42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a claim based on a discriminatory act if the employee fails to file an EEOC charge within 300 days.

Keller v. Association of American Medical Colleges · filed 1985-09-30(e)

Failure to file a charge of discrimination within 300 days as required by section 2000e-5(e) will bar a claim based on the allegedly discriminatory act.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC filing period begins when an employee receives definite notice of termination, and grievance proceedings do not toll it.

Hale v. New York State Department of Mental Health · filed 1985-10-22(e)

The timeliness of plaintiff's filing of his EEOC complaint in the case at bar must therefore be measured from the date he received definite notice of his termination, not the date of his actual discharge.

Section 2000e-5(c) generally delays filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC until 60 days after state proceedings begin, unless those proceedings end sooner.

Seredinski, Louise v. Clifton Precision Products Co., a Division of Litton Systems, Inc · filed 1985-10-28(c)

There is, however, an important proviso: "no charge may be filed ... by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the state or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated...." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(c). The net result of these two provisions is that where state proceedings are commenced by the EEOC sending notice to the state agency upon its receipt of a Title VII charge, as is often the case in deferral states, see Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 92 S.Ct. 616, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972), the 300-day limitation period is effectively cut to 240 days, because the Title VII charge--though it has been received by EEOC--may not be deemed "filed" until sixty days later.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant in a deferral state who does not file with a state agency to file an EEOC charge within 240 days of the last alleged discriminatory act.

Berry v. EI Dupont De Nemours and Co. · filed 1985-12-31(e)

Thus, the plaintiff did not timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC because he filed with the EEOC more than 240 days after the last alleged act of discrimination occurred — 259 days.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; a claim of continuing discrimination does not preserve an otherwise untimely charge when ongoing discrimination is not proven.

Vermett v. Hough · filed 1986-01-29(e)

Since I have now concluded that Vermett was not subject to on-going and continuous sexual harassment and discrimination, I find Vermett’s EEOC complaint to have been untimely, and that she has failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to the filing of a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a discrimination claim if the claimant fails to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Welborn v. Reynolds Metals Co. · filed 1986-02-12(e)

Any claim of discrimination by plaintiff against defendant arising out of her March 1981 application for employment is barred because of plaintiff’s failure to file a charge with EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination and to allege compliance with that deadline.

Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co. · filed 1986-03-21(e)

In order to bring a Title VII action, plaintiff is required to file an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. ... Because Count II fails to make even a general allegation concerning the Title VII time requirements, it is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(d) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; the later effects of a workload assignment do not extend that filing period.

Dr. Julia Elizabeth Berry v. The Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and Agriculture and Mechanical Colle · filed 1986-03-05(d)

We first examine Berry’s claim that the district court erred in holding that her Title VII claim of discrimination of a heavier instructional workload was time-barred for failure to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the “alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). ... The first three relate solely to Berry’s work assignment, which was finalized in January 1977 before the actionable period.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline does not allow a continuing violation theory unless discrimination continued into the charge-filing period.

Sampath K. Hemmige, and Cross-Appellee v. Chicago Public Schools, and Cross-Appellants · filed 1986-03-10(e)

Because we find that plaintiff failed to establish any incident of a “present” discrimination, there was no basis for consideration of the theory of “continuing discrimination.”

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day filing period is satisfied when an employee files an EEOC charge within 180 days of a discriminatory wage payment.

Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency · filed 1986-03-27(e)

By finding that each payment of discriminatory wages constituted a “continuing violation,” we implicitly rejected the LESA’s characterization of wage payments as merely the present effect of a past act. As each plaintiff in the instant action filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days of a payment, we conclude that plaintiffs’ action is not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice and bars claims when the charge is untimely.

Wright v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. · filed 1986-05-20(e)

The Court expressly finds and determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the Section 706(e) Title YII defense asserted by defendant to plaintiffs’ claims herein, that defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law with respect to each claim herein asserted by each plaintiff against defendant in this action and that there is no just cause or reason for delay in entry of final judgment in this case in favor of defendant and against each plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s EEOC filing period runs from final notice of an allegedly discriminatory termination, rather than the date the termination takes effect.

Shockley v. Vermont State Colleges · filed 1986-06-18(e)

Title VII prescribes similar time limits for filing with the EEOC, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... Generally, the timeliness of a discrimination claim is measured from the date the claimant receives notice of the allegedly discriminatory act, not from the date the decision takes effect.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances.

Mauro v. Board of Higher Education · filed 1986-07-03(e)

To be timely, a Title VII claim must be filed with the EEOC “within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Mauro’s employers did not interfere with his ability to exercise his rights nor are there any extraordinary circumstances present to warrant tolling the expiration of the 300-day period until March 15,1983,16 months after Mauro was notified he would be terminated.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day filing period does not bar a claim challenging an allegedly discriminatory appraisal when the employer used it for later adverse employment decisions within that period.

Huguley v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1986-07-21(e)

Defendant argues that Kitchen’s claim, filed with the EEOC on August 9, 1983, is barred by the applicable 300-day statute of limitations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), because it challenges an October, 1981 performance appraisal. Defendant’s argument ignores the breadth of Kitchen’s claim, which challenges not only the appraisal but also its use against him from December, 1981 through July, 1983 to justify layoff and delayed recall. ... Kitchen’s claim is timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on acts outside the EEOC charge-filing period unless they are part of a continuing violation.

Arna v. Northwestern University · filed 1986-07-22(e)

No relief is available for the alleged acts of discrimination in the transfer from custodial to landscaping and while Arna was employed in landscaping, since standing alone they are time-barred and they cannot be made part of a pattern of ongoing discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day filing period bars claims based on a period of discrimination that ended more than 300 days before the EEOC charge.

Santos v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center · filed 1986-07-23(e)

Because the events leading up to and including the 1980 forced resignation occurred well more than 300 days before plaintiff filed her first EEOC charge, these claims are time-barred.

In New York, a Title VII claimant must file an EEOC charge within 300 days after receiving notice of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Rodriguez v. Chandler · filed 1986-08-11(e)

To assure that a Title VII claim is not time-barred, a plaintiff in New York must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days after he receives notice of the alleged unlawful employment practice. This period of limitation, mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), applies because New York is a “deferral state” — a state with its own antidiscrimination agency.

Section 2000e-5 requires a timely charge that satisfies state deferral rules before the EEOC may investigate and enforce a subpoena.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. · filed 1986-08-12(c), (e)

Setting aside for the moment the issue of a continuing violation, which will be subsequently addressed, Congress made it very clear that the EEOC’s authority to make investigations such as that involved in this proceeding depends on a proper complaint being filed within 300 days following the alleged unlawful employment practice. Its authority, therefore, is expressly conditioned upon there being a charge properly filed under Section 2000e-5 of the Civil Rights Act, and the EEOC may only subpoena evidence that relates to properly filed charges under investigation or in question.

A continuing violation can allow people harmed before the 300-day charge period to receive class relief when the discrimination continued into that period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works · filed 1986-08-13(e)

But whatever the proper reading of Domingo’s less-than-crystal-clear phrasing may be, this Court elects to follow the square holding in Guardians Association, 633 F.2d at 251: Because Chicago Miniature engaged in a continuing course of discrimination against black persons, even persons who suffered discrimination during the earlier part of that continuous period (and not just within the 300 days) can become class members entitled to relief.

Section 2000e-5(e) provides a 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge in a deferral state when the complainant has initially instituted state or local proceedings.

Downum v. City of Wichita, Kan. · filed 1986-10-03(e)

Kansas is a deferral state to which the extended 300-day period applies. Plaintiff may have “initially instituted proceedings” with the KCCR by the EEOC’s act of forwarding to the KCCR a copy of plaintiff’s charges. Lastly, the KCCR may have waived its 60-day deferral period by virtue of a worksharing agreement between it and the EEOC. Because these questions are unanswered by the record the court entertains reasonable doubt about the defendant’s entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of timely filing, and therefore finds summary judgment inappropriate.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period does not bar earlier claims arising from a continuing policy of discrimination.

Selzer v. Board of Education · filed 1986-09-19(e)

To the contrary, numerous discrimination cases not involving examinations have applied the “continuous violation” doctrine so as to allow the presentation of claims which would otherwise be barred by § 2000e-5(e), when the claims arise from incidents which appear to be part of a continuing policy of discrimination. ... We disagree, therefore, with defendants’ contention that the class must necessarily be limited to women whose claims arose within the three hundred days before Ms. Selzer and Ms. Jawin filed their EEOC complaints.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a timely charge to cover earlier acts in an ongoing discriminatory policy when a separate discriminatory act occurs within the filing period.

Egger v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union · filed 1986-09-23(e)

Under this theory, where there is evidence that the alleged violations are ongoing in nature, a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC may be timely filed as to all acts encompassed by the discriminatory policy so long as the charge is filed within the statutory period following a discriminatory act which is part of the alleged pattern of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII complaint to reach the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act; a disputed accrual date can prevent summary judgment based on that deadline.

Ohemeng v. Delaware State College · filed 1986-10-02(e)

The statute requires that the plaintiff file his Title VII complaint with the EEOC within 180 days from the date the alleged discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Assuming arguendo that June 20, 1984 was the accrual date and using 180 days as the most restrictive of the time periods the Court could adopt, the Court finds that plaintiff timely filed his complaint with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of a discrete employment decision; its continuing effects do not extend the filing period.

Sessom v. Milwaukee Distribution Center, Inc. · filed 1986-10-09(e)

The court concludes that the applicable 180-day limitations period began to run in January, 1982, when Sessom requested and was denied permission to wear a dress while working. Sessom filed her EEOC charge on July 2, 1984, over two and one-half years after the “alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”

Section 2000e-5(e)(1)’s administrative charge deadline depends on when the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; a continuing violation may make a later charge timely.

Fowler v. Taco Viva, Inc. · filed 1986-10-21(e)(1)

If the violation was continuous the administrative filing on July 3, 1985, is timely. Consequently, the Court cannot determine at this stage in the proceedings when the charge filing limitation commenced. Resultantly, Taco Viva’s request for summary judgment or, alternatively, dismissal of the Title VII employment discrimination claims for failure to timely comply with the statutory conditions precedent must be denied.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an EEOC charge filed within 180 days of an independent discriminatory employment act.

Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad · filed 1986-10-21(e)

Davis filed her claim within 180 days of Dinunzi’s selection as an engineer in 1983, thereby clearly satisfying the time requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge-filing period begins when a former employee’s employment ends, and an EEOC enforcement action cannot revive claims already barred by that deadline.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. United Insurance Co. of America · filed 1986-10-13(e)

Title VII requires that a victim of discrimination file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days after the “alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Consequently, the 180-day limitation period begins to run from the date that the employment relationship is terminated. ... Excusing the requirement of filing for these former employees would have the anomalous result of reviving claims which would otherwise be barred if brought as individual suits.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employment discrimination charge within 180 days, but a continuing discriminatory hiring policy may preserve earlier claims if it affected the employee during that period.

Brown v. Town of Allenstown · filed 1986-11-20(e)

Both federal and New Hampshire law require employment discrimination claims to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e); RSA 354-A:9 III. ... However, if the plaintiff can show that a discriminatory hiring policy existed which had some impact on her within the limitation period, then the continuing violation doctrine would apply and would preserve as causes of action those claims which would otherwise be barred as falling outside the statutorily prescribed time period. ... Accordingly, the Court holds that doubt exists as to the material issue of whether defendants engaged in a continuing violation and plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support her claim. ... Defendants’ motion is denied as to Count I.

Section 2000e-5 requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the employee knew or had reason to know of the alleged discrimination.

Jordan v. Wilson · filed 1986-11-25(e)

In order to sue under Title VII, an employee must first file a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of when the employee knew or had reason to know of the allegedly discriminatory act. ... Neither Pierce’s nor Oyler’s Title VII claims are time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the challenged action.

Nazaire v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. And International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers · filed 1986-12-09(e)

It is well-settled that, to be timely, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the challenged action. ... Because Mr. Nazaire’s cause of action for discrimination accrued significantly before April 3, 1979, the EEOC complaint filed on May 20, 1981 was not timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the discriminatory act; later recognition of a discriminatory motive does not restart the period.

Dr. Janet I. Merrill v. Southern Methodist University · filed 1986-12-24(e)

Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), requires a discrimination victim to file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the act’s occurrence. ... This Circuit has also consistently focused on the date that plaintiff knew of the discriminatory act. ... The district court did not err in its application of the limitations period.

A continuing violation satisfies § 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period when the employer applies its discriminatory policy to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s class during that period.

Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine · filed 1986-12-08(e)

We hold, instead, that to establish a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show some application of the illegal policy to him (or to his class) within the 180 days preceding the filing of his complaint.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge before a plaintiff may bring a Title VII suit in federal court; the court treated filing the charge as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction.

Worrell v. Uniforms To You & Co. · filed 1987-02-27(f)(1)

No reasonable interpretation of Gibbs could construe the court’s opinion as abrogating the requirement of filing a charge with the EEOC as a prerequisite for federal subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an administrative charge; discrete discriminatory acts outside that period are untimely absent an equitable basis for considering them.

Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. · filed 1987-03-19(e)

Subsection 706(e) of Title VII gives a deferral state claimant, as is plaintiff here, 300 days to file an administrative charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Timely filing is a prerequisite to bringing suit in federal court, although the requirement may be excused on equitable grounds. ... Accordingly, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to those alleged discriminatory acts occurring prior to December 9, 1981, is granted.

An ongoing discriminatory policy during the charge-filing period can make a Title VII complaint timely under the continuing-violation theory.

Alexander v. LOCAL 496, LABORERS'INT. UNION · filed 1987-03-25(e)

Therefore, because the plaintiffs have alleged and have given sufficient supportive evidence that they were and are still being harmed by a discriminatory policy in effect during the statute of limitations period, the Court holds the complaint timely.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Howard v. Holmes · filed 1987-03-27(e)

For an alleged act of discrimination to be actionable under Title VII, the act complained of must have occurred within 300 days of the filing of charges with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). The failure to promote, which plaintiff alleges was discriminatory, occurred in 1975, while the allegedly retaliatory demotion occurred in 1977. Both of these incidents are well outside the statute of limitations period, and are, therefore, dismissed as time barred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits a Title VII claim to the 180 days before the plaintiff files an EEOC charge.

Tillman v. Holy Cross Hospital · filed 1987-03-31(e)

Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII is limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) to the date 180 days prior to the filing of her unfair employment practice charge with the EEOC.

In a deferral state, a claimant has 300 days from the alleged discriminatory act to file an EEOC charge.

LaBeach v. Nestle Co., Inc. · filed 1987-04-20(e)

Under subsection 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a claimant in a deferral state such as New York has 300 days from the act complained of within which to file an administrative charge with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a class allegation in a discrimination charge that identifies the affected employees and the nature of the alleged discrimination.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Astronautics Corp. of America · filed 1987-05-20(b)

The “CLASS ALLEGATION” charges in the present case meet the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court in Shell Oil. Both charges set forth the class of persons allegedly discriminated against (all of respondent’s female employees) and the nature of such discrimination (unequal pay, promotion and terms and conditions of employment in the Heck charge and unequal pay in the Benkowski charge).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination; an untimely original charge cannot make an amended charge timely by relation back.

Cobb v. Stringer · filed 1987-06-03(e)

42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-5(e) requires that a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice (discrimination) occurred. ... The untimeliness of the filing of the amended Charge cannot be cured by relating back to a previous untimely filed original Charge.

Section 2000e-5(c) and (e) govern timely administrative filing of Title VII claims; when employees learned of the challenged conduct bears on whether their claims are timely.

Ledoux v. District of Columbia Raymond J. Greene v. District of Columbia · filed 1987-06-16(c), (e)

The appellees moved to dismiss the appellants' actions on the grounds that they failed to file their Title VII claims with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and the EEOC within the time periods prescribed by statute, see 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e-5(c), (e) (1982), ... The District Court denied this motion with respect to fifteen of the appellants based on its finding that they were unaware (due in part to the MPD's withholding of the facts) until some time in 1981 that the Department had considered race and sex in making the additional five promotions. However, the court dismissed six of the appellants from the suit based on its finding that they had actual knowledge of the Department's actions in early 1979, and thereafter did not pursue their claims within the requisite statutory periods. ... Because these factual findings are not clearly erroneous, we affirm this portion of the trial court's judgment 11 In the alternative, the trial court held that it was unnecessary to analyze the validity of the Plan, because there had been no "but for" causation between the Department's reliance on the Plan and the appellants' failure to obtain promotions.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC filing deadline may be tolled in exceptional cases between private parties when mental incapacity prevents a claimant from pursuing any remedy.

Moody v. Bayliner Marine Corp. · filed 1987-07-13(e)

Therefore, the court holds that in suits between private parties, under exceptional circumstances, the period for filing a charge with the EEOC in Title VII cases may be tolled, in the discretion of the court, for that period of time which mental incapacity rendered the plaintiff incapable of pursuing any remedy.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge filing period begins when an employee knew or should have known of the challenged employment action.

Payne v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad · filed 1987-08-04(e)

The Court has concluded Mr. Payne either knew or should have known in April of 1979 that he could not transfer his Chicago seniority to the Memphis roster. For Title VII purposes, this commenced the running of the charge filing period. ... Mr. Payne did not file his charge with EEOC until February 18, 1982, thereby failing to meet statutorily mandated jurisdictional prerequisites.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally gives a Title VII claimant who first files with a state agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge after the alleged discriminatory act.

Monroe-Lord v. Hytche · filed 1987-08-19(e)

Generally, a Title VII litigant who initially files her charge in a state agency may sue upon the allegedly discriminatory acts occurring within the 300 days prior to filing with the EEOC — in this case, the 300 days prior to January 3, 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Plaintiffs were notified in June 1982 that they had been denied tenure. These allegedly discriminatory acts clearly fall outside the 300-day limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge in a deferral state to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act.

Grudowski v. Butler Paper Co. · filed 1987-09-02(e)

In deferral states such as Indiana, charges of discrimination must be “filed” with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... The charge was therefore not timely filed with the EEOC and the plaintiffs Title VII claim is subject to summary judgment.

In a deferral state, a Title VII claimant must file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act.

Alsup v. International Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local Union No. 3 · filed 1987-09-09(e)

In “deferral states” such as Ohio, where the EEOC defers to the state agency established to investigate such charges of discrimination, the EEOC charge must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful act.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Skeeter v. City of Norfolk · filed 1987-09-21(e)

In order to be actionable under Title VII, a charge must be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a claimant who files an EEOC charge within 300 days to use that filing period even if the charge was filed with the state agency after the state deadline.

Wallace v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1987-09-23(e)

The Court concludes that the instant action is not precluded by the fact that Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, but with the state agency after the state limitations period had lapsed.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a claimant in a deferral state to use the 300-day EEOC filing period even if the state-agency filing was untimely, provided the EEOC filing becomes effective within 300 days.

Maurya v. Peabody Coal Company · filed 1987-10-01(e)

In conclusion, then, we hold that Maurya made a timely filing within 300 days with the EEOC and that he is not penalized for failure to timely file with the KCHR.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a charge filed more than 300 days after the last alleged discriminatory act, even when the plaintiff alleges a continuing violation.

Fuchilla v. Prockop · filed 1987-10-13(e)

Plaintiff's sworn charge against Dr. Prockop was filed December 7, 1983, 302 days after the date the last discriminatory act by Prockop could have occurred. Thus, assuming that there were a series of discriminatory acts, no act occurred within the 300-day time limit, and accordingly, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Prockop are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of the last alleged unlawful employment practice; a factual dispute about that date can preclude summary judgment.

Beckham v. Grand Affair of North Carolina, Inc. · filed 1987-10-14(e)

If Defendant is correct, then Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed within 180 days of the last allegedly unlawful employment practice as required by § 2000e-5(e), and Plaintiff’s First Claim would be barred. ... Under Plaintiff’s version of the facts, her EEOC charge was timely filed.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day EEOC filing period applies when state or local agency proceedings were instituted, even if those proceedings were untimely under state or local law.

Michael E. MENNOR, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. the FORT HOOD NATIONAL BANK, Defendant-Appellant · filed 1987-10-16(e)

The 300-day filing period of 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(e) for cases in which state or local agency proceedings have been instituted applies whether or not these other proceedings are timely instituted under state or local law.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows complainants in deferral states 300 days to file an EEOC charge even if state proceedings begin more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination.

Gilardi v. Gary Schroeder, D/B/A Gary Schroeder Trucking · filed 1987-11-04(e)

In light of the well-reasoned precedent both in this and other circuits, we conclude that the 300-day filing period under Title VII is available to deferral state residents who file complaints with state agencies more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets a 180-day period for filing a Title VII discrimination charge with the EEOC.

Wood v. Exxon Corp. · filed 1987-11-23(e)

The applicable limitation period under Title VII and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1985); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1985). Plaintiffs charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC on October 19, 1982. Any acts of alleged discrimination occurring on or before April 22, 1982, are barred by limitations.

A state agency’s waiver of initial processing under a worksharing agreement terminates state proceedings and satisfies Section 2000e-5(c)’s deferral requirement.

United States v. Berrien County · filed 1987-11-23(c)

MDCR’s waiver constitutes a “termination” of MDCR proceedings and satisfies the deferral provisions of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a Title VII claimant 300 days to file an EEOC charge after filing with a state or local agency, even if the state filing missed the state deadline.

Daisley v. General Electric Co. · filed 1987-11-25(e)

As Congress wrote this section without mention of or reference to state statutes of limitations, this Court will not imply this additional requirement.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII claimant to file an EEOC charge within 180 days; a charge filed after that period is untimely.

Byrd v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc. · filed 1987-12-15(e)

Whatever date is applied between the time of the original filing of Payne in 1972 and the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 1982, it is clear that plaintiffs did not file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Their Title VII claims must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a claimant in a deferral state 300 days after an alleged discriminatory act to file an EEOC charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Graphics Press, Inc. · filed 1988-01-13(e)

Her complaint is thus deemed filed with the EEOC 60 days later, or June 8,1985, well within the 300 day time limitation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a written charge signed under oath or affirmation; a response to an EEOC questionnaire does not qualify as a charge.

Buffington v. General Time Corp. · filed 1988-01-15(b)

Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff Buffington’s response to the Questionnaire was not a “charge” of discrimination as contemplated under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a 300-day filing period when the claimant initially institutes state or local proceedings; an EEOC referral under a worksharing agreement does not satisfy that requirement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 1988-01-15(e)

The law is clear in this Circuit that the EEOC’s transmittal of Keener’s claims to the MCHR pursuant to the worksharing agreement between the two agencies does not constitute the “initial institution” of a proceeding with the MCHR under section 706(e).

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to file an EEOC charge and provide notice to the respondent before bringing a Title VII action.

Touron v. Dade County · filed 1988-01-20(e)

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge to be filed with the EEOC after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of the charge is to be filed upon the person against whom such charge is made within a designated time. ... There is nothing in the record to show such compliance; significantly, Plaintiff has not alleged compliance either.

In a deferral State, filing a charge with the state agency within 240 days of the alleged discrimination preserves the federal Title VII claim.

Torriero v. Olin Corp. · filed 1988-01-29(c)

Accordingly, the Court finds that proceedings were initiated with the CHRO within the requisite 240 day period, and thus, plaintiff's Title VII claim is preserved.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a claim for each discriminatory act occurring within 180 days before the claimant files an EEOC charge, even if earlier acts are untimely.

45 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1441, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,776 · filed 1988-01-29(e)

It is axiomatic that each plaintiff is entitled to prosecute under Title VII any act of discrimination that occurred within 180 days of the filing of her EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; separate, unrelated employment acts do not extend the filing period as a continuing violation.

Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America · filed 1988-02-08(e)

Timely filing with the EEOC is a prerequisite to maintenance of a Title VII action. ... Resolving all inferences and doubts in Miller’s favor, we still do not find a triable issue of a continuing violation. ... Yet, to this day, she has not filed a claim with the EEOC regarding her 1982 demotion.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows a timely charge based on an adverse employment decision applying an earlier discriminatory review process.

Johnson v. General Electric · filed 1988-02-22(e)

Even if the event in February is in some sense a “consequence” of the earlier discrimination, it is also alleged to be an independent discriminatory act in and of itself. ... That count therefore was not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows the 300-day filing period when the EEOC forwards a charge to a state agency under a worksharing agreement, even if the charge is untimely under state law.

Joe D. URRUTIA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. VALERO ENERGY CORP. and Jerry Woodson, Defendants-Appellees · filed 1988-03-31(e)

Since the TCHR had already waived jurisdiction over Title VII claims filed within this time frame, all that was required to institute state proceedings was a nominal filing with the TCHR, which was accomplished when the EEOC transmitted appellant’s discrimination charge on a standard form on August 8, 1985. We hold that such proceedings were thereby initially instituted. ... Appellant, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of the 300-day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the alleged injury.

Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamenta · filed 1988-04-05(e)

A plaintiff may bring a Title VII action only if he has first filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of suffering injury in violation of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). ... Hence, the class action challenge to the high school diploma requirement may not be brought under Title VII.

A claimant in a deferral state may use the 300-day federal filing period despite filing after the state agency’s deadline, if the state filing allows an effective EEOC filing within 300 days.

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HANSA PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1988-04-18(c), (e)

We hold that a claimant’s untimely filing under state law does not prohibit application of the federal 300-day filing period. The claimant need only make a state filing in sufficient time so as to allow an effective filing with the EEOC within 300 days.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge is a limitations period subject to equitable tolling.

Llewellyn v. Celanese Corp. · filed 1988-03-01(e)

The requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) that plaintiff file her EEOC charge within the 180-day period is a statute of limitations rather than a prerequisite to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. As a statute of limitations, it is subject to equitable estoppel or tolling when the circumstances of the case warrant such treatment.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing deadline does not prevent earlier acts from serving as evidence of a later constructive discharge, even if separate claims based on those acts may be time-barred.

Thames v. Maurice Sporting Goods, Inc. · filed 1988-05-13(e)

Though any separate claims based on Maurice’s 1984 and 1985 actions may be time-barred under Title VII and ADEA, those actions are nonetheless admissible as relevant evidence as to a claimed constructive discharge of Thames in 1986 (Downey v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 649 F.2d 302, 305 (5th Cir.1981)).

Section 2000e-5 permits a state agency to waive its 60-day period for initial processing, allowing an EEOC charge to be filed immediately; an untimely state filing does not bar the extended 300-day federal filing period.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Commercial Office Products Co. · filed 1988-05-16(c), (e)

We join the Circuits in concluding that state time limits for filing discrimination claims do not determine the applicable federal time limit. ... Because we find that the extended 300-day federal limitations period is applicable to this case and that the CCRD's waiver of the 60-day deferral period "terminated" its proceedings within that 300-day limit, we conclude that Leerssen's claim was timely filed under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII claim against a related employer omitted from the administrative charge when the plaintiff lacked reason to know of the relationship and the employer suffered no prejudice.

Sargent v. McGrath · filed 1988-05-17(f)(1)

In light of the directions and policies articulated by the court of appeals in Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers, 657 F.2d 890, 892, 908 (7th Cir.1981), I am persuaded that Ms. Sargent’s failure to name Zayre in her equal rights division charges does not deprive this court of jurisdiction over her claim against Zayre.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice to preserve a federal Title VII suit.

Paulo v. Cooley, Inc. · filed 1988-05-18(e)

In all events, the complaining employee must file with the EEOC within three hundred days after the occurence of the alleged unlawful employment practice, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), or lose the right thereafter to bring suit in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(c) determines when an EEOC charge is deemed filed for purposes of the 300-day filing period.

Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank · filed 1988-05-19(c)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), plaintiffs EEOC charge is deemed to have been filed on November 24, 1980. Therefore, to recover, the plaintiff must initially prove an act of unlawful discrimination within the 300 day filing period, i.e. January 30, 1980.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits a Title VII claim to conduct occurring within 300 days before the plaintiff files an EEOC charge.

Mira v. Monroe County School Board · filed 1988-05-31(e)

III. Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII is limited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) to the date 300 days prior to the filing of her charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)'s naming requirement is satisfied when the entity named in the administrative charge is legally identical to the defendant sued.

Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College, Raul Parilla, as President of Montgomery Communi · filed 1988-06-03(f)(1)

Because we find that under Maryland law the board of trustees is identical with the college, we find no violation of the statutory naming requirement.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to sue on a charge it accepted and investigated even if the charge was never verified.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Calumet Photographic, Inc. · filed 1988-06-08(f)(1)

Whereas the statute suggests that a private person who wishes to sue on a charge deemed meritless by the Commission must perfect her charge pursuant to the requirements of subsec. 5(b), the statute permits the Commission to bring a lawsuit on behalf of a person who has filed a charge irrespective of whether the charge has been perfected.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day filing deadline may be tolled when EEOC assistance with an initial charge leads a claimant to add an allegation after the deadline.

Cobb v. Stringer · filed 1988-06-21(e)

In these circumstances, we believe that Cobb raised a material factual issue of whether her initial visit to the EEOC tolled the filing requirement as to her demotion, making the subsequent amendment timely.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge filing period is tolled for putative class members while a class action asserting substantially similar claims is pending.

Sharpe v. American Express Co. · filed 1988-06-29(e)

This Court concludes that the reasoning which made it appropriate to extend the American Pipe doctrine to class members who wanted to file individual actions also makes it appropriate to extend the tolling doctrine to putative class members who want to begin the administrative process by filing a claim with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is not extended merely because a female employee continues to earn less than a former male coworker earned, absent present discrimination or an established discriminatory policy.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Penton Industrial Publishing Company, Inc. · filed 1988-07-13(e)

The courts have recognized only two narrowly limited exceptions of “continuing violations” which would toll the running of a statute of limitations under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act. ... This court declines to recognize such an exception to the statutes of limitations for Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline is not extended under a continuing-violation theory unless a present Title VII violation occurred within the filing period.

Malhotra v. Cotter & Co. · filed 1988-08-24(e)

But a finding of a continuing violation must be based upon a present violation within the relevant time period. ... Because Mr. Malhotra has not presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a present violation of Title VII, there is no basis for his continuing violation theory.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 180-day deadline for filing an EEOC charge can be waived if the defendant fails to raise it in the trial court.

Hernandez v. Hill Country Telephone Cooperative · filed 1988-07-19(e)

Under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e) a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. Hill Country argues that the trial court erred in finding it liable for discrimination based on acts which occurred more than 180 days prior to November 2, 1982, the date Hernandez filed his initial EEOC charge. This issue was not raised in the trial court and is first presented on appeal. We must deem it waived.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge in a deferral state to be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, subject to the state proceedings filing requirement.

Crandall v. Prudential Insurance · filed 1988-07-29(e)

When a claim is brought in a deferral state, a Title VII charge must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Thus, regardless of the date on which the unlawful employment practice occurred— July 1, 1985 or September 9, 1985 — the EEOC charge was not filed within the 240/300 day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars Title VII claims based on acts occurring more than 300 days before an EEOC charge unless a continuing violation applies.

Sosa v. Hiraoka · filed 1988-11-09(e)

Consequently, these allegations are based on occurrences dated more than 300 days prior to the filing of the EEOC charge and are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) from serving as bases for liability.

A factual dispute over whether an employer posted required notices of EEOC rights can prevent summary judgment on the timeliness of a Title VII charge.

Robinson v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co. · filed 1988-11-15(e)

Therefore, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment must be denied, as regards Rene-Fitzgerald, on the basis of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact which would, if established, lead the court to toll the limitations period as regards the filing of her AK complaint.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a person who first pursues state agency proceedings to file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged employment practice or 30 days after notice that the state proceedings ended, whichever is earlier.

Mays v. New York City Police Department · filed 1988-12-09(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), when a person has initially instituted proceedings with a state agency, he must file a charge with the EEOC “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier ...” ... Therefore, the Court concludes that plaintiffs claim with respect to his termination in 1974 is untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful practice, or within 300 days if proceedings first begin with a state or local agency; the filing period may be waived or tolled.

Chapman v. Homco, Inc. · filed 1988-12-13(e)

First, a charge must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within 300 days if the proceedings are initially instituted with a state or local agency. ... Given the above facts and Title VII filing deadlines, any Title VII claim that the Plaintiff might bring is also time-barred. Additionally, Plaintiff has asserted no reason why the filing requirements and the limitations period are waived or tolled.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act; related acts may qualify for the continuing violation exception.

Scott v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York · filed 1989-01-13(e)

Title VII requires a plaintiff complaining of an alleged discriminatory employment practice to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Since the alleged act of discrimination which falls within the 300 day period is unrelated to the alleged acts of discrimination which fall outside of the 300 day period, the continuing violation exception does not apply.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing period begins at the actual discharge when earlier notices did not make termination final or irrevocable.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. University of Detroit · filed 1988-12-13(e)

Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that Roesser’s EEOC rights did not accrue until May 15, 1984, and his complaints to the EEOC against the UDPU and the University were timely under the accrual provision of section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

The EEOC charge filing period begins when the employee is notified of the adverse employment decision; grievance proceedings do not toll it.

Peterson v. City of Wichita, Kan. · filed 1989-02-14(e)

The filing period for a discrimination charge commences on the date the employee is notified of the adverse employment decision, regardless of the fact that the adverse effects are not felt until later, such as in a later date of actual termination or a subsequent receipt of severance benefits. ... These decisions unquestionably require the limitations period in the case at bar to commence running on June 8, 1983.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives a claimant who first files with a state agency 300 days to file an EEOC charge; when the EEOC receives the charge during the 60-day deferral period, the court measures timeliness from a constructive filing 60 days after the state filing.

Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co. · filed 1989-03-22(e)

Accordingly, the 300-day limitations period in these cases is measured not from the actual filing with the EEOC but with the constructive filing that took place 60 days after filing with the state agency. Stated more simply, the limitations period in a situation such as this is measured back 240 days from the state filing.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a 300-day filing period when the EEOC transmits a discrimination complaint to a qualified state agency, thereby instituting state proceedings.

Washington v. Herbert Patlis and Dennis Patlis, D/B/A Pico's Restaurant · filed 1989-03-22(e)

Washington’s filing with the EEOC and the EEOC’s transmission of this complaint to the TCHR, therefore, meets the applicable 300-day time limit, thus preserving her right to pursue her claim in federal district court.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a charge within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice; for retaliatory discharge, the period begins when the employee receives notice of the impending discharge.

Blanchard v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1989-01-25(e)

Relief under Title VII is dependent upon filing a charge of discrimination “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred_” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). In a retaliatory discharge case, the one hundred and eighty day time period commences when the employee is notified by the employer of the impending discharge. ... Since Ms. Blanchard filed a timely administrative charge, her claim for retaliatory discharge is not time-barred.

In a deferral state, Section 2000e-5(e) requires a claimant to file administrative charges within 240 days of the challenged conduct.

Mack v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc. · filed 1989-03-28(e)

In a “deferral state” such as Massachusetts, the statute requires a claimant to file administrative charges within 240 days of the challenged conduct.

In New York, Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge within 300 days, but a claim may be heard after that period if it is reasonably related to a timely EEOC charge.

Bennett v. New York City Department of Corrections · filed 1989-02-03(e)

If a plaintiff waits more than 300 days to file an EEOC charge, a district court may assume jurisdiction over the claim if and only if it is “reasonably related” to a charge timely filed with the EEOC. ... Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and it will not be considered.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1)’s 90-day deadline is measured from when the clerk initially receives a complaint submitted with an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

McClelland v. Herlitz, Inc. · filed 1989-02-09(f)(1)

Because such documents are initially tendered by litigants to the clerk prior to referral to a magistrate, and because under the court’s holding today the operative date for the timeliness determination is the date of initial receipt by the clerk, the clerk is directed in all future cases to mark IFP applications "received” on the date they are first received in the clerk’s office prior to referral to a magistrate.

A distinct retaliation claim requires a timely EEOC charge unless equitable tolling is justified.

Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Service, Inc. · filed 1989-02-27(e)

Sherman has not proffered any reasons which justify the use of equitable principles to toll the 300-day period from the date she was fired in which she was required to file a new EEOC charge based on the alleged retaliation. Accordingly, Sherman’s Title VII claim for retaliation is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge filing deadline is subject to equitable tolling, but an employee who had counsel during the filing period must justify a late charge.

Freeman v. CSX Transportation Co. · filed 1989-03-22(e)

Under these circumstances and with no explanation as to why the charge was filed originally with the Florida Commission on Human Relations rather than the Florida or Alabama EEOC office, the court concludes that Freeman has provided no justification for equitable tolling.

A continuing violation can bring earlier harassment within the 180-day EEOC charge filing period if at least one incident occurred during that period.

Waltman v. International Paper Co. · filed 1989-06-16(d)

In order to sustain a Title VII claim of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the "alleged unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(d). ... In order to sustain a claim under this exception, known as a continuing violation, the plaintiff must show that at least one incident of harassment occurred within the 180 day period. ... Because Waltman has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a continuing violation, summary judgment on this issue was improper.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits allegations of earlier discrimination to survive the filing deadline at the pleading stage when they form part of an alleged continuing violation; the plaintiff must still prove the exception at trial.

White v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc. · filed 1989-04-28(e)

Plaintiff’s claim rests solidly within the “continuing violation” exception because she is alleging acts of discrimination both before and after May 3, 1983, all of which constitute an alleged continuum of discrimination leading to her discharge. ... Of course, the Court’s ruling that the statute of limitations does not bar plaintiff’s claim applies only to the complaint itself; based on the evidence offered at trial, the Court will have to decide whether plaintiff has satisfied the “continuing violation” exception.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s EEOC charge-filing deadline does not bar a claim alleging a discriminatory campaign that continued through the filing of the charge.

Bertoncini v. Schrimpf · filed 1989-05-04(e)

If so, then plaintiff can hardly be expected to have filed a charge with the EEOC before she discovered the discriminatory campaign against her. And the defendants, who allegedly participated in this continuing violation of plaintiff’s rights, cannot rely on the statute of limitations as a defense to plaintiff’s claims.

Section 2000e-5's filing deadline bars Title VII claims based on earlier misconduct that is separate from a timely challenged termination.

Starrett v. Wadley · filed 1989-05-22(e)

Under that section, Title VII claims must be brought within 240 days, which can under some circumstances be extended to 300 days, after the alleged discriminatory employment practice. ... Thus, to the extent that plaintiff asserts claims for prior misconduct that is separate from the eventual termination, those claims are barred under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act; later discrete acts do not revive an untimely claim based on an earlier act.

Wimberg v. University of Evansville · filed 1989-06-28(e)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 requires that complainants file their 2000e charges with the EEOC within three hundred (300) days of the alleged violation. ... Since the March 12, 1984 incident upon which plaintiff relies to prove her sex discrimination case falls outside the three hundred (300) days before she filed her EEOC charge, her Title VII claim is barred, and the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on plaintiff’s sex discrimination charge is granted.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge alleging a continuing violation when at least one discriminatory act occurred within the 300-day filing period.

June YOUNG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1989-08-22(e)

At the outset, we must address defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s claim is time-barred for her failure to file this charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 300 days of the violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... To succeed under the continuing violation theory, plaintiff must demonstrate that the acts of alleged discrimination are part of an ongoing pattern of discrimination and that at least one of the alleged discrete acts of discrimination occurred within the relevant limitations period. ... Young’s claim was therefore timely filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge within 300 days of the alleged violation; for a continuing violation, at least one discriminatory act must fall within that period.

Dicker v. Allstate Life Insurance · filed 1989-10-19(e)

In the case of a continuing violation, the plaintiff must allege that one discriminatory act occurred within the 300 days prior to filing the charge. ... Each of these alleged discriminatory acts occurred after January 12, 1988. Therefore, plaintiffs timely filed their claim.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 300 days, but the filing period is tolled until facts supporting a discrimination charge were or should have been apparent to a reasonably prudent employee.

Perera v. Flexonics, Inc. · filed 1989-10-25(e)

A charge under Title VII must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). However, this filing deadline is tolled “until the time when facts that would support a charge of discrimination were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff.” ... Accordingly, we find that there is an issue of fact as to whether these Title VII claims are time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s filing period requires a discriminatory act within the period; continuing effects of an earlier act do not suffice.

Brackshaw v. Miles, Inc. · filed 1989-10-26(e)

Brackshaw must allege that a discriminatory act, not merely an effect of a discriminatory act, took place within the limitations period in order to bring a Title VII claim.

In Puerto Rico, employees have 300 days after an unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC charge.

Sampayo-Garraton v. Rave, Inc. · filed 1989-12-03(e)

Puerto Rico is a “deferral” state within the meaning of section 706(b) and (d) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and (e), in which employees have 300 days after unlawful employment practice to file charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires Federal Home Loan Bank employees to file an EEOC complaint within 180 days when no state or local agency can hear their employment discrimination claims.

Osei-Bonsu v. Federal Home Loan Bank of New York · filed 1989-12-12(e)

Relating this finding to the language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), the Court now holds that an employee of the Federal Home Loan Bank must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct if he is to later file a Title VII action against his employer in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day EEOC filing period is not tolled when an employee gains constructive knowledge of her rights through consultation with an attorney before that period begins.

Bass v. Burleigh · filed 1989-12-21(e)

Having concluded that plaintiff had constructive knowledge more than 180 days prior to the time she filed her claim with the EEOC, the Court finds the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not toll the statute of limitations in this case.

In a deferral state, Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day EEOC filing period may begin when an applicant knew or should have known of the alleged discrimination; an employer’s response that leaves open the possibility of hiring does not establish that date as a matter of law.

Poindexter v. Northrop Corp. · filed 1990-01-17(e)

At this point, the Court finds that Northrop has not demonstrated, as a matter of law, that Poindexter knew or should have known of the alleged discrimination more than 300 days before he filed his EEOC charge. Northrop, therefore, has not demonstrated an entitlement to summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s claim is time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s charge-filing deadline is not overcome merely because the effects of earlier discrimination continue.

Palmer v. Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor · filed 1990-01-30(e)

It is well settled that "effects" alone are not sufficient to defeat a time bar, even under a "continuing violations" theory of liability.

Section 2000e-5(e)'s 300-day filing period may be tolled when related discriminatory acts form a continuing violation and at least one act falls within that period.

Moore v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. · filed 1990-02-12(e)

Although the instant case presents a close question, the court finds that since plaintiff has alleged that the series of acts constituted a pattern of harassment, and since one of the acts occurred within the 300-day limitations period (the October 15, 1985, discipline), plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts that, viewed in the light most favorable to him, would establish a continuing violation and thus toll the statute of limitations under Bruno.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars a Title VII claim when the EEOC charge is filed more than 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act.

Payne v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1990-02-14(e)

Section 706(e) requires a person to file charges with the EEOC within 180 days after the occurrence of an alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... In the instant case, Payne did not file his EEOC charge until August 20, 1986, more than 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination in October of 1984. We will therefore grant GM’s summary judgment motion with regard to plaintiff’s claim of an untimely appraisal in 1984.

Section 2000e-5(e) gives an employee 300 days after an alleged discriminatory act to file an EEOC charge before a Title VII claim becomes time-barred.

Jackson v. GTE Directories Service Corp. · filed 1990-04-02(e)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), Jackson had 300 days after the act of discrimination occurred to file a charge with the EEOC, lest his Title VII action be time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) starts the EEOC charge filing period when the claimant first learns of the alleged discriminatory denial; later requests that repeat the denial do not restart it.

Mitilinakis v. City of Chicago · filed 1990-04-05(e)

Here the alleged discriminatory practice, the event which triggered the running of the time period in which plaintiff was required to file her EEOC charge, occurred on December 1, 1985 when plaintiff was first denied reinstatement.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits a charge filed during an ongoing pattern of discrimination to cover all discriminatory acts in that pattern.

Cuello-Suarez v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica De Puerto Rico · filed 1990-04-25(e)

This being so, as long as the charges were filed, as they indeed were, during the life of the discriminatory conduct, they would be timely as to all discriminatory acts encompassed by the violation.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows an extended 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge in a deferral state; a charge submitted on day 284 may be timely depending on the state agency proceedings.

Rebecca SHEPHERD, Appellant, v. the KANSAS CITY CALL and Reuben Benton, Appellees · filed 1990-06-11(e)

Neither this fact nor the 300-day filing period was acknowledged in the district court. The record does not address either the existence of any worksharing agreement or the nature of any interaction between the MCHR and the EEOC regarding the charge Shepherd submitted to the EEOC on the 284th day. Thus, remand is necessary to determine whether Shepherd’s charge was timely filed.

A plaintiff who shows a continuing violation of Title VII may avoid the 300-day EEOC filing limit.

McLaughlin v. State of New York, Governor's Office of Employee Relations · filed 1990-06-11(e)

After reviewing the allegations contained in the complaint, the additional assertions made in plaintiffs affidavits, and taking into consideration the fact that there has never been any discovery in this suit, this court holds that plaintiff has made a showing of the existence of a continuing violation of Title VII by the defendants sufficient, at this time, to avoid the application of the 300-day Title VII limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day charge-filing period is not extended when the alleged discrimination is an isolated act rather than a continuing violation.

Chaffin v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 1990-06-12(e)

A complaint is timely when "filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... Chaffin's claim alleges an isolated act of racial discrimination which occurred more than three years prior to the filing of his original EEOC charge. The District Court properly determined that this untimely claim cannot be saved by the continuing violation theory that Chaffin asserts.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing period for discriminatory pension benefits begins when a retiree receives specific notice that he will receive those benefits, rather than when he first learns of the pension policy.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. First National Bank · filed 1990-06-26(e)

It seems a reasonable extension of Heiar that the Title VII limitations period begins running from the time a retiree receives specific notice that he will in fact receive discriminatory benefits, rather than from the time he first becomes aware that a discriminatory pension policy exists.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s filing period runs from the discriminatory act; when an employee resigns, the period can run from notice of resignation rather than the last day of work.

Adames v. Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd. · filed 1990-07-09(e)

Since New York is a deferral state, plaintiffs Poggi and Krlic had 240 days from the last date of alleged discrimination within which to file with the New York State Department of Human Rights (or the EEOC, which would defer to the state agency). ... Because the relevant time period is measured from the date the employee gave notice of her intent to resign and not her last day on the job, Krlic’s complaint was untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) allows 300 days to file an EEOC charge where a qualifying state or local agency has a work sharing agreement with the EEOC; the period begins when the claimant learns of the challenged employment decision.

Truelove v. Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia · filed 1990-07-11(e)

Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ...,” unless a charge is instituted within 300 days with a state or local agency that has a work sharing agreement with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The District of Columbia has such a work sharing agreement. ... Therefore the 300-day limit applies in this case. ... As the period of limitations for filing a charge must be deemed to have commenced on April 6, 1988, the date plaintiff was given notice of the evaluation committee’s decision, plaintiff’s claim of discrimination based on the 1986-87 evaluation must be dismissed as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) permits an otherwise untimely Title VII claim when it is part of a continuing discriminatory policy with an act within the filing period.

Pfau v. Coopers & Lybrand · filed 1990-07-13(e)

In this Circuit, a plaintiff may rescue an otherwise stale discrimination claim it constitutes a part of a continuing violation of discrimination, some of which falls within the limitations period. ... The motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

In a deferral state, a Title VII claimant has 300 days to file an EEOC charge.

Holland v. First Virginia Banks, Inc. · filed 1990-07-20(e)

Virginia, however, is a so-called “deferral state,” and consequently the plaintiff had a 300 day filing period.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge before a plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim in court.

Payne v. Duracell U.S.A. · filed 1990-07-27(e)

Under § 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), Plaintiff had 180 days after the alleged demotion to file a charge with the EEOC. ... Plaintiff’s claim, therefore, is precluded by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5 requires an EEOC charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Watson v. Sears, Roebuck Co. · filed 1990-07-30(e)

To be timely, such a charge must be filed within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... Since Ms. Watson filed her EEOC charge on August 9, 1989, any alleged discriminatory practice occurring prior to February of 1989 is time barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) places a time limit on discriminatory acts that may form a Title VII claim, though earlier acts may be considered as evidence of a pattern.

Seo v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. · filed 1990-08-15(e)

Much of the conduct complained of by plaintiff occurred prior to March 15, 1986, more than 240 days from the filing of Seo’s discrimination claim and is therefore outside the scope of plaintiff’s Title VII suit. Although evidence of these prior complaints was permitted for the purpose of showing a pattern of discrimination, the Court does not find such a pattern.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets a deadline for filing a Title VII charge with the EEOC; equitable tolling requires a justification beyond the absence of prejudice.

Harper v. Georgetown University · filed 1990-08-21(e)

He filed his charge alleging violation of Title VII with the EEOC and the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights on January 27, 1988, well beyond the 180 days provided by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The Court can find no basis to justify equitable tolling in this instance.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s charge-filing deadline applies separately to each distinct claim of discrimination; a timely hiring claim does not revive an unrelated, untimely work-assignment claim.

Sandoval v. Saticoy Lemon Ass'n · filed 1990-08-31(e)

As such, the statutory limitations period applies to each claim of discrimination giving rise to a Title VII cause of action. ... The plaintiffs cannot use the continuing violation theory to bring their otherwise time-barred claims against Saticoy’s work assignment policies within Title VII’s limitations period.

A Title VII charge is timely under § 2000e-5(e) when alleged harassment continues within 300 days of filing, even if the charge lists an earlier date as the last act of discrimination.

Cline v. General Electric Credit Auto Lease, Inc. · filed 1990-10-01(e)

Second, Ms. Cline presents evidence that notwithstanding what she put in her EEOC charge, Mr. Burd’s harassment continued while she was on leave. This harassment consisted of calling her up, asking for “Syphilis,” and inquiring as to her health. These calls occurred well within Title VII’s 300-day limit.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed within 180 days of the discriminatory act; an earlier claim is not saved by a timely claim without a nexus between them.

Frazier v. First Union National Bank · filed 1990-10-02(e)

The Court finds that as a matter of law Plaintiffs have failed to establish that a nexus exists between the timely filed claims and those claims that occurred 180 days prior to the filing of the charges with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely EEOC charge; an employer does not waive an untimeliness defense merely by failing to raise it during the EEOC proceeding.

Byrnes v. Herion, Inc. · filed 1990-10-12(e)

Plaintiff has failed to argue any facts which could give rise to a disputed issue of tolling or estoppel. Moreover, we cannot agree with plaintiffs position inasmuch as an administrative proceeding before the Commission is not adversarial by nature thus depriving defendant of any method by which it could have asserted an objection. Finally, we are unable to find any authority for the proposition that a waiver under these circumstances would be appropriate. Based upon the foregoing, it is our determination that plaintiffs Title VII claim is time-barred under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a timely filing with the EEOC; failure to file on time can warrant dismissal of a Title VII complaint.

Layton v. General Motors Corporation · filed 1990-10-17(e)

The district court dismissed Layton's complaint on the basis that she had failed to timely file her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(e). ... Upon review, we conclude the district court properly dismissed the complaint, for the reasons stated by that court.

In a deferral state, a party must file with the EEOC or the state agency within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Cobb v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. · filed 1990-10-24(e)

In "deferral states", states that have their own state or local employment opportunity commissions, a party must file with the EEOC or the state agency within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a Title VII charge to be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Hubbard v. City of Middletown · filed 1990-12-05(e)

A Title VII claim must be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. ... Therefore, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hubbard timely filed her Title VII claim with the EEOC, and defendant City of Middletown’s motion for summary judgment on Hubbard’s Title VII claim must be denied.

An initial EEOC complaint can satisfy Section 2000e-5’s 180-day filing requirement even if the final charge is signed later.

Ghahramani v. BASF Corp. · filed 1991-01-31(e)

The defendant argued that the plaintiffs claims had prescribed because the final complaint was signed over 180 days from the time Ghahramani left BASF. The Court disagrees and finds that the initial complaint was sufficient notice to comply with the 180 day requirement.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an EEOC charge within 180 days of a discriminatory act, but earlier related acts may be pursued as part of a continuing violation.

Sosa v. Hiraoka · filed 1990-12-06(e)

Title VII provides that claimants such as Sosa must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of an act of discrimination. ... Allegations of conduct occurring prior to the 180-day period are actionable if Sosa can show that they are part of a "continuing violation" of Sosa's Title VII rights. ... Because Sosa thus sufficiently alleged a continuing violation, we reverse dismissal of allegations in his complaint as time-barred.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires an EEOC charge within 300 days of a discriminatory act, but a continuing violation can satisfy the filing requirement when the discriminatory practice continues into that period.

Laughinghouse v. Risser · filed 1990-12-18(e)

As a general rule, a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC no later than 300 days following the discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). However, the continuing violation theory provides an exception to this general rule. ... Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated that the continuing violation theory should be applied here. Defendants have not offered any argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs Title VII claims based on incidents in the fall of 1985.

Where the 300-day period applies, a Title VII charge must be filed within 300 days of the final employment decision; later efforts to obtain reconsideration do not restart the period.

Faulkner-King v. BD. OF TR. OF UNIV. OF ILLINOIS · filed 1991-02-22(e)(1)

While the University’s procedures regarding tenure invitations take place over an extended period of time, as in Ricks, the final decision regarding Plaintiff was made on August 20, 1986, when the Board of Trustees extended her a terminal contract. Any action subsequent to that date was merely an attempt to obtain reconsideration of a past decision rather than to influence a future decision.

Section 2000e-5 requires an employee to file a discrimination charge within 180 days of the alleged act; an earlier act cannot be pursued as a continuing violation without a connection to timely acts.

Allen v. Denver Public School Board · filed 1991-03-26(e)

In order to bring suit under Title VII, an aggrieved employee must file a complaint with the EEOC or a related state agency within 180 days of the alleged unlawful act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. ... Allen has not provided any evidence to the court regarding the connection between any of these acts. ... Therefore, the nonpromotion claim is prohibited as untimely.

Section 2000e-5(e) bars claims based on discriminatory acts that occurred more than 300 days before the administrative complaint was filed.

Miller v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 1991-02-22(e)

Litigation of all of these incidents except for the November 12, 1985 suspension is time-barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) because they took place more than 300 days before the December 9, 1985 filing.

Section 2000e-5 gives a claimant in a deferral state 300 days to file an EEOC charge when the EEOC initially processes it; ordinary settlement negotiations do not justify tolling that deadline.

Foutty v. Equifax Services, Inc. · filed 1991-04-05(e)(1)

In a “deferral” state such as Kansas, a complainant has 300 days from the alleged discrimination in which to file an administrative complaint with the EEOC. ... Under these facts, the court concludes that equitable tolling is unwarranted and, accordingly, grants defendant’s motion.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 300-day filing period applies when the EEOC refers a charge to a state agency within that period, even if the EEOC received the charge first.

Bouman v. Block · filed 1991-07-23(e)

Since the EEOC deferred jurisdiction to the state within 300 days, the extension period is triggered regardless of whether the complaint was first received by the EEOC or the state. The district court did not err in concluding that Bouman's EEOC complaint was timely filed and that her Title VII claim was not time-barred.

Section 2000e-5’s charge-filing deadline may be equitably tolled when the employer’s conduct raises a genuine factual dispute about whether it caused the delay.

Foutty v. Equifax Services, Inc. · filed 1991-05-07(e)(1)

Under these circumstances and considering the facts in the light most favorable to Foutty, as we are required to do on summary judgment, Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214, 105 S.Ct. 1187, 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), the court finds that Foutty has raised genuine issues of material fact as to whether Equifax’ conduct was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.