42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay and promotion as equitable relief for an employee denied a promotion through discrimination.

Milburn v. West · filed 1994-06-15(g)

Absent the possibility of a damage remedy, the most appropriate relief for a plaintiff in the circumstances of this case is backpay for the difference between the plaintiffs compensation in his actual positions at the Aqueduct and the compensation he would have received had he been promoted to the position of maintenance general foreman, together with a variation on the Title VII “reinstatement” remedy.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces Title VII backpay by earnings received or earnable with reasonable diligence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-07-19(g)(1)

The duty of a Title YII plaintiff to mitigate has been codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1): “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” ... Thus, we cannot say that as a matter of law, Widmont breached her duty to mitigate, and we deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to reduce a Title VII back pay award, while leaving the amount of the award to the district court’s discretion.

Daniel v. Dennis Loveridge and Loveridge MacHine & Tool, Inc., a Utah Corporation · filed 1994-08-23(g)

Then, as the statute dictates, the district court deducted therefrom Daniel’s “interim earnings” in the amount of $10,770.71. ... We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in its determination of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) does not require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation to receive back pay.

Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks · filed 1994-09-06(g)(2)(A)

The court does not read 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) as precluding a back pay award here. To read this subsection as imposing the requirement that plaintiff prove but-for causation as a prerequisite to back pay would undermine the affirmative defense scheme established by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which makes clear that it is “respondent” who must "demonstrate[ ]” that the same decision would have been made even absent the illegal motivation.

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable discretion to award back pay to make a Title VII victim whole, but an award extending beyond termination needs clear findings supporting it.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cherry-Burrell Corp. · filed 1994-09-19(g)

We recognize that the "district court has broad equitable discretion to fashion back pay awards in order to make the Title VII victim whole," 4 but in view of our expressed uncertainties and the potentially inconsistent findings about intended discrimination in the lay-off/termination in 1990, we REMAND only this aspect of the damages for further consideration, clarification, or amendment.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a finding of intentional discrimination to award back pay for lost wages.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cherry-Burrell Corp. · filed 1994-09-19(g)

Title VII mandates a finding of discriminatory intent to support a damages award for lost pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back-pay liability to the two years before a complaint is filed with the appropriate agency.

Park v. Howard University · filed 1994-09-23(g)

Under Title VII, back-pay liability “shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior” to the filing of a complaint with the appropriate agency. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Dr. Park filed her claim with the D.C. Department of Human Rights and Minority Development on September 23, 1992. Therefore, the earliest date for back-pay liability to be assessed to the defendant is September 23, 1990, a considerable time after the delay in promotion occurred.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to losses incurred within two years before an EEOC charge, even for applicants who applied earlier.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. O & G Spring and Wire Forms Specialty Company · filed 1994-10-11(g)

But the court only calculated back pay due from October 22, 1982 (two years before the filing of a charge with the Commission, as required by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)); see also Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 659 F.2d 736, 740 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1100, 102 S.Ct. 674, 70 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). ... The district court was clearly entitled to include all victims in the remedy and properly limited recovery in accordance with the two year limitation of Title VII.

An employer opposing Title VII back pay bears the burden of showing that the employee failed to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Lutheran Family Services · filed 1994-12-05(g)(1)

The burden having been shifted to LFS to rebut her claim by demonstrating that her efforts at mitigation were unreasonable, LFS has failed to offer anything more than argument to the effect that Savage’s attempts at securing comparable subsequent employment were less than reasonable or diligent.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows up to 100% of back pay for sex discrimination, with duplicative benefits deducted.

Terri L. NICHOLS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony M. FRANK, Postmaster General; U.S. Postal Service, Defendants-Appellant · filed 1994-12-13(g)(1)

Under Title VII, victims of sex discrimination — regardless of whether that discrimination results in a work-related “injury” or not — are entitled to a maximum of 100% of their back pay, as long as that sum does not lead to double recovery. Duplicative benefits must be deducted, as the district court did here.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits recovery of lost fringe benefits as Title VII relief.

Kelli Lyn Metz, and v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., and Cross-Appellee · filed 1994-11-08(g)

Lost fringe benefits are available under the remedial provisions of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (providing for back pay and any equitable relief that the court deems appropriate).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII claimant to mitigate damages; whether an offered job was substantially equivalent can determine entitlement to back pay.

Nelson-Cole v. Borg-Warner Security Corp. · filed 1995-04-06(g)

Under Title VII, a claimant has a duty to mitigate damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... In this ease, however, because there is a factual dispute as to whether the Plaintiff was offered a substantially equivalent position, summary judgment is not appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows back pay to include lost raises and proven fringe benefits.

Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. · filed 1995-05-04(g)

Plaintiff clearly is entitled to a back pay award pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In light of Title VIPs policy to make whole a victim of discrimination, the award of back pay should include not only the straight salary, but raises and fringe benefits, as well, which Plaintiff would have received but for the intentional discrimination.

A court may award back pay under § 2000e-5(g)(1) without deducting unemployment compensation the employee received after termination.

Dailey v. Generale · filed 1995-06-20(g)(1)

Therefore, unemployment compensation will not be deducted from the plaintiffs back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits how far back a back pay award may reach, rather than capping the total award.

Taylor v. Cent. Pa. Drug & Alcohol Serv. Corp. · filed 1995-06-30(g)

Calling this limitation a "cap" is a misnomer. Rather, it states a limit as to the period of time prior to the filing of a complaint for which back pay may be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits how far back a back pay award may reach before an EEOC charge is filed; it does not cap the total award.

Taylor v. Central Pennsylvania Drug & Alcohol Services Corp. · filed 1995-06-30(g)

Calling this limitation a “cap” is a misnomer. Rather, it states a limit as to the period of time prior to the filing of a complaint for which back pay may be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

EEOC v. Regency Architectural Metals Corp. · filed 1995-08-08(g)

In the words of the statute, "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... We conclude that Hodge's earnings between January 1983 and November 1987 averaged $8,000 per year. Thus, we conclude that she is entitled to an average yearly back pay award of $8,000, which, over a period of four years and ten months, gives a total of $38,667.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits lost employment benefits caused by discrimination to be included in back pay when their value is proved.

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, Inc. · filed 1995-09-29(g)

To the extent that benefits should have flowed to plaintiff as a result of the positions she was denied because of the defendant’s intentional and unlawful conduct, those benefits should be considered as part of the back wages and salary that plaintiff ... was deprived of due to defendant’s unlawful conduct.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence; a failure to mitigate does not automatically eliminate back pay.

Booker v. Taylor Milk Company · filed 1995-08-31(g)(1)

The plain language of section 2000e-5 shows that amounts that could have been earned with reasonable diligence should be used to reduce or decrease a back pay award, not to wholly cut off the right to any back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to leave unemployment insurance benefits undeducted from a back pay award as a matter of equity.

Talada v. International Service System, Inc. · filed 1995-10-10(g)

It is in this court’s discretion to determine whether or not to deduct the amount of any unemployment insurance received from any damages awarded. ... Talada’s award will not be reduced by any unemployment insurance award already collected for the reasoning expressed above.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay to make a discrimination victim whole, reduced by interim earnings.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. · filed 1995-11-17(g)(1)

Papa is presumptively entitled to back pay from the date of discharge to the date of trial, minus his interim earnings. However, the Court finds that David Papa will be “made whole” with an award of damages from the date of termination up to September, 1994 when he began college to change careers.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a back pay award to a prevailing Title VII plaintiff, reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Eldred v. CONSOL. FREIGHTWAYS CORP. OF DELAWARE · filed 1995-12-08(g)(1)

The court will award back pay to plaintiff. In calculating an award of back pay, “[ijnter-im earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person ... discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.”

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes backpay for a successful Title VII plaintiff, and that relief is not subject to the cap on compensatory and punitive damages.

Reynolds v. Octel Communications Corp. · filed 1995-12-08(g)

The $300,000 limit on compensatory and punitive damages does not preclude Reynolds, as a successful Title VII plaintiff, from obtaining other damages. “Compensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interest on back-pay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) ].” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2). ... Reynolds is thus entitled, in conformity with the objectives of Title VII, to recover this amount as backpay to restore her to the position she would have been in but for the discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for unlawful employment discrimination.

Eichenwald v. Krigel's, Inc. · filed 1995-12-13(g)(1)

Because the court has concluded that plaintiffs Eichenwald, Riehman, and Fuller were unlawfully sexually harassed by Mr. Shine, Krigel’s vice president of operations, the court may order relief in the form of back pay under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay for a successful Title VII plaintiff, and the district court has broad discretion to set the amount.

Ziegler v. K-Mart Corporation · filed 1996-01-10(g)

Under Title VII, the court may award a successful plaintiff any appropriate relief, including reinstatement, back pay or “any other equitable relief” the court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The amount of back pay awarded to a successful Title VII plaintiff is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. ... Given the wide latitude afforded the judge in this area, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in calculating the back pay award in the way it did.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence; the employer bears the burden of showing substantially equivalent jobs were available and the claimant failed to seek them diligently.

Shpargel v. Stage & Co. · filed 1996-01-31(g)(1)

Thus, the burden is on the defendants to prove that there were substantially equivalent jobs available to the plaintiff but that he failed to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking such jobs. ... Thus, the defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing that there were substantially similar positions available.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence; the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Mertig v. Milliken & Michaels of Delaware, Inc. · filed 1996-05-01(g)

The employer may satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by proving that it offered the discharged employee a job that was substantially equivalent to his or her former position; or (2) by establishing that other substantially equivalent positions were available to the former employee and he or she failed to use reasonable diligence in attempting to secure such a position. ... In light of the disputed issue of job equivalency between Mertig’s prior sales position and the CSD letter series position, the Court concludes that this issue is more appropriately resolved by the trier of fact.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay to remedy economic injury from unlawful employment discrimination.

Terry v. Gallegos · filed 1996-05-16(g)

Plaintiff shall receive back pay, retroactive to the first claim for which defendant is found in violation of Title VII, i.e., the Atlanta District Director selection on November 11, 1984.

Section 2000e-5(g) authorizes back pay and reinstatement, with back pay reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Kahmann v. Reno · filed 1996-05-31(g)

The court may order back pay, reinstatement, and “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Any order for back pay must be reduced by “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” ... In this ease the defendants failed to put forth any evidence which might show that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages after her termination on December 13, 1991. Thus, the defendants failed to meet then-burden and the court will award back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

LaFleur v. Wallace State Community College · filed 1996-06-18(g)

This amount, of course, should be reduced by any “[i]nterim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence” by the plaintiff.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Notter v. North Hand Protection, a Division of Siebe, Incorporated · filed 1996-06-21(g)(1)

The district court's charge accurately stated the law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) provides in relevant part, "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to refer specifically to Notter's attending school.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a back pay claimant to use reasonable diligence to obtain and maintain substantially equivalent employment.

Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare · filed 1996-07-26(g)(1)

Second, in order to give effect to the statutory requirement to use reasonable diligence, it necessarily follows that the claimant must also use reasonable diligence in maintaining that substantially similar employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a plaintiff to seek suitable employment with reasonable diligence, and the employer bears the burden of proving that backpay should be tolled.

Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., Cross-Appellee · filed 1996-07-26(g)

A plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages by seeking suitable employment with reasonable diligence. ... It is the employer’s burden to prove that backpay should be tolled. ... Backpay should not be tolled and the district court is affirmed on this issue.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a back pay award to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.

Brooks v. Fonda-Fultonville Central School District · filed 1996-08-30(g)

Any order for back pay must be reduced by “[i]nterim earnings or amounts eamable with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a claimant seeking back pay to use reasonable diligence to obtain and maintain substantially equivalent employment.

Donna Patterson Nicholas Brown, and Michael L. Adams v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corporation Mark Kennedy · filed 1996-09-11(g)(1)

The claimant must exercise reasonable diligence in both seeking and maintaining substantially equivalent employment in order to effectuate the reasonable diligence requirement.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; unemployment benefits need not be deducted.

Iannone v. Frederic R. Harris, Inc. · filed 1996-09-24(g)(1)

Against this amount, it is necessary to offset the income that Ms. Iannone received during the same periods. Under Title VII, “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(g)(1). ... Therefore, I will not deduct Ms. Iannone’s unemployment compensation payments from her back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not permit back pay that would place an employee in a better position than she would have occupied without the discrimination.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ilona of Hungary, Incorporated · filed 1996-10-02(g)(1)

Here, the award of back pay to Gluk-hovsky places her in a better position than she would have occupied had the discrimination not occurred, because she would have quit anyway. We cannot sanction such a result, and therefore reverse the award of back pay to Glukhovsky.

Section 2000e-5(g) makes back pay a remedy for the court to determine; a jury’s finding on its amount is advisory.

McCue v. State of Kansas, Dept. of Human Resources · filed 1996-11-18(g)

The court agrees with the defendant that the determination of back pay is a question for the court. ... We therefore consider the jury’s determination of back pay as advisory pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c).

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII claimant seeking back pay to make reasonable and diligent efforts to find suitable employment.

Meyer v. United Air Lines, Inc. · filed 1997-01-16(g)

A Title VII claimant has a statutory duty to use reasonable and diligent efforts to secure suitable employment in order to mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay after a worker resigns following a wrongfully denied promotion, subject to the duty to mitigate.

McCoy v. Oscar Mayer Foods, 1 · filed 1997-03-06(g)(1)

Similarly, the district court's belief that liability for a wrongfully denied promotion would terminate upon the employee's voluntary resignation is not necessarily true. Assuming that if McCoy had received the promotion he would have stayed with the company, back pay for the period after his resignation is at least conceivable. To make the victim whole, an equitable remedy must reconstruct the victim's employment status as best as possible to the way it would have been absent discrimination, which may require ordering the employer to reinstate or hire the victim into the wrongfully denied position--as would be obvious if this were a simple refusal to hire case. On the other hand, the victim is burdened with a duty to mitigate, making a voluntary resignation risky and likely diminishing or even eliminating the back pay entitlement.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits Title VII back pay to the two years before an administrative charge is filed.

Thomas v. Denny's, Inc. · filed 1997-04-25(g)

Moreover, while the continuing violation theory as it functions in a Title VII case in essence extends the limitation period, it does not address the period within which damages can be recovered. That period, as we have stated above, is specifically limited by section 2000e-5(g) to the two years prior to the filing of administrative charges.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires back pay to be reduced by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; the defendant bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Evans v. State of Conn. · filed 1997-06-17(g)

Any calculation of a back pay award must be reduced by “interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Defendant bares the burden of establishing that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires interim earnings to be deducted from a back pay award.

Lyons v. Memphis Board of Education · filed 1997-08-15(g)

The statute provides, in pertinent part: “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... The jury returned a verdict for $137,017 and failed to reduce the back pay allowable to plaintiff by the $3,000 as required by statute. Thus, the award of back pay is excessive by $3,000.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence, including during voluntary unemployment.

Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-09-05(g)(1)

The court agrees that plaintiff should not receive back pay for that two-month period. ... Therefore, the court reduces the $37,700 amount by $4,000 (the court’s reasonable estimate based on the evidence of what plaintiff’s earnings would have been at the job she left voluntarily), leaving a total back pay award of $33,700.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not allow back pay for a private sector job the plaintiff never obtained while still employed by the defendant; such an award would be compensatory damages.

McCaskill v. West · filed 1997-09-24(g)

Here, the district court concluded that a back pay award to plaintiff, who was at the time still employed by defendant, for the loss of a private sector job he applied for and ... did not get, possibly due to a tainted reference, would be in the nature of impermissible compensatory damages. We agree.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for intentional discrimination, but a plaintiff must attempt to mitigate damages.

Herman v. City of Allentown · filed 1997-11-21(g)(1)

Plaintiffs, however, must attempt to mitigate damages in order to be entitled to back pay. ... Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to back pay from the time the Defendant refused to rehire him in February, 1995 through the end of May 1995.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not treat disability retirement benefits from a collateral source as interim earnings that reduce back pay.

Arneson v. Chater · filed 1997-11-07(g)(1)

We affirm the district court's refusal to deduct Arneson's disability benefits from his back pay award because these benefits were from a collateral source and should not be considered interim earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g) does not treat disability benefits from a collateral source as interim earnings that reduce a back pay award.

Stephen A. ARNESON, Appellee, v. John J. CALLAHAN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Appellant · filed 1997-11-07(g)

We affirm the district court’s refusal to deduct Arneson’s disability benefits from his back pay award becaúse these benefits were from a collateral source and should not be considered interim earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence, including when the claimant voluntarily works part-time.

Jefferson v. Milvets System Technology, Inc. · filed 1997-11-25(g)(1)

This duty to mitigate also applies to “underemployed” Title VII claimants like the plaintiff, who works only part-time. ... Thus, the plaintiff has failed to mitigate his economic damages at least since the time he accepted his job with TSS in April of 1996.

Section 2000e-5(g), incorporated into the ADA, authorizes back pay subject to the court’s equitable discretion.

Gonzales v. Sandoval County · filed 1998-03-13(g)

Back pay is an authorized form of damages under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g), 12117(a); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). The decision to award back pay lies in the court’s equitable discretion.

In an Attorney General pattern-or-practice suit, § 2000e-5(g) permits back pay to accrue from two years before the United States gives the employer notice and information comparable to an EEOC discrimination charge.

United States v. City of Warren · filed 1998-03-16(g)

To this end, in a pattern or practice case, the back pay period should begin whenever the United States provides the employer with notice and information comparable to that normally contained in a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) principally provides injunctive relief; before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts treated back pay under it as incidental to equitable relief.

Spratt v. Guardian Automotive Products, Inc. · filed 1998-03-17(g)(1)

The central tenant of this provision is quite obviously to provide injunctive relief, and prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 courts understood that back pay awarded under § 2000e-5(g)(l) were merely incidental to the equitable relief contemplated by this provision.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) measures back pay by earnings lost because of discrimination, reduced by actual earnings and amounts obtainable through reasonable efforts to mitigate damages.

Alexandra TROY, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. BAY STATE COMPUTER GROUP, INC., Defendant, Appellant · filed 1998-04-14(g)(1)

But no one has suggested that there was any pertinent difference in the standards for measuring back pay; under both rubrics Alexandra Troy was entitled to recover, although only once, for what she would have earned absent the discharge, reduced by any compensation that she actually received during the same period and any additional amount that she would have received through reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a back pay award based on the applicant’s chance of obtaining a job when discrimination denied him an interview.

Drews v. Social Development Commission · filed 1998-08-11(g)(1)

Based on analysis above, I find that Mr. Drews would have had a one in eight chance of receiving the position if the defendant had interviewed him. He should therefore receive as back pay 12.5 percent of the salary and fringe benefits that he would have received if he had been given the job.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces a back pay award by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc. · filed 1998-08-12(g)(1)

To this end, Title VII provides: “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Thus, in calculating a back pay award, the trial court must determine what the employee would have earned had she not been the victim of discrimination, and must subtract from this figure the amount of actual interim earnings.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay reduced by actual earnings and amounts the employee could have earned through reasonable mitigation, with the employer bearing the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital, Michael D. Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hospital · filed 1998-10-23(g)(1)

Carey was entitled to recover for what he would have earned absent the discharge, reduced by any compensation that he actually received and any additional amount that he would have received through reasonable efforts to mitigate the damages, with the employer bearing the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a plaintiff could have earned with reasonable diligence; the employer bears the burden of showing a failure to mitigate.

Daneshvar v. Graphic Technology, Inc. · filed 1998-12-23(g)(1)

Clearly, plaintiff had an obligation to use reasonable methods to mitigate his damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (amounts earnable with reasonable diligence reduces back pay allowable); ... Moreover, the employer (here, defendant) bears the burden of showing a lack of reasonable diligence. ... Defendant has not met that burden here.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence.

Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, Local 201 · filed 1999-03-30(g)

Under Title VII, "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). This creates a statutory duty to minimize damages on the part of Title VII claimants, which requires them "to use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment." Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay as equitable relief for Title VII violations, but a plaintiff who does not prevail on her retaliation claim is not entitled to it.

Sanchez v. Elec · filed 1999-03-31(g)

Back pay is permitted to provide equitable relief for Title VII violations. See id. at 791-92 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)). Inasmuch as plaintiff did not prevail on her retaliation claims, she would not be entitled to back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay against a party named only in a later EEOC charge to begin two years before the first charge when that party shared an identity of interest with a party named in it.

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' International Union of North America · filed 1999-04-30(g)

Section 706(g) of Title VII, as amended in 1972, provides that “[bjack pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Because of this identity of interest, LIU-NA could have been sued under the plaintiffs’ first EEOC charge. Accordingly, then, the plaintiffs’ second EEOC charge was not needed and we will not limit plaintiffs’ Title VII damages by the date of this second, unnecessary charge.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to award back pay for unlawful employment discrimination, reduced by the plaintiff’s interim earnings.

Chadwick v. District of Columbia · filed 1999-07-13(g)(1)

The granting of back pay is specifically enumerated as an available means of achieving this goal. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... After subtracting the $3000 plaintiff earned in the interim as mitigated damages, the Court concludes that plaintiff should be awarded $63,980.61 in back pay, plus prejudgment interest.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence, assessed in light of the claimant’s circumstances.

Finical v. Collections Unlimited, Inc. · filed 1999-08-19(g)(1)

This evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Plaintiff complied with her duty to mitigate damages by using reasonable diligence to maintain subsequent employment. Therefore, Defendants are not entitled to a summary judgment ruling that Plaintiffs damages following her resignation from Johnson Freight Lines are limited to the difference between what she would have earned working for Defendant and what she would have earned working for Johnson Freight Lines.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits backpay liability to the two years before a charge is filed with the Commission.

Madison v. IBP, Inc. · filed 1999-12-28(g)(1)

Regarding backpay, this position is contrary to the clear statutory language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l), which states, “back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission.”

Section 2000e-5(g) provides a presumptive equitable remedy of back pay that intervening physical limitations do not automatically defeat.

Salveson v. Douglas County · filed 2000-03-28(g)

Back pay is an equitable remedy and is awarded at the discretion of the trial court. ... However, we reject the contention that intervening circumstances eliminate the presumption in favor of awarding back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not treat Social Security and Veterans’ Administration disability benefits as interim earnings that reduce back pay.

Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc. · filed 2000-03-31(g)(1)

In this court’s opinion, SSA and VA disability benefits are not “interim earnings” as contemplated under the above-cited provision of Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits up to two years of back pay before an administrative charge, but recovery in a continuing violation case is limited to the applicable charge-filing period.

Leyen v. Wellmark, Inc. · filed 2000-04-18(g)

There is some appeal to this argument, especially since § 2000e-5(g) vests discretionary power in the district court to award Title VII plaintiffs back pay at most two years prior to the date of administrative filing. However, notwithstanding authorization by Congress to grant up to two years in back pay, this Court is constrained by judicial holdings from the Eighth Circuit which expressly limit back pay recovery in continuing violation cases to the statute of limitations period.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) treats back pay and front pay as equitable remedies ordinarily determined by the judge.

Pals v. Schepel Buick & Gmc Truck, Inc. · filed 2000-07-14(g)(1)

Back pay and front pay are equitable remedies under § 706(g)(1) and therefore matters for the judge even after § 1981a(c), as the only published appellate decisions on point conclude.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not allow back pay or front pay for a period when an employee suffers no income loss caused by discrimination.

Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co. · filed 2000-09-14(g)(1)

Absent any injury, an award of back pay or front pay is plainly unwarranted under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for a plaintiff who resigns only if she proves constructive discharge.

Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick · filed 2000-09-19(g)

In Derr, this court explicitly held that the equitable remedy of back pay is only available under § 2000e-5(g) when the plaintiff has demonstrated that she was constructively discharged.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence; failure to mitigate does not defeat the claim.

Capizzi v. County of Placer · filed 2001-03-26(g)

First, mitigation is measured by reasonable diligence, and second, a failure to mitigate works a reduction in back pay, but does not defeat the claim.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to offset employer-funded benefits against back pay when the award still makes the employee whole and deters future violations.

Szedlock v. Tenet · filed 2001-04-11(g)(1)

Thus, an offset is proper only where, as here, the back pay awarded fully compensates the plaintiff for her lost wages and serves to deter future violations of the Rehabilitation Act. Because these goals are satisfied here, an offset of the CIA’s contributions is appropriate.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay as equitable relief even when the jury awards no damages for losses it was allowed to consider.

Anderson v. Richardson · filed 2001-05-30(g)

Title VII provides in part that a court may order “affirmative relief,” which may include awards of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Since the only adverse employment action at issue was the 1997 10-day suspension, the jury’s finding that defendant retaliated against plaintiff justifies an award of backpay for that suspension.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a trial court to consider a request for front and back pay as equitable relief for a Title VII violation.

Galindo v. City of Roma Police · filed 2001-07-09(g)

Given the Supreme Court’s holding in Albemarle that trial judges should address equitable remedies such as front and back pay under 2000e-5(g), the magistrate judge should have considered Galindo’s request.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits equitable relief for unlawful employment discrimination, and courts should presume that back pay will be awarded once discrimination is found.

Salveson v. Douglas County · filed 2001-07-10(g)(1)

In 1972, § 706(g) was amended to allow courts to award "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... Once a court finds unlawful discrimination, it is to presume that back pay should be awarded.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back and front pay for an employee who leaves because of discrimination only if the employee establishes an actual or constructive discharge.

Hertzberg, Julie K. v. SRAM Corporation · filed 2001-08-02(g)

The requirement that a plaintiff establish a discriminatory discharge in order to receive lost pay precludes such a recovery for Ms. Hertzberg in the present case.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence to reduce back pay.

Bush v. Roadway Express, Inc. · filed 2001-07-12(g)(1)

Second, Title VII .provides that “interim earnings”' — including amounts earned in mitigation of damages as well as amounts not earned because the plaintiff failed to mitigate — must be deducted from any back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits the court to award back pay as equitable relief, which is outside the statutory damages cap.

Rahn v. Junction City Foundry, Inc. · filed 2001-07-20(g)

The back pay award of $2,030, however, constitutes equitable relief and thus is not subject to the statutory cap.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires an employee to mitigate backpay damages; an unreasonable rejection of an unconditional reinstatement offer ends the accrual of backpay.

Robles v. Cox & Co., Inc. · filed 2001-07-31(g)(1)

This court finds a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff has rejected defendant’s offer of reinstatement. Therefore, this court denies defendant’s motion for summary judgment tolling defendant’s backpay liability.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence; an employer need not prove comparable work was available if the claimant made little or no effort to find it.

Wagner v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc. · filed 2001-08-27(g)(1)

Although an employer ordinarily must come forward with evidence that comparable work is available, that is not the case if the plaintiff makes little or no effort to seek employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires mitigation of back pay, and an employee’s voluntary departure does not by itself bar recovery.

Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center, Inc. · filed 2002-05-16(g)

Instead, we simply apply the general statutory duty located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) to mitigate employer damages. ... In this ease, Dennis reasonably mitigated Colleton’s damages even though she left its employ.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII plaintiff to mitigate back-pay damages; voluntarily leaving the employer does not automatically bar back pay.

Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Medical Center · filed 2002-05-16(g)

Instead, we simply apply the general statutory duty located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) to mitigate employer damages.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits backpay for Title VII violations; post-termination backpay covers the period between termination and an offer of reinstatement.

De La Rosa v. Northern Harvest Furniture · filed 2002-09-04(g)

Similarly, Title VII provides that “the court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982 ed.). ... When appropriate, post-termination backpay would cover the period after an employee is terminated and before the employer offers reinstatement., See Del Rey, 976 F.2d at 1117. ... The only period for which immigration status might potentially be relevant is the period from March 16, 2001, to August 24, 2001.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides back pay for a prevailing Title VII plaintiff; a back pay award can support punitive damages even when the jury awards no compensatory damages.

Corti v. Storage Technology · filed 2002-09-18(g)

A prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII case is entitled to back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits recoverable back pay to the two years before a discrimination charge is filed.

Tomita v. University of Kansas Medical Center · filed 2002-10-08(g)(1)

Title VII, however, limits his recovery of back pay to a period no longer than two years before he filed his charge of discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence but does not prescribe a method for calculating that reduction.

Godinet v. Management & Training Corp. · filed 2003-01-07(g)

Note 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) endorses neither the periodic nor aggregate approach, providing only that “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” The goal of the statute is to make the plaintiff whole.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires overtime earnings that would have been unavailable absent discrimination to be deducted from Title VII back pay.

Mendoza v. City of New Orleans · filed 2003-02-17(g)

In calculating back pay under Title VII, “[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Setting aside whether the officers chose to work overtime, the distinction is immaterial to the analysis. Just as in Bing and Chesser, it would have been impossible for the officers to have earned the disputed wages absent the discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a reduction in back pay when the employer shows that substantially equivalent work was available and the employee did not seek it with reasonable diligence.

Van Le v. University of Pennsylvania · filed 2003-03-04(g)(1)

Damages in a Title VII case may be reduced by the jury, provided that the defendant-employer makes certain showings.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay and front pay even when a plaintiff receives no compensatory damages.

Black v. Waterman · filed 2003-03-27(g)

As relevant here, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g) provides that a plaintiff who establishes employment discrimination “may” obtain equitable relief including reinstatement and back pay. ... Second, courts may award back pay and front pay even though the plaintiff recovers no compensatory damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay when discrimination prevents an employee from maintaining other employment despite reasonable diligence.

Hare v. H&R Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-05-22(g)(1)

But given that the District Court reasonably could have found that the harassment Hare suffered at H & R was the “primary cause” of her psychological condition and the fact that Hare attempted suicide in October 2000, the Court also reasonably could have concluded that as the direct result of H & R’s discrimination and retaliation Hare could not with “reasonable diligence” maintain other employment in the fall of 2000. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). As a result, the Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding back pay for this period.

Section 2000e-5(g) leaves back pay to the court’s discretion; an advisory jury verdict does not control the award.

Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services, Inc. · filed 2003-07-23(g)

Because the jury’s verdict on back pay is only advisory, the court must make its own determination of plaintiffs losses and award back pay, if any, accordingly. Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit decision in Godinet, this court will calculate plaintiffs back pay loss on a periodic basis.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows back pay for a Title VII violation without offsetting income the employee could have earned while still working for the defendant.

Leidel v. Ameripride Services, Inc. · filed 2003-07-24(g)(1)

Defendant is not entitled to any offset for earnings from plaintiffs secondary income inasmuch as plaintiff proved to the Court’s satisfaction that he could have achieved these earnings in addition to any earnings he could have made had he not been fired by defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) generally bars back pay for an applicant refused employment for a reason other than discrimination.

Green v. Joy Cone Co. · filed 2003-08-21(g)(2)(A)

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A), the Court generally may not order the grant of back pay to an individual who “was refused employment ... for any reason other than discrimination.” Since Ms. Green is not claiming to have been discriminated against on account of a disability, the issuance of back pay is inappropriate under the law.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay and retroactive promotion when discrimination affected a promotion unless the employer proves by clear and convincing evidence that the employee would not have been selected anyway.

Stephenson v. Simon · filed 1976-11-12(g)

The Court of Appeals for this circuit has clearly held that the remedy which plaintiff seeks is only available to her if she would have been promoted but for the fact that she was the victim of sex discrimination. Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C.Cir. 1976), interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). ... Defendant’s interpretation of the mandate of Day v. Mathews, supra, is clearly contrary to the plain holding of the Court of Appeals, which stated that “back pay and retroactive promotion should be awarded unless the Secretary, by clear and convincing evidence, carries his burden of proving that, even absent the admitted discrimination, [plaintiff] still would not have been selected.” 530 F.2d at 1086. (Emphasis added). Certainly the defendant has not sustained this burden of proof. ... Therefore, Day compels the Court to award plaintiff the remedy she seeks — back pay and retroactive promotion to GS-12 status.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a back pay claimant to make a reasonable, good faith effort to find other employment.

Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital · filed 1982-08-18(g)

Such efforts have been held to be necessary in order for a back pay claimant to meet the reasonable diligence standard of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1)’s back pay remedy may be decided by a jury in an ADA retaliation case when the parties impliedly consent.

Rhoads v. Federal Deposit Insurance · filed 2003-09-30(g)(1)

Even if back pay is rightly regarded as an equitable remedy, the court holds that the FDIC impliedly consented to have the jury decide the issue of back pay. In Title VII and ADA cases where numerous types of monetary relief are sought, juries frequently determine back pay awards.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) allows Title VII back pay to accrue from up to two years before an EEOC charge, but only for a period when pay discrimination occurred.

Lovell v. BBNT Solutions, LLC · filed 2004-02-06(g)(1)

By contrast, the Title VII back pay period is longer; under Title VII, back pay liability can accrue from a date up to two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

A claimant’s discharge for misconduct from later employment does not permanently cut off the possibility of back pay.

Johnson v. Spencer Press of Maine, Inc. · filed 2004-04-16(g)(1)

The district court was correct that once Johnson was fired from Hannaford for misconduct, he was no longer mitigating his damages, as was required. But that did not mean that the possibility of back pay was permanently cut off.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) treats back and front pay as equitable remedies under the ADA, requiring a sufficient factual basis for an award.

Bartee v. Michelin North America, Inc. · filed 2004-06-29(g)(1)

A district court’s decision to award back or front pay under the ADA is an equitable one. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Relief “may include . . . back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate[.]”); McCue v. Kansas, 165 F.3d 784, 791-92 (10th Cir. 1999) (interpreting back and front pay to be equitable remedies under § 2000e-5(g)(1) in a Title VII case).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires back pay to be reduced by a plaintiff’s interim earnings.

Vaughn v. Sabine County · filed 2004-07-28(g)(1)

The district court must reduce an award for back pay by a plaintiff’s interim earnings such as Holman’s earnings in 2001.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) generally permits back pay for a successful Title VII claimant, subject to the claimant’s duty to make a reasonable, good-faith effort to mitigate damages.

Richardson v. Tricom Pictures & Productions, Inc. · filed 2004-08-24(g)(1)

While a successful Title VII claimant, such as Richardson,-is generally entitled to an award of back pay, the claimant must make a reasonable and good-faith effort to mitigate her damages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence; a failure to mitigate does not automatically eliminate all back pay.

Caufield v. Center Area School District · filed 2005-05-20(g)(1)

Similarly, we cannot agree with the District Court that an appellant’s failure to mitigate her monetary losses ipso facto bars all monetary relief in the form of back-pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) treats back pay and front pay as equitable remedies.

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No. 04-2196-Cv · filed 2005-07-20(g)

As the Seventh Circuit has said, however, it is manifest that, under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act, both front pay and back pay are equitable remedies.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) provides back pay as equitable relief for Title VII discrimination.

Fogg v. Gonzales · filed 2005-07-25(g)(1)

Back pay is a form of equitable relief under Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1), and is not subject to the cap on compensatory damages.

Back pay is calculated by period, so higher earnings from a later job do not reduce back pay for an earlier period of unemployment.

Lopez v. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. · filed 2006-04-13(g)(1)

Her “excess” earnings, by virtue of her ability to obtain a higher paying job some seven months subsequent to her termination from Aramark are not to be subtracted or utilized to reduce her back pay award during her period of unemployment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to award back pay as a discretionary remedy for discrimination.

Rudebusch v. Arizona · filed 2006-06-07(g)

Title VII provides for recovery of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, back pay is not an automatic or mandatory remedy, but rather one that the Court may invoke.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not permit back pay for a hostile work environment claim alone without a successful constructive discharge claim.

Spencer v. Wal Mart Stores Inc · filed 2006-11-22(g)(1)

We hold that a successful hostile work environment claim alone, without a successful constructive discharge claim, is insufficient to support a back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) makes back pay available to successful Title VII claimants, and the ADA extends that remedy to successful ADA employment discrimination claimants.

Burris v. Richards Paving, Inc. · filed 2007-02-08(g)(1)

“Back pay is available to a successful Title VII plaintiff under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” ... Therefore, because “[a] plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under the ADA has the same remedies as provided by the 1964 Act,” ... back pay is also available to those bringing successful claims under the ADA.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by amounts a claimant could earn with reasonable diligence, and the employer bears the burden of proving a failure to mitigate.

Hudson v. Chertoff · filed 2007-02-12(g)(1)

Consequently, the Court finds that the plaintiff was not reasonably diligent in seeking substantially equivalent employment. However, because the plaintiff was on leave status due to his disability and the defendant’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff is entitled to full pay for the period between October 21, 2002 through the date of termination, February 26, 2005, and back pay reduced by the amount of $47,030 for the period between February 26, 2006, and entry of the judgment in this action.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to award lost wages for the period between a jury verdict and reinstatement to make an employee whole.

Harding v. Cianbro Corp. · filed 2007-05-02(g)(1)

It seems plain that the Court has the authority to order recovery for the period that the jury could not anticipate, whether the award is characterized as back pay or front pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a Title VII class action complaint to seek back pay for class members injured by the employer’s discriminatory practice.

Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated · filed 2008-02-06(g)(1)

In addition to praying for declaratory and injunctive relief, the complaint may also seek back pay on behalf of individual class members who have been injured by the employer’s discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g) gives courts broad equitable power to remedy employment discrimination, including through back pay.

Tse v. UBS Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2008-02-19(g)

Title VII provides that a court finding unlawful discrimination “may enjoin [the discrimination] ... and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement ... with or without back pay or any equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Under Title VII, the courts have broad equitable powers to remedy employment discrimination.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits promotion and back pay as equitable relief for a plaintiff denied promotion through retaliation.

O'SULLIVAN v. City of Chicago · filed 2008-03-28(g)

Title VII vests district courts with broad discretion to award “appropriate” equitable relief to remedy unlawful discrimination. ... In light of the absence of any evidence that a court-ordered promotion of Lieutenant Lipman would cause hostility or friction in the work environment, promotion to captain is the appropriate remedy.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) gives courts broad equitable authority to award compensation for the increased tax burden caused by a lump-sum back pay award.

Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc. · filed 2009-01-30(g)(1)

Congress armed the courts with broad equitable powers to effectuate this “make whole” remedy. ... We hold that a district court may, pursuant to its broad equitable powers ... granted by the ADA, award a prevailing employee an additional sum of money to compensate for the increased tax burden a back pay award may create.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits employer-paid workers’ compensation benefits to be deducted from a Title VII back pay award.

McKenna v. City of Philadelphia · filed 2009-07-07(g)(1)

The Court will accordingly deduct the amount Carnation received in worker’s compensation from his back pay award.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits back pay to the two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Port Authority Police Asian Jade Society of New York & New Jersey Inc. v. Port Authority · filed 2010-01-14(g)(1)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) provides that back pay cannot be awarded from a date earlier than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC. The plaintiffs’ EEOC charge was filed on January 31, 2001. Two years prior to that date is January 31, 1999. The jury’s back pay award for three plaintiffs exactly matches the back pay plaintiffs’ expert calculated would be due had those plaintiffs been promoted on October 31, 1999. October 31, 1999 is within the two-year statutory period.

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to the two years before an employee files a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

Grant v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville · filed 2010-07-22(g)

These backpay awards are subject to the two-year limitations, measured from the date of each Plaintiffs original charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).

Section 2000e-5(e)(3)(B) permits recovery of back pay for the two years before a discrimination charge when pay during that period reflects an earlier discriminatory decision or procedure.

Randall v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORP. · filed 2010-09-22(e)(3)(B)

Under current law, regardless of the time the discriminatory decision occurred or the discriminatory procedure was adopted, a plaintiff is entitled to recover back-pay for the proceeding two years prior to the date she filed her charge of discrimination, so long as her pay during those two years continued to reflect the employer’s discriminatory decision or procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B). Plaintiffs in the case before us filed their first charge of discrimination on August 5, 2005. Consequently, we hold that Randall and Pepmeier are permitted to seek to recover their back-pay entitlements dating back to August 6, 2003, so long as they succeed in proving that during this two-year period they received lower pay than similarly situated male counterparts as a result of their employers’ prior discriminatory acts.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a Title VII plaintiff who was not terminated to prove constructive discharge to receive front pay or back pay.

Brown v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-03-03(g)(1)

Initially, this Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that this Circuit does not require a successful claim or finding of constructive discharge in order to award equitable relief to a Title VII plaintiff who is not terminated from her employment with the defendant. Proof of constructive discharge is indeed required under these circumstances to support an award of front pay or back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for unlawful employment practices, subject to mitigation; an employer disputing back pay must show available substantially equivalent work and a lack of reasonable diligence in seeking it.

Ayala v. SUMMIT CONSTRUCTORS, INC. · filed 2011-04-25(g)(1)

In this case, Cruz is entitled to back pay to make him whole for Summit’s unlawful retaliation, because of which he was not returned to work on the two-and-a-half month project for which Roberts sought to rehire him. Although Summit put forth evidence in an attempt to establish that Cruz failed to mitigate his damages, the Court finds that the company did not meet its burden of establishing that substantially equivalent positions were available to Cruz and that he failed to use reasonable care and diligence in seeking those positions.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to reduce back pay by amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Gryder v. L. Fred Dennin, III · filed 2011-05-31(g)(1)

The district court did not abuse its considerable discretion by awarding appellant $923,656.08 in back pay and deducting $20,000.00 per year in mitigation for what he could have earned by working part time after his termination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes back pay for Title VII discrimination, but a plaintiff who resigns cannot recover back pay after departure without a viable constructive discharge claim.

Lewis v. District of Columbia · filed 2011-06-14(g)(1)

In the absence of a viable constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff is barred from recovering back pay for the period following her resignation from the DCRA and the court grants summary judgment to the defendant on this aspect of the plaintiffs request for relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for employment discrimination, but back pay after resignation requires a viable constructive-discharge claim.

Lewis v. Fenty · filed 2011-06-14(g)(1)

In the absence of a viable constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff is barred from recovering back pay for the period following her resignation from the DCRA and the court grants summary judgment to the defendant on this aspect of the plaintiff’s request for relief.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) bars backpay when the employer shows that it took the adverse action for a reason other than discrimination.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes · filed 2011-06-20(g)(2)(A)

But if the employer can show that it took an adverse employment action against an employee for any reason other than discrimina tion, the court cannot order the “hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any backpay.” §2000e–5(g)(2)(A).

Section 2000e-5(g) treats back pay as equitable relief, with its availability and amount decided by the court.

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Autozone, Inc. · filed 2011-11-08(g)

Because back pay is a form of equitable relief, whether back pay is appropriate and the amount of any such award are questions for the court, not for the jury.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a failure to mitigate to reduce a back pay award, but does not make the plaintiff ineligible for back pay.

Hemphill v. City of Wilmington · filed 2011-12-20(g)(1)

Both Title VII and the cases interpreting it permit only a reduction in back pay if a plaintiff has failed to make reasonable efforts to seek substantially equivalent employment.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay against a retaliating former employer based on wages the employee would have earned with another employer.

Nassar v. University of Texas South-Western Medical Center · filed 2012-03-08(g)

Section 2000e-5(g) states that back pay is “payable by the employer . . . responsible for the unlawful employment practice.” It does not require that the employer liable for back pay be the same entity for whom the plaintiff would have worked had he not suffered unlawful retaliation.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits backpay liability to the two years before the relevant EEOC charge was filed.

United States v. City of New York · filed 2012-03-08(g)(1)

Employers’ liability for backpay extends to two years before the filing of the relevant EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).

Section 2000e-5 makes back pay available as equitable relief to a prevailing Rehabilitation Act plaintiff through its incorporation into that Act’s remedies.

Schmidt v. Solis · filed 2012-09-18(g)(1)

Back pay is an element of equitable relief that is specifically available to a prevailing plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) precludes reinstatement and back pay when the plaintiff fails to establish that discrimination or retaliation caused the termination.

Lewis v. Donley · filed 2012-11-13(g)(2)(A)

This finding is not clearly erroneous, and precludes the award of reinstatement or back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A) (plaintiff must establish termination was not for “any reason other than” discrimination/retaliation).

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay for a successful Title VII plaintiff without a finding of constructive discharge, subject to a duty to mitigate damages.

Bennett v. CSX Transportation, Inc. · filed 2012-12-05(g)

The Fourth Circuit applies instead only “the general statutory duty located at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) to mitigate employer damages.” Id. As back pay is awarded to successful Title VII plaintiffs as a general rule, Id., and in light of the foregoing standard, the Court properly awarded back pay to plaintiff even in the absence of a jury verdict on constructive discharge.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay, reduced by interim earnings; when calculated annually, excess earnings in one year do not reduce back pay owed for another year.

Jean-Baptiste v. District of Columbia · filed 2013-07-19(g)(1)

Thus, where Jean-Baptiste earned more in a given year than her estimated back pay, the excess will not reduce her award in any other year.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) does not categorically bar post-resignation backpay when an employee was not constructively discharged, but the employee must mitigate damages.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bloomberg L.P. · filed 2014-04-28(g)(1)

Accordingly, the Court holds that Title VII, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL do not categorically bar post-resignation backpay for plaintiffs who have not been constructively discharged.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires backpay to be reduced by earnings the employee could not have received in the position unlawfully denied.

Oakley v. City of Memphis · filed 2014-05-19(g)(1)

Accordingly, the district court properly treated those earnings as “interim earnings” under § 2000e-5(g)(1) and deducted those wages from backpay.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings and amounts earnable with reasonable diligence; “net lost wages” does not mean wages after taxes.

Smith v. City of New Smyrna Beach · filed 2014-10-23(g)(1)

The statute that authorizes the payment of back-wages defines back-pay as the earnings denied as a result of the unlawful employment practice less any amounts that the plaintiff actually earned or could have earned through reasonable diligence.

Section 2000e-5, as incorporated into the ADA, commits back pay determinations to the court rather than the jury.

Isbell v. John Crane, Inc. · filed 2014-11-21(g)(1)

Both under the caselaw ... and by statute (see 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a), incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 into the ADA) issues of back pay under the ADA are committed to the court and not to the jury for determination.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes back pay as equitable relief for a successful Title VII retaliation claim.

Yonemoto v. McDonald · filed 2015-07-10(g)(1)

Pursuant to the parties’ Stipulation Regarding Damages, Doc. No. 197, the court finds that Plaintiff is entitled ,to equitable relief in the form of back pay pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) in the amount of $117.40, and compensatory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) in the amount of $1,750.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) limits back pay for a continuing unlawful employment practice to two years before the filing of an EEOC charge.

Howe v. City of Akron · filed 2015-09-17(g)(1)

In the case of a continuing unlawful employment practice, however, the statute limits back pay to no “more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the [EEOC].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a back-pay award to be reduced by interim earnings and amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Gracia v. Sigmatron International, Inc. · filed 2015-09-17(g)(1)

Any back-pay award to a.victim of discrimination must therefore be reduced by “[i]nterim earnings and amounts'earnable [by the employee] with reasonable diligence.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

Section 2000e-5(g) limits back pay to two years before an EEOC charge and reduces it by earnings obtained or reasonably obtainable during that period.

Overman v. City of East Baton Rouge · filed 2015-09-22(g)

Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC. Interim earnings or amounts that can be earned with reasonable diligence by the person discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires proven interim earnings to be deducted from a back-pay award.

Stragapede v. City of Evanston · filed 2015-08-28(g)(1)

This amount must be offset from any award of back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l).

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

Mathiason v. Aquinas Home Health Care, Inc. · filed 2016-05-16(g)(1)

In that time, plaintiff is responsible for mitigating her damages. “Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l). ... Subtracting plaintiffs post-discharge mitigation earnings from her total estimated earnings if she had remained employed at Aquinas results in total estimated wage losses following her constructive discharge in the amount of $54,126.48. The court finds this amount appropriate as an award of back pay.

Section 2000e-5(g) permits back pay measured by earnings the plaintiff would have received from another employer absent discrimination, with the responsible employer paying the award.

Szeinbach v. The Ohio State University · filed 2016-04-20(g)

Hence, even though the culpable employer itself must indeed pay the appropriate amount of back pay, nothing in the statute forecloses the possibility that the amount might depend on what the plaintiff could have earned while working for a different employer.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) requires a Title VII claimant to use reasonable diligence to find suitable work, and rejecting an unconditional offer of reinstatement can end backpay accrual.

Pineda v. Byrne Dairy, Inc. · filed 2016-08-31(g)(1)

An employee terminated in violation of Title VII has a duty to attempt to mitigate his damages by using reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l). Rejection of an unconditional offer of reinstatement forecloses any claim for future front pay and tolls the accrual of back-pay liability under Title VII.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits a court to adjust a back-pay award to compensate for increased income taxes caused by receiving the award in one lump sum; the adjustment is discretionary.

Arthur Clemens, Jr. v. Qwest Corp. · filed 2017-11-03(g)(1)

In so doing, we also agree with those courts that the decision to award a gross up—and the appropriate amount of any such gross up—is left to the sound discretion of the district court.

Section 2000e-5(g) requires a Title VII plaintiff to mitigate back pay losses, but the employer bears the burden of proving interim earnings or a lack of reasonable diligence.

Pittington v. Great Smoky Mountain Lumberjack Feud · filed 2018-01-24(g)

As noted above, plaintiffs in Title VII cases have a duty to mitigate damages, but “‘the burden of producing sufficient evidence to establish the amount of interim earnings or lack of diligence’ in mitigating damages” rests with the defendant.

Section 2000e-5(g) provides a backpay remedy that applies to ADA claims; an employee’s unnoticed administrative law-license suspension does not bar backpay she would have received absent discrimination.

Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. · filed 2018-02-21(g)

The ADA incorporates the procedures and remedies available under Title VII, including backpay under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). ... Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mosby-Meachem backpay for the time during which her law license was administratively suspended.

Section 2000e-5(g) allows a successful Title VII plaintiff to recover back pay and permits reinstatement to prevent future lost wages.

Briggs v. Temple Univ. · filed 2018-10-16(g)

The ADEA and Title VII allow a successful plaintiff to recover back pay damages and permit reinstatement to prevent future lost wages.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) permits back pay for overtime lost to discrimination, estimated from comparable employees’ overtime hours less overtime the plaintiff actually worked.

Robinson v. District of Columbia · filed 2018-10-23(g)(1)

Second, the Court addresses Mr. Robinson’s motion for back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1). ... Subtracting from this total Mr. Robinson’s 526 SEB overtime hours during this period, id. Ex. 2 & Ex. 4, the Court concludes that Mr. Robinson would have worked 828 ATEU overtime hours ... at his applicable overtime rates during the period at issue in 2014 and 2015.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) places the burden on the employer to show that a plaintiff failed to mitigate a back pay loss.

Robinson v. District of Columbia · filed 2019-05-08(g)(1)

While that duty falls on the plaintiff, the employer must show that the plaintiff failed to discharge it.

Section 2000e-5(g)(1) reduces back pay by interim earnings or amounts the claimant could have earned with reasonable diligence.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ecology Services, Inc. · filed 2020-03-19(g)(1)

I cannot conclude, as a matter of law or fact, that Hamilton’s efforts to obtain comparable employment were not reasonable, or that she was idle in searching for comparable work. Again, this is a jury question.