42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within ninety days of the alleged unlawful employment practice to recover damages or reinstatement.

Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company · filed 1967-09-12(d)

Employees who do not file charges with the EEOC within ninety days after the occurrence of an alleged discriminatory employment practice are barred by the Act from recovering damages or reinstatement.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge against an employer within ninety days of the alleged discriminatory incident before suing that employer.

Vogler v. McCarty, Inc. · filed 1968-01-31(d)

The complaint of Paul Vogler, Jr. against McCarty, Inc. and Branton Insulations, Inc. must be dismissed on the ground that he did not file a charge against those defendants with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within the ninety day period following the alleged discriminatory incident described in the complaint as required by Section 706(a) and (d) of Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000e-5).

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; the verification rule in this decision is otherwise unchanged.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 90-day filing rule is satisfied when a timely unsworn EEOC charge is later amended with a sworn charge.

Roberson v. Great American Insurance · filed 1969-03-31(d)

The court treated the sworn charge as an allowable amendment to the initial unsworn complaint, which had been filed within the proper time. ... The logic of this holding is compelling and we find it controlling in the instant action to permit plaintiff’s suit, as in substantial compliance with the statute’s 90-day rule.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 90-day limit does not bar a charge alleging a continuing practice of discrimination.

Motorola, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1968-06-10(d)

Petitioner also contends that the demand is not based on a valid Commissioner’s Charge under § 706(d) of the Act because it is made 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. We find no merit in this contention. The practice of discrimination, if it exists, is by its nature, a continuing violation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 90-day charge-filing period runs from a completed employment action; failure to rectify that action does not make it a continuing violation.

Hutchings v. U. S. Industries, Inc. · filed 1969-04-09(e)

The Court is of the view, however, that the discontinuance of the job assignment on October 3, 1966, was not continuing but was a completed act when effected. There is no known authority to the effect that a failure to rectify an alleged unlawful act converts it into a continuing transaction or suspends the 90 day period. Accordingly, I conclude that Plaintiff is barred from seeking relief as to the October 3, 1966 occurrence because of his failure to file a charge with the EEOC within the statutory 90 day period.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an EEOC charge about a discriminatory transfer to be filed within ninety days after the transfer, even if the alleged discrimination continues.

Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe and Foundry Company · filed 1969-07-28(d)

The Court finds, however, that once the transfer is made, regardless of what precipitated same, it becomes final, and it appears to the Court that the dictates of § 2000e-5(d) require that an aggrieved party file his complaint as to that particular incident with the EEOC within ninety days after the alleged unlawful practice.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the outer EEOC charge-filing limit after state or local proceedings from 210 to 300 days; the separate 30-day period after state notice remains in current subsection (e)(1).

Section 2000e-5(d)'s 210-day filing limit is tolled when a person files an EEOC charge during the state's 60-day period to act on the complaint.

Vigil v. American Telephone & Telegraph Company · filed 1969-10-23(d)

We hold that the filing of a charge with EEOC during the 60 day period in which the state agency has exclusive jurisdiction to act is effective to toll the running of the 210 day time limit of Section 2000e-5 (d); that under the facts presented it was not a jurisdictional necessity for plaintiff to also refrain from filing with the State Commission for a full 60 days.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d), as applied by the court, required an EEOC charge following state agency procedures to cover practices occurring within 210 days before the charge was filed.

Nishiyama v. North American Rockwell Corp. · filed 1970-03-18(d)

The allegations in the Complaint are not restricted to alleged unlawful employment practices occurring within 210 days prior to the filing of the charge with the EEOC as required by Section 706(d) of the Act. Thus the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of the Complaint and the Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b) (1).

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d)'s 90-day filing deadline can be met by an unsworn letter that identifies the parties and describes the challenged practice; a later sworn charge may be treated as an amendment.

Moss v. Lane Co. · filed 1970-03-24(d)

The question which must be determined is whether the letter of August 20, 1966, is sufficient to comply with the 90 day time period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). This court holds that it does. ... Although the letter was not sworn to, it was sufficiently precise to identify the parties and did describe the practice complained of. Therefore, the charge is deemed filed as of August 20, 1966, and the charge properly sworn to filed November 30, 1966, will be treated as an amendment.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the outer EEOC charge-filing limit after state or local proceedings from 210 to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires a federal commission charge within 210 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice when the claimant follows procedures for a state with a local employment discrimination law.

Marquez v. Omaha District Sales Office · filed 1970-06-17(d)

The second jurisdictional question relates to the requirement of 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e-5 [d] that persons following the procedures outlined in subsection [b] [procedures to be followed in states where local law has prohibitions against unlawful employment practices, as is the case in Nebraska] must file a charge with the federal commission within 210 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Previously by way of a motion to dismiss, the question of the effective filing date of the charge was deemed to be May 1, 1967. Any act of discrimination claimed by the plaintiff must have occurred no earlier than 210 days preceding May 1, 1967.

Law changed since International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (Dec. 20, 1976), rejected tolling the EEOC charge period during contractual grievance proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is tolled when an employee invokes contractual grievance remedies to seek a private settlement.

Willie A. HUTCHINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1970-06-19(d)

The statute of limitations question presented on this appeal is controlled by our recent decision in Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Company, 5 Cir., 1970, 421 F.2d 888, in which we held that the statute is tolled “once an employee invokes his contractual grievance remedies in a constructive effort to seek a ‘private settlement of his complaint.’ ”

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) replaced the former 30-day period to sue after EEOC notice with 90 days under current subsection (f)(1).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires suit within thirty days after receipt of EEOC notification, and a letter conveying that voluntary compliance was not secured can satisfy the notice requirement.

Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation · filed 1970-11-06(e)

The only time requirement for the filing of suit in federal court is the thirty-day period following receipt of notification from the EEOC required by § 706(e). ... That letter plainly states that the EEOC had not achieved voluntary compliance within sixty days and thus conveyed the information called for by § 706(e). When read in light of the May 27, 1966, letter requesting § 706(e) notification, the June 9 letter plainly satisfies the terms of that section.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an EEOC charge within ninety days of the alleged discriminatory act; later retirement payments do not extend that deadline when the act is not continuing.

McCarty v. Boeing Co. · filed 1970-11-20(d)

For jurisdiction to exist, there must have been compliance with the statutory prerequisites of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, one of which is that plaintiffs must have filed their charge of unlawful employment practices with the Equal Economic Opportunity Commission (herein EEOC) within ninety days after the alleged discriminatory acts occurred. ... The Court is of the opinion that such acts were not continuing in nature and plaintiffs’ charge with the EEOC was not timely filed.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 90-day charge-filing period does not bar claims alleging continuous discrimination merely because the complaint identifies specific earlier acts.

Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp. · filed 1971-05-18(d)

The defendant is also mistaken in its contention that the charges of the plaintiffs, other than the charge of illegal discrimination acts in the company lay-off commencing October 1, 1969, were untimely within the contemplation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). The complaint claims that these violations alleged were constant and continuous, although several specific acts are set forth as illustrative of the pattern. Thus, the 90-day period for filing the charge does not bar this action.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 90-day deadline is satisfied when an EEOC charge is filed while a pattern of unlawful employment practices continues or within 90 days after it ends.

Jamison v. Olga Coal Company · filed 1971-12-14(d)

At the same time, however, the courts have recognized that unlawful employment practices under the Act may involve a pattern of conduct extending over a period of time, a “continuing” violation rather than a single incident, and in such cases the 90-day requirement is satisfied if the charge is filed with the EEOC while such conduct or pattern of conduct continues or within 90 days after it ceases. ... Under such circumstances, defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to satisfy the 90-day requirement, therefore, must be denied.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 90-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge does not apply when the alleged unlawful employment practice is continuous.

Mixson v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1971-12-01(d)

Again, and more pertinent for present purposes, if the alleged unlawful employment practice is continuous in nature, the 90-day limitations period for filing with the EEOC does not apply since there is no single date after which the period might begin to run.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the outer EEOC charge-filing limit after state or local proceedings from 210 to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(d) permits evidence of earlier discriminatory acts when the alleged discrimination continued into the 210-day filing period.

Tooles v. Kellogg Company · filed 1972-01-11(d)

This Court adopts what it finds as the better view that where the discrimination has been of a continuing nature as herein alleged, evidence of prior acts against plaintiff must be allowed to show the continuing pattern of discrimination which has occurred and continued to occur within the 210 day limit preceding the date the complaint was brought.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d) allows a complainant in a state with a qualifying agency to file with the EEOC within 210 days of the alleged discrimination, or 30 days after notice that state proceedings ended, whichever is earlier, whether the charge was first delivered to the state agency or the EEOC.

Ugiansky v. Flynn and Emrich Company · filed 1972-02-05(d)

As long as the state commission has been afforded the first opportunity to act on the complaint, there is a period of 210 days after the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice (or 30 days after notice of the termination of the state commission proceedings, whichever period expires earlier) within which the complaint may be filed with the EEOC.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When the EEOC refers a charge to a state agency, the charge is filed with the EEOC when the state proceedings terminate, and only discriminatory acts within the preceding 210 days are timely.

Richard v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation · filed 1972-02-15(d)

Thus, the Court concludes that plaintiff's charges were "filed" with the EEOC when the proceedings with the Missouri Commission terminated. Only discriminatory acts alleged to have occurred within 210 days preceding that date were properly filed with the EEOC.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d)'s filing deadline is satisfied when a charge reaches the EEOC during the state agency's sixty-day period, even though the EEOC must wait to investigate.

Vigil v. American Telephone · filed 1972-02-18(d)

Certainly the clear import of the decision of the Supreme Court in Love is that the filing with the EEOC of a complaint within the sixty-day period, when the state agency has exclusive jurisdiction to act, does serve to meet the jurisdictional requirement of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(d) that the complaint be filed with the EEOC within two hundred and ten days from the date of the unfair employment complained of, even though the EEOC may not proceed with its investigation until the state agency has had the complaint for sixty days.

Law changed since International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (Dec. 20, 1976), rejected tolling the EEOC charge period during contractual grievance proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s charge-filing period is tolled while an employee pursues promptly initiated contractual grievance procedures and begins to run when those procedures end.

Moore v. Sunbeam Corp. · filed 1972-03-10(d)

Under this reasoning, although the incident actually “occurred” on October 24, 1966, for limitations purposes the “occurrence” was not completed until Moore exhausted his promptly initiated contractual remedies. We therefore hold that, with respect to the October 24, 1966, incident, the statute began to run on February 16, 1967.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d)'s 90-day filing period begins anew when a separate allegedly unlawful employment practice occurs.

MOLYBDENUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Respondent-Appellant · filed 1972-03-29(d)

Rather, we are dealing with two separate and distinct acts, the latter of which occurred within the 90-day period. Without expressing any view whatsoever on the issue of discrimination, we simply hold that the 90-day statutory period commenced to run anew from the last allegedly unlawful employment practice.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5’s ninety-day charge deadline may be satisfied by a continuing discriminatory labor practice; compliance may require a factual determination rather than dismissal on the pleadings.

4 Fair empl.prac.cas. 590, 4 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 7751 Herbert Belt v. Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. · filed 1972-04-04(d)

We cannot agree with the district court that a discriminatory labor practice may not be a continuing act. ... In any event, even if appellants’ allegations of an oral request for promotion failed to state a continuing course of discrimination, a de novo determination of compliance with the ninety day requirement would better effectuate the purposes of the Act than would a Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal on the pleadings.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the version at issue, § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within 90 days, and a factual dispute over when the applicant learned of the hiring decision precluded dismissal as untimely.

Henderson v. First National Bank of Montgomery · filed 1972-05-29(d)

A key question in this motion to dismiss is whether plaintiff tolled the 90-day time limit within which 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) prescribes that a charge must be filed with the EEOC. ... Since factual disputes are to be resolved in favor of the plaintiff upon a motion to dismiss, the Court for the present accepts plaintiff’s rendition of the facts and finds that this ground of the motion to dismiss is due to be denied.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d) sets a 90-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge, extendable to 210 days for state proceedings, but does not allow further tolling for the same state-agency consideration.

Moore v. Sunbeam Corp. · filed 1972-06-27(d)

In our view the statute provides a basic limitations period of 90 days, which may be extended (or "tolled") to a maximum of 210 days. We do not think that Congress intended a further extension (or a second "tolling") to achieve the same purpose (time for state consideration) as the original enlargement of the 90-day period to 210 days in those states which have a Fair Employment Practices Agency.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(d)'s 90-day charge-filing requirement permits substantial compliance when a charge is seven days late and the employer suffers no prejudice.

Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation · filed 1972-08-23(d)

Since plaintiff Loughrey’s charge before the Commission was adequate and proper in every respect except that it was filed seven days late, this court holds that there has been substantial compliance with the statutory requirements, and the court has jurisdiction to consider the claim of plaintiff Loughrey along with those of the other two plaintiffs.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the 210-day state-proceedings limit to 300 days; International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (Dec. 20, 1976), later rejected tolling during contractual grievances.

Section 706(d)’s 210-day EEOC filing period is tolled while a contractual grievance is processed and begins to run when arbitration ends.

Phillips v. Columbia Gas of West Virginia, Inc. · filed 1972-09-12(d)

Therefore, the 210-day limitation period began to run on May 29, 1970, the day the arbitrators handed down their final decision. This terminated the formal grievance procedures available under the collective bargaining agreement between Columbia and the defendant unions and plaintiff would be required under the Act to file his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 210 days of that date. Having failed to file charges within this 210-day period, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was without jurisdiction to process plaintiff’s claim.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the outer EEOC charge-filing limit after state or local proceedings from 210 to 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 210-day EEOC charge deadline bars a class member’s federal Title VII claim if the member could not have filed a timely charge.

Hecht v. Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. · filed 1972-11-16(d)

Thus, on an individual basis, if a charge is barred before the EEOC by the 210 day statute of limitations, it is equally barred as the basis of a judicial action, and the period of limitations for administrative proceedings prevents federal suits as effectively as would a statute of limitations specifically applicable to them.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the 1964 version of § 2000e-5(d), the EEOC’s initial receipt of a charge tolls the 210-day filing period while required state proceedings take place.

Mary RICHARD, Appellant, v. McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1972-12-04(d)

We conclude, therefore, that the 210 day statute of limitations was tolled upon receipt of appellant’s complaint by the EEOC on March 22, 1971, and that dismissal based upon this complaint was improper.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Where state or local enforcement proceedings are available, § 2000e-5(d) requires a timely EEOC charge and bars claims based on conduct outside its 210-day filing period.

Rouse v. Gulf Oil Corporation · filed 1972-10-13(d)

Because the two hundred and ten day period had long expired by the time the charge was filed, this alternative motion will be granted.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Before the 1972 amendments, § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Tuma v. American Can Company · filed 1973-04-26(d)

Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Section 706(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)(1970), required that charges be filed before the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... In view of this fact, these charges cannot be considered continuing on September 16, 1971, and therefore will be barred by the 90-day filing provision.

Law changed since Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (June 3, 2019), held the charge-filing requirement mandatory but nonjurisdictional and subject to forfeiture if raised too late.

Timely filing of an EEOC charge is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit; an isolated act does not extend the filing period as a continuing violation.

Gordon v. Baker Protective Services, Inc. · filed 1973-05-18(e)

It is well settled that the statutory period of time for filing a complaint with the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any subsequent action.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an employment discrimination claim to be filed within ninety days.

6 Fair empl.prac.cas. 891, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8961 Paul B. Revere, Sr. v. Tidewater Telephone Company · filed 1973-10-02(d)

The district court, without reaching the merits, dismissed the Title VII claim on the ground that Revere had not filed his employment discrimination claim within the ninety-day time limit prescribed by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(d); ... Our examination of the record and the opinion of the district judge discloses no error. Accordingly, the decision below is affirmed.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; the continuing-violation principle remains.

Section 2000e-5(d) does not bar continuing Title VII violations that persisted into the 90 days before an EEOC charge was filed.

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1973-11-12(d)

Each of the above enumerated Title VII violations are continuing violation, and each continued during the 90 day period preceding the filing of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and therefore, none is barred by the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).

Law changed since EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (May 16, 1988), held that an untimely state filing does not forfeit the 300-day federal period.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day EEOC filing period only when the state filing is timely under state law; otherwise the 180-day period applies.

Olson v. REMBRANDT PRINTING COMPANY · filed 1974-04-12(e)

This Court finds that since the EEOC's filing with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the plaintiff was not timely under Missouri law (RSMo 296.040 V.A.M.S.) it did not have the effect of bringing the plaintiff within the 300 day requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), but left the plaintiff within the 180-day requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) which the plaintiff failed to meet.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; this case applied the former 210-day period.

Section 2000e-5(d)’s 210-day filing period is tolled when the EEOC receives the complainant’s complaint.

Hardison v. Trans World Airlines · filed 1974-05-15(d)

Accordingly, in this case plaintiff’s complaint of August 29, 1969, tolled the 210-day statute of limitations so that even if we assume that the E.E.O.C. assumed jurisdiction of plaintiff’s case on November 18, 1969, the latest arguable date, plaintiff perfected his federal remedy well within the proper time. We find and conclude, therefore, that we do have jurisdiction of this case under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d).

Law changed since International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (Dec. 20, 1976), held that pursuing a contractual grievance does not toll the EEOC charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing period is tolled while an employee pursues a collective bargaining grievance.

Elfego R. SANCHEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1974-06-21(e)

However, appellant was pursuing his rights during this period under a collective bargaining grievance procedure and where this is the situation most authorities hold that the limitation is' tolled. ... The holdings of the cited cases to the effect that the statute is tolled are in tune with the construction given by the Supreme Court and other federal courts to this kind of a provision. ... The cause must, therefore, be remanded to the trial court for determination and findings on this issue.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) extended the EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; the continuing-violation principle remains.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing period is tolled when an unlawful practice has a present and recurring effect on the person bringing the charge.

American Finance System Inc. v. Harlow · filed 1974-10-17(e)

From these decisions, it appears that isolated acts of discrimination and continuing patterns of bias only toll the ninety day limitations period of 42 U.S. C. § 2000e-5(e) where the unlawful practices have a present and recurring effect on the plaintiff-class representative.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) replaced the prior 30-day private-suit and 210-day deferred-charge periods with 90-day private-suit and 300-day deferred-charge periods.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII complaint to allege facts establishing that it was filed within the applicable period or that the discrimination continued into that period.

Grohal v. STAUFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC. · filed 1974-11-01

Defendant points out correctly that, although plaintiff’s complaint must, according to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, be filed within 30 days after a rejection by the FEPC or 210 days after the last alleged act of discrimination, the only alleged act falling within that time period is plaintiff’s termination. ... Therefore, the Court will grant defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it fails to allege necessary jurisdictional facts and will grant defendant’s motion for a more definite statement.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period after state or local proceedings from 210 to 300 days.

Section 706(d) required an EEOC charge within 210 days of the alleged unfair practice when the claimant had first filed with a state agency.

Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1975-01-23(d)

We agree with Liberty Mutual that such individuals should have been excluded. At the time charges were filed with the EEOC, section 706(d) provided that where, as here, a charging party had instituted proceedings with a state agency which has jurisdiction over discriminatory employment practices, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 210 days of the occurrence of the alleged unfair practice.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after state or local proceedings.

Section 2000e-5(e) required an EEOC charge within 90 days of the unlawful practice before a Title VII suit could proceed, absent extenuating circumstances or a formal contractual grievance procedure.

Dudley v. Textron, Inc., Burkart-Randall Division · filed 1975-01-27(e)

Thus, the eases interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 hold that unless there are “extenuating circumstances,” or a “formal” contractual grievance procedure, a complaint of an unlawful employment practice must be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of the unlawful practice. Plaintiff failed to comply with this requirement, and the Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s action based upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is Granted.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) replaced the former 30-day period for a private suit after EEOC notice with 90 days.

A second EEOC right-to-sue letter cannot restart the 30-day filing period under the then-applicable version of subsection (e).

Donald R. CLEVELAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY, AKA McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, a Corporation, · filed 1975-01-29(e)

The EEOC had no statutory authority to issue such a letter and therefore the 30-day period must be deemed to run from the issuance of the first letter.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after state or local proceedings; Fort Bend County v. Davis (2019) later held the charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional.

Under the version of § 2000e-5(d) applicable to Stewart’s claim, an EEOC charge had to be filed within ninety days, and an untimely charge deprived the court of Title VII jurisdiction.

Stewart v. Marquette Tool & Die Co. · filed 1975-03-31(d)

The first EEOC charge of employment discrimination was filed by Stewart on July 15, 1971, more than ninety days after the alleged discrimination. At the time Stewart’s claim arose Title VII required filing within ninety days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1971). Failure to file a timely charge deprives this Court of jurisdiction.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after state or local proceedings.

As then written, § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within 90 days of the alleged unlawful act; its continuing effects did not restart the filing period.

Doris R. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED AIR LINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-04-16(d)

Under the statute, it is the alleged unlawful act or practice — not merely its effects — which must have occurred within the 90 days preceding the filing of charges before the EEOC.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Before the 1972 amendments, § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within ninety days; people whose claims were already time barred could not join a Title VII class.

Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp. · filed 1975-07-16(d)

Applying the teaching of Wetzel, we shall exclude from the class to be determined pursuant to Title VII those persons who could not have filed charges with the EEOC on July 7, 1971, the date on which Jones filed his charge. Since the applicable limitations period prior to the 1972 amendments was ninety days, ... we shall exclude those persons who unsuccessfully applied for employment at, or who' left the employment of UGI, more than 90 days prior to July 7, 1971, that is, prior to April 8,1971.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the former ninety-day filing rule, a former employee had to file an EEOC charge within ninety days of termination; the continuing-discrimination theory did not extend that period after employment ended.

11 Fair empl.prac.cas. 628, 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,355 · filed 1975-07-21(d)

If they believed that their termination was the result of unlawful discriminatory practices, then a charge was required to be filed within ninety days of that termination. Although the plaintiffs contend that the ninety-day limitation period is no bar because the discrimination is continuing in nature, that is not the case once employment has ended.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the then-applicable § 2000e-5(d), a former employee had ninety days after termination to file an EEOC charge; continuing discrimination did not extend that period after employment ended.

Terry v. Bridgeport Brass Co. · filed 1975-07-21(d)

If they believed that their termination was the result of unlawful discriminatory practices, then a charge was required to be filed within ninety days of that termination. Although the plaintiffs contend that the ninety-day limitation period is no bar because the discrimination is continuing in nature, that is not the case once employment has ended.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under former § 2000e-5(d), the ninety-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the facts supporting a discrimination charge are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated to the claimant.

Mrs. Roger McMillan REEB, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ATLANTA, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-08-04(d)

We hold that the ninety day period did not begin to run in the present case until the facts that would support a charge of discrimination under Title VII were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A continuing discriminatory promotion system can be challenged under Section 2000e-5(e) even if no promotion opening arose during the 90 days before the EEOC charge was filed.

Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1975-08-01(e)

Plaintiffs here challenge the entire promotion system maintaining that it continually operated so as to hold them in lower echelons. Hence, the 90 day period prior to the filing of the EEOC charges looms inconsequential in this kind of ease.

Law changed since International Union of Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1976) held that pursuing a contractual grievance does not toll the EEOC charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC charge deadline can be tolled while an employee pursues a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement.

Bush v. Wood Brothers Transfer, Inc. · filed 1975-08-11(f)(1)

Therefore, it is the opinion of this Court that Alexander and Culpepper apply to Plaintiff’s Title VII action, that Johnson does not apply, that the Title VII action is timely, and that Defendants’ Motions For Summary Judgment on this issue should also be denied.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after state or local proceedings.

The pre-1972 version of § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Cora Lee EAST, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROMINE, INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1975-09-02(d)

But the guiding statute at the time, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d), mandated: “A charge under subsection (a) of this section shall be filed within ninety days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . ” ... The filing here was not until long after any alleged June 1967 act took place.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the 1964 version of § 2000e-5(d), a Title VII charge had to be filed with the EEOC within 90 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Marshall v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co. · filed 1975-09-08(d)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as in effect in 1969, required as a jurisdictional prerequisite for admittance into a federal district court that a charge be filed with the EEOC within 90 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964).

Law changed since Fort Bend County v. Davis (2019) held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional limit.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; failure to meet that deadline bars the court from considering the Title VII claim.

Beasley v. Motor Freight Express, Inc. · filed 1975-09-23(e)

The record reflects that the alleged discrimination ceased on 13 December 1971 and that plaintiff filed his charge with the EEOC on 11 April 1973 which is well beyond the 180 day filing period mandated by Section 2000e-5(e). Failure to file within the prescribed period is a jurisdictional deficiency hence the Court cannot consider the merits of plaintiff’s charge under Title VII.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 (1972) extended the EEOC charge period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after state or local proceedings.

Former § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within ninety days of a discriminatory act as a jurisdictional prerequisite, unless the discrimination was continuing.

Tippett v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company · filed 1975-10-17(d)

Since the plaintiffs have not met the jurisdictional prerequisite of having filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within ninety days of an act of discrimination, and there being no continuing discrimination, the Court lacks jurisdiction over this cause of action and it must be dismissed.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the former subsection (d), filing a grievance under a collective bargaining agreement does not toll the 90-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge.

Guy v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. · filed 1975-10-24(d)

Guy would have us add another exception to the Act to toll the limitations’ period of 90 days when the grievant resorts to a contractual remedy under a collective bargaining agreement. ... We are not persuaded that we should add additional exceptions not authorized by Congress.

Law changed since Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is a mandatory claim-processing rule, subject to forfeiture, rather than a jurisdictional limit; the filing deadline still applies when timely raised.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge-filing requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite that limits eligibility for class back pay.

Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc. · filed 1976-02-10(e)

In light of East, this court will follow the result in Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., supra, and rule that persons who terminated their employment more than 180 days before February 12, 1970, may not be included within plaintiffs’ class for back pay purposes.

Law changed since EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988), held that an untimely state-agency filing does not bar use of § 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day federal filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days unless the complainant timely institutes state or local proceedings to qualify for the extended 300-day period.

De Gideo v. Sperry-Univac Co. · filed 1976-06-09(e)

Accordingly, if a complainant fails to timely file a charge of discrimination with the appropriate state or local agency, then he or she is not entitled to the benefit of the 300-day limitation period, but must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (1972) extended the ordinary EEOC charge-filing period from 90 to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; this note applies the former period.

Under former subsection (d), a charge that reaches the OFCC within 90 days can satisfy the EEOC filing deadline through constructive filing or equitable tolling when agency delay postpones its delivery to the EEOC.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Delaware Trust Co. · filed 1976-07-07(d)

In summary, whether receipt of Hsu’s charge by the OFCC constituted a “constructive” filing with the EEOC, or simply tolled the running of the ninety days until actual receipt of the letter by the EEOC, I conclude that HSU’s charge met the federal statutory prerequisites for filing with the EEOC.

Law changed since Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (Feb. 24, 1982), held that a timely EEOC charge is not jurisdictional and is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge for the court to exercise Title VII jurisdiction over the allegations.

Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. · filed 1976-06-25(e)

This Court has jurisdiction of plaintiff's claims of discriminatory pay and transfer only under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, since a timely charge regarding these allegations was not filed with the EEOC, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(e) required an EEOC charge within 180 days, and the court treated an untimely charge as a jurisdictional bar to a Title VII action.

Kenil K. GOSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REVLON, INC. and Its Wholly Owned Subsidiary, USV Pharmaceutical Corporation, Def · filed 1976-10-29(e)

The failure to file timely charges with the EEOC was, of course, a jurisdictional bar to this proceeding as well.

Law changed since Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (June 3, 2019), held that Title VII’s charge-filing requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional and can be forfeited if raised too late.

Section 2000e-5(e) makes timely filing of an EEOC charge a jurisdictional prerequisite to a later Title VII suit and requires filing within thirty days after notice that state agency proceedings have ended when that deadline is earlier.

Vasquez v. Werner Continental, Inc. · filed 1977-04-08(e)

The statutory period of time for filing a complaint with the EEOC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any subsequent court action. ... After review of the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing concerning the receipt of notification, this Court finds that plaintiff received the notice of dismissal from the FEPC on November 18, 1975. Plaintiff’s charge to the EEOC, therefore, was not made within the mandatory thirty day period.

Law changed since Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (Dec. 15, 1980), held that a grievance or internal review of a communicated tenure denial does not postpone the charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period for a challenged tenure denial can run until the employer completes its review and affirms the decision.

Cap v. Lehigh University · filed 1977-06-03(e)

It is clear that the alleged discrimination continued at the very least from the time she received her terminal contract until she was informed that the matter had been reviewed and the decision affirmed.

Law changed since Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019), held that filing an EEOC charge is a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC before suing.

Shaw v. Greyhound Lines · filed 1977-09-02

Since Shaw had not filed charges against Greyhound with the EEOC, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the Title VII claim against Greyhound was properly dismissed by the district court, as conceded here by appellant.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC before bringing a Title VII action.

Cutliff v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-09-02(f)

Since Shaw had not filed charges against Greyhound with the EEOC, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of .1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the Title VII claim against Greyhound was properly dismissed by the district court, as conceded here by appellant.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) lengthened the charge-filing period to 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; the 210-day limit described here applied to the older charge.

Section 2000e-5(d) bars challenges to conduct more than 210 days before an EEOC charge, but permits challenges to conduct within that period.

Nickel v. Highway Industries, Inc. · filed 1977-09-14(d)

Even though the effective date of the filing of the plaintiffs’ charge with the EEOC was May 10, 1970, and the plaintiffs would thus be barred from challenging as discriminatory any of the defendants’ conduct prior to October 11, 1969,1 find that this restriction is of limited significance because portions of the complaint aver (para. 28 and 32) discriminatory conduct relating to the application of Addendum C.

Law changed since Pub. L. 92-261 § 4(a) (Mar. 24, 1972) replaced the former 90-day EEOC charge deadline with 180 days, or 300 days after initial state or local proceedings; the older period governs the charge discussed here.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge filing period begins when an employer applies a discriminatory policy to an employee, rather than when the employee learns the policy will affect her.

Sangster v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-10-14(e)

Here, although plaintiff knew that she was considered by United to have forfeited her seniority and transfer rights on the day she married, United did not enforce its policy against her until November 8, 1968. Her cause of action accrued as of that date, and on that date the 90-day filing period began. Her filing with the EEOC, therefore, was timely.