42 U.S.C. § 2000e

A city can be an employer under Title VII’s definition in § 2000e(b).

Robinson v. City of Lake Station · filed 1986-03-19(b)

Defendant City of Lake Station, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 US.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s agent definition can make an employer liable for a supervisor’s harassment.

Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc. · filed 1986-03-05(b)

Since the term “employer,” as defined in § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982), includes “any agent of [a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with a workforce of specified size],” the court had little trouble deciding that Taylor’s activity was prohibited conduct, since he was an agent of Capital City with respect to employees whom he supervised. ... This Court can ascertain no justification why the sound reasoning of the Vinson court should not be adopted.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents, including intermediate supervisors who participate in discriminatory employment decisions.

Hamilton v. Rodgers · filed 1986-03-07(b)

The definition of "employer" is, however, broad, including agents of the actual employer. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). ... So viewed, Wilford and Nelson were agents of the Fire Department, despite their intermediate standing within the Department's hierarchy.

An entity with significant control over employment practices may qualify as an employer even if it is not the employees’ immediate employer.

Baranek v. Kelly · filed 1986-03-20(b)

The issue for this Court, therefore, is whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts to find that the MDEA exercises the requisite control over Area II’s employment practices to warrant inclusion in the term “employer.” Examining the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, I rule that the MDEA is an employer of Area II’s employees for the purposes of this Title VII action.

Section 2000e(b) includes a school board’s agents in the definition of employer when they make a discriminatory employment decision.

Ponton v. Newport News School Board · filed 1986-03-19(b)

Defendants Webb and Waters acted as the School Board’s agents in making the decision to force plaintiff to take a leave of absence and are therefore also "employers” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes an individual plant manager from Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Williams v. Hevi-Duty Electric Co. · filed 1986-03-28(b)

Moreover, the defendant Block is not an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a company engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing more than fifteen people.

Fair v. Amp Inc. · filed 1986-04-08(b)

(2) AMP is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), being engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing in excess of fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

Devlin v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis · filed 1986-05-13(b)

Defendant is an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold may be established by inferring continuous employment from hospital records showing the same nurses working months apart.

Dr. Emsley A. DAVIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WEST COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1986-04-07(b)

The district court found that jurisdiction had not been established because Davis failed to prove that West had fifteen or more employees each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). We have reviewed the hospital records of the eighteen surgical patients of Dr. Davis referred to above. From our examination of patient John Higgins' medical file, we identified fifteen individuals employed as nurses at West between June 28, 1980 and July 25, 1980. The medical file of patient Johnnie Ruzicka reflects that these same nurses were employed at West between January 1, 1981 and February 1, 1981. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is reasonable to infer that these fifteen nurses were employed continuously during the five month period between July 1980 and January 1981. It is also reasonable to infer from this evidence that technicians, orderlies and other support personnel were in the employ of West during the requisite period. Because the record reveals that West employed more than the number of employees required by the act, the district court's conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction is erroneous.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Hill v. Berkman · filed 1986-05-15(b)

Such a choice was expressly rejected in the definitional section of Title VII. The United States is not an “employer” for purposes of the statute.

A company and its wholly owned subsidiary can together constitute an employer under Title VII.

Ivy v. Meridian Coca-Cola Bottling Co. · filed 1986-06-03(b)

The Company and its wholly owned subsidiary, C.C. Coin Caterers Company (hereinafter referred to as the “Company” unless designated separately as “Coin Caterers”), constitute an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) treats a supervisor who participates in a discriminatory decision as an agent of the employer.

Hamilton v. Rodgers · filed 1986-06-13(b)

We agree with the view that "[a] person is an agent under Sec. 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimination." Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District, 537 F.Supp. 966, 970 (D.Colo.1982). To hold otherwise would encourage supervisory personnel to believe that they may violate Title VII with impunity. Defendants Wilford and Nelson were correctly held liable.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, with agency principles guiding when an employer is liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · filed 1986-06-19(b)

While such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their particulars to Title VII, Congress' decision to define "employer" to include any "agent" of an employer, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. For this reason, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors.

An entity with more than fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks falls within Title VII’s definition of employer.

Bowen v. Valley Camp of Utah, Inc. · filed 1986-07-16(b)

Defendant at all times material hereto had more than fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks. ... At all times relevant hereto, defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” can cover a corporation doing business in a state.

Gordon v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1986-07-31(b)

Defendant General Motors Corporation (GMC) is a corporation doing business in the State of Missouri and is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer,” including officers, directors, supervisors, and others involved in managerial decisions.

Hendrix v. Fleming Companies · filed 1986-08-14(b)

Thus, if the Individual Defendants were officers, directors, supervisors or otherwise involved in managerial decisions of Fleming Companies, they are “employers” under the definition in § 2000e. With respect to each Individual Defendant, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the requisite managerial control/authority to bring the defendant within the definition of employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer” to include the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.

Crawford v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education · filed 1986-08-08(b)

The Board is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

A state agency can qualify as an employer under § 2000e(b).

Autry v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources · filed 1986-08-22(b)

The Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of employer determines whether a company is covered by Title VII.

Chavis v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1986-08-29(b)

Whitehall is an employer within the meaning of Title VII and the court has personal jurisdiction over the parties.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” did not include the school superintendent in this Title VII suit.

Harris v. District of Columbia · filed 1986-10-22(b)

Defendants also seek the dismissal of Superintendent McKenzie from this cause of action because she is not an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII. We agree and dismiss Superintendent McKenzie from the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, so knowledge of a sexually discriminatory employment decision is imputed to the employer.

Highlander v. K.F.C. National Management Co., D/B/A Zantigo Heublin Corporation Zantigo Mexican Restaurant · filed 1986-11-18(b)

Because Title VII defines “employer” to include “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person,” knowledge of an employment decision based on impermissible sexual factors is imputed to the employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., Inc. · filed 1986-10-24(b)

Defendant Rea is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) can make an employer liable for an agent’s discriminatory handling of a job application if the employer benefited from or acquiesced in the conduct.

Brown v. Town of Allenstown · filed 1986-11-20(b)

If there was some benefit to or acquiescence by Allenstown arising from Hill’s alleged failure to properly forward plaintiff’s employment application, then Hill could be found to be acting as Allenstown’s agent as to the mishandling of the application and, consequently, Title VII and RSA 354-A would impose liability on Allenstown for Hill’s actions.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a business with more than 15 employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ryder/PIE Nationwide, Inc. · filed 1986-12-10(b)

(2) Ryder is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who counts as an employer under Title VII.

Houston v. Reeves Bros. · filed 1986-12-29(b)

(3) Defendant, Reeves Brothers, Inc., is an “employer” as defined by § 701(b) of Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer covers Lincoln National Corporation.

Reeder-Baker v. Lincoln National Corp. · filed 1986-12-09(b)

Lincoln is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employee and an employer for Title VII.

Coles v. Cilco Terminal Co. · filed 1986-12-16

For purposes of Title VII, the plaintiff is an “employee” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), and the defendant is an “employer” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer by reference to a workforce of at least fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mid-South Automobile Club · filed 1987-01-14(b)

Defendant has employed fifteen or more employees in each working day of twenty or more calendar weeks in the preceding years involved. The Memphis office has not employed fifteen or more employees since January, 1973.

Section 2000e(b) does not make employees acting within the scope of their authority individually liable under Title VII.

Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1987-03-19(b)

Those defendants, as individuals, are neither employers nor agents thereof within the purview of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). They were employed by ConEd as employees and at all times were acting within the scope of their authority for the acts complained of. Those acts should not now be considered as the basis for individual liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines who is an employer under Title VII and identifies the employing entity as the defendant.

Howard v. Holmes · filed 1987-03-27(b)

The Times, however, as the “employer” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982), is the actual defendant.

Section 2000e(b) includes supervisory employees who act as an employer’s agents within its definition of employer.

Young v. Sedgwick County, Kan. · filed 1987-05-27(b)

Since respondeat superior liability under Title VII applies to supervisory employees who are the agents of employers (and therefore employers themselves for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)), Owens v. Rush, 636 F.2d 283 (10th Cir.1980), this Court cannot grant Witsman summary judgment on Young’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” covers the defendant association.

Petrosky v. Washington-Greene County Branch Pennsylvania Ass'n for the Blind · filed 1987-06-26(b)

Defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer covered by Title VII to include a business with at least fifteen employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. FLC & Bros. Rebel, Inc. · filed 1987-06-29(b)

FLC, having more than fifteen employees, is an employer covered by Title VII pursuant to § 2000(b) of the Act.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, making their agency status relevant to a Title VII claim.

Rosenberg v. University of Cincinnati · filed 1987-05-11(b)

In a Title VII case, the relevant issue is whether the employees of a defendant who engaged in acts of discrimination were acting as agents of the defendant, see Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2408, 91 L.Ed. 2d 49 (1986); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining ‘employer’ to include agents thereof), not whether the defendant ratified the acts of its employees.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer includes a state college and a state higher education board.

Denny v. Westfield State College · filed 1987-05-12(b)

4. Defendants Westfield State College and the Board of Regents of Higher Education are agencies of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and are “employers” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Title VII’s definition of employer includes supervisors acting as agents when the employer delegates authority over employment decisions to them.

Mason v. Twenty-Sixth Judicial Dist. of Kansas · filed 1987-06-26(b)

The court finds that the individual defendants Bunnell and Arheart can be considered agents and thus, employers under Title VII.

Section 2000e defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Crutchfield v. Maverick Tube Corp. · filed 1987-07-14(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes organizations with fewer than fifteen employees from its definition of employer but does not expressly exclude international organizations.

Boimah v. United Nations General Assembly · filed 1987-07-24(b)

Title VII by its terms does not require a dismissal. Its definition of an “employer,” at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), excludes certain entities, most notably organizations with less than fifteen employees, but does not explicitly exclude an international organization such as the United Nations.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Anderson's Restaurant of Charlotte, Inc. · filed 1987-08-03(b)

(2) Anderson’s is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, allowing liability for discriminatory acts by supervisory personnel.

Todhunter v. Cullman County Commission on Education · filed 1987-07-21(b)

The provisions of Title VII have been interpreted as allowing an employer’s vicarious liability for the discriminatory acts of its supervisory personnel. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines “employer” to include any agent of the employer. Jim Boyd, Keith Pattillo and Michael Heatherly in their respective administrative capacities were each agents of the defendant school board at all times pertinent to this action for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) permits Title VII liability for discriminatory acts by an employer’s agents, including third parties delegated hiring duties.

Carlyne TERBOVITZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FISCAL COURT OF ADAIR COUNTY, KENTUCKY, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1987-08-05(b)

Under Title VII, an employer may be held liable for discriminatory actions that are perpetrated by its agents.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include Tarleton State University.

De Wiest v. Tarleton State University · filed 1987-08-31(b)

Tarleton State University is an employer as defined in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) treats the defendant company as a covered employer in a racial hiring suit.

McGee v. RANDALL DIV. OF TEXTRON, INC. OF GRENADA · filed 1987-09-08(b)

The plaintiff alleges unlawful racial discrimination in the hiring practices of the defendant, an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of employer covers a city and county government.

Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu · filed 1987-09-29(b)

The Defendant City and County of Honolulu is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Andrews v. City of Johnstown · filed 1987-08-31(b)

The evidence established that defendant is an employer as defined by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and that plaintiff is black, belonging to a racial minority intended to be protected by Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Kovalevsky v. West Publishing Co. · filed 1987-11-02(b)

Defendant employs in excess of 15 employees and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subd. 15.

When distinguishing employees from independent contractors for Title VII coverage, the employer’s right to control their work is the most important factor.

Helenkamp v. Ass'n · filed 1987-11-09(b)

When deciding whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor for Title VII purposes, the most important factor to consider is an employer’s right to control that person’s work. ... Defendant fails to address the issue of control and, thus, does not establish the absence of material facts in issue. The Court must deny summary judgment on that basis.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer's agents in the definition of employer, allowing direct liability when a supervisor uses delegated authority to harass an employee.

Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. · filed 1987-10-20(b)

The Act defines the term "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." 3 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, if Long was acting as an "agent" of Pilot Freight when he sexually harassed Sparks, Pilot Freight is directly liable to Sparks for Long's conduct--provided Sparks can establish the four elements of her prima facie case outlined above.

Section 2000e defines an employer to include a business affecting commerce that has at least fifteen employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Blue & White Service Corp. · filed 1987-11-19(b), (g), (h)

Blue and White had and continues to have at least fifteen employees and is an employer engaged in a business affecting commerce within the meaning of section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g) and (h).

Section 2000e(b) covers Celanese Corporation and its Fibers Operations division as employers under Title VII.

Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp. · filed 1988-03-01(b)

Defendants Cela-nese Corporation and Celanese Fibers Operations are “employers” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, but supervisory officials are not vicariously liable for subordinates’ harassment solely because they qualify as employers.

Brown v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1988-04-20(b)

Applying this reasoning to the Title VII context, the Court finds that although Parkins and Glassman are employers within Title VII’s definition of that term, the doctrine of respondeat superior does not make them vicariously liable for the acts of those who work under them. Consequently, in the absence of allegations of personal misfeasance or harassment on their part, they are improperly named as defendants in this action.

Section 2000e(b) excludes a company that did not employ fifteen workers on each working day in any relevant twenty-week period from Title VII’s definition of an employer.

McGinnis v. Ingram Equipment Co., Inc. · filed 1988-04-22(b)

Under Title VII, the Company is not an "employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(b); therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction under the former statute.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce that employs more than 15 people.

Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1988-05-19(b)

Defendant Chase is engaged in an industry that affects commerce and employs more than 15 employees and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

As originally enacted, § 2000e(b) excluded federal entities from the definition of employer, leaving federal employees without a Title VII cause of action.

Loeffler v. Frank · filed 1988-06-13(b)

As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII, by excluding federal entities from its definition of employer, see § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. §2000e(b), did not provide a cause of action to federal employees.

Section 2000e(b) permits related businesses with interrelated operations, common management, and centralized control of labor relations to be treated as one employer for Title VII coverage.

Whites v. Hahn · filed 1988-11-09(b)

Giving the required liberal construction to the definition and treatment of employer within the meaning of Title VII, Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389, 391 (8th Cir.1977), the Court concludes that Hahn, Fortune, Genuine and HBH are a single employer entity for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer; common law agency principles determine whether a supervisor is an agent.

Zentiska v. Pooler Motel, Ltd. · filed 1988-11-21(b)

Title VII’s definition of employer extends to “any agent of such [employer].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Title VII does not define “agent.” Courts must look to common law agency principles to determine if a supervisor is an agent for Title VII purposes. ... When Steve Zentiska took plaintiff’s name off the work schedule he was acting as an agent of defendant because he “purported to act or speak on behalf of the principal,” defendant.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a company with at least fifteen employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chas. Schaefer Sons, Inc. · filed 1988-12-22(b)

It appears the Company (having fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)) fits within the broad definition of employer.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer coverage to entities with fifteen or more employees.

Scott v. Arex, Inc. · filed 1989-01-23(b)

Title VII applies only to entities having fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Payroll records are a source of proof of the number of Arex’s employees.

A real estate management firm may qualify as an employer covered by Title VII.

Sahs v. Amarillo Equity Investors, Inc. · filed 1988-12-14(b)

AEI is a real estate management firm headquartered in Texas. It is an employer under the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes a nonsupervisory coworker who is not an employer’s agent from the definition of employer, so the coworker cannot be sued directly under Title VII.

Johnson v. AT & T TECHNOLOGIES, INC. · filed 1989-02-14(b)

As Defendant McCoy does not fall under the statutory definition of "employer" under Title VII and was not acting as an agent of such an employer, Plaintiff would not be able to sue him directly under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees, and control over association members alone does not make them employees.

Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc. · filed 1989-03-14(b)

The jurisdictional provision requires an employer to have in its employ fifteen or more “employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Although control is an important aspect to be considered it cannot be the sole factor. ... In light of the above, we find that Title VII, by its own terms, does not apply to the WPRA.

Including an employer’s agent in the definition of “employer” does not make the corporate employer directly liable for all of the agent’s harassment. For acts outside the scope of the agency, liability requires that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.

Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. · filed 1989-03-15(b)

Steele misconstrues the concept of direct liability. Bucknole, an agent of the corporate employer, is directly liable for his actions that violate Title VII. Likewise, the corporate employer would be directly liable for Bucknole's actions taken within the scope of their agency. However, when Bucknole acts outside the scope of the agency, the corporate employer can only be liable indirectly if it knew or should have known of Bucknole’s actions and failed to take prompt remedial action.

The definition of “employer” includes supervisory employees acting as the employer’s agents.

Sauers v. Salt Lake County · filed 1989-05-12(b)

However, the term "employer,” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), includes supervisory co-employees of the plaintiff employee. ... Thus, defendants’ Motion to Dismiss must be denied on this point.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Gillespie v. First Interstate Bank of Wisconsin Southeast · filed 1989-07-14(b)

Defendant First Interstate is an employer within the meaning of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and is liable for the discriminatory acts of the predecessor company, Continental.

Section 2000e(b) treats supervisors with delegated authority over employment decisions as agents of the employer.

Kolb v. Ohio, Department of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, Cleveland Developmental Center · filed 1989-07-10(b)

Brown, Rafter, and Darling are clearly “agents” within the meaning of Title VII, because they are supervisory or managerial employees of the Department which delegated employment decision-making authority to them.

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce that has at least fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks.

Graham v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1989-08-11(b)

The defendant, American Airlines, Inc. (American), is an employer engaged in an industry that affects commerce and employs more than fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of the twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the calendar years involved herein. Thus, American was an employer within the meaning of Title VII during the calendar years involved herein.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers the City of Miami Beach.

Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach · filed 1989-08-28(b)

The Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

A supervisor qualifies as an employer under Title VII if the supervisor significantly controls a plaintiff’s hiring, firing, or conditions of employment.

Paroline v. Unisys Corporation Edgar L. Moore · filed 1989-08-18(b)

An individual qualifies as an "employer" under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer, including a supervisor with actual and apparent authority over an employee.

Maturo v. National Graphics, Inc. · filed 1989-09-06(b)

Finally, Peters, as an agent of National Graphics, is liable for his harassment of plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (including in the definition of employer any agent of the employer).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent, but an employer must actively participate in a third party’s discriminatory program to be responsible for it under Title VII.

Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., and Safeway Arizona Federal Credit Union · filed 1989-09-06(b)

To establish employer responsibility for the discriminatory programs of third parties, the employer must be more than a broker, or other intermediary, that simply enables its employees to enter into arrangements with third parties; the employer must affirmatively, actively participate in the third-party program. ... We therefore conclude the district court correctly found SAFCU was not the agent of Safeway for title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of “employer,” allowing supervisory or managerial employees with responsibility for employment decisions to be sued under Title VII.

Burrell v. Truman Medical Center, Inc. · filed 1989-09-27(b)

Thus, the individual defendants may be sued pursuant to Title VII if they qualify as statutory “agents” of TMC.

Section 2000e defines employer and industry affecting commerce for Title VII coverage; this freight carrier fell within those definitions.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. · filed 1989-10-26(b), (g), and (h)

At all relevant times, Carolina Freight has continuously been and is now an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of section 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g), and (h).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer can cover a corporation operating a manufacturing facility.

Morris v. American Nat. Can Corp. · filed 1989-12-18(b)

Defendant American National Can Corporation is a Delaware corporation doing business in Missouri, in part through Foster-Forbes where glass containers are manufactured. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Stewart v. Cartessa Corp. · filed 1990-01-04(b)

It is engaged in the production and distribution of electronic components and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), and (h).

A police chief can qualify as an employer under Title VII even without final policymaking authority for municipal liability.

Crowley v. Prince George's County · filed 1989-11-29(b)

Although the chief of police here is not a final policymaker for purposes of § 1981, he nonetheless is an employer for purposes of Title VII.

Under § 2000e(b), a supervisor’s knowledge of sexual harassment is imputed to the employer for the employer-knowledge element of a quid pro quo claim.

Spencer v. General Electric Co. · filed 1990-01-16(b)

Of course, in a case such as this where the sexual harassment is being committed by one of the employer's supervisors, this element is automatically met because under 42 U.s.c. § 2000e(b) knowledge of the harassment is imputed to the employer through its agent-supervisor.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith · filed 1990-03-30(b)

Defendant Merrill Lynch is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines an employer to include municipalities and their agents, allowing a city to be held liable under Title VII for discriminatory hiring decisions delegated to a commission.

Scott v. City of Topeka Police & Fire Civil Service Commission · filed 1990-04-11(a), (b)

The definition of employer under the statute expressly includes governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions and their agents. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b). ... To hold that the City of Topeka could avoid liability for employment discrimination by delegating certification decisions to a commission would be contrary to the broad scope of the definition of “employer” under Title VII and would eviscerate Title VII’s protection for municipal employees.

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees.

McConnell v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc. · filed 1990-04-17(b)

Defendant is engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and has fifteen or more employees for each working day. ... Defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer” for Title VII; the court treated the Minerals Management Service as an employer under that definition.

Edwards v. Hodel · filed 1990-05-29(b)

MMS is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Under Title VII, an employment relationship requires compensation in exchange for services; association members who receive no compensation and owe no duty of service are not its employees.

Lance GRAVES, Appellant, v. WOMEN’S PROFESSIONAL RODEO ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee · filed 1990-06-29(b), (f)

Because the absence of any compensation flowing to WPRA members by reason of their membership, together with the absence of any duty of service owed by members to WPRA or anyone else, suffices to exclude WPRA from being an “employer” of its members under Title VII, Graves’s claim may be denied without probing the analyses used to deal with relationships that make it past this first cut.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. J.P. Stevens & Co. · filed 1990-07-05(b)

J.P. Stevens and Company, Inc. is an employer as that term is defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer”; the court treated the Department of the Army as an employer under Title VII.

Lacey v. Marsh · filed 1990-07-11(b)

Defendant Department of the Army is an employer within the meaning of Title VII for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-16(c).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII; Saticoy qualified under that definition.

Sandoval v. Saticoy Lemon Ass'n · filed 1990-08-31(b)

Saticoy qualifies as an employer within the meaning of section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(b) and as defined in the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal.Gov’t Code sec. 12926.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are subject to Title VII.

Fortino v. Quasar Co. · filed 1990-12-07(b)

At all times relevant to this action, Quasar was an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and, thus, is subject to Title YII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer, which covers a supervisor with responsibility over the employee.

Sandoval v. Pagano · filed 1991-02-26(b)

As it is uncontested that Pagano had supervisory responsibilities over Sandoval, he is an agent for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covered a motel partnership that employed more than fifteen people at the relevant time.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Marion Motel Associates · filed 1991-03-15(b)

The Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and, at all relevant times to this action, employed more than fifteen individuals at its Marion, North Carolina, motel facility known as the Park Inn International.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer.

Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. · filed 1991-03-08(b)

Mcllwain, Brown, Stewart, Ahlwardt, Owens and Lovett are agents of JSI and are therefore employers within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes qualifying public school districts in Title VII’s definition of an employer.

Senigaur v. Beaumont Independent School District · filed 1991-04-03(b)

BISD is a political subdivision of the State of Texas, located in Beaumont, Jefferson County, Texas. It is charged with the operation and maintenance of a public school system within its boundaries. BISD is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year to be covered by Title VII.

Stacy v. Frank G. Toomer, D/B/A Hilton Head Seafood Company, Lori M. Stacy v. Frank G. Toomer, D/B/A Hilton Head · filed 1991-04-11(b)

A jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a Title VII action is that the plaintiff must establish that the defendant employer is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). ... Based upon a review of all the evidence, we affirm the district court's holding that the jurisdictional prerequisites of Title VII have not been met.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer liability to the plaintiff’s employer; a county is not liable when the employing probation department is not its agency.

Randall v. Jefferson County · filed 1991-04-11(b)

The County was not Randall’s employer for purposes of Title VII. By state statute, JCAPD is not an agency of the County. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. Art. 42.131 (Vernon’s 1989). Accordingly, Jefferson County cannot be liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an agent of a covered employer.

Rush v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1991-04-12(b)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), an "employer” is defined in relevant part as “any agent” of a person otherwise defined as an employer, which McDonald's is. Thus, as McDonald’s agent, Funston-Renihan is an employer for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) defines a qualifying business with at least fifteen employees, and its agents, as employers under Title VII.

Noblet v. Reproduction Systems, Inc. (In re Reproduction Systems, Inc.) · filed 1991-05-29(b)

Throughout the relevant time period RSI had fifteen or more employees. Robert Cash, along with his wife, owns all the stock in the company. Robert Cash also operated as Chief Executive Officer during the relevant time period, and was an “agent” of RSI. Therefore, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, both RSI and Robert Cash are “employers” for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) includes an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing more than 15 persons within the definition of “employer”.

Wilson v. University of Texas Health Center at Tyler · filed 1991-06-07(b)

Defendant UTHC is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. It is engaged in industry affecting commerce, and employs more than 15 persons.

Section 2000e(b) defines the employer against whom Title VII relief is available; individual employees are not personally liable.

Busby v. City Of Orlando · filed 1991-05-17(b)

Individual capacity suits under Title VII are similarly inappropriate. The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within its definition of employer; a supervisor can be an agent without authority to hire, fire, or promote.

Sims v. Montgomery County Commission · filed 1991-06-06(b)

A supervisor need not necessarily be high in the business structure, nor does he have to have the authority to hire, fire, or promote in order to be considered an agent whose conduct is binding on an employer under the above principles.

The section defines an employer to include an entity with more than 15 employees and defines sex discrimination to include discrimination based on pregnancy.

Radovanic v. Centex Real Estate Corp. · filed 1991-06-18(b), (k)

At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant employed in excess of 15 employees and is an “employer” as defined by § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... (2) Section 701(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) defines “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” of Section 703(a)(1) to include discrimination based on “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions____” Discrimination based on a woman’s pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex.

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as an entity with fifteen or more employees.

Woods v. Ficker · filed 1991-07-17(b)

If the lesson in Rogero is applied in this case, as it must'be, neither Drs. Ficker nor Gainous meets the definition of “employer”, and thus neither is subject to suit under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person meeting the employee and industry requirements and any agent of that person.

Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc. · filed 1991-07-31(b)

Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Defendant Allison Reed Group clearly is an “employer” for purposes of this case. So too is defendant Smith, who was Allison Reed’s agent in charge at Techni-Craft. ... Defendant Marsella, however, is not an “employer” within the meaning of Title VIL Marsella was simply Smith’s secretary, and merely a co-worker of the plaintiffs. She had no authority to make any personnel decisions. ... A co-worker who is not the employer’s agent with the power to supervise can not be held liable under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person.

Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago · filed 1991-09-04(b)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) defines ‘employer’ as: “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person____” (Emphasis added). ... The court accordingly finds that the claim against Mr. Lawrence in his individual capacity must be dismissed.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person with at least fifteen employees and an agent who participates in discriminatory actions by virtue of a supervisory position.

Fauser v. Memphis Housing Authority · filed 1991-09-17(b)

"Employer” is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” This broad definition includes an agent of the employer if he, by virtue of a supervisory position, participates in the discriminatory actions which are the subject of the claim.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Jordan Graphics, Inc. · filed 1991-08-12(b)

At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant employed in excess of 15 employees and is an “employer” as defined by § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines the employer and commerce requirements that make Philip Morris subject to Title VII.

Sanchez v. Philip Morris Inc. · filed 1991-09-24(b), (h)

Defendant Philip Morris USA is an employer subject to the provisions of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (h).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer broadly enough to treat a high-level supervisor’s sexual harassment as harassment by the university.

Campbell v. Kansas State University · filed 1991-12-18(b)

He possessed sufficient authority to characterize his actions as acts of the “employer” within § 701(b) of Title VII. See Mack A. Player, Employment Discrimination Law 254 (practitioner’s ed. 1988). Without even resorting to agency principles, then, the court concludes that the University is liable for Deyoe’s actions: his acts are tantamount to those of the employer. Sexual harassment by the Head of Department is, thus, harassment by the University itself. Such an interpretation is consistent with the broad definition of “employer” in Title VII so as to effectuate the remedial and public policy goals of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include qualifying entities with at least fifteen employees and any agent of such a person.

Vesey v. Grover · filed 1992-01-07(b)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(“§ 2000e(b)”) defines employer, in relevant part, as ... a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person....

Volunteers who receive reimbursement for work-related expenses and free admission to an annual luncheon do not count as employees under Title VII’s employer definition.

Hall v. Delaware Council on Crime and Justice · filed 1992-01-14(b)

Even if Plaintiffs factual contentions are correct, the Court concludes that the “remuneration” received by the DCCJ volunteers is insufficient to consider these volunteers employees for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities count as employers under Title VII.

Coney v. Dept. of Human Resources of State of Ga. · filed 1992-03-27(b)

DHR is an “employer” within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as an individual or firm with at least fifteen employees and includes the employer’s agents.

Stockett v. Tolin · filed 1992-04-24(b)

For sexual harassment to be actionable under Title VII, however, the harassing actor must be an “employer,” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), i.e., an individual or a firm that is “engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person....” ... We disagree, since we find that the Defendant corporations were sufficiently integrated so as to be considered one “employer” for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer by requiring fifteen or more employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks, and the court excludes days without normal, full operations from that calculation.

Wright v. Kosciusko Medical Clinic, Inc. · filed 1992-04-27(b)

Therefore, the court concludes that, for purposes of determining the scope of protection afforded by Title VII, a day on which the employer does not conduct normal, full operations is not to be treated as a “working day”.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees on each working day in twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding year.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Alford · filed 1992-05-06(b)

Title VII defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, and common law agency principles determine who qualifies as an agent.

Sparks v. Regional Medical Center Board · filed 1992-05-12(b)

Title VII defines "employer” as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Title VII does not, however, define the term "agent.” Courts have looked to common law agency principles to determine when an agency relationship exists.

A public corporation with more than 15 employees that affects interstate commerce is an employer under § 2000e(b).

Suarez v. PUERTO RICO ELEC. POWER AUTHORITY · filed 1992-06-29(b)

Employing more than 15 employees and affecting interstate commerce, it is an employer as such term is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Defendant’s Post Trial Brief (“Def[’s] Br.”) at if 3.

Whether an organization meets § 2000e(b)’s definition of employer is a factual question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss.

Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. · filed 1992-07-06(b)

To the extent, however, that the Congregation actually contests Elbaz' claim that it is a § 2000e(b) employer, this is a factual question that cannot be decided in a motion to dismiss.

An employee may qualify as an employer’s agent under Title VII by exercising significant control over employment decisions without having complete authority over them.

Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Division · filed 1992-07-22(b)

Appellant is correct in her statement that nowhere is it required that an employee must exercise complete control of plenary duties to qualify as an agent of the employer. Rather, all that is required is that the employee have “significant control” of those duties.

Section 2000e defines an employer to include its agents, which can include supervisors delegated employer authority.

Stingley v. State of Ariz. · filed 1992-07-27(b)

The definition of an “employer” in Title VII includes agents of an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. ... The Court therefore concludes, that Austin was a Title VII employer.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII liability to employers; an individual supervisor who does not qualify as an employer cannot be held liable.

Carr v. F.W. Woolworth Co. · filed 1992-09-23(b)

Moreover, only “employers” may be liable under Title VII; defendant McCullen does not qualify as a employer as defined by the statute.

Section 2000e(b) treats a manager with authority to hire and fire employees as an employer for purposes of imputing knowledge of harassment.

Canada v. Boyd Group, Inc. · filed 1992-10-27(b)

Moreover, Mr. Strauss was Defendants’ poker-room manager who had the authority to hire and fire employees, and as such, is considered an employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer to include a qualifying business with at least fifteen employees and its agents.

Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. · filed 1992-12-02(b)

Title VII defines the term “employer” to include “a person engaged in industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year and any agent of such person....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). All of the defendants fall within the scope of this statutory definition: defendants Peak, Volkswagen and Fairfax employ fifteen or more employees for the requisite time period and it is undisputed that defendant Blaylock is an agent of Fairfax, his direct employer.

Section 2000e(b) includes within its employer definition an agent who participated in the decision making process underlying the discrimination claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Louisiana Network, Inc. · filed 1992-12-16(b)

A person is an agent under § 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision making process that formed the basis of the discrimination.

A company may qualify as a Title VII employer through a single-employer or joint-employer relationship even if it has no personnel record for the worker.

Bonilla v. Liquilux Gas Corp. · filed 1993-02-09(b)

In the case of the single employer doctrine, the two entities are essentially the same entity. In the case of the joint employer doctrine, the two share control of the employee to such an extent that they both function as an employer, even though they are operationally distinct. In either case, a company can be legally considered the employer of an individual without having a record of having employed that individual.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covered Alden Press.

Neal v. Alden Press, Inc. · filed 1993-03-10(b)

Defendant Alden Press is and was, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, a Delaware Corporation duly registered to do business in the State of Illinois and an “employer” within the definition of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes District of Columbia departments and agencies from Title VII’s definition of “employer.”

Zervas v. District of Columbia · filed 1993-03-17(b)

However, that definition expressly excludes “any department or agency of the District of Columbia.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss with regard to defendants DCFD and DCOP.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents and limits Title VII coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees; it does not make employees personally liable.

Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc., Dba Maxwell's Plum, Debtor in Possession Carlo Galazzo, Gen. Mgt., Dino · filed 1993-04-19(b)

The statutory scheme itself indicates that Congress did not intend to impose individual liability on employees. Title VII limits liability to employers with fifteen or more employees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and the ADEA limits liability to employers with twenty or more employees, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), in part because Congress did not want to burden small entities with the costs associated with litigating discrimination claims. If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run against individual employees.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer,” but does not make individual employees personally liable for Title VII damages.

Sattar v. Unocal Corp. · filed 1993-04-12(b)

This Court finds that the use of the word “agent” has meaning in two contexts: (1) when injunctive relief is sought against an individual employee, and (2) when an agent of the employer is itself an entity, not an individual. ... Because the Court finds this analysis of the disputed statutory sections and relevant Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent persuasive, it finds that, as a matter of law, defendant Forbes could not be liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g) and 1981a(a) for race discrimination, national origin discrimination, or racial harassment.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent, meaning a person with direct authority over the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.

Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 1993-04-30(b)

An agent is defined as a person with direct authority over the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. ... Acosta-Ronda is not alleged by the plaintiff to have had any authority over plaintiff's employment situation. She was assigned by plaintiff's employer to investigate plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment and was confined to a fact-finding role. Therefore, plaintiff would have no action against her under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees for twenty or more weeks during the year.

Ulloa v. American Express Travel Related Services Co. · filed 1993-05-25(b)

(2) . Defendant American Express Travel Related Services, Inc. (“American Express”) is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing over fifteen (15) employees for twenty (20) or more weeks during the year, within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer in relevant part as a person with fifteen or more employees during the specified weeks and includes that person’s agents.

Shepherdson v. Local Union No. 401 of International Ass'n of Bridge Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers · filed 1993-05-28(b)

The term “employer” as used in the statute and ease law does not here encompass the International or the Fund, directly, or by way of agency or single entity theory, and Local 401, the actual employing entity, on its own did not employ directly the requisite fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person or agent of a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees.

DeWald v. Amsterdam Housing Authority · filed 1993-06-07(b)

Their votes alone are not enough to hold these board members liable as “employers” within the meaning of Title VII. Since none of the individually-named defendants had independent authority to terminate plaintiffs employment, none can be held liable under Title VII as an employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least 15 employees on each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Metzger · filed 1993-06-16(b)

A shortage of employees during this time period alone does not enable the Defendants to exempt themselves from the reach of Title VII; section 701(b) of Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen [15] or more employees for each working day in each of twenty [20] or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer only if it has at least fifteen employees on each working day in twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding year, with employee status determined under the Title VII employee definition.

Miller v. Lifestyle Creations, Inc. Dba Lifestyle Sunglass Company, Steve Huebner and Does I Through V, Inclus · filed 1993-05-24(b), (f)

An employer is not subject to Title VII unless it is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Lifestyle Creations contends that it did not have fifteen or more employees for twenty weeks in either 1988 or 1989. Whether that contention is true or not turns on whether Lifestyle Creations' out-of-state sales representatives are considered employees or independent contractors. ... This circuit employs the "economic realities" test first enunciated in Lutcher v. Musician Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir.1980), to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. 3 The primary factor in the Lutcher test is the extent of the employer's right to control the means and the manner of the worker's performance. 4 Id.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make officers or supervisors personally liable under Title VII merely because they act as an employer's agents.

Pelech v. Klaff-Joss, LP · filed 1993-06-23(b)

Although the individual defendants charged in this case include a chairman, president, and building manager, even these high-level officers and employees are “agents” rather than “employers” within the meaning of Title VII. That is, despite the authority these defendants may wield within their organizations, they merely act on behalf of a larger employing company.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include its agents, but an employee qualifies as an agent only if the employee performs managerial or supervisory functions.

Robert Albert, and Cross v. The Edward J. Debartolo Corporation, D/B/A Southern Park Mall, Martin J. Plocica, Jack Petru · filed 1993-07-20(b)

There is no colorable argument that Lowe, a minor employed as a frequent shopper hostess, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. An employer is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ..., and any agent of such person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). "Agent" has been interpreted to include only those employees who perform managerial or supervisory functions. York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir.1982).

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee threshold can count a subsidiary’s employees affected by a parent corporation’s employment policy.

Goyette v. DCA Advertising Inc. · filed 1993-08-06(b)

In the instant case, the obvious employees we must count to determine whether Dentsu has more than fifteen employees for the purposes of Title VII are the DCA employees located in New York.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer; delegated authority to supervise and monitor coworkers can establish that agency relationship.

Webb v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1993-07-16(b)

It is clear from the evidence and, as a matter of fact Missouri Pacific concedes as much, that Missouri Pacific has delegated responsibility and authority to certain employees, assistant foremen, foremen, engineers and conductors, to supervise and monitor the work activities of co-employees and they are further required to report directly to designated management personnel any problems encountered in implementing these directives.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, allowing the employer to be liable for their acts even when an agent is an elected official.

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore · filed 1993-08-04(b)

Title VII's definition of "employer" incorporates liability for the act of "any agent" subject only to separate limitations not at issue in this case.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, allowing liability for an agent’s retaliation under general agency principles.

Goldsmith v. City of Atmore · filed 1993-08-04(b)

Title VII defines a potentially liable “employer” as any “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). ... We agree that the City would be directly liable for the retaliation under Title VII in either situation.

A supervisor with significant control over an employee’s hiring, firing, or working conditions acts as the employer’s agent, making the employer liable for the supervisor’s unlawful employment practices without proof that the employer knew of them.

Sauers v. Salt Lake County · filed 1993-08-09(b)

We agree with the Fourth Circuit that "[a]n individual qualifies as an 'employer' under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment." ... In such a situation, the individual operates as the alter ego of the employer, and the employer is liable for the unlawful employment practices of the individual without regard to whether the employer knew of the individual's conduct.

Title VII’s definition of employer excludes university officials sued in their individual capacities.

Roos v. Smith · filed 1993-09-27(b)

Defendants Smith, Mills-Jones, Hall and Witherspoon, in their individual capacities, contend additionally that they are not “employers” within the meaning of Title VII and that consequently, plaintiff’s Title VII claim against them in their individual capacities must be dismissed. The court agrees, see Davis v. State Dept. of Health, 744 F.Supp. 756 (S.D.Miss.1990), and concludes that plaintiff may not proceed against these defendants under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) makes an employer responsible for an agent’s discriminatory acts only when the agent acts at least partly to serve that employer.

Moham v. Steego Corp. · filed 1993-09-28(b)

For the definition of "employer", 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), Congress includes "any agent of such a person". ... As stated, we find this agency principle applicable and controlling. ... Instead, they were acting solely for the benefit of Mansfield; and, therefore, their discriminatory acts cannot be attributable to Steego, the selling company.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in its definition of employer, allowing individual liability for a supervisor who exercises significant control over hiring, firing, or employment conditions.

Lamirande v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1993-10-07(b)

In light of the foregoing, the court gives effect to the plain language of sections 2000e(b) and 2000e-2(a)(l), which clearly impose individual liability upon “any agent of” an “employer”.

Section 2000e(b) treats a law firm partner as an employer who may be sued in his personal capacity under Title VII.

Ruich v. Ruff, Weidenaar & Reidy, Ltd. · filed 1993-10-05(b)

Ruich may sue Reiter, her former employer, in his personal capacity under Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer includes the requirement that the employer be engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Anderson v. HCA Deer Park Hospital · filed 1993-10-06

During the time HCA was conducting business, it was an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Title VII.

Under § 2000e(b), an agent qualifies as an employer's agent only with respect to employment practices.

Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas · filed 1993-10-18(b)

We agree with the other courts that have addressed this issue and hold that an agent under Title VII and the ADEA must be an agent with respect to employment practices.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of “employer”; whether an agent is a proper defendant depends on the agent’s role and authority.

Addison v. Robert McQuay Baltimore County Government Personnel, Criminal Justice Coordinator Staff · filed 1993-10-25(b)

McQuay, as an agent of Baltimore County, may fall within the definition of "employer" set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988). * While McQuay may not be a proper party or be in no way responsible, the record does not permit either of those conclusions at this time. The facts as to McQuay's role and authority are not sufficiently set out in the record on appeal to make this determination.

A lawyer who is effectively the law firm itself is an employer under Section 2000e(b) and may be personally liable under Title VII.

Janopoulos v. Harvey L. Walner & Associates, Ltd. · filed 1993-10-28(b)

This case presents even stronger reasons to hold that Walner is an employer under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires at least 15 employees for 20 or more weeks within a single calendar year; weeks from different years cannot be combined.

Jensen v. Johnson County Youth Baseball League · filed 1993-11-01(b)

Defendant is not an “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) because it does not employ 15 or more persons for 20 or more weeks in a calendar year.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within its definition of employer; a supervisor’s harassment may be attributed to the employer when the supervisor acted as its agent.

Stafford v. State · filed 1993-10-13(b)

Williams’ conduct can be attributed to the DOC only if he was an agent of the DOC within the meaning of § 2000e(b). ... As such, Williams’ harassment of plaintiff was within the scope of his employment and Williams was an agent of the DOC for the purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) treats an individual as an employer under Title VII if the individual supervises the plaintiff and exercises significant control over hiring, firing, or employment conditions.

Ball v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo. · filed 1993-10-29(b)

While the City of Cheyenne is clearly an employer within the meaning of the statute, Renner is not. An individual qualifies as an “employer” under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiffs hiring, firing or conditions of employment.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make a supervising employee personally liable under Title VII in an individual capacity.

Henry v. EG & G. Missouri Metals Shaping Co. · filed 1993-11-19(b)

At the present time, this Court is unwilling to distinguish between personal and official liability, and extend liability under Title VII to a supervising employee in his/her individual capacity. Consequently, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against defendant Halbert.