability of public officials, the Title VII claim against the individual defendants must be dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer,” so a Title VII claim does not require a separate showing of imputed liability.

Kidwell v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-01-11(b)

Kidwell’s claim under Title VII fares better. As the District concedes, issues of imputed liability play no role under that statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person ... [of a specific kind] and any agent of such a person”).

Section 2000e(b) requires at least fifteen employees for twenty calendar weeks in the current or preceding year; for a foreign-controlled integrated enterprise, only employees working in the United States count toward that threshold.

Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1996-01-17(b)

Only those employees of the enterprise (whether on the payroll of the foreign or the domestic component) who work in the United States for twenty or more calendar weeks per year are to be counted for purposes of determining whether the enterprise is covered by the provisions of the ADA, ADEA and Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make a professor who is not the plaintiff’s employer a proper defendant to her Title VII claim.

Pallett v. Palma · filed 1996-01-19(b)

Defendant Palma is not a proper party either as an employer or a teaching institution. The federal claims against him are dismissed on the Court’s own motion.

An entity may remain a Title VII employer after another company takes over its staff if it continues to control an important aspect of an employee’s work.

Duguay v. Androscoggin Valley Hosp. · filed 1996-01-25(b)

Plaintiff is correct that, under a number of scenarios, the Hospital could have remained her "employer" after the switch.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person, and the court holds that an employee cannot be sued individually under Title VII.

Sheridan v. DuPont & Co. · filed 1996-01-31(b)

While reasonable arguments in favor of the contrary position can be made, see Miller, 991 F.2d at 588-90 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (Parker, J., dissenting), we follow the great weight of authority from other courts of appeals and hold that an employee cannot be sued. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Sheridan's claims against Amblard.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees.

Parikh v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. · filed 1996-02-15(b)

Defendant United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., headquartered outside the State of Mississippi operates motion picture theatres throughout the State of Mississippi and other states, employs more than fifteen employees and is an employer engaged in an industry that affects commerce as defined by Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines an employer as an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and defines industry affecting commerce broadly.

Casseus v. ELIZABETH GENERAL MED. · filed 1996-02-16(b), (h)

For the purpose of this statute, an "employer" is an entity "engaged in an industry affecting commerce [which] has fifteen or more employees." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). ... The term "industry affecting commerce" is defined to mean "any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry `affecting commerce' within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(h). ... It appears from these cases that the prevailing view is that a hospital is an employer for the purpose of Title VII, and, we, therefore, assume so as well.

The employer definition in § 2000e(b) does not impose individual liability on supervisors sued in their personal capacities.

Morrow v. City of Jacksonville, Ark. · filed 1996-02-16(b)

Given the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Lenhardt, together with the near unanimity of opinion on this issue among the Courts of Appeals, this Court will follow the prevailing view and dismiss plaintiffs Title VII, ADA and ADEA claims against defendants Hibbs and Tate in their individual capacities.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII's definition of employer to employers with more than 15 employees.

Czupih v. Card Pak Inc. · filed 1996-02-22(b)

The Congressional imposition of liability is clearly set forth by Congress’ limitation of Title VII to employers with more than 15 employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e includes governments and political subdivisions with at least fifteen employees, and their agents, within Title VII’s definition of employer.

Farris v. Board of County Commissioners of Wyandotte County · filed 1996-04-03(a), (b)

The term employer under Title VII includes "governments, governmental agencies (and) political subdivisions” that have fifteen or more employees ..., and any agent of such (government, government agency or political subdivision)."

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” excludes an individual employee from Title VII liability.

McCray v. DPC Industries, Inc. · filed 1996-04-12(b)

Pierce, as an individual employee of DPC, does not meet the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer for a Title VII sex discrimination claim.

Sieren v. Federal Labor Relations Authority General Counsel · filed 1996-04-12(b)

Finally, the district court properly held that the FLRA was entitled to summary judgment on Sieren's sex discrimination claim because the FLRA was not Sieren's "employer" as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII defendant to have at least fifteen employees to qualify as an employer.

Aguirre v. McCaw RCC Communications, Inc. · filed 1996-04-26(b)

To state a claim, the defendant must meet the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII by having at least fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person with at least 15 employees for 20 qualifying weeks and any agent of that person.

Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc. · filed 1996-04-12(b)

Under Title VII, "employer" is defined as "a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an agent, allowing Title VII liability for the entity that retains ultimate authority over the agent.

Hammer v. Hillsborough County · filed 1996-06-13(b)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). Therefore, it is not merely the agency which bears potential liability as an employer under Title VII, but the entity which retains ultimate authority as well.

Section 2000e(b) requires an agent and its principal each to qualify independently as a statutory employer; an agency relationship does not combine their employee counts.

Burdi v. Uniglobe Cihak Travel, Inc. · filed 1996-07-01(b)

Clearly, under the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory language, neither an agent nor its principal can be liable for a Title VII violation unless each is a statutory employer in and of itself when viewed separately from the other. Therefore, even if plaintiff could establish an agency relationship between UCT and Midwest, we would still lack subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make supervisors personally liable under Title VII merely because they act as an employer's agents.

Williams v. EI duPONT De NEMOURS & CO. · filed 1996-07-03(b)

Title VII does not impose individual liability upon supervisory employees unless they meet the statutory definition of "employer." ... Therefore, summary judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Chapman and Davis are dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees for each working day in at least 20 calendar weeks of the current or preceding year.

Guadagno v. Wallack Ader Levithan Assoc. · filed 1996-07-16(b)

Under Title VII, an employer must have had “fifteen or more employees for each working day of each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year” preceding the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines a covered employer to include a business engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astra U.S.A., Inc. · filed 1996-06-27(b)

At all relevant times, Astra has been a corporation doing business in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and continuously has had at least fifteen employees. Astra is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of sections 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) counts employees toward Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold when they are on the payroll for each working day of a week, whether or not they work each day.

McLeod v. City of Newton · filed 1996-07-12(b)

Stated simply, an employee must be on the payroll for each working day of the week in order to count towards the fifteen required. Employees who are hired, fired or quit midweek are not counted for that week.

Title VII's definition of employer does not permit individual liability for supervisors who are not employers.

Lueneburg v. Mystic Dental Group, No. 535839 (Aug. 1, 1996) · filed 1996-08-01(b)

The case law is clear, and the plaintiff concedes in her brief, that the defendants are not employers and may not be held liable individually under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer applies to a labor union sued for its conduct as an employer, including the fifteen-employee minimum.

Yerdon v. Henry · filed 1996-08-06(b)

Furthermore, nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history gives any indication that the definition of employer contained in § 701(b) does not apply to a labor organization when it is sued as a result of its conduct as an employer. Indeed, that the definition of “employer” specifically includes labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), suggests that labor unions are to be treated no differently than other employers.

Section 2000e requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and a defendant sued as an employer under Title VII.

Perdue v. Quorum Health Resources, Inc. · filed 1996-08-07

Because the Hospital was not Plaintiffs “employer,” it cannot be liable under Title VII and the ADEA to one who was not its “employee.” Accordingly, the Hospital Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII and ADEA claims.

A union sued as an employer under Title VII must meet the statutory definition of employer, including the requirement of at least 15 employees.

Kern v. City of Rochester · filed 1996-08-15(b)

In the present case, because Kern is suing Local 1071 in its capacity as her employer, not in its capacity as a labor organization, the district court properly determined that Kern must demonstrate that Local 1071 meets the Title VII definition of an employer. This definition requires that Local 1071 have at least 15 employees.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer limits individual liability under Title VII, while an employee’s actions may subject the employer to liability under agency principles.

Donna Patterson Nicholas Brown, and Michael L. Adams v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corporation Mark Kennedy · filed 1996-09-11(b)

Although individuals may not be held liable under Title VII unless they meet § 2000e(b) definition of “employer,” an individual employee’s actions may subject the employer to liability under agency principles.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, so notice to a supervisor acting in that role can constitute notice to the employer.

Varner v. Natl. Super Markets · filed 1996-09-09(b)

Indeed, Title VII defines employer to include any "agent" of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Accordingly, Pilch's notification to Mason while Mason was acting in his supervisory capacity was sufficient to constitute notice to National.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer's agents in the definition of employer, so notice to a supervisor acting in that capacity can constitute notice to the employer.

Varner v. National Super Markets · filed 1996-09-09(b)

Indeed, Title VII defines employer to include any "agent" of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Accordingly, Pilch's notification to Mason while Mason was acting in his supervisory capacity was sufficient to constitute notice to National.

Section 2000e(b)'s employer definition does not support Title VII liability against defendants who neither employed the plaintiff nor denied her employment.

Porter v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 1996-09-13(b)

Second, Porter does not contend that the federal defendants employed her or denied employment to her. Rather, she alleges that Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. was her sole employer. The district court properly concluded that there is no basis for imposing Title VII liability on any of the federal defendants under these circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer is similar to the ADA and ADEA definitions, so decisions interpreting employer under those statutes can inform Title VII liability.

Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co. · filed 1996-09-30(b)

Because Title VII, ADEA and ADA contain very similar definitions of the term "employer,” see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b) and 12111 (5)(A) and 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), case law interpreting that term within the meaning of any one of these statutes is relevant in determining whether liability exists under Title VII, ADA or ADEA.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer is a substantive requirement of a Title VII claim, not a limit on federal-question jurisdiction.

Smith v. Norwest Financial Wyoming, Inc. · filed 1996-10-15(b)

Thus, the definition of employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) is important only on substantive, rather than jurisdictional grounds.

An immediate supervisor is an employer’s agent under Title VII when the employer delegates traditional rights such as hiring and firing.

Grant v. UOP, Inc. · filed 1996-10-04(b)

Under this liberal construction, immediate supervisors are employers when delegated the employer’s traditional rights, such as hiring and firing. ... At the time Clary made this statement, under Garcia, he was not an “agent” for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for the specified period; employee status follows common-law agency principles, with particular attention to the employer’s control over the work.

McIntire v. Bowen-Leavitt Insurance Agency, Inc., a Utah Corporation · filed 1996-12-05(b)

Title VII defines an employer as one who has "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... The primary inquiry under common-law principles is whether the hiring party controls the means and manner by which work is accomplished. ... McIntire does not offer any evidence showing that Bowen-Leavitt controlled, in any way whatsoever, the means and manner of their work.

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer”; individual supervisors are not personally liable under Title VII, and entities that are not the plaintiff’s employer cannot be named as defendants.

Farrell v. State of NY · filed 1996-11-25(b)

The term “employer” is defined in Title VII as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for' each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Accordingly, no individual defendant may be named as a defendant to the Title VII claim. Moreover, as the State of New York and the New York State Bureau of Audit and Control are not the employers of the plaintiff, they may not be named as defendants to the Title VII action.