42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a back pay award to be reduced by amounts the claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

BELL v. ARDAGH GROUP S.A. · filed 2020-03-23(g)(1)

Since Plaintiff is seeking damages for lost wages and benefits in excess of $3,000,000, [Dkt. 1 at 3], and Title VII expressly requires that the back pay award be reduced by the “amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), Defendant is entitled to information relevant to these calculations.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court that finds an unlawful employment practice to award back pay for up to two years before the EEOC charge was filed.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Aviation Port Services, LLC · filed 2020-04-01(g)(1)

Section 706 of Title VII provides that upon the finding of an unlawful employment practice, the court may order the recovery of back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of the charge with the EEOC. ... Awarding them back pay would serve the statutory purpose of making them whole for any injuries they may have suffered.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits back pay for a discriminatory failure to promote to the period before a later nondiscriminatory termination, absent evidence that the promotion would have prevented the termination.

Collins v. Koch Foods Inc · filed 2020-04-10(g)(1)

But the holdings in those cases indicate that a plaintiff’s accrual of back pay must stop on the date of a non-discriminatory, albeit involuntary, termination of employment.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings and by amounts a claimant could earn through reasonable diligence.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ecology Services, Inc. · filed 2020-05-01(g)(1)

I cannot conclude, as a matter of law or fact, that Hamilton’s efforts to obtain comparable employment were not reasonable, or that she was idle in searching for comparable work.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by wages a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Smith v. City of Boston · filed 2020-05-13(g)(1)

These Officers failed to mitigate damages and thus their award of back pay will be “offset by any wages that could have been earned with reasonable diligence.” Johnson, 364 F.3d at 379 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); Quinones Candelario v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, 906 F.2d 798, 801-02 (1st Cir. 1990)).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) presumptively entitles a successful Title VII plaintiff to back pay.

Jones v. Technology Training Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-07-14(g)(1)

Additionally, “successful Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to back pay.” Pittington v. Great Smoky Mt. Lumberjack Feud, LLC, 880 F.3d 791, 799 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e– 5(g)(1). ... Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $88,735.97 in back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) measures back pay by the wages and benefits a plaintiff would have earned absent discrimination, reduced by earnings during that period.

Owen v. Rutherford Supply Corporation · filed 2020-07-16(g)

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), an ... award of back pay should be made in an amount equal to the sum of wages and benefits that a plaintiff would have earned absent the discriminatory conduct, less any money that the plaintiff did earn during that time period.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides back pay for victims of Title VII discrimination, subject to their duty to seek alternative employment with reasonable diligence.

Farsakian v. Kent · filed 2020-10-29(g)

Victims of discrimination are entitled to back pay under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g) (1994); Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended on denial of reh’g (Nov. 2, 2000). ... A plaintiff seeking back pay has a duty to mitigate damages by seeking alternative ... employment with reasonable diligence. Id. ... Therefore, the Court grants back pay in the amount of $11,126.03.

A plaintiff seeking back pay under § 2000e-5(g)(1) must support the requested amount with competent evidence before the court can award it.

Griego v. Arizona Partsmaster, Inc. · filed 2020-11-23(g)(1)

It will be incumbent on Plaintiff to establish at the hearing by means of competent, admissible evidence support for her requested back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Casanola v. Delta Machine & Ironworks LLC · filed 2021-01-05(g)(1)

Back pay may be reduced, however, by “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by” the employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay as equitable relief, reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Porter v. 1st Choice After School Kare · filed 2021-03-03(g)(1)

The amount of back pay is reduced by “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person . . . discriminated against.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by earnings a claimant received or could have earned with reasonable diligence; a factual dispute over that diligence can prevent summary judgment limiting back pay.

EDWARDS v. ALBERT EINSTEIN MEDICAL CENTER · filed 2021-04-07(g)(1)

Construing this record evidence in the light most favorable to Edwards, the Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that Edwards failed to exercise reasonable diligence in mitigating her damages. Because the factfinder must make this determination, AEMC is not entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of limiting back pay damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; a voluntary withdrawal from the workforce may warrant a deduction or tolling if supported by the evidence.

Complete Care Med. Ctr. Vs. Beckstead · filed 2021-04-09(g)(1)

If credited, this evidence—which includes the respondents' testimony at trial—supports deductions from, or tolling of, any back pay awards for the time periods that each voluntarily chose to stay home. ... We therefore vacate the district court's back pay awards and remand for further proceedings to address mitigation and recalculate damages as appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)’s restriction on backpay applies to ADA claims through the ADA’s enforcement provision.

Nawara v. County Of Cook · filed 2021-03-29(g)(2)(A)

The Green court applied 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) to an ADA case despite the language of the statute referring only to “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The court agrees with this decision.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces Title VII back pay by amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Konczal v. Zim Tim, LLC · filed 2021-04-15(g)(1)

Defendant has in fact presented evidence in support of a mitigation of damages defense, and, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, Defendant could succeed at reducing Plaintiff’s back pay if a jury holds it liable under Title VII. Moran, 788 F.3d at 204. The court will not resolve the factual disputes about sufficiency of the evidence at the summary judgment stage.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits an award of back pay when an employer intentionally engages in unlawful employment discrimination.

Griego v. Arizona Partsmaster, Inc. · filed 2021-04-20(g)(1)

A plaintiff may recover back pay if a court finds that a defendant intentionally engaged in the unlawful employment practice alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Because the Court found liability in Plaintiff’s favor, specifically, that Defendant had intentionally and unlawfully discriminated against her based on her disability, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to award back pay and front pay as equitable relief for intentional employment discrimination.

Hilliard v. Twin Falls County Sheriff's Office · filed 2021-05-14(g)(1)

Back pay and front pay are equitable damages that may be awarded by the Court under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) which in turn states that upon finding intentional discrimination, “the court may enjoin the [defendant] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes back pay available to successful Title VII plaintiffs, and the ADA incorporates that remedy for employment discrimination claims.

HOCH v. CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION · filed 2021-10-13(g)(1)

Because back pay is available to a successful Title VII plaintiff, Spencer v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1)), backpay is also available to Hoch.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A), as applied to ADA claims, bars back pay when the employment action was taken for a reason other than disability discrimination.

Nawara v. County Of Cook · filed 2021-11-04(g)(2)(A)

Thus, the court’s holding today in no way prevents future litigants from securing an award of back pay following an employer’s violation of § 12112(d). But such a successful plaintiff must show—as Nawara cannot—that they were discriminated against on the basis of their disability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces a backpay award by earnings from other employment and amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. MSDS Consultant Services, LLC · filed 2021-12-22(g)(1)

The backpay award is calculated by totaling the employee’s lost wages and benefits, less any amounts earned by the employee’s efforts to mitigate her loss through subsequent employment or that could have been earned through the exercise of “reasonable diligence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... In total, Mitchell earned $200,553.94 during the relevant backpay period, which will be deducted from the above backpay calculations.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay and front pay as equitable Title VII remedies, and a representation of complete disability to Social Security does not alone bar a plaintiff from seeking them.

NESBY v. YELLEN · filed 2022-04-12(g)(1)

Back pay and front pay are “available to a successful Title VII plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)). ... Thus, the Court will not preclude Ms. Nesby from seeking back pay, front pay, and employee benefits, simply because she represented to the Social Security Administration that she was completely disabled.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits an award of back pay under Title VII.

YOUNG v. JOB SHERPA, LLC · filed 2022-05-10(g)

Accrual of back pay is also permitted under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Plaintiff is entitled to back pay in the amount of $22,071.60.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

Smith v. Siskin Steel & Supply Company, Inc. (JRG3) · filed 2022-05-25(g)(1)

Title VII imposes a duty to mitigate damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). It states, “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” ... For the reasons stated above, the Court will not limit damages as a matter of law. Here, a trier of fact must decide reasonableness.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for wages the employee would have earned absent discrimination, limited to the period she would have remained employed.

THOMAS v. SHOSHONE TRUCKING, LLC. · filed 2022-10-28(g)

The court is authorized "to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but it not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g). ... Thomas is therefore entitled to $6,761.94 in backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes back pay and reinstatement as equitable Title VII remedies; a court, rather than a jury, decides back pay.

Karthauser v. Columbia 9-1-1 Communications District · filed 2023-01-24(g)(1)

Both back pay and reinstatement are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

A back pay award under § 2000e-5(g)(1) does not include per diem payments when the claimant fails to prove they belong in the award.

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. COASTAL DRILLING EAST, LLC · filed 2023-07-28(g)(1)

In other words, the EEOC did not satisfy its burden to show that it is more likely than not that the amount of back pay to which Pryce is entitled includes the per diem payments.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires courts to reduce a Title VII back pay award by the claimant’s post-termination earnings.

Pearson v. Royal Canin USA, Inc. · filed 2023-09-11(g)

Title VII courts are statutorily required to reduce any back pay award by a claimant’s post-termination earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces otherwise allowable back pay by amounts the employee earned or could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Flores v. Virginia Department of Corrections · filed 2023-09-27(g)(1)

Title VII provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis added). ... Given the evidence presented and in light of the presumption in favor of back pay, the court finds that the most appropriate award in this case would be one year’s back pay—i.e., Flores’s average weekly salary of $1,804 per week, multiplied by 52 weeks, for a total of $93,808.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence, but a failure to mitigate does not automatically bar recovery of lost wages.

Staton v. City and County of Butte-Silver Bow · filed 2023-11-29(g)(1)

A failure to mitigate does not bar completely the recovery of lost wages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to award back pay for an intentional unlawful employment practice, and the Rehabilitation Act incorporates that remedy for compensation discrimination claims.

Ngo v. DeJoy · filed 2024-01-31(g)(1)

Section 706 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally ... engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may . . . order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include . . . back pay.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Whether plaintiff can make the requisite showing that the USPS intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice is a question for trial. Defendant’s request to strike plaintiff’s prayer for economic damages is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5 permits back pay for a Title VII violation when the plaintiff establishes lost wages, subject to the duty to mitigate damages.

Sanderson v. Leg Apparel LLC · filed 2024-03-01(g)(1)

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to back pay for this period of unemployment, at an annual rate of his Leg Apparel salary of $92,500, for a total of $24,328.77.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces Title VII back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Sebunya v. Mayorkas · filed 2024-03-08(g)(1)

Under Title VII, “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence” reduce any award of back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... The agency has thus failed to show, as a matter of law, that Sebunya did not mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay as equitable relief for a prevailing ADA plaintiff; an invitation to reapply does not stop back pay from accruing.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Keystone RV Company · filed 2024-03-27(g)(1)

The ADA allows a prevailing plaintiff to recover back pay as a form of equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... An invitation to reapply is just that. It isn’t an offer. And it isn’t unconditional. Mr. Meeks’ decision not to reapply doesn’t stop the accrual of back pay on this record.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits equitable backpay, but a plaintiff cannot recover the same lost wages more than once.

McClinton v. Capstone Logistics LLC · filed 2024-03-27(g)(1)

“[B]ackpay is not an automatic or mandatory remedy” under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Three identical awards of backpay result in a windfall to Mr. McClinton, rather than making him whole.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) calculates back pay using the wages the employee would have earned absent discrimination, reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Revell v. Prince Preferred Hotels Shreveport L L C · filed 2024-08-01(g)(1)

Revell is entitled to back pay under Title VII, and these types of damages are calculated at the wage rate that the plaintiff would have received but for the unlawful discrimination and are reduced by “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for a successful ADA retaliation claim, but a claimant cannot recover it for a period when disability prevented her from working.

Smith v. Presidio Networked Solutions, LLC · filed 2024-09-05(g)(1)

As noted above, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117 and 2000e-5(g)(1), courts may determine that a plaintiff who prevailed on her claim of ADA retaliation is entitled to the equitable relief of back pay. ... First, Defendant submits that Plaintiff is ineligible for back pay for the period of July 15, 2020 to November 16, 2020 because “Plaintiff was deemed totally disabled and unable to work.” (Doc. No. 214 at 9.) The Court agrees.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1)’s back pay remedy requires evidence that the discrimination caused lost pay.

HEARD v. HAND & STONE MASSAGE AND FACIAL SPA · filed 2024-10-09(g)(1)

Accordingly, without evidence that Defendant’s failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability resulted in a loss of pay, an award of back pay is not warranted.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay for lost wages and benefits, reduced by earnings from later work and wages obtainable through reasonable diligence.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Key Management Partners, Inc. · filed 2024-10-24(g)(1)

Therefore, back pay is properly calculated by totaling the employee’s lost wages and benefits, less any amounts earned by the employee’s efforts to mitigate her loss through subsequent employment, or wages that could have been earned through the exercise of “reasonable diligence.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award back pay as equitable relief for Title VII violations.

Cox v. Northwest Regional Education Service District · filed 2024-10-25(g)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), the court may “order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include . . . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay, . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by earnings from comparable employment during the back-pay period.

BAUTISTA v. SWBC PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER SERVICES I, LLC · filed 2024-11-01(g)(1)

The Court finds that Bautista’s back-pay, if any, shall be reduced by her earnings from October 1, 2021 through January 5, 2022 because she held comparable employment at another funeral home working in sales.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for successful employment discrimination claimants, who must mitigate their damages; the defendant bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

James v. Professional Contract Services, Inc. · filed 2024-11-21(g)(1)

However, to be eligible for a back pay award, a claimant must mitigate his damages, and the Defendant has the burden of proving that a claimant has failed to mitigate his damages. ... The Defendant’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff to respond fully to Request No. 12 is, therefore, GRANTED.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes back pay and front pay available to a successful Title VII plaintiff.

Brennan v. Century Security Services · filed 2024-11-26(g)(1)

Back pay and front pay are “available to a successful Title VII plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 469 F.3d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)). ... For the foregoing reasons, Century’s motion in limine as to damages is DENIED.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces Title VII back pay by interim earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Deiter v. Tennessee Technological University · filed 2025-02-08(g)

Title VII itself provides that “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g). ... For these reasons, the Court will not reduce Dr. Deiter’s back pay award for a failure to mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by the amount an employee could earn with reasonable diligence.

EASTERLING v. COUNTY OF DELAWARE · filed 2025-03-13(g)(1)

An award of back pay will be reduced by the amount plaintiff could earn with “reasonable diligence” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Plaintiff reasonably mitigated his damages during the period covered by back pay by earning $109,935.94 at other jobs. Subtracting $109,935.94 from $202,626.24, the court will award plaintiff a total of $92,690.30 in back pay.

When the ADA incorporates § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A), its reference to discrimination is read as discrimination on account of disability.

Nawara v. Cook County Municipality · filed 2025-04-01(g)(2)(A)

Thus, § 12117(a) requires us to replace in § 2000e–5(g)(2)(A) the phrase “discrimination on account of race … national origin” with “discrimination on account of disability” while ... leaving the remainder of the subsection intact.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for a successful Title VII plaintiff, subject to a reasonable effort to mitigate damages.

Peck v. Schlage Lock Company, LLC · filed 2025-04-17(g)(1)

The Court may award a successful Title VII plaintiff back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). Plaintiff must make a reasonable and good faith effort to mitigate her damages, but the Court will not hold her to the highest standards of diligence.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence to reduce a Title VII back pay award.

Miller v. Coventry Holding Group, Inc. · filed 2025-04-03(g)(1)

“[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... As Miller points out, Coventry’s calculations ignore the trial testimony and fail to apply the quarterly earnings formula.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for a Title VII violation, reduced by earnings or amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

McMurray v. Tallant · filed 2025-05-23(g)(1)

Thus, a back-pay award is subject to a duty to mitigate damages and therefore must be reduced by the amount of any “earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1985).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits backpay against a labor organization responsible for an unlawful employment practice.

Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company · filed 2025-05-08(g)(1)

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1) (relief under Title VII may include backpay “payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding Southwest and the Union jointly and severally liable for backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces Title VII back pay by interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, so the duty to mitigate applies when back pay is sought.

Stewart v. City of Arcola · filed 2025-06-25(g)(1)

As the statute indicates, the duty to mitigate in Title VII contexts applies when Plaintiff seeks back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII claimant to mitigate lost wages and limits back pay when the claimant leaves substantially equivalent work.

HERRERA v. QUALITY CHEVROLET GMC OF ENGLEWOOD, INC. · filed 2025-06-30(g)

As Plaintiff acknowledges (see Damages Br. at 5), Plaintiff has a statutory duty under Title VII to mitigate her lost wages. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231–32 (1982) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)). ... As such, the Court does not extend Plaintiff’s back pay to the time period following her departure from Hudson.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay for lost insurance benefits when the employee incurred costs for replacement coverage or medical expenses the employer’s plan would have covered.

Johnson, Todd v. Madison Metropolitan School District (MMSD) · filed 2025-06-30(g)(1)

To recover benefits for lost insurance coverage, a plaintiff must show that he either incurred expenses in securing alternative insurance coverage or incurred medical expenses that would have been covered under the employer’s insurance program.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a back pay claimant to use reasonable diligence to seek substantially equivalent employment, while the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Patterson v. Spriggs Construction LLC · filed 2025-07-18(g)

A plaintiff seeking damages in an employment discrimination case, such as Patterson, must use reasonable diligence to obtain substantially equivalent employment after termination. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. 219, 231–32 (1982); see Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 1989) (Title VII “adopts a traditional rule on mitigation of damages.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g). Spriggs, as the employer, carries the burden of establishing that “there were substantially equivalent positions which were available” and that Patterson “failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking such positions.”

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for a prevailing Title VII hostile work environment plaintiff even when the jury rejects her retaliation claim.

Griffin v. Copper Cellar Corporation · filed 2025-08-08(g)

Title VII expressly contemplates back pay as one of the remedies available to a prevailing plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... As a matter of law, the jury’s conclusion that Defendant was not liable for retaliation does not preclude an award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits backpay as equitable relief for the court.

Hayes v. Skywest Airlines, Inc · filed 2019-07-19(g)(1)

As I informed the parties during the trial, it always has been my position that backpay is an equitable determination for the court, at least in this circuit. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (appropriate relief "may include . . . back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate[.]"); Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 2004) ("A district court's decision to award back or front pay under the ADA is an equitable one."). However, because both parties submitted proposed instructions addressing the issue of backpay, I found they had consented to have the issue determined by the jury.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires Title VII backpay to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts the plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence.

McConkey v. The Churchill School and Center · filed 2025-08-18(g)(1)

However, Title VII requires that any award of back pay shall be reduced by any “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by” the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for wages lost when a hostile work environment causes an employee to leave a worksite, even without constructive discharge.

Sargent v. Department of State · filed 2025-09-12(g)(1)

When a defendant is found to have engaged in an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, the Court has authority to provide the plaintiff with equitable relief, including back pay. ... The Court therefore finds based on the parties’ jointly stipulated calculation that Sargent is entitled to an award of $14,533 in back pay, before any prejudgment interest.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay and reinstatement available as remedies, including in ADA cases through § 12117(a).

Remlinger v. State of Nev. · filed 1995-07-31(g)

For each of those losses, however, there are the legal remedies of back pay and reinstatement. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (adopting, in ADA cases, Title VII remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces allowable back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Miles-Hickman v. David Powers Homes, Inc. · filed 2009-03-24(g)(1)

Section § 2000e-5(g)(1) of Title VII provides that “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.”

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires interim earnings to be deducted from Title VII backpay; earnings from supplemental work are not interim if the employee could have held both jobs simultaneously.

Wilson v. Federico F. Pena, Secretary, Department of Transportation · filed 1996-03-22(g)(1)

“Interim earnings” are deducted from Title VII backpay awards. ... Because Wilson's submissions reflected “supplemental” employment of a non-interim nature under the Bing analysis, the relevancy of the pre-backpay period under 5 C.F.R. § 550.805 (1995) is unclear on the record before this court.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits courts to award back pay as an equitable remedy for employment discrimination.

Complete Care Med. Ctr. Vs. Beckstead · filed 2020-07-01(g)

"Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits courts to grant equitable remedies to employees who have been impermissibly discriminated against by employers with fifteen or more employees." Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (remedies)). ... We observe no abuse of discretion in the record before this court.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces a back-pay award by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Zarco · filed 2025-12-11(g)(1)

Plaintiff is also responsible for mitigating her damages. “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(1). ... Her lost wages were calculated as $97.94 per day after subtracting the wages she was paid at her part-time job for a total of $2,350.56 in lost wages during this time. ... In light of the evidence in the record, the court finds a back-pay award of $5,789.06 is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s direction that the EEOC investigate charges does not give a charging party standing to challenge the agency’s decision to close an investigation.

Cross v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2025-11-25(b)

To be sure, Title VII states that the Commission “shall” make an investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). ... So even if Cross is right that Congress required the Commission to investigate all complaints, the Commission’s failure to do so is not a cognizable injury to her.

Section 706(b) does not imply a private right of action for charging parties to compel the EEOC to investigate or conciliate their charges more fully.

Hall v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1978-07-19(b)

This remedy explicitly provided by Congress strongly implies that Congress did not intend that charging parties be able to force the EEOC, by means of suit or the threat thereof, to more fully or speedily investigate or attempt to conciliate their charge.

Section 2000e-5 does not authorize a private suit against the EEOC for its handling of a discrimination charge.

Jay Lee GIBSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1978-09-05

The action was properly dismissed as to the defendant EEOC. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 et seq., confers no right of action against the enforcement agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives a claimant a private enforcement action when the EEOC delays processing a charge, rather than an implied action against the EEOC for that delay.

Stewart v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1979-12-28(f)(1)

Appellants argue, however, that such a provision should not act as a bar to their "implied cause of action" against the EEOC should the latter fail to handle charges of employer discrimination "as promptly as possible and, so far as practicable." In light of the claimants' right to maintain an action in a federal court via private enforcement, appellants' argument fails.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a charging party to seek de novo review against the employer, but provides no cause of action against the EEOC over its investigation.

Pearlswig v. Randolph · filed 1980-09-29(f)(1)

The plaintiff sued the wrong party. His right under the Civil Rights Act to a de novo review of the discrimination charge is a right to proceed against his former employer, the Greater Boston Legal Services. Title VII does not confer any express or implied cause of action against the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(k) authorizes costs against the EEOC and the United States on the same terms as against a private person.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. · filed 1986-07-15(k)

Rule 54(d) also provides that costs against a United States agency, such as the EEOC, shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. Section 706(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), states that the United States and the EEOC “shall be liable for costs the same as a private person,” and therefore provides the necessary statutory authorization for such cost awards.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) authorizes federal courts to hear Title VII enforcement suits against allegedly discriminatory employers, but does not authorize a former federal employee to sue the EEOC over its handling of a charge.

Golyar v. McCausland · filed 1990-04-23(f)(3)

Section 706(f)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), authorizes federal courts to hear enforcement actions brought against alleged discriminating employers by private parties, the Attorney General or the Commission. ... None of these sections is the proper basis for a claim by the former employee of a federal agency against the EEOC as an enforcement agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) bars the EEOC from naming a governmental entity as a defendant even when it considers that entity a necessary party; the Attorney General may sue the entity instead.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. American Federation of Teachers, Local 571 · filed 1991-02-25(f)(1)

If the EEOC could not proceed against Local 571 without joining District 205 in the action, it could have referred the entire matter to the Attorney General, who, unlike the EEOC, had the authority to proceed against both District 205 (a governmental entity) and Local 571 (a private entity).

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not confer jurisdiction over a Title VII suit against the EEOC for its handling of a discrimination charge.

Mitchell v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1995-06-13(f)(3)

The EEOC contends that I lack subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the jurisdictional provisions of Title VII confer jurisdiction only over suits against a discriminating private or public employer, which the EEOC is concededly not here. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e-6(b), 2000e-16. ... Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs suit is premised on Title VII, I agree with the EEOC and the analysis in Golyar that there is no subject matter jurisdiction here.

Section 2000e-5 provides remedies for employment discrimination claims, but no remedy against EEOC officials for failing to investigate a charge.

Materson v. Stokes · filed 1996-04-05

Thus, the remedies provided under §§ 706 and 717, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6, are unavailable to Plaintiff according to his claims. These sections grant remedies for aggrieved individuals who bring claims in the employment context. Plaintiffs complaint is one step removed, as he sues individuals he alleges failed to investigate these Title VII type claims.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not authorize a federal employee to sue the EEOC or another agency over its handling of a discrimination complaint.

Storey v. Rubin · filed 1997-04-25(f)(3)

While federal courts generally have subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under Title VII and the ADEA, this subject matter jurisdiction typically arises from one of the five specific code sections in these two remedial schemes through which Congress explicitly created rights of action, namely: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII) (authorizing the EEOC, Attorney General, and aggrieved employees to bring civil actions in federal court); ... None of these five sections creates a right or action or confers on this Court jurisdiction over a claim by a federal employee against the EEOC, or any other agency, challenging any aspect of the administrative processes (or any application of that process) by which complaints of discrimination are investigated and resolved.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) gives an aggrieved employee a direct action against the employer as the remedy for the EEOC’s improper handling of a discrimination charge.

Smith v. Gilbert F. Casellas, Chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 1997-09-02(f)(1)

As the other circuits have noted, the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII reveals that Congress intended the private right of action provided for in section 706(f)(1) of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)) — under which an aggrieved employee may bring a Title VII action directly against his or her employer — to serve as the remedy for any improper handling of a discrimination charge by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 permits the EEOC to sue over claims uncovered during a reasonable investigation of an individual’s charge when those claims undergo the required determination and conciliation procedures, even if the charge did not name them.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Michael Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, Milwaukee, Inc. · filed 1998-03-31

The relevant limit on the EEOC, therefore, is not the scope of the charge but the scope of a reasonable investigation of that charge.

Section 2000e-5 does not give employers a cause of action against the EEOC.

Borg-Warner Protective Services Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2000-01-04

Nothing in the statutes to which Borg-Warner cites supports the proposition that Title VII confers upon employers a cause of action against the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 and 2000e-6.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows an aggrieved employee to sue an employer but creates no claim against the EEOC for its handling of a discrimination charge.

Stern v. Haddad Dealerships of the Berkshires, Inc. · filed 2007-02-26(f)(1)

As applicable here, Title VII, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), expressly provides for three types of civil actions with respect to EEOC matters. ... As is evident, there is no mention in this statutory scheme of any right of an aggrieved employee to sue the EEOC itself in the event the employee does not like the way in which the claim against his employer has been handled.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) prevents the EEOC from suing a governmental agency on its own authority when conciliation fails and requires it to refer the case to the Attorney General.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Peabody Western Coal Co. · filed 2010-06-23(f)(1)

EEOC is prevented by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) from filing suit against the Secretary on its own authority. Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that if EEOC is not able to obtain a conciliation agreement with a governmental agency, it cannot itself bring suit against that agency.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not authorize an employee to sue the EEOC over its handling of a discrimination complaint.

McCall v. Yang · filed 2016-04-12(f)(3)

Similarly, none of Title VII’s special jurisdictional provisions allow an aggrieved employee to bring an action against the EEOC in these circumstances. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e-6(b), 2000e-16(c).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides an action against the employer as the remedy for improper EEOC handling of a discrimination charge, rather than an action against the EEOC.

Jordan v. Weinstein · filed 2017-08-11(f)(1)

“[N]o cause of action against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim.” ... Rather, “Congress intended the private right of action . . . under which an aggrieved employee may bring a Title VII action directly against his or her employer [] to serve as the remedy for any improper handling of a discrimination charge by the EEOC.”

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee to bring the underlying discrimination claim to court, but does not provide a separate claim for an agency EEO office’s mishandling of the charge.

Coulibaly v. Kerry · filed 2018-07-17(f)(1)

If the agency’s EEO office mishandles an EEO claim against the agency, the claimant’s remedy is to bring those claims to the Court, not new claims concerning the alleged mishandling.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits an employee to bring a discrimination claim against the employer, but does not create a separate claim against a federal agency’s EEO office for mishandling the complaint.

Coulibaly v. Pompeo · filed 2018-07-17(f)(1)

It follows that a plaintiff does not have a cause of action against the State Department's OCR for alleged deficiencies in the processing or mishandling of a discrimination complaint.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not create a cause of action against the EEOC over how it processes charges.

Crowder v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts · filed 2019-03-19(f)(3)

As for Crowder's claim for declaratory relief against the EEOC, the statutes that Crowder cites do not create a cause of action against the EEOC concerning how the EEOC processes complaints.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) lets an aggrieved employee sue the employer directly and supplies the remedy for improper EEOC handling of a discrimination charge.

McMillan v. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2019-08-29(f)(1)

Rather, “Congress intended the private right of action . . . under which an aggrieved employee may bring a Title VII action directly against his or her employer [] to serve as the remedy for any improper handling of a discrimination charge by the EEOC.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(f)(1)). Therefore, the court will dismiss McMillan’s claims by separate order.

Section 2000e-5(f)(3) grants jurisdiction over discrimination actions against employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations; it does not authorize a suit against the EEOC for handling a charge.

Georgy v. University of Louisiana Lafayette · filed 2022-08-26(f)(3)

Furthermore, none of the three (3) provisions granting jurisdiction in Title VII provide jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiff is suing the EEOC in its capacity as the enforcement agency.

Section 2000e-5 does not let a complainant sue the EEOC over its processing or investigation of a discrimination charge.

Williams v. EEOC · filed 2024-04-23

Title VII nowhere authorizes complainants who are dissatisfied with the E.E.O.C.'s processing and investigation to file suit against the E.E.O.C.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) does not require the EEOC to refer federal employees’ discrimination complaints to the Attorney General.

Neville v. Burrows · filed 2024-02-13(f)(1)

Thus, to say that Section 706(f)(1)’s language governing referral to the Attorney General applies to federal employees would contradict the text and structure of Title VII as well as Supreme Court precedent.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC administrative remedies do not apply to discrimination allegations against the United States.

Hoffman v. Boeing · filed 1979-06-08

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 are not applicable to allegations of discrimination by the United States; the United States is expressly excluded from the definition of employer under this section.

Section 2000e-5 does not provide the basis for a federal employee’s Title VII claim; that claim must be brought under § 2000e-16.

Garrison v. United States · filed 1988-07-19

Garrison asserts jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and thereby misstates the proper jurisdictional foundation upon which this action is based. In fact, Garrison's Title VII claim can be brought only under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, which extends the protection of Title VII to federal employees and is the exclusive and preemptive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment.

Section 2000e-5 generally applies to private-sector employers; discrimination claims by federal employees are governed by § 2000e-16.

Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs · filed 1999-01-21

We note that Holley's complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, the provision that applies generally to private-sector employers, under which her suit would be untimely, rather than § 2000e-16, the provision applicable to discrimination claims by federal employees.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) applies to discrimination claims by private sector employees, not federal employees.

Conkle v. Potter · filed 2003-12-19(f)(1)

To begin with, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) applies to discrimination claims brought by private sector employees and is inapplicable to this case since plaintiff was a federal employee.

Section 2000e-5(f) does not govern a federal employee’s Title VII claims; § 2000e-16(a) is the appropriate provision.

Mansfield v. Billington · filed 2008-09-03(f)

Although the plaintiff references 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) in her complaint, the court construes the plaintiff’s claims as being pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), the appropriate provision for federal employees.

Section 2000e-5(f) does not extend the federal government's Title VII waiver of sovereign immunity to federal employee suits filed in state court.

Robinson v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services · filed 2021-10-14(f)

In turn, § 2000e-5 makes clear that this waiver applies only to claims filed in “[e]ach United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f).

Section 2000e-5 provides a civil action procedure for federal employees bringing Title VII claims under § 2000e-16.

JACKSON v. YELLEN · filed 2025-04-16

Plaintiff is correct that Title VII applies to Federal Employees under § 2000e-16, but federal employees may file suit pursuant to § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to await completion of the EEOC process before filing a private suit without that delay supporting laches.

19 Fair empl.prac.cas. 1682, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 30,001 Wesley P. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Company · filed 1979-06-15(f)(1)

These statements clearly indicate that the private remedy allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) is only an alternative method for a plaintiff to obtain relief from discrimination. A plaintiff cannot be penalized for choosing to forgo this alternative and electing instead the legislatively and judicially favored method of relying on the administrative processes of the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 permits dismissal of an EEOC enforcement action for laches when unreasonable delay prejudices the employer’s defense to every claim.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Martin Processing, Inc. · filed 1982-02-03

Where such prejudice from unreasonable delay exists as to all of the pending claims, the dismissal of the entire action is justified.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a claimant to seek a right-to-sue letter after 180 days, but waiting for the EEOC does not shield a dormant claim from laches.

Paul JEFFRIES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-08-15(f)(1)

A plaintiff does not have an absolute right to await termination of EEOC proceedings. ... We do require such persons to show some interest in prosecuting their claims.

An EEOC enforcement action may be dismissed for laches when the EEOC’s inexcusable delay in filing suit unduly prejudices the employer.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1986-03-28

Indiana Bell has proven the two elements of the affirmative defense of laches. The EEOC inexcusably delayed in filing this suit and the delay has caused Indiana Bell undue prejudice. Therefore, this Court must grant Indiana Bell’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss the EEOC’s case against Indiana Bell.

A private Title VII suit may be barred by laches when the plaintiff unreasonably delays filing and the delay prejudices the defendant.

Garrett v. General Motors Corp. · filed 1987-04-24(f)

The equitable doctrine of laches is applicable to Title VII actions brought by private plaintiffs. ... For the reasons set forth, the Court concludes that the circumstances of this case warrant barring plaintiff's suit on the basis of laches.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) allows a claimant to seek a right-to-sue notice after 180 days, but laches may bar a later suit if the claimant's lack of diligence prejudices the defendant.

The Cleveland Newspaper Guild, Local 1 v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co. · filed 1988-02-11(f)(1)

We conclude that the doctrine of laches, like other equitable considerations, should be applicable to a Title VII proceeding in practice as well as theory.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) provides a waiting period for private Title VII suits, and pursuing administrative relief during that period does not by itself establish laches.

Tunis v. Corning Glass Works · filed 1988-09-16(f)(1)

Title VII claimants are “not required to litigate prior to the termination of the EEOC’s investigation and attempts at conciliation,” ... and it is not unreasonable per se for an aggrieved party to delay filing an action in federal district court pending the outcome of the administrative process. ... See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (mandating waiting period of 180 days between filing of charges with EEOC and filing private suit).

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a complainant to request a right-to-sue letter after 180 days; an employer asserting laches against a later suit must prove unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice.

Raley v. Board of St. Mary's County Commissioners · filed 1990-09-07(f)(1)

If the EEOC dismisses the complaint or has not filed a civil action within 180 days of the complainant’s filing, then the complainant may obtain a “right to sue” letter from the Commission and file his or her own action. ... To prove the defense of laches the defendant must show (1) unreasonable delay in bringing the action, and (2) resulting prejudice to the employer. ... For reasons stated below, this Court finds that the Board has not met its burden of proving “unreasonable delay.” Thus, this suit is not barred by laches and the Board’s arguments regarding prejudice need not be addressed.

Section 2000e-5’s EEOC filing procedure permits laches to bar a Title VII suit for unreasonable, unexcused delay before the charge is filed when that delay prejudices the defendant.

Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co. · filed 1995-02-27(e)(1)

Despite this, the same rationale supporting the laches defense for delays following administrative filing, applies equally as strong to delays prior to the administrative filing. ... We reject Ashley’s contention in this regard and proceed to the merits of laches defense.

Section 2000e-5 permits a laches defense to a Title VII suit when the plaintiff unreasonably delays filing after a charge and the delay prejudices the defendant.

Brown-Mitchell v. KC Power & Light Co. · filed 2001-10-05

The equitable doctrine of laches is a proper defense to claims of discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII when based upon the plaintiff's post-charge delay in filing his or her Title VII lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5 permits laches as a defense to a Title VII suit based on a plaintiff’s delay in filing after an administrative charge.

Brown-Mitchell v. Kansas City Power & Light Company · filed 2001-10-05

The equitable doctrine of laches is a proper defense to claims of discrimination and retaliatory discharge under Title VII when based upon the plaintiffs post-charge delay in filing his or her Title VII lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5 does not require an employee to exhaust an employer’s internal personnel remedies before bringing a Title VII suit.

Margaret MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee · filed 1979-06-28

Putting aside material issues of fact regarding whether Miller knew or should have known that she could have sought reinstatement through the personnel department, we decline to read an exhaustion of company remedies requirement into Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(c) requires a claimant to exhaust available state administrative remedies before bringing a Title VII claim in federal court.

Settles v. Pinkerton, Inc. · filed 1979-11-12(c)

It is obvious that the intent of the above-cited statute is to require a plaintiff to exhaust state administrative remedies, if any be available, before proceeding in the federal forum, and that the pursuit of available state remedies is required before this court has jurisdiction of any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII claimant to pursue administrative remedies before filing suit, including filing charges with the appropriate agency and allowing an opportunity for conciliation.

Skomorucha v. Wilmington Housing Authority · filed 1980-10-30

The statute requires that the aggrieved party file charges first with a state or local authority, and then with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). ... Only if conciliation is unsuccessful does the aggrieved party have a right to sue. ... Plaintiff has not met the statutory prerequisites for suing on a Title VII claim.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to cooperate with the administrative investigation and conciliation process before bringing a Title VII suit; a right-to-sue notice does not cure the claimant’s failure to do so.

Dates v. Phelps Dodge Magnet Wire Co. · filed 1984-03-02

By her own non-cooperation, plaintiff made it impossible for the administrative agency to attempt to resolve her case and in this respect did not adequately exhaust her administrative remedies so as to warrant the invocation of this court’s jurisdiction.

A Title VII claim may proceed when a genuine factual dispute remains over whether the agency investigation of an earlier discrimination charge would reasonably encompass it.

Johnson v. Provident National Bank · filed 1988-09-26(e)

Therefore, I find that a genuine issue of material fact does exist regarding Johnson’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies for her training discrimination claim, and Provident’s motion for summary judgment on Count I will be denied.

Section 2000e-5 requires a claimant to exhaust an EEOC charge before suing; an unrelated claim cannot proceed when the agency had no opportunity to investigate it.

Kawatra v. MEDGAR EVERS COLLEGE OF CITY U. OF NY · filed 1988-11-17

A party must, of course, file a timely charge with the EEOC and obtain a right-to-sue letter as a condition precedent to the filing of a Title VII action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), (b). ... Because such an approach is antithetical to the exhaustion requirement — the satisfaction of which is particularly appropriate where, as here, the supplemental claim is unrelated to the original claims — this Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s marital status claim.

Section 2000e-5 permits a Title VII plaintiff to bring a discrimination claim after filing an EEOC charge, receiving a right-to-sue notice, and timely filing suit.

Brown v. Hartshorne Public School District 1 · filed 1988-12-20

Brown had exhausted this claim by filing a charge of national origin discrimination with the EEOC, receiving notice of her right to file suit in district court, and timely filing this action.

A Title VII plaintiff must file an EEOC charge before suing and may pursue an unlisted claim only if it is reasonably related to the charge.

Chojar v. Levitt · filed 1991-09-25(e)

Filing a charge with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private civil action under Title VII. ... Judicial relief cannot be sought for claims not listed in the original EEOC charge unless they are “reasonably related” to the charge.

Section 2000e-5 requires a private Title VII plaintiff to file a charge with the EEOC before suing, and a plaintiff cannot litigate charges voluntarily withdrawn from EEOC investigation.

Wright v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 1993-02-03

Before filing an action in federal court under Title VII, a private litigant must first file a complaint with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815 (1989). ... Wright cannot litigate in federal court those charges which he voluntarily withdrew from investigation by the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies; a claim is unexhausted when a reasonable investigation of the EEOC charge would not uncover it.

Strub v. Public Service Co. · filed 1993-11-08

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (West Supp.1993), a plaintiff must exhaust certain administrative remedies as a precursor to bringing a case in federal court. ... In this case, the Court cannot say that either a reasonable investigation would have turned up evidence relating to sexual harassment, nor that the material presented to the Court indicates that Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to this allegation.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars a civil discrimination claim that was not raised in the EEOC charge.

Otis v. Canadian Valley-Reeves Meat Co. · filed 1994-07-22(b)

Where, as here, an attempt is made to include in the complaint allegations other than those contained in the charge filed with the EEOC, the action must be treated as one without a previous resort to the administrative process. In this situation, the Court must dismiss that claim. Accordingly, any claim based on putative racial discrimination is hereby dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a Title VII claimant to exhaust administrative remedies; claims beyond the scope of the EEOC charge and any investigation naturally arising from it are procedurally barred.

Dennis v. County of Fairfax · filed 1995-05-24(b)

Although appellant registered a complaint with the EEOC, he has nevertheless failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC complaint did not address any question of discrimination in hiring, training, or promotion. Where, as here, the claims raised under Title VII exceed the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are proeedurally barred.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before suing; the suit may include claims like or reasonably related to the administrative charge.

Shannon v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1996-01-03

The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the plaintiff a green light to bring her employment-discrimination claim, along with allegations that are "like or reasonably related" to that claim, in federal court.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to pursue and exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit.

Porter v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 1996-09-13

First, Ann Porter failed to show any attempt to pursue, let alone exhaust, her administrative remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to present a claim to the EEOC before suing; allegations that are separate from and not reasonably related to the charge are unexhausted.

Tolerson v. Auburn Steel Co., Inc. · filed 1997-03-18

The additional allegations constitute separate and distinct causes of action under Title VII, and, therefore, the additional allegations are not reasonably related to the allegations brought before the EEOC. Defendants’ Motion for Summary. Judgment, therefore, will be granted as to all claims unrelated to Defendant’s termination of Plaintiffs employment and their scheduling of his work hours on the ground that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5 requires a hostile work environment claim to be raised in the EEOC charge; a charge alleging a discrete denial of promotion does not exhaust that claim.

Manse v. Union Electric Co. · filed 1997-04-01

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on his claim of a racially hostile workplace.

A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies for accommodation claims before suing; a later EEOC charge cannot establish exhaustion for claims already in the lawsuit.

Henderson v. New York Life, Inc. · filed 1997-06-23

As to Henderson’s second EEOC Charge, the Court finds that it was filed subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit and, therefore, cannot be considered as a basis for evaluating whether the claims in Henderson’s complaint have met jurisdictional prerequisites.

Section 2000e-5 bars a Title VII claim that was neither included in an administrative charge nor reasonably related to its allegations.

Cooper v. Xerox Corp. · filed 1998-02-05

Cooper’s EEOC charge contains no similar or comparable descriptions leading me to conclude that a retaliation claim would be within the scope of the EEOC’s investigation. Accordingly, I find that Cooper’s second cause of action, for retaliation, is not reasonably related to the allegations in his administrative charge and therefore is dismissed.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a discrimination charge before a Title VII suit, and a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies as to each defendant.

Reese v. Teamsters Local Union No. 541 · filed 1998-02-17(e)

To bring a Title VII cause of action, an employee must file a discrimination charge with the state agency within 300 days after the alleged discriminatory act occurred, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). ... Because plaintiff did not name either Jackson or Owens Corning in his EEOC charge of April 16, 1997, he has not exhausted administrative remedies as to them.

Section 2000e-5 requires a Title VII plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies; a later lawsuit is limited to claims like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge.

Kidane v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1999-03-17

In order to bring a cause of action in federal court under Title VII, a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5 limits a Title VII suit to claims that a reasonable EEOC investigation could uncover from the administrative charge.

Robinson v. Rubin · filed 1999-06-21(e)

Robinson’s claims for race and sex discrimination would not have fallen within the scope of a reasonable EEOC investigation into Robinson’s retaliation claims.

A Title VII claim must be presented to the EEOC unless it falls within the scope of an earlier EEOC charge or a reasonable investigation of that charge.

Santiago v. City of Vineland · filed 2000-08-02

It is clear that Santiago is not excused from exhausting his administrative remedies with respect to his claim under Title VII because his race discrimination claim is not within the scope of either the EEOC charge or its reasonable investigation.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires a plaintiff to raise a Title VII retaliation claim in an administrative charge before pursuing it in federal court.

Richards v. Farner-Bocken Co. · filed 2001-05-30(e)

The court agrees with Farner-Bocken that Richards has not established that her retaliation claims under Title VII and the ADEA (or the ADA, if, contrary to the court’s reading of the Complaint, Richards was attempting to assert such a retaliation claim) can proceed where such retaliation claims were not mentioned in Richards’s administrative charges, and Richards does not argue to the contrary.

Section 2000e-5(e) requires an administrative charge before a Title VII suit, and a civil claim must fall within the scope of that charge or the investigation reasonably expected to follow it.

Siaca v. Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto Rico · filed 2001-07-31(e)

Therefore, plaintiffs ADEA and Title VII claims against defendants must be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Section 2000e-5 requires a plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies for a retaliation claim that is not like or reasonably related to an earlier Title VII complaint.

Harris v. Casino · filed 2001-08-30

Dismissal was proper because Harris’ retaliation claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 was not “like or reasonably related” to the allegations of his prior Title VII complaint, see Fielder v. UAL Corp., 218 F.3d 973, 989 (9th Cir.2000), and he was required to pursue his administrative remedies for this claim as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, see Stache v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO, 852 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1988).

Section 2000e-5(f) requires a Title VII plaintiff to exhaust EEOC remedies before bringing a claim in federal court; claims omitted from the EEOC charge may proceed if they are like or reasonably related to its allegations.

Fundukian v. United Blood Services · filed 2001-08-31(f)

To establish federal subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims, a plaintiff must first exhaust his or her administrative remedies before seeking federal adjudication of those claims. ... We conclude that Fundukian failed to exhaust her EEOC remedies as to her claims of discrimination based on race, sex, and age. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5 requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before an ADA employment discrimination suit.

Wright v. CompUSA, Inc. · filed 2001-12-28

Both M.G.L. ch. 151B and the ADA require the exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a civil lawsuit.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires a plaintiff to file a timely administrative charge with the EEOC or an appropriate state agency before bringing a Title VII claim.

B.K.B., Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee v. Maui Police Department, County of Maui, County of Maui, Defendant-Appellee · filed 2002-02-20(b)

Under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC, or the appropriate state agency, thereby affording the agency an opportunity to investigate the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

A Title VII claimant who obtains state court review of a discrimination claim cannot relitigate the same claim in a federal enforcement action.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. · filed 1979-10-02

Sinicropi permits no choice but to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint in this case on grounds of res judicata.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to give state findings substantial weight, but does not limit the preclusive effect of state court judgments.

Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. · filed 1982-05-17(b)

Similarly, the congressional directive that the EEOC should give “substantial weight” to findings made in state proceedings, § 706(b), 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(b), indicates only the minimum level of deference the EEOC must afford all state determinations; it does not bar affording the greater preclusive effect which may be required by § 1738 if judicial action is involved.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a federal Title VII suit despite an unreviewed adverse state agency decision.

Jones v. Progress Lighting Corp. · filed 1984-10-18(f)(1)

Accordingly this Court declines to adopt the analysis of the district court in Buckhalter, and holds that the plaintiff is not barred from litigating his Title VII claim in this Court.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a federal Title VII action after an adverse state administrative decision without requiring the claimant to appeal that decision in state court.

Parker v. Danville Metal Stamping Co., Inc. · filed 1985-01-30(f)(1)

An unappealed state administrative decision does not become a final state court decision under Title VII, as there is no requirement under the statute that a claimant pursue appeals through the state court system of an adverse administrative decision before bringing a Title VII action.

Section 2000e-5 permits a federal trial de novo after a state agency considers a discrimination complaint, unless a state court has adjudicated the claim.

Robert E. BOTTINI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SADORE MANAGEMENT CORP., Defendant-Appellee · filed 1985-06-12

Yet, at the same time, Title VII’s authorization of a civil action — following a civil rights complaint that is carried no further than consideration by a state administrative agency — has been uniformly interpreted to entitle the complainant to a trial de novo in federal court.

Section 2000e-5(b), together with section 2000e-8(e), prohibits the EEOC from disclosing investigative materials to the parties before suit.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joseph Horne Company · filed 1979-10-10(b)

We therefore hold that §§ 2000-5(b) and 2000e-8(e) prohibit EEOC from disclosing investigative materials to the parties prior to suit. The provisions of the regulations and the Compliance Manual purporting to authorize such disclosures are invalid and unenforceable.

Section 2000e-5(b) permits a charging party to discover EEOC conciliation documents.

Greene v. Thalhimer's Department Store · filed 1982-03-23(b)

Thus, this court, despite its reluctance to do so, must hold that conciliation documents are discoverable by the charging party.

Section 2000e-5(b) requires the EEOC to make a charge available to the employer named in it; its ban on public disclosure does not bar disclosure to a party in its own case.

J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Perry · filed 1983-06-16(b)

First, the plain language of the statute shows that the Commission is to make available to the employer the charge in any case to which it is a party.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars public disclosure of EEOC charges but permits disclosure to a party of information in its own file.

J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Perry · filed 1983-06-16(b)

Thus, Associated Dry Goods confirms the holding in Perry that disclosure of information to an employer is not the prohibited disclosure to the public under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(b) restricts the EEOC’s public disclosure of information obtained during an investigation.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1996-03-05(b)

To the contrary, the provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-8 make it a criminal offense for an officer or employer of the EEOC to make public any information obtained during an investigation, except when the matter goes to litigation.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the EEOC from making discrimination charges public, but charging parties are not considered members of the public under that rule.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. City of Milwaukee · filed 1999-06-22(b)

Section 2000e-5(b) states that charges themselves “shall not be made public by the Commission” and provides for fines or imprisonment for anyone violating this rule of confidentiality. ... The “public” set forth in these sections, however, does not include charging parties; a charging party has access to the information uncovered by the EEOC during the investigation of his or her own case.

Section 2000e-5(b) does not bar admission of an employer’s factual response to an EEOC charge when the response was made before the EEOC completed its investigation or began conciliation.

Brooks v. GRANDMA'S HOUSE DAY CARE CENTERS, INC. · filed 2002-10-15(b)

The letter in the present case was not written in the course of informal endeavors by the EEOC to settle the case. Further, the EEOC had not yet completed its investigation and had not determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that the charge was true. Thus, I found that the plain language of § 2000e-5(b) did not bar admission of the statement.

Section 2000e-5(b) bars the EEOC from making charges public but permits limited disclosures to parties when needed to secure appropriate relief.

Venetian Casino Resort v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · filed 2006-09-29(b)

Title VII limits the ability of the EEOC to make public disclosures of information gathered during its investigations, however, directing that “[cjharges shall not be made public by the Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). ... Thus, for all of these reasons, plaintiffs claim that the EEOC’s disclosure policy is violative of Title VII is of no avail.

Section 2000e-5(b)’s restriction on public disclosure does not prevent a charging party from obtaining the records of the EEOC’s investigation of that party’s complaint after the EEOC issues its determination, while the time to sue remains open or a suit is pending.

Shipman v. National Passenger Railroad Corporation (Amtrak) · filed 2014-12-23(b)

In plain language, Exemption 3, as applied to these circumstances, prevents a member of the public from receiving the records of the EEOC’s investigation of someone else’s discrimination complaint. However, it allows a complainant to receive the records that pertain to his complaint as long as (1) the EEOC has completed its investigation and issued its determination and (2) either the complainant requests the records during the 90-day window in which he may file suit against an employer or if the complainant has actually filed suit against the employer.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) requires 180 days of EEOC jurisdiction over a charge before a private Title VII suit, absent extraordinary circumstances.

Grimes v. Pitney Bowes, Inc. · filed 1979-12-19(f)(1)

No extraordinary circumstances have been shown in the present case that would justify an exception based on policy grounds to the obvious congressional mandate of a 180-day period of exclusive EEOC jurisdiction.

Section 2000e-5(e)’s 180-day filing period excludes class claims based on applications or terminations that occurred more than 180 days before the first charge.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc. · filed 1980-01-29(e)

Based on the foregoing, it would appear proper to exclude from the class the following persons: (1) black applicants who submitted applications to Crown more than 180 days prior to December 18, 1973, the date on which the first charge (Crawford’s) was filed; and (2) former black employees terminated more than 180 days prior to December 18, 1973. It is so Ordered.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) permits a private suit after the EEOC dismisses the charge or 180 days pass without agency resolution; an early right-to-sue notice does not waive that requirement.

Spencer v. Banco Real, S.A. · filed 1980-09-25(f)(1)

Congress clearly contemplated that the Commission would endeavor to fulfill these statutory mandates and that a complainant could resort to the federal courts only after the Commission had resolved the charge or spent 180 days attempting to do so.