42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s ninety-day period for filing suit may be equitably tolled when the EEOC misleads a claimant about when the period begins.

Wagher v. Guy's Foods, Inc. · filed 1991-05-09(f)(1)

The EEOC’s statement that the ninety-day time limitation would not begin running until plaintiff actually received the right-to-sue letter actively misled and lulled plaintiff's counsel into inaction. For this reason, the ninety-day period is equitably tolled until the plaintiff actually received the second right-to-sue letter. The defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied on this point.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is subject to equitable tolling when an employer actively misleads an employee and lulls her into inaction.

Schloesser v. Kansas Department of Health & Environment · filed 1991-06-04(e)

This is outside the periods of limitations of both Title VII and the ADEA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). However, the time limits for filing charges with the EEOC are subject to equitable tolling. ... From a review of the record in this case, we conclude that a question of fact exists concerning whether defendant Grant actively misled plaintiff and lulled plaintiff into inaction during the May 2, 1988, meeting.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally gives employees in Indiana 300 days to file a Title VII charge, and the “like or reasonably related” doctrine does not revive claims outside that period.

Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1991-05-10(e)

While these claims that are outside of the statute of limitations may or may not be “like or reasonably related” to those claims in the EEOC charge, Luddington cannot use this doctrine to avoid a statue of limitations bar.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge in a deferral jurisdiction to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Perkins v. District of Columbia · filed 1991-07-29(e)

Although the charge concerning defendant’s refusal to promote in May 1986 was timely filed in December 1986, the claims with respect to the 1978 RIF and reemployment by DOT, the 1981 promotion and other pre-1985 actions were not filed within the requisite 300 days. The Court concludes, therefore, that Perkins’ allegations respecting race discrimination and sex discrimination arising out of the RIF and reemployment by DOT are time barred under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a continuing violation claim based on earlier discriminatory acts when a violation within the filing period is reasonably related to them.

Garvey v. Dickinson College · filed 1991-08-23(e)

To rely on this theory, the plaintiff must prove that a violation occurred within the limitations period and that such violation is “reasonably related” to prior discriminatory acts alleged.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged conduct; earlier acts in a continuing pattern may be considered when an act in that pattern falls within the filing period.

Malone v. Pipefitters' Ass'n, Local Union 597 · filed 1991-09-19(e)

A plaintiff must file Title VII discrimination charges before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC”) within 300 days of the alleged conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... This second round of alleged discrimination appears to be part of the same pattern, and the Court finds that it is within the statutory period.

A timely complaint filed with OCR may satisfy Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC filing requirement if it is deemed filed with the EEOC under the referral regulations.

PRESTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA · filed 1991-08-18(e)

While the OCR letter does not specifically identify the August 1989 promotion decision, we conclude that the letter is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Preston is deemed to have complied with the filing requirement of section 2000e-5 when she filed a complaint with OCR within the 180-day period following the August promotion decision.

Section 2000e-5 generally requires a Title VII charge in a deferral state within 300 days of discrimination; a continuing violation requires at least one incident of harassment within that period.

Lane v. Ground Round, Inc. · filed 1991-10-02(e)

Because Missouri is a deferral state, ordinarily a plaintiff must file complaints with the relevant enforcement agency within 300 days of the discriminatory act. ... To establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show that at least one incident of harassment occurred within the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits 300 days to file an EEOC charge when a worksharing agreement between the EEOC and a state agency extends the filing period.

Tozzi v. Joliet Junior College, Robert Burke, Doctor and Salvadore A. Gutierrez · filed 1991-08-30(e)

The appellees have pointed out, in their jurisdictional statement and as an affirmative defense in their answer to the complaint, that Ms. Tozzi did not file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). We write only to note existence of a Worksharing Agreement between the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC which extends the time for filing to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits earlier discriminatory acts to be considered despite its 180-day EEOC filing limit when they form a continuing violation and at least one act occurred within that period.

Young v. Town of Fallsburg Police Department · filed 1991-10-01(e)

Section 2000e-5(e) requires that a charge with the EEOC must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice took place. Courts have interpreted this provision to allow Title VII claimants to maintain suits otherwise barred by the 180-day limit if the acts constituted a “continuing violation” of Title VII and at least one act occurred within the 180-day period. ... The court finds that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of “continuing violations” of Title VII. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely discrimination charge before a Title VII suit; the 300-day filing period requires initially instituting proceedings with a state or local agency.

Arnold v. K-Mart Corporation · filed 1991-11-13(e)

We have reviewed the record and we AFFIRM for the reasons stated in Judge Stiehl's attached district court order. ... Consequently, plaintiff's complaint is untimely and barred by 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely wage discrimination charge when unequal pay continues into the filing period, because each discriminatory paycheck is a separate violation.

Lees v. Case-Hoyt Corp. · filed 1991-12-23(e)

While each payment of a discrimi-natorily low paycheck is a separate and distinct violation of Title VII, all such payments are connected by the employer’s continuing policy and practice of paying an employee a lower wage because of their race or gender. ... As long as plaintiff can support an inference of wage discrimination during the limitation period her complaint is timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing rules did not bar a challenge to the allegedly discriminatory application of a facially neutral collective bargaining agreement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Elgin Teachers Ass'n · filed 1991-12-13(e)

Section 706(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), which establishes the time for filing charges, was recently amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166 (Nov. 21, 1991). ... In light of the foregoing statutory amendment, it is clear that EEOC’s suit is not time-barred.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge, measured from the final employment decision even if internal reconsideration follows.

Faulkner-King v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois · filed 1992-01-08(e)

(Illinois is a deferral state, so 300 days is the appropriate period.) ... Yet Ricks itself considered and rejected the possibility that a claim does not accrue until internal administrative processes have been exhausted. ... Just so here. There was nothing tentative about the one-year terminal contract. The decision could have been reconsidered, but it was a decision nonetheless.

Section 2000e-5(e) does not bar a claim based on a continuing discriminatory policy when related discrimination occurs within the EEOC filing period.

Myree v. Local 41, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers · filed 1992-03-06(e)

In this case, because the State Division is a so called deferral agency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (“§ 2000e-5(e)”) requires that the plaintiffs Title VII charge be filed with the EEOC within the earlier of 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or within 30 days from the date he received notice that the State Division terminated the proceedings. ... Each day the plaintiff continued in the trainee program while denied an opportunity to join Local 41 constituted the continuing act of the discrimination. ... As such, the plaintiffs claim is not barred by the limitations period contained in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits recovery for acts outside the filing period under a continuing-discrimination theory only when there is an inference of intentional discrimination within that period.

Bishena v. Marriott Corporation, a Corporation, and Host International, a Corporation · filed 1992-04-09(e)

The doctrine of continuing discrimination does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to recover for claims based on incidents outside of the actionable period unless the plaintiff has raised an inference of intentional discrimination occurring during the actionable period.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits Title VII claims to violations within an applicable period of no more than 300 days.

Benitez v. Portland General Electric · filed 1992-05-13(e)

To obtain relief, plaintiff must establish a violation of Title VII or ORS 659.030 within the limitations period applicable to each statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (establishing a Title VII limitation period of no more than 300 days); ORS 659.121(3) (establishing a one year limitation period for ORS 659.030). ... Nevertheless, I must evaluate plaintiff’s hostile environment claim based on the conditions maintained in defendant’s workplace during the applicable limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an administrative complaint within 180 days of a denied promotion to bring a Title VII claim based on that denial.

Y. Randolph v. City of Petersburg · filed 1992-05-26(e)

Although the district court did not address the earlier denials of promotion, all of which occurred prior to enactment of the ordinance which rendered Randolph unqualified by her nonresidency for a promotion in 1990, Randolph failed to file an administrative complaint within 180 days of those earlier denials as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). She is thus time barred from filing a Title VII claim based on those denials.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; an unexcused failure to meet that deadline bars a Title VII suit.

Winters v. Iowa State University · filed 1992-06-01(e)

On appeal, Winters does not dispute the district court's findings with respect to the limitations imposed by § 2000e-5(e), but rather argues the merits of his Title VII claim. His arguments are misplaced. His unexcused failure to comply with a condition precedent to suit bars his action under Title VII and any consideration of the merits of that action.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant in a deferral jurisdiction 300 days after an alleged discriminatory act to file an administrative charge.

Suarez v. PUERTO RICO ELEC. POWER AUTHORITY · filed 1992-06-29(e)(1)

Puerto Rico, being a deferral jurisdiction, requires that claimant file within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action. Failure to follow this procedure runs the statute of limitation, rendering the claim dead.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the plaintiff first files with a state or local agency; a disparate impact claim is timely if the last act under the challenged policy falls within that period.

58 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 1655, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,544 · filed 1992-06-01(e)

A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the violation or, where the plaintiff first files with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Gomes last suffered the impact of the eight year rule when the union denied his second grievance request in January of 1987, well within 300 days of the filing of his EEOC complaint in April of 1987. Accordingly, we conclude that Gomes' disparate impact claim is not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of a violation, or within 300 days if the plaintiff first files with a state or local employment agency.

Gomes v. Avco Corp. · filed 1992-06-01(e)

A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the violation or, where the plaintiff first files with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Gomes filed his complaints in April of 1987, more than 300 days after the 1985 incidents.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge-filing deadline is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling because it is not jurisdictional.

Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. · filed 1992-07-06(e)

As a general proposition, § 2000e-5(e) provides that an aggrieved person must make a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... The fundamental flaw in the Congregation’s thesis is its notion that Title VII’s filing requirements are jurisdictional. They are not.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on acts outside the statutory period unless they are related to a violation within that period.

Laffey v. Independent School Dist. No. 625 · filed 1992-07-28(e)

Plaintiffs claims of discrimination occurring prior to January 22, 1986, are barred as untimely under Title VII if unrelated to a violation occurring in the statutory period.

An EEOC charge challenging an ongoing discriminatory policy is timely as to applications of that policy within the preceding 180 days, even if the policy began earlier.

BEAVERS v. AMERICAN CAST IRON PIPE COMPANY · filed 1992-10-19(e)(1)

We hold, therefore, that the charge Beavers filed with the EEOC was timely as to any application of ACIPCO's allegedly discriminatory insurance benefits policy within the preceding 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period begins when the employee knows or has reason to know of the discrimination.

Luther Artis, Cross-Appellant v. Hitachi Zosen Clearing, Incorporated, Cross-Appellees · filed 1992-08-18(e)

Until he discovered the Title VII violation, Artis' cause of action did not accrue, and the limitations period simply did not start to run.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives employees 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a state with a discrimination agency; a continuing discriminatory policy may make earlier acts timely.

Wright v. ICI Americas Inc. · filed 1993-01-07(e)

Thus, Plaintiffs overall claim, including those otherwise untimely allegations, is one of a broad policy of discrimination and for purposes of a summary judgment motion should not be broken down into discrete acts of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) starts the 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge with the initial discriminatory decision; internal appeals do not restart it.

Lever v. Northwestern University · filed 1992-11-09(e)

But when the first decision is connected to and implies the second — when, in other words, a single discriminatory decision is taken, communicated, and later enforced despite pleas to relent — the time starts with the initial decision.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to file an EEOC discrimination charge within 180 days after being advised of an adverse employment action.

Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., Inc. · filed 1992-11-13(b)

Under Title VII, a claimant must file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days after the alleged discrimination occurs. § 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). This 180-day limitations period begins to run on the date an employee is advised of an adverse employment action. Welty v. S.F. & G., Inc., 605 F.Supp. 1548 (N.D.Ala.1985). In this case, the filing period began to run when Merritt Oil notified Andrews on July 27, 1990, of her discharge. The record shows that Andrews did not file a claim of discrimination with the EEOC until March 15, 1991, 231 days after her discharge. Her claim was thus untimely, and the trial court properly determined that Merritt Oil was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires Title VII claims to be filed with the EEOC within three hundred days of the alleged unlawful employment action.

Redd v. Fisher Controls · filed 1992-11-24(e)

Section 2000e-5(e), Title 42, United States Code, requires Title VII employment discrimination claims based on color and sex to be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within three hundred days of the alleged unlawful employment action. ... Regardless, Plaintiffs proffered evidence to rebut Defendant’s motion for summary judgment fails to create a material fact issue, and Plaintiff’s claims of age, sex, and race discrimination with regard to Defendant’s failure to promote Plaintiff and Defendant’s discharge of Plaintiff in October 1987 are, as a matter of law, barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).

When a person initially files a charge with a state agency, § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge by the earlier of 300 days after the unlawful practice or 30 days after notice that state proceedings ended.

Julia R.G. Coleman v. Mercy General of Sacramento · filed 1992-12-09(e)(1)

Finally, we conclude that Coleman's suit would be time barred even if her attempt to file with the DFEH amounted to the initiation of proceedings with a state agency. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), if a person initially filed a charge with a state agency, a charge may be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the unlawful employment practice, or within 30 days of receiving notice that the state proceedings have terminated, whichever is earlier.

A Title VII plaintiff must file a timely EEOC charge covering the claim brought in court, unless equitable tolling or estoppel excuses the delay.

Edmonston v. MGM Grand Air, Inc. · filed 1992-12-11(e)(1)

In sum, plaintiff raises no genuine issue of material fact preventing this court from finding that his failure to file a timely charge with the EEOC bars this action. Consequently, the statute of limitations defense applies, and summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII claim is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the discriminatory act; continuing effects of a past act do not restart that period, though equitable tolling may apply.

Issiah ROSS, Jr. v. BUCKEYE CELLULOSE CORPORATION · filed 1993-01-04(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII required that appellants file charges with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred" in order to sue Buckeye under the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Because appellants did not file charges of discrimination with the EEOC within the 180-day period and failed to establish grounds for equitable tolling, we hold that appellants' disparate impact claims challenging the P & P System at the Flint River Plant are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge after a claimant files with a state agency; a late charge bars the Title VII claim.

Phillips v. General Dynamics Corp. · filed 1993-01-19(e)

Under Title VII, if the plaintiff first files a charge with the state agency responsible for handling such claims, the charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful practice, or within 60 days after receipt by the plaintiff of notice of termination of the state proceedings, whichever is earlier. ... With April 19, 1989 as the date of the last allegedly unlawful act, under Title VII Plaintiffs charge with the EEOC needed to be filed on or before February 13, 1990. The effective date of the filing was March 23, 1990, therefore her Title VII claims are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a plaintiff to pursue earlier related harassment under a continuing violation theory when discriminatory acts occur within the 300-day charge-filing period.

Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters LoCal Union No. 600 of United Brotherhood of Carpenters · filed 1993-01-12(e)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations of individual incidents of harassment coupled with the distribution of calendars are sufficient to allow Plaintiff to proceed on a continuing violation theory. Thus, at trial, Plaintiff may introduce evidence concerning the remark made by Defendant Filyac on or before September 23, 1988 even though it is beyond the 300 day filing period because she has sufficiently alleged that discriminatory acts related to the prior act occurred within the 300 day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the local agency is a state deferral agency, but only 180 days when it is a notice agency.

Rivera v. Department of Justice · filed 1993-04-30(e)

In this case, which involves both government and non-government defendants, there were two filing deadlines: 180 days for suit against the Department of Justice and 300 days for suit against the individual defendants.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days when the claim is against a Puerto Rico government instrumentality that is not operating as a private business.

Silva v. Universidad De Puerto Rico · filed 1993-05-03(e)

Wherefore, this Court holds that pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 n. 5, the EEOC filing deadline for a sexual harassment claim against the UPR — an instrumentality of the Commonwealth — is 180 days.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to begin the administrative process within 300 days of the discriminatory act.

Sandler v. Marconi Circuit Technology Corp. · filed 1993-02-16(f)

Count IV alleging “Employment Discrimination” based upon religious and na-origin fails to specify under what statute it is brought, but it is clear that plaintiff has not and may no longer exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., because he has failed to commence the requisite administrative proceeding within 300 days of the discriminatory act — here, the April 2, 1991, discharge. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1988).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days, measured from when the claimant knows or reasonably should know of the discrimination.

Clark v. Sears Roebuck & Co. · filed 1993-03-29(e)

To maintain a cause of action under Title VII, in turn, a plaintiff must have filed a claim with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The limitations period for Section 1981 employment discrimination cases commences when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the discriminatory act has occurred. This is the same point from which the Title VII 180-day limitations period runs.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant 300 days to file a discrimination charge, and equitable estoppel can toll that period if the employer prevents timely filing.

Ramirez v. Chrysler Corporation · filed 1993-03-18(e)

By statute, Ramirez had only 300 days in which to file a charge of discrimination after the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Equitable estoppel can toll this limitations period. ... Therefore, Chrysler is not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations, and Ramirez' claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a plaintiff 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a state with an agency authorized to address employment discrimination.

Geneva Butts v. The City of New York Department of Housing Preservation and Development · filed 1993-03-24(e)

In states such as New York that have an agency with the authority to address charges of discriminatory employment practices, the statute of limitations for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is 300 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Two of the five promotion claims in Plaintiff’s complaint, and most of her claims of discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, allegedly occurred in 1987 and 1988. Since her EEOC charge was not filed until November 22, 1989, these claims are time-barred.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge; when the EEOC defers a charge to a state agency, it is treated as filed with the EEOC after 60 days or when state proceedings end, whichever occurs first.

McCanic v. City of Long Beach Marilou Newkirk · filed 1993-05-21(e)

Where the EEOC defers to a state agency, the complaint is not deemed filed with the EEOC until 60 days after deferral or the state proceedings terminate, whichever is earliest. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980). McCanic's complaint was not filed with the EEOC within the meaning of § 2000e-5(e) until at least March 8, 1988. Only discriminatory conduct occurring within 300 days of that date, or after May 13, 1987, would be actionable.

Section 2000e-5(e) treats a charge sent first to another agency as filed with the EEOC on the date the EEOC receives it.

NAACP Labor Committee v. Laborers' International Union · filed 1993-05-24(e)

However, the court will consider a charge filed at another agency and forwarded to the EEOC as filed with the EEOC as of the date of receipt by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge in a deferral state within 300 days of the discriminatory act; continuing effects of that act do not restart the period.

Blevins v. General Elec. Co. · filed 1993-06-01(e)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires a plaintiff to file a charge of discrimination in a "deferral state," such as Ohio, within three hundred (300) days of the time when the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... If plaintiffs believed that the use of the MATB to determine their eligibility for promotion was discriminatory, they should have filed a charge within three hundred days of their failure of the MATB. The filing of Title VII claims several years after that act was untimely.

Section 2000e-5 requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged employment practice and a federal suit within 90 days of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.

Edwards v. The Boeing Company International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers, Afl-Cio · filed 1993-06-18(e), (f)

Title VII claims are subject to the limitations periods set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) and (f). According to those provisions, charges of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged employment practice. A federal suit must be filed within 90 days of the issuance of a right-to-sue letter.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the employee receives notice of the layoff decision.

Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation · filed 1993-06-29(e)(1)

Defendant's layoff notice to Thompson on August 8, 1990, commenced the 300-day limitations period for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a deferral state; a continuing violation extends the filing period only if an independently actionable discriminatory act occurs within that period.

Kassaye v. Bryant College · filed 1993-08-03(e)(1)

Because the events of June 8, 1990 did not constitute an actionable violation of Title VII, there was no continuing violation extending into the 300-day limitations period. The district court correctly held that appellant’s EEOC charge was not timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a Title VII claimant to rely on acts outside the 300-day charge-filing period when they are part of a continuing pattern of discrimination that includes a timely act.

Belinda MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NANNIE AND THE NEWBORNS, INC.; Business Solutions, Inc.; Larry D. Gudgel, Defend · filed 1993-08-31(e)

Examining the plaintiffs allegations in light of the Berry factors, we conclude that the plaintiff has introduced sufficient facts to raise a triable issue on whether Gudgel and his companies engaged in a continuing course of discrimination such that the district court should consider the incidents that occurred prior to the 300 day time limitation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Clark v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1993-07-26(e)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must have filed a claim with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... Given Plaintiff’s above-mentioned sworn testimony on this issue and our prior rulings with respect to the application of the tolling doctrines in this case, we now must find that both of Plaintiffs civil rights claims are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely EEOC charge; continuing effects of an earlier employment decision do not restart the filing period.

Shelford v. New York State Teachers Retirement System · filed 1993-09-28(e)(1)

Since all of the plaintiffs named in the complaint were affected by the break-in-service rules upon their return to teaching in the mid-1970s and did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC until August 1992, plaintiffs’ claim may not be said to be timely.

For continuing Title VII violations, the 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins with the last act of discrimination.

Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting & Portable Local No. 101 · filed 1993-08-24(e)(1)

When Title VII violations are continuing in nature, the limitations period contained in § 2000e-5(e)(l) does not begin to run until the last occurrence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Fuentes v. City of New York Human Resources Administration · filed 1993-09-13(e)

The applicable limitations period with respect to Title VII requires that a charge be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the allegedly unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a plaintiff 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the state has an agency authorized to address employment discrimination charges.

McNeil v. Aguilos · filed 1993-09-16(e)

Since New York State has an agency authorized to address charges of discrimination in employment, the statute of limitations for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a deferral state; harassment alleged to continue into that period is not barred on that ground.

Watson v. Rally Manufacturing Corp. · filed 1993-09-29(e)

Because Florida has a state administrative agency dealing with issues of discrimination, it is considered a deferral state. Consequently, under Title VII, the time limit in Florida in which to file a discrimination charge after an allegedly unlawful practice or incident is 300 days. ... Since the actions allegedly continued into the 300-day period, Plaintiff Watson’s claims of verbal harassment would not properly be dismissed on these grounds.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows otherwise untimely discrimination claims when a timely EEOC charge concerns an incident furthering an ongoing discriminatory policy or mechanism.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-09-17(e)

Under the continuing violation exception to the Title VII limitations period, if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone. ... However, multiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation.

For continuing Title VII violations, the 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins with the last occurrence of discrimination.

Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers · filed 1993-11-17(e)(1)

When Title VII violations are continuing in nature, the limitations period contained in Sec. 2000e-5(e)(1) does not begin to run until the last occurrence of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a Title VII charge filed within the applicable 300-day period to proceed.

Brown v. Packaging Corp. of America, Inc. · filed 1993-12-20(e)

Because the statute of limitations for Ms. Brown’s charge began to run on April 21, 1993, and as discussed above Ms. Brown filed a charge with the EEOC on April 28, 1993, this Court finds that Ms. Brown satisfied the 300-day statutory filing requirement.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Edwards v. Norfolk Southern Corp. · filed 1994-01-10(e)(1)

Under both of these statutes, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or be dismissed as time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; 29 U.S.C. § 626; Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58, 101 S.Ct. 498, 503-04, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Therefore, the court can only consider claims for non-promotion 180 days before Edwards filed his charge with the EEOC — May 25, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a plaintiff who initially files with a state agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge; an alleged continuing practice can include earlier acts if at least one discriminatory act occurred within that period.

Dirksen v. City of Springfield · filed 1994-02-09(e)(1)

In order to maintain a Title VII action, a plaintiff who initially files a complaint with a state agency must file a complaint with the EEOC within 300-days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff successfully alleged that at least one discriminatory act occurred (the December 17, 1992 incident) within the 300-day period and this act was part of a continuing policy that includes other acts within the statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars Title VII claims based on discriminatory acts that occurred too long before the EEOC charge was filed.

Sunstrom v. Schering-Plough Corp. · filed 1994-02-16(e)

Any claim she has arising from this alleged July, 1989 conversation is also time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits otherwise untimely discrimination claims when they arise from an ongoing discriminatory policy and the employee timely files an EEOC charge about an act under that policy.

Lambert v. Genesee Hospital · filed 1993-11-24(e)

Under the continuing violation exception to the Title VII limitations period, if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone. ... Since plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of any such policy or mechanism here, the charge-person claims were properly dismissed as time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last day a continuing discriminatory policy was in effect, if the plaintiff experienced a discrete discriminatory act.

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers International Union · filed 1994-03-28(e)

Under the continuing violation theory, a charge of discrimination is timely filed as long as there is a discrete act against the plaintiff and he or she has filed an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last date that a discriminatory policy was in effect.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC charge deadline does not bar a Title VII claim when repeated discriminatory transfer denials constitute a continuing violation.

Bodiford v. State of Ala. · filed 1994-05-17(e)

The court finds that the facts, as alleged by the plaintiff, constitute a continuing violation so that the plaintiffs claims under Title I and II of the ADA and Title VII (Counts 1,2, and 6, respectively) are not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(c) allows a Title VII charge filed after 240 days to be timely if the state agency ends its proceedings or waives its exclusive jurisdiction before the 300-day deadline.

Morris v. State of Kan. Dept. of Revenue · filed 1994-03-15(c)

A filing beyond the 240 days still will be timely if the state or local agency actually terminates its investigation or its proceedings before the 300-day period expires. ... The late filing also will be timely if the state or local agency automatically terminates or waives its exclusive jurisdiction before the 300-day period expires.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination; new claims in a later charge do not relate back when they fall outside the scope of the earlier charge.

Price v. Public Service Co. of Colorado · filed 1994-04-26(e)

Because the August 6, 1992 E.E.O.C. charge adding claims of sexual harassment and unequal pay does not relate back to the February 10, 1992 E.E.O.C. charge, the relevant statutory time period extends back to 300 days before August 6, 1992; in other words, to October 8, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits recovery for earlier discriminatory acts when an act within the filing period is part of the same continuing violation.

Palmer v. Sharon Pratt Kelly, Mayor · filed 1994-03-18(e)

In order to recover based on a theory of continuing violations, a plaintiff must prove either a “series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the statutory period.” ... Thus, Palmer has proven a continuing violation and is entitled to the full remedy awarded by the trial court.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars untimely Title VII retaliation claims.

Grippi v. Consolidated Rail Corporation · filed 1994-03-28(e)

Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Grippi's claim of retaliation as to Conrail's 1988 employment hirings as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; an earlier pay decision is untimely when it has no continuing effect during that period.

Becky Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc. · filed 1994-05-18(e)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred” or be barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... But here Chambers was briefly promoted (without a pay increase) in 1983, and then demoted back to her previous position. The district court therefore correctly concluded that this allegedly discriminatory action had no continuing effect inside the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) applies a 300-day EEOC charge period to the retaliation claim before the court.

Kelley v. County of Ventura Personnel Department · filed 1994-07-06(e)

A retaliation charge under section 2000e-3(a) must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a claimant who files directly with the EEOC 180 days to file a charge; the 300-day period requires filing with a qualifying state or local agency.

Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co. · filed 1994-07-27(e)(1)

However, there is no indication that plaintiff utilized state avenues. Indeed, in the Complaint plaintiff pleads only that she filed a charge directly with the EEOC, and accordingly invokes the 180-day statute of limitations.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a continuing violation claim based on earlier discriminatory acts only if at least one related discriminatory act occurred within the filing period.

Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the University of California, University of California, Los Alamos Nati · filed 1994-07-11(e)

Thus, to establish a continuing violation, Dr. Mascheroni must allege that his employer engaged in a series of related discriminatory acts, at least one of which falls within the limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file a discrimination charge when the claimant initially files with a state or local agency authorized to grant or seek relief; otherwise the filing period is 180 days.

Vitug v. Multistate Tax Commission · filed 1994-07-27(e)(1)

That is, the “statutory prerequisite” for the extended filing period is that the complainant initially file his charge with a state agency “with authority to grant or seek relief from” an. unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). As discussed above, the IDHR lacked that authority in Vitug’s case. As a result, Vitug failed to meet the statutory prerequisite for the 300 day filing period, and was therefore required to file within 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely EEOC charge alleging a continuing pattern of discrimination to reach related acts outside the 300-day filing period.

Sunshine v. Long Island University · filed 1994-09-02(e)

Under the continuing violation doctrine, where there is a continuous pattern or policy of discrimination, and where the plaintiff has filed her charge no later than 300 days after the last discriminatory act by defendant, the plaintiff may recover for earlier acts of discrimination as well. ... Accordingly, under this arm of the continuing violation doctrine, plaintiffs EEOC charge is timely and her complaint not barred.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge, and a charge filed with a state agency acting as the EEOC’s agent counts as an EEOC filing.

Dircken v. State of Michigan, Department of Education, Vocational Rehabilitation · filed 1994-08-16(e)

In a deferral state such as Michigan, a charge of discriminatory conduct must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful act occurs. ... Dircken's filing of a charge of discrimination on May 25 with the MDCR accordingly constituted a simultaneous and timely filing with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing period treats each diminished paycheck as a new discriminatory act in a compensation discrimination claim.

Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Incorporated, Sharon D. Brinkley-Obu v. Hughes Training, Incorporated · filed 1994-09-26(e)

Under Title VII, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Our cases demonstrate, however, that in a compensation discrimination case, the issuance of each diminished paycheck constitutes a discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge against those alleged to have committed the unlawful conduct.

Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp. · filed 1994-09-28(e)

Title VII requires charges to be filed with the EEOC against those who committed the allegedly unlawful conduct.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s charge-filing period begins when the employee is notified of the allegedly discriminatory decision, even if the decision takes effect later.

Yoonessi v. State University of New York · filed 1994-08-26(e)(1)

The only alleged discrimination occurred — and the filing period began — at the time the decision to terminate was made by SUNY and communicated to plaintiff on August 30,1988. This is so even though the effect of that decision — the eventual loss of employment at the medical school — did not finally occur until March, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant first files with an authorized state or local agency.

Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman · filed 1994-11-07(e)

Therefore, since Oshiver filed a complaint with the PHRA, she had 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination in which to bring a charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant in a state with a discrimination agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge.

Brown v. City of New York · filed 1994-10-25(e)

Thus, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §' 2000e-5(e), any claims of discrimination that occurred prior to October 16, 1985 are time-barred. As Brown left his employment with the DOB in August 1985, any claims against the DOB are thus barred by the 300-day statute of limitations.

In a deferral state, § 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

66 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 981, 65 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,411 Jane Doe and Mr. Jane Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Compan · filed 1994-12-15(e)(1)

Even if the alleged activities of Mr. Stewart were sufficient to support a cause of action, we must conclude that the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action based on Stewart's conduct because her complaint was not timely. ... In a deferral state, such as Indiana, a charge must be filed within 300 days of the occurrence of the act that is the basis of the complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e)(2) treats an unlawful employment practice involving a seniority system as occurring when the system is applied and injures the employee.

Carter v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1994-12-16(e)(2)

Section 2000e-5(e)(2) defines in part that an “unlawful employment practice” occurs when “a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the seniority system or provision of the system.” Ms. Carter did not have the system applied to her until her termination from employment, because that was the first time she was eligible for benefits.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 300 days when that filing period applies.

Bremiller v. Cleveland Psychiatric Institute · filed 1995-01-12(e)

In a case such as this, plaintiff must file her claim within three hundred days. ... Plaintiff filed her EEOC complaint, timely, on December 1,1993.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits evidence of and recovery for an entire continuing violation when at least one violation occurred within the 300-day filing period.

West v. Philadelphia Electric Company · filed 1995-01-19(e)

Once the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support use of the continuing violation theory, however, the 300-day filing period becomes irrelevant — as long as at least one violation has occurred within that 300 days. Plaintiff may then offer evidence of, and recover for, the entire continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC filing period does not bar a hostile work environment claim when the alleged conditions continued into that period.

Quillen v. American Tobacco Co. · filed 1995-01-25(e)

Title VII requires a Plaintiff to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... In this case, it is clear that the plaintiffs allegations fall under the category of continuing violation and are therefore not time barred. ... Accordingly, the claims filed under Title VII for sexual harassment are found to be timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 180-day charge deadline does not require dismissal when repeated discriminatory acts may constitute a continuing violation extending into the filing period.

Lewis v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF ALABAMA STATE UNIV. · filed 1995-01-31(e)(1)

This court cannot say that Lewis could prove no set of faets consistent with her allegations which would amount to a continuing violation. Thus, this court is compelled to find that, despite Lewis’ failure to file with the EEOC sooner, her claim is not due to be dismissed for failure to comply with the 180 day rule.

A charge alleging a discriminatory refusal to reinstate can support an EEOC investigation and subpoena when the charge is not apparently untimely, even if an earlier suspension was not timely challenged.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NORFOLK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1995-01-26(e)(1)

Accordingly, the EEOC was authorized to investigate the charge that Norfolk discriminated against Powell because of his race in refusing to reinstate him immediately after the criminal charges were dismissed and the district court should have enforced the subpoena issued by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an Illinois complainant to file an EEOC complaint within 300 days of the alleged harassment.

Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corporation · filed 1995-02-06(e)

In Illinois, a complainant must file a complaint within three hundred days of the alleged harassment. ... Here, Posen’s conduct occurred more than three hundred days prior to Koelsch’s filing of her EEOC claim. Koelsch, therefore, is precluded from bringing a sexual harassment claim of a hostile work environment based solely on Posen’s pre-1991 behavior.

Section 2000e-5(e) extends the time to file an EEOC charge from 180 to 300 days when a charge is filed with a state agency; the state filing does not excuse an EEOC filing.

Bent v. Mount Sinai Medical Center · filed 1995-04-24(e)

... rather than excuse her from filing a charge with the EEOC, filing a charge with a state agency merely extends the time that a plaintiff has to file with the EEOC from one ... hundred and eighty to three hundred days.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge in New York to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the discriminatory act; an established continuing violation can extend that period.

Lloyd v. WABC-TV · filed 1995-03-30(e)

As a result, under either theory, Plaintiff has not established a continuing violation, and the 300 day statute of limitations applies. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is therefore appropriate with regard to the five incidents alleged to have occurred prior to December 27, 1991.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Walters v. Allstate Insurance Company · filed 1995-04-04(e)

Section 2000e-5(e) requires that a charge be filed "within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). In this case, plaintiff waited 327 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when a state agency handles employment discrimination complaints; the period begins when the claimant knew or should have known of the alleged discriminatory act.

Baba v. Warren Management Consultants, Inc. · filed 1995-04-13(e)(1)

Baba stopped performing work for WMC on January 19, 1990 and the alleged kissing incident took place on April 4, 1990; therefore, plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the alleged discriminatory act no later than April 1990, and the 300 day limitations period on her Title VII claims began to run at that point.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s charge-filing deadline does not require dismissal when a complaint supports a continuing-violation theory.

Shipbaugh v. Boys & Girls Clubs of America · filed 1995-04-25(e)(1)

In the present case, in order to hold that the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs claims, the court would have to find that the allegations in Shipbaugh’s Complaint would under no circumstances constitute a continuing violation. The court cannot make such a determination in this motion to dismiss.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s 300-day filing period does not bar a discrimination claim when timely examples support an alleged course of discriminatory conduct.

Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of New York & Vicinity · filed 1995-05-01(e)(1)

We agree with NY Holdings that if claimants base their discrimination claims solely on instances occurring outside the 300-day limitations period, or on instances substantiated solely by hearsay, the Administrator should have granted their Rule 56(c) motion. ... Claimants’ general allegations, supported by timely specific examples, allege sufficient facts from which a reasonable fact-finder could infer that claimants were the subject of discrimination during the statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely discrimination charge; separate denials of promotion do not form a continuing violation merely because the same promotion method was used.

Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania · filed 1995-05-04(e)

When the Civil Service Exam method was used again in 1987 and Clark was passed over for an interview a second time, she did file a complaint within the limitations period and that claim is properly before me now. Because Clark did not mark this as a continuing violation on her 1987 complaint, and because I independently find that this was not a continuing violation I will deny Clark’s motion to amend her complaint to assert a cause of action from 1985 onward as futile.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge where state and federal agencies have a worksharing agreement; a Title VII claim filed after that period is untimely.

Khair v. Campbell Soup Co. · filed 1995-07-03(e)

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims were filed with the EEOC on April 19, 1993, more than 300 days after the 1991 annual review was presented to the plaintiff on March 11, 1992. Since the statute of limitations has run on plaintiff’s ADEA and Title VII action, plaintiff can proceed only under the NJLAD and § 1981 on this claim.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory employment action to preserve a claim.

Ellert v. University of Texas, at Dallas · filed 1995-05-18(d)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) requires that in order to preserve a claim, a plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the allegedly discriminatory employment action. As Ellert failed to file her complaint until September 1991, any claim relating to the August 1989 incident, if it had any validity, has prescribed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) imposes a filing deadline for Title VII suits.

Kelly v. Adidas Usa, Incorporated · filed 1995-06-13(f)(1)

Appellant appeals from the district court's order dismissing Appellant's employment discrimination suit as time-barred under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) (West 1994), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 12117(a) (West Supp.1995). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion, and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a person who has instituted state agency proceedings to file an EEOC charge within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice.

James v. Prudential-Bache Securities Inc. · filed 1995-06-13(e)

Title VII requires that a person who has instituted proceedings with a state agency must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days after the unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in dismissing James' Title VII claim as untimely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act; waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling may excuse a late charge.

Humphreys v. Medical Towers, Ltd. · filed 1995-06-30(e)(1)

Humphreys did not file an EEOC charge within 300 days alter the incident, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Because Humphreys does not attempt to demonstrate facts supporting waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling, she may not now seek relief under Title VII for this incident.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge before a Title VII suit; the filing period may be tolled if the plaintiff proves a justification for delay.

Orsini v. East Detroit Public Schools · filed 1995-07-19(e)

While a district court may toll the filing period where a plaintiff alleges and proves ignorance of the law, lack of notice or some other justification, failure to timely file without proof of justification precludes a subsequent federal suit on those claims. ... Further, we find that if the district court had considered the issue, it would have dismissed the complaint on these grounds as Orsini has failed to establish a justification for tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC charge deadline is not tolled by equitable estoppel when the employer does not improperly prevent a timely filing.

Doctor Virginia Naples Kelecic v. Board of Regency Universities, a Body Politic Doing Business as Northern Illinois Univ · filed 1995-07-21(e)

The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply to Kelecic's claim because NIU's actions do not rise to the level of improper conduct. The facts do not support a tolling of the limitations period past the grant of tenure. As a result, Kelecic did not timely file her charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the touching incident.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant seeks relief through a state agency; a continuing hostile workplace claim is timely if the hostility extends into that period.

Webb v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation · filed 1995-06-13(e)(1)

Because Webb sought relief through a state agency, the relevant period here began 300 days prior to May 21, 1993, that is, July 26, 1992. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e)(1). Though many of the incidents of which she complains occurred before this date, Webb alleges several that are well within the filing period--e.g. Harris made the "swinging dicks" comment in October, 1992, called her "little Cathy" in November, 1992, and held her expense reports without cause in February, 1993. So long as Webb can show--with all of her evidence, even that outside the 300-day period--that she was subjected to a "hostile workplace" and that the hostility continued into the 300-day period, her EEOC charge is timely. We believe that she has, at least to the extent required to survive summary judgment.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice in a state with an agency authorized to address Title VII discrimination.

Ryan v. New York State Thruway Authority · filed 1995-06-28(e)(1)

In a state which, like New York, has an agency with authority to grant or seek relief with respect to discriminatory practices covered by Title VII, an aggrieved person must file with EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Section 2000e-5 treats a discharge with a deferred effective date as one discriminatory decision; refusing to undo that decision is not a new act of discrimination. The ADA incorporates this rule.

Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Illinois, and Steven Williams · filed 1995-06-20

But Ricks and cases in its wake hold that a discharge with a deferred effective date entails only one discriminatory decision. “An employer’s refusal to undo a discriminatory decision is not a fresh act of discrimination.” Lever, 979 F.2d at 556. Cases such as Ricks and Lever interpret 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but they apply directly (rather than by analogy) because the ADA incorporates the enforcement provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days in a state with a fair employment practice agency, but a continuing violation may include earlier acts that form an ongoing pattern of discrimination.

Lesko v. Clark Publisher Services · filed 1995-09-21(e)(1)

Title VII provides that in any state with a fair employment practice agency, such as PHRC, charges must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful conduct. ... Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the allegations identified above constitute a continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge deadline may permit claims involving earlier acts when those acts are part of a continuing violation.

Oswald v. Laroche Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1995-07-24(e)

Such a course of events does not evidence a “permanence” such that plaintiff should have been aware to assert his rights such that alleged acts of discrimination prior to February 20, 1993, are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; the 300-day period requires proceedings with a state referral agency.

Amos v. Esmor Texas Inc · filed 1995-08-29(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a complaining party must file a charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. In order to qualify for the 300-day period mentioned in the statute, the complaining party must institute proceedings with the state referral agency.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days when no state law claim triggers the 300-day deferral period.

Booth v. North Carolina Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources · filed 1995-09-19(e)(1)

Because plaintiffs Charge did not allege a state law claim, the deferral provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), and the 300-day time frame set forth in § 2000e-5(e)(l) did not apply. Thus, plaintiff was required to file her EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practices.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period does not apply when a charge alleges no state law claim; the claimant must file an EEOC charge within 180 days.

Booth v. NC DEPT. OF ENVIRONMENT, HLTH. & NAT. RES. · filed 1995-09-19(e)(1)

Because plaintiff's Charge did not allege a state law claim, the deferral provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), and the 300-day time frame set forth in § 2000e-5(e)(1) did not apply. Thus, plaintiff was required to file her EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practices.

A Title VII pay claim is timely when the employee receives an allegedly discriminatory paycheck within 300 days before filing an administrative charge.

Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Company, Robert Boyle David Nelson · filed 1995-09-19(e)(1)

Thus, Ashley’s Title VII pay claim is timely because she received allegedly discriminatory paychecks within 300 days prior to the filing of her administrative charge.

An ADA employment claimant must file a verified EEOC complaint within 180 days of termination.

Sager v. Wampler Longacre, Incorporated Leonard J. Dunahoo, Individually and in His Capacity as Human Resou · filed 1995-10-03(b), (e)(1)

As explained from the bench by the magistrate judge, Appellant failed to file a verified administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within the 180-day statutory deadline. 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000e-5(b), (e)(1) (West 1994). Defendants terminated his employment in July 1992; he filed a verified complaint with the EEOC on February 22, 1993. Therefore, his ADA claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5 permits an EEOC charge filed between 240 and 300 days after the alleged discrimination to be timely when a worksharing agreement terminates the state agency’s exclusive jurisdiction upon the EEOC’s receipt of the charge.

Humphrey v. Council of Jewish Federations · filed 1995-10-16(e)(1)

Because the NYSDHR-EEOC Worksharing Agreement effectively terminated NYSDHR’s jurisdiction upon the EEOC’s receipt of the charge, ... each of Humphrey’s charges were timely filed with the EEOC within the applicable 300 day period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day EEOC charge filing deadline does not bar a claim alleging a pattern of discrimination continuing to the present.

Velez v. City of New London · filed 1995-10-31(e)

Because plaintiff alleges a pattern of discrimination continuing to the present, the 300-day requirement is not applicable, and defendants’ motion to dismiss counts 3 and 14 is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days, subject to equitable tolling when warranted.

Zellars v. Liberty National Life Insurance · filed 1995-10-19(e)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory action of which he or she complains. ... A close look at the facts of this case reveals that Mr. Zellars’ disposition does not fall within any of the three categories enumerated above. ... Thus, the court will not consider Mr. Zellars’ Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but using an employer’s internal grievance process after notice of the EEOC filing requirement does not warrant tolling absent bad faith or deception.

Crossman v. Crosson · filed 1995-11-06(e)

Under these circumstances, and moreover, in the absence of any allegations of bad faith or deception on the part of the defendants in preventing the plaintiffs from timely exercising their federal rights under Title VII or the ADEA, the Court regards equitable tolling to be inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day EEOC charge period applies to ADA claims and begins when the adverse employment decision is communicated, even if the employee later learns it was a discharge rather than a suspension.

Washburn v. Sauer-Sundstrand, Inc. · filed 1995-11-01(e)(1)

If discrimination occurred, it occurred when Washburn was disciplined for his absenteeism. Under the discovery rule, therefore, it is immaterial whether the adverse employment decision of August 12, 1992, was communicated to Washburn in terms of discharge or indefinite suspension.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant first files with a state agency.

Miller v. CBC Companies · filed 1995-11-29(e)

As the EEOC charge was filed within the 300-day time limit,3 plaintiff's ADA claim is not time-barred to the extent it relates to her termination.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC charge-filing deadlines apply to ADA employment claims: 300 days when the claimant initially pursued state or local proceedings, and 180 days otherwise.

Layser v. Morrison · filed 1995-12-04(e)

Even if the alleged acts upon which Layser bases his ADA claim occurred after the ADA became effective, the claims would still be time barred because the acts took place more than 300 days before he filed a charge with the EEOC. ... Because Layser has failed to comply with the timing requirements of Title VII, I conclude his ADA claim is not properly before this Court.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period generally limits recovery to conduct within 300 days of an EEOC filing, but earlier acts may be admitted as background or to support a continuing violation theory.

Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-11-17(e)

The Title VII statutory limitations period, however, is not necessarily a bar to the admissibility of pre-statute acts. ... Time-barred claims can be used as “relevant background” or used to support a continuing violation theory.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires timely filing of discrimination charges; earlier conduct may be included under a continuing violation theory if unlawful conduct occurred within the filing period.

Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co. · filed 1995-11-29(e)

Ruffino has failed to provide specific facts within the appropriate limitations period sufficient to avoid summary judgment on her state and federal claims of sexual harassment. ... Title VII and Chapter 151B require that plaintiffs file charges of discrimination within a fairly narrow limitations period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), M.G.L. c. 151B, § 5. ... Particularly, under continuing violations theory, where a plaintiff alleges an ongoing course of discrimination, a charge may encompass unlawful conduct outside of the limitations period, as long as at least one incident of unlawful conduct occurred within the requisite period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge-filing period runs from the discriminatory act; later effects of that act do not restart it.

White v. Stackhouse, Inc. · filed 1995-12-20(e)

The limitations period runs from the point of the discriminatory act and not from the later continuing effects.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a charge based on a continuing violation when a related act occurs within 180 days of filing.

Fowler v. Sunrise Carpet Industries, Inc. · filed 1996-01-03(e)(1)

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs Kerr and Fowler did not file EEOC charges within 180 days after their initial exposure to Defendant Hankins’s harassing conduct. The issue to be decided, therefore, is whether Defendant Hankins’s conduct amounted to a continuing violation. ... Because these actions were part of a series of related actions taken by Defendant Han-kins, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Kerr’s and Plaintiff Fowler’s Title VII claims are not time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the claimant initially files with an authorized state agency; an advance waiver in a worksharing agreement can make that state filing effective for EEOC filing purposes.

Bergstrom v. UNH · filed 1996-01-09(e)(1)

The court is persuaded by the sound reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, the substantially similar reasoning of the other circuits that have addressed this issue, and the absence of any contrary decisions of the First Circuit. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff's claim was timely filed with the EEOC in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a charge filed with a state agency within 300 days to count as timely filed with the EEOC when a worksharing agreement makes the state agency the EEOC’s filing agent and waives the state agency’s exclusive processing period.

Bergstrom v. University of N.H. · filed 1996-01-09(e)(1)

The court is persuaded by the sound reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, the substantially similar reasoning of the other circuits that have addressed this issue, and the absence of any contrary decisions of the First Circuit. Accordingly, the court finds that the plaintiff’s claim was timely filed with the EEOC in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing deadline may be tolled until an employee knew or reasonably should have known facts supporting a discrimination charge.

Kidwell v. District of Columbia · filed 1996-01-11(e)

Applying this standard, we hold that while Kidwell knew from the 1990 date on which the instructor position was filled that a woman had been selected, only Smith’s later admissions placed him on reasonable notice of facts supporting a claim of sex discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action, or within 300 days if the claimant has already filed with a state or local equal employment agency.

KAREN VAN ZANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KLM ROYAL DUTCH AIRLINES; And Kenneth Hasan King, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1996-03-28(e)

Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment action or, if the claimant has already filed the charge with a state or local equal employment agency, within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action.

Section 2000e-5(e) time bars untimely claims based on discrete denials of a raise or promotion; a later discharge does not make those denials a continuing violation.

Weeks v. Coury · filed 1996-03-29(e)

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff contends his raise or promotion should have been given sooner, these claims are time barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); ... The alleged denials of pay raise and promotion were discrete acts separate from Plaintiff’s discharge, and therefore the facts presented by Plaintiff fail as a matter of law to establish a continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a complainant 300 days to file a discrimination charge with a state agency when its worksharing agreement treats the charge as filed with the EEOC.

Alvey v. Rayovac Corp. · filed 1996-04-04(e)

Therefore, in Wisconsin, a charge of discrimination actionable under federal law is timely if it is filed with the state Equal Rights Division within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a Title VII claimant who first files with a state or local agency 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act to file an EEOC charge.

Evans v. Technologies · filed 1996-04-05(e)(1)

Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. , provide a maximum of 300 days from the occurrence of an alleged discriminatory event for a claimant to file a timely charge with the EEOC, if she first instituted proceed- ings with a state or local agency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 26 U.S.C. § 26(d)(2), while Montgomery County law allows one year, Mont. Co., Md., Code § 27-7. Charges filed outside that time frame are barred, but a discriminatory allegation may still constitute relevant background evidence for valid claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an aggrieved person to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Nwosun v. General Mills · filed 1996-04-19(e)(1)

An aggrieved person must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... The district court correctly granted summary judgment.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) sets a 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge when state proceedings have begun, subject to a continuing-violation exception for acts under an ongoing discriminatory policy.

Amin v. Quad/Graphics, Inc. · filed 1996-06-03(e)(1)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. However’, when proceedings have also been instituted in a state agency, such as the New York Human Rights Commission, a charge must be filed within 300 days. ... This evidence suffices to create an issue of fact whether there existed a policy of discrimination within the scope of the exception to the Title VII limitations period. Accordingly, defendants’ motion on this ground must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged act when state law also prohibits the discrimination; continuing effects of a job reclassification do not extend that deadline.

Herrero v. St. Louis University Hosp. · filed 1996-04-26(e)(1)

Under Title VII and the ADEA, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC or the MCHR within 180 days after the occurrence of the last allegedly discriminatory act; this is extended to 300 days because Missouri law also prohibits such discrimination. ... The undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff's charges of discriminatory demotion under Title VII, the ADEA, and the MHRA are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a state with an equal employment opportunity enforcement agency; a continuing violation requires an incident within that period.

Edwards v. Nederland Independent School District · filed 1996-05-20(e)

For such states as Texas which have a state equal employment opportunity enforcement agency, Title VII allows 300 days for a complainant to file a charge with the EEOC. ... The Plaintiff has provided nothing in the way of permissible summary judgment evidence which shows that an incident occurred within the 300 days prior to the EEOC filing. Based on the current record, this Court finds that no continuing violation exists and the Plaintiffs claims for racial and sexual harassment are dismissed as time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission before a claimant may bring a Title VII employment discrimination claim.

Key v. Oakland Housing Authority · filed 1996-05-03(e)(1)

In order to bring an employment discrimination claim under Title VII, a claimant must first file a timely complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory act, extended to 300 days if the complainant first institutes state or local proceedings.

Roelen v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 1996-06-27(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII requires a complainant to file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last act of alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). If, however, a complainant initially institutes proceedings with a state or local agency, the time limit for filing with the EEOC is extended to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; later amendments can cure technical defects in a timely charge.

Clark v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. · filed 1996-06-24(e)(1)

Section 2000e-5(e)(l) states, “[A] charge [under Title VII] shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” ... The defects in the August letter were technical and were corrected through later action. As such, section 1601.12(b) requires that August 19, 1994, be considered the date Clark’s charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC. August 19 was within 180 days of the events of March 1994 that gave rise to this litigation. All acts prior to the March date are not barred as they could form the basis for a continuing violation. The Court finds that Clark’s EEOC charge of discrimination was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) gives a Title VII claimant in a state with a discrimination agency 300 days to file a charge after receiving notice of the challenged employment decision.

Campbell v. Grayline Air Shuttle, Inc. · filed 1996-07-02(e)(1)

The charge, filed 358 days later, was clearly filed after the statutory limitations period had expired and was therefore untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged incident to recover damages for it, subject to equitable exceptions.

Williams v. EI duPONT De NEMOURS & CO. · filed 1996-07-03(e)(1)

A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination within 300 days after the allegedly discriminatory incident in order to recover damages flowing from that incident. ... For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that neither exception asserted by Plaintiff applies, and therefore that Plaintiff may not recover under Title VII for any action or conduct occurring before April 2, 1992.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff who files with a state civil rights agency to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Detrick v. H & E MACHINERY, INC. · filed 1996-07-26(e)

Because Detriek filed her complaint with the DHR, she was required to file her EEOC complaint within 300 days of the alleged wrongful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) requires a timely administrative charge; separate denials of promotion years apart do not qualify as a continuing violation that extends the filing period.

Heilman v. American Family Mutual Insurance · filed 1996-07-05(e)(1)

Title VII mandates that a plaintiff file an administrative charge of discrimination “within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l). ... This Court finds that plaintiffs failure to timely file an administrative charge regarding the 1990 promotion entitles defendant to summary judgment on this part of Count I.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period runs from the last discriminatory act in a continuing hostile environment, allowing the entire course of conduct to be actionable.

Varner v. Natl. Super Markets · filed 1996-09-09(e)

A plaintiff is required to file a complaint under Title VII and the MHRA with the relevant enforcement agency within three hundred days of the discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.075, 213.111. ... We have found that evidence of a hostile environment falls under the "continuing violation" exception to a statute of limitations bar and that the limitations period runs from the "last occurrence of discrimination." Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Under this theory, the entire course of conduct creating the hostile environment suffered by Varner is actionable.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge within 300 days of discrimination; for a continuing hostile environment, the filing period runs from the last discriminatory act.

Varner v. National Super Markets · filed 1996-09-09(e)

A plaintiff is required to file a complaint under Title VII and the MHRA with the relevant enforcement agency within three hundred days of the discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 213.075, 213.111. ... We have found that evidence of a hostile environment falls under the "continuing violation" exception to a statute of limitations bar and that the limitations period runs from the "last occurrence of discrimination." Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 229 (8th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Under this theory, the entire course of conduct creating the hostile environment suffered by Varner is actionable.

The 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge may be equitably tolled until the employee has, or should have, facts supporting a discrimination claim.

Henderson v. AT & T CORP. · filed 1996-08-01(e)(1)

However, if, at the time of the adverse employment action, the employee did not have enough information to support filing a discrimination claim, the 300 day limitations period may be equitably tolled until the time the facts supporting a cause of action are or should be apparent to the employee.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)'s 300-day filing period permits earlier hostile-environment acts to be considered when they are substantially related to an independently actionable act within the filing period.

Hernandez v. Wangen · filed 1996-08-01(e)(1)

The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff’s untimely claims of a hostile environment do not have the degree of permanence that would require Plaintiff to file an E.E.O.C. complaint within 300 days of any of the alleged untimely acts.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) permits a claim based on a continuous pattern of discrimination when at least one act occurred within the 300-day filing period.

Scarborough v. Brown Group, Inc. · filed 1996-09-25(e)(1)

Thus, where there has been a continuous pattern of discriminatory acts, a Title VII claim is actionable in its entirety as long as at least one of the acts occurred within the limitations period.

In a deferral state, Section 2000e-5(e)(1) allows 300 days to file a discrimination charge, beginning when the employee receives clear notice of termination.

Madison v. St. Joseph Hosp. · filed 1996-08-28(e)(1)

Insofar as the plaintiff learned of her employer's decision to discharge her and received effective, clear, and unambiguous notice of the adverse employment action on July 2, 1993, the court herewith finds and rules that Madison's claims accrued on that date. Thus, the 300-day administrative filing clock commenced to run thereon, later expiring on April 28, 1994.

Section 2000e-5 sets the deadlines for filing a Title VII charge and for suing after an EEOC right to sue letter; the Equal Pay Act’s limitation period does not govern Title VII pay discrimination claims.

Holt v. Kmi-Continental, Inc. · filed 1996-09-04(e), (f)(1)

Title VII has its own statutorily prescribed time limitations. Title VII requires a claimant to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful discrimination, or if the claimant initially filed a complaint with a state or local agency, within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory conduct, or within thirty days of receiving notice that the state or local agency has terminated the proceedings, whichever is earlier. ... Once a claimant has received a right to sue letter from the EEOC, suit must be filed within ninety days. ... Plaintiffs claims are timely under these rules since she made a timely complaint to the EEOC and then filed suit within ninety days of receiving her right to sue letter. We know of no precedent that indicates that the Equal Pay Act’s statute of limitations applies to Title VII claims of sex-based pay discrimination.

A claimant who initially proceeds before the MCAD has 300 days to file a complaint with the EEOC.

Forsythe v. Microtouch Systems, Inc. · filed 1996-09-27(e)(1)

If a claimant initially proceeds before the MCAD, she has 300 days to file a complaint with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Appel v. Reser's Fine Foods, Inc. · filed 1996-09-13(e)

This court finds that the facts in this record support only the conclusion that Appel was an employee of Reser’s through July 8, 1994 and was an independent contractor thereafter. The complaint filed on May 9, 1995 with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries and the EEOC was not filed within 300 days of the day that Appel was last employed by Reser’s and was therefore not timely filed. The motion of the defendants for summary judgment is granted as to Appel’s claim under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day EEOC charge filing period is not tolled by a general allegation of ongoing discrimination based on discrete failures to promote.

Choi v. Chemical Bank · filed 1996-09-30(e)

Accordingly, the continuing violation exception does not apply on these facts to toll the 300-day filing limitation.