42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline bars a claim based on an earlier failure to train when only its effects continue.

Wood v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1977-12-06(e)

If continuing discrimination is properly pleaded and shown the filing deadlines are generally inapplicable. ... Here the past act was a failure to train plaintiff. From a theoretical viewpoint the two are indistinguishable. Thus, the Court is without jurisdiction and the action will be dismissed for failure to comply with the filing requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; a completed discharge does not become continuing discrimination merely because its effects persist.

Carter v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1977-12-07(e)

Section 706(e) of the 1964 Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires that the charge be filed “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Where, as here, the charge is one which must first be submitted to a state or local agency, the time to file with the Commission is extended to 300 days, or 30 days after receipt of notice of termination of the state or local proceedings, whichever is earlier. ... Due to his delay in filing a charge with the EEOC, plaintiff’s Title VII claim is barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period covers a test that continues to bar advancement during the 180 days before an EEOC charge.

Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. · filed 1977-10-19(e)

There is no basis in reason to distinguish, insofar as the statute of limitations is concerned, between a seniority system operating as a continuing bar to advancement and a test so operating.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline limits a Title VII class to employees who could have filed timely EEOC charges when the named plaintiff filed his charge.

Domingo v. New England Fish Co. · filed 1977-11-21(e)

I hold that only employees not time barred from filing a charge with the EEOC when Domingo filed his are to be included in the class for the Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely EEOC charge; continuing effects of a past discriminatory act do not extend the filing period without a present violation.

MARTIN v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION · filed 1977-12-15(e), (d)

Plaintiff did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, however, until 1974 more than three years after the alleged discriminatory acts took place. Under either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II 1972) (EEOC charge required within 180 days) or its predecessor, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) (EEOC charge required within 90 days), plaintiff's EEOC charge of discrimination was untimely. ... Here, the record is void of any showing that any discriminatory violation exists now, or has existed at any time subsequent to the incidents relied upon by plaintiff. Moreover, in the language of the Supreme Court, "the (seniority) system is neutral in its operation." Id., 97 S.Ct. at 1889. Consequently, we hold that the district court properly concluded that plaintiff is barred from maintaining his Title VII claim for relief.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; a refusal to hire does not become a continuing violation merely because its consequences persist.

Leiman v. Fashion Institute of Technology · filed 1977-12-13(e)

The complaint filed with the EEOC was not timely with respect to the hiring. ... In the instant case, the complaint was filed at least 319 days after the hiring. Untimely filing with the EEOC is grounds for dismissal of a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely EEOC charge; the continuing effects of an earlier discriminatory act do not make an untimely charge timely when no present violation exists.

Martin v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1977-12-15(e)

Under either 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. II ... 1972) (EEOC charge required within 180 days) or its predecessor, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970) (EEOC charge required within 90 days), plaintiffs EEOC charge of discrimination was untimely. ... Consequently, we hold that the district court properly concluded that plaintiff is barred from maintaining his Title VII claim for relief.

When a complainant first files with a state or local agency, § 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice or 30 days after notice that the agency proceedings ended, whichever is earlier.

Keyse v. California Texas Oil Corp. · filed 1978-01-12(e)

In that event the charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful practice or within 30 days after receiving notice of termination of the proceedings before the state or local agency, whichever is earlier.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC charge filing period does not bar a claim at the pleading stage when the complaint alleges discrimination continuing through the charge filing date.

Bethel v. Jendoco Construction Corp. · filed 1978-01-16(e)

Taking as true these allegations of the complaint, Helstoski v. Goldstein, supra, 552 F.2d at 565, it is apparent that Bethel has alleged Title VII violations by Navarro which continued to the filing of the charge with the EEOC and which therefore must have occurred within the requisite 180-day time period provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 300 days when the claimant first initiates state or local agency proceedings.

SMITH v. AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES · filed 1978-01-26(e)

Under § 2000e-5(e), Smith's charge to the EEOC had to be filed within 180 days after October 6, 1970 and thus the November 19, 1971 filing was untimely. ... Since Smith had instituted proceedings with a state agency against APL, his time to file under § 2000e-5(e), see note 2, supra, was fixed at 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Smith v. American President Lines, Ltd. · filed 1978-01-26(e)

Under § 2000e-5(e), Smith’s charge to the EEOC had to be filed within 180 days after October 6,1970 and thus the November 19,1971 filing was untimely.

In a deferral state, an employee has 300 days after an alleged unlawful employment practice to file a charge with the EEOC.

Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc. · filed 1978-01-26(e)

Since Maryland is a “deferral” state, an employee has 300 days from the commission of the alleged unlawful employment practice to file with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Therefore, the relevant time period began to run 300 days prior to plaintiff’s filing with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period can define a Title VII class when class members could have filed with a state agency, even if the representative did not.

Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1978-01-31(e)

The only element that is binding upon the class is the date upon which the representative plaintiff filed his charges with the EEOC. The class members are not limited by the method that the representative plaintiff utilized. Since class members could have filed with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the 300-day limitation provides the proper measure to be used for class definition purposes.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing period runs from the date of discharge; discharge is not a continuing violation.

Rudolph v. Wagner Elec. Corp. · filed 1978-02-01(e)

Discharges are not continuing violations. The date of discharge is the controlling date under the statute, and the charge must be filed in relation to that date.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; an alleged discriminatory refusal within 180 days of filing can establish timeliness if proved.

Zagars v. Gettysburg College · filed 1978-03-29(e)

Since Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC in September of 1973, this allegation, if proved, will establish the timeliness of the suit. Thus, it is apparent that Plaintiff has raised sufficient issue of fact to defeat Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge filing period is satisfied at the pleading stage when alleged discriminatory practices continued through the filing of the EEOC charge.

BETHEL v. JENDOCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION · filed 1978-02-01(e)

Taking as true these allegations of the complaint, Helstoski v. Goldstein, supra, 552 F.2d at 565, it is apparent that Bethel has alleged Title VII violations by Navarro which continued to the filing of the charge with the EEOC and which therefore must have occurred within the requisite 180-day time period provided in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an initial charge within 180 days, either with the EEOC or, in a deferral state, with a state or local agency; a timely agency filing can allow additional time to file with the EEOC.

Wiltshire v. Standard Oil Co. of California · filed 1978-03-08(e)

Analysis of the statutory scheme thus leads to the conclusion that a claimant must file his claim within 180 days, either with the EEOC or, in a deferral state, with the 706 agency, and it is only where a timely filing has been made with the 706 agency that an additional 120 days may be available for filing with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; later effects of an earlier discriminatory act do not restart the filing period unless they are new violations.

Masco v. United Airlines · filed 1978-04-17(e)

Under the circumstances of this case, timely filing of charges with the EEOC was an unfulfilled prerequisite to appellees’ maintaining a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 300 days if the claimant first files with a state agency.

Parker v. Bell Helicopter Co. · filed 1978-04-21(e)

Under Title VII and EEOC charge must be filed either: (1) within 180 days of the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment practice if the charge is filed directly with the EEOC; or (2) within 300 days of the alleged act if plaintiff first files his grievance with a state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Consequently, those claims arising more than 180 days before the earliest applicable EEOC filing must be excluded from the class unless they were filed with a state agency within 300 days of the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC charge deadline is not restarted by the continuing effects of a past change to a facially neutral seniority system.

Bertheas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1978-05-09

In view of the facial neutrality of the new seniority system, the Court is persuaded that the rationale of Evans and Cates applies here and that no “present violation” of Title VII exists by virtue of the application of the new seniority system so as to validate plaintiff’s otherwise untimely EEOC charge under the theory of “continuing violations.”

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an aggrieved person to file a discrimination charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Chapman v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. · filed 1978-05-16(e)

Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), provides that a person aggrieved must file a charge of discrimination within one hundred and eighty days of the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment practice. ... To the extent plaintiffs complain about their initial employment in telephone sales as opposed to premise sales, their claims are time barred because they were not filed within 180 days of their employment.

Section 2000e-5(e) excludes former employees and rejected applicants from a Title VII class if they could not have filed timely EEOC charges when the representatives filed theirs.

Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · filed 1978-06-14(e)

Therefore, those employees who left the employ of PECO and those applicants for employment who were rejected by PECO before March 22, 1975, are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) from asserting a claim against PECO under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Lockhart v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1978-06-16(e)

In a Title VII case, a notice must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice with the EEOC setting forth the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp.V.1975).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act; claims based on earlier acts are time-barred.

Gill v. Monroe County Department of Social Services · filed 1978-06-19(e)

Applying these rules in this case, I find that two restrictions must be placed on the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. First, the definition of the class must be narrowed to exclude individuals who terminated their employment with the Department before October, 1972. Second, Title VII claims based on acts of alleged discrimination which occurred before October, 1972 must be stricken from the complaint as barred by the three hundred day time limit.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Rita P. BRACAMONTES and Isabel Manale, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMSTAR CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-07-07(e)

We agree with the district court’s holding that contentions arising from actions before October 1973 were time-barred. The charges were not filed as a class action. The plaintiffs filed their charge with the E.E.O.C. within the 180 day time limit only for the events of October 1973.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely charge against the employer sued; a later charge against a different employer does not relate back when that employer was not named in the original charge.

Walter BRYANT, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1978-05-10(e)

Similarly, the charge against the defendant could not be regarded as a “relation-back” amendment of the charge against South Central Bell since the defendant was never a party to the case until 1973.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge after a discriminatory act; later effects of that act do not restart the filing period.

MASCO v. UNITED AIRLINES · filed 1978-05-11(e)

Simply put, the violations giving rise to the present action were appellees' respective separations from employment. As in Evans, United was entitled to treat those past acts of discrimination as lawful after appellees failed to file charges within the prescribed time period.

The 1972 amendment’s 180-day EEOC filing period applies to charges pending before the EEOC when the amendment took effect, even if the alleged discrimination occurred more than 180 days earlier.

Mary Josephine WOOD, Appellant, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1978-08-02(e)

In our opinion this reasoning extends to include all cases pending, and not simply those in which the discriminatory act occurred within 180 days of the amendment.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits Title VII liability to people injured within 180 days before the discrimination charge was filed.

Lazarus v. Maryland · filed 1978-08-02(e)

... the defendants are liable only to persons injured within 180 days of the filing of the charge of discrimination. Id. 2000e-5(e); ... These two individuals must be excluded from the class.

Section 2000e-5’s charge-filing period bars relief for an individual who suffered no timely discriminatory act, but does not limit remedies for an individual who did.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. North Hills Passavant Hospital · filed 1978-08-04(e)

The Court agrees with the Hospital’s position to the extent that Evans precludes the EEOC from seeking relief for any individual who did not suffer a discriminatory act within 180 days of the filing of Pope’s charges with the EEOC. As to remedies available for individuals who did suffer timely injuries, however, this Court agrees with the Second Circuit that the limitation period does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars class claims arising more than 300 days before the representative filed her EEOC charge.

Aungst v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1978-08-23(e)

Therefore, women whose claims arose more than 300 days before Aungst filed on July 17, 1974, will be barred by the statute of limitations in section 706(d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Furr v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1978-09-05(e)

First, § 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that a charge of discrimination be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Filing with the Labor Department’s Wage and Hour Division does not satisfy § 2000e-5(e)’s requirement to file a timely Title VII charge with the EEOC.

Bledsoe v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 1978-09-29(e)

Filing a charge with the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor does not meet the requirement for filing with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when notice of termination and termination coincide, even if the employee remains on the payroll to receive accrued pay.

KRZYZEWSKI v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY · filed 1978-10-03(e)

However, where the notice of termination and the act of termination coincide, the date on which these events take place is clearly the one on which the unlawful employment practice occurs, and courts are bound by the congressional determination of the acceptable amount of delay to be permitted in filing a charge with EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) treats an unsworn, unserved EEOC charge as effective on the date it was filed when determining timely claims.

Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co. · filed 1978-10-30(e)

The Court, in accordance with its earlier order certifying the class, credits Kyriazi’s first charge with the EEOC filed January 7, 1972, thereby allowing her to represent a class of women who had viable claims of discrimination within 210 days of that date, or June 9, 1971. For it is by now well-settled law that unsworn, unserved charges are effective on the date filed.

Section 2000e-5’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge is not tolled while an employee pursues a contractual grievance or a state civil rights remedy.

EVERSON v. McLOUTH STEEL CORPORATION · filed 1978-11-03(d), (e)

At the time of his discharge the applicable statute required Everson to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within ninety days of the date of his discharge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). The statute was amended in 1972 extending the time to 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). As found by the District Court and admitted by the plaintiff, he did not file his charge with EEOC within the time allotted by either of the above statutes. ... It is clear to us that Congress intended that the remedy under Title VII should be expeditiously exercised. The exercise of alternate procedures in the present case resulted in a delay of nearly five years. ... The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge begins when the employee is discharged, even if a contractual grievance is later arbitrated.

Joan RUDOLPH, Appellant, v. WAGNER ELECTRIC CORPORATION, Appellee · filed 1978-11-08(e)

Rudolph was dismissed from her employment in February 1973, and that was the occurrence for purposes of the Title VII limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge filing limit does not bar earlier events when the alleged discrimination is continuing.

White v. City of Suffolk · filed 1978-10-17(e)

Consequently, the 180-day limitation of Title VII does not bar plaintiffs from raising events prior to 1974 in this case.

Section 2000e-5(d)'s charge-filing deadline does not bar a challenge to a discriminatory promotional system that produces a new violation whenever a promotion is made.

PATTERSON v. The AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY · filed 1978-10-23(d)

It did not deal with a continuing violation such as a discriminatory promotional system where the discrimination continues from day to day and a specific violation occurs whenever a promotion is made.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely charge alleging a continuing discriminatory practice even when some challenged acts occurred before the charge-filing period.

Shehadeh v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland · filed 1978-11-08(e)

When, however, a continuing discriminatory employment practice is alleged, the administrative complaint may be timely filed notwithstanding that the conduct impugned is comprised in part of acts lying outside the charge-filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits a Title VII class to employees who could have filed timely EEOC charges.

Wajda v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1978-11-03(e)

With respect to the proper cut-off date for class members’ claims, Penn Mutual correctly notes, and plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument, that Wajda may represent only those female employees who could have filed timely charges with the EEOC on or after November 16, 1972, which was three hundred days before Wajda filed her own complaint on September 11, 1973.

Section 706’s administrative charge-filing deadline operates like a statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar.

BETHEL v. JEFFERSON · filed 1978-11-09(e)

In any event, it is § 706 that is implicated here, and we must accept Laffey as controlling on the nature of its charge-filing provision More broadly, all members of the Supreme Court have recently joined in opinions referring to Title VII's time exactions as statutes of limitation and not as immutable jurisdictional mandates.

Section 2000e-5 limits Title VII claims to acts occurring within 300 days before an EEOC charge is filed; earlier acts may serve as background evidence.

Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center · filed 1978-09-11(e)

Thus, while acts which were not the basis of the EEOC charges may be relevant as background the timely claims, they may not themselves constitute the basis for imposition of liability. Accordingly, the allegations of Count I must be limited to events occurring not more than 300 days prior to the dates on which plaintiffs filed their charges: May 3, 1975 (Garcia) and February 16, 1976 (Perez).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; claims based on earlier acts are untimely.

Roscoe FRIEND v. LEIDINGER · filed 1978-11-29(e)

The applicable period of the statute of limitations mentioned above is the 180 days established in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), which requires that a charge under Title VII be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... It found no basis for liability as to any test given prior to May 11, 1974, the 180th day before the filing of the discrimination charge with EEOC since the complaints were not timely under Title VII. ... It is not necessary for this Court to pass on the alternate ruling, since the trial judge was correct in his application of Evans and Hazelwood.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice for a claim to be actionable.

Garrett v. R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. · filed 1978-12-27(e)

That aspect of the statute is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) which requires that for a claim to be actionable an EEOC complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act; for a failure to promote, the period normally begins when the position is filled.

Satz v. ITT Financial Corp. · filed 1979-01-25(e)

Normally, in the context of a discriminatory failure to promote or hire into an elevated position, the point in time at which the discriminatory act is said to occur, and thus when the one hundred and eighty (180) day period begins to run, is when the position in question is filled (and by logical extension when the promotion is de facto denied).

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge within 300 days when the state charge meets the state's filing deadline, even if the state charge was filed after 180 days.

Din v. Long Island Lighting Co. · filed 1979-01-03(e)

Having complied with the State statute, plaintiff’s filing of the EEOC complaint within 300 days was timely even though the filing with the SDHR was not within 180 days.

Before the 1972 amendments, § 2000e-5(d) required a charge after state agency proceedings to be filed with the E.E.O.C. within 210 days of the alleged unlawful practice or 30 days after notice that the state proceedings ended, whichever came earlier.

Connie A. KEYSE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA TEXAS OIL CORPORATION and American Overseas Petroleum Ltd., Defendan · filed 1978-12-21(d)

Prior to March 24, 1972, the effective date of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) [now 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)] required that where state agency proceedings had been instituted, the charge had to be filed' with the E.E.O.C. within 210 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within thirty days after notice of the termination of the state proceedings, whichever came earlier.

A continuing discriminatory practice can extend the deadline for filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC.

Ridgeway v. INTERN. BROTH. OF ELEC. WKRS., ETC. · filed 1979-01-26(e)

Therefore, plaintiffs have adequately alleged a continuing violation and this action is not time barred.

Under the version then in effect, § 2000e-5(e) allowed 90 days to file a charge, or 210 days when the claimant first sought relief from a state or local agency.

Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. · filed 1979-02-26(e)

The statute, as in effect at the time the instant charges were filed, provided for a time limitation of 90 days. The statute further provided for a longer, 210 day period where (as here) recourse was initially sought from a state or local agency.

Section 2000e-5(e) uses a 180-day period measured from the filing of an EEOC charge.

Duncan v. Tennessee · filed 1979-03-02(e)

April 27, 1975, is 180 days prior to October 24, 1975, the date on which plaintiff filed his first EEOC charge. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Former § 2000e-5(d) required an EEOC charge within 90 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; continuing effects of a past act do not extend that deadline without a present violation.

Erma TRABUCCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DELTA AIRLINES, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-03-14(d)

We, therefore, believe that the District Court was not in error in holding that no continuing violation exists, and that the lower court’s application of the 90-day rule to the single, alleged incident on February 10, 1970 was proper.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when the EEOC charge is filed after the applicable deadline.

Johnson v. Host Enterprise, Inc. · filed 1979-03-15(e)

Because plaintiff did not file his charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC within the limits prescribed by statute, his Title VII claims must be dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

HANSBURY v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA · filed 1979-04-18(e)

The claims of post-layoff "continuing" discrimination under Title VII were properly dismissed insofar as they involved conduct occurring prior to March 24, 1972, or prior to the 180 day period preceding the filing of the second EEOC complaint.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits an organization to file an EEOC charge for its members without requiring a member to file individually.

NAACP v. City of Corinth · filed 1979-05-03(b)

This condition may be met by the filing of a charge by an organization for its members, and the charge need not be filed by one or more members, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6. This prerequisite was satisfied by the Alcorn County Chapter of the NAACP filing a charge against the city of class discrimination on April 9, 1974.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits a Title VII class to employees who could have filed timely EEOC charges when the named representative filed, unless an earlier filer intervenes as a class representative.

Inda v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1979-05-21(e)

In summary, the definition of the proper litigating class in a Title VII case includes those persons who were capable of filing EEOC charges on or after the date the named representative filed; but where an earlier-filing complainant is properly allowed to intervene on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, all those persons who were capable of filing EEOC charges at or after the time she filed her charges are legitimate members of the litigating class. Until such intervention takes place, the limits of the district court’s jurisdiction must be measured by the jurisdictional time period applicable to the named representative’s EEOC filing.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling and is not jurisdictional.

Kathleen T. HART, Appellant, v. J. T. BAKER CHEMICAL COMPANY · filed 1979-05-14(e)

On balance, we hold that the time limits for the filing of a charge are not jurisdictional but are rather subject to the principles of equitable tolling.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day filing period permits claims based on discriminatory practices that continue within that period, even if they began earlier.

Kohne v. Imco Container Co. · filed 1979-06-12(e)

Where plaintiffs allege continuing violations, however, not just continuing results of past violations, they are not precluded from raising events prior to the 180-day limitation period of Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on discriminatory acts that occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed, even if a seniority system gives those acts present effect.

Trent v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. · filed 1979-06-13(e)

Even assuming that the present Allegheny seniority system gives present effect to past acts of discrimination, since said past acts of discrimination allegedly occurred in 1952 and 1964, more than three hundred days prior to March 17, 1976, said alleged acts are not actionable. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) gives an aggrieved party 300 days to file an EEOC charge in a state with a local referral agency.

Jacobs v. BD. OF REGENTS, ETC. · filed 1979-07-10(e)

The defendants reliance upon the 180 days rule is here misplaced. Where there exists a local referral agency in the state where a charge is being brought, an aggrieved party has 300 days within which to file- her charge with the commission.

Section 2000e-5(e) treats a charge as filed when the EEOC receives it, even if the state deferral period has not ended.

Silver v. Mohasco Corp. · filed 1979-07-18(e)

We are of the view, however, that an informed reading of Title VII, consistent with its purpose, requires us to conclude that a charge is “filed” for purposes of § 706(e) when received, and “filed” as required by § 706(c) when the state deferral period ends.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

BLEDSOE v. PILOT LIFE INSURANCE CO. · filed 1979-07-20(e)

Under the requirements of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1972), such a charge "shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . ." Accordingly, EEOC dismissed her claim as not timely lodged, and she commenced her present suit on July 12, 1977, in District Court. ... Summary judgment on her suit has our approval, founded on the District Judge's opinion.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Bledsoe v. Pilot Life Insurance · filed 1979-07-20(e)

Under the requirements of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1972), such a charge “shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . .” ... In a finished memorandum, the trial judge looked both to the equities and to the law as written, and concluded that Ruth Bledsoe’s charge was barred by her delay in submitting it to the EEOC. Summary judgment on her suit has our approval, founded on the District Judge’s opinion.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC filing period permits equitable modification, but reliance on a state agency employee's assurances that a charge was filed does not toll it.

Chappell v. Emco MacHine Works Company · filed 1979-09-06(e)

Since the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this court have recognized that equitable considerations can, in certain circumstances, mitigate the demands of § 2000e-5(e) of Title VII, holdings which characterize § 2000e-5(e) as jurisdictional do not preclude equitable modification of its requirements. ... We therefore conclude that Chappell's reliance on Whitley's representations did not toll the running of the 180-day time period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge within 180 days of the alleged violation, and a Title VII class cannot include people whose charges were already time-barred when the representative filed his charge.

Newton v. Kroger Co. · filed 1979-09-12(e)

On the other hand, Title VII suits must be preceded by an EEOC charge, and the charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). It is not appropriate for a Title VII class to include persons whose charges would have been time-barred at the time when plaintiff filed his charge.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day EEOC charge-filing period determines eligibility for membership in a Title VII class.

Sobel v. Yeshiva University · filed 1979-09-26(e)

Under the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), a charge raised pursuant to Title VII must be “filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Thus the statute of limitations to be applied in this action is the short period of one hundred and eighty days.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline does not bar a Title VII claim challenging a continuous and present discriminatory practice.

Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc. · filed 1979-10-03(e)

The limitations period for Title VII is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), which provides that an EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, or within 300 days if the charge is first referred to a state agency. ... Since the plaintiffs allege a continuous and present practice of discrimination rather than a single, isolated act, the statute of limitations is no bar.

A continuing violation can make a Title VII charge timely only if the discrimination itself continues; lingering effects of a past act do not suffice.

Isadore GOLDMAN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee · filed 1979-10-25(e)

To state such a continuing violation, however, a complaint must indicate that not only the injury, but the discrimination, is in fact ongoing. The district court held that that hurdle was not surmounted here, and we agree. A continuing violation is not stated if all that appears from the complaint is that the plaintiff continues to suffer from the ongoing effects of some past act of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant who first files with a state agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge; notice that the state proceedings have ended can shorten that period but cannot extend it.

Alton Roy DAUGHTRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KING’S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-11-08(e)

The language “or within 30 days after receiving notice that the state agency has terminated the proceedings . .” only operates to cut short the 300-day period — it cannot lengthen it.

Section 2000e-5’s 180-day charge period does not impose a class cutoff for continuing discriminatory hiring, promotion, or salary practices.

Cooper v. University of Texas at Dallas · filed 1979-12-10(e)

The discriminatory acts of which plaintiff here complains — hiring, promotion, and salary — constitute continuing violations of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s deadline for filing an EEOC charge may be equitably tolled when an employer’s assurances reasonably cause a claimant to delay filing.

Jane Acomb LEAKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1979-10-10(e)

The circumstances present in this case lead us to the conclusion that the time period here was tolled on equitable grounds.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits a Title VII class to people allegedly discriminated against within 180 days before the earliest EEOC charge was filed.

Petty v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. · filed 1979-11-07(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), in order to maintain a suit under Title VII a plaintiff must file charges with the EEOC within 180 days after the date of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... Under Title VII, the class will be limited to persons allegedly discriminated against within 180 days prior to the date on which the earliest charge was filed, September 28, 1978.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, subject to equitable tolling when warranted.

Hamilton v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1979-11-14(e)

The EEOC complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. ... Under these circumstances, neither the EECO filing period or the Texas statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. The claim based on the 1969 physical examination and its results have not been timely presented. Consideration of this claim is, accordingly, barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when the employee fails to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days of discharge.

Sandra S. GEROMETTE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-12-03(e)

It is clear from the above that no charge was filed either with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission or with the EEOC within 180 days from the date of plaintiff’s discharge. Under Michigan as well as federal law her Title VII cause of action is barred.

Under the former version of § 2000e-5(d), a discrimination charge had to be filed with the EEOC within ninety days; continuing effects of an earlier act did not restart that period.

Fowler v. The Birmingham News Company · filed 1979-12-27(d)

Accordingly, the lower court’s application of the ninety-day rule to the alleged actions in 1969 and the other claims of discrimination that stem from that action was proper.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; termination ordinarily starts that period, and equitable tolling must account for the delay.

Otstott v. Verex Assurance, Inc. · filed 1980-01-03(e)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that a complaint be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination. ... Even if the statute is considered to be tolled from plaintiff’s first contact with the EEOC office until that date, there is no reasonable ground for the failure of plaintiff or his attorney to file a complaint within six months of that date. ... Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s failure to timely file a complaint with the EEOC is GRANTED.

For the 300-day EEOC charge deadline, integrated corporations may be treated as a single employer.

Ratcliffe v. Insurance Co. of North America · filed 1980-01-14(e)

Since INA and INA Corporation, insofar as their employment practices are concerned, must be deemed the joint employers of plaintiff, her amended complaint cannot be dismissed as barred by the 300 day limitations period imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a challenge to alleged discrimination when the plaintiff does not file an EEOC complaint within 180 days of the act.

Headrick v. Aluminum Co. of America · filed 1980-02-27(e)

The plaintiff cannot complain about the discriminatory nature of the lay-offs here, since she did not file timely complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days after the lay-offs occurred, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s extended filing period applies to charges pending before the EEOC when the 1972 amendments took effect, even if filed more than 180 days before enactment, so long as the Commission had not formally acted on them.

Hunter v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. · filed 1980-02-28(e)

For the reasons fully set out in the opinions of the Ninth and Eighth Circuits in Inda and Wood, supra, we join those Circuits in holding that the word “pending” in the above-quoted statutory amendments includes charges filed with the Commission more than 180 days prior to the enactment of the amendments, so long as the Commission, as here, had not yet formally acted upon the charges.

A Title VII hiring charge filed with the EEOC within 180 days of notice of the challenged hiring decision satisfies § 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline.

Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, Alabama · filed 1980-03-03(e)

Since Appellant met all of the filing time limits required to prosecute a Title VII claim based on the events of 1974 and 1975, (the last year in which the alleged discrimination occurred, for counting purposes as well as for limitations purposes), lodging her complaints with the EEOC well within 180 days of being told that someone else had been hired in 1974 and of being informed of the Town’s decision not to fill the vacancy in 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), the relevant years for counting purposes are 1973, 1974 and 1975.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely EEOC charge concerning an ongoing discriminatory practice to encompass related acts that occurred more than 300 days before filing.

Members of Bridgeport Housing Authority Police Force v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1980-01-29(e)

The policy of discrimination in this case existed both before and within the 300 day period prescribed by § 2000e-5(e). The plaintiffs’ filing with the EEOC therefore was timely. Furthermore, it encompasses the manifestations of discriminatory practice that occurred more than 300 days before the filing since the discrimination here constitutes a continuing violation of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge based on a continuing discriminatory practice when a violation occurs within the applicable filing period; the continuing effects of past violations alone are insufficient.

Margaret Christine REED, Individually, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-03-07(e)

For the purposes of this action, then, the critical question is whether Lockheed, within 300 days of Reed’s filing her charge, engaged in the unlawful conduct of failing to promote women in situations where men would be promoted. ... The decision that her Title VII claim is time-barred must be reversed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s extended filing period applies to charges pending before the EEOC when the 1972 amendment took effect, even if they were filed more than 180 days before enactment, so long as the EEOC had not formally acted on them.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 172, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,695 · filed 1980-02-28(e)

For the reasons fully set out in the opinions of the Ninth and Eighth Circuits in Inda and Wood, supra, we join those Circuits in holding that the word "pending" in the above-quoted statutory amendments includes charges filed with the Commission more than 180 days prior to the enactment of the amendments, so long as the Commission, as here, had not yet formally acted upon the charges.

Section 2000e-5’s filing period does not begin while a discriminatory policy continues, so a settlement based on that policy is not time-barred.

Moore v. City of San Jose · filed 1980-04-01(e)

The period of limitation would not start until the time when the policy was discontinued. When continuing discrimination is involved, as it was here, an action on the merits is not time-barred (Id. at 761). Therefore an action to approve a settlement agreement based on the same policy is not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Steward v. Norfolk, Franklin & Danville Railway Co. · filed 1980-03-19(e)

The timely filing is a prerequisite to maintenance of a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally limits a Title VII claim to practices occurring within 180 days before the EEOC charge.

McNeil v. McDonough · filed 1980-03-20(e)

McNeil filed his Title VII charge with EEOC on May 25, 1974, and was issued a right to sue letter under date of March 4, 1976. Complaint was filed May 28, 1976, within 90 days, and can reach back 180 days before the EEOC filing, or to November 26, 1973.

Section 2000e-5’s 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge is not tolled while an employee pursues a collective bargaining grievance.

Jerome HARRIS, Appellant, v. NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee · filed 1980-04-14(e)(1)

Under that section of the Act, plaintiff was required to file his complaint with the Commission within 180 days after the discrimination of which he complained and was required to file his suit within 90 days after he received his right to sue letter. ... In International Union of Electrical etc. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., supra, a majority of the Supreme Court held that pursuit of a collective bargaining grievance procedure within the context of employment discrimination does not toll the limitations provisions appearing in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ... We find ourselves in agreement with the district court, and we do not labor the matter. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing period runs from the actual discharge date, even if vacation and severance pay keep the employee on the payroll afterward.

Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc. · filed 1980-04-14(e)

In the instant case, the affidavits, in our view, clearly establish that Wilkerson was discharged on March 14, 1975. ... As indicated, if Wilkerson was discharged on March 14,1975, it is agreed that none of the notices later filed by Wilkerson was timely filed. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment on that issue in the case.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Laborde v. Regents of the University of California · filed 1980-05-19(e)

Plaintiff’s claim for failure to be promoted in the 1973-74 academic year and failure to have the title of Associate Dean with commensurate pay as Chief Academic Advisor during the years 1973 and 1974 are barred under the 1964 Civil Rights Act inasmuch as plaintiff did not timely file a charge under this Act within 300 days after these allegedly unlawful employment practices occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge alleging a continuing pattern of discrimination when specific discriminatory acts occurred within 180 days before filing.

22 Fair empl.prac.cas. 929, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,843 Goldie Satz v. Itt Financial Corporation · filed 1980-04-16(e)

Appellant thus alleges a general pattern of discrimination which included specific discriminatory acts within 180 days prior to the filing of her EEOC charge. Her claim is therefore timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period does not apply when a charge is sent to a state or local agency only for information, with no intent that the agency process it.

Lopez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. · filed 1980-05-19(e)

Accordingly, the charges were never actually “instituted” with the MCHRC, within the meaning of § 2000e-5(e), since there was no filing with an intent that the MCHRC would process the charge. Thus, the 180-day filing period is applicable in this case.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; earlier conduct may be considered when the violation continues into that period.

Jones v. Birdsong · filed 1980-06-02(e)

Section 2000e-5 of 42 U.S.C. provides that a charge of discrimination must be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... We are required, therefore, to consider only those alleged violations which occurred after March 18, 1977. If any of those violations were also present prior to that time, we may then consider the past violation also.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Daley v. St. Agnes Hospital, Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(e)

While this contention would ordinarily form the basis for a Title VII claim, Daley concedes that such a claim is time-barred, for Title VII, in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires that a charge must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” Daley was discharged on January 10, 1975, but did not file his charge with the EEOC until December 19,1975, almost a full year later.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires discrimination charges to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days.

Durant v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., Inc. · filed 1980-06-03(e)

Section 706(d) of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), establishes a 180 day limitations period for the filing of charges of discrimination with the EEOC. Therefore, any discrimination claims which may have existed against the defendants for actions prior to February 24, 1973 are time-barred and outside the scope of this lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(e) extends the EEOC charge-filing period from 180 to 300 days when a complainant sufficiently begins state agency proceedings, even without filing a formal state complaint.

Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc. · filed 1980-06-06(e)

We hold that her contacts sufficiently “initially instituted” proceedings with the state agency to extend the time from 180 to 300 days for filing with the EEOC.

The EEOC charge filing deadline does not prevent approval of an otherwise appropriate class settlement while its jurisdictional effect remains unresolved.

Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass'n, Local 550 v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1980-06-13(d)

We think the principles favoring settlement of class action lawsuits remain the same regardless of whether the disputed legal issues center on the jurisdiction of the court over the action. Where, as here, the jurisdictional question is not settled with finality, parties should not be forced to litigate the issue of jurisdiction if they can arrive at a settlement that is otherwise appropriate for district court approval.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a claim involving earlier discriminatory acts when they are part of a continuing violation whose last act falls within the 180-day filing period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sage Realty Corp. · filed 1980-06-06(e)

Insofar as it is undisputed that the last act of this alleged discriminatory pattern is within the 180-day statute of limitations period of section 706(e) of Title VII, the Court has jurisdiction over each allegedly discriminatory incident under the theory of a continuing violation.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing period runs from the actual discharge, even if vacation and severance pay keep the employee on the payroll.

Wilkerson v. Siegfried Insurance Agency · filed 1980-07-15(e)

In the instant case, the affidavits, in our view, clearly establish that Wilkerson was discharged on March 14, 1975. Under the authorities, the fact that she was kept on the payroll until May 16, 1975, because of vacation and severance pay rights does not alter that fact. ... As indicated, if Wilkerson was discharged on March 14, 1975, it is agreed that none of the notices later filed by Wilkerson was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge before a Title VII suit may proceed in federal district court.

Jacobs v. College of William and Mary · filed 1980-07-29(e)

The timely filing of a charge with this agency is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. in federal district court.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; the continuing effects of an earlier discriminatory act do not restart the filing period.

Simmons v. South Carolina State Ports Authority · filed 1980-07-30(e)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff may not bring suit in a district court unless a charge has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged unfair practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Since the plaintiffs failed to timely challenge the allegedly unlawful classification practice itself, they cannot now challenge its derivative effects.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge period is satisfied for continuing salary discrimination when the EEOC charge is filed within 180 days of the last discriminatory act.

Fisher v. Dillard University · filed 1980-08-18(e)

Under Title VII, a charge must be filed within 180 days of the unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976). ... A charge attacking a continuing violation such as salary discrimination is timely if it is filed within 180 days of the last act of alleged discrimination. ... Plaintiff did, therefore, comply with the 180 day rule, and neither of her claims for salary discrimination are time-barred under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge filing period begins when the employee is discharged; internal personnel review does not postpone it.

Mueller v. City of Los Angeles Fire Department · filed 1980-08-22(e)

To adopt Mueller’s argument would conflict with the time limits contained in the federal statute because any person aggrieved by an employer’s personnel action could keep the controversy alive for a considerable period within the employing agency’s personnel review procedures with resulting uncertainty in the time when federal action, if any, is to be commenced.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives an employee 180 days to file an EEOC charge after an alleged discriminatory discharge; the period begins when the employer ends the employee’s work, even if pay continues.

Pravin B. SHAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HALLIBURTON COMPANY, D/B/A Halliburton Services, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1980-09-12(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), Shah had 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred to file a complaint with the E.E.O.C. ... Therefore, Shah’s discharge must be deemed to have occurred on May 26, 1976, triggering the running of the 180-day period on that date.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination and a federal complaint within 90 days after receiving a right-to-sue notice.

O'Connell v. Liberty Mutual Insurance · filed 1980-09-25

The plaintiffs met the timeliness requirements of Title VII. Each filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 180 days of the date of the alleged acts of discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), and filed her complaint in federal district court within 90 days of receipt of her Notice of Right to Sue.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing period does not restart because the effects of earlier discrimination continue.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McCall Printing Corporation · filed 1980-10-24(e)

The former carloaders' claims do not fall within the time restraints outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The fact that the residual effects of the alleged discrimination are still felt through seniority status established in 1966 does not render this a continuing act of discrimination under the rule in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, supra.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing period does not restart when an employee repeats a request for relief from an earlier discriminatory act.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. McCall Printing Corp. · filed 1980-10-24(e)

The former car-loaders’ claims do not fall within the time restraints outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Repeated requests for further relief from a prior act of discrimination will not set the time limitations running anew.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely Title VII charge when recurring discriminatory pay continued within the filing period.

Jenkins v. The Home Insurance Company · filed 1980-12-15(e)

Every two weeks, Jenkins was paid for the prior working period; an amount less than was paid her male counterparts for the same work covering the same period. Thus, the Company’s alleged discrimination was manifested in a continuing violation which ceased only at the end of Jenkins’ employment. ... We find that: (1) Jenkins has sufficiently alleged a continuing violation of her rights under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, and (2) this violation continued until the end of her employment, and (3) her claims were timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC filing period applies only when the employee first institutes proceedings with the appropriate state agency.

Sutton v. Aluminum Co. of America · filed 1980-11-07(e)

Secondly, the 300-day period applies only “in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings” with the appropriate state agency.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day charge-filing period begins when the discriminatory act is complete.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Safeway Stores · filed 1980-11-17(e)

The 180-day requirement was met. The discriminatory act started in March of 1974, and culminated in November, 1974, when Mr. Nobel retired, and Chambers became the full-fledged carpenter. The statute of limitations was not set in motion until the completion of that act.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC filing requirement can be satisfied by a union’s charge on behalf of its members; a continuing discriminatory policy can also excuse an individual’s late filing.

Ass'n of Flight Attendants v. Texas International Airlines, Inc. · filed 1981-01-05(e)

The court finds that the plaintiffs’ failure to file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the termination of their maternity leave does not bar their claims for two reasons. First, their union’s filing of a charge with the EEOC in 1973 satisfies the filing requirement for the named individual plaintiffs. Second, the policies complained about constitute continuing violations of Title VII, if they are found illegal, and need not meet the 180 day limitation.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge filing period begins when the challenged employment decision is made and communicated, even if employment ends later.

Delaware State College v. Ricks · filed 1980-12-15(e)

Congress has decided that time limitations periods commence with the date of the "alleged unlawful employment practice." See 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5 (e). Where, as here, the only challenged employment practice occurs before the termination date, the limitations periods necessarily commence to run before that date.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline does not bar a challenge to the bona fides of an ongoing seniority system when the challenge asserts continuing discrimination.

Day v. Patapsco & Back Rivers Railroad · filed 1981-01-15(e)

In the opinion of this Court, a challenge to the bona fides of an ongoing seniority system constituted a valid assertion of continuing discrimination, and Evans was hence inapposite.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; without evidence of defendant conduct warranting equitable relief, a late charge cannot be saved by equitable tolling.

Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation · filed 1981-02-17(e)

As a prerequisite to bringing a Title VII action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that the aggrieved person file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days following the occurrence of the alleged discrimination. Villasenor filed his charge two years after the alleged incident. ... Because no evidence was presented to establish conduct on the part of the defendants that might cause a court of equity to intervene, the limitations period cannot be equitably tolled.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days; equitable tolling requires evidence that could justify extending that deadline.

Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. · filed 1981-02-17(e)

As a prerequisite to bringing a Title VII action, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) requires that the aggrieved person file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days following the occurrence of the alleged discrimination. ... Because no evidence was presented to establish conduct on the part of the defendants that might cause a court of equity to intervene, the limitations period cannot be equitably tolled.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing deadline may be equitably tolled, but tolling is inappropriate when the delay would seriously prejudice a defendant who did not cause it.

Franklin v. Herbert Lehman College · filed 1981-02-25(e)

Title VII’s statute of limitations should not be tolled under circumstances that would seriously prejudice a defendant who is not responsible for the delay. Such circumstances are present here.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period applies to a charge filed within 180 days of the discriminatory act and pending when the 1972 amendments took effect.

Willie M. WALKER, Willie Rhoades and Bobbie P. Lowery, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. the JIM DANDY COMPANY, Defendant-Appell · filed 1981-03-13(e)

Thus, we hold that where the charge was filed less than 180 days from the date of the discriminatory act and was pending on the effective date of the 1972 amendments, it must be considered to have been timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act, or within 300 days if the claimant first filed with a state agency.

Ganguly v. New York State Department of Mental Hygiene-Dunlap Manhattan Psychiatric Center · filed 1981-03-25(e)

As a prerequisite to this action, plaintiff must have filed a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice or “in the ease of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State . .. agency” within 300 days of the alleged act.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge concerning the challenged events and a timely civil action after the EEOC’s determination.

U.T.B., United Third Bridge, Inc. v. Local 3 · filed 1981-04-20(e)

The sole evidence that a charge had been filed with the EEOC concerning the events at issue, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1976), was a determination by the EEOC dated January 2, 1977, introduced by defendants. ... Since this action was not commenced until September 6,1979, the jurisdictional prerequisites for a suit under Title VII have not been met.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act; later consequences do not restart the filing period.

Womack v. Shell Chemical Co. · filed 1981-05-18(e)

For the purpose of the time limitations under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the proper focus is upon the date of the alleged discriminatory act, “not upon the time that the consequences of that act became most painful.”

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when the EEOC charge is filed outside the 180-day period and neither a continuing violation nor equitable tolling applies.

Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 1981-04-24(e)

Thus, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact arid, as a matter of law, there was no continuing violation of Title VII by Firestone’s failure to transfer the plaintiff into the maintenance training program, or any other job in 1972. His claim is therefore barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Likewise, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact pertaining to equitable tolling, and as a matter of law, that doctrine does not apply to this case.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely EEOC charge based on a new discriminatory refusal to reinstate, even when an earlier termination falls outside the filing period.

Meehan v. New England School of Law · filed 1981-04-29(e)

For the reasons stated herein, I find that Meehan did file a timely charge of discrimination; therefore, the defendants’ motion is denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge to be filed within 300 days of the alleged act; a conclusory allegation of a continuing violation does not excuse late filing.

Sogluizzo v. Local 817, International Brotherhood of Teamsters · filed 1981-05-06(e)

It is a jurisdictional prerequisite to maintenance of a Title VII suit that it be timely filed. Thus, “a plaintiff must have filed a charge of discrimination with EEOC [or a state counterpart] within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.”

Section 2000e-5(e) permits recovery for earlier acts under a continuous discriminatory policy if an EEOC charge is filed within 300 days of the last act under that policy.

Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport · filed 1981-05-29(e)

Where, however, the defendant has engaged in a continuous policy of discrimination, acts in furtherance of that policy are not viewed in isolation. In such circumstances if the charge has been filed no later than 300 days after the last act by the defendant pursuant to its policy, the plaintiff may recover for earlier acts of discrimination as well.

Section 2000e-5(c) and (e) require a claimant alleging a continuing violation in a deferral state to identify a new, discrete discriminatory act within 300 days before the effective EEOC filing date.

Lorentzen v. Trustees of Boston College · filed 1981-07-24(c), (e)

In order for Lorentzen’s claims to be timely filed, a new, discrete violation of Title VII had to have occurred in the 300 days prior to his filing with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars liability for acts occurring more than 180 days before the charge, though those acts may serve as background evidence.

Marie v. Eastern Railroad · filed 1981-05-29(e)

Under United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, acts prior to 180 days before the charge are the equivalent of “pre-Act hiring.”

Section 2000e-5(e) treats each payment under a sex-discriminatory pay scale as a new violation for purposes of the charge-filing deadline.

Strong v. Demopolis City Bd. of Ed. · filed 1981-06-10(e)

This circuit views sex-based discrimination in pay to be a continuing violation. ... This is so because each time the employer pays its employees on the basis of a discriminatory scale a new act of discrimination is committed.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits actionable Title VII claims to discrimination occurring within 180 days before an EEOC charge is filed.

Cormier v. P. P. G. Industries, Inc. · filed 1981-06-18(e)

Under Title VII only those acts of discrimination occurring within 180 days prior to the date an individual filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission are actionable.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the extended federal filing period when a charge is filed with a state agency in time for an effective EEOC filing within 300 days, even if the state filing is untimely.

Morrison v. United Parcel Service · filed 1981-06-10(e)

In short, § 2000e-5(e) does not require that a party make a timely filing with a state agency as a prerequisite to obtaining the extended federal filing period. The statute only requires that a filing with the state agency be made with sufficient time to allow an effective filing with the EEOC within 300 days after the occurrence of the discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a person seeking relief for employment discrimination to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice.

Moore v. Lion Oil Co. · filed 1981-06-30(e)

We affirm the district court’s ruling that Moore’s complaint was barred for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Title VII. Under that Act, a person seeking relief for employment discrimination must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice has occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days of the employment practice before a Title VII suit may proceed.

Ward v. Caulk · filed 1981-07-17(d)

Title 42, U.S.C., § 2000e-5(d) requires that such charges arising from an employment practice be filed within 180 days of the practice's occurrence. Ward filed his EEOC complaint more than two years after his termination. His suit is therefore barred by the statutory filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing period runs from the alleged unlawful employment practice; an ongoing discriminatory policy is a continuing violation for that deadline.

Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1981-07-31(e)

The time period starts to run from the date on which the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... We agree with the district court’s finding that this was a continuing violation. ... Therefore, plaintiff’s filing of his charge with the EEOC was timely.