42 U.S.C. § 2000e

Section 2000e(b) counts part-time workers toward the employee threshold for an employer covered by Title VII.

Hornick v. Borough of Duryea · filed 1980-11-06(b)

Total non-CETA full- and part-time workers exceed the jurisdictional threshold, and I am in accord with those courts which have held that part-time workers are to be counted in ascertaining whether a “person” is an “employer” and therefore subject to the remedial provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e(a) includes non-federal governments, governmental agencies, and political subdivisions among the persons covered by Title VII.

Porter v. District of Columbia · filed 1980-11-05(a)

Section 701(a) was amended to include non-federal “governments, governmental agencies [and] political subdivisions” among those “persons” covered by Title VII’s strictures against discrimination.

Section 2000e’s definitions brought state and local governments within Title VII’s coverage effective March 24, 1972.

Stacy v. Michigan Employment Security Commission · filed 1980-11-13(a) and (b)

This amendment extended the coverage of Title VII to include state and local governments and became effective March 24, 1972.

Section 2000e covers an entity that qualifies as an employer under its definition.

Brown v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1980-12-31

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1978).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees for each working day in 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Spray v. Kellos-Sims Crane Rental, Inc. · filed 1981-02-09(b)

“Employer” is defined by § 2000e(b) as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees and any agent of that person.

Fike v. Gold Kist, Inc. · filed 1981-02-27(b)

The only remaining theory open to the plaintiffs to establish the jurisdiction of this court is that of agency, based on Title VII’s definition of the term “employer” as a “person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees— and any agent of such person.” It is settled that only an agency relationship which establishes an “employment nexus” will suffice. In other words, one of the corporations must have been the agent of the other with respect to employment practices.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an entity engaged in an industry affecting commerce that employs at least fifteen persons.

Lindsey v. Angelica Corp. · filed 1981-03-06(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b), in that it is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employs at least fifteen persons.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an entity employing more than twenty-five persons.

McFadden v. KSD/KSD-TV, Inc. · filed 1981-03-09(b)

Defendant employed more than twenty-five persons at these times, and was an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) identifies which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sage Realty Corp. · filed 1981-01-29(b)

Sage and Monahan Builders are employers within the meaning of § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Monahan Cleaners was an employer within § 701(b) at the time of the occurrence of the acts of sex discrimination at issue here.

The Definitions section covers employers with more than fifteen employees and employees for Title VII purposes.

Harris v. Richards Manufacturing Co. · filed 1981-03-31(b), (f)

The Court has jurisdiction over the employer who has more than fifteen employees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and over the employee under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Backus v. Baptist Medical Center · filed 1981-04-15(b)

The Baptist Medical Center is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) defines who counts as an employer or agent under Title VII, and individual trustees acting for NYCERS are not employers or agents under that definition.

Women in City Government United v. City of New York · filed 1981-04-24(b)

Those defendants, as individuals, are not employers (or agents thereof) within purview of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an entity sufficiently involved in the employment process even if it lacks ultimate hiring authority.

Rivas v. STATE BD. FOR COMMUNITY COLLEGES, ETC. · filed 1981-06-26(b)

For Title VII purposes, it is not necessary for individuals or the council to have total control or ultimate authority over hiring decisions. If the involvement is sufficient and necessary to the total employment process, the individual is considered an employer.

A corporation employing more than fifteen people in an industry affecting commerce qualifies as an employer under § 2000e(b).

Czarnowski v. Desoto, Inc. · filed 1981-07-29(b)

Defendant is an employer for the purpose of title VII as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1978).

Section 2000e(b)(1) excludes District of Columbia agencies subject by statute to competitive service procedures from the definition of “employer”; the District of Columbia Fire Department is outside that exclusion.

Torre v. Marion Barry, Jr., Individually and as Mayor of the District of Columbia · filed 1981-08-04(b)(1)

In contrast, section 706 applies to employers as defined in the Act, but the term “employer” by definition does not include “any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(l) (1976). ... The same result must be reached with respect to the members of the District of Columbia Fire Department. ... It follows that they are covered by section 706 of Title VII, rather than section 717, and they retain an independent right of action under section 1981.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers a company with more than 5,000 employees.

Wattleton v. Ladish Co. · filed 1981-08-05(b)

2. Ladish, with one of its principal facilities in Cudahy, Wisconsin, is a major employer in the Milwaukee area and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); it currently employs in excess of 5,000 employees, 4,000 of whom are under the jurisdiction of bargaining units.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Taylor v. Amaturo Group, Inc. · filed 1981-08-07(b)

Defendant, Amaturo Group, Inc., is a corporation engaged in an industry affecting commerce. It is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

A municipality can qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Pope v. CITY OF HICKORY, NC · filed 1981-08-17(b)

The Defendant is a municipality and at the times complained of in the complaint was the Plaintiff’s employer. Also, the Defendant is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, and an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Dillon v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1981-08-20(b)

Defendant, Chrysler Corporation, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes an agent of a state employer within its definition of employer, including a personnel commission that supervises the state’s merit system.

Cannon v. State of Del. · filed 1981-09-28(b)

But I need not conclude that the Personnel Commission is an employer in the usual sense, because the Act expressly reaches the conduct of “any agent” whose conduct may violate the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). This explicit language impels me to the conclusion that the Personnel Commission may be liable under Title VII, because it is an agent of the State of Delaware, responsible for supervising the operation of the merit system under a legislative mandate.

Section 2000e(b)'s employer definition covers an entity with more than 15 employees in an industry affecting commerce.

Monroe v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept. · filed 1981-09-30(b)

Defendant is an employer of more than 15 employees in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of an employer covers Dow Chemical Company.

Gunn v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1981-09-30(b)

The defendant is an employer within the scope and meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person with 15 or more employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce, as well as that person’s agents.

Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education · filed 1981-10-09(b)

Title VII’s definition of employer is broad in scope; it covers persons with 15 or more employees, engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and any agent of such a person.

A corporation and its operating division can each qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Anderson v. Paccar, Inc. · filed 1981-10-30(b)

Defendant Paccar, Inc., is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in the State of Tennessee. Defendant Peterbilt Motor Company, a division of Paccar, Inc., is engaged in the manufacturing of tractor trailer trucks at the Madison facility. Defendants are employers within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer covers the State defendants and the City of Newark.

United States v. State of New Jersey · filed 1981-11-13(b)

The State defendants and the City of Newark are employers within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 31 U.S.C. § 1242, as amended.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers a corporation operating retail stores in several states.

Brunetti v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1981-11-23(b)

Defendant is a corporation with its principal office in Bentonville, Arkansas. It is engaged in the sale of merchandise at retail stores located in several states. The store that is the subject of this proceeding is located in West Memphis, Arkansas, and is designated as Store No. 70. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer can include both a company and a benefits association that controls employees' disability compensation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wooster Brush Co. · filed 1981-10-08(b)

Under the circumstances of this case the Association’s control of disability payments is control of an aspect of compensation to individuals who work for the Company. Therefore, the Association and the Company fall within the definition of “employer” under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” covers RMA, a corporation that manages restaurants, cafeterias, and delicatessens.

Richardson v. Restaurant Marketing Associates, Inc. · filed 1981-11-30(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer does not cover individual officials who lack a significant relationship with the plaintiff's employment.

Barlow v. Avco Corp. · filed 1981-12-03(b)

None of the definitions of “employer” in Title VII are applicable to Messrs. Bodnar and Jaffe as individuals. Plaintiff was at all relevant times an employee of AVCO Corporation. Defendants Bodnar and Jaffe were the Labor Department officials responsible for monitoring the performance of AVCO. While there is some authority for the proposition that entities who exercise significant control over the employment situation may be proper defendants in a Title VII action, see, e. g., Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C.Cir.1973), the uncontroverted affidavits of these two defendants establish that they did not have the kind of relationship with the employees of AVCO which would bring them within the line of cases on which plaintiff relies.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covered a corporation doing business in Missouri and engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Meyers v. ITT Diversified Credit Corp. · filed 1981-12-14(b)

Defendant, I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corporation, is a Delaware corporation doing business in Missouri, engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The corporation is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes Emporia State University.

Mitchell v. Visser · filed 1981-12-17(b)

Defendant Emporia State University is an “employer” within the meaning of the statutory definition contained in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 15 or more employees for each working day, including any agent of that person.

Rimedio v. Revlon, Inc. · filed 1982-01-13(b)

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day . . . and any agent of such a person.”

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Scott v. Oce Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-03-02(b)

Océ, headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e’s employer definition covers a corporation engaged in interstate commerce that employs about 3,000 people.

Powell v. Georgia Pacific Corp. · filed 1982-03-17(b)

Georgia-Pacific Corporation (hereafter G-P) was and is an employer engaged in interstate commerce within the definition of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and employed some 3,000 persons for work in its facilities at Crossett.

Section 2000e(b) covers a college in an industry affecting commerce that employs fifteen or more people for each working day in twenty or more calendar weeks.

Leftwich v. HARRIS-STOWE STATE COLLEGE, ETC. · filed 1982-05-05(b)

Defendant college is an employer in an industry affecting commerce and has employed fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks at all times relevant hereto.

Section 2000e(b) covers a federally chartered commercial bank as a Title VII employer.

Grove v. Frostburg National Bank · filed 1982-04-22(b)

Defendant is a federally chartered commercial bank, with its facilities located in Frostburg, Maryland, doing business in this district. It is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).

Section 2000e(b) treats a person as an employer's agent if the person participated in the decision making underlying the alleged discrimination.

Jones v. METRO. DENVER SEWAGE, ETC. · filed 1982-04-26(b)

A person is an agent under § 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision making process that forms the basis of the discrimination. ... Accordingly dismissal on the ground that the defendants are not agents is inappropriate at this time.

Section 2000e(b) treats a person who participated in the decision making behind the alleged discrimination as an employer's agent.

Jones v. Metropolitan Denver Sewage Disposal District No. 1 · filed 1982-04-26(b)

A person is an agent under § 2000e(b) if he participated in the decision making process that forms the basis of the discrimination.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in the definition of “employer”; a supervisor who acquiesces in a subordinate’s sexual harassment may be liable under Title VII.

Robson v. Eva's Super Market, Inc. · filed 1982-05-04(b)

Other courts have noted that the term “employer” as used in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) is defined in § 2000e(b) to include “any agent” of the employer. ... Since Brown was admittedly plaintiff’s supervisor, there are facts in this case from which it could be determined that he was the “agent” of Eva’s.

Section 2000e’s definitions of “employer” and “commerce” determine whether a person is covered by Title VII.

Matter of Chapter 13, Pending and Future Cases · filed 1982-05-07(b) and (g)

But there is no evidence that Kleinman is an “employer” or engaged in “commerce” as those terms are defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and (g). Therefore, he is not covered by the Act.

Section 2000e(b) covers a savings and loan association as an employer under Title VII.

Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-05-17(b)

The Association was, at all times relevant hereto, a “person” within the meaning of section 701(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and an “employer” within the meaning of section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer” covers Wilson Industries.

Schulte v. Wilson Industries, Inc. · filed 1982-06-17

At all times material hereto the defendant, Wilson Industries, Inc. [hereinafter “defendant” or “Wilson”] was “an employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers Harris-Teeter Supermarkets.

Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket · filed 1982-07-13(b)

The defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e’s employer and commerce definitions cover an institution with more than fifteen employees that is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

Lanyon v. University of Delaware · filed 1982-08-13(b), (g), (h)

At all times material to this suit it employed more than fifteen employees, and is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of sections 701(b), (g), (h) of the Act.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes a city police department.

Fadhl v. POLICE DEPT. OF CITY & CTY. OF SAN FRAN. · filed 1982-09-02(b)

2. The San Francisco Police Department is an agency of the City and County of San Francisco and is an employer within the meaning of § 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers First Federal Savings and Loan Association.

Jones v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1982-09-07(b)

First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Winston-Salem is an employer as that term is defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer covers the defendant.

Clymore v. FAR-MAR-CO., INC. · filed 1982-09-13(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) (West 1981).

Section 2000e(b) includes a retirement plan administrator within the meaning of “employer” when it is closely intertwined with the universities that delegate employee benefits to it.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance And Annuity Association · filed 1982-09-29(b)

We agree with the district judge that TIAA and CREF, which exist solely for the purpose of enabling universities to delegate their responsibility to provide retirement benefits for their employees, are so closely intertwined with those universities, (in this case LIU), that they must be deemed an "employer" for purposes of Title VII.

An employer with more than fifteen employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce falls within Title VII’s employer definition.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stone Container Corp. · filed 1982-10-01(b), (g), and (h)

5. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, the Company has employed more than fifteen employees and has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 701(b), (g) and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (g), and (h).

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent in its definition of employer; allegations that a hospital board member acted as its agent can satisfy that definition at the pleading stage.

Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hospital · filed 1982-08-27(b)

However, I find that the allegations in the amended complaint sufficiently qualify Mr. Gallagher, a member of the Hospital’s Board of Directors, as an agent of the Hospital.

Section 2000e's definition of employer covers an entity employing more than fifteen persons.

Fancher v. Nimmo · filed 1982-11-02(b)

The defendant employs more than fifteen persons and is thus an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e's employer definition covers the Delaware River Port Authority.

McCann v. Delaware River Port Authority · filed 1982-10-13(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the Act.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents within its definition of employer, making officials who exercise authority over employees proper Title VII defendants in their official capacities.

Williams v. City of Montgomery · filed 1982-10-19(b)

The evidence reflects, however, that the City of Montgomery is an employing authority within the meaning of Title VII; and that the personnel board and its members, to the extent that they exercise authority over the employees of the City of Montgomery, see note 2, supra, and the remaining defendants are all agents of the City of Montgomery. Therefore, all the defendants are proper defendants in their official capacities.

Section 2000e(b)’s small-employer exemption does not cover a company with nearly 500 employees merely because it favors family members.

Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co. · filed 1982-11-09(b)

In 1972 Congress amended the section to exclude from coverage employers with fifteen or fewer employees, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, § 2(2) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)), though the House version of the bill had originally suggested an even lower threshold. ... Here, however, we deal with an enterprise employing nearly 500 people. The “family” consists of more than 100 members and at one time included as many as 208. We will not dilute Title VIPs imperative by altering the balance Congress has already struck.

Section 2000e(b) includes a state mental health institute within its definition of an employer.

Stinson v. Tennessee Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation · filed 1982-12-21(b)

The defendant, MTMHI, is an employer within the definition of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this cause.

A state circuit court is an employer under § 2000e(b).

Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St. Louis County · filed 1982-12-30(b)

The Circuit Court is a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) and an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Allegations that a supervisor made the challenged personnel decisions can prevent summary judgment that the supervisor falls outside § 2000e(b)’s definition of employer.

Jeter v. Boswell · filed 1983-01-07(b)

Since the Plaintiff alleges that Boswell was responsible for making the complained of personnel decisions for the Defendant company, this Court is precluded from summarily finding that Boswell is not subject to suit as an employer.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” covers MCI Telecommunications Corporation.

Foster v. MCI Telecommunications, Corp. · filed 1983-01-20(b)

MCI is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s broad definition of employer may include a city, county, and metropolitan planning commission.

Howard v. Topeka-Shawnee County Metropolitan Planning Commission · filed 1983-02-07(b)

We agree with plaintiff that the broad definition of employer found in Title VII would arguably include these defendants and that summary judgment must be denied as to the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b) defines who is an employer subject to suit under Title VII.

Guerrero v. Reeves Bros. · filed 1983-02-14(b)

The Defendant was an “employer” as defined by Section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) at all times pertinent to this action and is thereby subject to suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e defines an employer in part by whether it is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Minneapolis Electric Steel Casting Co. · filed 1982-12-17

At all times material to this suit, the Company was an employer licensed to do business in Minnesota and engaged in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of section 701 of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) excludes employers with fifteen or fewer employees from Title VII coverage; a business with nearly 500 employees does not qualify.

Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Company · filed 1983-02-17(b)

In 1972 Congress amended the section to exclude from coverage employers with fifteen or fewer employees, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, Sec. 2(2) (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b)), though the House version of the bill had originally suggested an even lower threshold. ... Here, however, we deal with an enterprise employing nearly 500 people.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer excludes the mayor from individual liability under Title VII.

Gladden v. Barry · filed 1983-03-09(b)

Under Title VII, plaintiff cannot state a claim against Mayor Marion Barry individually, because Mr. Barry is not an employer within the meaning of that statute.

A corporation engaged in an industry affecting commerce can qualify as an employer under § 2000e(b).

Ghalam v. Tesson Ferry, Inc. · filed 1983-03-30(b)

2. Defendant, Tesson Ferry, Inc. is a corporation doing business in the St. Louis Metropolitan area, and is engaged in an industry affecting commerce. The corporation is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s employee threshold cannot be met by combining two entities’ employees when their relationship establishes neither joint employment nor agency.

Massey v. Emergency Assistance, Inc. · filed 1983-04-08(b)

In an effort to surmount this hurdle, plaintiff argues that the relationship between the City — which is conceded to have had many more than 15 employees at all relevant times — and Emergency Assistance was such that either the two entities should be considered as one for these purposes, or that Emergency Assistance was an “agent” of the City within the meaning of 2000e(b). Given the proof before me, I feel both those arguments must be rejected; and I conclude, accordingly, that the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs Title VII claim.

Section 2000e(b) requires an employer to have at least fifteen employees; a separate union benefit fund cannot count as the union’s agent to meet that requirement.

Sciss v. Metal Polishers Union Local 8A · filed 1983-04-13(b)

The legislated separation between the unions and the funds when read in conjunction with the Amax case lead to the conclusion that the funds are not agents of the union. Accordingly, plaintiff’s strained argument that her employer may fit within a possible statutory exemption for labor organizations must fail. Ms. Sciss was employed by the funds and not the unions, the funds do not employ fifteen or more persons, and therefore her complaint must be dismissed.

An employer within the meaning of § 2000e is a proper Title VII defendant.

Brandon v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. · filed 1983-04-27(b)

2. Defendant Cook Paint & Varnish Company is a proper Defendant within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e(b)'s fifteen-employee threshold cannot be met by counting county employees when the county is not a party and the tax collector is the sole defendant.

Patricia H. ROGERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. B.M. NOONE, Individually and as Putnam County Tax Collector, Defendant-Appel · filed 1983-05-02(b)

We agree with the district court that it is not appropriate to take a headcount of all county employees--strangers to this law suit--in determining whether the sole named defendant meets the jurisdictional requirement of numerosity.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII, including an employer in an industry affecting commerce.

Ferguson v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1983-06-02(b)

American Telephone and Telegraph Company is an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) treats a state government agency that affects commerce as an employer covered by Title VII.

Annie Mae Carpenter, Cross-Appellants v. Stephen F. Austin State University, Cross-Appellees · filed 1983-06-06(b)

The defendant University, ... as a state government agency which “affects commerce” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), is an employer subject to coverage of the Act from March 24, 1972.

Section 2000e(b) and (f) exclude a county from being a worker’s Title VII employer when the state controls her employment and the county merely issues state-reimbursed paychecks.

Lewis v. DeKalb County · filed 1983-06-03(b), (f)

A fortiori, DeKalb County is not plaintiff’s employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b),... and plaintiff is not an employee of DeKalb County within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(b) defines “employer” for Title VII purposes.

Burrows v. Chemed Corp. · filed 1983-06-30(b)

The corporation is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Kumar v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF UNIVERSITY OF MASS. · filed 1983-07-01(b)

The defendant Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts is an employer within the definition of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and subject to the provision of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Coser v. Moore · filed 1983-08-03(b)

The Board of Trustees of the University of the State of New York, the chancellor of the state university system and the president of Stony Brook are employers within the meaning of § 701(b).

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Collins v. Robinson · filed 1983-08-03(b)

Defendant Tommy Robinson is the duly elected Sheriff of Pulaski County and is the Chief Officer of the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Department. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person.

Crowder v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc. · filed 1983-08-31(b)

Section 2000e(b) of Title 42 provides as follows: “The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day .. ., and any agent of such a person .... ” ... The evidence before the Court plainly shows that Equitable is not an “employer” under the statutes in question here.

Section 2000e(b) defines which organizations qualify as an employer under Title VII.

Lewis v. St. Louis University · filed 1983-09-28(b)

Defendant St. Louis University is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e treats an organization's officers as employers who may be liable when they act as the organization's agents, even if they do not directly employ anyone.

Dague v. Riverdale Athletic Ass'n · filed 1983-09-30(b)

Defendants Powell and Jackson also argue that they are not employers within the meaning of the Act. ... Both defendants Powell and Jackson claim that they are officers of the Riverdale Athletic Association and do not directly employ any employees. Therefore they maintain that these claims against them individually should be dismissed. Defendants do not explain why officers of an organization should be treated any differently from the organization’s agents, who are clearly subject to liability under the Act. Defendants offer no cases to support their proposition and the court is unpersuaded of its soundness. Suffice it to say that it is inconceivable that Congress could have intended to exclude from liability the very persons who have engaged in the employment practices which are the subject of the action. Absent some showing that such was Congress’ intent, this court must deny the motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Craft v. Metromedia, Inc. · filed 1983-10-31(b)

Defendant is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes regular part-time employees when determining whether an employer has the required number of employees.

Virginia THURBER, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. JACK REILLY'S, INC., D/B/A Jack's, Defendant, Appellant · filed 1983-10-14(b)

Every court which has addressed the issue has held that regular part-time employees are employees within the meaning of § 2000e(b). ... In short, we find no basis in authority, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history or public policy to support the appellant’s position. ... Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court, 521 F.Supp. 238, is affirmed.

Section 2000e(b) defines a Title VII employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.

Kern v. Dynalectron Corp. · filed 1983-10-19(b)

Defendant corporation operates and maintains a business and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) in that the company is engaged in an industry effecting commerce and employs at least fifteen persons.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as an entity engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce that employs fifteen or more persons.

Hou v. COM. OF PA., DEPT. OF EDUC. · filed 1983-11-07(b)

Defendant, Slippery Rock State College, is an employer engaged in industry affecting interstate commerce, employs more than fifteen (15) persons and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with fifteen or more employees and any agent of that person.

Childs v. Local 18, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, and International Brotherhood of Electrical · filed 1983-11-10(b)

The district court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellant’s Title VII claims because IBEW was not appellant’s employer and Local 18 was not an employer within the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). ... We conclude, therefore, that Local 18 and the IBEW are not a single employer under the Stuart Broadcasting test. ... Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of appellant’s Title VII claims against both the IBEW and Local 18.

Section 2000e(b) defines which organizations and persons count as an employer under Title VII.

Flowers v. Area Agency on Aging of Southeast Arkansas, Inc. · filed 1983-10-24(b)

AAASA is an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer to include an agent of a covered person.

Craig v. Y & Y Snacks · filed 1983-12-02(b)

Furthermore, when a supervisor who has plenary authority over hiring, discipline and dismissal makes an employment decision, that decision may be imputed to the employer. Title VII itself defines "employer" to include "any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least 15 employees for each working day in 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.

Musser v. Mountain View Broadcasting, Inc. · filed 1984-01-11(b)

For purposes of § 2000e(b) “current calendar year” is the year in which the alleged discrimination occurred. ... Under the § 2000e(b) requirement that the “employer” shall have maintained at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, both full and part-time employees can be counted. ... The Court FINDS that the defendant is an “employer”- within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Catlett v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission · filed 1983-12-05(b)

The defendant Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission is an agency of the State of Missouri organized and existing under the laws of the State of Missouri and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Ross v. City of Fort Wayne Board of Public Safety · filed 1983-12-06

Defendant, City of Fort Wayne, Board of Public Safety, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Section 2000e(b) treats an employer’s agent as an employer, allowing suit against an agency that screens applicants on another agency’s behalf.

Patzer v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System · filed 1984-01-19(b)

In screening applicants, DOA was acting as the agent of the University and can be sued under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) does not define an independent association with no employees as an employer merely because it provides benefits to another entity’s employees.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees Relief Ass'n · filed 1984-02-08(b)

Likewise since the Association itself has no employees whatsoever, it cannot fall within the definition of an employer under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), at least when independently considered.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of “employer” covers Schlitz.

Johnson v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. · filed 1984-02-13(b)

Schlitz is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e’s definition of “employer” includes Baylor College of Medicine.

Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine · filed 1984-03-05(b)

Defendant Baylor College of Medicine is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., which employed the Plaintiffs during times material to this lawsuit.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer determines whether a defendant is covered by Title VII.

Dewey v. R.L. Polk & Co. · filed 1984-01-31(b)

1. Defendant R.L. Polk & Co. is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

An association with no employees does not independently qualify as an employer under § 2000e(b).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wooster Brush Company Employees Relief Association · filed 1984-02-08(b)

Likewise since the Association itself has no employees whatsoever, it cannot fall within the definition of an employer under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b), at least when independently considered.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents, including individuals who participated in the employment decision at issue, within its definition of “employer.”

Thompson v. International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers · filed 1984-02-24(b)

Following those cases, this Court finds that the named individual defendants are “employers” within the meaning of Title VII.

A store employee's discouraging comments do not make her the employer's agent for Title VII hiring liability when she has no authority to screen applicants or affect hiring.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. F & D Distributing, Inc. · filed 1984-03-05(b)

This case, however, is fundamentally different from Miller, Gillin, or Nanty, in that there is no evidence that Mrs. Claborn had any authority in the hiring process. ... Although she was allowed to make comments, no evidence was adduced that these comments constituted a "prescreening" affecting the interviewing or hiring process. Mrs. Claborn had no authority to refuse, and never refused, to give Ms. Gressel an application.

Section 2000e(b) limits Title VII employer coverage to employers with at least fifteen employees.

Geraldine v. Carter v. Duncan-Huggins, Ltd. · filed 1984-03-12(b)

At all times relevant to this case, Duncan-Huggins hired less than fifteen people and thus did not fall within the ambit of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).

Section 2000e(b) defines which businesses qualify as employers under Title VII.

McCloud v. Fairchild Industries, Inc. · filed 1984-03-30(b)

The defendant is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and is ... an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of employer, so partial federal funding does not make it liable under Title VII to a state agency’s employees.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-04-23(b)

Although back pay awards are “payable by the employer”, § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the United States is explicitly excluded from the Title VII definition of an employer, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and thus from Title VII liability to employees other than of its own agencies, regardless of its role in partially funding the state welfare program.

Section 2000e(b) permits an officer’s actions to be attributed to the corporate employer under Title VII.

Bailey v. Binyon · filed 1984-03-30(b)

Under Title VII, for purposes of Binyon's Incorporated’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), Binyon's actions in this case clearly may be attributed to the corporate employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e defines who is a covered employer and employee under Title VII.

Graham v. Bendix Corp. · filed 1984-04-20

Defendant was a covered employer, and plaintiff, holding the post of general clerk in technical publications, was a covered employee, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are subject to Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination.

Miller v. Kansas Power & Light Co. · filed 1984-04-26(b)

Defendant KP & L is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and is therefore subject to Title VII’s prohibition of gender-based discrimination in employment.

Section 2000e(b) does not treat an unemployment appeals referee as the claimant’s employer when there is no employment relationship between them.

Jones v. Singer Career Systems · filed 1984-04-26(b)

There is absolutely no indication that Mr. Andrews is an “employer”, at least with respect to Ms. Jones, within the meaning of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) treats a personnel board that exercises delegated employer functions as the employer’s agent under Title VII.

Williams v. The City of Montgomery · filed 1984-05-03(b)

These functions are traditionally exercised by an employer, but the Board utilizes these powers in the instant case; and, therefore, the Board is an agent of the City for purposes of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer for Title VII; a person who is neither the plaintiff’s employer nor its agent is not a proper defendant.

Dillard v. Rumph · filed 1984-05-17(b)

Title VII proscribes discrimination by an “employer,” as that term is defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). It is undisputed that Ms. Saunders is neither plaintiff's employer nor an agent of plaintiff’s employer within the meaning of this section.

Section 2000e(b) excludes the United States from the definition of an employer, so federal funding does not make it liable under Title VII for a state agency's employees.

Walls v. Mississippi State Department of Public Welfare · filed 1984-05-18(b)

Although back pay awards are "payable by the employer", Sec. 706, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), the United States is explicitly excluded from the Title VII definition of an employer, Sec. 701, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b), and thus from Title VII liability to employees other than of its own agencies, regardless of its role in partially funding the state welfare program.

Section 2000e's definition of employer covers TIAA and CREF for purposes of Title VII.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association · filed 1984-05-21(b)

With respect to liability, we held that defendants College Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF") and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association ("TIAA") (collectively "TIAA-CREF") must be deemed to be "employers" for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., that use of gender-distinct mortality tables by TIAA-CREF to compute annuity benefits violates Title VII, and that Title VII is not rendered inapplicable to TIAA-CREF by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1011 et seq. ... The judgment of this Court rendered September 29, 1982, is reinstated, subject only to the modification set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Section 2000e treats TIAA and CREF as employers for Title VII purposes.

Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n · filed 1984-05-21(b)

With respect to liability, we held that defendants College Retirement Equities Fund (“CREF”) and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (“TIAA”) (collectively “TIAA-CREF”) must be deemed to be “employers” for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., that use of gender-distinct mortality tables by TIAA-CREF to compute annuity benefits violates Title VII, and that Title VII is not rendered inapplicable to TIAA-CREF by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. ... The judgment of this Court rendered September 29, 1982, is reinstated, subject only to the modification set forth in the preceding paragraph.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agent within the definition of employer; a county’s governing board can be its agent.

Bostic v. Wall · filed 1984-06-07(b)

The Defendant Board is the governing body of Mecklenburg County, and as such, is the “agent” of Mecklenburg County within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b).

Section 2000e(b) excludes employers with fewer than 15 employees from Title VII coverage.

Stoltzfus v. Ulrich · filed 1984-05-01(b)

Congress has chosen to exclude certain classes of employers from the coverage of Title VII. Among those excluded are employers of fewer than 15, employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). A review of the interrogatories and corresponding answers filed in this ease show that defendant Ulrich Supply employed only 12 people at the time of plaintiff’s discharge.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers St. Louis University.

Sanderson v. St. Louis University · filed 1984-06-29(b)

SLU is an employer within the meaning of Section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq., and operates an institution of higher learning within the City of St. Louis, Missouri.

A labor union can qualify as an employer under § 2000e(b).

Phillips v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners · filed 1984-07-13(b)

2. Defendant United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (“UBC”), is a labor union within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., and an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

A corporation may qualify as an employer under Title VII’s definition.

Shore v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 1984-07-03(b)

Defendant, Federal Express Corporation, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Memphis, Tennessee, and is an employer within the meaning of that term as it is used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

Section 2000e(b) does not count shareholders of a law practice professional corporation as employees when determining whether the corporation meets Title VII’s fifteen-employee threshold.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. · filed 1984-07-13(b)

The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether shareholders in a professional corporation engaged in the practice of law are also employees of that corporation for purposes of Section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). The district court held that the shareholders are not employees. We affirm.

Section 2000e(b) includes agents who make or contribute to an employer’s employment decisions within the definition of employer.

McAdoo v. Toll · filed 1984-08-07(b)

Accordingly, those individuals who are charged with the responsibility of making — or contributing to — employment decisions for the University of Maryland are liable as its agents under Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) treats a railroad with 843 employees that is engaged in an industry affecting commerce as an employer.

Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad · filed 1984-09-12(b)

The Defendant is engaged in an industry affecting commerce and is an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) requires a city to have at least fifteen qualifying employees for twenty or more calendar weeks to be a Title VII employer.

Perry v. City of Country Club Hills · filed 1984-09-17(b)

After excluding attorneys, elected officials, and CETA/SYEP workers, it is clear from the exhibits presented to this Court by defendant that defendant did not employ fifteen or more employees in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in either 1979 or 1980. ... Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant was not an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) during the relevant years.

Section 2000e(b) includes a health systems agency with fifteen to twenty staff members within its definition of employer.

Sparrow v. Piedmont Health Systems Agency, Inc. · filed 1984-09-18(b)

Piedmont Health Systems Agency, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) covers Northern as an employer under Title VII.

Easley v. Northern Shipping Co. · filed 1984-10-04(b)

Northern is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Under § 2000e(b), a sheriff who has taken office is an employer when he refuses to rehire someone, even if the alleged sexual advances occurred before he took office.

Jean SIMMONS, Et Al., Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Robert LYONS, Individually and as Sheriff of Washington Parish, Defendant · filed 1984-11-12(b)

On reflection, however, the discriminatory employment violation based on sex or gender occurred when Lyons failed to re-hire Miss Simmons on or after July 1, 1980 — allegedly because of her rejection of his sexual advances — , at which time Lyons was an employer within the definition of Title VII.

Section 2000e(b) includes a county-maintained transportation agency as an employer under Title VII.

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, California, and Service Employees International Union Loca · filed 1984-12-04(b)

Established and maintained by the County of Santa Clara, California, the Agency is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) includes a county operating a mass transit system as an employer under Title VII.

Nieves v. Metropolitan Dade County · filed 1984-12-06(b)

3. Defendant is an employer within the meaning of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer includes the board of trustees governing this state college.

O'CONNOR v. Peru State College · filed 1985-02-22(b)

For purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), the Board is an “employer” as defined by the statute.

A city is an employer under Title VII, but its police civil service commission is not itself an employer.

Lilly v. City of Beckley, W. Va. · filed 1985-03-01(b)

Defendant City of Beckley is an employer within the meaning of Title VII and is not immune to liability thereunder. ... Defendant Beckley Police Civil Service Commission is not, in and of itself an employer within the meaning of Title VII, but by virtue of its relationship with respect to the matters at issue herein is an appropriate party to this action and is a necessary party for purposes of affording complete relief.

Section 2000e(b) includes an employer’s agents in its definition of “employer.”

Anderson v. Phelps · filed 1985-03-29(b)

Thus, if defendants, King, Phelps, Jennings, Martin, Davoli, Rivers, Jones, Holmes, Gallagher, Fanguy, and Whitley were found to be “agents” of the Department of Corrections, they could be subject to Title VII liability.

Section 2000e defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Wolfe v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co. · filed 1985-03-29(b)

Defendant, B & 0, is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Defendant’s Admissions; See also Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact, No. 1 at p. 1).

Section 2000e(b) covers a company engaged in an industry affecting commerce that employs more than fifteen people.

Moore v. Inmont Corp. · filed 1985-04-04(b)

The Defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court and is an “employer” as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), being engaged in an industry affecting commerce and employing in excess of fifteen employees.

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Pierson v. Norcliff Thayer, Inc. · filed 1985-04-04(b)

Defendant is an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines an employer by its engagement in an industry affecting interstate commerce and the number of employees it has during the required calendar weeks.

Harrison v. Reed Rubber Co. · filed 1985-04-22(b)

Defendant, a Missouri corporation, is an employer engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce. Defendant has had more than fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current and preceding years within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Price v. Cannon Mills Co. · filed 1985-04-23(b)

Cannon Mills of Kannapolis, North Carolina is an employer as that term is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of “employer” covers the manufacturing company in this case.

Warren v. Halstead Industries, Inc. · filed 1985-04-26(b)

The company is an “employer” as defined under Title VII and is subject to the court’s jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

A company with more than 200 employees engaged in an industry affecting commerce qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Schutz v. Western Publishing Co. · filed 1985-05-29(b)

The defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of section 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and section 3(d) of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Washington v. Dayton Hudson Corp. · filed 1985-06-06(b)

Defendant is an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer can cover a city.

Slaughter v. City of Maplewood · filed 1985-07-05(b)

In addition, defendant is an employer as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII.

Rosemond v. Cooper Industrial Products · filed 1985-07-09(b)

Defendant Cooper, is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e(b) covers a city as a Title VII employer when it operates in an industry affecting commerce and meets the 15-employee, 20-week threshold.

Arnold v. City of Seminole, Okl. · filed 1985-07-10(b)

The City of Seminole is an employer engaged in an industry that affects commerce and employs more than fifteen (15) employees for each working day in each of the twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the calendar years involved herein. Thus the City of Seminole was an employer within the meaning. of Title VII during the calendar years involved herein.

Section 2000e(b) defines which employers are covered by Title VII.

Hohe v. Midland Corp. · filed 1985-07-10(b)

2. Defendant Midland Corporation is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines a covered employer to include one engaged in an industry affecting commerce with at least fifteen employees for the required twenty weeks.

Crockett v. Eckerd Drugs of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1985-08-16(b)

2. The defendant is an employer engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and had fifteen (15) or more employees for each working day in each of twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar years, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines who qualifies as an employer under Title VII, including an entity employing more than fifteen people.

Ardrey v. United Parcel Service · filed 1985-08-19(b)

It employs in excess of fifteen employees and is an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer includes Davie Truckers.

Lester R. EVANS, Appellant, v. DAVIE TRUCKERS, INC., Appellee; Lester R. EVANS, Appellee, v. DAVIE TRUCKERS, INC., Appel · filed 1985-09-09(b)

Davie Truckers cross-appeals from the district court's finding that Davie Truckers is an employer within the meaning of Sec. 701(b) of the Act and from the district court's failure to award Davie Truckers attorneys' fees. We affirm.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer includes supervisory employees but excludes employees who do not supervise the Title VII plaintiff.

Duva v. Textron · filed 1985-12-11(b)

While supervisory employees fall within the ambit of the term “employer,” the same is not true of employees who do not supervise the Title VII plaintiff. Consequently, if any of the individual defendants was not in a supervisory position with respect to plaintiff, he would not be a person against whom plaintiff could maintain a Title VII action.

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer covers Western Carolina University.

Farlow v. UNIVERS. OF NC THROUGH ITS BD. OF GOV. · filed 1985-12-24(b)

Western Carolina University is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b)’s definition of employer includes Western Carolina University.

Farlow v. University of North Carolina ex rel. Its Board of Governors · filed 1985-12-24(b)

Western Carolina University is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) treats a public official as an employer through its agent definition only when the official acts in an official capacity.

Barger v. State of Kan. · filed 1985-12-30(b)

Only when the official is working in his official capacity can he be said to be an “agent” of the government or governmental agency, and therefore an “employer” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities qualify as employers under Title VII.

Franklin v. ITT Weaver · filed 1985-12-30(b)

Defendant is an employer as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).

Section 2000e(b) defines which entities are employers subject to Title VII.

Brownlee v. Gay and Taylor, Inc. · filed 1986-02-03(b)

Gay & Taylor is an “employer” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and is subject to the provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e's employer and employee definitions cover the University of Missouri's curators and its campus patrolmen.

Wallace v. University of Missouri, St. Louis · filed 1986-01-14

Defendant the Curators of the University of Missouri is an employer and plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

Section 2000e(b) covers qualifying employers that affect commerce, and § 2000e(f) covers their employees.

Thomas v. Cooper Industries, Inc. · filed 1986-01-31(b), (f)

Defendants are “employers” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Plaintiff is an “employee” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).

Section 2000e(b)'s definition of employer can include an individual doing business as a motel and coffee shop.

Priest v. Rotary · filed 1986-02-12(b)

George Rotary, doing business as the Fireside Motel and Coffee Shoppe, was at all times relevant herein an employer within the meaning of section 701(b) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Section 2000e’s definition of employer covers a business that employed more than fifteen people throughout the relevant period.

Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc. · filed 1986-03-04(b)

The defendant was an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. and employed more than fifteen persons at all times material to this case.