42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit before 180 days have passed when the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter after determining it cannot act within that period.

Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc. · filed 1980-10-29(f)(1)

In conclusion, the court holds that jurisdiction is conferred on district courts to hear claims of employment discrimination under Title VII when a right-to-sue letter has been sent to the aggrieved person, even if that occurs within the 180-day deferral period, provided there has been a determination that the EEOC will be unable to act within that time.

Section 2000e-5(e) provides a 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge in states with a qualified state agency.

Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc. · filed 1982-01-11(e)

The statute also provides that the limitations period for filing with the EEOC is extended from 180 to 300 days when the aggrieved party has initiated a complaint with a qualified state agency. Id. § 2000e-5(e). ... Charges in the present case are therefore subject to the 300 day limit.

A timely state agency intake form can institute proceedings for the 300-day EEOC filing period when the claimant’s failure to complete a formal charge is not shown to be the claimant’s fault.

Apolonio A. PASTRANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL MOGUL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1982-07-21(e)

We conclude that the equities present in this case require us to deem Pastrana’s FEPC charge “initially instituted’’ when he completed the CIS form on October 1, 1979. This date is within the 180-day limit specified by state law. The Illinois FEPC therefore had “authority to grant or seek relief” and the extended 300-day limit for filing with the EEOC was available to Pastrana.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII suit based on a right-to-sue notice issued before 180 days have elapsed.

Brown v. Puget Sound Electrical Apprenticeship & Training Trust · filed 1984-05-03(f)(1)

This court upheld the validity of right to sue notices issued prior to the expiration of 180 days in Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n., 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S.Ct. 814, 63 L.Ed.2d 55 (1980). See also Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir.1980) (right to sue notice issued before 180 days elapsed was valid). Therefore, under the law of this circuit, the district court did not err in assuming jurisdiction over Appellees' disparate impact claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to wait for the EEOC to dismiss the charge or for the 180-day period to run before proceeding with a private suit.

People of State of NY v. Holiday Inns, Inc. · filed 1984-08-29(f)(1)

Plaintiffs’ Title VII charges are therefore remanded to the EEOC with the direction that it reassert jurisdiction for an additional period of time necessary to constitute the 180-day period set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) or until said charges are dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits suit on a right-to-sue letter issued before 180 days have passed when early issuance does not circumvent EEOC conciliation.

Hooks v. RCA Corp. · filed 1984-10-25(f)(1)

Although some courts have refused to enforce this regulation because it undermines the congressional policy favoring conciliation of employment discrimination disputes, e.g., Mills v. Jefferson Bank East, 559 F.Supp. 34 (D.Colo.1983), I find that the right to sue letter was properly issued in the present case and that jurisdiction lies in this court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires dismissal of the EEOC charge or expiration of the 180-day period before a claimant may file a Title VII suit.

True v. New York State Department of Correctional Services · filed 1984-12-31(f)(1)

... I find that the language of section 2000e-5(f)(1) is clear in requiring either the dismissal of the charges or the passage of the stated time period as a condition precedent to the filing of a Title VII cause of action in a federal district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to sue before receiving a right-to-sue notice when the EEOC has not acted on the charge for more than 180 days.

Bishopp v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation · filed 1986-04-18(f)(1)

Under the statute, appellants could have brought suit before receiving their right to sue notice because the EEOC's delay in issuing the notice or otherwise acting on the charges exceeded 180 days.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to sue before 180 days have passed when the EEOC issues a right-to-sue notice after certifying that it cannot process the charge within that period.

Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan · filed 1994-06-09(f)(1)

Because we hold that early issuance of a notice of right to sue based on the Commission’s certification that it will be unable to process the charge within 180 days does not preclude a claimant from filing an action in federal court, we reverse the judgment of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an early right to sue notice only after the EEOC dismisses the charge; administrative infeasibility does not excuse the 180-day waiting period.

Montoya v. Valencia County · filed 1994-12-29(f)(1)

The EEOC’s regulation permitting the EEOC to issue right to sue notices prior to passage of 180 days without dismissal of the charge is patently inconsistent with section 2000e-5(f)(l). This section authorizes early right to sue letters only after the EEOC dismisses the charge. It makes no allowance for excusing compliance on grounds of administrative infeasibility.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to pursue a private Title VII suit after 180 days have passed since filing an EEOC charge, without waiting for the EEOC to finish its investigation.

Vance Ex Rel. Vance v. W.G. Yates & Sons Construction Co. · filed 1997-06-12(f)(1)

Furthermore, complete exhaustion of the administrative process is not required if, before filing suit, at least 180 days have passed since the plaintiff filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(e)(1) generally limits actionable harassment to the 180 days before an EEOC charge, but earlier incidents may provide background for timely conduct.

Rorie v. United Parcel Serv. · filed 1998-07-23(e)(1)

Recognizing that the September 1995 conversation falls outside of the 180-day period, we believe that, at the very least, McFadden’s comments suggest that his later behavior presents a jury question as to hostile environment.

Section 2000e-5 requires 180 days of EEOC processing before a claimant may sue based on a right-to-sue notice issued early at the claimant’s request.

Shepherd v. United States Olympic Committee · filed 2000-04-20(f)(1)

Based on the reasoning in Martini and that in Mills, however, I find Shepherd’s claims, filed less than 180 days after filing charges with the EEOC violates the 180-day waiting period under §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-5(f)(l).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) prohibits an early right-to-sue notice before the 180-day waiting period expires when the EEOC has not meaningfully investigated the charge.

Stafford v. Sealright, Inc. · filed 2000-06-21(f)(1)

Accordingly, the Court finds that notwithstanding 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), Title VII clearly prohibits the issuance of a Right to Sue notice prior to expiration of 180-days following the filing of an aggrieved person’s administrative charge of employment discrimination, particularly when the record indicates, as it does here, that the EEOC has not conducted any meaningful inquiry into plaintiffs charge prior to authorizing a civil suit.

Section 2000e-5(e) limits the Title VII events considered to those occurring within 300 days before the EEOC charge was filed.

Marshall v. Federal Express Corp. · filed 2000-11-30(e)

We further note that only events occurring 300 days before Marshall filed his EEOC charge will be considered for purposes of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), but that events occurring two years before the filing of the complaint will be considered under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Section 2000e-5(e) generally requires an employee to file an EEOC charge within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act; a timely charge does not revive claims based on earlier, discrete acts.

Williams v. Alabama Indus. Dev't Tr'g · filed 2001-05-04(e)

Generally, an aggrieved employee may not obtain relief for any alleged discrimination occurring more than 180 days before he filed his administrative charge with the EEOC. ... An employee cannot use one timely-filed EEOC charge as a bootstrap for lapsed claims arising out of other remote, discrete events. ... Therefore, Williams’s race claim shall encompass only the July 1999 incident, which is all that fell within 180 days of the EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a Title VII complainant to wait 180 days after filing an EEOC charge before suing in federal court, even if the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter earlier.

Thompson v. Jasas Corp. · filed 2002-07-15(f)(1)

Under Title VII, a right to sue letter is not to be issued sooner than 180 days after the EEOC charge is filed. ... Because the EEOC stopped processing plaintiffs charge after it had been pending for only 48 days, Count IV must be dismissed without prejudice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to sue after giving the EEOC 180 days to process a charge without proving that the EEOC actually investigated it.

Hill v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority · filed 2002-11-06(f)(1)

The District of Columbia Circuit’s opinion in Martini requires that the EEOC must have discrimination charges before it for 180 days prior to a plaintiff filing a civil action in this Court. While the Martini Court recognized that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) states that the EEOC “shall” investigate the charges, and that this duty is “mandatory and unqualified”, it is clear that the Court did not impose an affirmative burden upon a plaintiff who has filed a civil suit after the expiration of the 180 day period to show that the EEOC actually carried out its legislative mandate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to sue after the EEOC dismisses a charge without waiting 180 days from the charge’s filing.

Torres v. Johnson · filed 2002-11-27(f)(1)

Because the EEOC dismissed Torres’s charge, he was not required to wait to sue until 180 days after he had filed his EEOC charge.

Section 2000e-5(e) sets a 180-day period for considering alleged adverse employment actions.

Beard v. 84 Lumber Company · filed 2006-10-17(e)

In any event, these events occurred outside the 180-day period, and, therefore, we do not consider them as adverse employment actions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires a claimant to wait for an EEOC right-to-sue letter or the expiration of the 180-day waiting period before filing suit.

Keeler v. Cereal Food · filed 2007-10-10(f)(1)

But at the time he filed his First Action, he had not fully exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to that charge because he had not yet received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, nor had the 180-day waiting period under § 2000e-5(f)(1) expired.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars a Title VII civil action filed before the EEOC issues notice and before its 180-day period to act on the charge has elapsed.

Robinson-Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ. · filed 2008-01-29(f)(1)

Plaintiff presents no such notice from the EEOC here and in fact filed this action before 180 days had passed. Because it thus appears that plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the Court will dismiss plaintiffs fourth claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not permit the EEOC to issue an early right-to-sue notice merely because it expects that it cannot finish processing a charge within 180 days.

Hardy v. Lewis Gale Medical Center, LLC · filed 2019-03-27(f)(1)

The EEOC's regulation at issue adds a fifth option, allowing it to issue a notice of right to sue earlier than 180 days, upon a determination that it will be unable to complete the charge's processing within that period. ... Because Congress' intent is clear, the EEOC is not permitted to alter this framework through its rule-making authority.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice before 180 days have elapsed.

Hernandez v. Premium Merchant Funding One, LLC · filed 2020-07-13(f)(1)

Thus, this Court concludes that § 2000e-5(f)(1) does not unambiguously mandate a 180-day waiting period. ... Therefore, because 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) is “based on a permissible construction of the statute,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, this Court defers to the EEOC’s interpretation and upholds the regulation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a Title VII claimant to sue after an EEOC charge has been pending for 180 days, even without a right-to-sue notice.

Vaughan v. Capital City Protective Services, II LLC · filed 2022-06-27(f)(1)

Therefore, under these cases, Vaughan was free to come to this Court as early as May 2019, which was 180 days from her EEOC filing in November 2018, and so was clearly permitted to bring suit in October 2020.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not prevent enforcement of a forum-selection clause that selects a district where the action could have been brought.

CAMPINELL · filed 2026-02-06(f)(3)

I do not see how a transfer to a district where the case could have been brought contravenes the public policy the Plaintiff claims is embodied in the ADA’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3), as incorporated by the ADA, does not bar transfer under a forum-selection clause to a district where the action could have been brought.

MAYHEW · filed 2026-02-06(f)(3)

I do not see how a transfer to a district where the case could have been brought contravenes the public policy the Plaintiff claims is embodied in the ADA’s venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for ADA employment discrimination claims through the ADA’s incorporation of Title VII’s venue provision.

Williams v. Long Island Railroad · filed 2026-01-28(f)(3)

Venue for Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims under the ADA is governed by the venue provision found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Venue for Plaintiff’s ADA claims is therefore proper in this district,1 the Eastern District of New York, and every other district in the State of New York.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Rajkumar · filed 2026-02-02(f)(3)

As explained supra, venue is proper for Title VII claims “in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... But for the alleged unlawful termination, she would have continued to work in Delaware. Venue is thus proper in the District of Delaware.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district within the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Mercado · filed 2026-01-16(f)(3)

That being said, under one provision of Section 2000e-5(f)(3), this court, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and the other two federal district courts within the State of New York, see § 112(a)-(d), are all proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Reddy · filed 2026-01-14(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff seems to allege that the alleged unlawful employment practices occurred in Queens County, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, this court, and the other two federal district courts within the State of New York, see § 112(a)-(d), are all proper venues for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3), incorporated into the ADA, permits venue where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Reyna · filed 2025-12-19(f)(3)

Turning to Plaintiff’s ADA claims, New York is not the State where the unlawful employment practices allegedly occurred. Venue of Plaintiff’s claims thus does not appear to be proper in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue under the would-have-worked provision in an employee’s principal place of work, even when the employee regularly teleworks from another district.

Ani v. Reagan · filed 2025-12-04(f)(3)

The best reading of the statute, however, compels the contrary conclusion. The statute’s “use of the article ‘the’”—“the judicial district”—“rather than ‘a’ strongly suggests that the requirement refers to the aggrieved individual’s principal place of work, and not any district in which the individual’s work might take him.” ... Ani’s telework agreement makes clear that her “principal place of work” was in New York.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets four grounds for venue in Title VII cases, based on the alleged unlawful practice, employment records, where the plaintiff would have worked, or the respondent’s principal office.

Graciano · filed 2025-11-12(f)(3)

For Plaintiff’s Title VII claims, venue is proper in any of the following four scenarios: [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but [4] if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. ... Because Plaintiff has failed to show that this case fulfills any of the four criteria under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), I find that venue is improper with respect to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue in Title VII cases and permits suit in districts connected to the alleged employment practice, relevant records, or the employee’s prospective workplace, with a further option based on the respondent’s principal office.

Phillips v. Hill · filed 2025-11-04(f)(3)

Under that provision, venue is proper [1] in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, [2] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or [3] in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, [4] but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. ... Ms. Phillips’ filings contain no facts establishing the District of Columbia as the proper venue under Section 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make an employee’s home district a proper venue for an ADA claim solely because the employee worked and communicated from home there.

KHARTCHENKO · filed 2025-11-10(f)(3)

The fact that plaintiff worked from and communicated with defendants from her home in New Jersey is insufficient to establish New Jersey as the proper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in a district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Varmaa v. Yellen · filed 2025-03-17(f)(3)

Venue is proper in (1) the state where the unlawful employed practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) the district where relevant employment records are maintained and administered, and (3) the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The Plaintiff alleges that the unlawful employment practices “were committed” in “Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland.” Compl. ¶ 2. So venue is proper in Maryland for the Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an action in any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Richards v. MSPB · filed 2025-03-18(f)(3)

We agree with Mr. Richards that transfer to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see § 7703(b)(2) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-16(c)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (permit- ting an action to be brought “in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed”).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where relevant employment records are maintained.

Cherry-El v. Martin · filed 2025-02-26(f)(3)

Under Title VII, however, an action may be brought only in the judicial district in which the allegedly unlawful employment practice occurred or where the relevant employment records are maintained, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(3), and the complaint fails to identify any action that occurred in the District of Columbia or any employment records that are maintained here.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows venue where relevant employment records are maintained and administered; a copy of the records in a district does not establish venue there.

Walton v. Regan · filed 2025-02-18(f)(3)

Even accepting that conclusory allegation, the existence of a copy of Walton’s records in the District of Columbia does not establish that this district is the “locus of the relevant employment records.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Stilwell v. Northwell Health, Inc. · filed 2025-02-18(f)(3)

Claims proceeding under Title VII are subject to a separate venue provision, which provides that venue is proper in, among other places, “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3); see also Bolar v. Frank, 938 F.2d 377, 378-79 (2d Cir. 1991) (§ 2000e–5(f)(3) displaces the general venue statute for Title VII claims).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the unlawful employment practice occurred; when alleged acts span districts, the court considers where the events with the most operative significance occurred.

Miller v. Mayorkas · filed 2025-02-20(f)(3)

Thus, applying a “commonsense” approach, Lamont, 590 F.2d at 1134, the Court concludes that the events with the most “operative significance,” id., occurred in Maryland. The District of Maryland is therefore the appropriate venue for the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims under the first provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the allegedly unlawful termination decision was made.

Szubinski v. SJM Premier Medical Group LLC · filed 2025-01-31(f)(3)

Plaintiff has carried her burden under the first prong of Title VII’s venue provision by establishing that the allegedly unlawful employment practice was committed in Hawai`i. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3), as incorporated into Title I of the ADA, permits venue in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Paray v. Intuit · filed 2024-07-09(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff was employed in New York, venue for her ADA claim is proper in any district in the State of New York, including the Southern District of New York.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows a Title VII action in a district tied to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked.

RIVERA v. ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY · filed 2024-07-11(f)(3)

Title VII contains its own venue provision stating that an action under Title VII “may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). None of those criteria are satisfied based on the facts alleged in Rivera’s Complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims, including where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Dupree v. Behaviorally · filed 2024-05-13(f)(3)

Because nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that the alleged unlawful employment practices took place in the State of New York or that Defendant is a resident of State of New York, it is clear that venue is not proper in this court under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) or Section 1391(b)(1), (2).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) supplies the specific venue rule for Title VII claims, so the general venue statute does not govern their venue.

Hairston v. Wormuth · filed 2024-04-25(f)(3)

Because Congress has set out a specific venue provision within Title VII for claims arising under that statute, the general venue provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 do not control the issue of proper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice.

Pentzer v. Secured Land Transfers LLC · filed 2024-04-29(f)(3)

Pentzer took steps to set up and operate the TitleOne office, and the TitleOne office continued to operate even after Pentzer suffered the alleged retaliation. The Court determines that Pentzer has fulfilled Title VII’s special venue provision and that the District of Montana proves to be the proper venue for Pentzer’s Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make a Title VII plaintiff’s residence alone a proper venue.

Cheng v. Bureau of Labour Statistics · filed 2024-04-22(f)(3)

The face of the complaint does not allege that any unlawful employment practice occurred in Maryland. ... Ms. Cheng has thus failed to establish a prima facie showing for venue based on this ground.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in a federal district within the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Woods v. Louisiana Special School District · filed 2024-02-26(f)(3)

As the Court explained in a previous order and reasons in this case,3 venue is proper both in this Court and in the Middle District of Louisiana pursuant to Title VII’s venue statute because both districts are in “the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) treats electronic employment records as maintained and administered where the server storing them is located for Title VII venue purposes.

Szubinski v. SJM Premier Medical Group LLC · filed 2024-02-20(f)(3)

When employment records are stored electronically, the location of the server storing the records is the place where they are considered to be maintained and administered for the purpose of Title VII venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII actions and applies to Rehabilitation Act and ADA actions.

Ransom v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-02-07(f)(3)

As set forth above, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(3) governs venue in Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA lawsuits, and thus venue is proper in the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits suit in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Kent v. Ssa · filed 2024-02-05(f)(3)

That statute directs that such a case is set to be brought in “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been com- mitted, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and ad- ministered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful em- ployment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office.” § 2000e-5(f)(3). The agency has not shown that transfer to the District of Arizona is appropriate. We in- stead transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, where the employment action oc- curred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides the exclusive venue rules for Title VII employment discrimination actions, displacing the general venue statute.

Dumas v. Mohawk Field Services, Inc. · filed 2023-11-07(f)(3)

Title VII contains a specific venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which specific venue provision is exclusive and displaces § 1391’s general venue provision.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a Title VII claim where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the relevant employment records are maintained.

Martin v. Impact Health · filed 2023-11-13(f)(3)

Under Title VII, venue is proper in the District of Idaho (which is where Plaintiffs worked, and the alleged wrongful employment conduct occurred) or in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (which Defendant confirmed is where its employment records are maintained).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Beauford v. McDonough · filed 2023-11-15(f)(3)

It agrees with Judge Ryu that this District is not a proper venue for the suit. It also agrees that the District of Montana appears to be a proper venue because that is where “the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed.” 42 USCS § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets venue for discrimination actions based on where the alleged practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the person would have worked, with the respondent’s principal office available if the respondent is not found in those districts.

Rogers v. MSPB · filed 2023-10-18(f)(3)

Because Mr. Rogers pursues a claim of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, this action is governed by the venue restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). ... From the record, the Eastern District of Washington satisfies none of those conditions. The court will instead transfer to the District of Columbia, leaving it for that court to address the proper respondent.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue where a plaintiff merely intended to apply to work; the plaintiff must have an established employment interest in the district.

Beall v. Robinson Exports and Import Corporation · filed 2023-10-24(f)(3)

The Court agrees with the Defendants that prong C of Title VII’s venue provisions would not create proper venue in an otherwise-unrelated judicial district based merely on a supposed intention to apply to work there.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Justis v. Department of Agriculture · filed 2023-10-25(f)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (providing that suit may be brought “[i]n any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the em- ployment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office”). Instead, we conclude that trans- fer to the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis- trict of Pennsylvania (where Mr. Justis worked prior to his removal) is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be brought in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Williams v. Glengariff Rehabilitation Healthcare Center · filed 2023-10-25(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that her former employer is located in Nassau County, and that the events that are the bases for her claims, including an alleged assault, occurred there also, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for her claims under Title VII. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue where a plaintiff merely intended to apply to work; the district must have an established connection to the plaintiff’s employment.

BEALL v. REICO KITCHEN & BATH · filed 2023-10-24(f)(3)

The Court agrees with the Defendants that prong C of Title VII’s venue provisions would not create proper venue in an otherwise-unrelated judicial district based merely on a supposed intention to apply to work there.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit in a judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred, and that venue choice weighs against transfer.

Johnson v. United Parcel Service · filed 2023-09-29(f)(3)

Given the public policy behind the Title VII’s forum provision, the Court finds that the interests of Justice weigh against transfer in this case given Johnson and Jackson’s allegations that the retaliatory and discriminatory decisions were made in this district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where employment records are kept, or where the plaintiff would have worked; if the employer cannot be found in those locations, venue also lies where it has its principal office.

Hassett v. United Airlines Incorporated · filed 2023-09-18(f)(3)

The Title VII venue statute provides for venue in four locations: 1) “any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed”; 2) “the district where employment records are kept”; 3) “the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice”; or, 4) if the employer cannot be found within any of the preceding locations, “the district where the defendant keeps its principal office.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Jansen v. The City of New York · filed 2023-09-07(f)(3)

This court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, including the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, is a proper venue for Plaintiff’s claims under Title VII because a significant portion, if not, all of the unlawful employment practices, including Plaintiff’s removal from her position, are alleged to have occurred on Staten Island, Richmond County, New York. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim in any federal district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Riese v. LI Child and Family Development Services Inc. · filed 2023-08-09(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that her former employer is located in Patchogue, Suffolk County, New York, and that the events that are the bases for her claims, including her termination, also occurred there, this court, and every other federal district court within the State of New York, are proper venues for her claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue under its employment records provision merely because some records were signed in the district; the location of the master set controls.

Jackson v. Mayorkas · filed 2023-08-16(f)(3)

The fact that, as Jackson has asserted, certain employment records relating to his departure were signed in Maryland does not establish that the “master set” of his employment records is located in Maryland.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII employment discrimination action in the judicial district where the alleged unlawful practice occurred.

Monte v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. · filed 2023-06-07(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that his claims arose in New Jersey, venue for this action lies in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. See § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) bases venue under its employment-records provision on where the records are maintained and administered, regardless of whether they can be accessed elsewhere.

Harris v. Wormuth · filed 2023-06-06(f)(3)

While he may be correct that, as a matter of convenience, the location of the relevant employment records is immaterial, § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not take convenience into account. It is the actual location of the records that matters, regardless of how easy it would be to access those records elsewhere.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3), rather than the general federal venue statute, controls venue for Title VII suits.

Velasco v. Haaland · filed 2023-05-19(f)(3)

For Title VII suits, it is the venue provision of Title VII found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), and not the general federal venue statute found at 28 U.S.C. § 1391, that controls.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in a district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained, or where the aggrieved person would have worked.

Ikem v. Mondelez International, Inc. · filed 2023-05-10(f)(3)

This action could have initially been brought in the Eastern District of Virginia under Title VII’s venue provision, as the Eastern District is (1) in Virginia, the state in which the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred, (2) the judicial district “in which the employment records” relevant to this matter are “maintained and administered” and (3) the judicial district in which Ikem “would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(£)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where an unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred.

Murray v. United Electrical Contractors, Inc. · filed 2023-05-08(f)(3)

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant committed Title VII violations in both the Eastern District and Western District. Not only were the alleged Title VII violations committed in Michigan (and the Eastern District is a “judicial district in the State”), but a number of the alleged Title VI violations occurred in the Eastern District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits an employment discrimination action in a district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Halloum v. United States Air Force · filed 2023-05-03(f)(3)

Because Plaintiff alleges that the discrimination took place outside this district, this district is not a proper venue for this action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for Title VII and Rehabilitation Act claims where the alleged conduct occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the plaintiff would have worked; the defendant’s principal office is available only if the defendant cannot be found in those districts.

Dehaemers v. Wynne · filed 2007-11-29(f)(3)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), venue for Plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act and Title VII claims is proper where (1) the Air Force’s alleged retaliation or improper dissemination of records occurred; (2) the employment records relevant to the Air Force’s actions are maintained and administered; (3) Plaintiff would have worked but for the Air Force’s alleged actions; or, only if the Air Force cannot be found in any of those districts, (4) where the Air Force has its principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where employment records are maintained and administered; sending copies elsewhere to assess an application does not change where the records are administered.

Román Martínez v. Potter · filed 2005-08-17(f)(3)

The use of the word “administered” by Defendant, however, does not mean that the records are actually “maintained and administered” for purposes of the statute anywhere but in Puer-to Rico, where Plaintiff worked for the duration of his employment at the Postal Service. Having made copies of a person’s records for the purpose of assessing an application that was denied, does not mean that this person’s records are now administered in that place.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives a Title VII plaintiff’s choice of district greater weight when a court considers transfer to another district in the same state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2005-05-31(f)(3)

In order to acknowledge this distinction without rendering section 1404(a) functionally inapplicable, and in order to read the “interests of justice” prong of the section 1404(a) analysis through the lens of the special venue provision, this court finds that a plaintiffs choice of forum is entitled to greater deference prior to intrastate transfer in cases where venue is based on allegations that the locus of unlawful employment practices occurred in that state, but not in that district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)'s federal venue rule does not apply to Title VII claims filed in state court.

Igoe v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations of the State · filed 2005-01-11(f)(3)

The fact that Igoe asserts a federal claim under Title VII does not make the federal venue statute, 42 U.S.C. sec.2000e-5(f)(3), applicable. Where a federal claim is brought in state court, venue is determined by reference to the laws of the state, not the federal statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Perkins v. Town of Princeville · filed 2004-09-27(f)(3)

In other words, in a Title VII action brought in North Carolina, a plaintiff may bring the action in any of the three federal judicial districts within this state as long as the alleged employment discrimination occurred in North Carolina.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in the district where the employees would have worked but for the alleged discriminatory practice.

James v. England · filed 2004-08-27(f)(3)

Additionally, all of the plaintiffs have satisfied the third-prong' of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). All of them contend, and the defendant does not refute, that all of the plaintiffs would have been transferred to the Washington Navy Yard if not for the RIF.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not make a plaintiff’s residence alone a proper venue for a Title VII action.

Dixon v. Brownlee · filed 2004-03-31(f)(3)

Because venue does not lie in the District of Puerto Rico under section 2000e — 5(f)(3), but does properly lie in the Northern District of California, the Court will transfer this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) in the interest of justice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII and ADA actions to districts connected to the alleged discrimination, employment records, affected workplace, or, in specified circumstances, the respondent’s principal office.

El v. Belden · filed 2004-03-23(f)(3)

Plaintiff has offered no facts to support venue in this district. Therefore, venue is improper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)'s venue rules do not apply to federal employee ADEA actions.

Rebar v. Marsh · filed 1992-04-28(f)(3)

In so doing, we reject the Government's argument and the district court's decision that the venue provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act should be read into the age discrimination statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Rehabilitation Act claims to districts connected to the alleged discrimination, relevant employment records, or where the employee would have worked.

Lengacher v. Reno · filed 1999-12-17(f)(3)

Specifically, Title VII provides that venue is proper (i) in any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred, (ii) in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or (iii) in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. ... The Eastern District of Virginia meets none of these criteria and hence, is not a proper venue for plaintiffs Rehabilitation Act claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mustang Mobile Homes, Inc. · filed 1999-12-10(f)(3)

Because this cause arises out of actions allegedly taken by Defendant in Lubbock, and because the Western District of Texas is a judicial district in the State, Texas, in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), the Court finds venue for this cause is proper in the Western District of Texas.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue in Title VII actions, but a defendant, including the United States, waives improper venue by failing to object in time.

Phillips v. Rubin · filed 1999-08-19(f)(3)

However, in Title VII cases, the general venue statute does not apply; rather, the more specific venue provision found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) controls. ... Therefore, venue is not proper in this district. ... Here, the venue requirement has not been met, but Defendant failed to make timely objection. Defendant has thus waived any objection to venue.

Section 706(f) limits venue for employment discrimination suits to the judicial districts specified in that subsection.

Stebbins v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 1969-05-20(f)

Thus the intent of Congress to limit venue to the judicial districts concerned with the alleged discrimination seems clear.

Section 706(f) limits venue for a Title VII employment discrimination suit to the judicial districts it specifies.

Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1969-10-27(f)

Thus the intent of Congress to limit venue to the judicial districts concerned with the alleged discrimination seems clear. Only where the putative employer cannot be brought before the court in one of those districts may the action be filed in the judicial district in which he has "his principal office."

Section 2000e-5(f) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Gilbert v. General Electric Company · filed 1972-09-25(f)

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the phrase must be given full syntactical weight in upholding plaintiffs’ contention that the section provides for a forum in any part of the state.

Section 2000e-5(f) limits Title VII venue to the districts specified in the statute.

Dubnick v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of California · filed 1973-03-01(f)

This district, on the other hand, satisfies none of the Act’s venue conditions unless the court accepts plaintiff’s invitation, supported by EEOC as amicus, to read into the complaint facts which are not alleged and insert into the Act provisions never placed there by Congress.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district where the alleged discrimination occurred when the employer can be found there for jurisdictional purposes.

Gloria FORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALMAC INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellant · filed 1974-04-03(f)(3)

Among the four venue provisions of § 706(f) is that which lays venue in the district where the alleged discrimination occurred. Here it occurred in Kansas, and the employer can be “found” in Kansas for jurisdictional purposes. It is also “found” there for venue purposes.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII plaintiff to choose among specified venues, but those venue choices remain subject to transfer under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Parish Water Work's Co. · filed 1976-05-10(f)(3)

In the light of this, it cannot be said that Congress intended to place the venue provisions of Title VII outside the purview of the transfer clauses of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) treats the district of a respondent’s principal office as a district where the action might have been brought for transfer purposes.

Weltmann v. Fletcher · filed 1976-05-27(f)(3)

“For purposes of sections 1404 and 1406 of Title 28, the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office shall in all cases be considered a district in which the action might have been brought.” ... Since the plaintiff’s suit originally met the jurisdictional and venue prerequisites for filing in the District of Columbia, this Court has discretion to order the suit transferred to that forum.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred.

Thompson v. Board of Education of Romeo Community Schools · filed 1976-05-27(f)(3)

A broad venue provision is appropriate for class actions, for which Title VII actions are peculiarly appropriate, and broad venue provisions within any state may aid in avoiding local economic and political pressures.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not treat records about a successor corporation agreement as employment records that establish venue.

Richman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. · filed 1977-10-20(f)(3)

These records may indeed be valuable to support this claim, and plaintiff’s New York counsel may want to engage in discovery here, but these are not the “employment records” the location of which forms a basis for venue in a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district within the state where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have occurred.

Coker v. Marmon Group, Inc. · filed 1978-08-14(f)(3)

Defendant’s motion is unmeritorious. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides, in part referring to institution of a Title VII civil action, ... Such an action may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, . . . (Emphasis added.) ... The statute has been interpreted to be one of special venue, ... Venue is properly laid. Defendant’s motion is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where an applicant would have worked but for alleged discrimination, even when time would have passed before the applicant began work.

Matthews v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · filed 1979-11-07(f)(3)

This interpretation of the phrase “would have worked” is too literal, for it would make the third venue standard inapplicable to any hiring situation in which there was a time lag between the alleged discriminatory practice and the date that the applicant would have begun work if hired. We cannot ascribe such an intent to Congress.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the respondent has its principal office only if the respondent is not found in a district covered by the provision’s first three venue tests.

Turbeville v. Casey · filed 1981-10-30(f)(3)

Each of these tests points to venue in the Eastern District of Virginia. The statute provides that only when the respondent is not found within any of the districts described under these first three tests, may the action be brought in the district where the respondent has his principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides four categories of districts where a Title VII action may be brought; the defendant’s principal office is available only if venue is unavailable under the first three.

Templeton v. Veterans Administration · filed 1982-06-09(f)(3)

Section 706(f) specifies four categories of judicial districts where a plaintiff may bring a Title VII action. It is clear that venue does not lie in this District under any of these categories, and instead lies in California or Missouri.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits where a Title VII action may be brought; a companion § 1981 claim does not establish pendent venue when Title VII is the principal claim.

Hayes v. RCA Service Co. · filed 1982-07-20(f)(3)

Title VII contains a special venue provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) which limits the choice of available forums. ... Thus, under any of the three possible situations which might provide a proper basis for Title VII venue in this case, the District of Columbia does not satisfy the requirements, while Maryland does. ... Therefore, in order to preserve the intent of Congress as to permissible venue in Title VII actions, the Court feels compelled to apply a rule in an employment discrimination case such as this, that Title VII will be considered the principal cause of action and a companion cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 will be only secondary.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Aitkin v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. · filed 1982-07-22(f)(3)

Consequently, I find that venue is appropriate in any of the several judicial districts in New York State. Plaintiff’s choice of the Western District of New York is perfectly logical since she now resides in the area. Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue is therefore denied.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) controls venue in Title VII suits over other federal venue provisions.

Donnell v. National Guard Bureau · filed 1983-05-24(f)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). This provision controls any other venue provision governing actions, in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Prather v. Raymond Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1983-07-27(f)(3)

For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that venue in the case sab judice is proper in any judicial district in the State of Georgia since the unlawful act is alleged to have occurred in this state.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII actions to districts connected to the alleged employment practice, relevant records, or the employee’s work location, with a provision for the respondent’s principal office.

Allen v. Isaac · filed 1983-08-02(f)(3)

The choice of forum in a Title VII case must be strictly construed in accordance with the venue requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Venue in the Northern District of Illinois is improper as to Jones and Faust.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in districts connected to the alleged employment practice, relevant employment records, or where the plaintiff would have worked.

Thornton v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1983-08-25(f)(3)

Herein venue is lacking. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) of Title 42, U.S.C., provides that an action under Title VII “may be brought in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice ____” In the within case, the judicial district in which the alleged unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred and in which the employment records are allegedly maintained, and the judicial district in which plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, is the District of Delaware. Conversely, there is an absence of any such Maryland orientation.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims and permits a fourth venue choice only when the respondent is not found in any district covered by the first three.

Morrow v. Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1983-10-05(f)(3)

The three choices for venue set forth above should strictly govern claims under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) allows venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where relevant employment records are maintained.

Hoffman v. United Telecommunications, Inc. · filed 1983-12-08(f)(3)

Accordingly, the court finds the first venue provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) to have been met by plaintiff. Venue is, therefore, proper in this judicial district in that the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed here. The court further notes that a substantial number of employment records relevant to the alleged discriminatory practice are maintained in this district, and, therefore, the second provision of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) has also been met.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) specifies the exclusive venues for Title VII employment discrimination actions.

Kravec v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. · filed 1983-12-13(f)(3)

It is clear that by the terms of § 2000e-5(f)(3) venue is proper only within one of the four judicial districts of New York and that there is no venue in the Northern District of Georgia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII employment discrimination actions instead of the general venue statute.

Thurmon v. Martin Marietta Data Systems · filed 1984-10-26(f)(3)

Thurmon is therefore incorrect in arguing that the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 control and he cannot seriously contend that the specific judicial districts where his action may have been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) should be ignored.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not establish venue in a district merely because part of an employment record was sent there for the employee to review.

Sconion v. Thomas · filed 1984-11-09(f)(3)

Moreover, although plaintiff does not make such a contention, the fact that a portion of her employment record may have been sent to this district for her perusal does not mean that the records were “transferred” for the purposes of the venue statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where an unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, including where an alleged initial act occurred even if its effects arose elsewhere.

Allen v. Bolger · filed 1984-11-20(f)(3)

Since Allen contends that the unlawful practicó was committed in Kansas and that subsequent events in Michigan were merely effects of that original unlawful practice, the Court finds that venue is proper in this district under the terms of alternative [1].

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) requires the district court to resolve where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice before deciding whether venue is proper.

Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company · filed 1985-03-26(f)(3)

The district court must arrive at an initial resolution of all factual issues bearing on whether the District of Columbia is "the judicial district in which [Stebbins] would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice."

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained or administered, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the practice.

Bartel v. Federal Aviation Administration · filed 1985-04-18(f)(3)

The special venue provision governing Title VII actions provides that such actions may be brought in one of three districts: (1) that in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed; (2) that in which the employment records relevant to the practice are maintained or administered; or (3) that in which the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims and displaces the general venue statute.

Arrocha v. Panama Canal Commission · filed 1985-05-20(f)(3)

Plaintiff’s claim that § 1391(e) should govern venue in this action must fail, however, because it is well settled that claims brought under Title VII are strictly governed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the districts where a Title VII action may be brought and permits a court to consider transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.

Lewis v. Madison County Board of Education · filed 1988-02-02(f)(3)

In considering a motion to transfer pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404, this Court feels compelled to look first to the categories set out in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). These are all in the Northern District of Alabama. Next, the Court turns to the considerations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice.” This Court can think of no consideration which would justify venue in this jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII claims to the districts specified in the statute.

Stacy v. Hilton Head Seafood Co. · filed 1988-04-05(f)(3)

Further, under Title VII, venue is only proper in a judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such employment practice are maintained, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Thus, venue is improper with respect to plaintiffs Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue based on employment records in the judicial district where the complete master set is maintained and administered.

Washington v. General Electric Corp. · filed 1988-06-27(f)(3)

From the statute’s use of the singular, it is clear that Congress intended venue to lie on the basis of the presence of records only in the one judicial district in which the complete, “master” set of employment records is “maintained and administered.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) sets the districts where a Title VII claim may be brought.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chas. Schaefer Sons, Inc. · filed 1988-12-22(f)(3)

This court is the proper venue to hear the EEOC’s claim brought on behalf of McDowell. Title VII claims may be brought in any of the following places: (1) where the unlawful act is alleged to have been committed; (2) where plaintiff would have worked but for the unlawful act; (3) where employment records related to the proscribed conduct are maintained; and (4) where the employer has its principal office (but only if the defendant cannot be brought before the court in any of the three preceding districts). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Most, if not all, of the foregoing tests for venue are met in this case.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) controls venue in Title VII actions and displaces the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Trujillo v. Total Business Systems, Inc. · filed 1989-01-30(f)(3)

I am persuaded that the more specific venue provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) control and, thus, exclude the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3)'s Title VII venue rules apply to actions against the federal government.

Archuleta v. Sullivan · filed 1989-11-21(f)(3)

There is no qualification in § 2000e-16(c) that § 2000e-5 only applies in part and that subsection 5(f)(3) does not control. This Court is unwilling to rule that the venue provisions of Title VII are inoperative in actions against the federal government where there is no clear statutory basis that Congress so intended.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit where the respondent has its principal office if no district otherwise qualifies under its venue rules, including the rule for relevant employment records.

Wiggs v. Secretary of the Army · filed 1990-04-20(f)(3)

As the alleged discrimination took place in Japan and Wiggs alleges that he would have worked in Japan absent the alleged discrimination, venue would be in the district in which "respondent has his principal office" (i.e., the Eastern District of Virginia) unless there is some other judicial district "in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered."

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for employment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and limits venue to the districts it specifies.

Sheila M. BOLAR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service, Defen · filed 1991-07-11(f)(3)

The relevant statutory language and case law convince us that section 2000e-5(f)(3) controls the question of venue in this instance.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII suit to be filed anywhere in the relevant state.

Richardson v. Alabama State Board of Education · filed 1991-07-17(f)(3)

The Title VII venue provisions provide for filing "in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed [or] in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(3). This means anywhere in the relevant state.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII employment discrimination actions, allowing suit where the alleged practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained, or the employee would have worked.

Leroy H. JOHNSON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAYLESS DRUG STORES NORTHWEST, INC., Dba Wonder World, Et Al., Defendants · filed 1991-12-06(f)(3)

Here, under section 2000e-5(f)(3), the Northern District of California was not the appropriate venue for this action. When the alleged employment discrimination occurred, Johnson was working for Payless in Las Vegas, Nevada; Payless maintains and administers its employment records for its Nevada employees in Las Vegas; and Johnson would have worked in Nevada but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. Thus, under section 2000e-5(f)(3), the District of Nevada was the appropriate venue for Johnson’s action.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not require a defendant to be physically present in a district to be found there for Title VII venue purposes; legal presence is sufficient.

Harrison v. INTERN. ASS'N OF MACHINISTS & AEROSPACE · filed 1992-12-03(f)(3)

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) is not a new provision. This section has never been interpreted to require the physical presence of a defendant and has consistently been applied to require only the legal presence of a defendant, that is, the ability of the plaintiff to bring the defendant before the court in one of the other three possible districts specified in the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action to be brought in the district of the respondent's principal office when the respondent is not found in a district specified by the provision's other venue rules.

Wiggs v. Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Navy United States Marine Corps United States of America · filed 1993-02-25(f)(3)

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by transferring Wiggs' claim against the Secretary of the Army to the Eastern District of Virginia where the Secretary maintained his principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII claim to be filed where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are maintained and administered, or the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged practice.

Rosebud F. Speed v. National Association of Letter Carriers Health Benefits Plan · filed 1993-04-15(f)(3)

We affirm the dismissal of Speed's Title VII claim because the District of Columbia was not a proper venue. A plaintiff may file a claim where the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, where the employment records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the employer has its principal office only if venue is unavailable in the other districts the provision specifies.

Minnette v. Time Warner · filed 1993-06-30(f)(3)

Although Time Warner maintains its principal place of business in Manhattan, the judicial district where the employer’s principal office is located is a proper place for venue only if venue cannot be laid in one of the other three possible districts specified in the statute.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) supplies the venue rules for Title VII cases instead of the general venue statute.

Rick S. Folino v. American Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-08-13(f)(3)

Defendant contends the district court correctly relied upon the venue provisions of Sec. 2000e-5(f)(3) rather than the general venue statute. We agree.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits transfer of a Title VII action when the plaintiff fails to establish venue in the chosen district.

Zughni v. Pena · filed 1994-03-29(f)(3)

Because Zughni has utterly failed to satisfy her burden of establishing venue, we conclude that transfer is appropri­ate. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to transfer this action to the Northern District of Ohio is granted.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged discrimination occurred when the defendant remains legally present there, even after closing its local store.

Takkallapelli v. Builders Square · filed 1995-06-14(f)(3)

In such circumstances, defendant is to be "found" in New Hampshire for purposes of the determination of proper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) applies to ADA employment discrimination suits and permits suit in the district where the plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged discrimination.

Chubb v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1995-12-29(f)(3)

I deem the provision in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), that provides for the jurisdiction where a case can be brought, to be a “procedure” as stated in Section 12117. Therefore, § 2000e-5(f)(3) applies in the case at hand. Pursuant to this statute, the action is properly brought in Colorado since Colorado is the judicial district in which Plaintiff would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice of Defendant.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Title VII claims, permitting suit in any district in the state where the alleged unlawful practice occurred, where relevant employment records are maintained, or where the aggrieved person would have worked but for the practice.

Launer v. Buena Vista Winery, Inc. · filed 1996-02-06(f)(3)

However, it is clear that venue is proper for all of the plaintiffs claims. ... Claims under Title VII are strictly governed by the venue provisions of that title which provide: [A]n action may be brought in any judicial district in the state in which the unlawful employment practice alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue to particular judicial districts within a state.

Lindloff v. Schenectady International · filed 1996-12-24(f)(3)

This court was unable to locate any Fifth Circuit cases on this point and is of the opinion that the second sentence in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue to particular districts within a State.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of the state where the unlawful employment practice allegedly occurred.

Doage v. Board of Regents · filed 1997-01-08(f)(3)

As already discussed, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) places venue in this Title VII action in any district of Illinois, the state where ISU allegedly committed unlawful employment acts against Doage. Therefore, venue is appropriate in any of the three districts of Illinois, including both the Northern and Central Districts.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides the specific venue rules for Title VII actions and displaces the general venue statute.

Weber v. Ideker, Inc. · filed 1997-09-19(f)(3)

The specific provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) apply to the exclusion of the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Title VII permits venue in the district where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or where the claimant would have worked but for that practice.

Sizemore v. Able Body Temporary Services · filed 1997-11-18(f)(3)

Under (1) and (3), the Middle District of Alabama wherein Dothan lies, is a proper venue.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue based on employment records only when they are both maintained and administered in the district.

Hood v. Val Gene Corporation · filed 1998-03-03(f)(3)

To establish venue under § 2000e-5(f)(3), plaintiff had to show the records were both maintained and administered in the Western District of Oklahoma.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) establishes venue based on employment records only when they were both maintained and administered in the proposed district.

Pierce v. Shorty Small's of Branson Inc. · filed 1998-03-03(f)(3)

To establish venue under § 2000e-5(f)(3), plaintiff had to show the records were both maintained and administered in the Western District of Oklahoma.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) limits venue for Title VII actions to the districts it specifies, overriding the general venue statute.

Harding v. Williams Property Co · filed 1998-08-31(f)(3)

This specific circum- scription overrides the general venue statute at 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue in the district of the respondent’s principal office when no judicial district is available where the alleged discrimination occurred, the relevant records are kept, or the employee would have worked.

Foxx v. Dalton · filed 1999-04-14(f)(3)

As a result, this lawsuit must be filed in the district where the Defendant has his principal office.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) gives Title VII plaintiffs a choice of venues that an employer’s contractual forum selection clause cannot override.

Thomas v. Rehabilitation Services of Columbus, Inc. · filed 1999-03-19(f)(3)

Rather, the public policy which permits an aggrieved party to bring her Title VII action in the forum in which the alleged discriminatory acts occurred is expressly stated in the statute. ... Accordingly, this Court holds, as a matter of law, that the contractual choice-of-forum clause in the Acknowledgment form is unenforceable under the terms mandated by Congress in Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue for a failure-to-promote claim where the decision was made or where it was implemented or its effects were felt.

Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc. · filed 2000-03-10(f)(3)

Thus, we hold that venue is proper in both the forum where the employment decision is made and the forum in which that decision is implemented or its effects are felt.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the plaintiff likely would have worked but for the alleged discrimination.

Johnson v. Washington Gas Light Co. · filed 2000-03-17(f)(3)

I believe the record establishes that it is likely that, had plaintiff received one of the positions he sought, he would have been assigned to work in the District of Columbia at some point. I conclude, accordingly, that plaintiff has met his burden of showing that venue is properly laid in this District.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits Title VII venue where relevant employment records are maintained and administered; the records need not be directly relevant, and the defendant bears the burden of proving improper venue.

Brigdon v. Slater · filed 2000-04-26(f)(3)

Accordingly, DOT bears the burden of proving that the documents in question are not sufficiently relevant to Brigdon’s employment claims to satisfy 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). ... Applying this standard to § 2000e-5(f)(3), the determinative question is whether the employment records in Brigdon’s Official Personnel File have any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of Brigdon’s claims more probable or less probable than it would be without the records. ... Accordingly, DOT has failed to prove that venue is improper.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or in the district where relevant employment records are maintained and administered.

Beland v. US Dept. of Transportation · filed 2001-02-14(f)(3)

First, I find that venue for this action would lie in the District of Columbia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred or relevant employment records are kept.

Cameli v. WNEP-16 the News Station · filed 2001-02-28(f)(3)

Defendants correctly argue that venue would have been proper had this case been brought in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Middle District is an appropriate venue for this Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) ease because, among other reasons, the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, and relevant employment records are kept, in that district.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any judicial district of a state where an unlawful employment practice occurred.

Adams v. Cal-Ark International, Inc. · filed 2001-06-15(f)(3)

Under the Title VII venue provision, as it has been interpreted, venue is proper in any judicial district in the state in which an unlawful employment practice occurred. Pursuant to this standard, venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) governs venue for Rehabilitation Act employment claims against the federal government; venue may be proper where the applicant’s interactions with the employer and challenged testing occurred.

Bruce v. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation · filed 2001-08-22(f)(3)

The appropriate test for venue is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), which states: ... Despite defendant’s ardent beliefs to the contrary, the court finds that the Northern District of New York is the appropriate venue for plaintiffs claims. ... For these reasons, venue is proper in the Northern District of New York and shall not be transferred to the District of Columbia.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits venue where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, relevant employment records are kept, or the employee would have worked but for the alleged practice.

de Rojas v. Trans States Airlines, Inc. · filed 2001-11-19(f)(3)

To determine if venue is proper in New Jersey, therefore, the Court must answer the following factual questions: 1) was the unlawful employment practice committed in New Jersey?; 2) are the plaintiffs employment records in New Jersey?; or 3) would plaintiff have worked in New Jersey but for the alleged discriminating conduct? If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then venue is proper. If, on the other hand, the answer to all three questions is no, the action must be dismissed or transferred.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) permits a Title VII action in any federal judicial district in the state where the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

Becnel v. Smile Community Action Agency, Inc. · filed 2001-12-21(f)(3)

Because this cause arises out of actions allegedly taken by the defendant in Lafayette, Louisiana, venue for this cause is proper in the Middle District of Louisiana.