42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(b) requires fifteen or more employees for twenty weeks in either the current or preceding calendar year; weeks from different years cannot be combined.

Carroll v. Village of Shelton · filed 1996-12-19(b)

I, however, do not agree that the weeks may be aggregated between two different years. ... To the contrary the statute allows suit where the defendant employed fifteen or more employees for twenty weeks in either the current year or the preceding year.

Section 2000e(b) requires a union sued as an employer to meet Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold; employees of an international union are not counted with those of a local unless the unions are a single employer.

Maxwell v. Kight · filed 1996-12-31(b)

Local 450 is being sued in its capacity as an employer. It does not have the number of employees required to qualify under the statutory definitions of “employer.” Moreover, the operations of the local are not sufficiently intertwined with those of the international union to warrant aggregating the number of employees of these entities.

An individual employee who supervises another employee is not personally liable as an employer under Title VII.

Stilley v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth System of Higher Education · filed 1996-12-24(b)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petrosky was not the employer of Lori Stilley, but rather the University was the employer and Petrosky was the co-director and principal investigator on the ADL Project.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer; liability for employees’ acts requires proof that they acted as agents.

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company and Eastman Chemical Company, D/B/A Texas Eastman Company · filed 1997-01-16(b)

In general, Eastman cannot be held liable under Title VII absent proof that its employees acted as its agents. See Title VII's definition of "employer", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (act covers "employers" and their "agents", not "employees").

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees to be subject to Title VII.

Croce v. VIP Real Estate, Inc. · filed 1997-01-13(b)

Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff proved that the Title VII threshold requirement of “fifteen or more employees” has been met.

Section 2000e(b) counts an individual toward the 15-employee threshold on each working day an employment relationship exists, whether or not the individual is paid that day.

Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1997-01-14(b)

We agree with petitioners that the ultimate touchstone under § 2000e(b) is whether an employer has employment relationships with 15 or more individuals for each working day in 20 or more weeks during the year in question.

Section 2000e defines an employer as an entity with at least 15 employees; related companies may be counted as a single employer when their ownership, control, and operations support that conclusion.

Westphal v. Catch Ball Products Corp. · filed 1997-02-18(b)

Title VII and ADEA define “employer” to mean entities with 15 and 20 or more employees, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). ... Even if it was not, the other evidence of common ownership and control and of interrelationship of operations was sufficient to permit the ultimate conclusion that the entities were a single employer. Accordingly, this Court quite plainly had jurisdiction over the Title VII claim until it was dismissed at the end of the plaintiff’s case.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of “employer” under Title VII’s general provisions.

Hodge v. Dalton · filed 1997-02-19(b)

The United States is not an employer amenable to suit under the general provisions of Title VIL... Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) provides: "The term ‘employer’ ... does not include (1) the United States....”

Providing payroll services to a franchisee does not make a franchisor an employer under Title VII when the franchisor lacks control over labor relations.

Hatcher v. Augustus · filed 1997-03-01(b)

The fact that South-land provided a payroll service to Augustus for paying the employees of the Wantagh 7-Eleven does not in any manner create an indicia of control over labor relations sufficient to demonstrate that Southland is an employer of Hatcher.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of an employer's agent does not require a harasser to have significant control over employment decisions before the employer can be liable for harassment.

Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc. · filed 1997-05-08(b)

For all of these reasons, we conclude the discussion in Sauers of who constitutes an "agent" for Title VII purposes is strictly limited to situations in which a court is determining whether a claim against a named individual defendant (in his official capacity) can operate as a claim against the employer itself. Where, as here, plaintiff has properly sought Title VII relief directly against her employer, the "agent" definition in Sauers simply has no applicability in deciding whether the employer is liable for the conduct of its employees.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer's agents in the definition of employer; employee conduct requires proof of agency to impose liability on the employer.

Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co · filed 1997-06-02(b)

In general, Eastman cannot be held liable under Title VII absent proof that its employees acted as its agents. See Title VII's definition of "employer", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (act covers "employers" and their "agents", not "employees").

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person.

Garraway v. Diversified Material Handling Inc. · filed 1997-07-25(b)

This Court agrees with the reasoning of the majority of Courts of Appeals. Part of the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII is “a person ... who has fifteen or more employees,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and Ladd did not have any employees. Since Ladd is a supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an “employer” under Title VII, his motion for summary judgment must be granted on Counts V and VI, which raise federal claims.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry and any agent of that person, but does not impose individual Title VII liability on employees who are not otherwise employers.

Chatman v. Gentle Dental Center of Waltham · filed 1997-08-22(b)

The court is persuaded by the Second Circuit’s reasoning that, when read in the full context of Title VII, § 2000e(b), cannot be interpreted to create individual liability on the part of individual employees of the employer entity. Therefore this court weighs in with the nearly-unanimous view of the federal circuits that an employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an “employer,” cannot be held hable under Title VII. Accordingly, the Title VII claims brought against the individual defendants in count IV are DISMISSED.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as an entity with fifteen or more employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Hoar v. Prescott Park Arts · filed 1997-08-25(b)

Because Title VII prohibits particular employment practices by an "employer," the statutory definition of "employer" defines the statute's jurisdictional reach. ... In pertinent part. Title VII defines "employer" as one "who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b).

The Title VII employer definition treats the corporate entity as the employer when the allegations identify it as the entity meeting that definition.

White v. Midwest Office Technology, Inc. · filed 1997-09-04(b)

Instead, her allegations point only to Midwest Office as the entity meeting the definition of employer under Title VII and the KAAD.

Section 2000e distinguishes a person, including an individual, from an employer, which includes a qualifying employer and its agents.

Martini v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n · filed 1997-09-10(a), (b)

The definitions section of the statute draws a clear distinction between a “person”, including individuals, and an “employer”, who is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person.

Dalton v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp. · filed 1997-09-30(b)

Title VII provides that “it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer” to discriminate against an individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex. or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute defines an “employer” as connoting “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Therefore, as a matter of law, the individual Defendants in the present case cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Accordingly, the Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants are hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as an employer for purposes of Title VII.

Townes v. Platke & Berkowitz · filed 1997-10-10(b)

The district court1 dismissed her complaint on the ground that Platke & Berkowitz was not an “employer” for purposes of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Townes appeals. After careful review of the record, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court&s order dated December 3, 1996.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees during each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks, as well as any agent of that person.

Mullis v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank · filed 1997-10-17(b)

To establish that the defendant is her employer, a plaintiff must show, that the defendant meets the statutory definition of employer, and that an employer-employee relationship existed between herself and the defendant. ... Title VII defines the term "employer” to include "a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer, but a supervisor must have sufficient authority to qualify as an agent.

Pfau v. Reed · filed 1997-10-27(b)

Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person----” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). ... The case law in this circuit indicates that this degree of authority is, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish that a supervisor is an agent within the meaning of Title VII. ... We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Gonzales was not Pfau’s employer for purposes of determining the DCAA’s liability under Title VII.

The definition of employer includes an employer's agents, with agency liability governed by common law respondeat superior principles.

Marie PFAU, Plaintiff-Appellant v. REED · filed 1997-10-27(b)

Title VII defines "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). While the plain language of the above provisions facially appears to provide a basis for rendering agents of an employer personally liable for their discriminatory acts, this circuit has interpreted Title VII's definition of employer as merely importing common law agency principles of respondeat superior liability. ... Thus, the actions of one who constitutes an agent of an employer may be considered the actions of the employer for purposes of imposing Title VII liability on the employer. ... We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Gonzales was not Pfau's employer for purposes of determining the DCAA's liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” receives a liberal construction.

Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, FL · filed 1997-11-05(b)

We accord a liberal construction to the term “employer” under Title VII.

Related companies operating as a single employer may count their employees together to meet Title VII’s minimum employee requirement.

Player v. Nations Biologics, Inc. · filed 1997-11-24(b)

Hence, the plasma centers owned by Savoy and managed by his company, Nations, were an “integrated enterprise” for purposes of aggregating the number of employees to meet the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII and the ADEA Although Riverfront and Nations did not individually have the requisite number of employees to fall within the scope of Title VII or the' ADEA, the court finds that the total number of individuals employed by Nations, Riverfront, and the additional plasma centers owned by Savoy and managed by Nations during the relevant time period meet the jurisdictional requirements of these statutes.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer excludes subordinates who perform no employer functions and cannot affect an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.

Malladi v. Brown · filed 1997-12-01(b)

In this case, the employees, who Malladi alleges have perpetrated discrimination against her, do not fall within the definition of employer under Title VII. These employees do not perform any traditional employer functions, and, in fact, perform no functions that can impact the terms and conditions of Malladi’s employment; they are her subordinates.

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Long v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority · filed 1997-12-05(b)

Although Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum argues that jurisdiction may exist pursuant to Title VII 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, for purposes of that title the term “employer” specifically excludes “an Indian Tribe”.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for the specified period to be covered by Title VII.

Vickery v. Minooka Volunteer Fire Department · filed 1997-12-15(b)

Title VII applies to any employer who “has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Because plaintiffs have failed to show that the Board and the Department are employers within the meaning of Title VII, the plaintiffs’ claims under Count I and Count II must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer incorporates agency principles, but a supervisor's limited authority does not necessarily make the supervisor the employer's agent.

Pfau v. Reed · filed 1998-01-06(b)

We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that Gonzales was not Pfau's employer for purposes of determining the DCAA's liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) permits an entity that controls a worker’s compensation and working conditions to be treated as an employer even when another entity also employs the worker.

Gryga v. Ganzman · filed 1998-01-12(b)

Plaintiffs evidence shows that defendant controls numerous aspects of her compensation and working conditions. The City of New York pays plaintiff, provides her with benefits, withholds her taxes, sets her holiday schedule, docks her pay when she is late, and retains the authority to discharge her if circumstances warrant. Thus, this court finds as a matter of law that the City of New York is- plaintiff’s employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make individual supervisors personally liable under Title VII.

McNight v. Dormitory Authority of State of NY · filed 1998-02-19(b)

However, as defendants correctly argue, and plaintiff now concedes, “individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII.” ... Therefore, plaintiffs Title VII claims against the individual defendants are dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII complaint to allege facts showing that the defendant meets the fifteen-employee minimum when employer status is challenged.

Davies v. Genesis Medical Center · filed 1998-02-12(b)

Because Plaintiffs have not pled any facts identifying A & A as an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), including whether A & A has fifteen or more employees, the Court grants A & A’s Motion to Dismiss this claim.

Plaintiffs who offered no evidence that Paramount met § 2000e(b)’s definition of employer could not pursue their Title VII claim against it.

DeShiro v. Branch · filed 1998-04-17(b)

The Plaintiffs failed to present any evidence to show that Paramount is an “employer” as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person with at least fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Hazel v. School Bd. of Dade County, Fla. · filed 1998-05-08(b)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) allows a .person to bring suit against an employer who “has fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in their current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ....” ... Paragraph six and Exhibit A are sufficient to satisfy Hazel’s jurisdictional requirements under § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) requires each joint employer to meet the fifteen-employee minimum independently; their employees cannot be counted together to meet it.

Serrano v. 900 5th Avenue Corp. · filed 1998-05-11(b)

Because 900 5th’s employees cannot be counted with BHS’s, it falls outside Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Section 2000e(b) counts individuals on an employer’s payroll toward its fifteen-employee threshold if they appear there for at least twenty weeks in the year.

Russell v. Buchanan · filed 1998-05-19(b)

Thus, if fifteen or more individuals appear on the company payroll for 20 or more weeks during the year, jurisdiction is appropriate.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for each working day in at least twenty weeks of the current or preceding calendar year.

Hosler v. Greene · filed 1998-05-21(b)

Turning to the remaining employees listed on Defendants’ payroll withholding reports, Plaintiff fails to provide evidence showing that Defendants had fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Section 2000e(b) allows employees of sufficiently interrelated businesses to be counted together when deciding whether an employer meets Title VII’s employee threshold.

Landon v. Agatha Harden, Inc. · filed 1998-05-21(b)

Based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to show that Agatha Harden, Inc., d/b/a Checkeare Systems of Montgomery — the named defendant in this action — is so interrelated to, either Checkeare Systems of Mobile or Agatha Harden, Inc.’s corporate headquarters in Columbus, Georgia, to warrant aggregation of the number of individuals employed by each entity for purposes of establishing Title VII liability.

Section 2000e(b)’s employee threshold does not combine separately operated businesses merely because they share an owner.

Sharpe v. Jefferson Distributing Co. · filed 1998-06-03(b)

Ai employer may not use multiple incorporations to put a single enterprise beyond the scope of Title VII, but neither Title VII nor any other federal law lumps together as one firm all businesses owned by a single person. ... The district court’s decision that Sharpe was employed by Data Genesis, a two-employee corporation, is not clearly erroneous. Title VII therefore is inapplicable.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer by its employee count and includes its agents; under subsection (a), governments and political subdivisions can qualify.

Vandermeer v. Douglas County · filed 1998-07-15(b)

Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person ....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). “Person” is defined to include “governments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), so the defendants clearly can be employers within the meaning of the statute — as long as they have the requisite number of employees. However, the defendants have not argued that any of the defendants had fewer than 15 employees during the relevant period. Nor has any evidence been presented as to the number of employees employed by any of the defendants. Thus for purposes of this motion, at least, we will treat all of the defendants as falling within the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) counts workers toward Title VII’s employer threshold only while they have an employment relationship under traditional agency principles.

Kemether v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n · filed 1998-08-06(b)

Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and construing employment broadly for Title VII jurisdictional purposes, I apply traditional principles of agency law as elaborated in Darden and clarified in Walters to conclude that a PIAA-registered official is not in an employment relationship with any relevant hiring party — PIAA, Deleo Chapter, an assignor, the Del Val league, or a PIAA member school — outside of the regular season or the post-season of that official’s sport.

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII plaintiff to allege that the defendant is an employer.

Dunn v. Tutera Group · filed 1998-08-14(b)

Plaintiff must also allege that defendants are employers under Title VII and that defendants employed plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) & (f); 28 U.S.C. § 623. In this case, plaintiffs complaint is sufficient under these standards, since she alleges that she exhausted administrative remedies and received a right to sue letter. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants are Title VII employers and that she worked for defendants during the relevant period.

Section 2000e(b) does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII when they lack actual and direct control over employment conditions and status.

Hall v. State Farm Insurance · filed 1998-09-24(b)

At a minimum, federal decisions interpret Title VII as requiring at least actual and direct control over employment conditions and status before liability may be imposed. Odland’s testimony establishes that State Farm supervisors do not have that level of control.

Section 2000e(b) generally requires fifteen employees for twenty weeks, and allows separate entities to be combined for that count in some circumstances.

Artis v. Francis Howell North Band Booster Association, Inc. Francis Howell R-Iii School District Joseph Stacy · filed 1998-12-09(b)

Title VII applies to employers with “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.... ” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). Separate entities may be consolidated for purposes of meeting this employee numerosity requirement in certain circumstances. ... Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find the district court correctly concluded that the Association did not meet the employee numerosity requirement under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) does not make an employer’s agents individually liable under Title VII unless they independently qualify as employers.

Welch v. Cook County Clerk's Office · filed 1999-01-14(b)

Liability for employment discrimination under Title VII can only be imposed against an individual who qualifies independently as an employer. ... Because Defendants Teater, Robinson, Murray, Jackson-Hallen, and LaMont do not qualify as employers, the Title VII claims against them as individuals are dismissed.

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer,” including its reference to agents, does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII.

Brown v. Middaugh · filed 1999-02-19(b)

Although this language appears to allow individual liability under Title VII, courts have found it does not. ... Accordingly, the individual Title VII claims against Middaugh, Paravati, Meyers, Chappie, Hughes, White and Lisi are dismissed.

Section 2000e excludes the United States from its definition of employer, so federal employees cannot be counted with private employees to meet Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Brug v. National Coalition for the Homeless · filed 1999-03-19(b)

The Court, however, concludes that the Radio and Television Broadcast factors are not applicable to this case because Title VII prohibits the aggregation of private and federal employees in order to meet the definition of an employer under Title VII as a matter of law.

An entity’s status as an employer under Title VII depends on its control or supervision of the worker under common law agency or joint employer principles.

Sowemimo v. D.A.O.R. Security, Inc. · filed 1999-04-19(b)

These facts, in addition to the contract between DHS and D.A.O.R., demonstrate that DHS was not Sowemimo’s employer under the common law agency test nor under the joint employer theory, and thus defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted as to plaintiffs claims against DHS under Title VII, the HRL, and the NYCHRL.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer by a fifteen-employee threshold, which governs substantive Title VII coverage rather than subject matter jurisdiction.

Morris-Eberhart v. J.G. Mathena & Assoc., Inc. · filed 1999-04-30(b)

Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... This court fully concurs with the persuasive reasoning and conclusion reached by Judge Lungstrum in Saxon. ... Because the plaintiff does not directly challenge the procedural flaw in the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court will not deny the motion but will construe it as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and convert it to a motion under Rule 56.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees.

Jones v. Sabis Educational Systems, Inc. · filed 1999-06-01(b)

The Act defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Because the Foundation was not plaintiffs employer (and in any event, has less than 15 employees), the Foundation’s motion to dismiss count V(A) is granted.

A sole proprietor can qualify as a Title VII employer by employing the required number of workers across businesses operated under different trade names.

Curran v. Morrissette, et al. · filed 1999-07-01(b)

If the court simply considers the total number of Morrissette's employees, without regard to the fact that he pursues his business ventures under two distinct trade names, it is clear that he meets the statutory definition of "employer."

Section 2000e requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty or more weeks; a district attorney’s autonomous office may be counted separately from the state.

Lewis v. McDade · filed 1999-07-13(b)

Therefore, the office of the Douglas County District Attorney should be treated as a separate entity for Title VII purposes. The District Attorney did not employ more than fifteen (15) employees, as that term is defined in Title VII, for each work day in twenty (20) or more weeks during the applicable period. Accordingly, the District Attorney’s office and the State of Georgia do not qualify as “employers” under Title VII.

For Title VII claims against a state entity, the employer is the agency or part of the state with actual hiring and firing responsibility.

Hearne v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago · filed 1999-07-16(b)

Title VII actions must be brought against the “employer.” In suits against state entities, that term is understood to mean the particular agency or part of the state apparatus that has actual hiring and firing responsibility.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII; an employee cannot be sued in an individual capacity.

Scott v. Estes · filed 1999-08-04(b)

Title VII does not provide a cause of action against an employee in his individual capacity.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person with at least fifteen employees for each working day in at least twenty calendar weeks of the current or preceding year.

Wallace v. Smith & Smith Construction, Inc. · filed 1999-08-19(b)

Defendant’s evidence, in contrast, shows that the number of employees and the duration worked is insufficient to satisfy the definition of “employer” under Title VII. Plaintiffs evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to either the number of employees or the duration, and, accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claim must be granted.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold can count union stewards who receive compensation for their services through reimbursements for lost time, dues, and retirement contributions.

Daggitt v. United Food & Commercial Workers International Union Local 304A · filed 1999-08-20(b)

The Court concludes that the Union’s reimbursements to stewards for “lost time,” membership dues, and 401(k) employer contributions is sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship for Title VII purposes. ... For the limited purposes of this Title VII case, the plaintiff has met her burden to establish that the Union employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in 1995, 1996 and 1997.

Section 2000e(b) excludes independent contractors when counting employees to determine whether an entity is a Title VII employer.

Morris-Eberhart v. J.G. Mathena & Assoc., Inc. · filed 1999-08-05(b)

Therefore, independent contractors are not counted as employees in determining whether an entity is an employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee minimum does not count shareholders of a professional corporation who function as partners in managing and owning the firm.

Saxon v. Thompson Orthodontics · filed 1999-08-19(b)

On balance, the evidence supports only the conclusion that the doctor/shareholders are essentially “partners” and, accordingly, that they are not employees of the firm.

Section 2000e(b) permits closely connected corporations to be treated as one employer under the integrated enterprise test.

Thomas v. Bet Sound-Stage Restaurant/BrettCo, Inc. · filed 1999-09-01(b)

In determining whether sufficient integration exists to treat the corporations as a single, integrated “employer,” the Court must weigh four factors. ... Here, on a motion to dismiss and prior to discovery, there is not enough evidence in the record to determine whether BrettCo is an “employer” under the integrated enterprise analysis for purposes of Title VII liability. Plaintiff, however, has alleged sufficient facts in her complaint to survive the motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e’s employer definition covered the hotel owner personally but did not cover the hotel’s franchisor as Thorne’s employer.

Thorne v. Welk Investment · filed 1999-11-22(b)

Next, Defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Welk was personally Plaintiff’s employer. Instead, Defendants claim, Thorne was actually employed by Welk Investment, Inc. In a related issue, the trial court granted summary judgment in Choice Hotel’s favor on the ground that Choice Hotel, as franchisor, was not Thorne’s employer. The Plaintiff appeals this determination. We, however, see no error of law or fact in either conclusion.

Section 2000e(b) requires a plaintiff to present evidence that the defendant had at least fifteen employees on its payroll for twenty weeks during the year of the alleged harassment or the preceding year.

Mizwicki v. Gerald Helwig, D.C., P.C. And Archer Service Corporation, Ltd. D/B/A Midwest Chiropractic Care Center · filed 1999-11-15(b)

Under the payroll method set forth in Walters, the plaintiff is required to show that at least fifteen employees were on the defendant’s payroll for twenty weeks during the year of, or preceding, the alleged harassment. ... Mizwicki clearly failed to do this as to both defendants. The district court therefore properly granted judgment for the defendants as a matter of law.

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee requirement cannot be waived on equitable grounds.

Reil v. Clinton County, New York · filed 1999-11-19(b)

Finally, the Court declines Plaintiffs invitation to evade the statutory requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) on equitable grounds. Congress enacted § 2000e(b), and Congress can revise it.

A subsidiary with fewer than fifteen employees cannot count its parent’s employees toward Title VII’s employer threshold unless the companies constitute a single employer.

Da Silva v. Kinsho International Corp. · filed 2000-01-04(b)

Accordingly, the Court holds that (i) Kinsho Int’l and Kinsho Mataichi do not constitute a “single employer”; (ii) Kinsho Int’l does not qualify as an “employer” under Title VII; and (iii) Plaintiffs Title VII claims against defendant Kinsho Int’l must be dismissed.

An individual employee or supervisor who does not qualify as an employer cannot be held personally liable under Title VII.

Morris v. Oldham Cnty Fiscal · filed 2000-01-20(b)

It should be noted that Likins and Black cannot be held individually ... liable under either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § ... 2000e et seq., or the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A et seq. In Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997), we stated, “[A]n individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an ‘employer,’ may not be held personally liable under Title VII.”

Section 2000e(b) counts temporary workers toward Title VII’s 15-employee threshold when a staffing agency exercises sufficient control over their terms of employment, including as a joint employer.

March v. Technical Employment, et al. · filed 2000-03-03(b)

The court is persuaded that TESI in fact exercises sufficient control over substantial aspects of the temporary workers’ terms and conditions of employment to warrant the conclusion that it “employs” those workers for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employment relationship for an entity to qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Pfeil v. Intecom Telecommunications · filed 2000-03-20(b)

An employment relationship is a prerequisite to Title VII liability. Since no employment relationship existed between Intecom Acquisition and Plaintiff, Intecom Acquisition does not meet the statutory definition of an employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

An entity with fewer than fifteen employees cannot meet § 2000e(b)’s employer definition by combining its employees with those of a larger joint employer.

Prunella v. Carlshire Tenants, Inc. · filed 2000-05-09(b)

Thus, because Carlshire’s employees cannot be counted with Garthchester Realty, Ltd.’s employees, Carlshire falls outside Title VII’s definition of “employer.” Accordingly, the instant action is dismissed as to Carlshire for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Title VII’s definition of employer includes a corporate agent that provides management services to an employer.

Nealey v. University Health Services, Inc. · filed 2000-06-21(b)

The Court concludes, therefore, that Mason is not on point and that CareSouth, by virtue of its agency relationship with UHS, qualifies as an “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII coverage as having at least fifteen employees.

Da Silva v. Kinsho International Corporation and Haruo Maruyama · filed 2000-10-05(b)

Taking what we believe is an appropriately limited view of the nature of issues that should determine subject matter jurisdiction and examining the wording of Title VII’s jurisdictional statute, we agree with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is not a jurisdictional issue, at least as long as a plaintiff, as in the pending case, makes a non-frivolous claim that the defendant is a covered employer. Since the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction was properly invoked and no issue is raised as to the Court’s discretionary exercise of supplemental jurisdiction or the rejection of either the federal or the state claims on the merits, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Meister v. Texas Adjustant General Department · filed 2000-11-28(b)

First, the United States armed forces are not covered by Title VII because the United States is excluded from the statutory definition of “employer.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer excludes individual supervisors from personal liability under Title VII.

Johnson v. Quin Rivers Agency for Community Action, Inc. · filed 2001-01-17(b)

Individual supervisors have no personal liability under Title VII or the ADEA because they are not “employers” within the meaning of either statute.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer definition requires examining an entity’s control over the worker’s means and manner of performance; shared ownership of a workplace alone does not establish employer status.

Ratts v. Board of County Com'rs, Harvey County, KS · filed 2001-03-28(b)

Therefore, the main focus of this analysis is whether and to what extent the County had the “right to control the ‘means and manner’ ” of Ms. Ratts’ performance. ... No evidence has been presented that would establish the requisite degree of control over Ms. Ratts’ working performance. Therefore, Ms. Ratts has failed to provide sufficient evidence indicating that the County was her employer.

Section 2000e(b) excludes a company from Title VII’s definition of employer unless it has at least 15 employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Allen v. Comprehensive Analytical Group, Inc. · filed 2001-04-30(b)

Defendants have provided sufficient evidence to support a finding that CAG does not qualify as an “employer” and, as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to dispute this claim. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claim asserted against CAG.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII to include an entity meeting the statute’s 15-employee requirement.

Riggs v. County of Banner · filed 2001-08-24(b)

The court has previously ruled that the County during 1997 satisfied the 15-employee requirement for an "employer” under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, even when employees of an integrated enterprise are counted together.

Tyler v. Intl Brhd Elec Wrkrs · filed 2001-09-11(b)

Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not clearly err by finding that, although Local 130 and the Funds comprised a single, integrated enterprise, Tyler failed to satisfy the statutory twenty-week minimum requirement.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for purposes of Title VII coverage.

Dunn v. Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc. · filed 2001-08-21(b)

Determining whether a defendant is an “employer” under Title VII involves a two-step process: (1) the defendant must fall within the statutory definition; and, (2) there must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. ... In short, the Court finds that Uniroyal is not an employer of the plaintiff as a matter of fact and law.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer excludes individual officials from personal liability under Title VII.

Noaks v. Ohio Lottery Commission · filed 2001-09-25(b)

First, the district court properly rejected plaintiffs claims against the individual defendants under Title VII because those defendants are not included within the statutory definition of “employer” under Title VII and related civil rights statutes, and therefore cannot be held personally liable for alleged discrimination.

A Title VII complaint must allege facts showing that the defendant qualifies as an employer under the section’s definition.

Riggs v. Cuna Mutual Insurance Society · filed 2001-10-10(b)

In this case, plaintiff fails to advance the minimal factual allegations necessary to establish that defendant qualifies as an “employer” under Title VII.

A franchisor can qualify as an employer under § 2000e(b) when it retains control over a franchisee’s employment decisions.

Patsy Freeman v. Suddle Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2001-10-18(b)

For present purposes, the court is satisfied that the agency analysis will yield the same conclusion as the integrated enterprise test; the level of control that Huddle House exercises over Suddle in the context of employment decisions is determinative of a finding that it is an employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e’s employer and employee definitions require an employment relationship; when related entities are alleged to be a single employer, courts examine their operations, control of labor relations, management, and financial control.

Ortiz v. Wingard · filed 2001-10-24(b), (f)

In applying the single employer inquiry, the Court must examine four factors to determine if there is an employment relationship: interrelationship of operations, centralized control of labor relations, common management, and common ownership or financial control.

A bus company operating within one state can meet Title VII’s employer definition when its operations plausibly affect interstate commerce.

Rodriguez v. Beechmont Bus Service, Inc. · filed 2001-11-21(b)

For the purposes of this motion, plaintiff is entitled to the reasonable inference that such buses, even if they travel only within state limits, use the same roads that are used by vehicles traveling interstate and that Beechmont purchases buses, fuel and replacement parts in interstate commerce. As a result, we conclude that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendants affect interstate commerce.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, but the employer is not liable for their conduct unless they acted within the scope of their employment.

Austin v. Mabey · filed 2001-12-20(b)

The summary judgment record establishes that the evidence relied on by the plaintiffs would be insufficient to satisfy a reasonable jury that the Cajun employees were acting within the scope of their employment with Cajun when they made employment recommendations to LaGen. Therefore, defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of its status as an employer under Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer definition depends on the employment relationship, with control over the worker carrying more weight than payment of salary.

United States v. Matagorda County, Texas · filed 2002-01-10(b)

The Court concludes that the undisputed facts of this case, when evaluated within the framework of the Fifth Circuit’s hybrid test, mandate a conclusion that Matagorda County was not Jordan’s employer for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks of the current or preceding year to qualify under Title VII.

Sublett v. Edgewood Universal Cabling Systems, Inc. · filed 2002-01-19(b)

As the statute indicates, not only must the employer have employed 15 or more employees in order to qualify as an “employer”, it also must have employed 15 or more employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks. ... Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Edge-wood is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Castille v. Compliance Solutions · filed 2002-01-30(b)

Next, we agree with the primary basis supporting the magistrate judge’s decision: Compliance Solutions is exempt from the reach of Title VII and the ADEA. Barring a handful of exceptions not relevant here, Title VII applies to organizations that have “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) excludes entities with fewer than fifteen employees from Title VII’s definition of employer, including when their agents are sued in their official capacities.

Marburger v. Upper Hanover Township · filed 2002-02-04(b)

The law is clear: plaintiffs may not maintain Title VII suits against entities or agents of those entities in their official capacities where such entities employ less than fifteen people.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees to qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Evans v. N Street Boxing Club · filed 2002-03-04(b)

North Street Boxing Club did not have the requisite 15 employees to qualify as an employer.3 Therefore those defendants affiliated with NSBC cannot be liable.

Section 2000e(b) sets the employee-count threshold for an employer under Title VII.

Coleman v. ANR-Advance Transportation Co. · filed 2002-03-08(b)

To the contrary, ANR-Advance had more than the requisite number of employees to be independently liable under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).

A parent corporation’s employees do not count toward its subsidiary’s Title VII employee threshold without facts showing the two are a single employer.

Darden v. Daimlerchrysler North America Holding Corp. · filed 2002-03-14(b)

Accordingly, Darden’s allegations are insufficient to bring CSI into the purview of Title VII or the ADEA’s definition of employer and the Court must dismiss Darden’s claims against CSI for failure to satisfy the elements of a cause of action under either statute, and thus to state a claim sufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII; a fire department with no employees is not the employer when its personnel are employed by the city.

Cooper v. Virginia Beach Fire Department · filed 2002-04-12(b)

The Court finds that the City of Virginia Beach is the Plaintiffs employer for purposes of Title VII. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss VBFD as a party to the action because it is not the “employer” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 2000e(b) excludes companies with fewer than fifteen employees from Title VII’s definition of employer.

Marvelli v. Chaps Community Health Center · filed 2002-03-27(b)

Since CHAPS employed fewer than 15 people in calendar years 1998 and 1999, see Walsh Reply Aff. ¶ 4, plaintiffs may not maintain a Title VII claim against CHAPS.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, allowing employer liability for an agent’s sexual harassment under agency principles.

McPherson v. HCA-HEALTHONE, LLC. · filed 2002-05-09(b)

In certain circumstances, an employer may be found to be liable for the actions of its agents, such as supervisors, as well as for the actions of its employees.

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer by requiring at least fifteen employees during the relevant period.

Calvert v. Midwest Restoration Services, Inc. · filed 2002-05-22(b)

We have stated, however, that the fifteen-employee requirement is jurisdictional.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII as an entity with at least 15 employees.

Arbabi v. Fred Meyers, Inc. · filed 2002-05-28(b)

Defendant Fred Meyer, Inc., is not an employer under Title VII because it has fewer than 15 employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes; the court held that a franchisor lacking control over the franchisee’s labor relations was not the plaintiff’s employer.

Spaulding v. NW Hospitality Investment Co., LLC · filed 2002-06-11(b)

To establish a prima facie case for his federal employment discrimination claims against defendant Days Inn, plaintiff is required to prove, inter alia, that Days Inn is his employer. ... Even assuming, however, that the lenient single-employer test applies, here, plaintiff nonetheless has not met his burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Days Inn was his employer. Rather,-the record before the court reflects that, as a matter of law, Days Inn cannot be held liable as an employer under the federal anti-discrimination statutes.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a business engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees on each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Cameron v. Mid-Continent Livestock Supplements · filed 2002-06-27(b)

Before reaching the merits of a Title VII claim, the Court must first determine if the defendant in question is an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and is therefore subject to Title VII liability. In order to be an "employer," a defendant must be a business "engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines employer to include agents, but that language imports respondeat superior liability rather than individual liability for employees.

Smith v. Amedisys Inc. · filed 2002-07-26(b)

Under Title VII, an “employer” includes any “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce . . . and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). This circuit has held that there is no individual liability for employees under Title VII. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994). While Title VII’s definition of the term employer includes “any agent” of an employer, Congress’s purpose was merely to import respondeat superior liability into Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires a labor organization sued by an employee for employment discrimination to meet Title VII's definition of employer.

Anita Ferroni, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Warehousemen Local No. 222, Defendant-Appel · filed 2002-08-07(b)

Moreover, the plain language of the statute shows that a labor organization can be an employer. Id. § 2000e(b) (excluding “a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)” from the definition of employer).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an agent.

Min Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company · filed 2002-08-07(b)

However, once sex discrimination is assumed (or, as in this case, found by the jury), principles of agency law, and not the labels “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment,” are controlling on the question of an employer’s vicarious liability. ... Id. at 754, 118 S.Ct. 2257 (“We turn to principles of agency law, for the term ‘employer’ is defined under Title VII to include ‘agents.’) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)”); see also Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (finding that Congress intended courts “to look to agency principles for guidance” when determining employer liability under Title VII).

Section 2000e(b) defines employer for Title VII and, after amendment, includes municipal employers.

Gupta v. City of Norwalk · filed 2002-08-15(b)

Also, as to the Title VII claim, “[wjhen the Act was first passed municipalities were not defined as ‘employers’ under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and therefore were not subject to its provisions. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, effective date, Mar. 24, 1972, amended the statute so as to bring municipal employers within its purview.”

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees and any agent of that person, and state governments can qualify as employers.

Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania D/B/A Department of Corrections Donald T. Vaughn Phico Services Company Co · filed 2002-08-21(b)

But both Title I and Title VII define “employer” to include persons “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 12111(5)(A). State governments can constitute “employers” under the statute.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce and that person's agents.

Coral Mateu-Anderegg v. School District of Whitefish Bay · filed 2002-08-26(b)

The statute itself defines employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Courts are to interpret Title VII "based on agency principles."

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees or an agent of such a person.

Castillo v. American Board of Surgery · filed 2002-08-27(b)

“Employer” for Title VII purposes is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines an employer to include qualifying employers and their agents and defines person to include receivers.

Murray v. Gilmore · filed 2002-09-30(a), (b)

Title VII provides a cause of action against employer. The statute defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ..., and any agent of such a person. ..,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and further defines “person” as including “receivers.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e defines an employer to include a person with fifteen or more employees and an agent, and defines person to include receivers.

Murray v. Gilmore · filed 2002-10-30(a), (b)

Title VII provides a cause of action against employer. The statute defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ..., and any agent of such a person 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and further defines “person” as including “receivers.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as one that employs 15 or more employees during the specified period.

Foster v. Hall · filed 2002-12-09(b)

To qualify as an “employer” under Title VII, the Coroner must employ “15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers both defendants in this teacher certification dispute.

Gulino v. Board of Education of the City School District of New York · filed 2002-11-25(b)

Plaintiffs seek summary judgment declaring both defendants liable as employers under Title VII. ... For the reasons that follow, the court rejects defendants’ arguments and grants plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII and does not make individual public officials personally liable merely because they are alleged to be an employer’s agents.

Guerin v. Pointe Coupee Parish Nursing Home · filed 2003-01-10(b)

An “employer” is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as; “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year, and any agent of such person.” ... Because Title VII does not provide for the personal liability of public officials, the Title VII claim against the individual defendants should be dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) defines the employer that may be held liable for discrimination under Title VII.

Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County · filed 2003-02-06(b)

A Title VII claim is, by necessity, an official-capacity action because only an "employer" may be held liable for discrimination which violates Title VII's provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir.1995).

Section 2000e(b) requires a Title VII employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty weeks in the current or preceding year.

Wilson v. COMTRUST LLC · filed 2003-02-07(b)

Plaintiff has not produced sufficient evidence to meet her burden of establishing that any Defendant employed at least fifteen individuals for twenty weeks or more in the current or preceding years. Accordingly, Defendants individually are not “employers” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes a company from Title VII’s definition of employer unless it has at least fifteen employees for the required period.

Castille v. Compliance Solutions Occupational Trainers, Inc. · filed 2003-02-04(b)

Compliance Solutions cannot be subject to Ms. Castille’s anti-retaliation suit unless it satisfies Title VII’s statutory definition of employer. ... “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .” ... Based on Ms. Castille’s recitation of the number of employees at Compliance Solutions, coupled with her former employer’s affidavit, we determine the district court correctly concluded Compliance Solutions did not fall within Title VII’s definition of employer, and therefore it ... properly dismissed Ms. Castille’s case.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer does not make supervisors or agents personally liable under Title VII.

Cintron v. Gonzalez · filed 2003-02-19(b)

Title VIPs statutory structure suggests that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability over supervisors or agents of employers.

A temporary employment agency that does not control workers’ duties at a client assignment is not their employer under Title VII.

Watson v. Adecco Employment Services, Inc. · filed 2003-03-06(b)

This Court finds persuasive the reasoning of Astrowsky, Kellam, and Williams, and holds that Adecco, as a temporary employment agency exercising no control over Plaintiffs’ responsibilities or duties once on assignment, cannot be considered the Title VII employer of these temporary employees.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to meet the fifteen-employee threshold; there is no need to aggregate employees when the state offers no evidence that it falls below that threshold.

Smith v. Alabama · filed 2003-03-19(b)

As the State has not presented any evidence regarding its failure to satisfy the "fifteen employees” requirement, there is no need for the court to count or aggregate employees.

An entity qualifies as a Title VII employer only if it meets the statutory definition, including the requirement of at least fifteen employees.

Cooper v. Southern Co. · filed 2003-03-31(b)

An "employer” is a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Thus, Plaintiff has standing to sue TSC only if it can be shown that TSC constituted an "employer” from whom Plaintiff received compensation.

A firm falls outside Title VII’s employer coverage when excluding its bona fide general partners leaves it below the required employee count.

Parsells v. Manhattan Radiology Group, L.L.P. · filed 2003-04-03(b)

Acknowledging the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.1987), that bona fide general partners are not considered “employees” for purposes of the federal anti-discrimination acts, plaintiff concedes that defendant MRG’s partners cannot be counted toward the number of employees and that, excluding the partners, defendant MRG did not have the requisite number of employees during the relevant time period. Plaintiff, thus, expressly concedes that defendant MRG is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claims. Defendant’s motion, then, is granted with respect to plaintiffs Title VII claims.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, but supervisors are not individually liable under Title VII.

Bankhead v. Arkansas Department of Human Services · filed 2003-05-07(b)

The term employer, as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, means “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such person ....” ... where the Court held that supervisors may not be found individually liable under Title VII. ... Therefore, Defendants’ summary-judgment motion on Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims against Defendants Knickrhem, Williams, and McCook is 'GRANTED and those claims are dismissed.

A nonprofit is an employer under § 2000e(b) when its activities affect interstate commerce.

Johnson, Robert v. Apna Ghar Inc · filed 2003-06-04(b)

Because Apna Ghar’s activities, as described above, are “matters which ‘affect’, ‘interrupt’, or ‘promote’ interstate commerce,” Polish Nat’l Alliance, 322 U.S. at 647, Apna Ghar is engaged in an industry that affects commerce and is properly classified as an “employer” for purposes of Title VII.

An insurer administering a company’s employee health benefits is not necessarily those employees’ employer under Title VII.

Klassy v. Physicians Plus Insurance · filed 2003-06-09(b)

In short, defendant Physicians Plus was not plaintiffs’ “de facto or indirect” employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) can cover a nonprofit organization as an employer when its activities affect commerce.

Johnson v. Apna Ghar, Inc. · filed 2003-07-21(b)

Because Apna Ghar’s activities, as described above, are “matters which ‘affect’, ‘interrupt’, or ‘promote’ interstate commerce,” Polish Nat’l Alliance, 322 U.S. at 647, 64 S.Ct. 1196, Apna Ghar is engaged in an industry that affects commerce and is properly classified as an “employer” for purposes of Title VII.

A supervisor who is the corporate employer’s alter ego may be treated as an employer under Title VII.

Bonilla v. Tooling & Stamping, Inc. · filed 2003-09-09(b)

Under these circumstances, we agree with the Magistrate that Defendant Hernández was indeed the alter ego of Defendant Tooling for the purposes of imposing individual liability under Title VII, and will deny this part of Defendants’ motion.

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as an entity with at least 15 employees for the required number of weeks.

Gettings v. Building Laborers Local 310 Fringe Benefits Fund · filed 2003-11-13(b)

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Gettings’s Title VII claim because the Fund does not satisfy the statutory definition of an employer. An employer, for purposes of Title VII, is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The district court found that, from 1995 to the present, the Fund has never had 15 or more employees. Only 6 persons are employed by the Fund. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the Fund was entitled to summary judgment on Gettings’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer under Title VII; individual employees are not personally liable under Title VII.

Tekula v. Bayport-Blue Point School District · filed 2003-12-15(b)

The term “employer” means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such person. ... However, because a Title VII claim against an individual employee is treated as one for vicarious liability against the employer, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII claims against Curtis and Doroski is granted.

Section 2000e(b)’s 15-employee requirement is an element of a Title VII claim, not a limit on federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Doe v. Goldstein's Deli · filed 2003-12-19(b)

However, we have recently held that the 15 employer requirement is an element of plaintiffs’ cause of action, rather than a jurisdictional requirement. See Nesbit v Gears Unlimited, Inc., 2003 WL 22390426, (3d Cir. 2003). The district court therefore erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer limits when a subordinate employee’s discriminatory motive can be attributed to the employer: the subordinate must be the actual decisionmaker or principally responsible for the decision.

Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc. · filed 2004-01-05(b)

In sum, to survive summary judgment, an aggrieved employee who rests a discrimination claim under Title VII or the ADEA upon the discriminatory motivations of a subordinate employee must come forward with sufficient evidence that the subordinate employee possessed such authority as to be viewed as the one principally responsible for the decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer.

Section 2000e(b) includes an entity employing more than 500 people within its definition of an employer.

Clements v. Barden Mississippi Gaming, L.L.C. · filed 2004-05-07(b)

Barden Gaming employs in excess of 500 persons (actually over 1000) and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer; an allegation that a defendant meets that definition can suffice at the pleading stage.

Gad-Tadros v. Bessemer Venture Partners · filed 2004-07-26(b)

Here, the amended complaint states that, “Defendant BVP is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).” Therefore, accepting all facts in the complaint to be true, as the Court must for the purpose of this motion, at this juncture, the Court finds that the BVP is an employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees, as well as that person's agents.

Vargas v. Fuller Brush Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. · filed 2004-09-08(b)

Determining the meaning of the term “employer” is essential because Title VII is directed at “employers.” Title VII defines employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day and any agent of such person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e. Therefore, because of “individual capacity”, above co-defendants are not the employing entity, and it should be determined whether they can be held liable as agents of the employing entity.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make supervisors or agents personally liable under Title VII.

Gonzalez v. Guidant Corp. · filed 2005-03-03(b)

The Court however finds a second reason to dismiss with prejudice the claims against co-Defendants Américo O’Neill and Luis Fuentes, as well as those against co-Defendant Heriberto Diaz: that they are not employers within the meaning of Title VII, and further, that Title VII does not provide for individual liability.

Title VII’s definition of “employer” does not impose personal liability on individual employees or supervisors who do not themselves qualify as employers.

Kennedy v. R.W.C., Inc. · filed 2005-03-16(b)

However, the Sixth Circuit, in dismissing a Title VII claim against supervisors who were described as “upper-level management” stated that “Congress did not intend individuals to face liability under the definition of ‘employer’ it selected for Title VII.” ... The Court believes that Biniecke’s position was equivalent to the “upper-level” managers in Wathen, and it will dismiss Counts One and Two as to him as well.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees during the required period.

Angeloni v. Diocese of Scranton · filed 2005-03-17(b)

Although individually named in the suit, Reverend Hazzouri could not be liable under Title VII because he was not Angeloni’s employer; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) excludes federal agencies from the definition of “employer” used in Title VII’s general employment discrimination provision.

George, Diane v. Leavitt, Michael · filed 2005-05-17(b)

Although this provision does not apply to federal agencies, see id. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer”), Title VII contains a separate provision that does.

Section 2000e(b)’s employer requirements are elements of a Title VII claim to be decided on the merits, rather than jurisdictional requirements.

Dean v. American Federation of Government Employees Local 476 · filed 2005-08-29(b)

Under the controlling law of the D.C. Circuit, the elements of an ‘employer’ under Title VII are not jurisdictional requirements, but rather are elements of a claim that must be decided on the merits.

Section 2000e(b) includes states and their alter egos in Title VII’s definition of employer.

Ramos v. Puerto Rico Police Department · filed 2005-09-20(b)

A reading of such definition indicates that the States as well as their alter egos, in so far as they are not expressly excluded from the definition mentioned above, are employers for purposes of actions brought against them under Title VII.

Insufficient interrelationship between two businesses does not make one a Title VII employer under § 2000e(b).

Rector v. State Farm Mutual Insurance · filed 2005-10-13(b)

Given the amount of evidence produced by the plaintiff, plaintiff has failed to establish sufficient facts to find a significant degree of interrelationship of the co-defendant and Kelly to determine that Kelly is an “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

A company that neither employed the plaintiff nor met the fifteen-employee threshold was not a Title VII employer under § 2000e(b).

Bartlett v. W.T. Harvey Lumber Co. · filed 2005-11-08(b)

For these reasons, the Court cannot conclude that Pinnacle and Harvey Lumber should be considered as a single “employer” under the “agency” test. Because Pinnacle was not Plaintiffs employer and did not have fifteen or more employees during the relevant time frame, it is not an “employer” under Title VII’s definition of that term, and Pinnacle is entitled to summary judgment on this basis.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, allowing an agent’s discriminatory conduct to be imputed to the employer under agency principles.

Garcia v. Los Banos Unified School District · filed 2006-02-17(b)

With respect to Plaintiffs allegation that the district failed to take appropriate action after Plaintiff formally complained about the May 30, 2003 masturbation incident, Title VII defines an employer to include any agent of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), which means that discriminatory conduct by an employer’s agent may be imputed to an employer generally on agency principles, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998).

Section 2000e(b)’s 15-employee threshold is an element of a Title VII claim, not a limit on federal subject-matter jurisdiction.

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. · filed 2006-02-22(b)

Applying that readily adminis- trable bright line to this case, we hold that the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue.

Section 2000e(b)’s 15-employee threshold is an element of a Title VII claim, and an allegation that the defendant entities together constitute an employer suffices at the pleading stage.

Berry v. Lee · filed 2006-03-08(b)

Although Berry does not specifically allege that BSI, BSUSA, BSC, or CBPC has 15 or more employees, she alleges that “Bao Sheng is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.” P.2d Am. Compl. 16. ... The court accepts these allegations as true. Accordingly, the court cannot grant Rule 12(b)(6) relief because to do so it would be required to consider matters outside the pleadings.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold may be met by counting employees of multiple stores when their operations and control of employment are sufficiently integrated to make them a single employer.

Viera v. Yacoub · filed 2006-03-31(b)

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Molina-Viera fails to produce evidence of common ownership and common management, and does not establish to the Court’s satisfaction an interrelation of operations and a degree of centralized control of labor relations of the magnitude required by the First Circuit. Merely buying merchandise together (each one assuming his share of the price and risks) and looking after a brother’s store while he is absent, is a far cry from the level of control and intermingling of operations required by the First Circuit for a single employer to exist.

Title VII’s employer definition requires at least 15 employees during the statutory period, and that employee count is an element of the plaintiff’s claim.

Faulkner v. Woods Transportation · filed 2006-04-05(b)

Thus, to survive Woods Transportation’s Rule 50(a) motion, Faulkner needed to present at trial legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Woods Transportation had at least 15 employees during the statutory time period.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for the specified number of weeks to qualify as a Title VII employer.

Whittle v. GMJ Ltd. · filed 2006-06-15(b)

Since the record does not show that Adminsolutions had “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year,” Adminsolutions could not have been Whittle’s Title VII employer and was entitled to summary judgment for that reason.

Title VII permits relief from the employer, not from individual employees in their personal capacities.

Bowers v. Janey · filed 2006-07-07(b)

Thus, an individual defendant in a Title VII claim is really only a “nominal defendant,” as the plaintiff may only obtain relief from the employer.

Section 2000e(b) does not treat a person sued solely because she is another defendant’s spouse as an employer under Title VII.

Hirsbrunner v. Ramirez · filed 2006-07-14(b)

As stated at the outset, Title VII defines an employer to be “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is clear that co-defendant Claudia Rajchevich is not an employer within the meaning of Title VII. As such, plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII action against her.

Section 2000e(b) requires a plaintiff to prove that an employer has at least fifteen employees.

Hoyle v. United Auto Workers Local Union 5285 · filed 2006-08-03(b)

Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Plaintiff must prove this numerical threshold as an element of her claim.

Managers who run a business’s daily operations may count toward Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold; their authority alone did not justify excluding them on summary judgment.

Cyndee Smith v. Castaways Family Diner and Carrol A. Gonzalez, Doing Business as Castaways Family Diner · filed 2006-07-18(b)

Because the district court erred in excluding these two individuals from the roster of employees on summary judgment, we reverse and remand.

A state agency that sets teacher certification requirements is not the teachers’ Title VII employer when it does not hire, pay, or supervise them.

Gulino v. New York State Education Department · filed 2006-08-17(b)

As an initial matter, plaintiffs fail to meet the threshold showing that SED hired and compensated them. ... SED does have some control over New York City school teachers—e.g., it controls basic curriculum and credentialing requirements—but SED does not exercise the workaday supervision necessary to an employment relationship.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for Title VII to apply.

Gilham v. Athens Land Trust, Inc. · filed 2007-02-07(b)

To meet that definition, the defendant must employ fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is undisputed that ALT has never employed more than six persons at any one time and is therefore not an “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a qualifying entity with at least fifteen employees and its agent; whether the defendant meets that definition requires examination of its employment relationship with the plaintiff.

Muhammad v. Dallas County Community Supervision & Corrections Department · filed 2007-02-14(b)

Muhammad could establish that DCCSCD falls within Title VII’s definition of an ... “employer” by either showing that DCCSCD is: (1) itself “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees” or (2) an agent of the Dallas County district judges who are themselves “person[s] engaged in an industry affecting commerce who ha[ve] fifteen or more employees.”

Section 2000e(b) excludes Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of employer, but that exclusion does not bar a claim under Section 1981.

Aleman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc. · filed 2007-05-03(b)

While the definition of "employer" in Title VII excludes Indian tribes and Alaska Native Corporations, these exclusions state that they are limited to the section of federal law that contains Title VII.