42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(b) requires a municipal employer to have at least fifteen employees for twenty calendar weeks in the current or preceding year for Title VII to apply.

Jewkes · filed 2026-02-20(b)

A review of the competing declarations, and supporting payroll registers, establish the undisputed facts that Orangeville did not have more than 15 employees in either 2022 or 2023. The undisputed material facts demonstrate that Ms. Jewkes’ cannot establish the essential “number of employees” element of her claims. Because she has failed to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the Amended Complaint’s Title VII claims.

An adjudicatory merit board is not an employee’s Title VII employer when the sheriff’s department employs him.

Swain v. Cook County Sheriff's Department · filed 2025-09-26(b)

As the Board Defendants argue, it is the Sheriff’s Department—not the Board—that is Swain’s employer for Title VII purposes.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks of the current or preceding year.

Hightower v. Jet's Pizza · filed 2024-10-02(b)

Given the foregoing, Plaintiff’s challenges to Defendants’ undisputed statement of facts are unsupported and are insufficient to establish a dispute of the single, material fact that is dispositive of this case: whether Defendants had fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

A Title VII claim fails if the plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant employed at least fifteen employees.

Villada v. Grand Canyon Diner · filed 2024-08-19(b)

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Grand Canyon Diner employed fifteen employees, the threshold number for application of Title VII, her Title VII claim fails on the merits, and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied as to her Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b) covers employers with at least fifteen employees for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Brandon v. Primex Garden Center · filed 2024-06-25(b)

Title VII defines an “employer” subject to its obligations as, subject to some limitations not relevant here, “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Here, Sharpe does not allege how many employees Primex has, and the Amended Complaint does not identify fifteen Primex employees. ... Sharpe therefore has waived his causes of action under Title VII and they will be dismissed with prejudice.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for a Title VII claim; that requirement is an element of the claim.

White v. American Federation of State County and Government Employees Union Local 2250 · filed 2024-06-25(b)

Accordingly, courts have dismissed Title VII claims under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff failed to plead that the defendant employer had at least fifteen employees at the time of the alleged violation. ... Plaintiff admits in his EEOC charge that Local 2250 employs fewer than fifteen employees. ... Thus, especially in light of Plaintiff’s concession, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims will be dismissed, and it is unnecessary to decide whether those claims are untimely.

A Title VII discrimination claim requires an employer-employee relationship, which can include joint employment.

BIRD v. MASTERY CHARTER SCHOOLS · filed 2024-06-10

Examining the record in this case under the Darden rubric, I find Bird has failed to establish she was a Mastery employee, notwithstanding her assertion that she was “hired” by Mastery when it “forced” her to take RRM status.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer–employee relationship with at least fifteen people on each working day for twenty or more weeks in the current or preceding year.

JONES v. FEATHERSTONE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION · filed 2021-11-05(b)

Thus, Jones has not alleged that fifteen or more individuals had an employer–employee relationship with Featherstone for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks in 2019 or 2020.

Title VII applies only to employment discrimination and requires an employer/employee relationship.

Nagy v. State of Ohio · filed 2021-10-05

Finally, plaintiff’s allegations are totally implausible and without merit to the extent she alleges a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. That statute applies solely to discrimination in employment, and the existence of an employer/employee relationship is a necessary prerequisite for sustaining such a claim. Collier v. Austin Peay State University, 616 F.Supp.2d 760, 769–70 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding national origin discrimination have no connection whatsoever to an employer/employee relationship.

Section 2000e(b) includes a county as an employer under Title VII.

Macedo v. Elrich · filed 2021-09-24(b)

Rather, the County remains the government entity properly construed as the “employer” for purposes of Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer can encompass an entity that controls a worker’s terms of employment, but a claim requires a plausible employment relationship with that entity.

Colon v. Westchester County Department of Corrections · filed 2019-11-25(b)

Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims must be dismissed, because the facts alleged do not suggest that he has or ever had an employment relationship with the WCDOC. Plaintiff does not allege that he was employed by, or sought employment from the WCDOC, or that the WCDOC controlled the terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment or compensation such that it should be considered Plaintiff’s employer.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees.

Martin v. Performance Trans. Inc. · filed 2019-10-04(b)

By its terms, Title VII applies only to employers who have fifteen or more employees. ... Thus, there is no basis for a Title VII claim against the corporate defendants.

Whether a defendant qualifies as an employer under § 2000e(b) is an element of a Title VII claim that must be decided on the merits.

Gilliland v. Sanico Clanton, LLC (CONSENT) · filed 2019-08-05(b)

Because a determination of whether the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction hinges on whether Sanico is an “employer” under Title VII, that determination will, at the same time, effectively decide the merits of Plaintiff’s claim.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks of the current or preceding calendar year.

Bouey v. Orange County Service Unit · filed 2016-12-21(b)

The district court did not err by granting summary judgment on Bouey’s Title VII claims based on its finding that OCSU was not an “employer” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer and an employee under Title VII.

Howard v. Blalock Electric Service, Inc. · filed 2010-09-21(b), (f)

During the period of time relevant to this case, Blalock Electric was an “employer” subject to Title VII’s provisions, and Howard was an “employee” entitled to statutory protection from race-based discrimination.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.

Clements v. HOUSING AUTH. OF BOROUGH OF PRINCETON · filed 2007-12-12(b)

Under the ADA and Title VII, the term “employer” means “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.” ... Thus, I find that the HAP did not have the threshold number of employees required to bring suit under the ADA and Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) covers employers with at least fifteen employees, and section 2000e(f) defines an employee as an individual employed by an employer.

Dean v. American Federation of Government Employees, Local 476 · filed 2007-09-20(b), (f)

As a result, the Court concludes that the Local did not have the requisite fifteen employees during either 2002 or 2003, and therefore does not meet the statutory definition of an “employer” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII purposes, and section 2000e(f) defines an employee.

Cobetto v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals · filed 2007-10-15(b), (f)

Wyeth does not dispute that it is “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year[J” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Therefore, Wyeth is an “employer” for purposes of Title VII. It is also undisputed that Cobetto was an “employee” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e defines an employer to include qualifying entities with fifteen or more employees and defines person to include governments and governmental agencies.

Ayala-Gonzalez v. Toledo-Davila · filed 2007-08-31(a), (b)

The Puerto Rico Police Department is also an employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), “employer means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees .... ” “Person includes one or more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions____” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee requirement is an element of a Title VII claim rather than a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.

Swift v. Realty Executives Nevada's Choice · filed 2006-11-29(b)

The Supreme Court recently held, however, that to the extent that definition requires fifteen employees, it is not a jurisdictional requirement but rather an element of the statutory cause of action. ... Thus, the district court’s denial of Realty Executives’s motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction based on its finding that there was sufficient evidence that Realty Executives had fifteen employees is not error.

The court deferred deciding whether the defendant met § 2000e(b)’s employer definition until after discovery.

Christaldi-Smith v. JDJ, INC. · filed 2005-04-26(b)

While Mrs. Jennings’ affidavit and JDJ’s submission of payroll records may well be correct, the Court will refrain from deciding the issue of whether JDJ is an employer covered by Title VII in the context of a motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee requirement defines a covered employer; a dispute over that requirement does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction when the plaintiff makes a nonfrivolous claim of coverage.

Fernandez v. M & L Milevoi Management, Inc. · filed 2005-03-07(b)

The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the threshold number of employees established by the definition of “employer” set forth in Title VII is not a jurisdictional issue, provided that Plaintiff “makes a non-frivolous claim that Defendant is a covered employer.” ... Da Silva therefore requires the Court to deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

Section 2000e(b)’s fifteen-employee threshold is an element of a Title VII claim, rather than a limit on federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited Inc · filed 2003-10-21(b)

In this context, we hold that, while the matter is not free from doubt, the fifteen-employee threshold is a substantive element (whether an “employer” exists) of a Title VII claim and is not jurisdictional.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees for Title VII coverage.

Ward v. Hickory Steak House · filed 2003-08-08(b)

After the hearing, the magistrate judge concluded that Ward had not established that Yakup and Maria Maras were employers covered by Title VII, as she did not show that they had fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Moreover, Ward has not argued that she has any evidence that the defendants Maras employed enough people to be covered by Title VII. For all of the above reasons, the judgment below is affirmed in its entirety.

Section 2000e defines employers and employees for Title VII and excludes the United States from the employer definition.

Villescas v. Richardson · filed 2000-11-06(b), (f)

Title VII defines “employer” as “a person ... who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The ADEA includes the same definition except it applies to “a person ... who has twenty or more employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). Both Title VII and the ADEA define “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f).

Section 2000e defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Reddy v. Good Samaritan Hospital & Health Center · filed 2000-09-19(b)

The Court concludes that the approach set forth in Christopher for attaching liability to those entities who interfere with an individual’s employment opportunities is inapplicable to the present circumstances. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to created a genuine issue of material fact on whether AA/Northwest is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. Because AA/Northwest is not an employer under that statute, it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII claims.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Fernandez v. Wolff · filed 1996-02-22(b)

More importantly, Fernandez gives us no reason to conclude that the alteration of GSU’s status somehow elevates Wolff and Allen to “employers” under Title VII. Accordingly, we grant Wolff and Allen’s motion to dismiss Count III against them.

Even if Title VII permits individual liability for an employer’s agents, a supervisor must exercise employer-like authority over the claimant to qualify as an “employer” under § 2000e(b).

Ball v. Renner · filed 1995-05-10(b)

In sum, no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Renner was the equivalent of an “employer” as that term is understood in the Title VII context, because of the absence of proof that Renner exercised supervisory/managerial authority over Ball.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer excludes individual employees from personal liability under Title VII.

Oliphant v. Perkins Restaurants Operating Co. · filed 1995-05-10(b)

The court will sustain the motion to the extent of finding as a matter of law that defendant Ahmad Haji is not an “employer” and thus not liable upon the claim asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

An entity that controls workplace security but lacks ultimate control over a worker’s hiring, firing, wages, and benefits is not that worker’s employer under Title VII.

Lambertsen v. Utah Department of Corrections · filed 1995-04-26(b)

Although DOC exercised some control over plaintiff for security purposes when she was within the confines of the prison, ultimate control over her employment was exercised by the School District. The court, therefore, concludes that DOC was not plaintiffs employer for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s reference to an employer’s agents establishes employer liability for their acts but does not make agents personally liable under Title VII.

Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey · filed 1995-04-24(b)

We find that there is no individual liability under Title VII but that the reference to agents in the definition of employer is simply to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer to make employers responsible for their agents’ conduct, without making the agents individually liable.

Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1995-05-04(b)

Although courts which impose liability on individuals under Title VII often refer to the inclusion of “agents” of the employer within the definition of employer, See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); ... I find that the purpose for including agents within the definition of employer was to ensure that employers were subject to the rule of respondeat superior.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer does not make an individual employee personally liable under Title VII unless that employee otherwise qualifies as an employer.

Boyland v. General Novelty, Inc. · filed 1995-05-09(b)

The better view is that individual employees who do not otherwise qualify as “employers” are not individually liable under Title VII. Accordingly, defendant Doggett’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is hereby granted.

Section 2000e(b) permits Title VII claims against an employer through supervisors in their official capacities, but not against supervisors individually.

Cross v. Alabama, State Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1995-04-06(b)

Horsley, in Ms individual capacity, also contends that he is not an “employer” withrn the meamng of Title VII. We agree. ... Therefore, the appel-lees’ Title VII claims are properly rendered against the Department through Horsley, Poundstone, and Stricklin m their official, not individual, capacities. To the extent the district court ruled otherwise, we reverse.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make supervisors individually liable under Title VII; claims against them proceed in their official capacities as agents of the employer.

Cross v. State of Alabama · filed 1995-04-06(b)

Horsley, in his individual capacity, also contends that he is not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. We agree. ... Therefore, the appellees' Title VII claims are properly rendered against the Department through Horsley, Poundstone, and Stricklin in their official, not individual, capacities.

Section 2000e(b)'s agent language does not impose personal liability on individual supervisors and instead treats their acts as imputable to the employer.

Lane v. David P. Jacobson & Co., Ltd. · filed 1995-03-22(b)

Title VII refers to an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988) (emphasis added). ... Although the holding of the Fourth Circuit was not founded on the Title VII language, the clear implication of the decision in Birkbeck was- that the Fourth Circuit does not support individual liability for agents of employers under Title VII. ... Thus, the Court GRANTS defendant Howard Jacobson’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the Title VII claims.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer, allowing individual liability under Title VII.

Tabora v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital · filed 1995-03-31(b)

Not only are there instances in which individual liability makes sense from the point of view of remedy, but the applicable language clearly defines employer to include an employer’s agent. Accordingly, Dr. Morelli will not be dismissed at this stage of this case.

A school board can qualify as an employer under Title VII for a racial discrimination claim.

Perkins v. School Board of Pinellas County · filed 1995-03-08(b)

Defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as to Plaintiffs claim of racial discrimination.

Individual county commissioners are not employers under Title VII when the county employs the worker, so they cannot be held individually liable under Title VII.

Smith v. Lomax · filed 1995-02-22(b)

They could not, however, be considered her employer; Fulton County is her employer. Accordingly, they cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents, so employer liability for an adverse employment decision turns on the conduct of the agents responsible for that decision.

Meadows v. State University of New York · filed 1995-01-24(b)

SUNY Oswego therefore can be held liable for the unlawful acts of its agents. The focus, however, is not on all the agents of SUNY Oswego, but only on those agents who were responsible for the adverse employment decision at issue — here, the decision not to renew Smouse’s contract.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, allowing them to be held personally liable for Title VII violations.

Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc. · filed 1995-01-27(b)

I hold that the statute means what it says. Both employers of 15 or more persons and their agents may be held hable for Title VII violations.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer includes agents to make employers liable for their agents’ conduct, but does not make individual employees personally liable under Title VII.

Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc. · filed 1995-01-18(b)

The Fifth Circuit approved of Miller’s reasoning that the purpose of the “agent” provision in § 2000e(b) was to incorporate respon-deat superior liability into Title VII and that there was no reason to stretch the liability of individual employees “beyond the respondeat superior principle intended by Congress.” ... This construction of the language of the statute survives the 1991 amendment.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer” but does not make supervisors personally liable under Title VII.

Shipley v. Dugan · filed 1995-01-19(b)

What seems clear is that the term “employer” is defined to include any agent of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). In determining whether Congress intended to confer personal liability on those agents, this court is persuaded that it did not.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not make a co-employee or supervisor individually liable under Title VII.

Howard v. Board of Educ. Sycamore Dist. · filed 1995-02-08(b)

As a result, Title VII does not create liability on the part of a co-employee or supervisor, and Counts I — III are dismissed as to Welcker.

Section 2000e(b) treats a person as an employer’s agent when that person makes or contributes to employment decisions affecting the plaintiff.

Moore v. Reese · filed 1993-03-30(b)

Accordingly, only those defendants in this case who were responsible for making or contributing to employment decisions affecting Moore can be liable as agents of the University. ... Neither Reese, Cerny, nor Bank is an agent of the University; thus, none is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII and the ADEA.

Title VII authorizes suit against an agent of a governmental employer.

Kizer v. Curators of University of Missouri · filed 1993-03-25(a), (b)

Unlike the ADEA, but similar to the MHRA, Title VII authorizes suit against an agent of a governmental employer.

Section 2000e(b) includes local governments as employers subject to Title VII liability.

Rogers v. Mount Union Borough Ex Rel. Zook · filed 1993-03-03(b)

The immunity issue does not arise in the title VII context. A 1972 amendment to title VII subjects local governments to the same liability as private employers.

Section 2000e(b)’s agent clause permits suits against supervisors in their official capacities, but does not impose individual liability on them.

Babb v. Bridgestone/Firestone · filed 1993-02-23(b)

There are two reasons for denying individual liability under Title VII to supervisors: First, the reinstatement remedy awardable under Title VII can only be provided in a supervisor’s official capacity. Second, and more persuasive in the Court’s opinion, is that a supervisor is an agent only when acting in his official capacity. Thus, the statutory authority for liability should only extend as far as the agency relationship.

Section 2000e(b) treats an employer’s agent as liable under Title VII in an official capacity, but not individually.

Jenkins v. City of Grenada, Miss. · filed 1993-01-25(b)

Section 2000e(b) defines “[t]he term ‘employer’ [as] a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person____ Because [defendant Morgan’s] liability [if any] under Title YII is premised upon [his] role as agent of the city, any recovery to be had must be against [him] in his official, not his individual, capacity.” ... Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to defendant Morgan’s individual liability.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold does not count partners who own and control the firm and bear unlimited liability for its losses.

Auld v. Law Offices of Cooper, Beckman & Tuerk · filed 1992-12-18(b)

CBT's partners have an equity stake in a firm they control, and bear unlimited liability for the firm's losses. Therefore, the partners are not employees for the purposes of Title VII and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

Section 2000e's employer definition does not cover a broadcaster with only seven employees.

Howard v. WOLFE BROADCASTING CORP. · filed 1992-11-25(b)

When Wolff fired Howard, it had only seven employees; therefore, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not have jurisdiction over Howard's complaint of discrimination. Likewise, Howard had no cause of action under federal law. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2) (1972).

Section 2000e(b) can treat an entity as a Title VII employer when it significantly affects a worker’s access to employment, even if another entity formally employs the worker.

Hill v. New York City Board of Education · filed 1992-11-12(b)

On these facts, this court concludes that the Board “significantly affect[ed] access of [the plaintiff] to employment opportunities____” As such, the Board constituted an “employer” of the plaintiff for Title VII purposes.

Title VII’s definition of employer includes agents, allowing supervisors who participate in discriminatory decisions to be sued in their individual capacities.

Bridges v. Eastman Kodak Co. · filed 1992-09-01(b)

Therefore the court will follow prior cases in this Circuit, which have assumed that both individual and official liability may be imposed, and plaintiffs may maintain suit against defendants Walker and Kucik in their individual capacities under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer; company officers and managers acting as agents may be sued under Title VII when the employer was named in the EEOC charge.

Gilmore v. Local 295, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1992-08-06(b)

In contrast, the individual Airborne defendants, Brazier, Eller and Brower, clearly stand in an agency relationship to Airborne Express, the respondent named in plaintiffs EEOC charge. Bob Brazier is Airborne’s President. Steve Eller is Airborne’s Regional Field Manager and Christopher Brower is the Field Service Manager. In these capacities, these defendants act as agents for Airborne Express. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b). Additionally, the scope of the EEOC’s investigation might reasonably have included the possibility of discrimination by individuals in managerial positions in the company. Further, as agents of Airborne, the individual defendants would have received notice of plaintiff’s complaint to the EEOC and would have participated in any conciliatory efforts conducted by the Commission. Therefore, we decline to dismiss the charges against defendants Brazier, Eller and Brower.

Section 2000e(b) and (f) define who qualifies as an employer and an employee under Title VII.

Savko v. Port Authority · filed 1992-07-31(b), (f)

3. Plaintiff is an employee and PAT is an employer within the meaning of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b) and (f).

Section 2000e(b) covers a school district with more than fifteen employees as an employer under Title VII.

Mack v. Kent County Vocational & Technical School District · filed 1991-02-19(b)

At all times material to this suit the School District employed more than fifteen employees and is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), and (h).

Section 2000e defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Cline v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. · filed 1991-01-31(b)

GECAL was, at all relevant times, an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e(a) includes states and their subdivisions among those subject to Title VII suits.

Sosa v. Hiraoka · filed 1990-12-06(a)

Indeed, in 1972 Congress amended Title VII specifically to subject states and their subdivisions to Title VII actions for unlawful discrimination.

Section 2000e’s definitions of commerce and industry affecting commerce bear on whether a defendant qualifies as a Title VII employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Brown Printing Co. · filed 1990-11-28(g), (h)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of §§ 701(g) and (h) of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)’s employee threshold counts salaried employees on the payroll even on days they do not work.

Norman v. Levy · filed 1990-12-12(b)

Although Tyra did not err by omitting from its count those weeks in which Tyra employed fewer than fifteen workers (as long as the three employees from part 1 of this opinion are included in counting to fifteen), the rest of Tyra’s calculations are underinclusive, in that Tyra’s method omits from the count salaried employees who were not actually working on any given day.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer's agents in the definition of employer, so courts use agency principles to decide when an employer is liable for an employee's sexual harassment.

Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department · filed 1990-10-12(b)

Congress defined "employer" as a "person engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) (emphasis added). ... This court is now called upon to apply the principles enunciated in Hicks. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that defendants are not liable for Galvan's harassment of plaintiff under section 219(2)(d).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer permits Title VII claims against individual officials only in their official capacities.

Rolin v. Escambia County Board of Education · filed 1990-08-15(b)

However, Title VII actions can only be maintained against individual defendants in their official capacities, not in their individual capacities.

Under Title VII’s definitions of employer and employee, administering a teacher certification exam alone does not make the state the teachers’ employer.

Allene Fields and Earine Daniels v. Hallsville Independent School District · filed 1990-07-30

However, since the definitions of “employer” and "employee” under both the ADEA and Title VII are identical for our purposes, we conclude that the ... State and Teachers did not have an employment relationship under either statute.

Section 2000e(b) includes agents who participate in the discriminatory employment decision, allowing their actions and knowledge to be imputed to the employer.

Levendos v. Stern Entertainment · filed 1990-07-25(b)

A person is an agent under Sec. 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimination. ... According to the testimony presented, and accepted as true by the district court, both Hartman and DeVos "participated in the decision-making process that forms the basis of the discrimination." Thus, it seems clear that the actions of and notice to both Hartman and DeVos, as supervisory employees and agents, may be imputed to Stern Entertainment.

Section 2000e(b) does not treat individual officials as employers in their personal capacities for Title VII liability.

Davis v. State Department of Health · filed 1990-06-28(b)

Thus, these defendants cannot be considered “employers” in their individual capacities.

Title VII requires the defendant employer to have at least 15 employees.

Fernandez v. Kogan · filed 1990-06-18(b)

Title VII [42 U.S.C. § 2000e] requires that the defendant firm employ at least 15 persons.

Section 2000e(b) makes the employing corporation, rather than its president individually, the proper defendant in a Title VII action.

Prichard v. Ledford · filed 1990-05-24(b)

Although Don Ledford is named individually as a defendant, since the corporation was Prichard’s employer, the corporation, not Ledford himself, is the proper defendant in this Title VII action.

A Title VII plaintiff need not expressly allege that the defendant meets Section 2000e(b)’s definition of an employer.

Williams v. Greendolf, Inc. · filed 1990-04-26(b)

The Court finds that plaintiff need not allege explicitly that the defendant meets the definition of “employer” for purposes of Title VII, and that, on the present record, it cannot be said that plaintiff or his counsel violated Rule 11 in this regard.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer excludes a coworker who has no supervisory or managerial authority from liability under Title VII.

Smith v. Prudential Financial Services, Inc. · filed 1990-04-09(b)

Courts have generally held that to be an “employer” for the purpose of Title VII, one must be an officer, director or supervisor of a Title VII employer or otherwise involved in managerial decisions. ... Roberson has submitted the uncontradicted affidavit of W.D. Biles III, manager of Prudential’s Columbia office, which states that Roberson worked for Prudential in a non-managerial, non-supervisory capacity and had no supervisory authority over the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot maintain a Title VII claim against Roberson.

Section 2000e(b) imputes a supervisor's knowledge of sexual harassment to the employer when the supervisor commits the harassment.

Spencer v. General Electric Co. · filed 1990-02-13(b)

Of course, in a case such as this where the sexual harassment is being committed by one of the employer's supervisors, this element is automatically met because under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b) knowledge of the harassment is imputed to the employer through its agent-supervisor.

Section 2000e(b) allows personal Title VII liability for an individual who qualifies as an employer by acting as the employing entity’s agent.

Suarez v. Illinois Valley Community College · filed 1988-06-09(b)

So long as the parties understand that the individual defendants will be liable in their individual capacities— i.e., personally — only insofar as they acted as employers under the statute — that is, as agents for the IVCC — and that the official capacity claims are nothing more than claims against the IVCC, the individual/official capacity dichotomy allows plaintiff to make clear in her Title VII claims, as in her § 1983 claims, that she seeks recovery from both the individuals and the government entity for which they work.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of employer, allowing a supervisor’s sexual harassment to be attributed to the employer when the supervisor has authority to change an employee’s employment status.

Shirley HUDDLESTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROGER DEAN CHEVROLET, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-05-20(b)

This court has held recently that when a plaintiff’s alleged harasser acts as an agent of the employer, then the harasser is the employer for purposes of Title VII. ... Rummel supervised 20-40 employees and possessed the authority to fire Huddleston or otherwise alter her employment status. Thus, Sparks controls, and Huddleston made out a prima facie case against RDC for the sexual harassment attributable to Rummel.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer excludes a nonsupervisory coworker from individual liability under Title VII.

Flowers v. Rego · filed 1988-05-18(b)

Because it is undisputed that Rego held no supervisory, managerial or other position of authority with defendant Cliff Peck Chevrolet the court finds that he can not be held liable under Title VII which prohibits “employers” from discriminating on the basis of sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines a covered employer to include an entity with more than fifteen employees that is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hospitals · filed 1988-04-25(b), (g), (h)

Harper Grace employs more than fifteen (15) employees. As such, Harper Grace is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b), (g) and (h).

A municipality that funds police officers’ salaries may be an employer under Title VII even when a separate board tests and hires applicants.

Shannon v. Village of Broadview · filed 1988-04-01(b)

Notwithstanding the Board's statutory authority to test and hire applicants, the Village appropriates the funds that pay for the salaries of the police officers. As other courts have recognized, such control renders the municipality an “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e defines a covered employer by its number of employees and its connection to an industry affecting commerce.

Ross v. Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. · filed 1988-03-11(b), (g), (h)

The Twenty-Four Collection is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of §§ 701(b), (g) and (h), of Title VII; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), (g), (h) (1982); and at all relevant times it has employed more than fifteen persons.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, allowing liability when an employee uses delegated authority over personnel decisions to commit quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Sowers v. Kemira, Inc. · filed 1988-02-17(b)

Title VU’s definition of employer extends to “any agent of such [employer].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... Here, Mr. Skinner subjected plaintiff to quid pro quo sexual harassment by exercising the apparent and actual authority delegated to him by the defendant. Accordingly, the defendant is liable for the acts of Skinner constituting quid pro quo sexual harassment.

Section 2000e(b) does not permit a Title VII claim against a non-supervisory co-worker who was not the plaintiff’s employer.

Busse v. Gelco Express Corp. · filed 1988-02-04(b)

Employees may not sue non-supervisory co-workers for discriminatory acts .under Title VII. ... The complaint contains no allegation that Ayesh was plaintiff’s supervisor. ... Plaintiff’s Title VII claim will therefore be dismissed as to defendant Ayesh.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within the definition of employer.

Perry v. Manocherian · filed 1987-11-30(b)

Thus, these three can fairly be deemed agents of NYHRC, and as agents are liable as erhployers under the statutory scheme.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a business engaged in an industry affecting commerce that employs more than fifteen people.

Tate v. Dravo Corp. · filed 1985-12-12(b)

(2) The Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), being engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing in excess of fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of “employer,” covering a supervisor who participates in personnel decisions and controls employment conditions.

Tafoya v. Adams · filed 1985-07-08(b)

Given Adams’ position and responsibility in the Parks and Recreation Department, he is an “agent” of the city for purposes of § 2000e(b). Accordingly, defendant Adams is an “employer” subject to the terms of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer or its agent to have some control over the plaintiff’s employment.

Bostick v. Rappleyea · filed 1985-07-05(b)

Defendants Fink, Burstein, Regan, Rappleyea and Catterson, however, cannot be considered employers or agents for the purposes of this action, and thus the claims must be dismissed as against them.

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce that employs at least 15 people.

Blair v. Philadelphia Housing Authority · filed 1985-05-22(b)

2. PHA is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); it is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employs 15 or more persons.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, making a supervisor’s Title VII violations attributable to the employer.

Vinson v. Taylor · filed 1985-05-14(b)

We have encountered nothing impuning our reading of the statutory text as meaning that infractions of Title VII by agents are unlawful employment practices attributable to their employers.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer excludes these university officials as defendants on the plaintiff's Title VII claim.

Hoferek v. University of Missouri · filed 1985-02-15(b)

Uehling and Zanders are not proper party-defendants to plaintiffs Title VII claim; they are defendants only insofar as Counts 2 and 3 remain.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” does not make agencies that investigated a worker’s discrimination charge defendants to the worker’s Title VII employment claim.

Valente v. Moore Business Forms, Inc. · filed 1984-10-04(b)

Title VII proscribes discriminatory practices by an aggrieved employee’s "employer", as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The administrative agencies named in plaintiff s original handwritten complaint could not be named as defendants pursuant to the jurisdiction of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer and does not change traditional rules holding principals liable for their agents’ acts.

New York Ex Rel. Abrams v. Ocean Club, Inc. · filed 1984-09-11(b)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) the term “employer” includes “any agent of such a person.” The phrase includes an agent of the employer in the class to be charged for violations of the act. ... It does not modify traditional concepts imposing liability on principals for the acts of agents.

Section 2000e(b) may cover a state civil service department as a city’s agent when the department controls testing used in city hiring.

United States v. City of Yonkers · filed 1984-08-22(b)

Within that sphere of competitive testing, the undisputed facts reveal that the department exercised complete autonomy. On the record on summary judgment, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the state thus acted as Yonkers’ agents for purposes of Title VII.

Title VII’s definition of employer may encompass a company whose control or influence over employment practices remains to be determined through discovery.

People of State of NY v. Holiday Inns, Inc. · filed 1984-08-29(b)

In the instant action it cannot be said as a matter of law that Holiday Inns, Inc. could not be found to be plaintiffs’ employer within the meaning of either Title VII, the ADEA, or the Human Rights Law.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of employer, making school board officials proper Title VII defendants in their official capacities.

Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Board · filed 1981-07-06(b)

The defendants in their official capacities are proper defendants, since they are agents of the Board.

Section 2000e(b) covers an individual or council sufficiently involved in the employment process, even without ultimate authority over hiring.

Rivas v. State Board for Community Colleges & Occupational Education · filed 1981-06-26(b)

For Title VII purposes, it is not necessary for individuals or the council to have total control or ultimate authority over hiring decisions. If the involvement is sufficient and necessary to the total employment process, the individual is considered an employer.

Section 2000e(a) and (b) define an employer as a person with at least fifteen employees during the specified period, including the person's agents.

Oaks v. City of Fairhope, Ala. · filed 1981-05-20(a), (b)

To establish a claim under Title VII, Oaks must establish that she was subjected to discrimination by an “employer” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and § 2000e(b): [An] “employer” is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.

Section 2000e(e) covered a labor organization with more than 100 members that represented employees of employers in an industry affecting commerce as of July 2, 1965.

Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Paul Vogler, Jr. · filed 1969-01-15(e)

Local 53 has more than 100 members and is engaged in the representation of employees of employers in an industi’y affecting commerce. Thus it was amenable to the Act on July 2, 1965.

Section 2000e(b) covers a hospital with approximately 523 employees as an employer.

United States v. Medical Society of South Carolina · filed 1969-03-10(b)

Since Roper Hospital has approximately 523 employees, it is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s employer coverage cannot be rejected on a motion to dismiss based on an ambiguous allegation that the plaintiff was one of 28 employees when the complaint alleges coverage.

Brittian v. Belk Gallant Co. · filed 1969-03-31(b)

Although the complaint as filed did allege that plaintiff “was one of an employee complement of 28 people”’ it is not clear that! this was intended to be an allegation of the total number of persons employed in all capacities, or that this is the relevant work force for purposes of § 2000e. Plaintiff affirmatively alleged jurisdiction under § 2000e and that allegation cannot be refuted by the statement in the complaint upon which defendant relies.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of an employer covers Southern Pacific Company.

Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Company · filed 1968-11-25(b)

Defendant Company is an employer within the meaning of Sections 701 (b) and 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e and 2000e-2).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities and persons count as an employer under Title VII.

South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1970-01-21(b)

The Petitioner, South Central, is an employer within the meaning of § 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

United States by Clark v. Local 189, United P. & P., Afl-Cio, Clc · filed 1969-06-26(b)

Defendant Crown is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec. 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Lea v. Cone Mills Corporation · filed 1969-07-29(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of § 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e does not exempt railroads from Title VII coverage.

Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad · filed 1969-07-16

Exempt employers listed in § 2000e do not include railroads.

Section 2000e defines employers and labor organizations by reference to their engagement in an industry affecting commerce.

Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Company · filed 1970-01-12(b), (d), (e)

The defendant Mohawk Rubber Company is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce as those titles are defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b). ... The defendant Local 539, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce as those titles are defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(d) (e).

Section 2000e defines employers, labor organizations, and industries affecting commerce for Title VII.

United States Ex Rel. Mitchell v. Jacksonville Terminal Co. · filed 1970-05-05(b), (d), (e), and (h)

The defendant Company is an employer within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b), and is engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(h). ... The defendant unions are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 701(d) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(d), and are engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(e).

Section 2000e(b) covers a corporation operating in an industry affecting commerce as an employer.

Robinson v. Lorillard Corporation · filed 1970-03-12(b)

2. Lorillard Corporation is an employer in an industry affecting commerce, within the meaning of § 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are subject to Title VII.

Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec · filed 1970-09-09(b)

Each plaintiff is an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b)) and subject to the provisions of that Act.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” covers the defendant corporation.

Andres v. Southwestern Pipe, Inc. · filed 1971-01-27(b)

We find that the defendant is an “employer” under the Act.- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) covers a manufacturing company employing hundreds of workers as an employer under Title VII.

United States v. Continental Can Company · filed 1970-11-03(b)

The defendant Continental Can Company is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) does not treat an ordinary parent and subsidiary as one employer when determining whether the employee threshold is met.

Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc. · filed 1971-03-11(b)

Thus the question sharply presented is whether, in an ordinary parent-subsidiary situation, can the fact that there are two corporations be ignored for present purposes and the corporations be treated as one ? There is nothing in the statutory language or legislative history (1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Adm.News, p. 2355) which supports the contention that you can and there is no case called to our attention that so holds. We therefore decline to do so.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers in industries affecting commerce are covered by Title VII.

Kober v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation · filed 1971-03-29(b)

The Court finds that it has jurisdiction of this action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and that defendant is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b).

Section 2000e(b) requires sufficient factual allegations to determine whether a defendant qualifies as a Title VII employer.

Leslie v. Philadelphia 1976 Bicentennial Corp. · filed 1971-09-10(b)

Leslie has not made sufficient factual allegations for us to determine whether or not Bicentennial Corp. is an employer within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, we will grant the motion to dismiss the equal employment opportunity count of the complaint with leave to Leslie to amend that count within twenty days.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers a clothing manufacturer in this case.

Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co. · filed 1971-09-21(b)

Defendant is a manufacturer of clothing and is an “employer” within 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers an electric utility with approximately 6,053 employees.

United States v. Virginia Electric and Power Company · filed 1971-05-17(b)

Defendant VEPCO is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and is engaged in industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of “employer.”

Ogletree v. McNamara · filed 1971-09-23(b)

Congress has also specifically exempted the United States as an “employer” from the Equal Opportunities Subchap-ter of the Civil Rights Act: ... “(b) The term ‘employer’ * does not include (1) the United States * * 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers Monsanto.

Ochoa v. Monsanto Company · filed 1971-11-26(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer; the company here qualified.

Bragg v. ROBERTSHAW CONTROLS CO., FULTON SYLPHON DIV. · filed 1972-03-17(b)

Defendant Company is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and is engaged in industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).

Section 2000e(b) treats the hospital, its administrator, and its office manager as employers under Title VII.

Doe v. Osteopathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc. · filed 1971-10-14(b)

The defendant Osteopathic Hospital of Wichita, Inc., and the defendants Ge-gen and McGraw, are “employers” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b), and subject to the provisions of 42 U.S. C.A. § 2000e-2 et seq.

Section 2000e(b) defines employer to include Central Motor Lines.

United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 1971-12-23(b)

3. The defendant Central is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and is engaged in' an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).

Section 2000e(b) permits member companies to be treated as a single employer for Title VII coverage when their association controls hiring and establishes uniform employment policies.

Williams v. New Orleans Steamship Association · filed 1972-01-18(b)

In view of this, the Court finds itself in agreement with the plaintiffs that for purposes of Title VII coverage the individual companies which make up the New Orleans Steamship Association should be treated as a single employer.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include one engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1972-07-12(b)

Defendant Liberty Mutual Insurance Company is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of § 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), as amended.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers a company that refines, distributes, and sells cane sugar.

Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corporation · filed 1972-10-06(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) of the Act.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered as employers in an industry affecting commerce.

Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co. · filed 1972-11-20(b)

2. McLean and MAS are both employers in an industry affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) covers an employer in an industry affecting commerce.

Russell v. American Tobacco Company · filed 1973-01-18(b)

The defendant, The American Tobacco Company, is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes duPont, which maintained a plant in Texas.

Miles v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. · filed 1973-03-02(b)

2. The Defendant, ... is an employer within the meaning of that term as defined in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of “employer,” which can cover a trade association that conducts collective bargaining for its member contractors.

United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Hot Water, Hydraulic Sprinkler, Pneumatic Tube, Compressed Air, I · filed 1973-06-21(b)

Section 2000e(b) includes within the definition of “employer” both a person “who has twenty-five or more employees” and “any agent of such a person.” MCA, as a trade association for purposes of unified collective bargaining, performs the functions of an agent for its member contractors.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers a corporation with approximately 2,666 employees.

Merriweather v. American Cast Iron Pipe Company · filed 1973-08-22(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers a company in an industry affecting commerce.

Young v. EDGCOMB STEEL COMPANY · filed 1973-09-07(b)

2. Edgcomb Steel Company is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U. S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers an electric utility engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co. · filed 1973-10-02(b)

3. Defendant Detroit Edison Company is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) and is engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in the definition of employer; a committee administering the employer’s retirement plan may qualify as its agent or alter ego.

Chastang v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1973-10-26(b)

Under the facts of this case the Trust Committee during the relevant time period was the agent ... or, in light of the other circumstances as well as the substantial identity of officers and directors and Trust Committee members, the alter ego of F&E.

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer or labor organization under Title VII.

Taylor v. Armco Steel Corporation · filed 1973-09-14(b), (d), (e)

The Defendant Armco is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Defendant International and the Defendant Local are labor organizations within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(d) and (e).

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the ordinary employer definition, leaving the EEOC without jurisdiction over this federal employer’s practices.

Tomlin v. United States Air Force Medical Center · filed 1974-01-17(b)

It must also be noted that the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does not extend to employer practices where the United States is the employer in question.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes the City of Boston, a municipal corporation and political subdivision of Massachusetts.

Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher · filed 1974-02-11(b)

The City of Boston is a municipal corporation incorporated pursuant to the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and is a political subdivision of Massachusetts. The City of Boston is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), as amended.

Section 2000e(b) covers a company engaged in an industry affecting commerce as an employer.

Barnett v. WT Grant Company · filed 1974-03-08(b)

The defendant W. T. Grant Company is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)].

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes a corporation engaged in automobile-parts warehousing and distribution.

Causey v. Ford Motor Company · filed 1974-04-05(b)

The defendant, Ford, is a corporation engaged in the warehousing, sale and distribution of automobile parts and accessories in the north Florida and south Georgia areas and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of employer covers a company operating a plant with hundreds of employees.

Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Company · filed 1973-12-28(b)

3. The defendant is an employer within the meaning of Section 701 of said Act. (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e) and plaintiff is an employee of defendant.

Section 2000e(b) covers a trucking company that is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McLean Trucking Co. · filed 1974-01-18(b)

Defendant McLean Trucking Company is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.