42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

An EEOC charge filed while an alleged continuing discriminatory practice is ongoing is timely and can preserve an earlier class period.

Key v. Gillette Co. · filed 1981-06-19(e)

I find that the plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint during the life of any alleged Title VII violation, ... and therefore I rule that the class period remains 1968-1975 inclusive, from the year that plaintiff’s employment began to the year that the district court action was filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) prevents acts occurring more than 180 days before a charge from independently establishing pattern-or-practice liability, though they may serve as background evidence.

Ste. Marie v. Eastern Railroad Association · filed 1981-07-13(e)

Under United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, acts prior to 180 days before the charge are the equivalent of "pre-Act hiring."

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a deferral state without requiring a state agency filing within 180 days.

Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co. of California · filed 1981-08-03(e)

The language used in the deferral state exception does not make the 300-day extended filing period contingent upon initially instituting state proceedings within 180 days.

A Title VII plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice before suing over it.

Wayne Alfred JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL TIRE AND RUBBER CO., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-08-06(e)

An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge is timely only if filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred.

In a deferral state, an EEOC charge submitted between 240 and 300 days after the alleged discrimination is timely if the state agency completes its proceedings before day 300.

David L. OWENS, Appellant, v. RAMSEY CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1981-08-13(e)

In other words, a complainant in a deferral state must file the complaint within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory practice to insure timely filing with the EEOC. A filing after 240 days and before 300 days will suffice if the deferral agency completes its consideration of the charge before the end of the 300-day period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days after the last alleged discriminatory act.

Farmer v. Ara Services, Inc. · filed 1981-08-28(e)

The record shows that Chambers lodged a charge of discrimination with the EEOC naming the union as respondent on May 25,1970, less than 90 days following the last act of discrimination which Chambers alleged occurred on March 16, 1970. A complaint is timely filed with the EEOC if filed within 180 days after the last act of discrimination allegedly occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows an EEOC charge filed within 180 days of a separate discriminatory refusal to consider an applicant for employment.

Vivian L. ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NORTH AMERICAN ROCKWELL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-09-10(e)

Alternatively, we hold that Mrs. Roberts’ complaint with the EEOC was timely because a discriminatory act occurred on September 11, 1973, well within the 180-day time period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day filing period for a discriminatory refusal to reinstate begins when that alleged refusal occurs, even if an earlier discharge is outside the filing period.

Poolaw v. City of Anadarko · filed 1981-09-25(e)

Poolaw's allegation that his post-termination treatment was discriminatory is a claim separate and distinct from his allegation of discriminatory discharge. The 180-day period within which he was required to file his reinstatement claim began to run at the time that alleged violation actually occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC complaint within 180 days after the claimant knows or reasonably should know that the challenged act occurred.

Kitty Jones YATES, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MOBILE COUNTY PERSONNEL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-10-05(e)

Title VII requires persons claiming discrimination to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory practice occurs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (West 1974). This limitations period begins to run from the time that the complainant knows or reasonably should know that the challenged act has occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC complaint within 180 days, beginning when the claimant knows or reasonably should know that the challenged act occurred.

Cleveland McWILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-10-05(e)

Title VII requires persons claiming discrimination to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days after the allegedly discriminatory practice occurs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e) (West 1974). This limitations period begins to run from the time that the complainant knows or reasonably should know that the challenged act has occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant in a deferral state to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Penk v. Oregon State Board of Higher Education · filed 1981-10-09(e)

Such charges must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e— 5(e). Ann Mischler has failed to meet the jurisdictional time requirements for maintaining a claim of sex discrimination under Title VII. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Ann Mischler.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the last alleged act of discrimination.

Farmer v. Ara Services · filed 1981-10-15(e)

The record shows that Chambers lodged a charge of discrimination with the EEOC naming the union as respondent on May 25, 1970, less than 90 days following the last act of discrimination which Chambers alleged occurred on March 16, 1970. A complaint is timely filed with the EEOC if filed within 180 days after the last act of discrimination allegedly occurred.

As then drafted, § 2000e-5(d) barred Title VII claims based on acts occurring more than 90 days before an EEOC charge was filed.

Gantlin v. Westvaco Corp. · filed 1981-10-19(d)

As then drafted, 706(d) of the Act specified that acts occurring more than 90 days prior to the filing of the charge (i. e., before January 25, 1967) were time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an effective EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice when the state agency deferral requirement applies.

CITICORP PERSON-TO-PERSON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. Diana BRAZELL, Appellee · filed 1981-09-01(e)

Since no charge had been effectively filed with EEOC within the 300 day period required by § 706(e), the complaint should have been dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the discriminatory act when no state or local administrative proceeding was initiated.

International Woodworkers Of America, Afl-Cio, Clc v. Chesapeake Bay Plywood Corporation · filed 1981-09-17(e)

Under Title VII, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... We therefore agree with the district court that Bennett's claims concerning bathroom privileges and task assignments, both of which arose during 1969 and 1970, and Dennis's claim relating to her initial assignment in 1971, are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day EEOC filing period does not apply when the worker fails to file a timely charge with the state agency.

Gunn v. Dow Chemical Co. · filed 1981-09-30(e)

The plaintiff having not timely instituted her State action with a State or local agency, the I.C.R.C. was without authority to grant or seek the relief the plaintiff sought. Thus, the failure of the plaintiff to timely file with the State agency did not trigger the special three hundred day (300) time period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period begins when facts supporting a discrimination charge become apparent or should have become apparent to a reasonably prudent person in the claimant’s position.

David TUCKER and William Earl Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1981-09-28(e)

Thus, viewed subjectively and objectively, the facts in this case do not meet the “apparency” requirement of Reeb until plaintiffs learned that white seasonals were being recalled.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing period begins when an adverse tenure decision is made and communicated, even if employment or internal grievance proceedings continue.

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College · filed 1981-09-30(e)

Likewise, in the instant case, we are bound to conclude that the statute of limitations began to run, for purposes of filing the Title VII action, at the time St. Francis College made its official decision to deny tenure and communicated that decision to Al-Khazraji, namely, on February 10,1978.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period is equitably tolled when a claimant timely files with a federal agency that handles some employment discrimination matters and the agency forwards the complaint to the EEOC shortly after the deadline, absent prejudice, bad faith, or lack of diligence.

Lois F. MORGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WASHINGTON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-10-07(e)

We conclude, therefore, that in the absence of prejudice to the defendant or a showing of bad faith or lack of diligence by a claimant, equitable considerations should toll the 180 day period for filing a complaint under Title VII when the claimant makes a timely filing with a federal agency, like the Labor Department, which has jurisdiction in some fields of employment discrimination and when that complaint is forwarded to the EEOC shortly after the time period has expired.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

McGill v. General Electric Co. · filed 1981-10-22(e)

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim is barred because plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Anderson v. Paccar, Inc. · filed 1981-10-30(e)

The alleged unlawful employment practice must have occurred within 180 days before the charge is filed, in this case April 2, 1976, in order for the Court to have jurisdiction to consider the alleged violations.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a retaliation charge to be filed within 180 days after the employer communicates its decision, absent grounds for equitable tolling.

Bickley v. University of Maryland · filed 1981-11-16(e)

The timely filing of an administrative charge is generally a prerequisite to the maintenance of a private Title VII action. ... The plaintiff’s retaliatory termination claim accrued when the University’s decision not to renew her contract was communicated to her in December of 1976, not when the contract ultimately expired on June 15, 1978. ... 1. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Title VII claims founded upon the 1978 retaliatory termination charge is GRANTED.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not require a complainant to file with a state agency within 180 days to qualify for the 300-day EEOC filing period.

Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Company of California · filed 1981-11-20(e)

The language used in the deferral state exception does not make the 300-day extended filing period contingent upon initially instituting state proceedings within 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day filing period began when the applicants were excluded from the hiring roster; the roster's continued effectiveness did not extend that period, though equitable tolling remains available when justified.

Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service · filed 1981-12-01(e)

The statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) requires that “the person aggrieved” file charges within 180 days of “the alleged unlawful employment practice.”... The effectiveness of the eligibility roster does not, standing alone, constitute a continuing violation of Title VII. Plaintiffs have not presented any justification for equitably tolling the 180-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing requirement is satisfied when a state agency refers a Title VII charge to the EEOC, even if the EEOC does not investigate it.

Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group · filed 1981-12-02(e)

The State Division’s referral of a copy of plaintiff’s charge to the EEOC satisfied plaintiff’s responsibility under Section 706(e) of Title VII to trigger EEOC investigation and conciliation procedures. The failure of the EEOC to probe the allegation of national origin discrimination does not alter this.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a Title VII claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file a charge, subject to equitable tolling where circumstances warrant it.

Boothe v. New York Ass'n for the Blind · filed 1981-10-23(e)

Because New York is a deferral state, the 300-day, rather than the 180-day, notice requirements apply to plaintiff. Yet plaintiff has failed to comply with both statutory mandates: his ADEA notice was 30 days late and his EEOA notice was 141 days late. Absent a showing of circumstances that could toll the timely notice statutes, therefore, plaintiff’s suit must be dismissed.

When the EEOC fails to refer a charge to a state agency as required, Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day period is calculated from the date the charge would have become effective after proper referral.

Carole Patricia ROBERTS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA BOARD OF REGENTS, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1981-11-16(e)

We conclude, therefore, that the state deferral period must be deemed to have begun on September 10, 1975, the date on which the EEOC was bound by its regulations to refer the charge to the ACRD. Accordingly, the 120-day deferral period expired on January 7, 1976, and the EEOC charge is deemed to have been effectively filed on that date. Applying the 300-day limitations period of § 706(e), the actionable period extends back to March 15, 1975, not to June 1, 1975, as the district court ruled.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory practice.

Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1981-12-15(e)

Because Pennsylvania is a deferral state requiring submission of claims to state agencies prior to the filing of a charge with EEOC, plaintiff was required to file her charges of sex discrimination with EEOC within 300 days of the practice or practices which serve as the basis of her charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file a charge in a deferral state, and each unequal paycheck can be a continuing discriminatory act.

Joy HALL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEDEX, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1982-01-15(e)

Furthermore, the discrimination was continuing in nature. Hall suffered a denial of equal pay with each check she received.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge period runs from the alleged discriminatory act; an eligibility roster's continuing effect alone does not restart it, and the period may be equitably tolled.

Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service · filed 1981-12-28(e)

The effectiveness of the eligibility roster does not, standing alone, constitute a continuing violation of Title VII. Plaintiffs have not presented any justification for equitably tolling the 180-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC filing period applies to charges filed in deferral states on or before June 23, 1980, even if the EEOC failed to refer the charge to the state agency.

Williams v. Owens-Illinois · filed 1982-01-11(e)

Filing a complaint with the EEOC placed the Commission under a duty to refer the complaint to the California compliance agency. The complainant is not to be prejudiced by the EEOC's failure to fulfill its duty. ... This court has ruled, however, that the Mohasco rule is not to be applied retroactively, and that the 300 day limit applies to charges filed with the EEOC in deferral states on or before June 23, 1980.

Section 2000e-5 requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; later seniority consequences do not restart that period.

McDonald v. Commonwealth Gas Co. · filed 1982-01-26(e)

In any event, the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, requires that a charge of discrimination “be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred...” ... This is no more than a claim that defendant discriminated in hiring in 1968. Plaintiff was hired in 1971 and did not bring suit until 1975. Therefore, I hold that the claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing deadline cannot be measured from an earlier job offer when the challenged employment decision may have included later action.

Leake v. University of Cincinnati · filed 1982-01-29(e)

Based on the preceding analysis, which indicates that actions pertinent to the Plaintiff’s claims may have taken place on dates up to and including October 3, 1972, the Court concludes that summary judgment is not appropriate on the basis of Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff’s EEOC charge was untimely because it was not filed within 180 days of the March 29, 1972 offer of employment to Guido Ruggiero.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling; it is not jurisdictional.

Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1982-02-24(e)

We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge over a tenure denial begins when a reasonable person would be on notice of the institution’s final decision on the merits.

Carpenter v. BD. OF REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF WIS. · filed 1982-01-11(e)

Under these circumstances, then, plaintiff was not made aware of defendant’s official position until Chancellor Baum notified plaintiff that the dean’s decision, not the executive committees’ decisions, would be upheld. Thus, the date on which the chancellor wrote to plaintiff expressing the conclusion of the chancellor’s first review, September 27, 1976, is the date on which the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and the date on which the Title VII limitations period commenced in this case. April 18, 1977, the day on which plaintiff’s charge was filed with the EEOC was fewer than 300 days after September 27, 1976.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits liability to timely conduct but allows earlier job assignments to be considered as evidence of a timely disparate impact claim.

Wilmore v. City of Wilmington · filed 1982-01-19(e)

The City’s liability, if any, rests only on post-limitations period conduct. But these acts operate upon a matrix of pre-existing facts which may cause a facially neutral selection procedure to have a disparate racial impact.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires at least one discriminatory act within the charge-filing period to support a continuing violation claim based on a series of acts.

Stewart v. CPC International · filed 1982-02-16(e)

He does not dispute that his EEOC charge regarding the 1971 rejection was not filed within the time limitation set forth in section 706(d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... We hold that the claim regarding the 1971 rejection is time-barred. ... At least one discriminatory act must have occurred within the charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires at least one discriminatory act within the charge-filing period for earlier discrete acts to form part of a continuing violation.

Stewart v. CPC International, Inc. · filed 1982-02-16(e)

At least one discriminatory act must have occurred within the charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5’s charge-filing deadline need not be resolved before an EEOC investigative subpoena is enforced; timeliness may be raised in a later court action.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1982-03-02(e)

The law does not require that EEOC factually demonstrate that it has a case impervious to assault by means of a motion to dismiss on a statute of limitations basis before an agency subpoena will be enforced. There is a factual dispute here as to the date of the filing of the charge. If, after EEOC completes its investigation, a decision is made to file a court action in Mr. Profitt’s behalf, the matter may then be properly raised. It is not properly raised at this early investigative stage.

Section 2000e-5 imposes time limits on filing an EEOC complaint before bringing a Title VII action.

Berkman v. City of New York · filed 1982-03-04

Jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Title VII action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. Plaintiff, by filing her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on May 16,1978, has complied with the time limitations imposed by that section with respect to all of the named defendants except the defendant Fire and Personnel Departments and the Director of the latter Department, who were not named in plaintiff’s administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a charge filed after a state filing deadline to proceed if it is filed within the applicable 300-day federal period.

Cruz v. BD. OF ED. FOR CITY OF TRINIDAD SCH. DIST. · filed 1982-04-05(e)

Accordingly, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims filed beyond the state limitations period but within the federal extended period is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge filed after a state filing deadline if it is filed within the extended 300-day federal period.

Cruz v. Board of Education · filed 1982-04-05(e)

Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims filed beyond the state limitations period but within the federal extended period is denied.

Section 2000e-5’s filing deadlines need not have the same jurisdictional effect for equitable tolling and res judicata.

Agnes E. NILSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the CITY OF MOSS POINT, MISSISSIPPI, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-04-26

Of course, as we have noted, “jurisdictional” need not have the same meaning in every context, so the characterization of the timely filing requirements for purposes of waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling does not necessarily govern the characterization of these requirements for purposes of determining the res judicata effect of a judgment.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Vera L. JENNINGS, Appellant, v. AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, Appellee · filed 1982-03-19(e)

Under § 706 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. The requirement, however, “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court” but is like a statute of limitations — “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a claim when the EEOC charge is filed more than 180 days after the challenged act.

Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education · filed 1982-04-15(e)

The AFT filed its EEOC charge on June 29, 1973. Since Harris’ transfer back to Carver occurred more than 180 days prior to the filing of the charge, it is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Rowe v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1982-04-30(e)

Since 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires filing of the charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, Johnson’s claim, to be timely filed, must have accrued after September 28, 1972, the date of entry of the Rowe decree.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, but the period may be tolled until the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts underlying the claim.

Forde v. Royal's, Inc. · filed 1982-04-30(e)

Under Section 706(e), as a general rule, a Title VII lawsuit should be dismissed where the plaintiff has failed to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last date of alleged discrimination. ... The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the 180-day limitations period is subject to tolling until the plaintiff actually knew or should have known the facts giving rise to the Title VII claim. ... It is the Court’s opinion, under the circumstances, that plaintiff’s Title VII claim should be dismissed with leave to amend.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge deadline cannot be satisfied by a continuing-violation theory based solely on a seniority system's continuing effects of past discrimination.

Scarlett v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. · filed 1982-05-24(e)

We are persuaded, however, that Scarlett has not alleged a continuing violation that will pass muster under the Evans decision.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing period begins when the employee is told of the adverse decision, even if employment continues afterward.

Vuksta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1982-06-10(e)

Similarly, in the case at bar, the complained of decision occurred on September 30, 1977. The fact that plaintiff continued to work for one month thereafter and remained on defendant’s list of employees until December 1978 does not stay the commencement of the limitation period.

An applicant excluded from a promotional eligibility list must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of learning of the exclusion.

Hood v. New Jersey Department of Civil Service · filed 1982-06-10(e)

With regard to the EEOC complaint by Heath in Vulcan Pioneers, formal notice of ineligibility for promotion was given by July 4, 1972, the date of the list's promulgation. At that time, Heath knew that he would not be promoted during the next three years. He did not, however, file his complaint within 180 days of July 4, 1972. His claim is therefore barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC charge filing period limits which claims may be included in a Title VII class when no continuing discriminatory practice is shown.

Leach v. Standard Register Co. · filed 1982-06-01(e)

Conversely, if continuing discriminatory practices are not shown, then all members of the class must complain of an act occurring within the 180-day limitation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Williams v. City of New Orleans · filed 1982-06-11(e)

Under Title VII, an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory practice when the claimant first institutes state or local proceedings; an untimely charge bars the Title VII claim.

Rodgers v. Peninsular Steel Co. · filed 1982-06-24(e)

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) expressly requires that charges be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory employment practice, in cases where the plaintiff has initially instituted proceedings with the relevant state or local agency. ... Accordingly, plaintiff’s Title VII allegation concerning this incident is barred by the statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period may be equitably tolled when a claimant submits a sufficient charge and EEOC processing delays would otherwise make it untimely.

Lanier WAITERS, Appellant, v. ROBERT BOSCH CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1982-07-07(e)

In this case, Waiters did everything required of him by the statute; had his charge been properly processed, the charge would have satisfied the filing period. Under such circumstances, equity clearly mandates the tolling of the 300-day period as of the date EEOC received the affidavit.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when an employer actively misleads a claimant about the cause of action or the claimant is prevented in an extraordinary way from asserting her rights.

Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency · filed 1982-07-23(e)

We reiterated in Carlile v. South Routt Sch. Dist. RE 3-J, supra, the proposition that although the filing of the requisite notice is not jurisdictional in the traditional sense, equitable tolling would be appropriate only if the employer had actively misled the plaintiff (or misrepresented material facts to the plaintiff) respecting the cause of action, or where the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her rights. None of these exceptions exist in the case at bar. Thus, there is no justification for the invocation of the power of equity to toll the limitation period.

A Title VII charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; for a rejected applicant, the period begins when the applicant receives notice of rejection.

Ulloa v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1982-07-30(e)

Here plaintiffs knew they would not be hired when notified that they had “failed” their background investigations; the 180-day limitations period began to run then.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits Title VII claims to discriminatory acts within 180 days before the EEOC charge was filed.

Gilbert v. City of Little Rock · filed 1982-08-13(e)

In a Title VII action the relevant time period begins 180 days prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... In the instant case the first EEOC charges were not filed until September 27,1978; therefore, the relevant time period for purposes of Title VII began on March 27, 1978.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC filing period can be satisfied by a later, distinct allegedly discriminatory denial, even if earlier denials occurred outside that period.

Pao v. Holy Redeemer Hospital · filed 1982-08-27(e)

Addressing these claims in order, I first find that the plaintiff has satisfied the 180-day filing requirement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... In this case, the plaintiff has allegedly been denied hospital staff privileges within the 180-day period prescribed by the Act. Further, although he had been rejected on two prior occasions, there were no grounds for assuming that the plaintiff’s subsequent applications or appeals would be unfruitful.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day filing period can run while related litigation over a prerequisite to benefits remains unresolved.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1982-07-12(e)

We perceive no reason why the two cases could not have been timely filed simultaneously with their relationship to each other spelled out in the pleadings. In fact, however, all of these SUB claims, as well as the 1975 EEOC charges, were filed far beyond the applicable statute of limitations of 300 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976).

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a claim based on a continuous pattern of discrimination when discriminatory acts continue into the 180-day period before the EEOC charge is filed.

29 Fair empl.prac.cas. 837, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,968 George Ann Martin Held, Cross-Appellant v. Gulf Oil Company, Cr · filed 1982-08-13(e)

Thus, if the discriminatory acts commenced prior to the 180 day period and there was a continuous pattern of discrimination that continued into the 180 day period, plaintiff may still maintain her action even though single discriminatory acts prior to the 180 days period are barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an administrative charge; the continuing effects of a completed demotion do not extend that deadline.

Malarkey v. Texaco, Inc. · filed 1982-07-23(e)

Subsection 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the counterpart of § 7(d) of the ADEA, also gives a deferral state claimant 300 days to file an administrative charge. ... (1) Defendant’s motion to dismiss so much of Counts I and II of the complaint as relate to the February 1976 demotion is granted on the grounds that plaintiff failed to file a timely administrative charge with the EEOC under the ADEA and Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing period for a discriminatory discharge begins when the employee receives notice of the final termination decision.

Lanyon v. University of Delaware · filed 1982-08-13(e)

The Court must therefore hold that the date of Lanyon’s discriminatory discharge for statute of limitations purposes was April 4, 1977.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is not tolled by a plaintiff’s mistaken choice to sue in state court.

Olga J. FOX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EATON CORPORATION, Successor to Eaton, Yale and Towne, Inc., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-09-27(e)

Unlike the ninety-day limitations period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), the one hundred eighty day period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is unaffected by Mrs. Fox’s attempt to proceed in state rather than federal court.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC filing period is not tolled while a claimant pursues a separate Title VI remedy.

Stafford v. Muscogee County Board of Education, Its Members and Dr. Braxton Nail · filed 1982-10-15(e)

Similarly, the filing of a Title VI claim does not toll the 180-day Title VII limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge-filing period is not tolled merely because an employer refuses to explain a discharge, absent active misleading.

Kent EARNHARDT, Etc., Plaintiff, Appellant, v. the COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Etc., Et Al., Defendants, Appellees · filed 1982-10-26(e)

We accordingly reject Earnhardt’s contention that Puerto Rico’s failure to explain tolled the running of the 180-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a deferral state when state proceedings are initiated, even if the state filing is untimely under state law.

Markita JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AIRCO CARBIDE CHEMICAL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-10-28(e)

To read a requirement into the provisions of Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), that timely filing under state law is necessary in order to obtain the 300-day filing period, would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Oscar Mayer as well as with the purpose of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory practice.

Simmons v. South Carolina State Ports Authority · filed 1982-11-29(e)

The plaintiffs' Title VII claims are subject to the requirement that an EEOC complaint must be filed within 180 days of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... We affirm on its opinion the order of the district court that the Title VII and Secs. 1981 and 1983 claims were barred, 495 F.Supp. 1239 (D.S.C.1980).

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge when the EEOC refers the charge to a state agency on the employee’s behalf.

Russell v. Belmont College · filed 1982-12-03(e)

Thus, the 300-day period was triggered by the EEOC on October 23, 1980 when it referred Dr. Russell’s charge to the state agency.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the complainant has instituted state or local proceedings.

Moses v. Avco Corp. · filed 1982-12-15(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the unlawful employment practice, unless the complainant has instituted proceedings with a state or local agency within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Thus, only those employees who worked at Avco after mid-August 1973, and suffered discrimination, may be included in either subclass.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is not tolled by an employee’s informal attempts to resolve suspected discrimination with the employer.

Graves v. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ETC. · filed 1982-11-01(e)

Plaintiff’s informal attempts at conciliation clearly will not serve to toll the Title VII filing requirements.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a Title VII claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge, even if the state charge is untimely under state law.

Jackson v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1982-12-02(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a Title VII plaintiff in a “deferral” state, such as Ohio, has 300 days to file after the alleged unlawful practice. ... The Jones decision, however, makes the fact of untimely filing with the OCRC irrelevant. Accordingly, Defendant’s first ground in support of its motion is not well taken.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline permits claims concerning earlier acts when an allegedly discriminatory employment policy continued into the filing period.

Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad · filed 1983-01-28(e)

The railroad may have tinkered with the specifics of the affirmative action plan in the interim, by making certain tests mandatory in 1977 and involving one or two different individuals in the transfer decisions, but these steps did not interrupt the railroad’s continuing policy of affirmative action which is the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaints. ... Plaintiff has alleged continuing violations sufficient to entitle him to trial on all of his Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; the deadline is a condition precedent subject to equitable tolling.

Watson v. Republic Airlines, Inc. · filed 1982-12-30(e)

The Court concludes that there are no equitable considerations which would warrant tolling the 180 day filing requirement.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing deadline does not bar earlier claims when the plaintiff alleges an ongoing discriminatory practice rather than merely a continuing injury.

Mamos v. School Committee of Town of Wakefield · filed 1983-01-03(e)

She has alleged a continuing wrong, not simply a continuing injury. That is sufficient to remove this action from the time constraints of § 2000e-5(e) and to permit plaintiff to pursue those claims arising prior to September 3, 1974.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim based on a promotion outside the charge-filing period when the challenged promotion policy did not continue into that period.

Scott v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n · filed 1983-01-07(e)

We conclude that (1) the doctrine of continuing violation was not properly raised and considered in the district court; (2) assuming, arguendo, that the issue was raised in the district court, the doctrine is not applicable to appellants claims; (3) appedants’ claims based upon alleged discrimination in the advancement of clerks from the 1969 “B” list are barred by the statute of limitations; (4) appellants have failed to make a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in the use of the permissive rule; and (5) appellants have failed to establish a violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge where a qualified state agency exists; each payment of discriminatory wages starts a new filing period.

Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages of America · filed 1983-02-08(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e), requires that a discrimination charge be timely filed with the EEOC. Where, as here, there is a qualified state compliance agency, that time period is 300 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory act. ... The policy of paying lower wages to female employees on each payday constitutes a "continuing violation." ... We conclude that the claims are timely because each plaintiff filed charges with the EEOC within three hundred days of a payment of allegedly discriminatory wages.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge based on an ongoing discriminatory promotion or transfer system, but the continuing effects of past discrimination alone do not extend the filing period.

Trevino v. Celanese Corp. · filed 1983-03-28(e)

Under United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the mere perpetuation of the effects of time-barred discrimination does not constitute a violation of Title VII in the absence of independent actionable conduct occurring within the statutory period. ... The persistence of a system of promotion and transfer which experience has shown to be animated by a spirit of unlawful discrimination constitutes a continuing violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge filed with a local agency on the 240th day in a deferral jurisdiction to be filed with the EEOC after the 60-day deferral period, on the 300th day.

Platts v. Cordis Dow Corp. · filed 1983-03-04(e)

In the instant ease, Plaintiff was discharged on May 11, 1981; her charge of discrimination was filed with the Metropolitan Dade County Fair Housing and Employment Appeals Board on January 6, 1982, the 240th day from the date the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Adding a 60 day deferral period to this date allowed for the filing with the EEOC on the 300th day. Plaintiff’s charge of discrimination was therefore timely filed.

Section 2000e-5 bars relief for incidents outside the 300-day charge-filing period, but permits those incidents to be used as background evidence for a timely Title VII claim.

James v. KID Broadcasting Corp. · filed 1983-03-15(e)

Both of these provisions require a plaintiff to file an administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Council (EEOC) within 300 days after the unlawful practice occurred. ... Under this authority, the plaintiff may introduce evidence concerning time-barred claims relevant to a timely claim. But that same authority is also clear that plaintiff may not receive any relief for the time-barred claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice; the deadline is a nonjurisdictional precondition to suit subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.

Cruce v. Brazosport Independent School District · filed 1983-04-25(e)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires charges to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit; the 180-day filing requirement is in the nature of a statute of limitations and is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. ... Because plaintiff failed to satisfy the condition, the grant of summary judgment to BISD was appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline bars claims based on earlier promotions when the challenged policy did not continue into the filing period.

30 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1517, 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,284 · filed 1983-05-02(e)

We conclude that (1) the doctrine of continuing violation was not properly raised and considered in the district court; (2) assuming, arguendo, that the issue was raised in the district court, the doctrine is not applicable to appellants claims; (3) appellants' claims based upon alleged discrimination in the advancement of clerks from the 1969 "B" list are barred by the statute of limitations; (4) appellants have failed to make a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in the use of the permissive rule; and (5) appellants have failed to establish a violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is not extended when a past discriminatory act has present effects but no continuing discrimination occurs.

Hartwell v. Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare Allegheny County Board of Assistance · filed 1983-03-17(e)

This case is authority here. ... No continuous discrimination is present in this situation and the defendant is entitled to have its motion to dismiss granted.

In a deferral state, a claimant must file a discrimination charge with the state agency within 240 days of the alleged discriminatory act to preserve a timely federal claim.

Ferguson v. EI duPont De Nemours and Co., Inc. · filed 1983-03-24(d)

Therefore, Ferguson must have filed a charge of discrimination with the state agency within 240 days of a discriminatory act in order to have filed timely.

An EEOC charge challenging discriminatory rankings on a hiring roster is timely while the employer continues using that roster to hire.

Alvarez v. City of Philadelphia · filed 1983-05-10(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), provides that a charge of discrimination must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... As plaintiffs filed their EEOC charges while that list was still in use, ... their filing was timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day charge-filing period begins when the employee learns of the discriminatory act, rather than when its consequences are felt.

Kuan v. City of Chicago · filed 1983-05-13(e)

Under Title VII, an administrative complaint must be filed within 300 days of the challenged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). ... As a result, his Title VII action is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a deferral state only when the claimant or the EEOC has instituted state or local proceedings.

KOCIAN, Charlotte T. v. GETTY REFINING & MARKETING COMPANY Appeal of Charlotte KOCIAN · filed 1983-06-15(e)

In light of the plain language of the statute and its legislative purpose, we hold that the 300-day limitations period is available to a litigant in a deferral state only when the EEOC or the litigant has instituted state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge filing period may be equitably tolled when the EEOC refuses to accept an attempted charge.

McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Co., Inc., a Corporation, Defendant · filed 1983-05-26(e)

In this case the affidavits that were before the district court raised a material factual issue whether McKee's April, 1979 visit to the EEOC tolled the filing requirement, making the charge filed in June, 1980 timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge; an absolute failure to file is not excused by equitable tolling.

Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands · filed 1983-07-01(e)

Nevertheless, Zipes merely held that the requirement of a timely filing is non-jurisdictional; it did not eliminate the EEOC filing requirement altogether.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when an effective EEOC charge is filed more than 300 days after the alleged discrimination.

Fick v. Canterbury Coal Co. · filed 1983-07-11(e)

In the instant case, plaintiff’s initial filing with EEOC on June 23, 1981, was within the 300 day limit but was ineffective because he had not yet filed with the PHRC. The EEOC immediately transferred the case to the PHRC, which transfered the case back to the EEOC on November 24, 1981. This second filing with the EEOC, however, occurred 328 days after the plaintiff’s notice date of December 31, 1980. Under the Mohasco holding, plaintiff is therefore time barred from proceeding with his Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act, but timeliness does not require proof of a discrimination case on the merits.

Nelson v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1983-07-11(e)

To satisfy the limitation provision, Nelson was not required to establish a case on the merits under McDonnell Douglas with respect to acts occurring within 180 days before the filing of her EEOC complaint. The statute requires the filing of a complainant's EEOC complaint within 180 days after the alleged instance of discrimination occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; later effects of an earlier seniority adjustment do not restart that period.

Byrd v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1983-07-15(e)

Moreover, it is a seniority claim which has at its core a single recurring theme — that theme being the illegality of the January, 1973 adjustment — an act which occurred well over 300 days prior to the filing of the August 17, 1975 EEOC charges. Accordingly, the court finds that the seniority portion of plaintiff’s suit brought under TITLE VII must fail as being time-barred by a considerable margin.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge deadline applies to a separate individual Title VII claim despite a pending class action; equitable tolling requires adequate grounds.

Pulley v. Burlington Northern, Inc. · filed 1983-08-15(e)

Consequently, plaintiff may not bring his Title VII claims on the basis of his individual EEOC charge. Plaintiff did not file his charge within the filing period prescribed by Title VII. Furthermore, the filing period was not tolled by the 1978 class action, nor has plaintiff adequately established his right at equity to a waiver of the filing period requirement. Accordingly, plaintiffs Title VII claims are dismissed to the extent they are brought on the basis of his March 17,1982 EEOC charge of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day filing period permits a timely charge when a continuing series of discriminatory acts extends into that period.

Coleman v. Clark Oil & Refining Co., Div. of Apex · filed 1983-07-26(e)

This continuing violation extends within the statutory 300 day filing period, thus rendering the charge of promotional discrimination timely under Title VII and the ADEA.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge, and distinct alleged discriminatory acts must be considered separately when deciding whether the charge was timely.

Ghosh v. New York University Medical Center · filed 1983-07-28(e)

The court therefore holds that the unlawful employment practices of which Dr. Ghosh complains are not limited to NYU’s allegedly discriminatory failure to pay him from the NIH grant administered by Dr. Cox.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Commissioner’s charge to identify the approximate dates of alleged unlawful employment practices and provide a factual or statistical basis for its allegations.

Holden v. Burlington Northern Inc. · filed 1983-08-10(b)

Consequently, the court finds that the 1974 Commissioner’s Charge is deficient: it fails to refer to the date of any alleged unlawful employment practice, and neglects to provide either a factual or a statistical basis for its allegations. As a result, the court holds that the 1974 Commissioner’s Charge may not be used to fulfill the jurisdictional prerequisites for plaintiffs’ action.

A Title VII claim cannot proceed if it was absent from the EEOC charge and investigation and could not reasonably have been expected to arise from that investigation.

Rogers v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. · filed 1983-08-30

The Court agrees, though, that she may not now assert her claim of discrimination in promotion because she did not raise it before the EEOC, it did not form part of the EEOC investigation, and the Court could not reasonably expect it to do so.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period is tolled for a member of a pending certified class action until a final adverse determination of the class claims.

32 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1696, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 33,794 · filed 1983-09-08(e)

Consistency with the policies reiterated in Crown, Cork & Seal requires that the tolling of the statute of limitations continue until a final adverse determination of class claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s limitations period is tolled for a class member while a Title VII class action remains pending, until final adverse determination of the class claims.

Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co. · filed 1983-09-08(e)

Consistency with the policies reiterated in Crown, Cork & Seal requires that the tolling of the statute of limitations continue until a final adverse determination of class claims.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of a discrete discriminatory discharge; later alleged discrimination does not extend that deadline for the discharge.

Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., Etc. · filed 1983-09-26(d)

It was a discrete act of discrimination, and Berry was obliged to seek relief from it within the statutory 180-day period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is not equitably tolled solely because a claimant is ignorant of the law.

Cruz v. Triangle Affiliates, Inc. · filed 1983-10-04(e)

In essence, plaintiff urges an equitable tolling based solely upon ignorance of the law, a circumstance or condition which does not toll the limitation.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC charge filing period limits relief for earlier violations absent an equitable reason to toll it.

Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc. · filed 1983-12-07(e)

Here, the Court finds no equitable justification for tolling or otherwise eliminating the 180-day time requirement. The earliest EEOC charge in evidence was filed March 26, 1973, thus establishing a cut-off date of September 26, 1972. Alleged violations of Title VII before that date will not be considered by the Court as claims for which plaintiffs may be granted relief.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC filing limit is an affirmative defense that an employer may raise in court even if it did not raise it during EEOC proceedings.

Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend · filed 1983-12-29(e)

Here, the defendants properly raised the issue of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory 180-day time limit of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) as an affirmative defense under F.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Because, as noted above, this court is not bound by the underlying administrative proceedings related to the filing of the discrimination charge with the EEOC (indeed, the EEOC proceedings form no part of this court’s record herein), the defendants’ decision not to raise the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations unless and until the plaintiff’s charge gravitated to federal court cannot be construed as a waiver of said defense.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets the deadline for filing an EEOC charge; a charge filed on day 299 without first filing with an available state agency is untimely unless equitable tolling applies.

Schier v. Temple University · filed 1984-01-13(e)

Now, our plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint on the 299th day after the last alleged violation of Title VII so that she complied neither with the 240-day rule nor with the 180-day rule. ... Accordingly, I conclude that the filing under Title VII claim was tardy and that there are no grounds for forgiveness, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice and bars claims based solely on acts outside that period.

Grimes v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co. · filed 1984-02-10(e)

Section 2000e-5 requires that a complaint be filed with the EEOC within One Hundred and Eighty (180) days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. It is undisputed in this ease that no such charge was filed within One Hundred Eighty (180) days of either Grimes’ discharge in 1976 or his reinstatement in 1979. Thus, any claim based solely on these two events is barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act to seek relief for that act.

Love v. Alamance County Board of Education · filed 1984-02-29(e)

Plaintiff may obtain relief under Title VII for discriminatory acts of defendant occurring within 180 days of the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling when a claimant reasonably follows an employer policy directing her to another agency.

Oliver v. Nevada · filed 1984-03-07(e)

However, we further find that because plaintiff was reasonable in her belief that she was required to initially file her claim with DOI, the limitations period should be tolled for the period beginning when she first learned of the existence of the amended non-discrimination policy in late December of 1981, continuing for the period of time required to prepare the letter that she sent to DOI, and terminating when DOI advised her that it had no jurisdiction over her claim (February 12, 1982). Thus it appears that a reasonable tolling period is 43 days. Therefore, although plaintiff’s claim was not filed with EEOC until 221 days after she was terminated, once the 43 days are deducted her claim was filed well within the limitations period of § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 1972 amendments apply to charges pending before the EEOC when they took effect, with the limitations period measured from each charge's original filing date.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. · filed 1984-02-13(e)

The applicable limitations period for claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is set forth in § 706(e) of that statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), as amended in 1972. The 1972 amendments apply to all cases in which charges were then pending before the EEOC. In the present case the plaintiffs Dantzler, Hicks, Goodman, Meeks and Middleton had charges pending before the EEOC when the 1972 amendments became effective. In these circumstances, the limitations period is measured from the original filing date in each case, not merely from the effective date of the 1972 amendments.

A continuing discriminatory policy permits a timely EEOC charge when the employer continues to enforce it, with each discriminatory selection creating a new violation.

Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine · filed 1984-03-05(e)

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs’ EEOC charges were timely filed. ... Moreover, every time the Defendant selected a rotation team and that selection process excluded Jews from the team, a new and continuing violation occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Henry James HOWARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-03-12(e)

We conclude that the deposition does not support Roadway Express’ characterization of the complaint; rather, the alleged unlawful employment practice was the rejection of Howard’s application on the basis of race following the discriminatory administration of a polygraph test in 1976. The EEOC charge at issue, therefore, was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the employee knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act occurred.

Julio CERVANTES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. IMCO, HALLIBURTON SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1984-03-26(e)

Under established federal law, the 180-day limitations period for Title VII claims and the limitations period for § 1981 employment discrimination claims begin to accrue “when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act has occurred.”

A Title VII salary discrimination claim is timely when the alleged discrimination includes an act within 180 days before the EEOC charge.

Danielson v. Dupage Area Vocational Education Authority · filed 1984-04-19(e)

The court notes that at least on the discriminatory compensation claims, which are explained to continue to the present, plaintiffs have clearly alleged a discriminatory act occurring within 180 days of the filing of the charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an actual violation within the EEOC charge filing period for a continuing violation claim.

Hill v. AT & T Technologies, Inc. · filed 1984-03-27(e)

Since there was no “actual discrimination against [Bailey] that took place” within the 180-day required filing period, “the theory of a continuing violation is [not] sustainable” in favor of this petitioner.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an actual violation within the EEOC charge-filing period for a continuing-violation claim.

Hill v. AT & T Technologies · filed 1984-05-03(e)

Since there was no "actual discrimination against [Bailey] that took place" within the 180-day required filing period, "the theory of a continuing violation is [not] sustainable" in favor of this petitioner.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits the 300-day EEOC filing period even when state proceedings were filed late, if the federal charge meets the statutory timing requirements.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pattin-Marion · filed 1984-06-08(e)

The plain impact of both subsections (c) and (e) of Section 2000e-5 is that the federal charge — filing period of 300 days is available whether or not state proceedings are instituted in a timely fashion, so long as the charge is filed with the E.E.O.C. 60 days after the state proceedings have commenced or 30 days after the complaining party receives notice that the state proceeding has terminated and within 300 days after the alleged illegal practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows an otherwise untimely Title VII claim based on a continuing violation only when the earlier act is part of a discriminatory pattern that continues into the filing period.

Alveari v. American International Group, Inc. · filed 1984-07-13(e)

The continuing violation doctrine permits a Title VII claimant to seek relief based upon otherwise time-barred claims if the acts for which relief would otherwise be barred are the product of a “continuing violation” of the Act, and if at least one act, also the product of such a violation, is committed within the limitations period. ... The allegations comprising Count I of the complaint fail to meet these standards.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the charge is filed with or referred to a state agency; the period runs from the final discriminatory decision.

Beverley v. Douglas · filed 1984-07-30(e)

Dr. Beverley filed a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the date the decision to deny her application became final. Accordingly, her complaint was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5 delays the effective filing of an EEOC charge until 60 days after state proceedings begin, unless they end earlier, and requires filing within 300 days of the alleged unlawful event.

Isaac v. Harvard University · filed 1984-07-31(c), (e)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that a complaint be filed (in this case) within 300 days of the alleged unlawful event. ... It now appears from documents submitted by the defendant with its motion for reconsideration that the proceedings before the MCAD were not terminated on March 16 but are in fact still ongoing. ... Accordingly, the order of July 31, 1984 denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment is VACATED. The defendant’s motion is ALLOWED and the complaint is DISMISSED on the merits.

In a state without an employment discrimination agency, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Kiper v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary & Secondary Education · filed 1984-08-01(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), because Louisiana does not have a state employment discrimination agency, the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC charge deadline may be equitably tolled when another person’s misleading or fraudulent conduct justifies the delay.

Clara Nell SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. T.C. McCLAMMY, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1984-09-04(e)

The basic principle that runs through these cases seems to be that equitable tolling is based upon the actions of someone other than the claimant that are misleading or constituted fraudulent conduct. In this case, neither the E.E.O.C., nor the employer, nor any other person conducted themselves in a way to make it inequitable to apply the 180-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing deadline does not bar a claim based on a discriminatory pay differential that continues into the filing period.

Derouin v. Division · filed 1984-09-06(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the case must be commenced within 300 days of the cause of action if a charge is filed with a state agency. ... In particular, the act of paying a discriminatorily low wage occurs not only when the pay level is set, but continues as long as the discriminatory pay differential continues. ... Since the differential in pay has been a continuing one, the respective statutes of limitation are no bar to plaintiffs’ claims.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; alleged discriminatory acts outside the applicable 300-day filing period are barred absent equitable tolling.

Valente v. Moore Business Forms, Inc. · filed 1984-10-04(e)

Accordingly, only the alleged unlawful employment practices which occurred within the 300 days preceding April 13, 1981 (or June 17,1980 to April 13, 1981) could be presented in plaintiff’s EEOC charge. Plaintiff’s charge to the EEOC, however, complains of her failure to secure desired promotions in 1978 and in late March 1980. The subject of these charges occurred before the starting date of the applicable 300-day administrative filing period. Since these events took place before the opening date of her available proof, they are precluded from the court’s consideration.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely charge based on a discriminatory refusal to promote within the applicable filing period, even when an earlier promotion decision occurred outside that period.

Beatriz CAJIGAS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BANCO De PONCE, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1984-10-10(e)

Here, in contrast, there is some indication that positions as manager were open in February and March when plaintiff continued to press for promotion, and thus plaintiff’s action is timely with respect to at least the alleged discriminatory refusal to promote plaintiff to an available executive position for which she was qualified occurring within 180 (or 240, as the case may be — we leave the matter to be determined in the first instance by the district court) days of the filing of her administrative complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a discrimination charge to benefit from the 300-day EEOC filing period even if it was not filed with the state agency within the state limitations period.

Haller v. Butler Shoe Corp. · filed 1984-10-17(e)

After an independent review of the cases decided under Title VII, I conclude that the plaintiff’s discrimination charge, filed within 300 days from the date of discrimination, is timely filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant in New York to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the discriminatory act, subject to equitable relief from an untimely filing.

Gilliard v. New York Public Library System · filed 1984-11-06(e)

The appropriate statute of limitations for Title VII claims brought in New York is governed. by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) which holds that a plaintiff must file with the EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act. ... The EEOC claim was filed more than 300 days later, on March 24, 1982, and the § 1981 claim was brought more than three years later.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge filing period is tolled for a putative class member by a class complaint when certification is later denied and the member timely protects her rights.

Rossini v. Ogilvy & Mather, Inc. · filed 1984-11-13(e)

Where a class action complaint has been filed, but class certification is denied, the complaint tolls the statute of limitations for members of the purported class who act in a timely fashion to protect their rights. ... Thus the filing of the complaint by Rossini tolled the statute of limitations for Zukofsky, a member of the class Rossini unsuccessfully sought to represent.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of an unlawful employment practice, but claims involving an ongoing discriminatory policy may include earlier related incidents.

Tyson v. Sun Refining & Marketing Co. · filed 1984-11-21(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), charges must be filed within 180 days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice took place. The courts have, however, long recognized an exception to this rule in cases in which the plaintiff has alleged a “continuing violation” of the Act. ... I believe that in the present case, plaintiffs have alleged a systematic policy of sex discrimination and claims related to incidents which occurred more than 180 days before the filing of EEOC charges in 1978 are not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge filing period is subject to equitable tolling, and assurances that an applicant would be hired can raise a triable tolling issue.

Janowiak v. City Of South Bend · filed 1984-12-06(e)

Construing the facts most favorably to plaintiff, this court holds that plaintiff's claim that Potvin assured him that he would be hired raises the question whether the statute was equitably tolled. Because this question merits a trial, the district court correctly determined that summary judgment should not have been granted on the statute of limitations issue.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline does not require a court enforcing an EEOC subpoena to resolve factual disputes about timeliness when the charge is facially valid.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROADWAY EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1984-12-13(e)

The facial validity of a charge is much different from a factual determination as to whether the charge was timely filed. The district court should examine a charge to make sure that it is facially valid, but it need not go beneath the face of the charge to make factual determinations as to timeliness.

In a deferral state, an EEOC charge filed between 240 and 300 days after the alleged discrimination is timely only if the state agency terminates its proceedings by day 300.

Zewde v. Elgin Community College · filed 1984-12-21(e)

If, as in this case, the charge is filed between 240 and 300 days, the court must determine whether the state agency actually terminated its proceedings on or before the 300th day. If so, the charge was “timely” filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge based on a present discriminatory act; the continuing effects of an older act do not restart the filing period.

Davis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1985-01-03(e)

The plaintiffs herein have not alleged present violations. They have alleged past violations with present effects. ... In summary, the plaintiffs’ 1982 EEOC charges do not assert actionable violations of Title VII within the relevant time period. Their Title VII claims are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC charge deadline in a deferral state is subject to equitable estoppel when an employer's threats reasonably delay filing.

Bilka v. Pepe's Inc. · filed 1985-01-09(e)

We think that the complaint’s allegations of threatened reprisal, if true, estop Pepe’s from raising the limitations issue.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a person to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Zangrillo v. Fashion Institute of Technology · filed 1985-01-28(e)

Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides that the EEOC charge “shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Plaintiff’s entitlement to relief under Title VII is predicated on the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day period for filing an administrative complaint about wrongful discharge runs from the date of discharge, even when severance payments continue afterward.

Joyce L. CAMERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-02-01(e)

We agree with all of the other circuits that have considered the question that the cause of action accrues on the date of discharge. ... Appellant’s administrative complaint was not filed within the pertinent 300-day period specified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice; notice of termination starts that period even if severance payments continue.

Shipper v. Avon Products, Inc. · filed 1985-02-11(e)

The relevant statutes require that a charge be filed within “300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Thus, if plaintiff was given clear notice of a decision to terminate her employment, then the fact that a period of severance pay may have continued beyond that time does not extend the statute of limitations. ... Accordingly, Shipper’s sex and age discrimination claims are dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when an employee is informed of a termination, even if employment or pay continues afterward.

Welty v. S.F. & G., Inc. · filed 1985-04-11(e)

The argument is contrary to the law and, under settled principles, the time for filing plaintiff’s EEOC charge began running on the date she was informed of her termination.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing period does not bar an earlier discriminatory act when independent actionable conduct occurs within the period and the employee could not reasonably have recognized the earlier act as actionable sooner.

Mary GLASS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PETRO-TEX CHEMICAL CORP., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1985-04-22(e)

Thus, Ms. Glass would establish that a continuing violation occurred by showing (1) that some “independent actionable conduct” occurred during the statutory period (here, the 1974 non-promotion) and (2) that she did not know and could not reasonably be expected to have realized that the 1969 discrimination was itself actionable until within 180 days of the date that she filed her charge with the Commission.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day period for filing a discrimination charge is not tolled by alleged physical or mental incapacity.

Steward v. Holiday Inn (Sic), Inc. · filed 1985-05-29(e)

Accordingly, this Court rules as a matter of law that the 180-day period to file a discrimination charge pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is not tolled by a period of alleged physical and/or mental incapacity.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Schutz v. Western Publishing Co. · filed 1985-05-29(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires that a charge of discrimination be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, with certain exceptions where charges are filed with state or local agencies.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely charge based on an allegedly discriminatory new tenure decision made within the filing period, even when an earlier tenure denial occurred outside it.

Reid v. University of Michigan · filed 1985-06-28(e)

In short, I conclude that plaintiff is entitled to challenge sex or race discrimination in defendant’s de novo tenure decision in early 1980. I also conclude that plaintiff has made sufficient allegations of discrimination in the de novo decision to raise a genuine issue of fact.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge filed within 300 days in a deferral state to be timely even if the claimant did not file with the state agency within its limitations period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ocean City Police Department · filed 1985-06-30(e)

Herein, this Court, fully persuaded by Soble and Haller, holds that Wright did not need to have filed his charge with MCHR within Maryland’s 180-day limitations period in order to benefit from the extended 300-day federal filing period accorded to claimants in deferral states.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day EEOC filing period when state agency proceedings are instituted, even if the state charge is untimely under state law.

Toney THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-07-01(e)

Since seven other circuits have unanimously held that even an untimely state claim will trigger the 300-day limitation extension, we reverse.

A contractual personnel-board appeal does not toll the deadline for filing a Title VII charge when it neither raises a Title VII claim nor gives notice of one.

Dyer v. Parish of Jefferson · filed 1985-07-10(e)

Plaintiffs appeal in this case was pursuant to his contractual right as an employee of the Parish of Jefferson to appeal disciplinary action taken against him, and was not a claim under either Title VII or the ADEA. It provided no notice to defendant of plaintiffs claims based on these statutes, and therefore did not toll the statutory limitations periods.

A plaintiff can avoid § 2000e-5(e)'s filing bar at the pleading stage by alleging a continuing violation that includes discriminatory conduct within the limitations period.

Virgo v. Local Union 580 · filed 1985-08-07(e)

However inartfully pleaded, the proposed amended complaint does allege a continuing violation of Title VII sufficient to avoid the statutory time-bar of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) at this stage of the litigation.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits Title VII claims to discriminatory acts within the applicable charge-filing period.

Peoples v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. · filed 1985-09-27(e)

Because of this perception, we cannot vacate our Order of October 18, 1984 as we are convinced, in light of the foregoing rationale, that said Order reflects the appropriate legal conclusion. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims pursuant to Counts I, II, and III of his amended complaint are limited to those allegedly discriminatory acts which P P & L has committed against him since January 20, 1982.

Sections 2000e-5(c) and (e) require a complainant in a deferral state to file with the state agency within 240 days to allow the 60-day deferral period to end before the 300-day EEOC deadline.

Anderson v. Wisconsin Gas Co. · filed 1985-09-27(c), (e)

Thus, in order to meet the 300-day filing requirement of Section 706(e) and the 60-day deferral requirement of Section 706(c), a complainant must file a complaint with the state agency at least within 240 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. ... However, Ms. Anderson’s situation does not indicate that she was “prevented from asserting her rights” so as to equitably toll the Title VII filing time limits.